Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Scholion. On Whispering
(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 74; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book V, n. 72.)
I. Notion. Whispering is evil backbiting directed to dissolving true or ordered friendship. The whisperer and the detractor intend to take away reputation.
"They differ," says the Angelic Doctor, "in the end, because the detractor intends to blacken the reputation of the neighbor; whence he chiefly brings forward those evils about the neighbor from which the neighbor can be defamed, or at least his reputation diminished; but the whisperer intends to separate friendship ... and therefore the whisperer brings forward such evils about the neighbor as can move the mind of the hearer against him, according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus 28: 'A sinful man will trouble friends, and in the midst of those having peace he will cast enmity'" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 74, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, V, 72).
II. Morality. 1. Whispering is opposed to charity and is a grave sin; indeed it is graver than detraction and insult. It is opposed to charity because it deprives the neighbor of a good. It is a grave sin, which is clear both from Sacred Scripture,1 and from the fact that it deprives the neighbor of a grave good. It is graver than detraction and insult, because it takes away from the neighbor a good which is greater than reputation and honor (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 74, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, V, 72). Yet it can be venial on account of slightness of matter, for example if it is apt only to lessen friendship a little.
- To whispering there is added a sin of injustice if it is done by an unjust means, as by detraction or unjust revelation of a secret; but in that case it obliges to restitution properly so called, as is clear (St. Alphonsus, V, loc. cit.).
What if someone deprives another of acquired friendship, using a means not unjust in itself, for example by manifesting natural defects publicly known?
Response. Many judge that in the case there is sin only against charity, not against justice; neither by reason of the good, i.e. friendship, since it is not owed from justice; nor by reason of the means, for in this case this is not unjust. But with St. Alphonsus and others it seems it must be said that there is sin also against justice, because if there is question of a good already acquired, no one, as it seems, can without injustice cooperate in any way toward deprivation of the good; to deprive him of such a good belongs only to him who continuously and gratuitously grants that good (St. Alphonsus, V, loc. cit.).
1 Ecclus. VI, 15; XXVIII, 15; Rom. I, 29, 30.