A Cardinal Virtue

Fortitude

St. Thomas treats it at II-II, qq. 123-140. See also every passage on the topic page.

How the Authors Compare

Whether martyrdom requires actual death divides them. St. Thomas: “the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death” (II-II, q. 124, a. 4). Prümmer: St. John, preserved from the boiling oil, “is not to be called a martyr in the strict sense” (II, n. 623). Merkelbach agrees, while granting that those miraculously preserved “have the merit of martyrdom” (II, n. 908). Noldin and Wouters hold otherwise. Noldin: “It is not required that death actually follow,” and St. John “underwent true martyrdom, but not completed martyrdom” (n. 280). Wouters: “according to the more common opinion it is not demanded that death in fact follow” (n. 418). Bontempi holds with St. Thomas: “for the perfect notion of Martyrdom it is required that one endure death for Christ” (On martyrdom, n. 21).
They name the opposed vices from different sides. For St. Thomas, timidity is “by excess of fear” (II-II, q. 126, a. 2). Noldin follows the passions and so counts four: fearlessness and cowardice by defect, timidity and rashness by excess (n. 277). Merkelbach measures against firmness instead, so timidity is the vice “by defect” and fearlessness the vice “by excess” (II, n. 912, n. 913). Prümmer makes timidity and cowardice one vice under two names (II, n. 638). Vermeersch sets “timidity and sloth” by defect and “fearlessness that loves dangers and immoderate daring” by excess (n. 713).
The same split recurs under patience. Wouters and Merkelbach put impatience by defect and insensibility by excess (n. 428, II, n. 926). Prümmer calls insensibility the vice “By defect” because it lacks sadness, and impatience the vice “By excess (of sadness, but by defect of endurance)” (II, n. 641). The authors agree on the vices and differ only in what they measure.
All five give the same four virtues as both integral and potential parts. Wouters follows St. Thomas closely: “these four parts” are integral when they “are restricted to the proper matter of fortitude”, and become distinct virtues when referred to lesser matters (n. 419).
Noldin writes “perseverance or constancy” as one part (n. 278). St. Thomas says the two “differ as to those things which make it difficult to persist in good” (II-II, q. 137, a. 3), and Merkelbach follows (II, n. 930).
Prümmer keeps the presumption opposed to magnanimity apart from the presumption against hope: it “is not to be confused with presumption which is contrary to hope” (II, n. 639). Merkelbach draws the same line (II, n. 918).
Whether martyrdom gives first grace by the very work done. Bontempi reports Soto, Bellarmine, Suarez, Lessius and many others holding that martyrdom, “by privilege and the special promise of Christ”, justifies like a sacrament (Whether martyrdom confers first gr, n. 1), and St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales and St. Thomas, with Vasquez, holding that it does not, so that contrition is needed in one in mortal sin; he takes the second: “Martyrdom has not the power of conferring first grace ex opere operato” (Whether martyrdom confers first gr, n. 4). Prümmer: in adults martyrdom needs “at least” attrition (II, n. 624), and for infants it works “as though ex opere operato” (II, n. 624); Noldin: “perfect contrition is not required, but that attrition suffices”, its effect coming from the work done, as in baptism (n. 281).

What It Is

With Tully: “Therefore Tully says (Rhet. ii), that "fortitude is deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils." On this sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 2
Defined: “Fortitude is a cardinal virtue by which the irascible appetite (and the will) is so strengthened that it does not desist from pursuing an arduous good even on account of the greatest dangers to bodily life.”	Prümmer II, n. 620In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 900; Wouters n. 416; Noldin n. 275; Marc n. 405
Vermeersch, with St. Thomas: “Fortitude is a virtue of the irascible appetite, "restraining fears and moderating daring."”	Vermeersch n. 707
The word also names a condition of every virtue: “First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 900; Noldin n. 275
So that “he cannot be called simply brave who indeed tolerates all the annoyances of this life, but is not prepared to endure death”	Noldin n. 275

Its Place Among the Virtues

Third of the cardinal virtues: “Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance fourth, and after these the other virtues.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 12In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 416; Bontempi Whether fortitude is a virtue, and, n. 24
“fortitude holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 12
Measured by goodness, not difficulty: “Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to its goodness rather than its difficulty.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 12, ad 2
Below justice: “Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker."”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 12, ad 3
A cardinal virtue: “Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 11In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 905
“Nevertheless even as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 2, ad 2

Its Matter, Subject and Acts

Its Matter
Fear and daring: “Therefore fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 3In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 276; Merkelbach II, n. 903
“Hence fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those passions.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 3, ad 2
Dangers of death above all: “Moreover it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 4In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 417
“because he that stands firm against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 4
In battle, taken broadly: “Accordingly it must be granted that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 5In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 709
And every danger borne for virtue: “thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear of deadly infection”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 5
Its formal object: “The formal object is natural honesty, which shines forth in the moderation of fear and daring”	Noldin n. 276In nearly the same words: Marc n. 405
Its Subject
In the irascible appetite: “The subject of each fortitude is the irascible appetite, insofar, however, as it is subject to the will.”	Prümmer II, n. 620In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 899
“Therefore, although properly speaking fortitude resides in the irascible appetite, nevertheless it directly exercises its overflowing influence upon the will.”	Prümmer II, n. 620
Its Acts
To endure and to attack, enduring chief: “Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 6In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 904; Marc n. 405; Noldin n. 276
Why: “For it is more difficult to repress fear than to moderate daring”	Prümmer II, n. 622In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 708
Its delight: “Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not to be sad."”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 8
Sudden dangers prove it: “Wherefore if a person without forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 9
Anger as its instrument: “Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but not immoderate anger.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 10
False likenesses: “Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 123, a. 1, ad 2In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 714

Its Highest Act: Martyrdom

An act of fortitude, commanded by charity: “Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 124, a. 2, ad 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 909; Bontempi On martyrdom, n. 12
It is “testimony to Christian truth through the endurance of bodily death”	Prümmer II, n. 623
“By the name martyrdom, in ecclesiastical usage, is understood the real testimony given to the faith by death endured.”	Noldin n. 279In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 908
Death: “Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 124, a. 4
Its conditions: “Conditions of true martyrdom are: a. death inflicted; b. death inflicted in hatred of the faith; c. death patiently endured.”	Noldin n. 280
For any virtue referred to God: “it follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may be the cause of martyrdom”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 124, a. 5, ad 3In nearly the same words: Bontempi On martyrdom, n. 23
Not only from the motive of fortitude: “for true martyrdom, theologically accepted, it is not required that the martyr undergo death from the motive itself of fortitude”	Noldin n. 279
The most perfect act: “Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of obedience, namely obedience unto death”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 124, a. 3, ad 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2442
Its effect: “Martyrdom, because it is an imitation of the very passion of Christ, justifies the sinner, whether baptized or not baptized, whether adult or little child”	Merkelbach II, n. 910In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 624
Innocent III: “He does injury to a martyr who prays for a martyr”	Prümmer II, n. 624
Not to be sought: “Regularly it is not lawful to offer oneself freely for martyrdom”	McHugh-Callan n. 2445In nearly the same words: Bontempi On martyrdom, n. 18

The Subjective Parts

None: “But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 128, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 625; Noldin n. 278; Marc n. 406; Wouters n. 419
“Whence fortitude is called a most specific species, because it has no other species of virtues under itself.”	Prümmer II, n. 625

The Integral and Potential Parts

“if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof” (II-II, q. 128.)

The same four, integral or potential: “Accordingly if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them there can be no fortitude”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 128, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 625
Four: “Four parts are enumerated by St. Augustine from Cicero: confidence (fiducia), or magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance.”	Prümmer II, n. 625In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 278; Marc n. 406
“Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 128, a. 1
As potential parts: “By this name are designated various virtues which, in a less difficult matter, keep the soul upright and persevering in good.”	Vermeersch n. 712
Not Aristotle's five likenesses: “The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, they differ as to motive”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 128, a. 1, ad 7

What Each Annexed Virtue Is

Each entry opens the passage. Noldin names patience and perseverance without defining them here.

Magnanimity
Magnanimity: “Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 129, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 626; Merkelbach II, n. 915; Wouters n. 420
“Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 129, a. 1, ad 3
In all the just, its acts in great men: “Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 129, a. 3, ad 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 917
With humility: “Magnanimity is not opposed even to the most perfect humility.”	Prümmer II, n. 628
Confidence and security: “To this virtue pertain confidence or trust and security.”	Marc n. 406
Magnificence
Magnificence: “The second potential part of fortitude is the virtue of magnificence, which is a virtue moderating the love of money, lest the great expenditures by which great external works ought to be made be impeded.”	Prümmer II, n. 630In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 921
Above all for God's worship: “And therefore magnificence is joined to holiness, because its principal effect is ordered to religion or holiness.”	Prümmer II, n. 630
Even in the poor: “but according to affection and preparation of soul, and consequently also according to merit, this virtue can also exist in the poor”	Prümmer II, n. 631
Not liberality: “The first difference is that liberality extends to all operations which concern money, namely, to expenditures, receipts, and gifts; but magnificence concerns only expenditures, that is, outlays.”	Prümmer II, n. 632
Patience and Longanimity
Patience: “a virtue by which someone so endures present evils (especially those inflicted by others) that he is not inordinately saddened by them”	Prümmer II, n. 633In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 923; Wouters n. 426; McHugh-Callan n. 2453
Its subject: “It is in the concupiscible appetite, because it is concerned with sadness, but it imitates the mode of fortitude”	Merkelbach II, n. 923In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 633
“Patience is not the greatest of the virtues.”	Merkelbach II, n. 924In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2454; Bontempi On patience, n. 14
Longanimity: “for longanimity is the virtue by which someone tolerates annoyances arising from the fact that he tends toward some good to be possessed after a long time”	Prümmer II, n. 635In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 927
Perseverance and Constancy
Perseverance: “a habit inclining one to persist in the exercise of the virtues according as right reason dictates, notwithstanding the annoyance arising from the duration of the work”	Prümmer II, n. 637In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 429
Not the gift of final perseverance: “for this gift of perseverance is not a virtue, but a special assistance of divine grace which cannot be merited even by the justified”	Prümmer II, n. 637In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 928
Constancy: “Constancy (standvastigheid) is a habit by which we firmly persist in the good against difficulties which arise from any exterior impediments whatsoever.”	Merkelbach II, n. 930In nearly the same words: Bontempi On perseverance, n. 13

The Precepts of Fortitude

In the Divine Law: “wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind to God”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 140, a. 1
Bontempi, after St. Thomas: “We do not have affirmative precepts of fortitude in particular”	Bontempi On the precepts of fortitude, n. 1
Yet commanded: “therefore it was necessary to give explicit precepts concerning fortitude”	Merkelbach II, n. 932In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2458
“The New Law commands courage before spiritual foes”	McHugh-Callan n. 2458

The Gift of Fortitude

The gift: “A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 139, a. 1In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 710
“The gift of fortitude infused by the Holy Spirit is always joined with the supernatural virtue of fortitude.”	Prümmer II, n. 621
“A special gift of the Holy Spirit is necessary for conferring supernatural fortitude, because the virtue of fortitude does not suffice.”	Merkelbach II, n. 931
“The gift of fortitude disposes man to overcome extraordinary difficulties which stand in the way of the exercise of virtues.”	Noldin n. 33
“It corresponds to the cardinal virtue of fortitude and perfects it”	Wouters n. 480
Needed: “A special gift of the Holy Spirit is necessary for conferring supernatural fortitude, because the virtue of fortitude does not suffice.”	Merkelbach II, n. 931
“Hence the soul is better disposed by the gift of fortitude toward every arduous thing than by any moral virtue.”	Bontempi On the gift of fortitude, n. 1
Its beatitude: “The fourth beatitude, namely, "Blessed are they who thirst and hunger after justice," corresponds to the gift of fortitude”	Prümmer II, n. 621

The Vices Opposed to Fortitude and Its Annexed Virtues

Each entry opens the passage. Wouters takes up the vices only under the annexed virtues. Vainglory is also a capital vice, with its own page.

St. ThomasII-II, qq. 125-138	PrümmerII, nn. 638-642	MerkelbachII, nn. 911-929	Noldinnn. 277-278	Woutersnn. 422-431
Against fortitude
timidity	Timidity	timidity	Timidity	—
—	cowardice	sloth or cowardice	Cowardice	—
fearlessness	Fearlessness	Fearlessness	Fearlessness	—
daring	Daring or temerity	Daring or rashness	Rashness or daring	—
Against magnanimity
presumption	Presumption	Presumption	presumption	presumption
ambition	ambition	Ambition	ambition	ambition
vainglory	vainglory	Vainglory	vain glory	vain glory
pusillanimity	pusillanimity	pusillanimity	pusillanimity	pusillanimity
Against magnificence
meanness	parvificence	Parvificence	smallness in doing	parvificence
waste	inordinate sumptuousness	Consumption	excessive profusion	consumption
Against patience
—	impatience	impatience	—	impatience
—	insensibility or hardness	hardness	—	insensibility
Against perseverance
effeminacy	softness or inconstancy	softness of soul	—	softness
pertinacity	pertinacity	obstinacy	—	pertinacity

Each of these is set out by author, with its kinds and gravity, on The Vices Against Fortitude.

The Opposed Vices and Their Gravity

The first word of each author on the gravity of each vice; each is set out in full on the vices against fortitude.

Timidity
“This timidity of itself is only a venial sin; if, however, someone from inordinate fear transgresses a grave precept, this is a mortal sin, or rather the cause of a mortal sin.”	Prümmer II, n. 638In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 912; St. Thomas II-II, q. 125, a. 3; McHugh-Callan n. 2446; Bontempi On the vices opposed to fortitude, n. 3
Fearlessness
“Fearlessness is a sin insofar as it causes other sins, or insofar as from it a man sins against charity toward himself.”	Prümmer II, n. 638In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 913; McHugh-Callan n. 2446; Bontempi On the vices opposed to fortitude, n. 9
Daring
As fearlessness, by what it causes: “The same holds concerning the sinfulness of this vice as was said concerning fearlessness.”	Prümmer II, n. 638In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 913; McHugh-Callan n. 2446
Presumption
“It is of itself a venial sin, because it is not against charity; accidentally it becomes mortal by reason of the cause, as if it proceeded from culpable error in faith, or by reason of the effect, as if it is done with great danger or notable harm”	Merkelbach II, n. 918In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 412; McHugh-Callan n. 2450
Ambition
“Since honor is a thing good or indifferent in itself, an inordinate appetite for it is of itself only a venial sin; nevertheless, it can become mortal on account of circumstances”	Prümmer II, n. 639In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 918; McHugh-Callan n. 2450
Pusillanimity
“Pusillanimity of itself does not signify a grave sin; nevertheless, it can become a grave sin if someone from pusillanimity omits a grave duty”	Prümmer II, n. 639In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 920; McHugh-Callan n. 2451; Bontempi On the vices opposed to magnanimit, n. 19; St. Thomas II-II, q. 133, a. 1, ad 2
Meanness and Waste
“meanness is less sinful than illiberality”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 135, a. 1, ad 3In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 640
Impatience and Insensibility
“Each sin, namely, insensibility and impatience, is of itself only a venial sin; nevertheless, it becomes mortal if on account of it another virtue, for example, fraternal charity, is gravely injured.”	Prümmer II, n. 641In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 926; McHugh-Callan n. 2455
Effeminacy and Pertinacity
Softness: “Inconstancy of itself is not a grave sin; nevertheless, it is the cause of many evils and impedes very many goods”	Prümmer II, n. 642In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2456

How It Is Gained and Strengthened

The Means (Merkelbach)
Merkelbach's means: “Frequent meditation on the fragility and vileness of temporal goods”	Merkelbach II, n. 932
“Foresight of evils”	Merkelbach II, n. 932
“The custom of acting strenuously in lesser things occurring daily”	Merkelbach II, n. 932
“Great esteem and love of fortitude on account of its own proper excellence”	Merkelbach II, n. 932
“Fervent love of God, which adds the greatest strength to the will”	Merkelbach II, n. 932
Strengthened (Vermeersch)
Open to all: “fortitude is open to all in at least some degree”	Vermeersch n. 716
Patience Gained (Prümmer, Merkelbach)
Patience, by considering: “To obtain the patience so necessary for the Christian life, it helps to consider: 1. the patience and longanimity of God tolerating sinners; 2. the patience of Christ in His life and death; 3. the patience of the saints”	Prümmer II, n. 636In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 925
“5. the evils which arise from impatience”	Prümmer II, n. 636
In the Catechism and St. Alphonsus
Small things first: “St. Teresa says that if we bear slight things patiently, we shall acquire courage and strength to bear great things.”	Spirago PATIENCE
The Passion: “Think upon the Passion of Christ.”	Spirago PATIENCE
St. Alphonsus: “Patience is a perfect sacrifice that we offer to God”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XIII
“He who resolves to suffer for God, suffers no more pain.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XIII

Where Each Author Treats It

St. Thomas	After justice, with martyrdom and the four annexed virtues	II-II, qq. 123-140
St. Thomas	Its precepts	II-II, q. 140
Prümmer	Its own treatise in the second volume, following St. Thomas	II, nn. 620-642
Merkelbach	Fortitude itself, martyrdom, then the annexed virtues	II, nn. 899-932
Noldin	Among the cardinal virtues, with a section on martyrdom	nn. 275-282
Wouters	Among the supernatural moral virtues	nn. 416-431