A Cardinal Virtue

Temperance

St. Thomas treats it at II-II, qq. 141-170. See also every passage on the topic page.

How the Authors Compare

St. Thomas counts four species, the fourth being purity, “as to the pleasures incidental to the act” (II-II, q. 143), and Prümmer follows, calling it pudicity (II, n. 647). Merkelbach, Noldin and Wouters count three: “abstinence, sobriety, and chastity” (n. 285), with Merkelbach treating pudicity inside chastity (II, n. 945). McHugh-Callan: “Chastity and decency are not separate virtues” (n. 2487); Marc and Vermeersch count four, “chastity and modesty about venereal things” (n. 409), “chastity and modesty of purity” (n. 723).
Prümmer gives two lists of the annexed virtues. The first follows St. Thomas: “continence, humility, meekness, modesty, and moderation” (II, n. 648). The second, in the chapter on them: “continence, meekness, clemency, and modesty” with humility under modesty (II, n. 708). Noldin has the second list (n. 285). Wouters omits continence: “meekness, clemency, and modesty” (n. 446). Marc counts seven: “continence, meekness, clemency, humility, modesty, studiousness, and eutrapelia” (n. 410).
Noldin calls continence “the virtue firming the will” (n. 285). St. Thomas says it “does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue” (II-II, q. 155, a. 1), and Merkelbach, that it is “not a virtue in the strict and full sense” (II, n. 1030). Marc too calls it “a virtue which resists movements of concupiscence” (n. 410); McHugh-Callan, “less than a moral virtue” (n. 2544); Bontempi, “not a wholly perfect virtue” (On continence, n. 2).
They use “stuprum” in different senses, as Prümmer itself notes, naming Noldin. Prümmer takes the older sense, “the illicit defloration of a virgin (with her consenting)” (II, n. 699); Noldin, “the deflowering of a virgin, against her will” (n. 23). Merkelbach counts defloration “even if violence is not inflicted” (II, n. 1005), and St. Thomas lists seduction and rape as two species (II-II, q. 154, a. 7).
The count of lust's species varies. St. Thomas opens with six and adds sacrilege afterward (II-II, q. 154, aa. 1, 10). Merkelbach numbers seven (II, n. 1005). Prümmer and Wouters count six according to nature and three against it (II, n. 698, n. 444).
As with fortitude, the same vices are named from opposite sides. Noldin and Merkelbach put insensibility by defect and intemperance by excess (n. 284, II, n. 941); Wouters reverses them (n. 434). Prümmer calls cruelty the vice “by defect” (II, n. 710), Wouters and Noldin by excess (n. 452, n. 285). Marc sets insensibility by excess and intemperance by defect, and opposes to meekness “irascibility (defect) and excessive indulgence (excess)” (n. 410).
Touch, or taste and touch. St. Thomas: temperance “is about pleasures of touch”, the pleasures of food and drink themselves coming by touch; taste and the other senses only “secondarily” (II-II, q. 141, a. 4; II-II, q. 141, a. 5). Merkelbach: “the principal pleasures of touch” (II, n. 937); McHugh-Callan: “the two delights of touch” (n. 2465). Noldin names taste beside touch: of the species, “two temper taste, but the third tempers touch” (n. 285); so Vermeersch, “moderating the delights of taste and touch” (n. 718), and Marc (n. 407); Wouters gives abstinence “the pleasure of touch and taste” (n. 435).
Whether the virtue of virginity needs a vow. St. Thomas: “Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity” (II-II, q. 152, a. 3, ad 4). Prümmer: “St. Thomas seems to require still further a vow of virginity”, and counts the question of no great moment in practice (II, n. 677). McHugh-Callan: “it seems more probable that this purpose must be expressed as a vow”, though “it is also held as probable that unvowed virginity may be called a lesser degree” of it (n. 2490). Wouters: “It is disputed whether a vow is also required” (n. 22). Noldin's definition asks only “a firm purpose of the will of abstaining perpetually” (n. 3).
What loses virginity beyond repair. St. Thomas: the purpose is recovered by penance, but not the matter, for one who has known venereal pleasure cannot cease to have known it (II-II, q. 152, a. 3, ad 3). Noldin: authors “dispute whether through immodest acts voluntarily admitted without effusion of semen virginity is lost reparably or irreparably”, and holds with Lessius that such acts do not lose it irreparably, so long as the integrity of the flesh remains (n. 4). McHugh-Callan: where the will to sin was of itself such as to bring that experience, though it did not, “it seems that the virtue cannot be recovered” (n. 2489). Wouters: “It is disputed whether virginity is lost irreparably through consent in a complete act while it is taking place”, the act having arisen apart from the will (n. 23).
Which side of humility pride stands on. St. Thomas: pride “may be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity and humility” (II-II, q. 162, a. 1); so Wouters, “By excess there is opposed pride” (n. 456), and Vermeersch, “by excess through pride and presumption” (n. 729). Prümmer turns it round: “Opposed to humility by excess is inordinate self-abjection”, and pride by defect (II, n. 715); so Merkelbach, “Inordinate abasement is opposed to humility secondarily and by excess; but by defect and primarily, pride is opposed” (II, n. 1047), and Marc, “inordinate self-abjection (excess)” and “pride (defect)” (n. 410). McHugh-Callan names “the extremes of pride and of abjectness or littleness of soul” (n. 2553). On the side of too little, Vermeersch sets not self-abjection but “timidity and pusillanimity”, vices “which are opposed to fortitude and magnificence” (n. 729).
Painting the face. St. Thomas, after St. Augustine: it “is a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin”, though not always mortal; to hide a disfigurement is lawful (II-II, q. 169, a. 2, ad 2). Merkelbach holds the same, but excepts the case where custom is general, “because then it would deceive no one” (II, n. 1066). Prümmer: “Ancient authors spoke more severely concerning cosmetics applied to the face. But apart from scandal and every evil end, there is no reason why cosmetics should be morally evil” (II, n. 717). McHugh-Callan: “In itself there is no harm”, naming “facial paints, powders and cosmetics”, though there could be sin by accident, as by deception (n. 2570).
Where studiousness chiefly works. St. Thomas puts its matter in knowledge, for man “naturally desires to know something” (II-II, q. 166, a. 2). Merkelbach: “It is subjected principally in the will for intellectual cognition, but secondarily in the concupiscible appetite for sensitive cognition” (II, n. 1052). Prümmer: “Studiousness indeed principally concerns the moderation of sensitive cognition in sight and hearing, because disorder more easily arises there”, though it “must not rarely be exercised also in intellectual cognition” (II, n. 716).

What It Is

Taken strictly: “as withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to man, it is a special virtue”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 2
Prümmer: “a virtue moderating the appetite concerning the pleasures of touch”	Prümmer II, n. 643
Merkelbach: “a virtue moderating the appetite concerning the principal concupiscences and pleasures of touch conformably to the due end”	Merkelbach II, n. 934
Noldin, Vermeersch and Marc name taste with touch: “Temperance, insofar as it is a cardinal virtue, is the virtue which moderates the appetite in the pleasures of taste and touch.”	Noldin n. 283In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 718; Marc n. 407
Wouters: “a moral virtue inclining man to moderate the pleasure of touch and taste in the conservation of the species and of the individual”	Wouters n. 432
The word also names a condition of every virtue: “Accordingly the word "temperance" has a twofold acceptation.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 934; Marc n. 407
“Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the virtues.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 2, ad 2

Its Place Among the Virtues

Fourth of the cardinal virtues: “justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 8
“yet it is not the greatest: for justice and fortitude directly pertain to the common good, temperance to the good of one”	Merkelbach II, n. 939In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 432
“Hence fortitude is greater simply, although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than fortitude but also than justice.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 8, ad 3
A cardinal virtue: “Therefore temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal virtue.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 7, ad 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 939
“both because these pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 7

Its Matter, Subject and Rule

Its Matter
Desires and pleasures: “Hence temperance is properly about desires, and fortitude about fears.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 3, ad 2
Of touch: “Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of touch.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 937
“Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and sexual pleasures.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 4
Taste and the other senses, secondarily: “Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have relation to the touch.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 5
“The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use of food and drink.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 5, ad 2
Not spiritual pleasures: “Merely spiritual pleasures are not the object of temperance”	Merkelbach II, n. 940
Its Subject
Its subject: “Just as the virtue of fortitude moderates the irascible appetite, so the virtue of temperance orders the concupiscible appetite as its proximate subject.”	Prümmer II, n. 643In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 718
Its Rule
Its rule, the need of this life: “The due end according to which the pleasures of touch are to be regulated is the necessity of the present life”	Merkelbach II, n. 938
“Accordingly the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for life is subordinate.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 1
So the temperate man desires other pleasant things “so long as they are not prejudicial to these things”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2
Pleasure may be intended: “Therefore from the intention of the author of nature nothing prevents man, in placing those actions, from being moved by pleasure and intending it”	Noldin n. 283
Natural and supernatural temperance: “Thus, for example, he sins against the natural virtue of temperance who so indulges the pleasures of taste that bodily health is thereby injured.”	Prümmer II, n. 645

The Integral Parts

They are “the conditions the concurrence of which are necessary for virtue” (II-II, q. 143.)

Two: “The integral parts of temperance are two, namely, shamefacedness and honorableness”	Prümmer II, n. 646In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 285; Wouters n. 445; Marc n. 408
Why two: “For as of every virtue, so also of temperance, there is a twofold office: to pursue its own object”	Wouters n. 445In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 721

The Subjective Parts

“The subjective parts of a virtue are its species” (II-II, q. 143.)

Abstinence
By two kinds of pleasure: “Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 143, a. 1In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2465
Three, or four with purity: “The subjective parts or species of temperance are three.”	Merkelbach II, n. 945In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 285
“Four subjective parts of temperance are enumerated by St. Thomas, namely, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, and pudicity.”	Prümmer II, n. 647In nearly the same words: Marc n. 409
Abstinence: “thus it is a virtue moderating according to the dictate of reason the concupiscences and pleasures, or the affection and use, of foods”	Merkelbach II, n. 947In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 435; Bontempi On abstinence, n. 1
Not mere going without: “Abstinence taken generally signifies the withdrawal of food. In this general sense it is not a virtue, but something indifferent”	Prümmer II, n. 649In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 947
Not food against drink: “This is not to be understood as though abstinence were concerned with food, and sobriety with drink.”	Vermeersch n. 719
Sobriety
Sobriety: “Sobriety (soberheid) is named from preserving bria, that is, measure.”	Merkelbach II, n. 981In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 438; McHugh-Callan n. 2474
“Sobriety is distinguished from abstinence.”	Merkelbach II, n. 982In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2474
Wine not unlawful: “The use of wine or of another intoxicating drink is not per se and totally illicit”	Merkelbach II, n. 983In nearly the same words: Bontempi On sobriety, n. 3
Most for some: “Sobriety should be cultivated by all, but certain ones are more bound to it than others.”	McHugh-Callan n. 2475In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 984; Bontempi On sobriety, n. 5
Chastity and Purity
Chastity: “Chastity is the virtue moderating pleasures in venereal matters according to the dictate of right reason.”	Prümmer II, n. 674In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 1; Wouters n. 441
Purity, McHugh-Callan says, no separate virtue: “Chastity and decency are not separate virtues; rather decency is a circumstance of chastity.”	McHugh-Callan n. 2487

The Potential Parts

“any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part of temperance” (II-II, q. 143.)

How Many
Any virtue that restrains: “any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part of temperance”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 143, a. 1In nearly the same words: Marc n. 410
“These virtues are annexed parts of temperance, because they imitate it in secondary matter as to mode”	Merkelbach II, n. 1034In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 285
Four: “The following potential parts of temperance are fittingly enumerated: continence, meekness, clemency, and modesty.”	Prümmer II, n. 708In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 285
Three, without continence: “The potential parts of temperance are: meekness, clemency, and modesty.”	Wouters n. 446
Seven: “Virtues of this kind are especially numbered as seven, namely: continence, meekness, clemency, humility, modesty, studiousness, and eutrapelia.”	Marc n. 410
Under modesty, four: “These seemingly are of four kinds.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 160, a. 2In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 285; Prümmer II, n. 711
Or five, with eutrapelia: “Of modesty, that is, the species are counted as humility, studiosity, modesty of conduct, eutrapely, and modesty of attire.”	Wouters n. 446
Why Each Belongs to Temperance
Why humility belongs here: “Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 161, a. 4In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 724
Yet also to justice: “But insofar as humility subjects man to God, it is referred to religion and becomes a potential part of justice.”	Vermeersch n. 729
Why studiousness: “wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 166, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1052; McHugh-Callan n. 2562
Its spur, to fortitude: “insofar as it impels to study notwithstanding labor, it rather pertains to fortitude”	Merkelbach II, n. 1052In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2562; Prümmer II, n. 716

What the Integral Parts Are

Each entry opens the passage.

Shamefacedness
Shamefacedness, not properly a virtue: “Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 144, a. 1In nearly the same words: Marc n. 408
A fear: “Modest shame (Schamhaftigkeit) is a certain disturbance of soul or fear rising from consideration of some deed bringing confusion or disgrace.”	Noldin n. 285In nearly the same words: Marc n. 408
“Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result of any fault of his own."”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 144, a. 2
Before whom: “Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 144, a. 3
Honesty
Honesty: “Wherefore "honesty is the same as spiritual beauty."”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 145, a. 2
A part of temperance: “Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 145, a. 4
“Honesty (Ehrbarheit) is a moral perfection averting man from dishonest pleasures and inclining him to the decorum which shines forth in abstinence from illicit pleasures.”	Noldin n. 285In nearly the same words: Marc n. 408
To be taught to the young: “must be cultivated as much as possible in the education of boys and girls”	Prümmer II, n. 646

Chastity and Virginity

Each entry opens the passage.

Chastity
A virtue: “Chastity is a virtue.”	Merkelbach II, n. 995In nearly the same words: Bontempi On chastity, n. 2
“It is a special virtue distinct from abstinence.”	Merkelbach II, n. 995
Its matter: “The proximate matter of chastity is the interior motions of the appetite concerning venereal things; its remote matter is external acts”	Merkelbach II, n. 996
Excludes or moderates: “according to the diverse state in which someone is found, the precept of chastity either prohibits and excludes every venereal delectation altogether, or prescribes only its moderation”	Noldin n. 1
Its grades: “Chastity was distinguished by the ancient theologians as threefold, namely, conjugal, widowly, and virginal.”	Prümmer II, n. 675In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 443
Virginity
Virginity, a special virtue: “Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as magnificence to liberality.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 152, a. 3In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 20
Defined: “Virginity, or virginal chastity, is defined as a firm purpose of the will of abstaining perpetually from all venereal delectations, both illicit and licit, in marriage, in a subject never corrupted.”	Noldin n. 3In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 677
Its form and its matter: “the formal and completive element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal pleasure”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 152, a. 3
Lost and repaired: “Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material therein.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 152, a. 3, ad 3
Above marriage, Trent: “If anyone says that the married state is to be preferred to the state of virginity or celibacy”	Prümmer II, n. 677In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether virginity excels conjugal, n. 7
Not the greatest: “nevertheless it is not the greatest of virtues”	Merkelbach II, n. 999
For God, not from contempt: “Virginity that results from mere contempt for sensible pleasure would be an excess”	McHugh-Callan n. 2490

Fasting, the Act of Abstinence

Each entry opens the passage.

Fasting
Its act: “Fasting is per se an act elicited by the virtue of abstinence.”	Merkelbach II, n. 951In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 650
Why: “since fasting is the guardian of chastity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 147, a. 1
“Fasting is an act of virtue, because it is ordained to some honest good, namely, 1) to repressing concupiscences of the flesh”	Merkelbach II, n. 950In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2469
Its precept: “Wherefore fasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law, while the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of positive law”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 147, a. 3
“Fasting is a useful good and therefore is not prescribed per se, but only in order to the end for which it is useful.”	Merkelbach II, n. 952
Its praise: “Fasting performed in a right manner and according to right reason is commended by so many examples and admonitions in Sacred Scripture and by the holy Fathers”	Prümmer II, n. 651

What Each Annexed Virtue Is

Each entry opens the passage. A dash means only that the author does not define it there.

Continence
Something of a virtue: “In this way continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by them”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 155, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1030; Bontempi On continence, n. 2; McHugh-Callan n. 2544
Defined: “It can be defined: a disposition of the will by which evil and vehement concupiscences concerning touch are resisted”	Prümmer II, n. 708In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 285; Marc n. 410
In the will: “Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 155, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1030; Prümmer II, n. 708
Less than temperance: “and in this sense temperance is far greater than continence”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 155, a. 4In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 708; Marc n. 410; McHugh-Callan n. 2544
“Hence the continent man is not badly compared by some to one who receives wild beasts to be tamed, but the temperate man to one who has already tamed them.”	Prümmer II, n. 708
In another sense, abstaining from all venereal pleasure: “On this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, and widowhood in the second.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 155, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1029
Meekness and Clemency
Meekness: “and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to right reason”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 157, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 709; Vermeersch n. 730; Noldin n. 285
Anger itself: “Anger is not an affection evil of itself, but is a passion indifferent of itself”	Prümmer II, n. 709In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2545
Its two offices: “it represses anger where a just cause of being angry is lacking”	Merkelbach II, n. 1033
“namely so that man does not grow angry except when, and as much, and in the way that he ought”	Marc n. 410In nearly the same words: Bontempi On meekness, n. 6
None to rouse anger: “Yet because we are too prone to desiring vengeance for injuries, no virtue is named whose office is to excite anger according to right reason.”	Vermeersch n. 730
Its excellence: “wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 157, a. 4In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 730
Clemency: “while it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 157, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 710; Vermeersch n. 731; McHugh-Callan n. 2551
How they differ: “clemency directly moderates and diminishes the effect, namely exterior punishment”	Merkelbach II, n. 1033In nearly the same words: Bontempi On clemency, n. 2
“Meekness should be practised by all, but clemency is the proper virtue of superiors.”	McHugh-Callan n. 2551In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 731
Not laxity: “Clemency is not the same thing, then, as arbitrary laxity or sentimentalism.”	McHugh-Callan n. 2551In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 731; Prümmer II, n. 710
Not the greatest: “It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 157, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1035
Modesty
Modesty: “Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 160, a. 1In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 453
Strictly, in outward things: “In the strict sense modesty is a virtue inclining a man to preserve decorum in external things.”	Prümmer II, n. 711In nearly the same words: Marc n. 410
Humility
Humility: “one, to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 161, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 712; Merkelbach II, n. 1042; Wouters n. 454
Its root: “Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the reverence we bear to God.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 161, a. 6
“Yet we prefer to place the formal root of humility, rather than in one's own nothingness itself, in the origin of every good from God.”	Vermeersch n. 724
In the appetite, ruled by knowledge: “Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 161, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 712; McHugh-Callan n. 2554; Vermeersch n. 729
Subject to God first: “But humility, considered as a special virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 161, a. 1, ad 5
And so to all men: “Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that which the latter has of God's”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 161, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1044; Prümmer II, n. 712
Without denying God's gifts: “It by no means prevents us from gladly acknowledging, notwithstanding humility, the goods, whether natural or supernatural, which God has bestowed upon us.”	Prümmer II, n. 712In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2555
“but outwardly prelates and persons constituted in dignity ought not to subject themselves to inferiors”	Prümmer II, n. 712In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2555
With magnanimity: “Hence it is clear that magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this, that each is according to right reason.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 161, a. 1, ad 3In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2553
Its place: “Therefore after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 161, a. 5In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 725; McHugh-Callan n. 2556
The foundation, by removing pride: “indeed, it is the foundation of the moral life, not indeed in the sense that it excels all the other virtues”	Prümmer II, n. 713In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1043; McHugh-Callan n. 2556
Its degrees, after St. Bernard: “One humility is sufficient, another abundant, another superabundant.”	Prümmer II, n. 714In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1045
Its Christian perfection: “Christian humility is perfected by contempt of earthly sublimity, which is done according to divine ordination.”	Vermeersch n. 727
Studiousness
Studiousness: “The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 166, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 716; Wouters n. 457
Its matter: “The proximate matter of this virtue is not cognition itself of truth, which, speaking per se, is good (nor does it need a moral virtue), but the appetite of truth to be known”	Merkelbach II, n. 1052
Rein and spur: “it belongs to this virtue both to urge on the inclination of the body and to restrain the desire of the soul”	Wouters n. 458In nearly the same words: Marc n. 410
Modesty of Bearing and in Play
Of bearing: “Hence it is evident that there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 168, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1057
“First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly, in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or place.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 168, a. 1In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 737
From within: “the true virtue of modesty of conduct does not consist only in external moderation, but requires that external moderation proceed from internal moderation of the passions”	Wouters n. 461
Play, and eutrapelia: “Hence it is necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 168, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1060; Prümmer II, n. 317
“Eutrapely is a moral virtue inclining man to moderate actions and words in playful matters and jokes”	Wouters n. 463In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 736
Its conditions: “First and principally, that the aforesaid delectation not be sought in any operations or words shameful, or injurious, or harmful to neighbor”	Merkelbach II, n. 1060In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 317
A sin in lacking it too: “Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 168, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1061; Vermeersch n. 736
“lack of mirth is less sinful than excess thereof”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 168, a. 4In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2568
Spectacles and dances: “Concerning spectacles and dances theologians remark that these, according to themselves, that is, with depraved circumstances excluded, are not dishonorable, but morally indifferent”	Merkelbach II, n. 1062
Modesty in Apparel
Of apparel: “It is not in the outward things themselves which man uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them immoderately.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 169, a. 1In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2569
“Modesty of external equipment is the virtue which applies the moderation of reason in the equipment of external things”	Merkelbach II, n. 1063In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 466
Custom the measure: “First, in comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 169, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1066
Adornment: “Wherefore if a married woman adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do this without sin.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 169, a. 2In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 734; McHugh-Callan n. 2570
“And if indeed they adorn themselves with this intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; whereas if they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for the sake of ostentation, it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 169, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1067; McHugh-Callan n. 2570
No duty to put off what is decorous: “Let it be noted that there is no obligation of putting away decorous adornment according to the custom of the country, even if certain determined persons would be enticed from it to concupiscence”	Merkelbach II, n. 1068
Plainness for penance, no fault: “It is not sinful, however, but a virtuous act of temperance, to wear simpler and poorer garments from the spirit of mortification and humility”	McHugh-Callan n. 2569
A word to confessors: “Let the confessor and preacher be cautious in admonishing the faithful concerning this matter”	Prümmer II, n. 717

The Species of Lust

Set out in full, with the authors' disputes on each species, on the page for lust.

The Precepts of Temperance

In the Decalogue: “Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue include a special prohibition of adultery, not only as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 170, a. 1In nearly the same words: Spirago CHASTITY
Why adultery alone is named: “Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our neighbor, as adultery is.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 170, a. 1, ad 2
No common affirmative precept: “Now it was not possible to give any common affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of temperance varies according to different times”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 170, a. 1, ad 3
The annexed virtues, by their effects: “and in this respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to the prohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of temperance”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 170, a. 2

The Gift of Fear

“Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 1, ad 3
“fear of God to temperance, insofar as it makes us flee the delights which most allure us to sin”	Merkelbach I, n. 633
“the gift of fear of the Lord corresponds both to the theological virtue of hope and to the cardinal virtue of temperance”	Wouters n. 481
“The gift of fear is a supernatural habit by which the just man, from the motion of the Holy Spirit, most profoundly reveres the majesty of God.”	Prümmer n. 453
And humility: “Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man reveres God”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 161, a. 2, ad 3

The Vices Opposed to Temperance and Its Parts

Each entry opens the passage. A dash means only that the author does not name it there. Gluttony, lust, anger and pride are also capital vices, each with its own page.

St. ThomasII-II, qq. 142-169	PrümmerII, n. 667 ff.	MerkelbachII, n. 941 ff.	Noldinnn. 284-285	Woutersn. 434 ff.
Against temperance itself
insensibility	—	insensibility or stupor	insensibility	insensibility
intemperance	—	intemperance	intemperance	intemperance
Against abstinence
gluttony	gluttony	Gluttony	gluttony	gluttony strictly so called, or surfeiting
—	—	—	—	excessive abstinence
Against sobriety
drunkenness	drunkenness	Drunkenness	drunkenness	drunkenness
Against chastity
lust	lust	Luxury	lust	lust
Against continence
incontinence	—	Incontinence	—	—
Against meekness
anger	irascibility	irascibility	irascibility	irascibility
lack of anger	sluggishness	lack of anger	lenity or excessive indulgence	sluggishness
Against clemency
cruelty	cruelty	cruelty	cruelty	cruelty
—	—	excessive mildness	excessive lenity	excessive leniency
Against humility
pride	pride	Pride	pride	pride
—	inordinate self-abjection	excessive self-abasement	—	excessive self-abjection
Against studiousness
curiosity	curiosity	Curiosity	—	curiosity
—	—	Negligence	—	negligence
Against modesty of conduct
—	—	affectation	—	affectation
In games
excess of play	—	—	—	scurrility
lack of mirth	—	—	—	moroseness

Each of these is set out by author, with its kinds and gravity, on The Vices Against Temperance.

The Opposed Vices and Their Gravity

The first word of each author on the gravity of each vice; each is set out in full on the vices against temperance and on the pages for gluttony, lust, anger and pride.

Insensibility
Against nature's order: “It is a sin and vice, because it is contrary to the natural order and to the Creator, who set pleasures upon actions necessary for the life of man”	Merkelbach II, n. 941In nearly the same words: St. Thomas II-II, q. 142, a. 1
Intemperance
Against the mean of reason: “It is a sin, because it is opposed to virtue, insofar as it exceeds the mean of reason which temperance establishes in pleasures.”	Merkelbach II, n. 942
Gluttony
“when a man has too great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do anything contrary to God's law, it is a venial sin”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 148, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 426; Merkelbach I, n. 506; Noldin n. 339; Wouters n. 319; McHugh-Callan n. 2472; Marc n. 365; Vermeersch n. 475; Bontempi On gluttony, n. 14; Sabetti-Barrett n. 146
Drunkenness
Perfect drunkenness, mortal: “Therefore drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 150, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 670; Merkelbach II, n. 986; Noldin n. 343; Marc n. 758; Sabetti-Barrett n. 148; McHugh-Callan n. 2480; Wouters n. 320; Vermeersch n. 477; Bontempi On drunkenness, n. 2
Excessive Abstinence and Sobriety
A sin, when nature is grievously molested: “and yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting nature grievously, he would not be free from sin”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 150, a. 1, ad 1In nearly the same words: St. Thomas II-II, q. 147, a. 1, ad 2
Lust
When directly willed, no light matter: “Venereal pleasure directly willed outside legitimate marriage is a mortal sin from its whole genus, so that it admits no smallness of matter”	Prümmer II, n. 682In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1003; Noldin n. 11; Wouters n. 311; McHugh-Callan n. 2496; Marc n. 367; Sabetti-Barrett n. 280; Bontempi Whether there is parvity of matter, n. 5; Merkelbach Chastity and Lust, Q. II
Incontinence
A sin twice over: “On this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 156, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 1031
Anger
Inordinate in its object: “mortal from its genus”	Wouters n. 324; Sabetti-Barrett n. 144In nearly the same words: St. Thomas II-II, q. 158, a. 3; Prümmer n. 430; Merkelbach II, n. 1038; Noldin n. 338; McHugh-Callan n. 2547; Marc n. 371; Vermeersch n. 485; Bontempi On anger, n. 19
Lack of Anger
As grave as the duty left undone: “This is not distinguished in malice from the omission itself of the office, and is not evil except insofar as in it the omission of the due action is judged to be willed.”	Merkelbach II, n. 1036
Cruelty and Excessive Leniency
Mortal, in St. Bonaventure: “the excess of cruelty in exacting punishments, by imprisoning, etc., is a mortal sin”	Bontempi On cruelty, n. 7
Pride
“not to be subject to God is of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 162, a. 5In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 500; Bontempi On pride, n. 6; Merkelbach Pastoral, Q. I
Excessive Self-Abjection
Casting away one's reputation, prodigality: “One who without proportionate cause neglects his reputation is guilty of the sin of prodigality”	Wouters n. 766In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 66; Merkelbach II, n. 169
Curiosity
Venial of itself: “according to itself is a venial sin; because it does not seem a great inordination that man should apply superfluous care in knowing things which do not pertain to him”	Merkelbach II, n. 1054In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2564; Prümmer II, n. 716
Vices of Bearing, Play and Dress
Affectation and rusticity, venial of themselves: “Per se these are venial; per accidens they can be mortal by reason of the end, scandal, offense, grave harm, etc.”	Merkelbach II, n. 1059

How It Is Gained

Temperance and Mortification
Acquired and infused: “Temperance as a natural and acquired virtue, concerning which there has been discussion thus far, differs in species from temperance which is a supernaturally infused”	Prümmer II, n. 645
“which end will be natural in acquired temperance, supernatural in infused temperance”	Merkelbach II, n. 934
Mortification: “But the body is to be mortified and the sensual appetites to be repressed not only by fasting, and particularly, by the fasts instituted by the Church, but also by watching, pious pilgrimages, and other works of austerity.”	Roman Catechism The Sixth Commandment
Above the human rule: “thus continence is superimposed upon chastity, voluntary poverty upon liberality, mortification upon temperance, contempt of earthly sublimity upon humility”	Vermeersch n. 738
St. Alphonsus: “If, then, we wish to be saved, and to please God, we must take pleasure in what the flesh refuses, and must reject what the flesh demands.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. VIII
“He that attends to the abnegation of the appetite makes continual progress in virtue.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. VIII
In quantity, quality and manner: “In what is it to be mortified? St. Bonaventure answers”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. VIII
Spirago: “He who sustains his mind with spiritual aliments will not care greatly for the food of the body”	Spirago TEMPERANCE IN EATING AND DRINKING
Chastity
Prayer and the sacraments: “But the most efficacious means for subduing its violence are frequent use of confession and Communion, as also unceasing and devout prayer to God, accompanied by fasting and almsdeeds.”	Roman Catechism The Sixth CommandmentIn nearly the same words: Spirago CHASTITY
“Chastity is a gift of God.”	Roman Catechism The Sixth Commandment
Idleness, intemperance and the eyes: “The first is studiously to avoid idleness”	Roman Catechism The Sixth Commandment
“In the next place, intemperance is carefully to be avoided.”	Roman Catechism The Sixth CommandmentIn nearly the same words: Spirago CHASTITY
“But the eyes, in particular, are the inlets to criminal passion”	Roman Catechism The Sixth CommandmentIn nearly the same words: Spirago CHASTITY; St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. VIII
Flight from occasions: “flight from occasions, namely to avoid vain loves, frivolous readings, spectacles, excessive contact and immoderate frequentations with persons of the other sex, and dances”	Merkelbach Pastoral, Q. Seven
The will strengthened: “frequently to renew the resolution of living chastely”	Merkelbach Pastoral, Q. Seven
“to trust in the divine help of grace; to resist immediately and strongly”	Merkelbach Pastoral, Q. Seven
“frequent reception of the sacraments and immediate confession after a fall”	Merkelbach Pastoral, Q. Seven
Our Lady: “Devotion to the Mother of God is also most efficacious”	Spirago CHASTITY
“Sometimes marriage is an efficacious remedy.”	Merkelbach Pastoral, Q. Seven
Shamefacedness taught to children: “it is especially fitting that they be cultivated, especially in the education of children”	Merkelbach II, n. 944
Humility
St. Alphonsus: “There are two sorts of humility: the humility of the intellect, and the humility of the will or of the heart.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XI
“Be careful never to boast of anything.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XI
“be careful never to confide in your own strength”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XI
“accept in peace all the contempt and bad treatment that you receive”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XI
Its acts: “The following acts of humility are enumerated: contempt of oneself”	Prümmer II, n. 714
Spirago: “St. Augustine prayed for the knowledge of God, that he might thereby know himself.”	Spirago HUMILITY
“Discouragement and pusillanimity are not characteristics of true humility.”	Spirago HUMILITY
Meekness
Humility and fortitude: “For acquiring meekness, humility, which makes us conscious of our own defects, and fortitude, which strengthens the will against sudden motions of anger, are very conducive.”	Prümmer II, n. 709
Spirago: “It is especially incumbent upon us to be meek in our intercourse with those with whom we live.”	Spirago MEEKNESS
“St. Francis of Sales, naturally of a choleric temperament, attained in the course of twenty years such perfect mastery over himself that he was thought to be phlegmatic by nature.”	Spirago MEEKNESS

Where Each Author Treats It

St. Thomas	The last of the cardinal virtues, with the longest list of annexed virtues	II-II, qq. 141-170
St. Thomas	Its precepts	II-II, q. 170
Prümmer	Its own treatise, with the laws of fasting and the sins of lust	II, nn. 643-717
Merkelbach	Five parts, from temperance in general to the annexed virtues	II, nn. 934-1068
Noldin	Among the cardinal virtues; lust in the separate work on the sixth precept	nn. 283-285
Wouters	Among the supernatural moral virtues; chastity at length in the third volume	nn. 432-468