Treatise: On the Cardinal Virtue of Fortitude and on the Annexed Virtues

S. Th. II-II, q. 123, a. 1 and 2.

899. Object of the treatise. - Just as there are virtues, namely, one cardinal virtue, justice, and several others annexed to it, which according to right reason order our operations toward others, so virtues are required which according to reason order our passions as to ourselves. But some passions incline toward evil, which temperance restrains; others decline from good, against which fortitude strengthens the soul.

"In two ways," says St. Thomas, q. 123, a. 1, "the human will is hindered from following the rectitude of reason: in one way, by this, that it is drawn by some delectable thing toward something other than the rectitude of reason requires; and this impediment the virtue of temperance removes. In another way, by this, that the will is repelled from that which is according to reason, on account of some difficult thing which threatens it; and for removing this impediment there is required fortitude of mind, by which, namely, it resists difficulties of this sort; just as man through bodily strength overcomes and repels bodily impediments."

Hence just as for moderating and restraining the vehement delectations of the concupiscible appetite there must be the cardinal virtue of temperance, so also a cardinal virtue is necessary concerning difficulties to be tolerated and repelled: fortitude, which strengthens the soul against the repulses of the irascible appetite and overcomes them, so that notwithstanding these a man nevertheless does the good.

From these things it now follows that fortitude:

1. is necessary, namely, for strengthening the soul against difficulties;

2. is a virtue, because it makes man pursue the good of reason;

3. has as its subject the irascible appetite, to be strengthened by reason;

4. has as its object difficulties and dangers to be conquered, so that it constitutes a mean between fear and presumption.

900. Fortitude (ἀνδρεία = manliness; force; sterkte) imports firmness of soul, and therefore in the general sense indicates every firmness in honorable good, and thus is a condition of every virtue, because for virtue it is required to operate firmly and immovably; but in the strict sense it signifies firmness of soul in sustaining and repelling those things in which it is most difficult to have firmness, namely, in graver dangers, even of death, and thus by excellence it is called fortitude.

This is the virtue restraining the movements of the soul concerning any terrible things whatever, especially concerning dangers of death to be sustained and repelled, or the virtue by which the irascible appetite is so strengthened that it does not desist from pursuing the arduous good and last end even on account of the greatest dangers of bodily life (a. 2). It can be defined: the virtue strengthening the appetite against the greatest dangers of bodily life so that it does not desist from pursuing the arduous good conformably to the due end. In this definition there is indicated:

1. the genus to which fortitude pertains: virtue, whether natural and acquired, or supernatural and infused;

2. the subject in which it is: appetite. For it is not in the will, which from its nature is an inclination conformed to reason, but in the sensitive appetite itself concerning passions, which must be moderated when they draw back from the good of reason: thus it is distinguished from prudence and the intellectual virtues;

3. the proper act by which it is distinguished from others: strengthening, so that it does not desist from pursuing the good of reason; and thus it is distinguished from temperance, which restrains the appetite;

4. the material object concerning which it is concerned: against the greatest dangers of bodily life; and thus it is distinguished from the virtues annexed to it, which are concerned with lesser dangers, and from justice, which is concerned with external operations toward another;

5. the formal object or proximate motive: conformably to the due end, which end will be natural in acquired fortitude, supernatural in infused fortitude.

901. Division of the treatise. - The treatise is divided into two parts:

The first is on fortitude itself, namely: 1) on fortitude according to itself; 2) on the act of fortitude; 3) on the vices opposed to fortitude.

The second is on the virtues annexed to fortitude: 1) on magnanimity; 2) on magnificence; 3) on patience; 4) on perseverance and constancy.

To these there is added a conclusion on the gift and precepts of fortitude.¹

¹ On fortitude, these can usefully be compared: St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123-140, with the commentaries of Cajetan, Sylvius, and Billuart; Lessius, De Iustitia et iure et ceteris virtutibus cardinalibus; Waffelaert, De Virtutibus cardinalibus; Winkler, Die Tugendlehre des H. Thomas von Aquin; Janvier, Conf. de N.-D.: La Force chrétienne; Sertillanges, La Morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin; Gilson, S. Thomas d'Aquin in the collection Les Moralistes chrétiens; Leroux, in Rev. Eccl. de Liège, 1928.