Section 1: Duty and its Motives

1. DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF DUTY.—Law as the external rule of conduct objectively binds all those for whom it is made; but it does not become a subjective obligation for the individual until obedience to it is perceived to be a duty (officium). Duty has been defined as the recognition of the applicability of a general precept to a concrete case. More correctly, it is a moral obligation to do something or refrain from doing it.¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 58, art. 3, ad 2: "Necessity is twofold: one is that of compulsion ... But the other is necessity arising from the obligation of a precept or from necessity of the end, namely when someone cannot attain the end of virtue unless he does this."

Jurisprudence knows none but compulsory duties, which can be enforced by external means. In the court of Moral Theology, on the contrary, every duty binds in conscience because duty, in its last analysis, spells accountability to the will of God (supremus debendi titulus). Hence the following distinctions:

(1) Natural and positive duties. Natural duties (officia naturalia) arise from the moral law of nature, positive duties (officia positiva) from divine or human laws.

(2) Negative and affirmative duties. Negative duties (officia negativa) forbid, whereas affirmative duties (officia affirmativa) command.

(3) Absolute (or perfect) and hypothetical (or imperfect) duties. The former bind not only always (semper), but in all conceivable circumstances (pro semper), e.g., telling the truth; the latter under certain conditions only (semper, sed non pro semper), as e.g., fraternal correction.

(4) Duties to God, to oneself, and to one's fellowmen. (5) Individual and social duties, arising from one's obligations towards oneself and one's relations to society.

(6) Duties of charity and duties of justice, dictated respectively by these two fundamental virtues.

(7) Higher duties obliging under pain of grievous, and lower duties obliging under pain of venial sin, according to the degree of obligation and especially according to the importance of the object involved (gravitas sive levitas materiae).

There are as many duties as there are actions that fall under the general law, and hence no exhaustive enumeration is possible. Life is in constant motion and conditions are changing all the time.

II. MOTIVES. —A motive is a reason for doing a thing, apprehended by the intellect, plus a desire to do it, residing in the soul. The motives that impel a Christian to live up to his duties are fear of God (timor Domini) and charity (caritas). These two motives differentiate Catholic Moral Theology from Determinism, as well as from the Pharisaic legalism that obeys the letter but disregards the spirit of the law. i. The highest of all motives is charity. It excludes moral compulsion and that slavish fear which cringes in apprehension of punishment; ² but it does not exclude that childlike reverence (timor filialis) which is the beginning of love (timor initialis).³

² Timor servilis, technically called timor serviliter servilis. (Cfr. 1 John IV, 18).

³ Ps. II, 11; Is. XI, 2 sq.; XXXIII, 6; Mal. I, 6; Prov. I, 7; IX, 10; XV, 33; Ecclus. I, 11, 22; XIX, 18; XXI, 13; XL, 28: Job XXVIII, 28; Matth. X, 28; Luke XII, 5; Rom. VIII, 15-17; 2 Cor. VII, 1; Gal. IV, 6; Phil. II, 12; 1 Pet. I, 17. —Cfr. St. Augustine, De Vera Relig., c. 17, n. 33: "Pietas timore inchoatur, caritate perficitur" (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 136).— IDEM, Enarr. in Ps., 63, n. 2. — Alcuin, De Virtut. et Vitiis, c. 15. — St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 19, art. 1-12.

All fear is more or less a product of egoism, and hence the timor filialis is a less perfect motive than charity. But even pure charity is not absolutely disinterested, and therefore moral compulsion as a means of training the will, and filial fear as a motive of duty, are not opposed to the Christian religion, though charity is invariably the highest and the only perfect motive.⁴

⁴ "Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore." (Horace, Epist., I, 16, 52). A man who merely obeys the law because he fears punishment, is not a vir bonus.

St. Bernard writes: "Charity alone can deflect the heart from self-love and love of the world, and direct it towards God. Neither fear nor self-love (amor privatus) is able to transform the soul. These motives sometimes alter a man's mien or some single act of his, but they never change his character (affectum). Even he who is a slave [to sin] occasionally obeys the will of God; but as he does not act of his own accord (sponte), it easily becomes manifest that his heart continues to be hardened." ⁵ According to Aquinas man's ultimate destiny is to be united to God by charity, and therefore sanctity or Christian perfection consists essentially in loving God and one's fellowmen in obedience to the sovereign precept of the Gospel.⁶ A famous fifteenth-century preacher, P. John Herolt, O.P., says: "To be truly good, our actions must be inspired by the love of God. What is not done for charity's sake, is neither pleasing to God nor meritorious. Hence we must guard against serving God merely for the sake of eternal reward, or because we are afraid of hell, but must do good chiefly for the love of God and His greater glory. True, the desire for Heaven and the fear of hell are salutary motives; but to avoid evil for no other purpose than to escape punishment would not only be unbecoming to a Christian but positively sinful." ⁷ St. Ignatius Loyola says that a man should be guided in all his actions as much as possible by a pure and perfect love of God, though he may be aided also by fear of punishment or hope of reward.⁸ The meaning is that we should strive to act from pure love of God, though not as if to act from lower motives were sinful.

⁵ Liber de Diligendo Deo, c. 12, n. 34 (Migne, P.L., CLXXXII, 995)-

⁶ Cfr. the Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 184, art. 1 and 3.

⁷ Cfr. N. Paulus, Johann Herolt und seine Lehre, in the Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, Innsbruck 1902, pp. 417 sqq.

⁸ Const., III, 1, 26 (Florence ed., 1893, 2, 43).

2. To the slavish legalism of the Pharisees ⁹ the Catholic Church opposes the spiritual interpretation of the law (ratio legis). She bids us obey the spirit rather than the letter, because the essence of morality does not consist in a purely external and material conformity to the law, but above all in a willing disposition of the heart and mind.¹⁰ There is no morality without legality, because one who truly loves God will gladly obey His law. On the other hand it is equally true that there is no true legality without morality. ¹¹ The alleged opposition between the interior spirit and external observance, between the gospel and "ecclesiastical formalism," exists only in the imagination of our opponents. There is, of course, no intention of denying that opposition between the two is possible. Man may obey the law outwardly while resisting it inwardly, and thereby destroy the true spirit of religion within his soul. But this is not the Catholic idea. The Church demands that we embrace the faith sincerely and obey its precepts with a cheerful heart. It was in this sense that Christ, after accusing the Pharisees of tithing mint and anise and disregarding the weightier things of the law—judgment, mercy, and faith —said to them: "These things you ought to have done, and not to leave those undone." ¹²

⁹ Cfr. Matth. XXIII, 1-33; Mark XII, 38-40; G. Beer, Schabbath, Tübingen 1908, pp. 37 sqq.

¹⁰ Cfr. Gen. IV, 3-5; Matth. XII, 1-12; Mark XII, 41-44; Luke XXI, 1-4.

¹¹ Cfr. Matth. XXI, 28-32; XXIII, 23-30; John XIV, 15. 21; XV, 10; 1 Cor. XIII, 1-8.

¹² Matth. XXIII, 23.—Ph. Kneib, Die "Jenseitsmoral," pp. 57 sqq.

The Catholic Church has never been satisfied with inculcating a merely external observance of the commandments. On the contrary, she has always insisted on faith and charity as the chief postulates of Christian perfection. St. Cyprian says: "When Cain and Abel offered their sacrifices to God, He regarded not the gift, but the heart of the givers, and was pleased best by the gift of Abel because Abel had a pure heart." ¹³ St. Ambrose writes: "The spirit in which you do a thing gives your work its name. As it comes out of your heart, so will it be appreciated [by God]. You see how the Judge regards your interior disposition. He consults with you as to whether He should accept your gift; He first interrogates your mind." ¹⁴ St. Augustine teaches: "Men's actions are judged [by God] according to the motive that inspires them, i. e., charity. Many things are done which look well enough, but do not spring from charity; even the thorns produce flowers. Some things that seem harsh and inhuman, are done at the behest of charity (dictante caritate) to further a good cause. Hence the brief commandment is once for all impressed upon you: 'Love [God] and do what you please' (Dilige et quod vis fac).... Let the root of charity grow in your heart, then nothing but good will proceed therefrom." ¹⁵ St. Gregory the Great declares: "God weighs the heart, not the gift (substantiam), and when a sacrifice is offered to Him, He does not regard its size, but the heart from which it comes.... Before God the hand is never empty if the shrine of the heart is filled with good will. ... No more precious gift can be offered to God than good will.” ¹⁶ John Herolt teaches that "the disposition of him who offers sacrifice is more pleasing to God than the gift offered. For perfection or holiness of life does not consist in external practices, such as fasting, watching, etc., but in humility, patience, chastity, mercy, obedience, and, above all, charity. External practices (exteriora exercitia) are valueless except in so far as they fit man to lead a virtuous life and are dictated by the right spirit. "¹⁷ Alphonsus summarizes the teaching of the Church as follows: "The essence of Christian perfection consists not in severity towards oneself, nor in prayer, nor in the frequent reception of the Sacraments, nor in giving alms, but in charity." ¹⁸ Needless to say, by thus insisting on the need of genuine charity these writers do not intend to disparage the practice of good works.

¹³ De Oratione Dominica, c. 24, n. 8.—See the Vienna edition of St. Cyprian's works (Corpus Scriptorum Eccles. Latin.), III, 1, 285.

¹⁴ De Officiis, I, c. 30 (Migne, P. L., XVI, 66).

¹⁵ Tract. in Epist. I Ioan., VII, n. 8 (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 2033).—Cfr. Abelard, Ethica, c. 5: "Habe, inquit Augustinus, caritatem et fac, quod vis." (P.L., CLXXVIII, 647).

¹⁶ Hom. in Evang., I, hom. 2 (Migne, P. L., LXXVI, 1093).—On the teaching of the Fathers cfr. M. Reichmann, S.J., Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel, Freiburg 1903, pp. 29 sqq., 40 sqq.

¹⁷ Cfr. N. Paulus, "Johann Herolt und seine Lehre," in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1902, pp. 429 sqq.

¹⁸ Pratica di amar Gesù Cristo, Turin 1768.—Cfr. F. Meffert, Der hl. Alfons von Liguori. Mayence 1901, p. 258; John Cassian, Collat. Patr., I, c. 6-7 (Migne, P.L., XLIX, 488); St. Gregory the Great, Hom. in Evang., II, hom. 29, n. 4 (P.L., LXXVI, 1216).

3. PARVITAS MATERIAE. —The teaching of the casuists concerning parvitas materiae must be judged in the light of the truth just set forth, namely, that the state of a man's soul is determined, not by his external compliance with the law, but by his interior disposition. Catholic theologians hold that a duty may be regarded as fulfilled even though the act be materially complete, and that no transgression is a mortal sin if the matter is unimportant (materia parva), —provided, of course, that the will of the transgressor be not positively evil; for a positively evil will may render an act grievously sinful even if the object be in itself slight.¹⁹

¹⁹ Cfr. H. Thurston, S.J., in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. IX, p. 154.

The doctrine of the parvitas materiae, however, is not without its difficulties. It cannot be left to the subjective judgment of the individual to decide in a given case what is materia parva, and the casuists have made it their particular business to fix a point with regard to every single commandment where the parvitas materiae begins. But their decision can only be approximate and naturally is subject to change. The objects of the moral law cannot be measured with mathematical precision. Note also that, if the parvitas materiae is to be interpreted in favor of morality, the subject must have the will to obey the law. Where good will is lacking, or where there is a positive tendency to evil, an act may be mortally sinful even though its object is materia parva according to common estimation. Thus the destruction of some object belonging to another, even though its value be small, may involve great malice, e. g., when one knows that the owner is extremely fond of the object and would be deeply grieved by its loss. In this way an act directed to a small and unimportant object may yet be a grievous sin.²⁰

²⁰ F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, p. 102.

READINGS, —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 203 sqq. —R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, pp. 267 sqq. —Th. Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Juris Naturalis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 378 sqq. —C. Gutberlet, Ethik und Naturrecht, 3rd ed., pp. 100 sqq. —J. E. Ross, C. S. P., Christian Ethics, pp. 75 sqq.