Section 1: Nature and Origin of Sin

1. DEFINITION. —The terms sin,¹ transgression,² iniquity,³ offense,⁴ and disobedience,⁵ are synonymously employed by Holy Scripture to designate a wilful transgression of the law of God, or voluntary disregard of His will.

¹ Ἁμαρτία, ἁμάρτημα. Rom. V, 13, 20; Eph. II, 1; 1 John III, 4.

² Παράβασις. Rom. II, 23; IV, 15; V, 14; Heb. II, 2.

³ Ἀνομία. Matth. VII, 23; Rom. VI, 19; 1 John III, 4.

⁴ Παράπτωμα. Matth. VI, 14 sq.; Rom. V, 18; 2 Cor. V, 19; Eph. II, 1.

⁵ Παρακοή. Rom. V, 19; Heb. II, 2.—Cfr. on the use of these terms K. Clemen, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, Vol. I, Göttingen 1897, pp. 35 sqq.

"What is sin," says St. Ambrose, "but an offense against the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly precepts?"⁶ St. Augustine, who employs the words "divine law" and "eternal law" alternately, declares that: "A sin is some deed, word, or desire against the eternal law."⁷ Since all temporal laws are derived from, or contained in, the lex aeterna, every sin manifestly involves a violation of the will of God. St. Thomas says: "Sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now, that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary.... Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which no thing can depart without becoming incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will. One is proximate and homogeneous, viz., the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz., the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine includes two things in the definition of sin; one pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says, ‘deed, word, or desire’; the other pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is, as it were, the form of sin, when he says, 'against the eternal law.'"⁸

⁶ De Paradiso, c. VIII, n. 39 (Migne, P. L., XIV, 292): "What is sin but a transgression of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly precepts?"

⁷ Contra Faustum Manich., l. XXII, c. 27 (Migne, P. L., XLII, 418): "A sin is some deed, word, or desire against the eternal law."

⁸ Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 71, art. 6: "Sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now, that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure; and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which no thing can depart without becoming incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will. One is proximate and homogeneous, namely human reason; the other is the first rule, namely the eternal law, which is God’s reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine includes two things in the definition of sin: one pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is, so to speak, the matter of sin, when he says, deed, word, or desire; the other pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is, as it were, the form of sin, when he says, against the eternal law." —Cfr. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, pp. 522 sqq. —The various definitions of sin given by the Fathers and leading Scholastics will be found in St. Bonaventure, Comment, in Sent., II, dist. 35, dub. 6 (Opera Omnia, Quaracchi 1885, Vol. II, p. 838).

The definition given by St. Augustine and adopted by St. Thomas applies alike to actual sins (i. e., acts or omissions violating the moral law) and sinful habits (habitus peccaminosi).

2. CHARACTERISTICS. —Sin, being a wilful transgression of the divine law, has the following, partly positive and partly negative, notes or characteristics: a) Sin does not inhere in the nature of things, nor proceed from the Divine Essence or some other independent principle, but owes its existence entirely to free-will. "By the will," says St. Augustine, "a man sins or lives a good life."⁹ St. Thomas writes: "Sin consists essentially in an act of free choice, which is a function of the will and of reason."¹⁰ And in another place: "A man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin."¹¹

⁹ Retract., I, c. 9, n. 4: "It is by the will that one sins and lives rightly." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 596).

¹⁰ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 6: "Sin consists essentially in an act of free choice, which is a faculty of will and reason."

¹¹ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 80, art. 1: "A man’s will alone is directly the cause of his sin."

Being an act of a created agent, sin is not a substance but merely an accident. It is not some- thing that is not (οὐκ ὄν), but something that ought not to exist (μὴ ὄν). In other words, it has no substance of its own, but is a privation or corruption of goodness (privatio boni) ; not, of course, a pure privation, but merely "an act deprived of its due order."¹² "Evil," the Angelic Doctor says, "... is nothing else than a privation of that which a man is naturally apt to have and ought to have;... but a privation is not an essence; it is a negation in a substance."¹³

¹² Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 72, art. 1, ad 2: "Sin is not a pure privation, but an act deprived of its due order."

¹³ Summa contra Gentiles, III, c. 7: "Evil is nothing else than a privation of that which one is naturally apt to have and ought to have. But a privation is not an essence; it is a negation in a substance." —Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XI, c. 9: "Evil has no nature, but the loss of good has received the name of evil." (Migne, P. L., XLI, 325). —Ibid., XII, c. 9 (P. L., XLI, 355). —IDEM, Contra Epist. Manich. Fundam., c. 35, n. 30: "Who can doubt that the whole of what is called evil is nothing other than corruption? But if no evil is found in things except corruption, and corruption is not a nature, then no nature at all is evil." (P. L., XLII, 201). —Cfr. Saint Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 63, art. 1: "To sin is nothing else than to depart from the rectitude which an act ought to have, whether sin is considered in natural things, artificial things, or moral things." — IDEM, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 21, art. 1: "Sin properly consists in an act done for some end when it does not have the due order toward that end." —Ibid., qu. 71, art. 1: "Sin properly denotes an inordinate act, just as an act of virtue is an ordered and due act." —Cfr. J. Nirschl, Ursprung und Wesen des Bösen, Ratisbon 1854, pp. 29 sqq.

Aristotle regarded sin as a necessary stage on the way to goodness, or as goodness itself in so far as it has not yet proceeded from potency to act, and consequently is a mere imperfection or minus bonum.¹⁴ This is a false view, for while it cannot be denied that both in the life of individuals and in the history of the human race evil sometimes appears as the inciting cause of good, it is equally true, and a matter of common experience, that such cases are the exception, not the rule, and consequently prove nothing with regard to the nature of evil. If an evil act accidentally results in good, this is not imputable to man, but to God. Cfr. Gen. L, 20: "You thought evil against me, but God turned it into good, that he might exalt me... and save many people."¹⁵

¹⁴ Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1. XIV, c. 4: evil itself is potentially good.

¹⁵ Cfr. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 96: "It must not be doubted that God acts well even by permitting things that are done evilly to be done. For He permits this only by a just judgment, and assuredly everything just is good. Therefore, although evil things, insofar as they are evil, are not good, nevertheless it is good that not only good things but also evil things should exist. For unless it were good that evil things should exist, they would in no way be permitted to exist by the omnipotent Good, for whom, without doubt, it is as easy not to permit what He does not will to exist as it is to do what He wills." (Migne, P. L., XL, 276).—IDEM, De Praedest. Sanctorum, c. 16, n. 33: "It is in the power of the wicked to sin. But that by sinning they should do this or that evil is not in their power, but in the power of God, who divides the darkness and orders it, so that even from what they do against the will of God, nothing but His will is fulfilled." (P. L., XLIV, 984).

It would be a mistake, however, to conceive sin as a simple negation. If it were merely the lack or absence of good, sin would be a natural and necessary result of creatural limitation, and its real author would be God Himself. Deep down in his heart every man knows that sin is not the work of God but of man, and that it involves guilt.¹⁶

¹⁶ Cfr. Psalm L, 5-6; Matth. XXVII, 3-5.

b) God cannot be the author of sin as such.¹⁷ For, in the first place, sin is not a substance but merely a privation, and, secondly, Almighty God punishes the sinner. "God in no wise wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good," explains St. Thomas; "the evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached." ¹⁸ In other words, "God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault." ¹⁹ Holy Scripture frequently refers to God as the Author of holiness, and the all-holy One who is free from sin and tempteth no man.²⁰ It seems hard to reconcile this truth with the many texts in which He is described as actively cooperating in the sinful deeds of His creatures. Thus St. Paul says of the gentiles that, because they practiced idolatry, "God gave them up (παρέδωκεν) to the desires of their heart, unto uncleanness, to dishonor their own bodies among themselves," and "delivered them up to shameful affections,... to a reprobate sense/' etc.²¹ In another place he declares that the heathen, "having their understanding darkened,... have given themselves up to lasciviousness." ²² The seeming contradiction cannot be solved by putting an arbitrary construction upon the sacred text. Being the first, universal, and immediate cause of all things and all operations, God works in every creature and has a share in every creatural act. Every ethical act performed by man has two causes —God and free-will. Though these causes cooperate closely, they are essentially distinct in their nature as well as in the relation they respectively bear to the act performed. Free-will is the efficient cause (causa efficiens) of every ethical act as such. But sin is never an act of God. St. Paul speaks of God as cooperating, not in the sinful acts of the gentiles, but in punishing them.²³

¹⁷ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Ordine, II, c. 7, n. 23: "You will confess God to be the author of evils—a sacrilege more detestable than which nothing occurs to me." (P. L., XXXII, 1005). — IDEM, Enchiridion, c. 23, n. 8: "We must in no way doubt that the cause of the good things pertaining to us is nothing other than the goodness of God, but that the cause of evil things is the will of a changeable good falling away from the unchangeable Good." (P. L., XL, 244).—Cfr. K. Clemen, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, Vol. I, pp. 123 sqq.

¹⁸ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 19, art. 9: "God in no way wills the evil of fault, which removes order toward the divine good. But He wills the evil of natural defect or the evil of punishment by willing some good to which such an evil is joined."

¹⁹ Ibid., qu. 49, art. 2: "God is the author of the evil which is punishment, but not of the evil which is fault." —Cfr. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, pp. 569 sqq.; Th. H. Simar, Die Theologie des hl. Paulus, Freiburg 1883, pp. 82 sq.

²⁰ Lev. XI, 44; XIX, 2; Matth. V, 48; XIX, 17; Jas. I, 13; 1 Pet. I, 1 6.

²¹ Rom. I, 24, 26, 28.

²² Eph. IV, 19; cfr. Acts VII, 42.

²³ διό, διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ καθώς παρέδωκεν.

It would not be correct, even so, to describe the divine cooperation in the evil deeds of men as a mere permission or toleration. God works in all His creatures at all times, and no secondary cause, whether it be spiritual or material, can operate without His concurrence. Hence He not merely permits sin, but somehow positively cooperates in its commission (concursus divinus). "God is the cause of the act of sin," says St. Thomas; "yet He is not the cause of sin [as such], because He does not cause the act to have a defect." ²⁴ "God is the author of all that exists/' explains St. Augustine, "but He is not the author of evil, because all things are good in so far as they exist." ²⁵ Again: "Every nature, even that which is corrupted, is good qua nature, and evil [only] in so far as it is corrupt." ²⁶ God's contribution to a sinful act is in itself good. He merely enables man to employ the faculties which He has given him for a good purpose. It is man who renders the act evil by having a wrong intention. The Scholastics express this truth as follows: "Deus concurrit ad materiale, non ad formale peccati /' The Tridentine Council condemns the assertion that "it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul."²⁷ Besides, God often employs sin as a means of punishing the sinner and thus indirectly causes good to spring from evil.²⁸

²⁴ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 79, art. 2: “God is the cause of the act of sin; yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to be defective. The act of sin is a certain movement of free choice. But the will of God is the cause of all movements, as Augustine says. Therefore the will of God is the cause of the act of sin.”

²⁵ De Divers. Quaest., 83, n. 21: "God is not the author of evil, who is the author of all things that exist; for insofar as they exist, they are good." (Migne, P. L., XL, 16).

²⁶ St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 13: "Every nature, even a corrupted one, insofar as it is a nature, is good; insofar as it is corrupted, it is evil." (P. L., XL, 16, 28).

²⁷ Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 6: "If anyone says that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works as well as good, not merely permissively but also properly and of Himself, so that the treason of Judas is no less His own work than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema."

²⁸ Cfr. Gen. XLV, 7 sq.; L, 20; Wisd. XI, 17; Matth. XIII, 29 sqq. —St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 54, n. 4: "Do not suppose that the wicked exist in this world for no purpose and that God works no good through them. Every wicked man lives either that he may be corrected or that through him a good man may be exercised." (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 630). — IDEM, Enchiridion, c. 27: "God judged it better to bring good out of evils than to permit no evils to exist." (P. L., XL, 245).

Against the teaching just propounded the following objection has been raised: "Some actions are evil and sinful in their species (secundum suam speciem). Now, that which is the cause of a thing, is also the cause of whatever belongs to that thing in respect of its species. If, therefore, God caused the act which is sinful, He would be the cause of sin." This fallacy is tersely refuted by St. Thomas as follows: "Acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein the nature of evil consists, but from some object to which that privation is united; and so this defect, which we say is not from God, belongs to the species of the act as a consequence, and not as a specific difference." ²⁹ In other words, God causes the act and its species, without causing the defect that renders it evil.

²⁹ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 79, art. 2, ad 3: “It would seem that actions are evil and sinful according to their species. But whatever is the cause of a thing is the cause of that which belongs to it according to its species. Therefore, if God were the cause of the act of sin, it would follow that He was the cause of sin. Acts and habits do not receive their species from the privation itself, in which the nature of evil consists, but from an object to which such a privation is joined. Thus the defect itself, which is said not to be from God, belongs to the species of the act consequentially and not as a specific difference.” —Cfr. J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, Vol. I, pp. 74 sqq.

Some theologians hold that God merely permits evil but never cooperates in its production. This view cannot be squared with the Tridentine decision quoted above, which refers to His action in the production of evil as " permissive operari." ³⁰ c) Sin, being inspired by opposition to the will of God, who is the Supreme Lawgiver and benevolent Father of His creatures, is an act of disobedience and ingratitude.³¹ As an act of disobedience it is called an offense (offensa Dei, offensio).

³⁰ V. supra, p. 8, n. 27.

³¹ Deut. XXXII, 6; Is. I, 2-4; Jer. II, 32; V, 21-25.

But if God is absolutely perfect and incapable of suffering, how is it possible to offend Him and provoke His anger,³² especially since the sinner commonly lacks the animus iniuriandi, i. e., the deliberate intention of offending? That this is so may be admitted; yet the (metaphorical) designation of sin as an offense against God corresponds so well with its nature and with our limited human conception of Him, that it must be accepted as substantially correct.³³

³² Cfr. Ps. V, 5 sqq.; X, 4; LXXVII, 17.—Cfr. M. Pohlenz, Vom Zorn Gottes, Göttingen 1909.

³³ Cfr. B. Doérholt, Die Lehre von der Genugtuung Christi, Paderborn 1891, pp. 269 sqq.

Being an act of disobedience to the will of God and a denial of the moral order, sin is necessarily opposed to the sinner's own welfare, nay to his very nature. Instead of the beatitude for which he was created, and towards which his nature as well as the will of His Maker compel him to tend, the sinner seeks his happiness in him- self and other creatures. Hence every sin springs from inordinate self-love ³⁴ and must result in shame, discontent, unhappiness, and spiritual suicide.³⁵ The common sense of mankind has embodied this truth in many proverbs, e. g., "Every sinner is his own executioner," "Sin is its own punishment," "It does not pay to be wicked," etc.

³⁴ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 4: "Inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin."

³⁵ Cfr. Gen. III, 5, 10; Jer. II, 13; Tob. XII, 10; Prov. VIII, 36.

3. ORIGIN. —For an explanation of the origin of sin we must turn to Revelation. a) The first sin, —the deliberate rebellion of Lucifer and his angels against the will of God ³⁶ —was purely spiritual. As these angels were pure spirits, the decision they made was irrevocable, and their punishment will last forever. Man also sinned, but his fall was not due to malice. He was seduced by the devil, the prince or god of this world,³⁷ who is not yet fully subdued, but continues to work havoc in the "children of unbelief." ³⁸ Man's sin, therefore, differs from the sin of the fallen angels in several respects: (i) It is not purely spiritual, but partly carnal, and hence the result, not of pure malice, but of malice and infirmity combined. (2) In man sin proceeds not merely from a momentary decision of the will, as in the case of the fallen angels, but likewise from original sin, which is a cooperating factor in every personal transgression. For this reason sin in man is not punished by death but is pardonable. True, man cannot redeem himself, but he can be redeemed.³⁹ Aside from the state of final impenitence, moreover, the soul of the human sinner is not utterly dead, but capable of being revived. In the majority of cases sin, to employ an Augustinian phrase, is "not nature, but against nature," ⁴⁰ and even the most grievous offender still remains an object of compassion in the eyes of God, who, while He hates sin, desires that the sinner be converted and live.⁴¹

³⁶ Cfr. Matth. XXV, 41; Luke X, 18; Apoc. XII, 7-9-

³⁷ John XII, 31; XIV, 30; XVI, 11; 2 Cor. IV, 3 sqq.—Cfr. Conc. Lateran. IV (a. 1215), c. 1: "The devil and the other demons were indeed created good in nature by God, but they became evil by themselves. Man, however, sinned at the suggestion of the devil." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 428).

³⁸ Wisd. II, 24 sq.; John VIII, 44; Eph. II, 1 sq.; VI, 12; I John III, 8.

³⁹ Matth. I, 21; Acts XVII, 22-31; Rom. V, 12; Gal. I, 4; cfr. Jas. I, 14.

⁴⁰ St. Augustine, Contra Epist. Manich. Fundam., c. 35, n. 39: "It is now easy to see that evil is not a nature, but contrary to nature." (Migne, P. L., XLII, 201).

⁴¹ Cfr. Ez. XVIII, 32; XXXI, n; Wisd. XI, 24 sq.; Matth. V, 45; 2 Pet. III, 9.

It is a characteristic fact of no small importance in judging the malice of sin that man was named after the lower or mortal side of his nature. Holy Scripture says: "As a father hath compassion on his children, so hath the Lord compassion on them that fear him: for he knoweth our frame."⁴²

Theologians are at variance with regard to the nature of the sin committed by the fallen angels and that of our first parents.⁴³ The crime of the angels probably was pride. Some rationalists hold that Adam and Eve died because the fruit of the tree of which they ate was poisonous. This theory is as untenable as that the first human sin was an act of fornication.⁴⁴

⁴² Ps. CII, 13 sq.—Cfr. Gen. V, 2; Ps. LXXVII, 38 sq.; Is. LXIV, 8 sq.—St. Ambrose, De Noé et Arca, c. 4, n. 9: "Man, placed in the region of earth and bearing flesh, cannot be without sin; for earth is, as it were, a place of temptations, and flesh an enticement to corruption." (Migne, P. L., XIV, 366).—Cfr. the major antiphon for Dec. 22 in the Roman Breviary: "O King of the nations and their desired one, and cornerstone who makes both one: come and save man, whom you formed from clay."

⁴³ Cfr. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, pp. 578 sqq., 593 sqq.; Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 220 sqq.; A. Schopfer, Geschichte des Alien Testamentes, pp. 47 sqq.; Pohle-Preus, God the Author of Nature, p. 342.

⁴⁴ Cfr. 2 Cor. XI, 3.

The question why God did not prevent the sin of our first parents, is answered by St. Augustine as follows: "God did not lack the power of creating man so that he could not sin, but chose to make him so that he could sin if he wished, or abstain from sin if he preferred, by forbidding this and prescribing that; thus it was first a merit not to sin, and later a just reward not to be able to sin." ⁴⁵ b) To understand the nature and gravity of sin, we must remember that the disobedience of our first parents was a very grievous, nay, in some respects the most grievous offense a human being could commit. And this for two reasons:

⁴⁵ De Continentia, c. VI, n. 16: "God did not lack the power to make him such that he could not sin, but He preferred to make him such that it lay with him to sin if he willed and not to sin if he did not will, forbidding the one and commanding the other, so that at first not sinning might be a good merit for him, and afterward being unable to sin a just reward." (Migne, P. L., XL, 359)-

«) Adam and Eve sinned in spite of the extraordinary natural and supernatural privileges which they enjoyed; 0) Their disobedience was an act of flagrant ingratitude and formal contempt, committed with the full knowledge that it would injure not only themselves but all their descendants.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XXII, c. 15, n. 1; Enchiridion, c. 27, 45, 48; De Corrept. et Gratia, C. 12, n. 35. —St. Bonaventure, Comment. in Sent., II, dist. 21, art. 3, qu. 1 and 2.

Moreover, Christ became man and suffered and died because of sin.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Cfr. Matth. I, 21; Mark X, 45; John III, 16 sq.; Rom. V, 8 sqq.; 2 Cor. V, 15; Eph. I, 7.

Again, men continue to sin, though their intellect is enlightened by revelation and their will strengthened by grace, and in spite of the incomprehensible love shown in the atonement.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ John III, 16; XV, 13; Eph. I, 3-14; HI, 16-19; 1 John III, 16; IV, 9. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 14, art. 2.

Every serious transgression of the divine law, i. e., every actual mortal sin, deserves temporal and eternal death and delivers the sinner into the bondage of Satan.⁴⁹ But not every transgression of the law is mortally sinful. There are slight offenses, called "light and daily sins, which are also called venial sins," by the Tridentine Council, and these do not destroy sanctifying grace.⁵⁰ It is to the important distinction between mortal and venial sin that we must now turn our attention.

⁴⁹ Gen. II, 17; Rom. VI, 23; Jas. I, 15-

⁵⁰ Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 11. Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 6, qu. 14.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 71-89. —Suarez, Tractatus de Vitiis et Peccatis, disp. 1-6 (Opera Omnia, Vol. IV, pp. 515 sqq.).—J. Müller, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, 6th ed., 2 vols., Stuttgart 1877-78.—M. Merkle, Das Wesen des Bösen, Dillingen 1847. —F. Teipel, De Peccati Natura, Coesfeld 1847, pp. 10 sqq.—J. Nirschl, Ursprung und Wesen des Bösen, Ratisbon 1854, pp. 23 sqq. —K. Clemen, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, Vol. I, Göttingen 1897, pp. 20 sqq. —C. Manzoni, De Natura Peccati, S. Angeli Laud., 1890. —J. B. Pighi, Commentarius de Iudicio Sacramentali, 3rd ed., Verona 1904, pp. 97 sqq. —E. Janvier, Exposition de la Morale Catholique, Vol. V, Paris 1907.—M. J. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Freiburg 1873, Vol. II, pp. 515 sqq. —Chr. Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. IX, 2nd ed., pp. 295 sqq.—Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, pp. 232 sqq.—A. C. O'Neil, O.P., art. "Sin," in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 4 sqq. —Card. Manning, Sin and Its Consequences, Am. reprint, New York 1904. —A. B. Sharpe, Evil, Its Nature and Cause, London 1906. —Card. Billot, De Natura et Ratione Peccati Personalis, Rome 1900.—Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 133 sqq. —Wilhelm-Scannell, A Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. II, 2nd ed., London 1901, pp. 3 sqq. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. I, pp. 320 sqq., 11th ed., Innsbruck 1914. —Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, Vol. I, pp. 186 sqq.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Moralis et Pastoralis, Vol. II, Paris 1905, pp. 239 sqq.—Al. Sabetti, S.J. (ed. T. Barrett, S.J.), Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 22nd ed., New York 1915, pp. 111 sqq. —Thos. Slater, S.J., The Foundation of True Morality, N. Y. 1920, pp. 65 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 391 sqq. —L. J. Nau, Readings on Fundamental Moral Theology, N. Y. and Cincinnati 1926, pp. 26-35.