Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 1: The Mutual Duties of the Married
Husband and wife together constitute a society, i. e., a stable union of persons, entered into for a common purpose, i. e., a complete enduring personal partnership for the continuance of the race.
From this definition may be deduced the mutual duties of husband and wife. These duties are partly natural, partly intellectual, moral, and religious. They are based upon the threefold character of Matrimony as a natural union, a moral society, and a sacramental association for the salvation of its members, and designed to enable man to accomplish the threefold purpose of marriage, namely, the propagation of the human race, mutual assistance, and mutual sanctification.1
1 Gen. I, 27 sq.; II, 18; Matth. XIX, 4–6; 1 Cor. VII, 2–5; 1 Tim. II, 15; 1 Pet. III, 7.
Though the sedatio concupiscentiae and the propagation of the species are true purposes of Matrimony, yet its highest or principal object is the undivided community of life led by husband and wife.2 Hence we may distinguish matrimonial duties of the natural or lower, and of the spiritual or higher order.3
2 1 Cor. VII, 2.—St. Augustine, De Bono Coniug., c. 5: “Marriage exists for this, that concupiscence, reduced to a legitimate bond, should not drift about misshapen and unrestrained, having from itself an unbridled weakness of flesh, but from marriage an indissoluble fellowship of fidelity; from itself a tendency to immoderate intercourse, from marriage a manner of chaste procreation. For although it is shameful to wish to use a husband lustfully, it is nevertheless honorable to be unwilling to unite except with a husband and to bear children only by a husband.”—Ibid., c. 3: “The good of marriage, which the Lord also confirmed in the Gospel, not only because He forbade dismissing a wife except for the cause of fornication (Mt. XIX, 9), but also because He came when invited to a wedding (John II, 2), why it is good is rightly asked. It does not seem to me to be only the natural fellowship in the different sex. Otherwise marriage would no longer be called such in old age, especially if they had either lost children or had begotten none. But now, in a good marriage, even one advanced in years, although the ardor of age between male and female has withered, the order of charity between husband and wife nevertheless flourishes, because the better they are, the earlier, by mutual consent, they have begun to abstain from the union of their flesh, not that it would thereafter be a necessity not to be able to do what they wished, but that it would be to their praise first not to have wished what they could.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 377, 375).
3 Gen. II, 24; Matth. XIX, 5; 1 Cor. VII, 4; Eph. V, 25–29; Tit. II, 4.
The qualities required of the married are thus described by the famous pulpit jester Abraham a Santa Clara: “Married people must have good teeth, for they are obliged to chew and swallow many disagreeable things. They must have good fingers, for it is often necessary that they peer through them. They must have good feet, for the shoe will often pinch them. They must have a good stomach, for they have to digest many troubles. They must be very devout, for they have to carry the cross every day in the year.”
I. The principal duties of the married in the natural order are cohabitation and the debitum coniugale.
- The duty of living together (communio mensae sive cohabitatio) is imposed by the common life to which both parties are vowed.4 By the law of nature the husband is the head of the family and determines its place and manner of living. If for some good reason he decides to change his domicile, the wife is bound to follow him, unless she is physically or morally unable to do so. If he is temporarily forced to live apart from his wife, he should obtain her consent, without which he should not act except in case of necessity, and even then only provided the separation does not bring in its wake the periculum incontinentiae. For a short absence the husband does not need the consent of his wife, but it would undoubtedly be an injustice to her if he remained away even for a brief while without informing her of the reason.5
4 Matth. XIX, 5; 1 Cor. VII, 5.—Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theologia Mor., l. VI, n. 977.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 388.
5 St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 939: “It is certain that spouses are bound by an obligation of justice to cohabit in the same house, at the same table and bed. Hence it is inferred that neither spouse can depart elsewhere for a long time against the will of the other unless just causes are present, namely for the public good, to support or protect the family, or to avoid harm from enemies. But Bossius, with Toletus and Sayrus, said that if the husband had to remain elsewhere for a long time, he would be bound, if he conveniently can, to bring his wife there so that she may cohabit with him. . . . The husband can undertake a brief pilgrimage for the sake of devotion even against his wife’s will; the wife, however, cannot do this without the husband’s consent, since she is subject to his will and it does not become the state of women to travel. From mutual consent, however, spouses can rightly separate from each other, provided the danger of incontinence and harm to the education of the offspring are absent, from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. VII, 5): ‘Defraud not one another, except perhaps by consent for a time, that you may devote yourselves to prayer, and return together again, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence.’”—Cfr. Reuter-Lehmkuhl, Neoconfessarius, P. II, c. 4, n. p. 151.
If the matrimonial contract stipulates that the husband shall not change his domicile without the wife’s consent, or if he becomes a vagabond after marriage, and the wife was unaware of this propensity before she married him, she is not bound to accompany him. The fact that the wife’s dowry has not yet been paid, does not justify the husband in refusing to cohabit with her, for the duty of cohabitation flows from the marriage contract. Arbitrary separation, secret escape, or malicious abandonment of one party by the other, is a grievous injustice.
If married people live apart, it is usually an indication that their spiritual union is not very close. The wife’s place is in her husband’s house, and she inflicts an injury upon him if she goes away to live with her parents or other relatives.
If a man wishes to emigrate to a foreign country, he should not do so against the wishes of his wife. Even though she can give no other reason for opposing the plan than a strong love of home, this sentiment should be respected. The man who without important reasons disregards such a noble sentiment in his wife, cannot expect her to become more closely attached to him if he disregards her wishes. Only when the motives inspiring the husband are very weighty, can the wife be expected to acquiesce, even at the sacrifice of her natural sentiments.6
6 Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, p. 629.
Neither party may leave the other except on account of notorious adultery or if further cohabitation has become impossible without serious danger to faith, morals, or honor. In that event the facts should be reported to the ecclesiastical authorities and permission obtained for a separatio a mensa et toro.
If one party has committed adultery, and the fact is established beyond doubt, the innocent partner is justified in denying to the guilty the debitum coniugale and other signs of matrimonial affection, and if he or she intends to apply for an ecclesiastical decree of separation, the debitum must be denied, because otherwise the right to a separation would be forfeited.
Even when there are good reasons for demanding a separation the innocent party should consider well whether it would not be better, for the sake of the temporal and eternal welfare of himself or herself and of the children, to condone the crime and continue to cohabit with the guilty partner rather than get a separation.
For a husband or wife to live apart from the other without sufficient canonical reasons is a mortal sin and renders the party per se unworthy of absolution. Under present conditions, however, the Church is no longer able to prevent such unauthorized separations and therefore tolerates them. Hence if married persons living apart are convinced that they are right, if their separation does not give scandal, and if admonitions and warnings are likely to prove ineffective, they may be left unmolested.7
7 J. E. Pruner, Kath. Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 3rd ed., p. 335; cfr. Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 934 sqq.
- The communio tori or ius et debitum coniugale also flows from the nature of Matrimony.
a) Matrimonial cohabitation in the narrower sense of the term is not sinful, but on the contrary, the right to demand, and the duty to render it, are clearly taught by St. Paul, when he says: “Let the husband render to his wife her due, and likewise the wife to her husband. The wife hath not control of her own body [in this matter], but the husband; the husband likewise hath not control of his own body, but the wife. Deprive not one another [of your due], unless it be by consent for a time, that you may devote yourself to prayer and [then] be together again, lest Satan use your lack of self-control to tempt you.”8
8 1 Cor. VII, 3 sq.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 938: “Although spouses are bound by no law to the use of marriage, they are nevertheless bound of themselves in justice to render the debt to each other if one asks it of the other expressly or tacitly (modesty, of course, standing in the way). The reason for the former is that they are not bound to use their right. The reason for the latter follows from the nature of a mutual contract. Neither is bound, speaking of itself, to request the debt, although accidentally one may sometimes be bound either by charity, e. g., to notice the danger of incontinence threatening the spouse, or by legal justice, because the public welfare would be endangered unless offspring were born.”—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., II, n. 687: “The conjugal debt is called that common action of the spouses which is necessary for generation and which is ordained by the supreme Provider of all things for propagating human society. This action consists in carnal union, by which man and woman become as it were one body and one flesh. An act of this kind is called a debt by the Apostle; for it is what spouses owe to each other.”—Ibid., n. 688: “The conjugal act is of itself altogether honorable and licit between true spouses, provided it is exercised for a due end; for it is the sole means established and ordained by the Creator of nature Himself for the legitimate propagation of the human race. The ends which render such an act honorable are: 1. The generation of offspring, which is numbered among the principal ends of marriage; 2. The satisfaction of the obligation arising from the right of one’s spouse; 3. The avoidance of incontinence both in oneself and in one’s spouse; 4. The desire of fostering or obtaining honorable friendship, of making manifest the conjugal affection, or of promoting it.”—Ibid., n. 696: “There is no obligation of itself to request the conjugal debt. The reason is that neither spouse is bound to use his right and each can remit it. Accidentally, however, there can be an obligation to request it from charity or another virtue, especially in the husband, e. g., if he judges that his spouse is in danger of incontinence because of modesty in asking, or if the request is necessary for the sake of fostering or restoring conjugal friendship, etc.”—Wilhelm, Das Eheleben, 98 sqq.
It follows that the married have the right, within the limits set by God, to demand the debitum coniugale of each other, and to this right corresponds the strict duty of rendering the debitum, unless there are good reasons justifying a refusal. Hence both parties have equal rights and duties in regard to matrimonial cohabitation and, generally speaking, are bound under pain of mortal sin to render each other the debitum. This obligation is especially grave if either party is exposed to the danger of incontinence.
As a rule the debitum coniugale or the redditio debiti may not be denied sub gravi if the other party expressly demands it, or the demand may be reasonably presumed. Unwarranted denial of this right is apt to disturb the peace and may easily become a source of marital infidelity.9
9 1 Cor. VII, 7.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 63, art. 2: “Requesting the debt happens in two ways: in one way expressly, as when they request it from one another in words; in another way interpretatively, when, namely, the husband perceives through certain signs that the wife would wish the debt to be rendered to her, but is silent because of modesty; and thus, even though she does not expressly request the debt in words, nevertheless the husband is bound to render it when certain signs of rendering the debt appear in the wife.”—Ibid., art. 9, ad 1: “This has been divinely ordained because of the slipperiness of the flesh, that the debt always be rendered to one requesting it, lest any occasion of sin be given.”—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 940: “He sins mortally who denies the debt to a spouse seriously and urgently requesting it, because it is a grave matter and is owed in justice. Understand this unless the one requesting can be turned aside by entreaties or another honorable reason and the request is not immoderate (for if it is denied once in words to one frequently requesting it, apart from danger of incontinence, it seems to be only venial because of lightness of matter; and sometimes, if one requests too immoderately and unjustly too often, none), nor is there another just cause for denying. M. Perez judges it a just cause, apart from danger of incontinence for either, if more children would be born than they can support.”
The duty of rendering the debitum ceases if the party demanding it is not in the full possession of his or her senses (e. g., insane or totally drunk), if he or she suffers from an infectious disease or has forfeited the ius petendi debitum coniugale by adultery.10
10 St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 948, 950–953; Gury, II, n. 696: “The obligation of rendering the debt ceases when the right of demanding it ceases; but the right is extinguished especially in the following cases, namely: 1. If one of the spouses has committed adultery, because fidelity is no longer owed to one who breaks fidelity; 2. If the one requesting lacks the use of reason, because his request is not a human act; 3. If the one rendering can reasonably fear damage or grave danger to health, because spouses are not judged to have bound themselves to render the debt with so great an inconvenience; 4. If the one requesting has lost the right to request because of incest committed with the other’s blood relatives or for some other reason.”
b) The conjugal act (usus matrimonii) is licit only if prompted by reasonable and proper motives, such as the desire for children (generatio prolis), mutual affection (caritas mutua), or the wish to avoid sin (evitatio peccati), and provided it takes place within the limits prescribed by the moral law, or, as theologians are wont to put it, “salva personae incolumitate et salvâ debitâ honestate.” Though in its nature licit, nay laudable and where the conditions for supernatural merit are present, even meritorious, the actus coniugalis may become illicit and sinful per ac- cidens, i. e., through the circumstances accompanying it.11
11 St. Augustine, De Genesi ad Lit., l. IX, c. 7, n. 12: “That which marriages possess as a good, and by which marriages are good, can never be a sin. This, however, is threefold: fidelity, offspring, sacrament. In fidelity, care is taken that there be no intercourse with another woman or man outside the marriage bond; in offspring, that it be lovingly received, kindly nourished, religiously educated; in the sacrament, moreover, that the marriage not be dissolved and that the man or woman who is dismissed not be joined to another even for the sake of offspring. This is, as it were, the rule of marriages, by which either the fecundity of nature is adorned or the depravity of incontinence is governed.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 397.)—Idem, De Bono Coniug., c. 6, n. 6: “Conjugal intercourse for the sake of generation has no fault; that for satisfying concupiscence, however, but nevertheless with one’s spouse, has venial fault because of fidelity to the marriage bed; adultery, however, or fornication, has mortal fault. And for this reason continence from all intercourse is indeed better than even marital intercourse itself, which is performed for the sake of begetting.”—Ibid., c. 7, n. 6: “But because that continence is of greater merit, while rendering the conjugal debt is no crime, demanding it beyond the necessity of generation is a venial fault, and fornicating or committing adultery is a punishable crime, conjugal charity ought to take care lest, while seeking for itself that from which it may be more greatly honored, it make for the spouse that from which the spouse may be condemned.” (P. L., 377 sq.)—Peter Lombard, Sent., l. IV, dist. 31, c. 5.—St. Thomas, S. Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 49, art. 5: “Just as the goods of marriage, in so far as they are in a habit, make marriage honorable and holy, so also, in so far as they are in actual intention, they make the act of marriage honorable with respect to those two goods of marriage which concern the act itself. Hence, when spouses come together for the sake of procreating offspring, or in order to render to each other the debt that pertains to fidelity, they are totally excused from sin.”—J. Nider († 1438), Praeceptorium Div. Legis, pr. 6, c. 4: “Intercourse in marriage is therefore a meritorious act and an act of the virtue which is called conjugal chastity, when it takes place solely for the sake of procreating offspring and educating it religiously for the increase of divine worship. And if the other due circumstances are then present, it is an act of the virtue which is called religion.”—Cfr. Denifle, Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 238 sqq.
a) If it entails grave danger to life or health for one or both of the parties, the act is illicit and cannot even be justified by the periculum incontinentiae, because the latter may be obviated by other means, e. g., prayer and mortification. When there is immediate danger to an already conceived fetus, e. g., through abortion, the concubitus matrimonialis is forbidden, because it would inflict upon the child an injustice which not even the danger of incontinence could excuse. If the procreation of an imperfect offspring is to be apprehended from the act, the principle of St. Thomas applies: “Although weak offspring may be generated, nevertheless it is better for it to exist thus than not to exist at all.”12 In such a case no right is violated by matrimonial intercourse because the proles concipienda as yet possesses no rights. Besides, the fact of conception and the harm apprehended are both uncertain.
12 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 64, art. 1, ad 4.
It should be observed, however, that harm caused to a child quite often means injury to the family and to the State, for instance, through idiocy. For this reason prospective parents are under a grave obligation to avoid whatever might lead to the birth of exceptionally abnormal offspring. Broadly speaking, married couples have not the right to bring into the world children whom they are unable to support, for they would thereby inflict a grievous damage upon society.
It should be remembered that a fetus has the rights of a human being. Hence the married are not permitted to have sexual intercourse if it is apt to injure an existing fetus and the injury is not compensated by a corresponding advantage. The risk of incontinence can be offset by other means. But to forbid marital inter- course when the danger of abortion is but slight, would be imposing an intolerable burden. Aside from the danger of abortion, all other possible injuries to be apprehended from marital intercourse may be compensated for by such reasonable ends as the fostering of mutual affection, avoiding incontinence, etc.13
13 F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. III, 5th ed., p. 431.
In cases of mental derangement on either side, the sexual intercourse of the married is subject to certain restraints imposed by regard for the welfare of the offspring. The children of a psychopathic or neurotic couple will not easily escape a hereditary taint. In cases of extreme and permanent psychic affection some authors hold that sexual intercourse is forbidden. When the trouble is less deep-seated and merely temporary, it will be advisable to await the return of a more normal condition, if this can be done without irritating the patient too much.14
14 Stöhr-Kannamüller, Handbuch der Pastoralmedizin, 5th ed., pp. 507 sqq.
β) Married people may not, under pain of mortal sin, gratify the sexual instinct outside the limits established by nature, especially are they forbidden to prevent conception or limit offspring except by mutual abstention.15 A hus- band who practices onanism cannot be absolved unless he shows extraordinary signs of contrition and a firm purpose of amendment. The wife should try to prevent onanistic intercourse. If she does not succeed, she should withhold interior consent from the sin committed by the vir onanista and manifest her disapproval of his conduct by earnest protests and admonitions. For the rest she may remain passive, because the act is legitimate in its inception and becomes sinful only through subsequent abuse on the part of the husband. If, however, it is impossible for the wife to render the debitum coniugale in ordine naturae, because the husband uses mechanical appliances (condoms, pessaries) or other means to prevent conception, (“contraceptives,” as they are called), she is strictly bound to deny him the debitum coniugale, because in that case the act is intrinsically bad from the very beginning and therefore co-operation would be illicit and a mortal sin except when rendered under the influence of dire compulsion.16
15 “A certain noble lord, otherwise well instructed, is accustomed to interrupt intercourse, even though his spouse objects, lest offspring follow. Asked why he acts thus, he replies that this was permitted to him by some learned confessor. When reproved, he says that he does it for a twofold reason: 1. Lest the condition of the family be brought low by more numerous offspring; 2. Lest the wife be excessively wearied by repeated pregnancy. Moreover, rejected by the pastor, who does not absolve him when he is unwilling to withdraw from this manner of acting, he everywhere proclaims his pastor ignorant and proud, as one who corrects the opinion of others and imposes unbearable burdens upon penitents. The Sacred Penitentiary, under date of Nov. 13, 1901, replied: The pastor of whom the case speaks acted rightly, and a penitent who is unwilling to abstain from this manner of acting, which is pure onanism, cannot be absolved.”—Cfr. L. Freund, Kindersegen und Kindersorgen, 2nd ed., Donauwörth 1907; D. J. Cardinal Mercier, The Duties of Conjugal Life, London C. T. S., pp. 14 sqq.
16 St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 927: “From the cases stated it is consequently resolved that it is lawful to use marriage for the sake of offspring, even though offspring need not necessarily be intended while it is exercised, provided that it is not positively prevented; indeed, sometimes it may even lawfully be excluded by a simple intention, e. g., by a poor man, lest he be excessively burdened with children.”—Ibid., n. 954: “You ask whether it is ever lawful to impede the generation of offspring. It is answered: Spouses can indeed for a grave reason do something from which the emission of seed follows accidentally; they sin, however, if in the use of marriage or after its use they do something by which conception is impeded or conceived seed is cast out. The reason for the former is that generation is not impeded, not even indirectly, but it is merely permitted that generation not occur, which is lawful for a reasonable cause. The reason for the latter is that they act against fidelity and the principal end of marriage. Hence neither impending poverty nor danger from childbirth excuses such persons.”—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., II, nn. 702–705.—Lehmkuhl, Casus Consc., Vol. I, 3rd ed., nn. 548–552.—Jos. Antonelli, Medicina Pastoralis, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 152 sqq., 476 sqq.
A woman who directly or indirectly (e. g., by complaining) induces her husband to employ unnatural means to prevent conception, commits a mortal sin.
It goes without saying that the medicinal or artificial sterilization of the semen virile post copulam is illicit.17
17 Except in cases of rape; Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 1013; cfr. Aertnys, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 7th ed., l. III, n. 192, qu. 2.
It is permissible to limit sexual intercourse to the period during which conception does not ordinarily take place.18
18 S. Poenit., decree of June 16, 1880.—M. D. Nardi, De Sanctitate Matrimonii Vindicata contra Onanismum, 3rd ed., Rome 1907.—C. Capellmann, Fakultative Sterilität ohne Verletzung der Sittengesetze, 13th ed., Aix-la-Chapelle, 1896, pp. 15 sqq.—A decision of the Holy Office, March 24, 1897, forbade the artificial fecundation of women (see Antonelli, Medicina Past., Vol. II, 4th ed., pp. 534 sqq.).
The excision of the uterus or ovaries, if performed for the sole purpose of preventing conception, is sinful, even in cases where conception might involve danger to the woman’s life.
If the husband demands the debitum coniugale while intoxicated, the wife, because of the danger to the offspring, is justified in denying him; nay, she is in duty bound to refuse if there is direct danger of abortion.19
19 Stöhr-Kannamüller, Handbuch der Pastoralmedizin, 5th ed., p. 507.
γ) Married people in the nature of things enjoy great freedom in those actions which are directed towards the concubitus coniugalis.20 But the usus matrimonii is not, as many seem to think, a permit for the unlimited gratification of the passions. It is, on the contrary, designed as a medicine and protection against inordinate concupiscence and must, therefore, always be chaste and decent.21 To indulge in it merely and solely for pleasure, i. e., to the positive exclusion of every other legitimate end, would consequently be sinful, for that pleasure is intended by nature as a means to an end, namely, the procreation of offspring, and must not be raised to the rank of an end in itself.22
20 St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 932: “You ask whether and when touches, looks, and indecent words are lawful between spouses. It is answered: Such acts are lawful to them in themselves, because to one to whom the end is lawful, the means are also lawful, and to one to whom consummation is lawful, the beginning is also lawful. Hence they may lawfully excite nature to intercourse by such acts. But if they are performed separately and without relation to intercourse, v. g., solely for the sake of pleasure, they are venial sins, because by reason of the state which renders those acts honorable they have a right to them. Unless, however, as often happens, they are joined with danger of pollution, or the spouses have a vow of chastity, for then they are mortal.”—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 700 sq.
21 Tob. IV, 13; VI, 16 sqq., 22. 1 Cor. VII, 29; Tit. II, 5.—St. Jerome, Adv. Iovinian., l. I, n. 49: “A wise man ought to love his wife with judgment, not with passion. Let him govern the impulses of pleasure and not be borne headlong into intercourse. Nothing is more shameful than to love one’s wife as though she were an adulteress. . . . It is the saying of a most learned man that chastity must above all be retained; when it has been lost, every virtue falls. In it lies the pre-eminence of womanly virtues. It commends the poor woman, exalts the rich, redeems the deformed, adorns the beautiful; it serves the ancestors well, whose blood it does not corrupt with secret offspring; it serves the children well, who need neither blush for their mother nor doubt their father; above all it serves herself well, whom it vindicates from the outrage of another’s body. . . . There are many things which ennoble distinguished characters. A woman’s proper virtue is chastity.” (Migne, P. L., XXIII, 281 sq.)—St. Augustine, De Bono Coniug., c. 11, n. 12: “The beauty of marriage is chastity in procreating and fidelity in rendering the carnal debt.” (P. L., XL, 382). Idem, Serm., n. 9 (al. 96 de tempore), c. 9, n. 12: “Many safeguards make a woman chaster; let manliness itself make a man chaste. For a woman therefore has greater custody, because she has greater weakness. She blushes before a man; do you not blush before Christ? You are freer because stronger: because you conquer easily, you are therefore entrusted to yourself. Over her are both the vigilance of her husband and the terror of the laws and the custom of morals and greater modesty; and over you is God, God alone.” (P. L., XXXVIII, 84.)
22 Prop. damn. sub Innoc. XI, n. 9: “The conjugal act performed solely for pleasure is wholly free from all fault and venial defect.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1026.)
According to Thomas R. Malthus († 1834) population, when unchecked, always increases in a geometrical ratio, whereas the food supply increases only in an arithmetical ratio, in other words, “while the primitive agricultural community increases from two to sixteen, the food which their labor produces only increases from two to eight. Thus a time must sooner or later arrive when the population has outrun the means of subsistence, and its further increase is limited by actual starvation.” The so-called Malthusian law has long since been disproved, but this fact does not hinder thousands of presumably educated persons from regarding its fundamental thesis as a sure conclusion of science.23 Christian economists have proved on a strictly scientific basis that Malthusianism is wrong.24 “With the increase in population,” says Dr. Linsenmann, “there grows not only the power of productivity inherent in human labor, but also, in consequence of advancing civilization, the productiveness of the soil, because it is more intensely cultivated, and the progress of the science of economics enables men to make better use of the gifts of nature. . . . The theory of voluntary self-restraint, moreover, misses its aim. If this self-restraint is to be truly moral, rather than a cause of grave moral aberrations and social evils (prostitution), it presupposes a moral strength which can be expected least of those who ought to be the first to exercise it. The man who possesses enough strength of character to practice this self-control, will not ‘breed proletarians,’ but is competent to establish and support a home of his own and to rear his children as useful members of society. It would not be better, but rather worse, for society if the best and morally most perfect families would produce fewer children in order not to deprive the offspring of the homeless proletarians of their sustenance. . . . When self-restraint is really moral and based upon mutual consent, it may be justified by the motive not to have more children than can be properly taken care of, in connection with other motives. But because of its dangers it should be recommended only with the greatest caution.”25
23 A. M. Carr-Saunders, The Population Problem, London, 1922; H. G. Sutherland, M. D., Birth Control, London, 1922, pp. 1 sqq.
24 H. G. Sutherland, Birth Control, London 1922, passim.—H. Pesch, S. J., Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie, Vol. II, pp. 587 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 132 sqq.—Idem, Der Sozialismus, 9th ed., pp. 392 sqq. (Engl. tr. by V. Gettelmann, S. J.).—F. Keller, Bevölkerungspolitik und christliche Moral, Freiburg 1905.—S. de Plauzoles, La Maternité et la Défense Nationale contre la Dépopulation, Paris 1909, pp. 119 sqq.
25 F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheol., pp. 633 sq.
Malthus, who was a parson of the Anglican Church and a conservative in politics, recommended abstinence from sexual intercourse on moral grounds only, and hence it is wrong to designate the modern theory of “birth control” as “Neo-Malthusianism.” In direct opposition to Malthus’s teaching the Malthusian League in England advises early marriage combined with artificial birth control.26 There can be no doubt that the honest citizen who marries and rears a large family of healthy children serves his country more effectively than the bachelor who engages in speculation regarding population figures.
26 “Although their policy is thus in flat contradiction to the policy of Malthus,” says Dr. Sutherland (op. cit., p. 3 sq.), “there are two things common to both. Each is based on the same fallacy, and the aim of both is wide of the mark. Indeed, the Neo-Malthusian, like Malthus, has ‘a mist of speculation over his facts, a vapor of fact over his ideas.’ Moreover, the path of the Malthusian League, although at first glance an easy way out of many human difficulties, is in reality the broad road along which a man or a nation travels to destruction; and as guides the Neo-Malthusians are utterly unsafe, since they argue from (a) false premises to (b) false deductions.”—Cfr. Aertnys, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 7th ed., l. VI, n. 493; B. Mosso, De Frustratione Finis Matrimonii in the Pastor Bonus, Treves 1893, pp. 376 sqq.
There is a duty of moderation and continence which binds all, even the married, according to the individual character of their relationship, and cannot therefore be regulated by a general law,—a duty to take care of one’s health and that of one’s partner, which finds expression in the ancient ecclesiastical admonition to the married to abstain from sexual intercourse at certain seasons of the year as a work of penance. That no positive law to this effect has come down to our time does not prove that the duty of moderation no longer binds married people. They should practice moderation for moral, religious, and hygienic reasons. The admonition of the Roman Catechism is still timely: “As all blessings are to be obtained from God by holy prayer, the faithful should be taught to abstain at times from marital intercourse in order to devote themselves to prayer and supplication to God. By practicing this religious continence, according to the proper and holy injunction of our Fathers, they will find the blessings of marriage augmented by a daily increasing accumulation of divine grace; and living in the pursuit and practice of piety, they will not only spend this life tranquilly and placidly, but will also rest on the true and firm hope, which ‘confoundeth not’ (Rom. v, 5), of attaining, through the goodness of God, life eternal.”27
27 Catech. Rom., P. II, c. 8, qu. 34.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 64, art. 6–9.
c) Intimately connected with the debitum coniugale is the duty of fidelity which the married owe to one another (fides matrimonialis). This duty is a postulate of nature, imposed by the purpose of Matrimony as well as by the fact that Christian marriage is a symbol of Christ’s indissoluble and exclusive union with His Church.28 Every gratification of the sexual instinct outside of Matrimony, nay even the voluntary desire for it, is a mortal sin (adulterium), doubly grave if the real or coveted accomplice is a married person. The specific sin of adultery is committed also if one party has illicit sexual intercourse with the consent of the other, because neither husband nor wife can abolish the matrimonial relation.29
28 Gen. II, 24; Matth. XIX, 5; 1 Cor. VII, 4; Eph. V, 25 sqq.; Heb. XIII, 4.—Catech. Rom., P. II, c. 8, qu. 24: “Fidelity . . . is the second good of marriage, not that habit of virtue with which we are imbued when we receive baptism, but a certain faithfulness by which husband and wife mutually bind themselves in such a way that one hands over to the other power over his or her body and promises never to violate that sacred covenant of marriage.”—St. Augustine, De Bono Coniug., c. 4: “This [fidelity], even in corporeal and abject matters, is a great good of the soul, and therefore it is certain that it ought to be preferred even to bodily health, in which our life also is contained. For although a little straw is almost nothing in comparison with much gold, nevertheless fidelity, when it is sincerely kept in a matter of straw just as in gold, is not therefore less because it is kept in a lesser matter.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 376.)
29 Prop. damn. sub Innoc. XI, n. 50: “Intercourse with a married woman with the husband’s consent is not adultery, and therefore it is sufficient in confession to say that one has committed fornication.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1067.)
Though, so far as the duty of mutual fidelity is concerned, there is no difference between man and wife, and adultery is equally sinful for both, in regard to the bonum fidei as well as the bonum sacramenti, this crime may be aggravated by uncertainty regarding the paternity of a resulting child.30
30 V. supra, pp. 438 sq., 440, 442. Cfr. Holweck, Die kirchlichen Strafgesetze, p. 265.
Adultery is one of the most pernicious of crimes, for it not only involves a grievous injustice to the innocent spouse, but violates the most sacred bond of society, destroys the peace and happiness of numberless families, promotes perjury, child-murder, and other heinous crimes; and hence we need not wonder at the terrible punishments leveled against it.31
31 Ecclus. XXIII, 21 sqq.; Ez. XXII, 11 sqq.; 1 Cor. VI, 9; Heb. XIII, 4.—St. Jerome, Adv. Iovinian., l. I, n. 49: “No calamity of captivity is greater than to be drawn to another woman.” (Migne, P. L., XXIII, 282).—Idem, Epist., 22, n. 12: “David . . . after, while walking upon the roof of his house, he was captivated by the nakedness of Bethsabee, joined homicide to adultery.” (P. L., XXII, 401).
Adultery is usually preceded by a mental estrangement between husband and wife, and by undue affection for a third party. Where this occurs, it is evident that husband and wife were not what they should have been to each other, namely, true soul-mates and boon companions, and this is often the fault of the party who poses as the innocent one after the catastrophe. Lack of expressions of sincere affection and signs of indifference are usually the first indications of an estrangement. They are followed by the destruction of mutual confidence and jealousy. Jealousy may be a sin, namely, when it nourishes suspicion; but in most instances it is caused by the coldness of the other partner, who claims rights, but forgets that he has corresponding duties to fulfil.32
32 Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, p. 634.
II. Prominent among the duties of the higher order which elevate and ennoble married life, are mutual love and the unity and indissolubility of the marriage bond.
- The principal duty of the married is mutual love (amor mutuus). The love which induced them to contract Matrimony should remain with them till death. St. Paul says: “Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church and gave himself up for her sake . . . Even thus ought husbands to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his own wife loveth himself. Surely no man hateth his own flesh, nay, he doth nourish and cherish it, even as Christ the Church; because we are members of his body, of his flesh and of his bones. For this shall man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall come to be one flesh. The mystery here is great—I mean in reference to Christ and the Church. However, let each of you, also, love his wife even as himself; and let the wife reverence her husband.”33
33 Eph. V, 28–33; cfr. Tit. II, 4.—Rive-Umberg, S. J., Die Ehe, 2nd ed., Ratisbon 1921, pp. 312 sqq.
This mutual love (unio cordium), which should be so strong that neither party will prefer his parents or children to the other except in extrema necessitate,34 is a highly important factor in marital life, first, because it preserves domestic concord, and especially the sacred blessing of mutual fidelity; second, because it guarantees mutual assistance and aid in the material, moral, and religious necessities of life, and third, because it secures the divinely-established subjection of the wife to the authority of her husband. For although husband and wife stand in a most intimate mutual relationship, and possess the same rights over each other in regard to the bonum fidei, yet the husband is the natural head of the family, and the wife owes him reverence and obedience in all matters pertaining to domestic government. From this duty of obedience it does not, however, follow that the husband may treat his wife as a servant or slave, for she is his companion and best friend, to whom he owes reverence and love.35
34 St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 939, dub. 2: “It must be noted that in extreme necessity aid must first be given to parents, who are to be loved as the source, rather than to one’s spouse, and first also to children, since they are a part of the parent. In grave necessity, however, aid must first be given to one’s spouse rather than to parents and children, because with respect to domestic administration there is a greater union between spouses, since they are one flesh.”
35 Gen. II, 20; III, 12, 16; Eph. V, 22–25, 28; Col. III, 18 sq.; Tit. II, 4 sq.; 1 Pet. III, 1.—Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 8, qu. 26 sq.—St. Ambrose, Epist., 63, n. 107: “Let the woman show deference to the man, not serve him; let her present herself to be governed, not coerced. She is unworthy of marriage who is worthy of strife. Let the man likewise direct his wife as a governor, honor her as the companion of his life, and let him make her a participant as a co-heir of grace.”—Leo XIII, Encycl. “Arcanum divinae sapientiae,” Feb. 10, 1880: “The man is the ruler of the family and the head of the woman; nevertheless she, because she is flesh of his flesh and bone of his bones, should be subject and obedient to the man in the manner not of a maidservant but of a companion, so that neither honor nor dignity be absent from the obedience rendered. In him who commands, and in her who obeys, since each represents an image, the one of Christ, the other of the Church, let divine charity be the perpetual moderator of duty.”—Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, nn. 389–391.
The sin of marital infidelity differs specifically from all other violations of charity. Voluntary aversion or enmity among married people easily becomes a mortal sin, both per se and because of the scandal arising therefrom and the evil consequences it may entail for the whole family.
One of the worst enemies of marital happiness is that blasé indifference to the simple joys of life which so often leads to coldness and neglect. When true love vanishes, its place is but too often taken by passion. The severest character test for the married is childlessness. Not many husbands can say to their sterile wives what Elcana, the father of Samuel, said to Anna: “Why weepest thou? and why dost thou not eat? And why dost thou afflict thy heart? Am I not better to thee than ten children?”36 And yet childless couples might learn from this Old Testament story, not only how to console each other, but also that God can render a barren womb fertile in answer to pious prayers and a vow.37 Unfortunately many childless marriages are barren through the fault of the husbands, who render their wives sterile by infecting them with loathsome diseases, usually contracted from prostitutes.
36 1 Kings I, 8.
37 Linsenmann, Lehrb. der Moraltheol., pp. 635 sq.—Cfr. Gen. XV, 2 sqq.; XVIII, 10 sqq.; XXI, 1 sqq.; Judg. XIII, 2 sq.; 1 Kings I, 19 sq.; Luke I, 36 sq.
- The unity of marriage (unitas matrimonii), flows directly from the spiritual and moral nature of Matrimony.
a) That polyandry (plurality of husbands) is opposed to the social order is evident from the fact that there is no room under that system for paternal law and authority. Polyandry is not so much a means for the multiplication of offspring as for indulgence in lust.
Polygamy (plurality of wives) does not necessarily and completely prevent the propagation of the race,38 yet it is unnatural and forbidden, being opposed to the unity of marriage, and consequently more or less incompatible with the equality which it demands between husband and wife. One inevitable consequence of the inequality ensuing from polygamy is the subjection of the wife to the husband; instead of a helpmeet, she becomes his slave.39 Polygamy is consequently forbidden by divine law, and the Church has strongly insisted on the unity of Christian marriage from the beginning of her career.40
38 Conc. Trid., Sess. XXIV, can. 2: “If anyone shall say that it is lawful for Christians to have several wives at the same time, and that this is prohibited by no divine law, let him be anathema.”—St. Augustine, De Bono Coniug., c. 17, n. 20: “It is not lawful for one woman to have several husbands as it is for one man to have several wives; nor could this be for the sake of offspring, if perhaps she could bear while he could not beget. For by a hidden law of nature, things which rule love singularity; things subject, however, are not only singly subject to single things, but, if natural or social reason permits, even several are becomingly subject to one. For one servant does not have several masters in the way that several servants have one master. Thus we read that no holy women served two or more living husbands, but we read that several women served one man, since the society of that nation permitted it and the reason of the time advised it; for this is not contrary to the nature of marriage. For several women can be impregnated by one man, but one woman cannot by several men (this is the force of first principles), just as many souls are rightly subjected to one God. And therefore there is no true God of souls except one, while one soul can commit fornication with many false gods, but cannot be made fruitful by them.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 387).—De Nupt. et Concup., l. I, c. 9, n. 10 (P. L., XLIV, 419).—St. Thomas, Sum- ma Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 65, a. 1: “Plurality of wives neither wholly removes nor in any way impedes the first end of marriage, since one man is sufficient to impregnate several wives and to educate the children born of them. But although it does not wholly remove the secondary end, it nevertheless greatly impedes it, because peace cannot easily exist in a family where several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy several wives according to their desire, and also because the participation of several in one office causes strife: just as potters quarrel with one another, and similarly several wives of one husband. It wholly removes the third end, because just as Christ is one, so also the Church is one. And therefore it is plain from what has been said that plurality of wives is in one respect contrary to the law of nature and in another respect not.”
39 Gen. I, 27; II, 24; IV, 19 sqq.; cfr. Gen. VI, 2; Matth. XIX, 2 sqq.; Luke XVI, 18; Rom. VII, 3; 1 Cor. VII, 3 sqq., 10.—Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 8, qu. 19.—St. Augustine, De Nupt. et Concup., l. I, c. 9, n. 10: “Nevertheless the very first divinely established union of the spouses sufficiently indicates that not one man and many women, but one man and one woman, pertains more to the good of marriage, so that marriages might take their beginning from there, where a more honorable example was contemplated.” (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 419).—St. Jerome, Adv. Iovinian., l. I, n. 14: “Where there is a number of husbands, there the husband, who is properly one, ceases to be. One rib at the beginning was changed into one wife. And they shall be, he says, two in one flesh (Gen. II, 24), not three or four; otherwise they are no longer two, if they are several.” (P. L., XXIII, 233).—The passage in Tertullian’s Montanistic treatise, De Exhort. Castitatis, c. 5: “Adam, the man of God, and Eve, the woman of God, having discharged the office of marriage one with the other, sanctioned the form of the man of God from the authority of the origin and the first will of God” (ed. Leopold, P. II, 103), refers to first in opposition to second marriage, which Tertullian regards as tantamount to fornication (cfr. ibid., c. 9: “Second marriage must be called nothing other than a kind of debauchery”).—V. Jäkel, Studien zur vergleichenden Frauenkunde, Berlin 1901, pp. 140 sqq.—G. Dorys, La Femme Turque, Paris 1902, pp. 236 sqq.
40 Conc. Trid., Sess. XXIV, can. 2.—Minucius Felix, Octavius, c. 31: “We gladly cling to the bond of one marriage; from the desire of procreating we know either one wife or none.” (Migne, P. L., III, 337).—Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, l. III, c. 12 (P. G., VIII, 1184).—St. Chrysostom, Hom. in Gen., LVI, c. 3 (P. G., LIV, 489).—Nicholas I, Epist., 97, n. 51 (P. L., CXIX, 999).
Gen. II, 24: “They shall be two in one flesh” (cfr. Matth. XIX, 5; Eph. V, 31) must be interpreted ethically. The meaning is that husband and wife should share the same ideas and sentiments, bear prosperity and adversity together, and act as if they were but one person. The text contains an indirect commendation of monogamy, because the relationship which it describes would be impossible in a polygamous marriage.
Gen. VI, 2: “The sons of God seeing the daughters of men, that they were fair, took to themselves wives of all which they chose [i. e., as many as] they chose,” describes not a good, but an evil deed.41
41 Ehrlich, Randglossen zur hebr. Bibel, Vol. I, 12, 29.
A non-Catholic writer says: “Monogamy is a burden to both parties, but weighs more heavily upon the husband than upon the wife. . . . From this fact the advocates of free love argue, with truly masculine logic, that monogamy ought to be abolished. Free love would probably be a more agreeable relation than marriage for the average man of to-day. For many it would merely mean the recognition and legalization of an existing condition. But for the female sex it would just as certainly prove a source of serious dangers and aberrations, fraught with far worse consequences than the present ‘yoke,’ of which a few neurotic women so bitterly complain. . . . The average man prefers polygamy, whereas the average woman rather favors monogamy. A radical change of the existing order would merely reverse the situation without improving it. . . . But there stands in favor of marriage and against free love this powerful argument: that the State recognizes (at least in principle) the duty of caring for children only in connection with a monogamous union concluded for life. Marriage and free love are equally inacceptable to both sexes: neither will be satisfied, no matter which solution is chosen. But the necessity of providing for the offspring decides the question absolutely in favor of marriage. The modern social community which we call State, and which has serious defects, but still greater advantages, demands monogamy in the interest of the child. All other expedients to safeguard the interests of the child and the liberty of the parents, are purely theoretical and utopian, and their occasional successful adoption within very small circles does not prove their adaptability on a larger scale. For the sake of the child it is necessary, therefore, that marriage be established by law. . . . We may agree with Björnson that the ideal of the woman, namely, chastity before and outside of marriage, should also be the ideal of the man. . . . Chastity on the part of the male is an absolutely reasonable demand and indispensable under present conditions for a healthy social life. Hence it should be striven for with might and main, even though, on account of its ideal nature, it can never be completely attained.”42
42 E. Platzhoff-Lejeune, Handschuhmoral, 2nd ed., pp. 16 sqq., 21.—F. W. Förster, Sexualethik und Sexualpädagogik, 3rd ed., Munich 1910, pp. 45 sqq., 83 sqq.
If polygamy is contrary to the natural law because it violates the rights of woman and endangers the welfare of the family, how could God permit it under the Old Law? Fr. Victor Cathrein, S.J., answers this question as follows: “Inasmuch as polygamy is opposed to equal rights for both sexes, God could permit it because He is the supreme Lord and therefore can dispense or withdraw human rights as He pleases in His wisdom and holiness. The evil consequences result- ing from polygamy He can prevent in some other way, or, for wise reasons, tolerate temporarily, if the chief purpose of marriage, namely, the propagation of the species, is thereby more quickly attained and this object is desirable for very particular reasons, as it was in the time of the Patriarchs.”43
43 V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., p. 418.—St. Augustine, Contra Faustum Manich., l. XXII, c. 47: “Now, indeed, the fact that his son Jacob is reproached for four wives as though for an enormous crime is cleared away by a general preliminary statement. For when it was the custom, it was not a crime; now it is a crime for the reason that it is not the custom. For some sins are against nature, others against custom, others against precepts. Since these things are so, what crime, then, is it that is charged against the holy man Jacob because he had several wives at once? If you consult nature, he used those women not for lusting but for begetting; if custom, this was commonly done at that time and in those lands; if precept, it was prohibited by no law.” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 428).—Idem, De Bono Coniug., c. 15, n. 17: “There is not now the necessity of propagation which existed then, when those already joined in marriage were permitted to take others for more abundant posterity, which certainly is not permitted now. For the hidden distinction of times brings so much opportunity to the just doing or not doing of something, that now he acts better who has not taken even one wife, unless he cannot contain himself. Then, however, even those who could much more easily contain themselves took several wives without blame, unless piety at that time demanded otherwise.” (P. L., XL, 385).—Idem, De Nupt. et Concup., l. I, c. 8, n. 9: “It was also permitted to certain individual men to have several wives, where the reason was the multiplication of offspring, not a varying appetite of pleasure.” C. 9, n. 10: “Hence, if one woman lies with several men, because there is for her no multiplication of offspring from this, but a multiplication of lust, she cannot be a wife, but is a harlot.” (P. L., XLIV, 419).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 65, art. 2; A. Lehmkuhl, S. J., Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 916 sqq.
b) The remarriage of either party after the death of the other (nuptiae secundae, bigamia successiva) is permitted, in fact, St. Paul expressly says that “the younger [widows] should marry, bear children, be mistresses of families, give no occasion to the adversary to speak “evil.”44 In matter of fact it is far more difficult for young widowers and widows to practice sexual continence than it is for those who have never been married.45
44 1 Tim. V, 14; 1 Cor. VII, 8 sq., 39 sq.—St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., IV, c. 26: “And let those married only once not reject those who have entered a second marriage; for continence is indeed good and admirable, but it is also pardonable to enter a second marriage, lest the weak commit fornication.” (Migne, P. G., XXXIII, 488 sq).—St. Augustine, De Bono Viduit., c. 11, n. 14: “I discuss these things for this reason, lest you suppose that either second marriages are a crime or that any marriages, since they are marriages, are an evil. Therefore do not wish them to be condemned by you, but to be disdained. Thus the good of widowed continence shines more brightly, since in vowing and professing it women can disdain what is lawful and pleasing to them.”—Ibid., c. 12, n. 15: “Men are accustomed to raise a question concerning third and fourth and still further marriages. Hence, to answer briefly, I dare neither to condemn any marriages nor to take from them the honor due to their number.” (P. L., XL, 439).—St. Jerome, Epist., 54 (al. 10), n. 18: “Think daily that you [Furia, a widow] are going to die, and you will never think of second marriages.” (P. L., XXII, 560).—St. Thomas, S. Th., 3a, Suppl., qu. 63, art. 1 sq.
45 Tertullian, Ad Uxor., l. I, c. 8: “Although in them [virgins] undiminished integrity and complete holiness are about to see the face of God close at hand, nevertheless the widow has something more laborious, because it is easy not to desire what you do not know and to turn away from what you have never desired. More glorious, therefore, is the continence which feels its own right, which knows what it has seen. A virgin may be regarded as happier, but a widow as more laborious; the former has what good she always had, the latter what good she has found for herself; in the former grace, in the latter virtue, is crowned. For some things are of divine liberality, others of our own operation.” (Ed. Leopold, P. II, 69).—St. Jerome, Epist., 123 (al. 11), n. 11: “It is certainly much more laborious not to enjoy what you have than to desire what you have lost. Hence virginity is also easier in that it has not known the incentives of the flesh, and widowhood more solicitous in that it recalls past pleasures in the mind; especially if she thinks that she has lost a living person, not sent him ahead: the former is a matter of grief, the latter of joy.” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 1053).
Regarded merely as a sign of sexual incontinence, second marriage appears as an imperfection, and there have been theologians who on this account declared it to be forbidden. But a second marriage need not be inspired entirely, or even mainly, by sensuality. It may, on the contrary, be contracted for honorable and highly moral motives, such as zeal for one’s own salvation, the welfare of society, etc., and hence the Church does not object to it. That she refuses to confer the nuptial blessing upon a bride who has received it before, must not be interpreted as a disapproval of second marriages. That blessing is for life. Not everything that looks stricter is morally more perfect, else the self-immolation of widows in India would constitute the highest ideal of marital fidelity.46
46 Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, p. 637.
Tertullian, who in his Catholic period had permitted, nay exalted second marriage with all the power of his matchless rhetoric, after joining the Montanists changed his attitude on this as on many other questions, and not only condemned the remarriage of widows and widowers, but denounced it as tantamount to fornication.47 This was an error, though it need not be regarded as specifically Montanistic, since several orthodox writers before Tertullian, e. g., Athenagoras,48 Theophilus,49 and Irenæus50 seem to have held the same view. Other ecclesiastical authors of the early period permitted second marriage, but regarded it as more or less an imperfection.51
47 Ad Uxor., l. II, c. 8 (ed. Leopold, P. II, 76); De Exhort. Castit., c. 9. De Monogamia, c. 1: “We know one marriage just as we know one God.” (Ed. Leopold, P. II, 112).—De Labriolle, “La Lutte de Tertullien contre les Secondes Noces,” in the Annales de Philos. Chrét., Paris 1907, pp. 362 sqq.
48 Supplic., c. 33.
51 Cfr. J. Müller, Das sexuelle Leben der christlichen Kulturvölker, pp. 35 sqq.; J. Mausbach, Altchristl. und moderne Gedanken über Frauenberuf, pp. 23 sqq.
- The indissolubility of the marriage bond (inseparabilitas vel indissolubilitas matrimonii)52 is to a certain extent founded on the nature and purpose of Matrimony, inasmuch as it determines the right relationship of husband and wife to each other, as well as that between parents and children, and vice versa. But the chief reason why marriage is indissoluble is that it has been raised to the rank of a Sacrament and constituted a symbol of Christ’s union with His church. The Catechism of the Council of Trent explains this as follows: “Although it belongs to marriage as a natural contract to be indissoluble, yet its indissolubility arises chiefly from its nature as a Sacrament, as which it attains to its highest perfection. To make its bond dissoluble would be repugnant both to the care of bringing up offspring and to the other advantages of marriage.”53
52 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. IV, pp. 183 sqq.—A. Cigoi, Die Unauflösbarkeit der christl. Ehe und die Ehescheidung, Paderborn 1895, pp. 151 sqq., 193 sqq.—J. Fahrner, Geschichte der Ehescheidung im kanonischen Recht, Vol. I, Freiburg 1903, pp. 11 sqq.—K. Böckenhoff, Die Unauflösbarkeit der Ehe, Munich, 1908, pp. 24 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 429 sqq.—M. C. Forest, O. P., Divorce (tr. by J. K. Foran), Ottawa, 1921, pp. 19 sqq.
53 Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 8, qu. 11: “Although it belongs to marriage, in so far as it is an office of nature, that it cannot be dissolved, nevertheless this is chiefly the case in so far as it is a sacrament, from which fact it also attains the highest perfection in all things which are proper to it by the law of nature. Nevertheless, both the care of educating offspring and the other goods of marriage are incompatible with making its bond dissoluble.”
Pope Pius IX, in his famous Syllabus of Errors, condemned the proposition that “The marriage bond is not indissoluble by natural law and in various cases divorce, in the strict sense of the term, may be sanctioned by civil authority.”54
54 Syllabus Errorum, n. 67: “By natural law the bond of marriage is not indissoluble, and in various cases divorce properly so called can be sanctioned by civil authority.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1767).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 67, art. 1 sq.—Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 8, qu. 25.—G. Schneemann, Die Irrtümer über die Ehe, Freiburg i. B. 1865, pp. 104 sqq.
Hence Christian marriage, when properly contracted and consummated, is absolutely indissoluble.55 “Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry another,” says Jesus Christ Himself, “committeth adultery against her.”56 And St. Paul writes to the Corinthians: “To the married I give this charge,—nay, not I, but the Lord,—that a wife depart not from her husband (but if she have departed, let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband), and that a husband put not away his wife.”57 Hence, even though the married may separate, they cannot marry again, since the matrimonial bond is dissolved only by death. The Catholic Church has never wavered in proclaiming the indissolubility of marriage.58 The question whether a woman may ever leave her husband and marry another, is answered by St. Jerome as follows: “Cutting off all subterfuges, the Apostle [St. Paul] positively declared that the woman who marries another while her husband lives, is an adulteress. . . . Let the husband be an adulterer, a sodomite, steeped in iniquity and therefore deserted by his wife,—yet he remains her husband as long as he lives, and she is not allowed to marry another. . . . He who marries a discharged wife is an adulterer, no matter whether she has left her husband or he has left her.”59
55 St. Augustine, De Bono Coniug., c. 24, n. 32: “The good of marriage among all nations and all men consists in the cause of generation and in the fidelity of chastity; but, as regards the people of God, also in the holiness of the sacrament, by which it is unlawful even for the woman departing by repudiation to marry another while her husband lives, not even for the sake of bearing offspring; although this alone is the reason for which marriages are contracted, the marriage bond is not dissolved, when the reason for which they are contracted does not follow, except by the death of a spouse.” (P. L., XL, 394).
56 Mark X, 11 sq.; cfr. Matth. V, 32; XIX, 9; Luke XVI, 19.—F. E. Gigot, Christ’s Teaching Concerning Divorce, N. Y. 1912, pp. 43 sqq.—J. MacRory, “The Preaching of the New Testament on Divorce,” Irish Theol. Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 17; Vol. VI, No. 1.
57 1 Cor. VII, 10 sq.; cfr. Rom. VII, 2 sq.—J. MacRory, The Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians, Dublin 1915, pp. 92 sq.—F. E. Gigot, op. cit., pp. 95 sqq.; A. Lehmkuhl, S. J., Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 920 sqq.
58 Conc. Trid., Sess. XXIV, can. 7 (cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. IV, pp. 190 sq.).—Tertullian, De Monogamia, c. 9: “He alone will separate who also joined. He will separate, however, not through the harshness of repudiation, which he reproves and restrains, but through the debt of death.” (Ed. Leopold, P. II, 123).—St. Chrysostom, Hom. in Matth., XVII, c. 4 (Migne, P. G., LVII, 259).—St. Basil, Epist., 199, c. 31, 36, 48 (P. G., XXXII, 727).—St. Augustine, De Serm. Dom. in Monte, l. I, c. 16, n. 48 (P. L., XXXIV, 1253).—Idem, Serm., 292 (al. 49 inter Hom. 50), c. 2 (P. L., XXXIX, 1710).—Idem, De Coniug. Adulter., l. II, c. 13, n. 13 (P. L., XL, 479).—Idem, De Nupt. et Concup., l. I, c. 10, n. 11: “This is without doubt the reality of this sacrament (Eph. v, 25): that a man and woman joined in wedlock persevere inseparably as long as they live, and that it is not lawful, except for the cause of fornication, for one spouse to be separated from the other. For this is observed in Christ and the Church, that the living with the living be separated in eternity by no divorce. The observance of this sacrament is so great . . . that, although women marry or wives are taken for the sake of procreating children, it is not lawful to leave a sterile spouse in order that another, fruitful one, be taken.” (P. L., XLIV, 420).
59 Epist., 55 (al. 147), n. 3 (Migne, P. L., XXII, 562 sq.)
Although the indissolubility of marriage may not be absolute under the moral law of nature,60 yet there can be no doubt that it corresponds more perfectly than dissolubility to the various purposes of Matrimony, and that, at any rate, arbitrary divorce is directly contrary to the natural law. Experience furthermore teaches that divorce inevitably leads to a loosening of the marriage bond and entails serious moral and social disorders.61 If in any case it becomes dangerous or intolerable for a husband and a wife to remain together, a temporary or permanent separation from bed and board (separatio a mensa et toro) will solve the difficulty.62
60 Deut. XXIV, 1 sqq.; Matt. V, 31; XIX, 7 sq.—On this controverted question see Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. IV, pp. 188 sqq.
61 Forest-Foran, Divorce, Ottawa 1921, pp. 59 sqq.; H. Woods, S. J., A First Book in Ethics, N. Y. 1923, pp. 261 sqq.; A. Lehmkuhl, S. J., art. “Divorce,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, pp. 54 sqq.
62 Conc. Trid., Sess. XXIV, can. 8: “If anyone shall say that the Church errs when it decrees that, for many causes, a separation between spouses with respect to bed or with respect to cohabitation can be made for a fixed or an indefinite time, let him be anathema.”
The fact that the marriage bond is indissoluble should, and as a rule does, result among Catholics in a more careful choice of partners for life, and thus provides an excellent guarantee for a truly moral union. But he who has made his choice carelessly, without regard for the principles of sound ethics, has no right to complain of the harshness of the law if his marriage turns out unhappy, but is in duty bound to try as hard as he can to convert the relationship into a truly moral one. Necessity often reconciles married couples who, if they could have easily obtained a divorce, would never have gotten away from a life of superficiality and dissipation. The marriage bond in such cases serves as a means to temper egoism and to restrain an undue craving for liberty.
It is objected that the strict enforcement of the law of indissolubility not only causes many persons to suffer needlessly, but exposes them to severe temptations and spiritual attacks for the rest of a possibly long life. We reply that, in the first place, when a marriage is unhappy, both parties are as a rule to blame, and hence merely suffer the penalty of their own sins, and their guilt is not expiated and their character will not be improved by placing them in a position where they can repeat the unsuccessful experiment at the risk of others. But when an innocent party is compelled to live in an unhappy marriage, he or she should remember that many an undeserved cross must be borne in this vale of tears, and the more patiently we submit to the trials God sends us, the better it will be for us in time and eternity. As a last and extreme measure of relief from danger to soul and body the Church is willing to grant a separatio a mensa et toro. In case such a separation takes place, the innocent party must, though there be no guilt on his or her part, renounce the gratification of the sexual instinct; nor is this a greater misfortune than when, as not infrequently happens, disease or some other reason compels a faithful husband or wife to abstain from the use of the marital privilege or forces many to remain single.
To the objection that an innocent wife is punished with undue severity by a separation from bed and board because she cannot escape a state of loneliness and helplessness by contracting a second marriage, we may reply that nowadays women are no longer as helpless as they used to be and can find legal or civil protection (alimony) and employment much more easily than in bygone days.63 Though an individual may now and then suffer grievously under the law of indissolubility, and though the pur- pose of marriage may not always be attained in spite of it, there can be no doubt that the chief object of Matrimony, namely the bonum commune, absolutely demands that the marriage tie be kept inviolate.64 “Marriage,” says Goethe, “is the beginning and the end of all culture. It gentles the boor and affords the educated a splendid opportunity to prove their nobility of character. Marriage must needs be indissoluble, for it bestows so much happiness that no single misfortune can outweigh it.”
63 Linsenmann, Moraltheol., p. 638.
64 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 67, art. 1, ad 4.—Idem, Summa contra Gentiles, l. III, c. 124.—Cfr. J. Mausbach, Die Stellung der Frau im Menschheitsleben, M. Gladbach 1906, pp. 19 sqq.
“The question whether legislation should make divorce more difficult or build a golden bridge for it when married people find their burden unbearable,” says a non-Catholic writer, “is a profoundly ethical one, both sides of which can be defended with solid arguments. To me it seems that the weightier reasons speak against easy divorce, because easy divorce paralyzes the courage and strength that men need for solving their difficulties in accord with the moral law, and tempts them to look prematurely for an external solution of them; and also because easy divorce undermines the security and confidence of both parties to the matrimonial contract.”65
65 Schneidewin, Die antike Humanität, pp. 180 sq.
READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 41–44; 44, 49, 64–65.—Catechismus Romanus, P. II, c. 8, qu. 23–34.—Sporer-Bierbaum, Theol. Mor., Vol. III, 2nd ed., 1009 sqq.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 881–883, 909–954.—J. A. Stapf, Die christliche Moral, Vol. III, Innsbruck 1842, pp. 357 sqq.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 627 sqq.—J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 153 sqq.—Rive-Umberg, S. J., Die Ehe, 2nd ed., pp. 114 sqq., 312 sqq. Ratisbon, 1921.—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 415 sqq.— A. Stöckl, Das Christentum, Vol. III, pp. 152 sqq.—Wilhelm, Das Eheleben, 2nd ed., (1910), pp. 232 sqq.—J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 366 sqq.—F. W. Förster, Marriage and the Sex Problem, N. Y. 1912, Pt. I, Ch. IX.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 415 sqq.—A. Vermeersch, S. J., De Castitate, Bruges 1919, pp. 234 sqq.—J. Antonelli, Medicina Pastoralis, Vol. II, 4th ed., pp. 493 sqq., 497 sqq.—T. Slater, S. J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. II, pp. 361 sqq.—Cardinal D. Mercier, The Duties of Conjugal Life, London (C. T. S.), s. a.