§ I. On the Liceity of the Conjugal Act Considered in Itself

907. Principles. - I. The conjugal act between legitimate spouses is of itself honorable and licit; for it is a means established and ordained by the Author of nature himself for the legitimate propagation of the human race.

II. The ends which render an act of this kind honorable are: 1. the generation of offspring, which is numbered among the principal ends of marriage; 2. the satisfaction of the obligation toward the other spouse; 3. the calming of concupiscence, and consequently the avoidance of incontinence both in oneself and in the other spouse; 4. the desire of fostering or conciliating honorable love, of manifesting or promoting conjugal affection, etc. - Thus commonly with St. Ligorius, no. 881 and following, Sanchez, and others against some who do not admit the last two ends.

908. Resolutions. - 1. The use of marriage is illicit if it is made for pleasure alone, that is, by expressly excluding the other ends ¹. This is apparent from proposition 9 condemned by Innocent XI, which reads thus: The act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from all fault and venial defect. Nevertheless, of itself it would be only a venial sin, just as it is venial to take food for delight alone. But the use of marriage is free from this fault if it is a remedy for concupiscence; for its satisfaction is licit as a remedy for concupiscence, whether this is intended expressly or implicitly ². - St. Ligorius, no. 912.

¹ See the fuller explanation of this doctrine in the Note to no. 28, vol. I, which certainly must be kept diligently before the eyes, lest anyone importunately harass both himself and others with empty anxieties concerning the use of pleasures.

² By these words the Author wished to signify that even this slight disorder or fault of one acting for pleasure alone is scarcely ever actually present. And the reason is plain: because the disorder does not reside in desiring pleasure. For, as St. Thomas says (Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 26, no. 6), The pleasure which follows good and desirable operations is good and desirable; and this (as the Angelic Doctor adds, ibid., no. 7) accords with the order of nature.... For we see that nature has joined pleasure to those operations of animals which are manifestly ordained to necessary ends.... For unless pleasure were present, animals would abstain from the aforesaid necessary acts. Therefore the disorder of one acting for pleasure alone will be present when he so rests, as it were, in the pleasure that he positively excludes every other end. I said that he positively excludes it; for the common and certain doctrine concerning every action teaches (see the things which we adduced from St. Thomas, vol. I, nos. 31, 32) that, for an act to be good, it is sufficient that either the further ends or those intrinsic to the work not be excluded, although the agent otherwise bears himself negatively with respect to them; that is, he does not think of them at all while acting, but apprehends the act only under a certain general concept as licit for himself and therefore honorable. The same must also be said concerning the conjugal act, namely, that for its honorableness it is sufficient that the ends intrinsic to this work, which the Author also enumerates in the preceding number, not be positively excluded, while the agent apprehends the work as licit for himself, or (which is the same) as not illicit, although he thinks nothing of those ends while acting.

It can scarcely happen, moreover, that the ends intrinsic to the conjugal work are altogether positively excluded. And this indeed the Author wished to intimate when he introduces the use of marriage as a remedy for concupiscence.

And indeed the Apostle is the authority that this end also, and indeed as an intrinsic one, is present in marriage, so that it may be a remedy for concupiscence, when he says (1 Cor. 7:2): But because of fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband. And again (ibid., verse 5): Do not defraud one another, unless perhaps by consent for a time ... and return again to the same, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence. And again (ibid., verse 9): But if they do not contain themselves, let them marry; for it is better to marry than to burn.

Indeed, Chrysostom, explaining these words of the Apostle, contends that this end is the principal one in the present age. For thus he says (On Virginity, chapter 19): When marriage was delivered for the sake of procreating children, then MUCH MORE was it delivered for extinguishing the heat of nature. And Paul testifies to this, saying: But because of fornication, let each have his own wife, not because of the procreation of children. For there he commands them to come together, not that they may be parents of many children; but why? Lest Satan tempt you, he says. And proceeding he did not say: If they desire children; but what? Let those who do not contain themselves contract marriage. For in the beginning, as I said, it had this twofold occasion; but afterward, with land and sea and the world filled, only one pretext remains, the abolition of wickedness and lust. And again (Homily: What Sort of Wives Are to Be Taken, section 5): Before all else learn what the cause of marriage was and why it was introduced into common life, and seek nothing further. What, therefore, is the cause of marriage, and why was it given by God? Hear Paul saying: But to avoid fornications, let each have his own wife. He did not say, so that poverty may be avoided and riches acquired; but what? That we may avoid fornication, that we may moderate concupiscence, that we may live soberly, that we may please God, content with our own wife. Marriage brings us this; this is its fruit; this is the gain from it.... This, then, must be regarded in marriage

especially: that we may flee sin and be free from fornications. Marriages are to be sought in this, that they may help us to lead life chastely.

Moreover, it will appear superfluous to explain in what manner marriage contributes to the aforesaid end, or by what reason it extinguishes the heat of nature, wards off the temptations of Satan, is the abolition of wickedness and lust, and conduces to moderating concupiscence and leading a sober and chaste life. Nevertheless, it will be useful to hear this from St. Thomas, who, upon the cited text of the Apostle (Lecture 1 on chapter 7 of the First Epistle to the Corinthians), has these things among others: The Apostle, considering the human race now multiplied ..., set aside that necessity for which marriage had been instituted as an office of nature, and proposed the second necessity, according to which it was instituted as a remedy for fault. For because carnal concupiscence still remains in the faithful after baptism ..., it especially incites men to venereal acts because of the vehemence of pleasure. And because it belongs to greater virtue to overcome this concupiscence entirely than can be suitable for men ..., it is necessary that concupiscence be yielded to in part and overcome in part; and this is done when the act of generation is ordered by reason.... But according to the same Holy Doctor, the act of generation is ordered by reason through two things, namely (ibid.): 1. that man use the act of generation according as it is fitting for the generation ... of children; 2. that in the human species there not be wandering and uncertain couplings, such as fornicarious couplings are, but that determinate men be joined to determinate women; and this determination is made through the law of marriage.

Therefore, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, the remedy for concupiscence divinely prepared for man through the institution of marriage resides in this: that through acts suitable for generation in legitimate marriage, concupiscence itself is satisfied; namely, that one yields to and satisfies that appetite for venereal things which the apprehended vehemence of pleasure excites. And since this satisfaction of concupiscence constitutes an end intrinsic to the work, it is manifest that one who is moved by the apprehension of pleasure to conjugal acts, which he otherwise knows to be entirely licit for him as one joined in legitimate wedlock, is so far from excluding a due end that instead, while he wills to satisfy this appetite, he pursues and fulfills the very end for which marriage was instituted by God. Wherefore that proscribed proposition which the Author recalls certainly had to be condemned; but it assuredly also had to be condemned for this reason: that it absurdly presents the act of marriage as though it were an indifferent work undertaken for pleasure alone, when in it there ought rather to have been discerned, from Apostolic doctrine, the work of calming concupiscence through the licit and honorable satisfaction of the venereal appetite, in which the intrinsic end of the work itself consists.

(**) 1. On the occasion of this Note the VV. wrote thirty-six columns (pages 822-840), in which they take up for censure the things which have some connection with the argument of this Note, both in this Note itself and also in other places throughout the course of the whole Work. They so divide the matter into three parts that they discuss: 1. the act of marriage exercised for pleasure; 2. pleasurable acts in general; 3. the interpretation of Propositions 8 and 9 among those condemned by Innocent XI.

Moreover, it seemed good to begin from this last head, for thence a plainer way will be laid out for resolving the difficulties also concerning the two former heads.

2. The VV. therefore contend (pages 836-840) that the condemnation of that proposition IX - The act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from every fault and venial defect - is not avoided through its interpretation handed down both in this Note and in the Note to no. 28, vol. I, in which these things are contained: It is one thing to act FOR PLEASURE; it is another to act FOR PLEASURE ALONE. The latter positively excludes a further end of the work.... But the former involves no disorder of this kind.... From this the reason clearly discloses itself why propositions VIII and IX concerning the act of marriage or the act of eating for PLEASURE ALONE were rightly proscribed by Innocent XI. For they labor under an intrinsic defect on account of the predicate ALONE, which positively excludes all other ends to which actions of this kind are ordained. For the fact that someone otherwise is enticed and moved to a work by the appetite for pleasure, just as to labor by the hope of a prize or wage, is consonant with the order of nature, as St. Thomas holds.

3. Moreover, do not authors whom St. Alphonsus holds as approved stand as sureties for this doctrine, some of whom everyone sees indicated there?

Cardenas, for example, distinguishes in entirely the same manner between a work exercised for pleasure and one exercised for pleasure alone; and he affirms that the one is free from fault, the other not free from it. For concerning the former he thus holds (Dissertation 6, chapter 2, article 2) in the titles of sections 53, 54, and 55: It is not illicit to engage in conjugal intercourse for pleasure as a subordinate end. Pleasure has been ordained by nature for the easier generation of offspring. By the very fact that it is had for pleasure as a subordinate end, it is not had for pleasure alone. But concerning the latter he says thus under the title of section 63: He who uses conjugal intercourse for pleasure alone inverts the order of nature. I ask: does Cardenas not clearly distinguish between one and another manner of acting for pleasure? Why, therefore, do the VV. allege Cardenas against the Note and, in addition, transcribe from Cardenas a long catalogue of Authors who condemn as illicit acting for PLEASURE ALONE? Is not this very thing also condemned as illicit in the Note?

4. Diego Duarte, formerly a Penitentiary in the Lateran Basilica, holds no differently from Cardenas (Brief Exposition of the Condemned Propositions, etc., Rome, 1712, no. 162), saying: It is asked whether it is licit to engage in conjugal intercourse for pleasure alone? Reply. The opinion which denies that carnal intercourse had for PLEASURE ALONE is not free from every fault, even venial, was condemned by Innocent XI with proposition 9.... But if one engages in the said intercourse for pleasure as a subordinate end ..., no fault at all will intervene; for one who so acts follows the order of nature, which appointed pleasure in intercourse for rendering easier the generation of offspring and the preservation of the species.

5. Felix Potestas expresses the same thing more briefly thus (vol. 1, part 2, no. 2280): The act of marriage was instituted by nature for two ends: for the procreation of offspring ... and for the calming of lust; for which reason he who exercises the act of marriage for delight commits no sin if he orders it ... to the principal end. He sins venially, however, who exercises it for delight alone.

6. Nevertheless, the VV. contend that it is the same whether you say that an act was placed for pleasure, or that an act was placed for pleasure alone; for they say that the condemnation of the aforesaid proposition is avoided in neither case. For thus they say (page 837): For verifying the condemned proposition, it is not necessary that one who seeks pleasure positively exclude every other end; it suffices that he exclude it negatively. For whether the other ends are excluded positively or negatively, it is always true that such an operator

The principal circumstances regard the person, the manner or position, and the time. acts for pleasure alone, or has no other end except pleasure itself. Hence the genuine sense of condemned proposition IX is: The act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone (that is, referred to no other end than pleasure) is entirely free from every fault and venial defect.

7. Reply. Indeed, you would rightly say that these things fell from the pen of the VV. altogether less cautiously. What it means to bear oneself negatively with respect to certain ends of a work is explained quite plainly in the Note by the words immediately following: that is, he does not think of them at all while acting. Only those who have never touched the scholastic doctors are ignorant that this meaning is assigned to that mode of speaking in the schools. It must be supposed, say the Salmanticenses (treatise 9, chapter 3, no. 24), that one who seeks precisely some accidental end in marriage can bear himself in two ways: either by positively excluding the other substantial end ..., or by bearing himself negatively concerning the proper end of marriage, either because he does not attend to it, does not remember it, or does not care about it, BUT WITHOUT EXCLUDING IT.

So far is it from being the same (as the VV. contend) either positively to exclude or negatively to bear oneself toward the ends of marriage, that the same Salmanticenses condemn the former as a grave fault, but call the latter a good and meritorious act. For concerning the former they say (ibid., no. 25): If anyone were to contract marriage POSITIVELY EXCLUDING its proper and substantial end, he would not only sin mortally, but would enter no marriage. But concerning the latter (ibid., no. 30): If anyone intends precisely other ends extrinsic to marriage, without excluding its proper substantial end, and thus tacitly and implicitly retaining it, such as riches, honor, PLEASURE, beauty, etc., he would commit no sin, but in contracting marriage WOULD EXERCISE A GOOD AND MERITORIOUS ACT.

8. But it was said in addition that the VV. wrote altogether less cautiously that it is the same whether other ends are positively excluded or one bears oneself negatively toward them, that is, thinks nothing of them while acting. For from this general principle it immediately and directly follows that, in every act, that end toward which the agent bears himself negatively, that is, of which he does not think while acting, must now be held as positively excluded. Moreover, it immediately follows from this that every action which is not elicited from charity and actually referred through charity to God, who by right is the ultimate end of all actions, is vicious. This doctrine indeed presents the condemned Quesnellian and Baian dogma that whatever does not proceed from the fountain of charity is sin, and that even good works performed merely with a view to eternal reward must be numbered among sins.

The reason for this consequence is plainly apparent. For as St. Thomas holds (book 3 of the Sentences, distinction 27, question 1, article 4, question 3), charity is compared to the other virtues both as mover, as end, and as form. He explains thus why charity is called the mover of all the other virtues: That charity is the mover of the other virtues is apparent from this: that the good itself which is the object of charity under the aspect of an end is the end of the virtues. In all ordered powers or arts, it so happens that the art or power which concerns the end orders the acts of the others to its proper end. Hence charity also moves all the other virtues to its own end, and according to this it is said to command their acts. Then he speaks thus of charity insofar as it is an end: If, therefore, charity is the

A fourfold circumstance, or impediment attached to the person, can stand in the way of seeking the debt, namely: 1. a vow of chastity;

mover of the other virtues, it is likewise their end, because this is common to all virtues: that their acts are their proximate ends.... But the end of an inferior power or habit is ordered to the end of the superior one ...; hence the acts of all the other virtues are ordered to the act of charity as to an end; and for this reason charity is called the end of the precept.

And again (book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 38, question 1, article 1), where the Holy Doctor wishes to prove that both God and charity together are the end of all wills or virtues: As there is one end of all things, he says, namely God, so there is one ultimate end of all wills, namely God. Nevertheless, there are other proximate ends; and if according to those ends the due relation of the will to the ultimate end is preserved, the will will be right.... But the due relation of the will to the ultimate end is preserved according to that end by which the will is fitted to participate in the ultimate end ..., and this is charity ...; and therefore not only God but also charity is the end of all right wills.

With these things premised, suppose, please, that what the VV. assume is established: that the end toward which the agent bears himself negatively, that is, of which he thinks nothing while acting, must be judged positively excluded. Will not the ultimate end, namely God and charity, be held positively excluded if a man while acting does not think of God and charity? And consequently, will not all actions which are not elicited from charity and are not actually referred to God be so many sins?

9. But the doctrine of St. Thomas recedes very far from these absurdities, precisely because it is wholly removed from that incautious principle of the VV. For thus the Holy Doctor says (ibid., reply to objection 4): It must be said that, in order that the end of some action be God or charity, it is not necessary that someone, while performing that action, think of God or charity.

And elsewhere (I-II, question 1, article 6, reply to objection 3): It must be said that it is not necessary that someone always think of the ultimate end whenever he desires or performs something; but the force of the first intention, which regards the ultimate end, remains in every desire of any thing, even if the ultimate end is not actually thought of.

And again (On Evil, question 2, article 5, objection 10, which he concedes): It is established that he who has charity has ordered himself and all his things to God, to whom he adheres as the ultimate end. Therefore, whatever he orders either to himself or to any other thing of his, he acts meritoriously, even if he does not actually think of God, unless he is impeded through some disorder of the act which is not referable to God. But this cannot be without being at least a venial sin.

And again (On Evil, question 9, article 2): It sometimes happens that a man does not actually order an act to God, although that act of itself contains no disorder by reason of which it is not referable to God; and nevertheless, because the mind of man is habitually related to God as to an end, that act not only is not a sin, but is also a meritorious act.

10. Hence Valentia holds thus (I-II, disputation 8, question 6, point 3): It must be noted that it is not necessary that the works of the just, in order to be meritorious de condigno, be referred to God by an explicit act either present or elicited a little before; but a virtual relation is sufficient for this, consisting in the fact that the just man AT SOME TIME referred himself and all his things to God through an act of charity.

And Montesinos is witness that this is the common doctrine in the schools, who expressly writes (on I-II, question 1, article 4, question 1, no. 13): It is the common doctrine of Theologians ... that the act of any moral virtue tends to its proper object by reason of its proper honorableness; nevertheless, implicitly and by its nature, without anything else, it tends to God; NOR IS IT NECESSARY THAT IT BE EXPRESSLY ORDERED TO HIM.

Let us therefore conclude that the principle which the VV. assume is altogether false, namely, that the end toward which the agent bears himself negatively, that is, of which he does not think while acting, is positively excluded; indeed, a principle of this kind leads directly to erroneous doctrines condemned by the Church.

11. What can appear more wonderful, however, the VV. do not sufficiently notice: through that principle of theirs even the Holy Doctor Alphonsus is involved in exactly the same condemnation. For these are the words of the Holy Doctor (On Human Acts, no. 44): Although someone approaching the table does not think of the preservation of life, but ONLY of the pleasure of food, as Gonet says, he does not sin on that account; because he wills such pleasure, at least virtually, for the preservation of life, and thus does not desire it inordinately. Now it is manifest that one who approaches the table thinking merely of the pleasure to be taken from food, but nothing of the preservation of life, bears himself negatively with respect to this intrinsic end of food. But, say the VV. (above, no. 6), whether the other ends are excluded positively or negatively, it is always true that such an operator acts for pleasure alone. Therefore even St. Alphonsus (according to the principles and reasonings of the VV.) teaches that it is licit to eat for pleasure alone, and consequently professes the condemned doctrine that eating and drinking to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health; which is proposition VIII proscribed by Innocent XI!

And for confirming (if it please the Superiors) a condemnation of this kind of the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, there also concur the things which the VV. (page 837) adduce from Martinet (Moral Theology, book 5, article 8, section 6) in confirmation of their aforesaid principle. This, they say, the distinguished Martinet rightly expresses in these words: He who in intercourse, neither excluding nor intending the ends of marriage, seeks pleasure alone, assuredly acts inordinately and cannot be excused from venial fault, from the proposition condemned by Innocent XI: The act of marriage, etc. And indeed, one who in an action neither excludes its proper ends nor expressly intends them assuredly bears himself negatively toward those ends. But this is precisely what the words of St. Alphonsus present concerning one who, seeking pleasure alone from food, neither excludes the end of preserving life nor intends it, since he does not think of it; yet according to Martinet, he who so acts cannot be excused from fault by reason of the proposition condemned by Innocent XI. Therefore St. Alphonsus, who teaches that this man does not sin, falls into condemned doctrine!

12. But again it ought to appear no less wonderful that the VV., after accusing those same Notes, as we have seen, of a condemned dogma, then say that they do not stand far from St. Alphonsus. For thus they write (page 834): Insofar as Father B. says: "In order that someone may honorably take pleasure from play ..., it is by no means necessary that he think of the end of play, whether intrinsic or further," he would not stand far from St. Alphonsus if he were to add that some honorable end, at least virtually intended, is necessary. For the Holy Doctor says (On Human Acts, no. 44, at the end): For an actual relation of all words or works to an honorable good is not required, since this would be an unbearable burden and a matter entangled in six hundred scruples;

but a virtual relation suffices, as we have said. Hence, although someone approaching the table does not think of the preservation of life, etc. (as above, in the preceding number).

13. Reply. In order that one may properly recognize how great and of what kind the distance is between the meaning of that Note and St. Alphonsus in so grave a question, it is preferable to have before the eyes the complete context of the Note, which is as follows (Note to no. 28, vol. I): The negative exclusion of an end does not vitiate an act; for it is not necessary for the honorableness of an action to think of a further end or even of the end intrinsic to the work. Therefore, in order that someone may honorably take pleasure from play, food, or rest, it is by no means necessary that he think of the end of play, food, or rest, whether intrinsic or further; but it is sufficient that he apprehend the action as consonant with right reason, or even that he find nothing in it contrary to the order of reason.

And altogether consonant with these are the things which are read thus also in the Note at this place: The common and certain doctrine teaches (see the things which we adduced from St. Thomas, vol. I, nos. 31, 32) that for a good act it is sufficient that the ends, either further or intrinsic to the work, not be excluded, although the agent otherwise bears himself negatively toward them, that is, does not think of them at all while acting, but apprehends the act only under a certain general concept as licit for himself and therefore honorable.

Now let us inquire whether that which the VV. say is lacking is absent in these words, namely, an honorable end at least virtually intended. But he must be blind who does not see here an honorable end, or, as St. Alphonsus says, an honorable good, intended not merely virtually but altogether actually.

And indeed in the former text it is expressly required that the agent apprehend the action as consonant with right reason. But St. Thomas finds the character of the honorable good in this, that it is ordered by reason. Thus the Holy Doctor (I-II, question 39, article 2): Every honorable good proceeds from these two things, namely, from the rectitude of reason and of the will. And again (II-II, question 145, article 2, reply to objection 3): Something is called honorable ... insofar as it has a certain comeliness from the ordering of reason. But that which is ordered according to reason is naturally fitting for man, etc. And in another manner the same Holy Doctor (II-II, question 145, article 1): The honorable, properly speaking, is referred to the same thing as virtue. Moreover, concerning virtue he speaks thus (II-II, question 23, article 3): Human virtue, which is the principle of all the good acts of man, consists in attaining the rule of human acts.... Hence moral virtue is defined by this: that it is according to right reason. This he afterward repeats elsewhere (II-II, question 145, article 2), saying: This pertains to the character of the honorable, which we said to be the same as virtue, which moderates all human things according to reason. Therefore, when in the Note it is said that an action is apprehended and consequently elicited as consonant with right reason, is it not openly said that the will actually tends toward the honorable good and virtue?

And in the other text, is it not most expressly said that the will tends toward that which it apprehends as licit for itself and therefore HONORABLE? But thus the will pursues the honorable good not merely virtually but altogether actually. Why, therefore, do the VV. accuse these Notes as though, according to them, an honorable end toward which the action tends is lacking?

14. Yet although it is false, according to the meaning of the Notes, that a relation to the honorable good is lacking from actions, nevertheless that which the VV. said must be conceded: the opinion of these Notes differs from the assertion of St. Alphonsus, at least if the latter is taken word for word; for the Holy Doctor, for the honorableness of an act, requires that the honorable good be intended virtually, while in the Notes it is required that the will actually tend toward the honorable good. But is this distance or difference of opinions of such a nature that the VV. rightly contend that the opinion of the Notes must be turned toward the opinion of St. Alphonsus? I would indeed judge that not a few will greatly doubt this, and for another reason.

And in truth, if the opinion of the Holy Doctor is taken word for word, it immediately occurs to ask whence that virtual relation to the honorable good arises, or how the honorable good is virtually intended there. For the example which the Holy Doctor supplies is pleasure taken from food. Someone will therefore ask: In what manner is this pleasure virtually referred to the honorable good, or how is the honorable good virtually intended in it? For this must proceed either from a preceding or actual intention of the agent, as happens when someone orders means to an end; or, apart from every added intention of the agent, it will arise from the nature of the pleasure itself, just as we saw with St. Thomas that all acts of all virtues are by their nature virtually referred to the end of charity, even if the one acting thinks nothing of charity. But in the case the former remains excluded, because, as St. Alphonsus says, one approaching the table thinks only of the pleasure of food. But if you say the latter, why, someone will ask, do we say that the spouse sins who, approaching the other spouse, does not think of the preservation of the human species (or another end of marriage), but ONLY of the pleasure of intercourse? Why could someone not contend that this person does not sin, with the reason of St. Alphonsus added (above, no. 11), because he wills such pleasure, at least virtually, for the preservation of the human species or as a remedy for concupiscence, and thus does not desire it inordinately? Otherwise, can these things please the VV., who meanwhile propose that the notion of a virtual relation is to be drawn from this passage of St. Alphonsus?

15. Otherwise, it will be judged much more congruous that this expression of the Holy Doctor is altogether elliptical, and that it is understood that one who approaches the table knows and apprehends the taking of food as an action licit of itself and consonant with reason.

And in this manner it is easily understood how the agent in the case virtually wills the preservation of life and, generally, those ends which render the action honorable. For while he wills the act as consonant with the order of reason, he certainly virtually wills those things on account of which the act is consonant with the order of reason, although he does not then think of them and indeed is altogether ignorant of them.

Indeed, no other norm assuredly appears consonant with the weak condition of men, by whose aid they may be directed to act honorably, than that they apprehend the action generally as licit. And in fact, who indeed would further require for the honorableness of an action that the agent also have before his eyes the reasons on account of which the action can be judged honorable? This investigation of reasons is left to philosophers and theologians, who otherwise often labor greatly in assigning them and are not rarely found disagreeing among themselves, as in the present matter also we perceive that they do not agree among themselves whether, for example, the remedy of marriage is licitly desired by reason of health or of avoiding in oneself the danger of incontinence. How, therefore, could this norm be proposed to the common condition of the faithful for acting honorably?

And to this must be said to pertain the things which the VV. also adduce from St. Alphonsus (On Human Acts, no. 44), where he writes: For an actual relation of all words or works to the HONORABLE GOOD is not required;

since this would be an unbearable burden and a matter entangled in six hundred scruples; but a virtual relation suffices. For it wholly abhors the truth that the Holy Doctor wished to signify that a consciousness of the honorableness of the action which someone is about to place is not necessary, and that a merely virtual consciousness suffices. Therefore, this meaning must be assigned to those words: that an actual relation or direction of the action to those intrinsic ends to which it is ordered by its nature is not necessary, but they are sufficiently intended virtually by the very fact that the action is generally known to be honorable, or even that nothing in that action is perceived as contrary to the order of reason.

Let us therefore conclude: 1. that the VV. demanded without any right that the opinion expressed in the Notes be turned toward the opinion of St. Alphonsus, if the latter is taken word for word; 2. but if the obscure meaning of his elliptical expression is aptly understood, as is fitting, the meaning of the Notes differs in nothing from the meaning of the Holy Doctor.

16. We shall now say some things concerning those matters which the VV. discuss through nine columns (pages 832-836) in the Article to which they inscribe the title: The Doctrine of Father Ballerini on Pleasurable Acts in General Is Weighed.

From the Note to no. 28, vol. I, where the distinction is touched upon between those acting for pleasure and those acting for PLEASURE ALONE, the VV. (page 833) adduce these words: But the former (namely, to act for pleasure) involves no disorder of this kind (namely, it does not positively exclude the further end of the work). For first, pleasure, as St. Thomas says (Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 26, no. 6), is good and desirable if it follows a good operation; and it is proper to the virtue of temperance that it moderate the use of pleasurable things and withdraw from those which are contrary to reason, but not from those which are fitting according to reason (see St. Thomas, II-II, question 141, article 1, reply to objection 1).

But the VV. oppose the things which follow from the same passage of St. Thomas: If pleasure were the ultimate end, it would be desirable according to itself. But this is false.... For the pleasure which follows good and desirable operations is good and desirable; but that which follows evil operations is evil and to be avoided. Therefore, it has from ANOTHER that it is good and desirable. And again (ibid.): In natural things pleasure is for the sake of operation, and not conversely; for we see that nature has joined pleasure to those operations of animals which are manifestly ordained to necessary ends.... For unless pleasure were present, animals would abstain from the aforesaid necessary acts. And chapter 27: For it has been shown that according to the order of nature pleasure is for the sake of operation, and not conversely.

17. Reply 1. In the Note it is not denied that pleasure is good or not good, and therefore desirable or to be avoided, according as the operation from which the pleasure is drawn is or is not good. Consequently neither is it denied that pleasure has from ANOTHER that it is good and desirable. Therefore one must reply: Let the antecedent pass, and I deny the consequence; that is, nothing is inferred from that former text against the Note.

I said, Let the antecedent pass, because, since otherwise according to the same St. Thomas pleasure, as pleasure, is some good, the objected text of the same Holy Doctor needs some explanation. Francis de Sylvestris, commonly called Ferrariensis, supplies this for us in his Commentary on this passage of St. Thomas, where he discusses thus: Something can be called good and desirable in two ways. In one way in the being of nature; in another way in the genus of morals. In the first way the goodness of a thing is considered absolutely according as it is in itself. In the second way it is considered in order to right reason; for it is called morally good

that which is conformable and proportioned to right reason, and it is desirable according to right reason. Therefore this proposition, pleasure is not desirable according to itself but from the operations which it follows, must be understood in the genus of morals, but not according to the being of nature. For thus it is true that of itself it is not desirable, because of itself it does not express some good consonant with reason or discordant from it, but has from the operations that it is conformable or deformable to it. In the being of nature, however, IT IS GOOD AND DESIRABLE ACCORDING TO ITSELF; on account of which St. Thomas says in book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 49, question 3, article 4, that pleasure, insofar as it is pleasure, names some good.

And in fact, St. Thomas, in the place here cited, question 1, reply to objection 3, replies thus to an objection which is of this kind: Every being, insofar as it is such, is good. Therefore that also which is the ultimate perfection of a being is universally good. But pleasure is the ultimate perfection of a being, for it perfects operation, which is second act. Therefore every pleasure is good. To this objection, I say, he replies thus: To the third it must be said that this reasoning does not prove pleasure to be good except insofar as it is pleasure. And then, resolving the arguments of those who say that every pleasure is evil, he adds: It must be said that the virtuous man does not flee every pleasure, but rather embraces his proper pleasure, which is to take pleasure in works of virtue; but he flees inordinate pleasures. And again (ibid., question 3, reply to objection 4): It must be said that the end of any thing is its most perfect operation; therefore all desire the pleasure by which operation is perfected, just as they desire their own perfect operation. And just as error occurs in the appetite for operation, because some insist upon foreign operations while abandoning their proper operations, as all the wicked who follow bestial operations while abandoning human ones, so also some follow foreign pleasures in place of their proper pleasures. Thus the Holy Doctor.

Therefore, Reply 2: from the doctrine of St. Thomas, pleasure in the being of nature is good and desirable according to itself; but in the genus of morals it is good and desirable when it is consonant with the order of reason; and in this latter sense St. Thomas said that pleasure has from another that it is called both good and desirable. Therefore it is again permissible to conclude that that former text of St. Thomas objected against the Note is in no way pertinent. For in the Note the same thing is affirmed, since it treats of pleasure which is supposed consonant with the order of reason. But now to the other objected passage of St. Thomas.

18. The VV. thought great force to be present in this text, because in it St. Thomas affirms (above, no. 16) that according to the order of nature pleasure is for the sake of operation, and not conversely. Hence they construct the argument thus (page 833): Pleasure in one acting rightly is for the sake of operation, or a MEANS TO THE END, but by no means operation for the sake of pleasure.

Reply 1. I distinguish: that opinion of St. Thomas strikes one acting for PLEASURE ALONE, I concede; it also strikes one acting for pleasure, but not for it ALONE, I deny. For thus St. Thomas explains his mind in another place, which the VV. also allege (loc. cit.), namely, Against the Gentiles, book 4, chapter 83, where he says: In this life it is inordinate and vicious if someone uses food and venereal things FOR PLEASURE ALONE and not for the necessity of sustaining the body, etc. And again: Therefore the order is preposterous and unbecoming if operations are exercised for PLEASURES ALONE. But in the Note it is expressly said that the intrinsic ends of the operations, for example the sustenance of the body, are not excluded, even if someone eats for pleasure, however little he thinks while eating of that sustenance of the body. Otherwise, did not St. Alphonsus also write (above, no. 11): Although someone approaching the table does not think of the preservation of life, but only of the pleasure of food ..., he does not sin on that account? Therefore that opinion of St. Thomas does not strike the doctrine of the Note, just as it does not strike the doctrine of St. Alphonsus.

19. Reply 2. When the VV. wish to conclude from St. Thomas that pleasure in one acting rightly is for the sake of operation, or a means to an end, they do not appear sufficiently to have grasped the meaning of that opinion: that according to the order of nature pleasure is for the sake of operation, and not conversely.

Here that most faithful interpreter of St. Thomas, Ferrariensis (Commentary on chapter 83, book 4, Against the Gentiles), must be heard, who beautifully presents the force of that opinion thus: It must be observed, he says, that when it is said that the pleasures of food and venereal things are not for their own sake but for operations, it is one thing to say that pleasures are for the sake of operations and another to say that they are sought for the sake of operations. For that they are for the sake of operations expresses their order according to the INSTITUTION OF BOTH BY THE AUTHOR OF NATURE and according to the intention of nature. For God, who instituted nature, ordered the aforesaid operations to the preservation of the individual and the species; but he added pleasures to these operations so that animals would apply themselves to operations of this kind from the appetite for these pleasures, and thus he willed pleasures to be for the sake of operations. But that pleasures are sought for the sake of operations expresses their order according as THEY TERMINATE THE ACT OF APPETITE; and then, if they are compared ... to the sensitive appetite, pleasures are not thus sought for the sake of operations, BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, OPERATIONS FOR THE SAKE OF PLEASURES, as St. Thomas says, I-II, question 4, article 2, reply to objection 2.

Concerning this, elsewhere (Commentary on book 3, chapter 26) the same Ferrariensis says: Therefore in this place St. Thomas speaks of that order in comparison WITH THE INTENTION OF THE ONE INSTITUTING nature and the order; but in the place alleged he speaks of the order itself, comparing it WITH THE SENSITIVE APPETITE. And a little later: There is a twofold intention of the one instituting nature in an order of this kind (namely, the order between operations and pleasures); one is first and principal, the other secondary. The first and principal is that individuals and species be preserved through operations, and for this pleasure is joined to the operations. The secondary is that they seek the operations from the appetite for pleasure ..., just as if we were to say that a law proposing rewards for studious operations first and principally intends that a man devote himself to studious works and orders the reward to this; but secondarily and accessorily intends that a man, enticed by the reward, seek studious operations for the sake of obtaining the reward.

Therefore, according to the mind of St. Thomas, when it is said that pleasure is for the sake of operation and not conversely, this must indeed be understood of the intention of God instituting nature, because God joined pleasure to operations so that the operations would be sought from the appetite for pleasure. It is otherwise, however, if the order between pleasures and operations is considered according as they terminate the act of appetite. For thus pleasures are not sought for the sake of operations, but, on the contrary, operations are sought for obtaining pleasure. Therefore the VV. wrongly wrote that pleasure in the agent is for the sake of operation as a means to an end.

And the comparison adduced with a reward appointed, for example, for a more elegant elegy or painting shows this most clearly. For would it not be absurd to say that the poet or painter orders the reward to the work as a means to an end, and not conversely order his work to obtaining the sought reward?

20. But again, the assertion of the VV. that pleasure on the part of the agent is related to operation as a means to an end is shown in another manner to be foreign to the doctrine of St. Thomas. The Holy Doctor objects to himself (Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 26, objection 3): Pleasure appears to be desired for its own sake in such a way that it is never desired for another. For it is foolish to ask someone why he wishes to be pleased. But this is the condition of the ultimate end, namely, that it is sought for its own sake.

Now St. Thomas does not deny the antecedent of this argument, but, having conceded it, denies the consequence. But the fact, he says, that men will pleasure not for another but for itself is not a sufficient sign that pleasure is the ultimate end.... For pleasure, although it is not the ultimate end, nevertheless accompanies the ultimate end, since pleasure arises from attainment of the end.

But see these same things explained more clearly elsewhere by St. Thomas (book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 49, question 3, article 4, question 3, reply to objection 3). For he again objects to himself: That which is desired only for itself and never for another is the ultimate end; but pleasure is of this kind, for it is foolish to ask why someone wishes to be pleased. And the Holy Doctor replies: To the third it must be said that, concerning things ordered to an end which are not joined to the end, we are accustomed to ask for what end they are done. But concerning those things which are joined to the end, such a question is not asked, because it is immediately apparent that they are desirable; and because pleasure is joined to perfect operation, which is the end, therefore it is not customary to ask why someone wishes to be pleased. And, moreover, pleasure expresses the resting of the appetite in something; hence to ask why someone wishes to be pleased is the same as to ask why he wishes his appetite to be brought to rest, which is the same as if it were asked why someone WISHES TO ATTAIN THE END OF THE WILL.

Therefore, if according to St. Thomas pleasure is not sought for another, it is manifest that pleasure is not sought by the agent as a means to an end.

21. And plainly worthy of attention is the manner in which Ferrariensis (Commentary on the cited chapter 26) reconciles this doctrine of St. Thomas with another place where St. Thomas says that pleasure is sought for another.

Pleasure, says Ferrariensis, accompanies the ultimate end, and from this it has that it is not sought by men for another, although it is not the ultimate end. But he indicates the apparent conflict thus: It has been said that pleasure in comparison with operation is similar to a perfection which is ordered to the species of a thing, and that the thing is the end of such a perfection; from which it appears that pleasure is sought for another. But here it is said that men will pleasure not for another.

For resolving this difficulty, while we now omit other things, Ferrariensis premises these things: Pleasure and the operation which it follows are related not as two goods (book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 49, question 3, article 4), but as one good, insofar as PLEASURE IS THE PERFECTION OF OPERATION. For just as from perfection and the perfectible there is made one perfect thing, so from operation and pleasure there is made one perfect operation, which is happiness. Hence, just as the ultimate and most perfect operation of man is not ordered to any other intrinsic perfection of man, so neither is the pleasure which accompanies and perfects it; therefore it is not customary to ask why someone wishes to be pleased.... But although pleasure is not sought for anything else separated from it

as something to be acquired through it, it is nevertheless ordered to the operation which it accompanies as to an end, JUST AS EVERY PERFECTION SUPERADDED TO A SPECIES, WHICH PERTAINS TO THE PRESERVATION OR COMELINESS OF THAT SPECIES, IS ORDERED TO THE SPECIES ITSELF AS TO AN END, since it perfects the operation, as comeliness perfects youth; and it is established that this comeliness is for the sake of him in whom youth exists, and not conversely.

Therefore the meaning in which St. Thomas says that pleasure is for the sake of operation and not conversely finally comes back to this: that pleasure is ordered to operation as every perfection is ordered to the thing which it perfects, just as comeliness perfects youth and (as St. Thomas says elsewhere) health perfects man; wherefore we say that health is for the sake of man, but not conversely. Thus the Holy Doctor (I-II, question 33, article 3): Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. In one way after the manner of an end, not indeed according as an end is called that for the sake of which something exists, but according as every good which supervenes completively can be called an end; and according to this the Philosopher says that pleasure perfects operation as a certain supervening end, insofar as upon this good which is operation there supervenes another good which is pleasure, which implies resting in a presupposed good. In a second way, on the part of the agent cause; not indeed directly, because the Philosopher says that pleasure perfects operation not as a physician perfects a healthy man, but as health does; but indirectly, insofar as the agent, because he takes pleasure in his action, attends to it more vehemently. And in the reply to objection 3: It happens that two things are mutually causes of each other, such that one is the efficient cause and the other the final cause of the other; and in this manner operation causes pleasure as an efficient cause, but pleasure perfects operation after the manner of an end. Now this meaning has nothing in common with the other meaning which the VV. attach to this opinion of the Angelic Doctor, namely, that pleasure is related to operation as a means to an end.

22. Otherwise, there is also another meaning in which, according to St. Thomas, pleasure is for the sake of another; this can be seen indicated in passing in the cited Note, where mention is made of play and of the doctrine of St. Thomas on the virtue of temperance.

St. Thomas proposes a certain necessity of some pleasure thus (II-II, question 168, article 2): Just as man needs bodily rest for the refreshment of the body, because he cannot labor continuously ..., so also it is on the part of the soul.... And therefore, when it extends itself beyond its measure into certain operations, it labors and is thereby fatigued, especially because in the operations of the soul the body also labors at the same time, insofar as the intellective soul uses powers operating through bodily organs.... But just as bodily fatigue is relieved through rest of the body, so also animal fatigue must be relieved through rest of the soul. But the rest of the soul is pleasure, as was held above; and therefore a remedy against animal fatigue is applied through some pleasure. And, after recalling the response which St. John the Evangelist is said to have made to those who were scandalized because they had found him playing with his disciples, namely, that the spirit of man would be broken if it were never relaxed from its application, he adds: Words or deeds of this kind, in which nothing except animal pleasure is sought, are called playful or jocose; and therefore it is necessary to use such things at times as a certain rest of the soul.... And therefore there can be a certain moral virtue concerning games ..., insofar as through this virtue man is restrained from immoderation in games.

23. But since every moral virtue consists in a mean, St. Thomas, after showing (loc. cit., article 3) that one can sin against this virtue by excess, further shows (ibid., article 4) that one can also sin by defect. For to the question whether some sin consists in a defect of play, he replies: It must be said that everything contrary to reason in human affairs is vicious. But it is contrary to reason that someone exhibit himself as burdensome to others, for example, when he offers nothing pleasurable and also impedes their pleasures.... But those who are deficient in play neither say anything ridiculous themselves, and are troublesome to those who do, because they do not receive the moderate games of others; therefore such persons are vicious and are called hard and boorish.

Indeed, he adds (article 3, reply to objection 3) that these games are not rejected by austerity: Austerity, he says, insofar as it is a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures, but those which are superfluous and inordinate.

He nevertheless adds (ibid., corpus): But because play is useful for rest and pleasure, while pleasure and rest are not sought for their own sake in human life but for the sake of operation ..., therefore deficiency in play is less vicious than excess in play. And to this pertain also the things which the Holy Doctor had said (loc. cit., article 2, reply to objection 3): The operations of play themselves according to their species are not ordered to some end; but the pleasure which is had in such acts is ordered to some recreation and rest of the soul.

How pleasure from games is ordered to operation the Holy Doctor explains thus (On chapter 3 of Isaiah, at the end), where he discusses choral games: Because it is impossible always to act in the active and contemplative life, therefore it is necessary at times to interpose joys among cares, lest the spirit be broken by excessive severity and so that man may more promptly devote himself to works of virtue.

24. From this doctrine of the Angelic Doctor something can now be deduced without difficulty which also contributes to the principal argument of this Note. For from the foregoing it is necessary at times to interpose joys among cares and to offer a remedy against animal fatigue through some pleasure. And indeed the moderate use of pleasure is so far from being evil of itself that it is rather an act of virtue; and, as the same St. Thomas adds (loc. cit., on chapter 3 of Isaiah), in one who is in the state of grace, even choral play is an act meritorious of eternal life (see Note to no. 32, vol. I, question 6).

Since these things are so, it is now permissible to ask: does it involve any disorder that, for those ends concerning which St. Thomas spoke a little before, a remedy is sought from some pleasure which is known also to have been ordered by God the Author of nature to another end? St. Thomas indeed writes (II-II, question 141, article 4): Because pleasure follows a natural operation, some pleasures are more vehement insofar as they follow operations which are more natural. But the most natural operations are those by which the nature of the individual is preserved through food and drink. It is therefore asked: does it present any disorder that the pleasure of food and drink, which God ordained to the preservation of nature, is also employed for another end?

Certainly, the same St. Thomas, who had said (loc. cit.) that temperance especially concerns pleasures of this kind and had added (loc. cit., article 6) that temperance accepts the NECESSITY of this life as the rule of pleasurable things, namely, that it uses them only insofar as the NECESSITY of this life requires, nevertheless approves (ibid., reply to objection 2) that the temperate man desires other pleasurable things which

are not necessary for health or for a good condition, provided they are not impediments to these. And he adds (ibid., reply to objection 3) that temperance regards necessity according to the fittingness of life, which is considered not only according to the fittingness of the body but also according to the fittingness of external things. To this passage Cajetan adds (in his Commentary): Thus every right use of pleasurable things removes some need either of the body, of duty, or of simply more perfect honorableness.... For, as is apparent in the text, the temperate man uses both the things necessary for the preservation and good condition of the body, and the things fitting according to means, duties, social intercourse, and honorableness.... For one who held a banquet not consonant with his own rank and that of the guests, according to means and honorableness, would not have sufficiently met the necessity of the fittingness of the present life.... Therefore, the necessity of the fittingness of the present life is the rule of temperance, according to which it also commands other virtues, for example liberality, urbanity, and any others which are sometimes needed.

Therefore, the remedy and right use of the pleasure which is taken from food and drink extends much further than the institution of nature, which ordained that pleasure to the preservation of the individual, appears to demand. Therefore, just as according to St. Thomas, because it is impossible always to act in the active and contemplative life, and therefore it is necessary to interpose joys among cares, on an occasion of rejoicing, for example at weddings, the use of pleasure which is perceived from choral play is right; can and must not the same be said of the pleasure which is taken from a banquet for the sake of rejoicing? Certainly the evangelical Father, who said to his servants (Luke 15): Bring the fatted calf, kill it, and let us eat and feast, gave this reason: But it was fitting to feast and rejoice, because this your brother was dead and has come to life again. And to this also pertains the fact that the Lord, on the occasion of a wedding (John 2), so changed water into wine that the chief steward said to the bridegroom: Every man first sets forth good wine, and when they have become intoxicated, then that which is worse; but you have kept the good wine until now. Therefore, there is no disorder if pleasure which of itself and principally is ordained to sustaining life is employed for another honorable purpose extrinsic to this end.

What of the fact that, according to the common sense of the faithful, it also pertains to the joy of the more solemn feast days in the Church that one ought, according to the means and condition of each person, to be cheered by richer and more abundant feasts? And indeed we are plainly taught that this is most honorable and altogether consonant with the sense of the Church when we read that St. Gregory Nazianzen, in his letter to Helladius (in Migne, letter 120) and another to Theodore (ibid., letter 121), gave thanks for the little gifts which had been sent to him by them when the solemnity of Easter recurred. Indeed, St. Basil also, in his letter to Amphilochius, Bishop of Iconium (in Migne, letter 232), does not hesitate to call these little gifts tokens of the feast day. But when, he says, the tokens of the feast also arrive, what else must one call it except a feast of feasts, as the old law was accustomed to call the Sabbath of Sabbaths? Moreover, among the little gifts sent to him he recalls also sweetmeats (tragemata); concerning this gift, however, he adds: My age is not fit for gnawing, since my teeth have long since been worn away both by time and infirmity.

It is therefore manifest that nothing inordinate is found in the fact that pleasure instituted and ordained by God the Author of nature to some special end is assumed for another honorable end whenever this in no way obstructs the end instituted by God and primary, namely, according to that saying of St. Thomas: The temperate man

desires other pleasurable things which are not necessary for health or for a good condition, provided they are not impediments to these.

25. Since these things are so, and since pleasure taken from a richer banquet according to the condition of each person is in no way opposed to the order of reason, whether the common occasion of joy requires this when certain feast days, both sacred and non-sacred, recur; and since the same reason of joy renders pleasures of this kind honorable also among private persons, if at some time the anniversary memory of a heavenly patron recurs, or the birthday of someone in the family is celebrated, or generally some cause of new joy has been brought either by health finally recovered after a most grave illness, or by a rich inheritance unexpectedly acquired, or by the unexpected return among one's own people from a most lengthy journey full of dangers, or from prolonged perils of war, or by accession to some new dignity or most noble office, etc., etc.; why, then, shall we say it is contrary to the order of reason if anyone in any way wearied by any cares, labors, business, studies, or anxieties seeks in moderation, in the aforesaid manner, some refreshment and rest of spirit, which according to St. Thomas is drawn from pleasure? And if even for this purpose alone he recreates himself by the enjoyment of this pleasure, as St. Thomas says (I-II, question 25, article 2), otherwise so observing the law of temperance that, as the same St. Thomas says, no impediment whatever is brought to the primary and natural end of the work, do we not now have that which the VV. otherwise denounce as condemned, namely, that someone can honorably use food and drink for pleasure or delight?

26. Moreover, since this has been said concerning the pleasure and delight of food and drink, why can it not also be said of the pleasure and delight which is sought from conjugal offices in the same circumstances as above? For how does this case differ from the preceding one when the pleasure sought from it for the necessary rest of a wearied spirit in no way impedes the end intended by nature according to the doctrine of St. Thomas? Indeed, if with St. Thomas you weigh, on the one hand, the necessity of some relief and rest from cares, studies, duties, business, and labors, which must be sought from some pleasure; and, on the other, the condition of very many to whom it is scarcely given to seek some honorable and easy pleasure elsewhere, it will readily appear how it can very commonly happen that the act of marriage, to which a certain desire for solace, pleasure, or delight leads, is also rendered wholly honorable by this end, namely, some necessary relief and rest.

This is not the end, you will say, for which God the Author of nature joined pleasure to a work of this kind. It is permissible to reply with the Salmanticenses (On Matrimony, chapter 3, no. 28) that no law commands that what is primary in a work be intended first, provided that what is intended is honorable and good, and especially if it is intrinsic to the work. But, as is apparent from the foregoing, it is honorable and good to seek the rest of a wearied spirit from pleasure, and it is intrinsic to the work to bring this rest through pleasure. Moreover, the Salmanticenses add this reason: that although from the intention of the agent an accidental end is intended primarily, nevertheless from the intention of the work the essential and primary end is always intended so long as it is not excluded.

And to the same matter Aegidius Coninck (disputation 25, no. 17): Although every thing is principally instituted by God, as the Author of nature, for some certain end, nevertheless at least secondarily it is also instituted for any honorable ends for obtaining which it has an aptitude. Eyes, for example, were chiefly given to us for seeing, but secondarily also so that we may signify something to another when honorable utility demands this. Wherefore, with their primary end entirely omitted,

we can use them for all honorable ends of this kind; because from no ground can any reason be shown which obliges us always to use any thing for obtaining its principal end, or principally to intend this end, especially when we do not positively impede it from following. But pleasure which is sought from the act of marriage for the rest of a wearied spirit and for animal recreation neither impedes nor excludes the ends intended by nature and otherwise is found entirely consonant with reason and the laws of temperance, as was said. Therefore it is honorably and consequently licitly sought and is assumed as a means to operation, insofar as man afterward, as St. Thomas says (above, no. 23), may more promptly devote himself to works of virtue.

27. A few things must be added here lest anything be omitted of those things with which the VV. filled those thirty-six columns.

To those things, therefore, by which it is shown in the Note, according to the doctrine of the Apostle and, after the Apostle, of St. John Chrysostom and St. Thomas, that there is in marriage an intrinsic end that it be a remedy for concupiscence, and consequently that this end is so far from being excluded by one who acts enticed by pleasure that he rather pursues and fulfills that very end, the VV. object two things.

First, they urge these things (page 828): It is not licit, or it is not free from every fault, to use marriage merely for capturing pleasure, because pleasure is not an honorable end. And for this they adduce the words of Roncaglia (!).

Reply 1. It can rightly appear hardly tolerable that the VV. added the word MERELY by their own effort, by which they insinuate that acting for pleasure alone is taught as licit in the Note, when the context and purpose of the entire Note tends to excluding that condemned opinion. Reply 2. The VV., therefore, rather condemn St. Alphonsus, who wrote (see above, no. 11) that he does not sin who, approaching the table, does not think of the preservation of life, but ONLY of the pleasure of food; in which words you truly see the exclusive particle only. But if, on account of the reverence due to the Holy Doctor, those words must be drawn to a right meaning, why do the VV. draw the words of others into a perverse meaning, in which no exclusive particle appears, but gratuitously intrude it themselves against the force of the context?

28. Secondly, the VV. urge (page 829) that two things appear to be confused in the Note which must altogether be distinguished, namely, to act for pleasure and to act as a remedy for concupiscence. And they add that these two ends are all the less to be confused because they are rather opposed to one another. When someone, they say, intends NOTHING EXCEPT PLEASURE (behold again the perverse opinion concerning one acting for pleasure alone gratuitously fastened upon our Note!), the same thing happens to him as to a drinker who does not extinguish thirst by drinking but rather increases it. Thus, the more someone pursues pleasure, the more he desires to enjoy pleasure.

Reply 1. Raphael Aversa responds well to these things (On Matrimony, question 21, section 4): The act of carnal intercourse is licit for calming concupiscence. But concupiscence is an appetite for a pleasurable good, as St. Thomas says. Therefore concupiscence is calmed through the use of a pleasurable good, or through pleasure sought from a licit conjugal act. How, therefore, do the VV. contend that pleasure sought from the conjugal work and a remedy for concupiscence are mutually opposed?

Reply 2. Therefore let the VV. condemn St. Thomas, who (see the text in the Note), because concupiscence chiefly incites men to venereal acts on account of the vehemence of pleasure, said it is necessary that concupiscence be yielded to in part, by ordering the act of generation according to reason, that is, with a legitimate wife and with the order of nature observed. Indeed, let them condemn the Apostle, who wrote: Return again to the same, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence. Indeed, let them also condemn the order of Divine Providence, which (see above, no. 19) joined pleasures to these operations so that FROM THE APPETITE FOR THEM animals would apply themselves to operations of this kind. Otherwise, if the Author of nature placed in man that concupiscence which, as St. Thomas says (I-II, question 30, article 3), is the appetite for a pleasurable good, he nevertheless at the same time placed reason, by whose order man moderates that appetite through temperance, which, as St. Thomas says (II-II, question 141, article 5), concerns the principal pleasures which chiefly pertain to the preservation of human life either in the species or in the individual.

29. And it is preferable here to add what the Salmanticenses hold thus concerning spouses enticed by pleasure to their proper office (On Matrimony, chapter 3, no. 33): When the act is good of itself and its proper end is not excluded, a good end is already applied in it; and thus, although indifferent ends are applied as applications of the will to it, the act is not thereby vitiated or rendered evil through defect of an honorable end.... Wherefore an act is good if someone eats temperately, not attending to the end of eating but also not excluding it (according to Martinet and the VV., however, above, no. 11, this would have to be called condemned doctrine!), even if he is applied to such eating by taste and pleasure. And in our case, when someone is applied to marital intercourse by the pleasure to be taken in it, such an act is good, because it is an act of justice and a rendering of the debt, even if attention is not given to this but to taking pleasure, which happens more frequently, because the honorable end of that act is always retained and such pleasure is only an application of the will to it.

Likewise Raphael Aversa (On Matrimony, question 21, section 4): Nor is it persuaded that to have intercourse moderately for pleasure is a venial sin, because in human operations it is not culpable moderately to desire the pleasure instituted in them by nature when the operations themselves are licit and honorable of themselves.

30. But to that which the VV. note (page 829, note 2), that marriage is the lowest remedy for concupiscence, Aversa replies (loc. cit.): The act of carnal intercourse ... is licit for spouses for calming concupiscence. Nor are they bound to use other more perfect and difficult means for this other end; but it is sufficient if they use the means which is also licit and conceded to them. Otherwise it would be very harsh to oblige married persons to strive to subdue the flesh by abstinences, prayers, and other things of this kind rather than have intercourse with one another conceded to them through marriage.... And this must be extended so that conjugal intercourse is licit for someone not only when he probably fears that he may fall into the sin of incontinence; but even if, through the help of God, he hopes and trusts that he will abstain from sin, yet suffers or would suffer the stings of the flesh, he can use this remedy to extinguish them.

And Peter Catalani (Moral Theology, part 3, question 12, chapter 6): Among the other ends for which marriage was instituted are numbered the generation of children ... and the calming of concupiscence. For it was fitting not only to provide for the preservation of the human race, but also ... to institute an opportune remedy for calming dishonorable couplings and movements of the flesh, as Paul wisely says in 1 Corinthians 7. Each end is honorable and licit for spouses;

wherefore, if spouses have intercourse for any one of the aforesaid ends, they commit no sin, because to act for an end preordained by God cannot be illicit and dishonorable. And although spouses could use prayers, fasts, mortifications, and other suitable means for calming concupiscence, they nevertheless are not bound to use them, because it is a counsel to use them and not all receive this word. Therefore, for spouses to have intercourse for these ends will not be to depart from rectitude, since it is a means instituted by God and sufficiently commended by the Apostle Paul. Indeed, it will not be sound counsel to persuade spouses to abstain from intercourse unless they are of proven virtue and sanctity.

31. The VV. object (page 830) that, in the Note, the text of St. Thomas from lecture 1 on chapter 7 of 1 Corinthians is adduced in a mutilated form and that those things which contradict it are omitted. For the Holy Doctor proceeds: In another way indulgence can be taken insofar as it regards fault ...; and according to this indulgence is referred to the conjugal act according as it has venial fault attached to it.... Hence it must be considered that the conjugal act is sometimes meritorious and without mortal or venial fault, for example, when it is ordered to the good of offspring ..., or when it is done for the sake of rendering the debt.... But sometimes it is with venial fault, namely, when someone is excited to the matrimonial act from concupiscence which nevertheless remains within the limits of marriage.... Therefore, in the first manner the act of marriage does not require indulgence; in the second manner it has indulgence insofar as someone consenting to concupiscence toward his wife does not become guilty of mortal sin.

Moreover, elsewhere (Supplement, question 49, article 5, reply to objection 1), the Holy Doctor writes: When nature alone moves one to the act of marriage, he is not altogether excused from sin except insofar as the movement of nature is ordered actually or habitually further to offspring, according as it is a good of the sacrament. And in the reply to objection 2: If someone through the act of marriage ... intends to avoid fornication in himself, there is some superfluity there, and according to this it is a venial sin.

32. Reply. The difficulty concerning the meaning of the Apostle Paul must be resolved in one way, even according to St. Thomas, but the difficulty concerning the opinion of St. Thomas in another.

Therefore, if the meaning of the Apostle is asked, even from the interpretation of St. Thomas, the objection of the VV. is empty; and the reason is that the words objected have nothing to do with the interpretation of the Pauline opinion. And indeed this is the commentary of St. Thomas: "But this I say according to indulgence," that is, sparing your infirmity; "not according to command," as though it were necessary for you unto salvation. For some things must be conceded to subjects on account of their infirmity, and they must not be compelled by command to goods. But the Apostle appears to speak unfittingly. For indulgence concerns only sin. Therefore, by the fact that the Apostle appears to have conceded marriage according to indulgence, he appears to express that marriage is a sin. But to this one can reply in two ways. In one way, so that indulgence is taken here for permission. But permission is twofold. One is of a lesser evil.... Such permission is not made in the New Testament on account of its perfection.... The other is permission of a lesser good, when, namely, man is not compelled by a precept to a greater good; AND IN THIS MANNER THE APOSTLE HERE INDULGES, that is, permits marriage, which is a lesser good than virginity, which is not commanded and is a greater good." Therefore the indulgence of which the Apostle speaks, according to St. Thomas, is referred to permission of a lesser good, but not to indulgence concerning any fault. Hence in the objected words which are immediately subjoined there, St. Thomas assuredly proceeds to resolve the objection proposed to himself, explaining further how indulgence can be referred to the conjugal act; but there he in no way expresses the opinion of the Apostle. And this is confirmed by those things which the Holy Doctor has below, saying: Then when he says (the Apostle), "But let each one," etc., he assigns the reason why he permitted marriage according to indulgence, namely, because not everyone has received from God the gift of such great virtue that he can contain himself entirely.

Viva speaks well concerning this opinion of Paul (On Matrimony, question 7, article 1, no. 2): If it were a venial fault to use such a means for avoiding incontinence, the Apostle could not grant an indulgence that the spouses should return to it. And Coninck (Disputation 34, no. 7) in the same sense: You will say: the Apostle says this according to indulgence; therefore he supposes there is some fault, because where there is no fault, we grant no indulgence. Reply. By denying the consequent and its proof. For to indulge does not there signify to remit faults, but indulgently to permit something. For the Apostle does not indulge them something past, but future; which is done with regard to faults only perversely. That is, no otherwise than we heard St. Thomas saying above: Such permission (namely, of a lesser evil) is not made in the New Testament.

33. Reply 2. But neither do the texts of St. Thomas objected by the VV. (above, no. 31) in any way strike the doctrine for the confirmation and explanation of which the authority of St. Thomas is adduced in the Note.

And certainly there are two things for the explanation of which the authority of St. Thomas is invoked in the Note. The first is that matrimony was divinely instituted also as a remedy for concupiscence. But this is proved by the words of St. Thomas there adduced: He proposes (the Apostle) the second necessity, according to which (matrimony) was instituted as a remedy for fault. Nor indeed is there reason why anyone should perhaps stumble over those words, as a remedy for fault. Behold how St. Thomas speaks more clearly a little afterward: The second good (namely, matrimony) has insofar as it is a remedy for CONCUPISCENCE, which is confined to a determinate person, and this good is called fidelity.

The other thing which is undertaken to be proved by the authority of St. Thomas in the Note pertains to the manner in which matrimony is a remedy for concupiscence, namely, that this consists in yielding to concupiscence itself through acts apt for generation in legitimate marriage. And for this purpose these words of St. Thomas are adduced there: For because carnal concupiscence still remains after baptism, although it does not dominate, it incites men especially to venereal acts on account of the vehemence of pleasure; and because it is a matter of greater virtue entirely to overcome this concupiscence than can befit men, according to Matthew 19: "Not all receive this word"; it is necessary that concupiscence be yielded to in part and overcome in part; which indeed is done when the act of generation is ordered according to reason. Then in the same place it is added how, according to St. Thomas, the act of generation is so ordered by reason that concupiscence is yielded to in part and overcome in part. And this is shown to be obtained when two conditions are observed, which St. Thomas indicates thus: 1. That man use the act of generation according as it befits the generation and EDUCATION of children; 2. That in the human species there be not wandering and uncertain couplings, such as fornical couplings are, but that determinate men be joined to determinate women: which determination indeed is made through the law of matrimony. It is therefore manifest that the texts of St. Thomas objected by the VV. (above, no. 31) prove not even the least thing. For confirming the proposed doctrine, therefore, the authority of St. Thomas was employed in the Note with the fullest right.

Moreover, regarding the texts adduced in the Note, the VV. (page 830, note 3) objected only this: that in the second text the words AND EDUCATION had been omitted; whence St. Thomas concludes that matrimony ought to be of a determinate man to a determinate woman. But it is briefly replied to this that it can appear strange that the VV. dwell seriously upon these things. For are not the words of St. Thomas adduced in the Note where it is said that the order of reason requires that in the human species there be not wandering couplings, but couplings of determinate men to determinate women? Those words certainly suffice for the purpose. For otherwise we leave the labor of gathering even those things which pertain less to the matter to those whose principal care it is that causes be judged from the immense bulk of the volume.

34. Yet another reply should be given to the texts objected above (no. 31), insofar as they appear to intimate that the pleasure sought in the conjugal act is not free from every fault. And especially those words appear to require this (Lecture 1 on 1 Corinthians): But sometimes it is with venial fault, namely, when someone is excited to the matrimonial act from concupiscence which nevertheless remains within the limits of matrimony, as, namely, when he is content with his wife alone.

I said, especially those words; for what the VV. object from the Supplement, question 49, article 5, reply to objection 1, is nothing. For the words objected from this place are these: When nature alone moves one to the act of matrimony, he is not altogether excused from sin except insofar as the movement of nature is ordered ACTUALLY OR HABITUALLY further to offspring, according as it is a good of the sacrament. But suppose, I ask, that you read there the following words: Nor nevertheless does it follow that the movement of nature is evil, but that it is imperfect unless it be ordered further to some good of matrimony. The Holy Doctor, namely, replies to the objection that the act of matrimony can be excused even without the goods of matrimony. Indeed, the objected words tell against the VV. who object to them. For to remove this imperfection of the matrimonial act, it suffices (as is said there) that the act be ordered actually or habitually to the goods of matrimony. But for the act to be called HABITUALLY ordered, it suffices that those ends not be positively excluded. Hence the doctrine of the Note which the VV. attack is confirmed: for an honorable act it suffices that its ends not be positively excluded, that is, however little they may be thought of while acting.

But regarding the last text objected by the VV. (above, no. 31), they themselves (page 832) note that not even St. Alphonsus admits that opinion of the Angelic Doctor, as being too rigid, and they transcribe these words of St. Alphonsus himself (book 6, no. 882): But, with the pardon of the Holy Doctor (whose opinions I have striven universally to follow in other matters), the interpretation of St. John Chrysostom appears more proper, whose words I shall presently adduce and whom Estius, Salmeron, and Cornelius followed, namely, that the phrase "on account of fornication" is not understood of avoiding the fornication of one's spouse, but one's own. And since these things are so, an easy reply offers itself to this text of St. Thomas. For, on the one hand, it does not in any way weaken the doctrine which we constructed on the authority of the same St. Thomas; while, on the other hand, not much weight should be given to an opinion which even St. Alphonsus judged should not be admitted, as being (the VV. say) too rigid.

35. But the reverence due to the Angelic Doctor would be better consulted if a more apt interpretation and reason for the objected opinion were employed.

And in truth St. Thomas (Lecture 1 on chapter 7 of 1 Corinthians) does not explain that saying of the Apostle, On account of fornication, etc., in such a sense that it would be licit with

St. Alphonsus to oppose the interpretation of Chrysostom to the interpretation of the Angelic Doctor. Behold his words: It has been said that it is good for a man not to touch a woman; but because all men are not fit for this good, let each man, on account of fornication, namely, to be avoided, have his own wife, that is, one determined for him, so that wandering and uncertain couplings, which pertain to fornication, may be removed. Hence also Proverbs 5: "Rejoice with the wife of your youth"; and afterward it is added: "Why are you seduced, my son, by a strange woman?" Therefore the interpretation of that Pauline passage which St. Thomas presents agrees to a nicety with the interpretation of Chrysostom which you see in the Note, namely, he interprets Paul concerning the avoidance of one's own fornication, not that of another.

But this must also be held for another reason, namely, lest we make St. Thomas fight with himself, and indeed in the same context. For he had premised these things in the same place: He proposes (the Apostle) the second necessity, according to which (matrimony) was instituted as a remedy for fault (that is, concupiscence; above, no. 33). For because carnal concupiscence still remains after baptism, although it does not dominate, it incites men especially to venereal acts on account of the vehemence of pleasure; and because it is a matter of greater virtue entirely to overcome this concupiscence than can befit men ... it is necessary that concupiscence be yielded to in part and overcome in part, which indeed is done when the act of generation is ordered according to reason. But it is manifest that the Holy Doctor here speaks of the remedy for each person's own concupiscence; otherwise the use of this remedy could never occur without the sin of one or the other spouse.

But, you will say, how then do these things agree with the objected opinion of the same Holy Doctor, namely, that if someone through the act of matrimony intends to avoid fornication in himself, this is a venial sin?

36. I reply that this opinion can be reconciled without difficulty with the aforesaid doctrine of the Holy Doctor, if its reason is sought more diligently from the context; and from this inquiry it will also be apparent in what sense another objected text of the Holy Doctor (above, no. 34) is to be understood.

That these things may therefore be understood more clearly, observe how St. Thomas, after he had asked (Supplement, question 49, article 4) whether the act of matrimony is excused by the aforesaid goods, namely, the goods of matrimony, immediately in the following fifth article, from which the objected words were taken, asks whether the matrimonial act can be excused without the goods of matrimony. But what he means by a matrimonial act without the goods of matrimony is clear from the first objection of the following sixth article, where it is said: It appears that whenever someone knows his wife, not intending any good of matrimony but pleasure alone, he sins mortally. Therefore, with St. Thomas, a matrimonial act not excused by the goods of matrimony is the same as a matrimonial act had for pleasure alone.

And to this indeed pertains the second objection of the fifth article and therefore the reply of St. Thomas from which the objected words were taken. For the Holy Doctor thus objects to himself: He who uses his spouse to avoid fornication does not appear to intend any good of matrimony; but such a one does not sin, as it appears, because matrimony was conceded to human infirmity for this purpose, that fornication might be avoided, as is apparent in 1 Corinthians 7; therefore even WITHOUT THE GOODS OF MATRIMONY his act can be excused. The objection therefore supposes a matrimonial act without the goods of matrimony. But, this state of the question being supposed, it is easily understood why St. Thomas proposes two cases in his reply, namely, when a spouse wishes to avoid fornication in the other spouse, and when in himself. For in the first case he denies that every good of matrimony is absent, because there is the good of fidelity and the act of justice in rendering the debt; but not likewise in the second case; and since, with this good of matrimony also removed, by hypothesis no other good of this kind now remains, the hypothesis of a matrimonial act without the goods of matrimony returns, namely, an act which is had for pleasure alone, which St. Thomas for this reason (above, no. 18) had already said to be stained by venial fault. And the same St. Thomas clearly exhibits the character of this act when, in the following article, reply to objection 1, he writes: It must be said that a man seeks meretricious pleasures in his wife when he attends to nothing else in her than what he would attend to in a harlot; which things the Holy Doctor refers entirely to the present hypothesis, for thus the objection has it: whenever someone knows his wife, not intending any good of matrimony, but pleasure alone. And in reality the matter stands thus when one deals with harlots; for neither the good of offspring nor the good of fidelity is sought there or attended to by the fornicator. Nor nevertheless does the Holy Doctor concede what the objection held, that one sins mortally if pleasure alone is attended to in one's wife without some other good of matrimony. For in the same article 6, in the body, he writes: But if pleasure is sought within the limits of matrimony, so that, namely, such pleasure would not be sought in another than one's spouse, it is thus a venial sin.

And from these things it also follows that it is by no means necessary to attribute to the Angelic Doctor that opinion which the VV. called too rigid, as though, namely, the Holy Doctor generally condemns as some sin an approach to one's spouse by which one finds a remedy for calming concupiscence in oneself, whereas, on the contrary, he himself acknowledges and teaches that matrimony was divinely instituted also for this end. For the Holy Doctor establishes only this, and most rightly, when someone approaches his wife for pleasure alone in such a way that no good of matrimony is attended to, no otherwise than one who approaches a harlot. And indeed, as we saw above (no. 34), according to the Holy Doctor it suffices that the good of matrimony be attended to actually or habitually, namely, that at least virtually that end or good be intended which renders the act of matrimony honorable. For this purpose Seraphinus Capponi, in his elucidations on this passage, alleges these words of St. Thomas: If it is not then ordered, it has nevertheless been preordained by reason. Therefore, for that act to have been preordained by reason is for it to be ordered habitually (see also above, no. 9). Therefore, according to St. Thomas, there is no inordination if a spouse, enticed by pleasure, approaches the other spouse, even if he intends the goods of matrimony only habitually, that is, by not excluding them, as they are excluded in the access of a fornicator to a harlot.

37. Hence, as I said in the preceding number, an easy solution is apparent to the difficulty which another text of the Holy Doctor objected by the VV. appears to introduce, where it is said that the conjugal act has indulgence insofar as someone consenting to concupiscence toward his wife does not become guilty of mortal sin (but of venial sin). For after the foregoing it is easily understood that in this place also the Holy Doctor discusses the matrimonial act without the goods of matrimony, that is, one had for pleasure alone.

That this may readily be clear, observe that according to St. Thomas there is a threefold good of matrimony, namely, the good of offspring, the good of fidelity, and the good of the sacrament. But since the good of the sacrament, as the Holy Doctor says (Supplement, question 49, article 5, corpus), makes matrimony itself honorable, but not its act, it remains that the act of matrimony must be rendered honorable by the goods of offspring or of fidelity, as the same Holy Doctor concludes there. With these things premised, let the context from which the objected words are taken be consulted (Lecture on chapter 7 of 1 Corinthians): Indulgence, says the Holy Doctor, is referred to the conjugal act according as it has venial fault annexed to it.... Hence it must be considered that the conjugal act is sometimes meritorious and without every mortal or venial fault, as when it is ordered to the good of offspring to be procreated and educated for the worship of God, for thus it is an act of religion; or when it is done for the sake of rendering the debt, for thus it is an act of justice; but every act of virtue is meritorious if it is with charity. But sometimes it is with venial fault, namely, when someone is excited to the matrimonial act from concupiscence which nevertheless remains within the limits of matrimony, as, namely, when he is content with his wife alone. Therefore in this place also a twofold case is discerned: the former, in which a good of matrimony appears; the latter, in which those goods of matrimony are lacking; for otherwise the reason for distinguishing one case from the other would be absent. But where the goods of matrimony are in no way attended to in the matrimonial act, one now intends the act of matrimony for pleasure alone, as was said above. Therefore, this passage also of the Angelic Doctor is by no means to be taken as a general rule concerning an act exercised on account of pleasure, but is to be restricted to one acting for pleasure alone in such a way that the goods of matrimony are not even virtually intended.

And let these things suffice, so that it may be concluded that the VV. did not write after sufficiently examining the matter when they said (page 832): It can appear strange that Father Ballerini endeavors to present St. Thomas as favoring him; all the more because it certainly did not escape him that this last reply (where, namely, St. Thomas appears to condemn the conjugal act for avoiding fornication in oneself), as being too rigid, is not admitted even by St. Alphonsus himself. We voluntarily omit many things which could easily be added from the same St. Thomas concerning this argument, lest this Note grow beyond measure.

2. The use of marriage with an adulterous mind is gravely illicit, as if one approaching his own wife should represent another woman to himself. - St. Ligorius, no. 913, and others commonly.

3. The use of marriage is licit for the sterile, both because no law to the contrary can be shown and because the sterile are of themselves fit to perform the conjugal act. If no generation follows, this occurs altogether per accidens; and besides generation there are other honorable ends which render conjugal intercourse honorable.

4. The use of marriage is licit even for the aged, whose seed is no longer prolific, provided that they are able sufficiently to perform intercourse or have a hope, not empty, of performing it. For the same reasons which we adduced concerning the sterile favor the aged. It is further confirmed from the practice of the Church, which blesses the marriages of the aged. - See St. Ligorius, no. 954.