Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 2: The Duties of Public Officials
- The highest government official in a country, whether his title be emperor, king, or president, is the representative of God, appointed for the purpose of enforcing justice and promoting the common welfare.1 St. Thomas2 describes his duties in a classical passage as threefold: “(1) That he establish a good life among the subject multitude; (2) That he preserve what has been established; (3) That he promote what has been preserved toward better things.” The institutio bonae vitae comprises: (a) that the people live in unity of peace; (b) that, united by the bonds of peace, they be directed in doing good; (c) that by the industry and foresight of their ruler they be provided plentifully with the necessaries of life.3
1 Rom. XIII, 3 sq.
2 De Regimine Principum, l. I, c. 15.
3 Ibid.: “(a) That the multitude be established in the unity of peace; (b) that the multitude, united by the bond of peace, be directed to acting well; (c) that through the ruler’s industry there be a sufficient abundance of the things necessary for living well.”
The conservatio bonae vitae implies: (a) a just administration by, and a proper succession of, officials; (b) proper laws and precepts, re- wards to encourage civic virtue and punishments to deter the people from wrongdoing; (c) safety of the commonwealth against exterior and interior enemies.4 The promotio bonae vitae implies: (a) correcting crimes, misdemeanors, and serious faults; (b) supplying the things that are necessary for the welfare of the nation, and (c) introducing indispensable and advisable reforms.5 The principal duty of the regent is to dispense justice to all. Hence he must never violate justice, or permit others to violate it; he must render to each what is his due, reward or punish all according to their deserts, combine firmness with paternal kindness and charity, and be ever mindful of the account he will one day have to render to God.6
4 Ibid.: “(a) Care concerning the succession of men and the substitution of those who preside over the various offices; (b) that by his laws and precepts, punishments and rewards, he restrain the men subject to him from iniquity; (c) that the subject multitude be rendered safe against enemies.”
5 Ibid.: “(a) In each of the things set forth above, if anything is disordered, to correct it; (b) if anything is lacking, to supply it; (c) if anything can be done better, to bring it to completion.”—Cfr. Aug. Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., n. 952.
6 Ps. II, 10, 12; Wisd. I, 1; VI, 2–4; VI, 7; cfr. Jas. II, 13.
“The right to rule,” says Leo XIII, “is not necessarily bound up with any special mode of government. It may take this or that form, provided only that it be of a nature to insure the general welfare. But whatever be the nature of the government, rulers must always bear in mind that God is the paramount Ruler of the world, and must set Him before themselves as their exemplar and law in the administration of the State.... They, therefore, who rule, should rule with even-handed justice, not as masters, but rather as fathers, for the rule of God over man is most just, and is tempered always with a father’s kindness. Government should, moreover, be administered for the well-being of the citizens, because they who govern others possess authority solely for the welfare of the State. Furthermore, the civil power must not be subservient to the advantage of any one individual or of some few persons, inasmuch as it was established for the common good of all. But if those who are in authority rule unjustly, if they govern overbearingly or arrogantly, and if their measures prove hurtful to the people, they must remember that the Almighty will one day bring them to account, the more strictly in proportion to the sacredness of their office and the pre-eminence of their dignity.”7
7 Encyclical “Immortale Dei,” Nov. 1, 1885: “The right of command is not of itself necessarily joined to any form of commonwealth: it can rightly assume this form or that, provided it is in fact effective for the common utility and good. But in every kind of commonwealth princes must altogether look to God, the supreme Governor of the world, and set Him before themselves as an exemplar and law in administering the state.... Government, therefore, ought to be just, not masterly, but as it were paternal, because God’s most just power over men is joined with paternal goodness.... But if those who are in authority slip into unjust domination, if they sin through arrogance or pride, if they take bad counsel for the people, let them know that they will someday have to render an account to God, and that the reckoning will be so much stricter, the more sacred the office in which they have been engaged or the higher the degree of dignity they have obtained.”—Cfr. J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 3, 26 sqq.
Least of all is a ruler permitted to employ his power against God, i. e., to the detriment of religion;—on the contrary, it is one of his first and most sacred duties to protect and foster religion, inasmuch as fidelity to God and to His holy law is a necessary condition of the temporal no less than of the spiritual welfare and prosperity of nations as well as individuals.8
8 Ibid., pp. 4 sqq., 29 sqq. Cfr. Ecclus. XIX, 18; 1 Tim. IV, 8.
“All who rule,” says Leo XIII, “should hold in honor the holy name of God, and one of their chief duties must be to favor religion, to protect it, to shield it under the credit and sanction of the laws, and neither to organize nor enact any measure that may compromise its safety. This is the bounden duty of rulers to the people over whom they rule.”9
9 Encyclical “Immortale Dei”: “The name of God must be holy among princes; and it must be placed among their chief duties to embrace religion with favor, to protect it with benevolence, to cover it with the authority and sanction of the laws, and neither to institute nor decree anything contrary to its safety. They owe this also to the citizens over whom they preside.” (Ryan, op. cit., pp. 4 sq., 29 sqq.)
- Public officials are the organs of the supreme ruler and entrusted with the duty of promoting the welfare of the people in their respective spheres, whether these be large or small.10
10 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 67–71; Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., n. 960–987.
The statement is frequently made in the United States that public officials are merely public servants. This, says Dr. Ryan, is incorrect. “They are, indeed, the servants of the people, but they are also something more. Inasmuch as their function is that of public service, they may properly be regarded as public servants; inasmuch as their position gives them the authority to enact laws which are morally binding on the people, they are not servants, but masters. Their character as public servants does not depend upon the fact that they are elected by the people; for hereditary kings are likewise bound to serve the common welfare. In a republic the members of legislatures may in a special sense be regarded as servants of the people, whenever they are instructed by the electors to carry out certain political policies. Their promise to pursue this course creates a particular responsibility to the people, and renders their position analogous to that of servants or agents. Nevertheless, they are masters and rulers when they enact the legislation necessary to carry out the policies to which they have committed themselves.”11
11 The State and the Church, p. 263.
One of the primary duties of public officials, according to the same writer, is “to possess an adequate knowledge of what constitutes the common welfare and of the means by which it is best promoted. This obligation is disregarded by a large proportion of those who seek public office. Men who are otherwise conscientious assume that good will and right motives are a sufficient equipment for public service. When we consider the enormously extended functions of the modern State, the numerous and profound ways in which its activities affect the welfare of all the people, and the consequent complexity of legislating and governing wisely, we see that this notion is utterly mistaken. Only in local governments and subordinate official positions is it true that common honesty plus common sense suffice for those who are charged with the duty of caring for the public welfare. In all the more important legislative and executive officers a considerable amount of special and specific knowledge is essential to an adequate discharge of official obligations.”12
12 Ryan, op. cit., p. 262.
Other important duties of public officials are: fidelity and conscientiousness in fulfilling the particular obligations of their state and impartiality in the administration of justice.13 They should also strive to be models of all other Christian virtues, especially of prudence, mildness, and benevolence. Here, too, what St. Paul says is true, that “love is the fulfilling of the law.”14 If public officials intentionally or out of culpable ignorance violate the rights of the people, or cause them material damage, they are guilty of sin and must make restitution. Thus, for example, a judge who, in a gravely culpable way, either because of ignorance or carelessness, has pronounced an unjust judgment, must repair the damage that results therefrom, because he is in duty bound to administer his office fairly and justly. If he has erred without grave fault, he is bound to correct his mistake as far as lies within his power.
13 Ex. XXIII, 2 sq., 6 sqq.; Lev. XIX, 15, 35; XXIV, 22; Deut. I, 17; XVI, 18 sq.; XXIV, 17; XXV, 1 sq.; Ps. LXXXI, 3 sq.; Is. I, 17; XXXII, 1; LVI, 1; Jer. XXII, 3; Zach. VIII, 16; Wisd. I, 1; Ecclus. XX, 31; Rom. XIII, 3 sq.; Jas. II, 1–9.—St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, l. IV, c. 4: “Justice removed, what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves but little kingdoms?” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 115).—Cicero, De Offic., l. II, c. 11: “Such is the power of [justice] that not even those who feed upon wrongdoing and crime can live without some particle of justice.”
14 Rom. XIII, 10; cfr. Zach. VIII, 19; Eph. IV, 15; Col. III, 14.—Sallust, Iugurth., 10: “By concord small things grow; by discord the greatest things fall apart.”
“The man who regards public office as an opportunity for private gain, except incidentally and as a necessary consequence of faithful public service, is false to his trust and violates legal justice. To accept a bribe for aid in the enactment of a bad law, for negligent or oppressive administration of the law, or for unjust judicial conduct, is an evident moral wrong. To obtain some advantage on the occasion of proper official actions, for example, through some form of ‘graft,’ is likewise a violation of legal justice. Such conduct is generally forbidden by the civil law; at any rate, it renders right judgment and adequate performance of official duties extremely difficult. Public officials are not justified in exposing themselves to such a grave temptation. What is true of their own private advantage, applies also to that of their friends. In their enactment or administration of the law they may not extend favors of any sort to any individual or class of individuals. The common good must be preferred to the good of individuals, and all individuals must be treated with exact justice.”15
15 J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 260 sq.
What would become of a State without justice? It would fall to pieces, for injustice breeds anarchy, and anarchy causes the disruption of all social bonds. When a State departs from the laws of justice, therefore, it courts destruction.
Every public official ought to be a vessel and an organ for the manifestation of justice within the sphere of his jurisdiction. He must be incorruptible, because justice cannot coexist with bribery. He must be impartial, for without impartiality his judgments would be unjust. He must be unselfish, for selfishness would render him susceptible to bribery. He must be discreet, for without discretion he cannot acquire and hold the confidence either of his superior or of the public. He must be diligent and punctual in the performance of his duties, else he cannot be a model to others. He must be chaste and temperate in all things, for he who is guilty of immoderate indulgence in the pleasures of the flesh can be neither assiduous nor impartial. Where would a slave of lust find the courage to sacrifice himself for the welfare of his country?16 He must be a man of superior culture, for without true culture there can be no wisdom, without wisdom no religion, without religion neither justice nor true benevolence.
16 J. M. Sailer, Handbuch der christl. Moral, Vol. III, p. 51, note 1: “History and philosophy both admit the influence of the current immorality on the conduct of public business.”—Tacitus says: “Nothing honorable resides in a mind corrupted by lust.”—Aristotle asks: “What difference does it make whether women govern, or whether those who govern are governed by women?”—Cfr. Polit., l. II, c. 9 (Op., II, 1269; III, 629).
The most indispensable qualities of a true statesman are: justice, wisdom, incorruptibility, and discretion; and the higher his office, the greater is his responsibility, and the more assiduously should he cultivate these virtues.
As justice is the very life and foundation of the State, and its administration is formally entrusted to the judges, their duties demand a special treatment.
a) A judge can pronounce official judgment only in matters over which the law gives him jurisdiction.
b) He must be familiar with the law so that he can apply it correctly to the concrete cases submitted for his decision.
c) He must be guided by a firm purpose of administering justice and, therefore, love justice above all things, as the embodiment of the divine will.
d) He must render his decisions according to the letter of the law, but never against its spirit, for this would be to disregard its very essence.
e) He must examine every case without prejudice, and preserve this impartial attitude until he has rendered judgment.
f) He must hear and examine all witnesses who are able and willing to tell the truth, and discount the testi- mony of those who are incompetent or addicted to falsehood.
g) He must adhere to the prescribed formalities in pronouncing judgment, for they are of the essence of the law.
h) He must protect right and justice against the prejudice and selfishness of minor officials; against interference by unauthorized outsiders; against prevarications on the part of lawyers, and, if necessary, also against usurpation by the rich and by the mob.
All this demands courage, wisdom, and fortitude of an altogether exceptional kind.17
17 F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, pp. 432 sqq.
READINGS.—St. Thomas, De Regimine Principum, l. I, c. 15 sqq.—IDEM, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 67 sqq.—Leo XIII, Encyclical “Immortale Dei,” of Nov. 1, 1885; English translation in The Pope and the People, London 1912, pp. 71 sqq. and in J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 1 sqq.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. IV, n. 192 sqq. (ed. Gaudé, II, 625 sqq.).—J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 177 sqq.—J. M. Sailer, Handbuch der christl. Moral, Vol. III, pp. 21 sqq., 50 sqq.—J. P. Gury, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 1 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 415 sq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 325 sqq.—Th. Meyer, S.J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 536 sqq., 584 sqq.