Section 3: Charity

I. DEFINITION.—Charity, as here understood, is a virtue by which we love God above all things for His own sake and our neighbor because of God. In this part of our treatise we deal with charity only in relation to our neighbor.

We love our neighbor if we wish him well (bene velle) both in regard to his temporal and eternal destiny, and if we aid him to the best of our ability in attaining that destiny (bene facere).

Charity, therefore, includes both the benevolent disposition which the Scholastics term amor affectivus and that constant inclination to do good which is known as amor effectivus.¹

¹ Tob. IV, 16; Matth. VII, 12; I Thess. IV, 9; 1 John II, 10; III, 18, IV, 12.

In the form of philanthropy or humanity, charity as a moral virtue was known and to some extent practiced by the ancient pagans.²

² Cfr. F. Bittner, Lehrbuch der kath. Moraltheologie, Pp. 420 sqq.

2. CHARITY AS A DUTY.—Whilst the Mosaic law³ limited the exercise of charity to the mem- bers of the Jewish nation, Christianity proclaims it as a universal duty, the fulfilment of which forms a distinctive badge of the true Catholic.⁴ For the precept inculcating love of neighbor virtually contains all the other commandments, even the "first and greatest," which is to love God above all things, and if we disobey this law, the observance of the others is unavailing for salvation, because sanctifying grace cannot dwell in the soul without charity.⁵ It follows that both as amor affectivus and as amor effectivus charity is a sacred duty. "What shall it profit, my brethren, if a man say he hath faith, but hath not works? Shall faith be able to save him? And if a brother or sister be naked, and want daily food, and one of you say to them: Go in peace, be ye warmed and filled, yet give them not those things that are necessary for the body, what shall it profit?"⁶ "My little children, let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth."⁷ Christ called the precept of charity which He gave to His disciples "a new commandment." He explained its meaning more fully, revealed its chief motives, and gave us a perfect model of its exercise in His own appearance and conduct, and, in re-creating man by means of grace enabled him for the first time since the Fall to observe the law of charity in its perfection.⁸ 3. THE RULE OF CHARITY.—The rule or norm of charity is Christian self-love,⁹ its principal motive is the love of God.¹⁰ We must love our neighbor first of all because he is a child of God, redeemed by Jesus Christ, and as such an object of divine love; and, secondly, because such is God's will, revealed to us in Sacred Scripture and by the example of our Divine Saviour.¹¹ God has created all men in His own image and likeness; all rational creatures form one great family under Him, as their common Father; all are capable, through grace, of attaining eternal happiness with Him in Heaven.¹²

³ Lev. XIX, 18, 34; Matth. V, 43; Luke X, 36 sq.

⁴ Matth. XXII, 39; John XIII, 34 sq.; XV, 12, 17; I John II, 10.

⁵ Matth. XXII, 40; Rom. XIII, 8-10; 1 Cor. XIII, 1-3; x John III, 14 sq.; IV, 7 sq., 20 sq.

⁶ Jas. II, 14 sq.: "What shall it profit, my brethren, if a man say that he hath faith, but hath not works? Shall faith be able to save him? And if a brother or sister be naked and lack daily food, and one of you say to them, ‘Go in peace, be ye warmed and filled,’ but you give them not those things that are necessary for the body, what shall it profit?"

⁷ 1 Ioa. III, 18: "My little children, let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth." Cfr. Prop. damn. sub Innoc. XI, n. 10: "We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act"; n. 11: "We can satisfy the precept of loving our neighbor by external acts alone." (Denz.-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 1160 sq.)

⁸ Simar, Moraltheol., ard ed., pp. ta 375 sq.

⁹ See this Handbook, Vol. III, qu pp. 4 sqq.

¹⁰ See this Handbook, Vol. IV, pp. 71 sqq.—Cfr. Tob. IV, 16; Matth. VII, 12.—St. Augustine, De Vera Relig., c. 46, n. 87: “This is the rule of love: that whatever good things he wishes to happen to himself, he should also wish for the other, and whatever evil things he does not wish to happen to himself, he should not wish for the other. He maintains this disposition toward all men.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 161).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 25, art. 1.

¹¹ Mal. II, 10; Matth. XXII, 39; hn XIII, 34; XV, 12, 17; Rom. V, 8 sq.; Eph. IV, 1-6.

¹² Slater, Mor. Theol., I, 179,

4. THE QUALITIES OF CHARITY.—Christian charity must of its very nature be religious, that is to say, it must have its motive and purpose in God;¹³ and, in the second place, universal, i. e., it must embrace both the physical and the spiritual needs of our fellowmen and extend to all without exception, even to personal enemies.¹⁴ Finally, charity must be effective, i.e., it must not consist in mere sentimentality or empty words, but manifest itself in deeds and sacrifices.¹⁵

¹³ Luke XIV, 26; I John III, 17 sq.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 44, art. 7.

¹⁴ Matth. V, 43-47; VI, 12, 15; XXII, 39; Luke XXIII, 24; Rom. XII, 14-21.—Cfr: St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 25, art. 8 sq.; Randlinger, Die Feindesliebe, pp. 79 sqq., 10I sqq.

¹⁵ John XIII, 34; XV, I2; Rom. V, 6-8; Jas. II, 15 sq.; = John III, 16-18.

The characteristic notes of charity are summed up by St. Paul in a famous passage as follows:

"Charity is patient, is kind; charity envieth not, 1s not pretentious, is not puffed up, behaveth not amiss, seeketh not her own, is not provoked, regardeth not evil; rejoiceth not over wickedness, but rejoiceth with the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things." ¹⁶ a) The purest form of charity is that by which the Christian believer loves his enemies. All other kinds of charity may have an admixture of selfishness, but to love one's enemies requires complete self-denial for God's sake. The precept by which we are bound to love our en- emies is an essential characteristic of the Christian religion, and in obeying it charity attains its loftiest heights.¹⁷

¹⁶ 1 Cor. XIII, 4-7: "Charity is patient, is kind; charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely, is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things."-Cfr. Phil. II, 1-4.

¹⁷ St. Augustine, Enarrat. in Ps., XCIII, n. 28: "When God does this (Heb. XII, 6–7), He trains us for an eternal inheritance, and He often bestows this benefit on us through evil men, in whom He exercises and perfects our love, which He wills to extend even to enemies. For Christian love is not perfect unless it fulfills what Christ commanded (Matt. V, 44): Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who persecute you." (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1214).—IDEM, Serm., 56 (al. 48 de Divers.), c. 10, n. 14: "You have enemies; for who lives in this world without an enemy? Attend to yourselves; love them. A raging enemy can in no way harm you as much as you harm yourself if you do not love your enemy. He can harm your farm, or your livestock, or your house, or your manservant, or your maidservant, or your son, or your wife, or at most, if power has been given him, your flesh. Can he harm your soul as you can? Extend yourselves to this perfection, dearly beloved; I exhort you." (P. L., XXXVIII, 383).—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 199–202; Capitaine, Die Moral des Klemens von Alex., PP. 347 sq.; Seitz, Die Heilsnotwendigkeit der Kirche, pp. 183 sqq.

How must we love our enemies? We must love them both positively and negatively. b) First and above all we are forbidden to hate them, i. e., we must put out of our hearts all ill will and revenge against those who dislike and wrong us, and show them those common marks of Christian charity which are due to all and may be refused to none.¹⁸1s What those marks are depends largely on the usages of time and place and of the society to which the parties belong.¹⁹1º This friendly disposition does not, of course, forbid the use of legal means to protect one's rights, if they have been violated, or to forestall future violations. c) The offender must take the first step towards reconciliation. He must show that he has changed his mind by asking for forgiveness and offering to make due reparation. The offended or injured person, on the other hand, is permitted to await the approaches of the offender, unless there be danger that, if he failed to act, recon- ciliation would become impossible, or grave scandal would arise, or important duties would be neglected, or unless he himself has retaliated by committing an additional injury against the offender. d) Reconciliation can be effected by showing to one's enemy the ordinary signs of charity which are due to all men. Extraordinary signs of charity (familiar intercourse, visits, etc.) are due only to the members of one's family and to neighbors of equal social standing, but not to strangers or persons of lower social position.²⁰2º There are circumstances, however, in which we are bound to show special signs of charity even to our enemy; for instance, when they cannot be withheld without scandal to others, who will ascribe the refusal to hatred; or when they are required to prevent our enemy from falling into grievous sin, for example, by conceiving a more intense hatred for us.²¹ "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give him water to drink: for thou shalt heap hot coals upon his head, and the Lord will reward thee.' ²² Different virtues manifest themselves in social inter- course, according as it is narrow or broad, but one thing is always necessary, and that is politeness, based upon that good will which every man owes every other man. Politeness in itself may embody respect, but as a rule it is little more than a manifestation of external deference. Natural ethics demands that we treat all our fellowmen with benevolence.²³ Christianity requires even more, namely, that we sincerely love them, one and all.

¹⁸ Cfr. Slater, Mor. Theol., Vol. I, p. 186.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Op. cit., p. 187; cfr. St. Bernard, Epist., I, n. 13: "An adversary pursues you more gladly when you flee than he withstands you when you resist; and he presses more boldly from behind than he resists to your face." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 78 sq.).

²² Prov. XXV, 21 sq.: "If your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is thirsty, give him water to drink; for you shall heap live coals upon his head, and the Lord will repay you."→ Cfr. Rom. XII, 20 sq.: "But if your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is thirsty, give him drink; for in doing this you shall heap coals of fire upon his head. Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good." -Cfr. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., CXLIII, n. 3: "In nothing is an enemy so thoroughly overcome as when we are merciful." (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1860).—IDEM, Serm., CXLIX (al. XXVI De Divers.), n. 19: "When anyone does good to his enemy and, not overcome by his evil, overcomes evil with good, he will generally repent of his enmities and be angry with himself because he has injured so good a man. But the burning itself is repentance, which consumes his enmities and malice like coals of fire." (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 807).—IDEM, Epist., CLIII (al. LIV), c. I, n. 3: "It is easy and natural to hate the wicked because they are evil; but it is rare and pious to love the same persons because they are men, so that in one and the same person you both condemn the fault and approve the nature, and thus hate the fault more unjustly because the nature which you love is defiled by it." (Ibid., XXXIII, 654).—Cfr. Randlinger, Die Feindesliebe, p. 86.

²³ M. Cronin, The Science of thics, Vol. I, PP. 317 sqq.

Against this precept some have objected that it is impossible to love those whom we do not know and who, perhaps, inspire us with a natural antipathy. This objection is based upon a misunderstanding. All that is demanded of us is that we wish our fellowmen well and be willing to help them in case of need. Mutual benevolence is the necessary basis of social intercourse. He who does not wish his fellowmen well, will associate with them solely for his own selfish purposes and thereby make truly social relations impossible, because he denies to others what he demands for himself.

The matter lies somewhat differently with regard to trust and confidence. As long as I do not know a man, I must suppose that he entertains a feeling of benevolence for his fellowmen, and therefore 1 have no right to treat him with suspicion, much less to harbor enmity against him. But I may and should practice prudent reserve until I have had an opportunity to know the stranger more intimately. This prudent reserve is all the more neces- sary for the reason that I do not know whether the stranger wishes to enter into closer relations with me or not. Men are differently constituted, and a hasty friendship often changes into enmity when the dissimilarity of natures becomes manifest, whereas a prudent reserve need not disturb mutual good will.

One of the principal difficulties connected with social intercourse is to determine the degree of intimacy one should cultivate with others. As this is largely a matter of character and taste, it must be left to the choice of each individual.²⁴

²⁴ Dorner, Individuelle und soziale Ethik, pp. 137 sq.; cfr. Göpfert, Moraltheol., Vol. II, 7th ed., pp. 15 sqq.

The commandment to love all men does not exclude, but, on the contrary, includes a certain order in the practice of this virtue, for the due ordering of charity appertains to the concept of virtue, in as much as a truly virtuous man will have due regard for the proper relations between charity and its object.²⁵

²⁵ St. Augustine, De Doctrina Christ., l. I, c. 27, n. 28: "He lives justly and holily who is an impartial appraiser of things; he is the one who has an ordered love, so that he neither loves what ought not to be loved, nor fails to love what ought to be loved, nor loves more what ought to be loved less, nor loves equally what ought to be loved either less or more, nor loves less or more what ought to be loved equally." (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 29).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 44, art. 8.

The moral value of friendship, when it is founded in God, is clearly indicated by Sacred Scripture. "A faithful friend is a strong defence, and he that hath found him, hath found a treasure. Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and silver is able to countervail the goodness of his fidelity. A faithful friend is the medicine of life and im- mortality: and they that fear the Lord shall find him." ²⁶ St. Augustine says that amicitia derives its name from amor, and no one can be a faithful and constant friend except in Christ.²⁷ Cicero declares that true friendship can flourish only among the virtuous.²⁸

²⁶ Ecclus. VI, 14-16; cfr. Prov. XVII, 17; XVIII, 19; Ecclus. XXXVII, 1 sqq.; John XV, 13-15.

²⁷ St. Augustine, Contra Duas Epist. Pelag., l. I, n. 1: "What else is friendship, which has received its name from nothing other than love and is faithful nowhere except in Christ, in whom alone it can also be eternal and happy?" (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 551). Cfr. the same Saint's Epistolae, LXXXII (al. XIX), c. 3, n. 36 and CLV (al. LII), n. 1; CCLVIII (al. CLV), n. 1–4 (P. L., XXXIII, 291, 667, 1071).

²⁸ Laelius sive de Amicitia, c. 5: "First of all I hold this: that friendship cannot exist except among the good."—Ibid., c. 6: "Friendship is nothing other than the highest agreement concerning all divine and human things, together with benevolence and charity."—Ibid., c. 11: "Since an opinion of virtue has been the conciliator of friendship, it is difficult for friendship to remain if you depart from virtue."—Ibid., c. 12: "This law shall be established in friendship: that we neither ask for shameful things nor do them when asked."—Ibid., c. 13: "Let this first law of friendship be established: that we ask honorable things of friends and do honorable things for the sake of friends."—Ibid., c. 18: "The foundation of the stability and constancy which we seek in friendship is fidelity. For nothing that is faithless is stable.... Thus what I said at the beginning becomes true: friendship cannot exist except among the good."—Ibid., c. 22: "He who removes modesty from friendship removes its greatest ornament. Thus pernicious is the error of those who think that license for lusts and all sins lies open in friendship. Friendship was given by nature as an aid to virtues, not a companion of vices."

Clement of Alexandria distinguishes three kinds of friendship. The first, he says, is based upon equality of virtue and character and is the most excellent and the strongest. The second results from acts of mutual benevolence, and is useful for everyday life. The third is little more than habitual kindness based upon mutual good will. True friendship, he adds, cannot co-exist with injustice and dishonesty, much less with flat- tery, which is its worst enemy.²⁹ Dear to me are my friends, but my enemies, too, have a claim on my good will and assistance. "My friend shows me what I can do," says Schiller, "my enemy, what I ought to do." Lucky is the man who has many friends, but woe to him who places too much reliance upon them. "A true friend proves his friendship when things grow uncertain," says Quintus Ennius.³⁰ Saint Jerome writes: "A friendship which ceases was never a true friendship." ³¹ There are many who stick to a friend as long as he shares their foibles and approves of their doings, but deny him as soon as he ventures to have opinions of his own.

²⁹ Capitaine, Die Moral des Klemens von Alexandrien, pp. 345 sq.—Seneca, De Benefic., l. VII, c. 25: "Admonition among friends is so beautiful a thing."—Cicero, Laelius sive de Amicitia, c. 25: "Therefore, just as it is proper to true friendship both to admonish and to be admonished, and for the one to do this freely, not harshly, and for the other to receive it patiently, not resentfully, so it must be held that no plague in friendships is greater than adulation, flattery, and servile assent. For although this vice of frivolous and deceitful men, who say everything for pleasure and nothing for truth, must be marked by many names, yet since pretense in all things is vicious—for it takes away the judgment of truth and corrupts it—it is especially opposed to friendship, for it destroys truth, without which the name of friendship cannot have force. For since the power of friendship lies in this, that one mind, as it were, is made from many, how can this come about if not even in each one there is one and always the same mind, but one that is variable, changeable, and manifold? For what can be so pliant, so wandering [variant: tender], as the mind of him who turns himself not only toward another's opinion and will, but even toward his look and nod? Does someone say no? I say no. Does he say yes? I say yes. In short, I have commanded myself to assent to everything, as the same Terence says, but he speaks in the character of Gnatho: to employ this kind of friend is altogether a mark of frivolity. Yet many who resemble Gnatho are superior in position, fortune, and reputation; their flattery is troublesome when authority has been added to vanity." Cfr. Terentius, Eunuch., 252 sq.

³⁰ Quoted by Cicero, De Amicitia, а-C. 7.

³¹ Epist., III (al. XLI), n. 6: "I beseech you, do not let the mind lose, together with the eyes, a friend who is long sought, scarcely found, and kept with difficulty. Let gold shine for anyone, and let gleaming metals from loads glitter upon splendid dishes. Charity cannot be compared. Love has no price. Friendship that can cease was never true."—Cfr. St. Ambrose, De Offc., l. II, c. 21, n. 123–137 (P. L., XVI, 179 sq.).—Ovid., Trist., I, 9, 5 sq.: "As long as you are fortunate, you will count many friends. If the times become cloudy, you will be alone."

5. What should be considered special or common manifestations of charity depends much on the established customs of a locality or community. In a general way it may be said that ordinary signs of charity are those that citizen commonly shows to citizen, relative to relative, neighbor to neighbor, friend to friend; special signs of charity are unusual marks of good will, such as are not ordinarily shown to all within a particular class. If acquaintances are accustomed to exchange greetings when they meet, if near relatives are always invited to family festivities, if friends visit one another, such courtesies are ordinary signs of charity in the places where they are customary. But it would be a special mark of charity to pay a social call to a mere acquaintance or to invite a friend to a gathering of one's relatives.³²

³² Homiletic and Pastoral Reiew, Vol. XX (1920), No. 10.

6. Opposed to charity are: contempt, hatred, envy, jealousy, vengefulness, cruelty, joy at the misfortunes of others, unwillingness to be reconciled, and every form of injustice.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 25-27 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, II, 359 sqq.).—F. Dupanloup, La Charité Chrétienne et ses Œuvres, Paris 1863 (Germ. tr., Die christliche Nächstenliebe und ihre Werke, Ratisbon 1864).-V. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., PP. 77 sqq.—-S. Randlinger, Die Feindesliebe, PP. 79 sqq., I0I sqq., Paderborn 1906.—Steinmüller, Die Feindesliebe, pp. 6 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 7th ed., PP. 15 sqq.-J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, Vol. I, Pp. 27 sqq.—E. M. Ommer, L'Amitié, Paris 1895—M. Lazarus, Das Leben der Seele, Vol.

III, and ed., Berlin 1882, PP. 251 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 66 sqq.-H. Noldin, S. J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 86 sqq.