Point II. On the Precept of Charity Toward Enemies in Particular

There is a precept also of loving enemies ². This is clear from the words of Christ, Matt. 5.44: But I say to you: love your enemies. And ibid. 6.15: If you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins.

¹ On the title above. An enemy is understood as one who has injured undeservedly, or pursues with hatred. But injury sometimes imports mere offense, when, namely, through an annoyance inflicted on the will of another, yet without violation of any right, his soul is irritated and deservedly provoked to displeasure, indignation, and anger: sometimes it also imports injustice, namely when something is done not only against the will, but also against the right of another. Through mere offense charity is violated; through injustice, justice.

Moreover, injustice either infers no damage, as, for example, if with no one else present you speak insult to someone, or it brings detriment in goods either of the person or of fortune. In the first case satisfaction is owed at least from vindictive justice, and in the external forum an action for injuries is given to him; in the other, restitution is also owed to the injured party, so that in the external forum both a civil action is given to him for recovering his own, and a criminal action for avenging the crime.

And indeed these things must be carefully and accurately distinguished, lest the Confessor indiscreetly demand from the penitent, as necessary, something more than the precept of charity toward enemies in reality requires.

² This precept does not say some special obligation toward enemies. Indeed, that enemies be loved insofar as they are enemies, this is perverse and repugnant to charity, because this is to love another's evil, as St. Thomas says (2. 2. q. 25. art. 1.), who adds (ibid. ad 2.): Insofar as they are enemies, ... this we ought to hate in them; for it ought to displease us that they are enemies to us. Therefore this precept imports only that someone loving God and the neighbor not exclude his enemies from that generality of love of neighbor, as the same St. Thomas says (ibid. o).

224. Rules. - First. Per se, the same signs of love are owed to enemies which are accustomed to be furnished to others of the same state ³; because their denial would be an act of revenge and a manifestation of hatred, which is opposed to Charity.

³ These are accustomed to be called common signs of love, which nevertheless are diverse, according as by a diverse reason of conjunction certain persons are bound among themselves. Hence some signs are common, for example, among brothers, or among students of the same monastery or college; others among fellow servants or fellow students; others among fellow citizens or fellow soldiers; finally others which a man owes from charity to any man. I have said from charity; for the other loves, which are owed by reason of other conjunctions, do not pertain to the virtue of theological charity, except insofar as their acts, no otherwise than the acts of other moral virtues, can be commanded by charity. See St. Thom. de Virt. q. 2. art. 9. 10.

But special signs are to be carefully distinguished from common signs of love, which by St. Thomas (3. Dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2. ad 1.) are called friendly benefits, and are exhibited particularly to some persons by reason of a certain conjunction or friendship or familiarity, which is not toward all otherwise of the same condition (St. Thom. l. c. in corp.). Thus not only among men otherwise bound by no other bond, but even among members of any community or group or college, it almost happens that someone is more friendly or familiar to one than to another.

But the difference which lies between common and special signs of love must be carefully noted. For since a conjunction of special friendship is undertaken by spontaneous and free will, thence friendly benefits proceed not from debt, but from liberality, as St. Thomas says (l. c. ad 1.): but on the contrary common signs of love proceed from debt, which is a necessary consequence of condition or state.

I said per se, because sometimes a reasonable cause is present for denying them for a time, for example, by reason of due correction, a good effect on children or inferiors, or on account of prudent fear of quarrels from the sight or conversation of an enemy, etc.; likewise on account of the expression of just sorrow conceived from injury, etc.

Second. Per se, special signs of love are not owed to enemies, for example, to visit them sick, to console them when sad, to receive them in hospitality or at a banquet, provided the reason of scandal is excluded, etc. ⁴.

⁴ Appositely St. Thomas (De virt. q. 2. art. 8. o): Since toward an enemy no other union remains to us except only the union of charity, from the necessity of precept we are bound to love them IN COMMON. And this he presently explains thus: We are bound by the affection and effect of charity, by which we love all neighbors and pray for all, not to exclude even those who are joined to us by no special bond, as, for example, those who are in India or Ethiopia.

From these things it is plain that only love in common is owed to an enemy; but this requires that he not be excluded from the common effects of love. Now by reason of state or condition and office it can happen that someone indiscriminately must visit the sick and serve them, or receive travelers with table and lodging, etc. Therefore in this hypothesis these would already be common signs of love, from which it would not be lawful to exclude an enemy. Otherwise one must say when these offices of charity are undertaken freely toward some. For then to furnish these to an enemy (unless perhaps he is in necessity) pertains not to the precept, but to the perfection of charity. For since (says St. Thom. 2. 2. q. 25. art. 8.) the neighbor is loved from charity on account of God, the more someone loves God, the more also he shows love toward the neighbor with no enmity impeding: just as if someone greatly loved some man, out of love for him he would love his children, even enemies to himself.

Third. Not only must the offense be forgiven the enemy in such a way that the desire of unjust revenge is cast away and the common signs of love are not denied; but to one asking pardon and exhibiting suitable satisfaction for the injury, if any occurred, certain particular signs also of special love, if any were previously accustomed to be given, generally speaking, are not to be altogether refused ⁵. - St. Thomas, 3. dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2. ad 5, and St. Antoninus, Part. 2. tit. 8. cap. 2. §. 6.

⁵ To deny to a man signs of familiarity, when necessity would require them, it would be revenge; or also when he would ask pardon, or when he who is regarded as an enemy thrusts himself into familiarity...; because then he loves, and is to be numbered among friends. St. Thomas (3. Dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2. ad 5.). Nevertheless, since it is a matter of special friendship or familiarity, which, just as it is freely admitted, so also is freely retained, Peter de Lorca is to the point (In 2. 2. q. 25. n. 27.): If the title (namely of furnishing signs of love) is only special friendship and familiarity, which some voluntarily contract among themselves, it is not owed to an enemy; for this is special love, and can be dissolved, not only if a friend becomes an enemy, but even if he does not become one: therefore no one is bound to preserve that friendship. Therefore the restoration of such former friendship and familiarity is not always necessarily to be exacted, nor must one deal harshly with him who wishes either to lessen or even to retain no special familiarity with him whom he has found to have failed in the office of friendship.

** And thus St. Alphonsus seems to be understood, who (Lib. 2. n. 28.) says that special signs of love are to be furnished if previously you were accustomed to exhibit peculiar signs to the enemy; as Tournely with Suarez, Bonacina, etc. And in reality Collet attributes this doctrine to Suarez, Bonacina, and Koninck: but less to the point, because those Doctors have nothing of the sort.

225. Questions. - Q. 1º Is it lawful to wish public punishment for an enemy, indeed also to seek it?

Resp. Affirm. per se, if every affection of revenge is absent ⁶; but in practice this is dangerous, and easily liable to deception, as St. Lig. notes, n. 29.

⁶ Thus St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 108. art. 1.): If his intention is borne principally toward the evil of him concerning whom he takes revenge, and rests there, it is altogether illicit.... But if the intention... is borne principally toward some good, at which one arrives through the punishment of the sinner, for instance toward the amendment of the sinner, or at least toward his restraint and the quiet of others, and toward the preservation of justice and the honor of God, vindication can be lawful, etc. Concerning this argument St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 29.) writes: Hence I adhere to Antoine, that practically speaking it is never lawful to seek the punishment of an enemy, even if just and to be done by legitimate authority. But Antoine himself does not speak so rigidly in reality, although otherwise most rigid. The words of Antoine are these (De Char. C. 2. q. 3.): It is never lawful to seek the punishment of an enemy, even if just and done by legitimate authority, insofar as it is his evil: for this is an act of hatred, never lawful. But on the contrary he had premised these things (ibid. q. 2.): Against him (an enemy) it is lawful to institute both a civil and a criminal action, provided this is not done from hatred, revenge, or another depraved end: the civil action indeed, so that he may compensate the damage inflicted, or make satisfaction for injury; the criminal, however, from love of public justice, lest he harm others, or lest crimes remain unpunished with damage to the republic.

Q. 2º What order ought to be observed in making reconciliation?

Resp. 1º He who has offended another ought first, per se, to employ means for reconciliation, as natural equity dictates.

2º If the offense is mutual and equal, let him who first offended first promote reconciliation; but if it is unequal, let him who offended more gravely go before. Moreover, absolute rules cannot be assigned, but the circumstances are to be considered. - Thus commonly.

Q. 3º Is there an obligation of greeting an enemy who is encountered?

Resp. Neg. per se, because greeting and conversation are not common signs owed to the neighbor ⁷. Yet one must say otherwise if circumstances of state, condition, or similar things require that all greet each other indiscriminately, or if it is a matter of a subject toward his Superior. - St. Lig. n. 28. - Sporer, etc.

⁷ St. Alphonsus (lib. 2. n. 28.) confesses according to the common opinion that you are not bound to greet an enemy. Nevertheless with others he admits some obligation, both of greeting and of exhibiting certain other special signs of love to an enemy even outside the case of either spiritual or bodily necessity, when this seems necessary 1º for avoiding scandal, lest namely the enemy be more provoked to anger and hatred; 2º for gaining the brother, namely for reconciling his soul to you and to God. Yet he adds that this obligation is not grave, which therefore would bind with grave inconvenience. And since acts of this kind in the offended person almost bring with them no small difficulty, this obligation does not seem to be very much urged. St. Alphonsus (l. c.) adds another exception, namely if the enemy is a Superior. But perhaps this does not pertain here; because greeting, when it is a matter of a Superior, is not a special sign.

Q. 4º Must an offender ask pardon from the offended person?

Resp. Affirm., per se, unless another means or manner of reconciliation more fitting is at hand, for example, by furnishing various offices or benefits, or unless the asking of pardon seems to profit nothing for placating the offended person. They also except if the offender is far superior to the offended, or if the offended is prudently judged to condone it. But other means of placating the offended are not lacking. - Thus commonly. - Lacroix, lib. 2. n. 189. - Tambur., etc.

Q. 5º Do you owe any signs of love to an offender not asking pardon?

Resp. Some affirm with St. Lig.; but others deny with St. Antoninus, Summa, part. 2. tit. 8. c. 2. §. 6. ⁸.

⁸ Thus St. Antoninus (Part. 2. Tit. 8. Cap. 2. §. 6.): Either the injurer exhibits fitting satisfaction, or he does not. If he exhibits it according to the quantity of the fault and his possibility, thus he is bound to receive him back into friendship and to speak to him.... But if he does not exhibit it, he is not bound to speak to him, namely when he either is wholly unwilling to satisfy, or satisfies by halves. And St. Thomas (3. Dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2. ad 5.): That someone of his own accord thrust himself into familiarity with an enemy, this belongs to perfection.

226. Resolves. - 1º It is not lawful to exclude enemies from prayers, for example, from the Lord's Prayer; indeed one would have to pray specifically for them, if this were the only means available to the offended person for extinguishing hatred ⁹.

⁹ Since it can scarcely happen that for restraining hatred no other means is at hand besides special prayer for the enemy, therefore it will scarcely ever be necessary that the Confessor prescribe this. For fulfilling the precept of praying for enemies, it is enough that they not be positively excluded, just as we do not exclude Indians or Ethiopians, as St. Thomas says, who also has these things (3. Dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2.): A man is bound (to cooperate) even with an enemy, at least by praying in common, so that he does not exclude him from his prayers, although perhaps he does not make special mention of him; just as it is not necessary that he make special prayer concerning all toward whom he has charity, but common prayer.

2º It is not lawful to exclude enemies from common alms, re-greeting ¹⁰, response, sale of exposed merchandise, because these are common signs of love. - Thus commonly. Understand this with the matter considered per se, according to the things said above, n. 224.

¹⁰ Concerning greeting note the following from Peter de Lorca (2. 2. Disp. 25. n. 28.): 1º Greeting and address are owed to enemies in the same way as to others.... nor are they among the general signs of love which we owe to all men, but among special ones: yet they are among general signs among those very much joined, and therefore they are not owed except to those joined. 2º Anticipated greeting is owed to no one, except to certain persons excelling in dignity, for the sake of honor. 3º Re-greeting and response are owed to all men by virtue of affability, especially to fellow citizens. 3º The omission of address and greeting, even when it is owed, is not regularly a mortal sin: for it is opposed to affability, which is not of so great obligation, unless perhaps from the circumstance of the person and from other things it would yield to a great injury, or on account of scandal, which rarely occurs and must be decided by the judgment of a prudent man.

3º They sin who avoid an enemy wishing to be reconciled, especially when he notices and feels it gravely, or who, when invited, refuse to go with him, unless nevertheless they are excused by fear of quarrels, or of new rancor, or by another just cause. Likewise those who refuse pardon, or do not accept suitable satisfaction, or exact more than is fair, or who bring the matter into court from hatred and revenge; likewise those who do not aid an enemy in necessity ¹¹, or do not prevent a grave damage of the same, when they easily can, and a fortiori those who rejoice over his evil.

¹¹ In necessity even enemies must be aided. But this is more an effect of justice than of friendship. St. Thom. 3. Dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2. ad 1.

4º They are not to be absolved, at least ordinarily ¹², who, although they say that they condone, nevertheless refuse to address an enemy, unless this can be pardoned to the recollection and horror of the injury. A fortiori those who assert that they will never say even a word to him; for these deservedly cast suspicion of a depravedly disposed soul.

¹² Certainly he who adheres to mortal sin cannot be absolved. Therefore also A., while he tempers his opinion thus, supposes that grave fault can sometimes be absent in the case. And indeed 1º Besides the horror from the memory of a recent injury, and the other causes enumerated above at n. 224, which excuse from furnishing common signs for some time, we have already noted that no one is bound to preserve familiarity or friendship which could be admitted or not admitted at pleasure; indeed it happens daily that friendships of this sort cease, now gradually, now abruptly, and often without blame. 2º Even if a disordered spirit and some appetite of unjust revenge are not entirely absent, this person is not therefore at once to be condemned of grave fault. For just as the inflicting of evil, so also the desire of another's evil admits smallness of matter; and if this has force with those who have harmed us in nothing, a fortiori it ought to have force with an enemy, who by injuring unjustly has provoked just indignation. Therefore the question returns to this, whether the offended person (whether he says he forgives or not), while he refuses certain offices to the offender, inflicts or wishes some grave evil upon him. For if this is absent, and no other grave inconveniences can be feared from those offices denied to the offender, the Confessor is indeed bound to the office of exhorting according to his powers, but by no necessity of denying absolution.

** And with this tempering those words of St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 28.) seem to be understood: But a religious who had refused for a notable time, say after a week, to speak with an enemy, Sporer rightly says n. 34. is not to be absolved. For thus Sporer (l. c.): In a monastery of nuns, two of them after a quarrel professed..., for many years not to wish to speak with one another, and in fact they were not speaking for a long time. The Confessor doubted whether they were in a state of mortal sin, and therefore whether sacramental absolution... was to be denied to those obstinately persevering thus, or not? Resp. Altogether that it is so: at least when the cause of the quarrel, or the quarrel itself, was grave. Because in that case the cessation of speaking for so long a time or so many years is rightly presumed to proceed from grave hatred. But if the cause of the quarrel was itself light, as much as concerns this head of the signification of hatred and scandal, the omission of speaking could be excused from mortal sin and be reputed venial. Because then, especially in women, and those otherwise fearful of conscience, it is not presumed to arise from grave hatred, but from natural feminine passion. Although again from another head, namely that of scandal, it could be mortal. And so, I would not absolve one still refusing to speak after one and another week.

5º Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred are not immediately to be charged with sin, especially grave sin; for often they confuse hatred properly so called, or of enmity, with hatred of abomination, or of a quality or defect, or they even labor under only some natural and invincible aversion of soul. Yet one must beware lest abomination of quality, disposition, etc., gradually extend itself to hatred of the person. - St. Lig. n. 50. - Voit, n. 703.