Section 3: Morality of Human Acts

By the morality of an act is understood its intrinsic relation to the moral order and to reason. Every human act, in concreto, is either good or bad. It is good if it conforms to the moral law; it is bad if it violates that law.¹

¹ Cfr. M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I,

The sources of morality (fontes sive principia moralitatis), i. e., the factors or principles which determine the relation of an act to the moral law, are: (i) the object or matter of the act, (2) its form, intention or end (finis), and (3) the attending circumstances.

Generally speaking, an act is good if all three of these factors cooperate in making it conformable to the right order; it is evil if any one of them is wrong or sinful. Hence the Scholastic axiom: "Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocunque defectu" ²

² Cfr. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Div. Nomin., c. 4, § 30 (Migne, P. G., III, 729). —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 19, art. 6, ad 1: "Dionysius says: Good arises from an integral cause, but evil from individual defects." —Ibid., art. 7, ad 3: "Evil occurs from individual defects, but good from the whole and integral cause." (Cfr. qu. 18, art. 4, ad 3).

I. THE OBJECT. —The object of an act (obiectum materiale) is that act itself, considered in the abstract. Though there are objects that are in themselves indifferent (e. g., eating and drinking), as a rule the object of an act has an inherent morality of its own, which causes the will of the agent to be either good or bad, according as the object is good (e. g., prayer, fasting), or bad (e. g., lying, stealing).³

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 18, art. 8: "Every act has its species from its object, and a human act, which is called moral, has its species from the object as related to the principle of human acts, which is reason. Hence if the object of an act includes something that agrees with the order of reason, the act will be good according to its species, as giving alms to one in need; but if it includes something contrary to the order of reason, the act will be evil according to its species, as stealing, which is taking another's property. It can happen, however, that the object of an act includes nothing pertaining to the order of reason, as lifting a straw from the ground, going into a field, and things of this kind; and such acts according to their species are indifferent." — Ibid., art. 9: "Every individual act must have some circumstance through which it is drawn toward good or evil, at least on the part of the intention of the end. Since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to a due end, by that very fact is opposed to reason and has the character of evil; but if it is ordered to a due end, it agrees with the order of reason and therefore has the character of good. It is necessary that it either be ordered or not be ordered to a due end. Hence every act of man proceeding from deliberative reason, considered individually, must be good or evil. But if it does not proceed from deliberative reason, but from a certain imagination—as when someone strokes his beard or moves his hand or foot—such an act is not, properly speaking, moral or human, since an act has this character from reason; and thus it will be indifferent, as though existing outside the class of moral acts." —Cfr. St. Ambrose, Expos, in Ps., 118, s. 14, n. 23: "Omnia cum ratione [facias], nihil sine ratione, quia non es irrationabilis, o homo, sed rationabilis." (Migne, P. L., XV, 1400).—St. Jerome, Epist., 112 (al. 89), n. 16: "For indifferent things do not stand between good and evil as the philosophers argue. Continence is good; luxury is evil. Walking, discharging the refuse of the bowels, casting the purgings of the head from the nostrils, and casting out phlegm by spitting are indifferent between the two. This is neither good nor evil; for whether you do it or do not do it, you will have neither justice nor injustice. But to observe the ceremonies of the law cannot be indifferent, but is either good or evil." (P. L., XXII, 926).

Objectively indifferent acts become good or bad when they are willed with a good or bad intention, or when good or bad circumstances surround them.

According to its gravity in the moral order, an act is called materia gravis or levis.

In regard to their object or matter human acts are either intrinsically good or intrinsically bad, according as their objects are good or bad in themselves. Intrinsically good acts may be good either absolutely or relatively. An absolutely good act (secundum se bonus), which can never be bad, is, e. g., the love of God. A relatively good act (in se bonus) is one that may be good or bad according to the reason or motive which inspire or the accidental conditions or circumstances which surround it. Such relatively good acts are, for example, prayer, fasting, almsgiving.

Intrinsically bad acts are such as run counter to the moral order by their very nature. Some are absolutely bad and can never become good, as, e. g., hatred of God, perjury. Others are bad merely because the agent has no right to perform them or because they are a source of danger or temptation, e. g., manslaughter, viewing unchaste pictures. Acts of the latter kind are called relatively bad. A relatively bad act may become good by virtue of special conditions or circumstances, e. g., self-defense or study.

Extrinsically bad acts are bad simply because they are forbidden. As Göpfert rightly remarks, however, "the terms 'extrinsically good' and 'extrinsically bad' do not denote merely the conformity or nonconformity of an act to the law, regardless of its intrinsic ethical character; but they indicate that the relation existing between such an act and the moral order owes its existence to a command or prohibition of the lawgiver.”⁴

⁴ Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., p. 191.

II. THE END. —By the end of an action (obiectum formale) is meant the reason or motive which induces the agent to perform that action, or, to employ a more familiar term, the intention with which he acts.⁵ i. An intention may be actual, virtual, or habitual. It is actual if it is elicited immediately before the act is performed and with direct reference to the same. It is virtual if its force is borrowed from a previous act of the will, which is accounted as continuing in effect. It is habitual if it once existed and has never been retracted.

⁵ Cfr. Matth. VI, 1-8. —St. Augustine, De Serm. Dom. in Monte, II, c. 13, n. 45: "Therefore we must consider not what each person does, but with what intention he does it. For this is the light within us, because this is manifest to us: that we do what we do with a good intention." (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 1289). —St. Bernard, De Baptismo, c. 2, n.

To be morally good an act must be inspired by an actual, or at least a virtual, good intention. A merely habitual intention is not sufficient for this purpose because it may exist in an unconscious subject, and is strictly speaking non-existent while the action is being performed.

The Catholic Church exhorts her children to make a good intention frequently, at least every day, in order to sanctify all their actions by referring them directly to God.⁶ There is no nobler motto than, "All for the greater honor and glory of God." ⁷ The end of an action may be primary or secondary, ultimate or intermediate, natural or supernatural.

⁶ (P. L., CLXXXII, 1035).

⁶ 1 Cor. X, 31; 1 Pet. IV, 11; Col. III, 17; cfr. John XV, 8; Phil. I, 10 sq. —St. Ignatius of Antioch, Epist. ad Polycarp., c. 5: Πάντα εἰς τιμὴν Θεοῦ γινέσθω. (Funk, Patres Apost., I, 2nd ed., 292, 8). —St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 34, s. 2, n. 16: "Who endures praising God all day? I suggest a remedy by which you may praise God all day, if you wish. Whatever you do, do it well, and you have praised God." (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 341).—On the good intention as a requisite of supernatural merit see Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 413 sqq.

⁷ Cfr. H. Lammens, "L'Antiquité de la Formule 'Omnia ad Maiorem Dei Gloriam,' " in the Revue de l'Orient Chrétien, VIII (Paris 1903), pp. 477 sqq.

2. As regards the influence of the intention on the morality of an act, note the following considerations: a) An act that is morally indifferent, so far as its object is concerned, becomes good or bad by the intention of the agent. Thus the act of eating, which is in itself indifferent, becomes good if done for the purpose of sustaining life and strength, bad if done exclusively for pleasure.⁸ b) An act that is objectively good (e. g., prayer, almsgiving) becomes bad if done for a wicked purpose. Conversely, an objectively good act derives an increase of moral value from a good intention.⁹ c) A materially bad act (e. g., a lie) is never rendered good by a good intention. The reason is that a good end cannot be attained by evil means.¹⁰ No advantage that could possibly be gained by sin is large enough to outweigh the injury inflicted on the moral law. Christ Himself said: "What doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his own soul? Or what exchange shall a man give for his soul?”¹¹ It is never allowed to do evil that good may come, which is but another way of saying that the end never justifies the means.¹² "This," says Father Slater, S.J., "is the teaching of Holy Scripture and of the Catholic Church, nor have the Jesuits any other doctrine different from that of the Church. Father Dasbach promised to give anyone two thousand florins who would prove in open court that the Jesuits had ever taught that the end justifies the means. Count Paul von Hoensbroech undertook to do so, but he failed in his suit when it was tried at Cologne, in the spring of 1905." ¹³

⁸ Eccles. X, 17.

⁹ Cfr. Matth. V, 16; VI, 1 sqq.; XXIII, 5, 15.

¹⁰ Cfr. Job XIII, 7; Rom. III, 8; VI, 1.—St. Augustine, De Mendacio, c. 21, n. 42: “No one is to be led to eternal salvation with a lie lending assistance.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 516).

¹¹ Matth. XVI, 26.

¹² Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Mendacium, c. 7, n. 18: “It matters very greatly from what cause, for what end, and with what intention something is done; but things which are known to be sins must not be done under the pretext of a good cause, for any supposedly good end, or with any apparently good intention.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 528).

¹³ Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 49.—P. Roh, S.J., Das alte Lied: “Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel,” 3rd ed., Freiburg 1894; M. Reichmann, S.J., Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel, Freiburg 1903; Fr. Gerard, S.J., Does the End Justify the Means? C. T. S. pamphlet.—B. Duhr, S.J., Jesuitenfabeln, 4th ed., pp. 542 sqq.; J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, pp. 92 sqq.; Pilatus (Dr. V. Naumann, a Protestant), Der Jesuitismus, Ratisbon 1905, pp. 280 sqq.; F. Heiner, Der Jesuitismus, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1902, pp. 81 sqq.; IDEM, Die Jesuiten und ihre Gegner, Munich 1906, pp. 73 sqq.; Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. III, p. 87; Vol. XIV, pp. 104 sq.; Brou, S.J., Les Jésuites de la Légende, Paris 1906; Concerning Jesuits, London 1902; Maynard, The Studies and Teaching of the Society of Jesus, London 1855.

However, while the sinfulness of an act is never neutralized, it may be diminished by the intention of the agent, if the choice of means results from imperfect knowledge or is made for the sake of a good purpose. To choose a bad means for the attainment of a good end manifestly indicates less malice than to choose a bad means for its own sake.¹⁴ An apparently good purpose may, on the other hand, augment the wickedness of an act because of the intrinsic contradiction contained in the attempt to employ a bad means for the attainment of a good end, e. g., if one meant to honor God by committing murder or fornication.

¹⁴ Cfr. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 18, n. 6: "It seems to me that every lie is indeed a sin, but it makes a great difference with what intention and about what matters each person lies. For he who lies with the intention of advising does not sin in the same way as he who lies with the intention of harming; nor indeed does the person who by lying sends a traveler onto a different road do as much harm as the one who corrupts the way of life by a deceiving lie." (Migne, P. L., XL, 240).—IDEM, Contra Mendac., c. 8, n. 19: "Someone will say: then is every thief to be equated with the thief who steals from a will of mercy? Who would say this? Yet neither of these two is good merely because one is worse. For he who steals from covetousness is worse than he who steals from pity; but if every theft is a sin, every theft must be abstained from." (P. L., XL, 529).—St. Bernard, De Praec. et Dispens., c. 7, n. 13: "It certainly matters from what cause, with what disposition, with what intention, by whose command, and in regard to what precept this evil is committed. Indeed, I say that no disobedience at all is to be regarded lightly, yet not every disobedience is to be judged of equal danger. For God's command is: You shall not kill [Ex. 20, 13]. Suppose, then, two murderers, one of whom committed the crime from a desire to plunder and the other from the necessity of defending himself. Does not the cause here quite evidently distinguish leprosy from leprosy, making the guilt of one and the same transgression very unequal? What if sudden anger drove the one, but calculated malice or an old hatred drove the other, to the same crime? Must that which is known to have been done with such dissimilar dispositions be weighed by a similar judgment? Further, nothing is more incestuous or obscene than those daughters of Lot having usurped intercourse with their father [Gen. 19, 32-36]; yet who does not see how greatly the piety of their intention and their intention of piety removed or diminished the guilt of that shameful and unspeakable crime?" (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 868).—The legend that St. Crispin stole leather to make shoes for the poor, is based upon a misunderstanding. Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 286.

By the circumstances of an action are understood certain accidental conditions which determine and distinguish it from others of the same kind.¹⁵

¹⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 7, art. 1: "In matters of place something is said to stand around a thing which is indeed extrinsic to it, but nevertheless touches it or approaches it according to place. Therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act and yet touch a human act in some manner are called circumstances. That which is outside the substance of a thing but pertains to the thing itself is called its accident. Hence circumstances must be called accidents of human acts." Cfr. ibid., qu. 18, art. 3, 10, 11. —Sweens, Theol. Mor. Fundament., pp. 106 sqq.

There are seven such conditions, enumerated in the old-time versus memorialis:

"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando?" (Who, what, where, when, by what means, why, and how?)

Some circumstances (circumstantiae gradum moralitatis mutantes) merely augment or diminish the malice of an act, whereas others completely transform its moral species (circumstantiae speciem moralitatis mutantes). This distinction is of great practical importance, for the circumstances which alter the species of a sin must be mentioned in confession.¹⁶

¹⁶ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, de Poenit., c. 5 and canon 7; Catechismus Romanus, P. II, c. 5, qu. 47.

However, it is not so much the external circumstances as the interior disposition or intention of the agent manifesting itself in and through the circumstances, that furnishes the criterion for determining the moral character of an act.

A modern writer on ethics somewhat paradoxically says: "It depends on time, place, and circumstances whether a virtue is a vice, or a vice, a virtue." This dictum is not true except in the limited sense explained above.¹⁷

¹⁷ Matth. VI, 1 sqq.; Luke X, 30 sqq.; XVIII, 9 sqq. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 7, art. 3.

The circumstances that augment or lessen the malice of an evil action (circumstantiae aggravantes vel minuentes peccatum) are enumerated in the following hexameters by a medieval writer: 15 "Aggravat ordo, locus, peccata, scientia, tempus, Aetas, conditio, numerus, mora, copia, causa, Et modus in culpa, status altus, lucta pusilla." ¹⁸ The circumstances that alter the moral species of an act may be variously classified.

¹⁸ Frater Conrad of Saxony, d. 1279. Cfr. A. Franz, Drei deutsche Minoritenprediger, Freiburg 1907, p. 30.

There are (1) Circumstances which render an act a transgression of more than one commandment or duty, e. g., when a man kills his parents or commits fornication with a married woman; (2) Circumstances by which a sinful act becomes a source of injury to others, as, e. g., when scandal is given; (3) Circumstances in which the matter of the sin committed (where such matter is divisible) ceases to be materia parva and becomes materia magna, as when one eats several ounces of meat on a day of abstinence, or steals, say, thirty-five dollars.¹⁹

¹⁹ This is the amount put down in the latest editions of Sabetti as materia absolute gravis. (Compendium Theol. Mor., ed. 23, New York 1915, p. 340.

(4) Another specific difference arises from the circumstance that an act which might have been externalized remains immanent, and therefore incomplete.

(5) Finally, the circumstance that an evil action was committed more than once furnishes a criterion (though not an infallible one) for classifying it as a sin of malice. It is for this psychological as much as for juridical considerations that the Church requires penitents to mention the number of their grievous sins in confession.

For determining the number or the numerical (in contradistinction to specific) distinction of moral acts, theologians give the following rules: a) The determining factor of an individual act is the last stage which it reaches in the process of realization. The natural preliminaries (introduction, preparation, etc.), the intermediary stages, and the ordinary means or instruments used in attaining the final end, are always presumed. Thus if one has burglarized a house he need not mention the circumstance that he employed a ladder to climb through the window. In this and similar cases a whole series of distinct acts is regarded as morally one (actus numero unus), provided, of course, the introductory and preparatory acts stand in their natural relation to the main act. When this is not the case, and if such acts have a malice of their own, the circumstances must be separately enumerated, as when a man drinks to excess in order to commit fornication. b) Acts belonging to the same moral species are reckoned as separate and distinct if they were far enough apart in time to render it possible and necessary for the agent to make a new decision of the will. A series of actions may be interrupted either voluntarily, e. g., by express or silent retraction, contrition; or involuntarily, e. g., by a considerable interval of time, inadvertence, sleep, etc. c) Sins are multiplied according to the numerical distinction of those affected by them. Thus, if you have told a lie in a grave matter, it is necessary to state how many persons were deceived or injured by it; if you gave scandal, to how many, and so forth.

READINGS.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 41 sqq. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 18 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 31 sqq. —J. Ernst, Ueber die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung, pp. 244 sqq. —J. F. Delany in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VIII, pp. 69 sq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., pp. 84 sqq.