Section — Koch–Preuss

Section 3: Requisites of a Normal Conscience

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¶1.

To be entirely reliable, conscience must be right, certain, and watchful. Hence the three conditions for the normal functioning of conscience enumerated by the Schoolmen: rectitudo, certitudo, vigilantia. i. In order to be right (recta s. vera), conscience must accord with the eternal law. Every man is in duty bound to follow his conscience when it prescribes an act as commanded or forbids it as unlawful.

¶2.

Conscience is called erroneous (conscientia erronea) when its dictates are not in harmony with the moral law.1 The mistake may be owing to a false conception of the law (error iuris), or to a wrong application of its provisions to a concrete fact (error facti), or to a faulty conclusion formed with regard to the latter (iudicium facti).2

1 Cfr. Rom. XIV, 23; 1 Cor. VIII, 7; X, 25 sqq.; John XVI, 2.

2 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Veritate, qu. 17, art. 2: "Conscience is nothing other than the application of knowledge to some particular act. In this application error can occur in two ways: in one way, because that which is applied contains an error in itself; in another way, because it is not applied correctly. —Cfr. 1 Cor. VIII, 1-13.

¶3.

If a mistake is made that could have been avoided, the conclusion is said to be vincibly erroneous (error vincibilis). In this case an act may be sinful, not because the agent has obeyed his conscience, but because the error was willed in the cause (voluntarium in causa). An er roneous conscience is invincible (error invincibilis) if the mistake committed was absolutely unavoidable. To follow the dictates of an invincibly erroneous conscience is no sin, even when the act performed is objectively evil. On the contrary, it would be sinful to act against one's conscience, even if, in acting against it, one would be objectively in the right. Of course, the mistake must be corrected as soon as it is realized.

¶4.
  1. Conscience is called certain (conscientia certa) if it declares without hesitation that an action is right or wrong. Where uncertainty exists, it is a duty to obtain certainty as soon as possible. When a man finds himself unable to form a certain conclusion with regard to the moral character of an act, he will either suspend judgment or assent to one of two contrary propositions, though conscious that the other may be true. In the former case, i. e., if no sufficient reasons are known for either affirming or denying a proposition, or if equally important reasons speak for the one and for the other, conscience is said to be doubtful (conscientia dubia). A doubtful conscience, if it bases its action on good and solid grounds, is called probable (conscientia probabilis).
¶5.

A doubtful conscience may, therefore, be defined as a suspension of judgment with regard to the lawfulness of an act.

¶6.

Theologians distinguish between positive and negative doubt. When there are no reasons, or very slight reasons, on either side, there is a negative doubt. Such doubts, which calm consideration generally shows to be unfounded, must be treated like temptations. When there is an apparent equality of reasons, and the mind cannot arrive at a decision either one way or the other, the existing doubt is positive. When positive doubt has reference to the morality of an action it is not lawful to perform that action.3 While conscience is in this state, one may abstain from action, or, if the decision cannot be postponed, one must do what would be licit in any case. Thus, in doubt whether an action be permissible, when it is certain that such an action may be omitted, the action is to be omitted, and vice versa. This is what is meant by the Scholastic axiom, "In dubiis pars tutior est sequenda.

3 Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. I, n. 22 (ed. Gaudé, I, 11): "We say that it is never lawful to act with a practically doubtful conscience; and in the event that someone acts, he sins, indeed with a sin of the same species and gravity concerning which he doubts, because one who exposes himself to the danger of sinning already sins, according to the saying: He who loves danger shall perish in it (Ecclus. III, 27). Therefore, if he doubts whether it is mortal, he sins mortally."

¶7.

From what has been said it follows that every man is in duty bound to rid himself of doubts and to acquire a certain conscience (bona fides). Whoever makes a sincere effort to solve his doubts by observing the conduct of conscientious people situated in similar circumstances, consulting an experienced guide, praying for light and trusting in Providence, will not sin, even if his final decision should happen to be wrong.4

4 Indirectly, according to Lehmkuhl, one may resolve a doubtful case by these reflex principles: (1) In doubt, the condition of the possessor is the better; (2) It must be seen upon whom the burden of proof falls; (3) For a certain law outside the matter of justice to be satisfied, a probable fulfillment positively proved suffices; (4) In doubts, one must stand for that for which the presumption stands; (5) In doubt, judgment must be made from what ordinarily happens; (6) A fact is not presumed but must be proved; but what by law ought to have been done is presumed in doubt to have been done, or done rightly; (7) In doubt, favors are to be enlarged and burdensome things restricted, that is, the more benign course is to be preferred; (8) In doubt, that which is least is to be held; (9) In doubt, the safer part is to be followed. —For an explanation of these rules, and some useful hints as to their application, see A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, pp. 122-126.

¶8.
  1. A watchful conscience (conscientia vigilans) is one which asserts itself promptly and strongly under all circumstances. The quality of watchfulness is enhanced by a conscientious observance of all the commandments, by careful attention to the inner workings of conscience, and especially by regular daily examinations.5 A conscience thus trained becomes tender (conscientia tenera) and makes its possessor a conscientious man.

5 Cfr. Gal. VI, 4 sq.; Eph. IV, 26.

¶9.

Continued disregard of the laws of God renders the conscience obtuse (cauteriata) and finally lax.6 a) A blunt or obtuse conscience fails to protest even against grievous sins. It is called sleeping, not dead, because conscience never dies, but always awakes again, even in the greatest criminals, either of itself or under the influence of grace, though often too late.7 Needless to say, every man is bound to keep his conscience from going to sleep. b) A lax conscience (conscientia laxa s. lata) is characterized by a tendency to deny or diminish obligations. It results from harboring wrong principles and leading a sinful life, and may be described as a frivolous conception of life and its duties.8 When a man's conscience has grown lax, his actions are morally equivalent to those performed in a state of vincible ignorance. A lax conscience is very hard to cure.9 There is really but one effective remedy for it, viz.: a thorough-going change of life. This is a drastic medicine, but unless it is applied promptly, the patient will succumb to delusions, grow impenitent, and incur eternal damnation.10

6 Cfr. 1 Tim. IV, 2.

7 Cfr. Mark IX, 43.

8 Cfr. Matth. XXIV, 38.

9 Cfr. Apoc. III, 15 sq.

10 Cfr. Ecclus. III, 29: "The sinner will add sin to sin."

¶10.

READINGS.—Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 59 sqq. —Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 27th ed., pp. 35 sqq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., pp. 319 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, pp. 203 sqq. —W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 188 sqq.