Section — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Section 4. On the Commutation of Vow
240. Declarations. 1. Commutation is the substitution of another work in place of that which had been promised, with the same obligation.
Dispensation differs from commutation in this, that by dispensation the obligation of the vow is removed, but by commutation it is transferred into another matter.
- This commutation can be made into a better work, into an equal one, and into a lesser one; then it can be made by proper or ecclesiastical authority.
That work is called better which here and now, all things considered, is more pleasing to God; but that is judged more pleasing to God which, according to place, time, and disposition of the one vowing, is more suitable to his salvation. Thus he who promised to give alms to a determinate poor man can give it to another more needy man, provided the former has not accepted the promise.
241. Who can commute vows. 1. Into an evidently better work commutation can be made even by the proper authority of the one vowing: for that which, all things considered, is better, is also more pleasing to God and without doubt is accepted by Him. But these must be excepted: a. reserved vows, which cannot be commuted except into the religious state; b. the vow of passing to a stricter religion, which, because of the prohibition of the Church, cannot be commuted by proper authority;1 c. vows made for the benefit of a third party and accepted by him, which cannot be commuted without his consent.
- Into an evidently equal work, a vow probably can also be commuted by proper authority; but because of the great difficulty of substituting a truly equal work, it must be advised that commutation not be made by proper authority, unless the work which is substituted is at least probably better.
Those who affirm use this argument: since the substituted matter is equal, it is equally pleasing and acceptable to God; but the usefulness of the one vowing is increased, since he will furnish this new matter more gladly and more fervently. Those who deny argue thus: the matter considered in itself and the substituted matter are indeed equal; but once the promise has been made, it is more pleasing to God if the one vowing furnishes the thing to which he obligated himself than if he substitutes another.
- But into a lesser work commutation certainly cannot be made by proper authority: for for this some dispensation is required, which cannot be made without ecclesiastical authority.
1 C. Licet 18, De regular. (III. 31).
242. Required conditions. 1. For validly commuting vows, legitimate power and a just cause are required.
a. He who has the power of dispensing in vows, whether ordinary or delegated, can commute them even into a lesser work: for he to whom the greater is lawful, the lesser is also lawful. He who has only the power of commuting cannot commute vows except into a morally equal work, or into one a little less good: for in commutation which is made into a lesser work something of dispensation is contained.1
A perpetual work can be commuted into an equivalent temporal work, a personal work into a real one, and conversely. But commutation cannot be made into commanded works.
b. A vow can be commuted into a better thing even without cause; into an equal thing, at least licitly, only for some cause, but a light cause suffices (for example, greater devotion of the one vowing, less danger of transgression); but into a lesser thing it can validly be commuted only for a graver cause, which nevertheless need not be as great as is required for dispensation.
Once commutation has been made, it is always lawful for the one vowing to return to the first work, whether the commutation was made by his own authority or by another's authority, whether into a lesser or equal or even better work: for commutation is a favor, which the one vowing is not held to use. And if commutation has been made several times into diverse works, the one vowing can choose any one of them.
If the work into which the vow was commuted becomes impossible: a. he is not held to return to the first work when the commutation was made by ecclesiastical authority, even if by the fault of the one vowing the work has become impossible: for by commutation the prior obligation is utterly extinguished, so that it no longer revives; b. he ought to return to the first work if the commutation was made by proper authority, because in this case the obligation is not extinguished before the fulfillment of the substituted work.
1 S. Poenitent., 1 Nov. 1899. A distinction must be made between the faculty of simply commuting vows, the faculty of commuting vows by dispensing, and the faculty of dispensing by commuting.