Section 9: Sins Against the Property of Others

1. Since the right of ownership is founded on the natural law and sanctioned by positive divine and human law, it follows that every man is in duty bound to respect the property of his fellowmen and to abstain from unjust interference with property rights. This is a duty of commutative justice (iustitia commutativa), and is violated by all deeds of injustice (iniustitia sive iniuria), i. e., by every voluntary violation of the property rights of another against his reasonable will (iuris alieni violatio). He who renounces a right of his own free will, loses it, and he who appropriates it, cannot be accused of injustice. But if one is compelled by violence, force, stratagem, or fear to give up a right, especially an inalienable right, he does not lose it, but suffers violence.¹

¹ Reg. Iuris in VI° Decr. Bonif. VIII, n. 27: “No injury or fraud is done to one who knows and consents.”—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 589: “No injury is done to one who knows and wills, because one who wills yields his right and therefore does not preserve the right; hence it is of the essence of injury that it be exercised against one who is unwilling. Except certain cases in which a man cannot yield his right, however willing; thus a married man cannot by his consent prevent the violation of his wife from being adultery strictly so called. See condemned proposition under Innocent XI, n. 50: ‘Intercourse with a married woman with the husband consenting is not adultery, and therefore it is sufficient in confession to say that one has committed fornication.’” —(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1200).—Ibid., n. 590: “1. Injury is done to one consenting as a result of force, deceit, or fear unjustly inflicted, because he does not give consent freely, but only to redeem himself from unjust harassment; 2. He who kills one who is willing does injury not only to God, but to the slain man himself, because the right to life cannot be renounced unless God, who established it, has first consented; 3. He who strikes a cleric does injury to him even though he consents, because he cannot renounce the privilege of the canon which pertains to clerical status; 4. A usurer does injury to a borrower paying usury, just as a seller does to a buyer conceding an excessive price for merchandise; 5. Torturers did injury to martyrs, even though the martyrs desired death and endured it willingly.”

Injustice is either formal or material, according as it is inflicted with or without knowledge and free will.

It is direct if fully intended; indirect, if merely an unintentional consequence of some other action.

It is grave or slight, according as it results in a grave or slight injury.

The gravity of a sin committed against the property rights of another is measured not only by the damage inflicted,² but likewise, and mainly, by the malice involved, the injury inflicted, and the danger arising from the deed to society.³

² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 73, art. 3: “Sins committed against one’s neighbor are to be weighed, in themselves, according to the harms inflicted on one’s neighbor, because from this they have the character of fault. The harm is greater in proportion as the good taken away is greater.”—Ibid., qu. 74, art. 2: “A sin against one’s neighbor is more grievous in proportion as greater harm is inflicted on one’s neighbor through it. But the harm is greater in proportion as the good which is taken away is greater.”

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 59, art. 4: “A mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity, through which the soul has life. Now every harm inflicted on another is of itself contrary to charity, which moves one to will the good of another. And therefore, since injustice always consists in harm to another, it is manifest that to do what is unjust is, by its kind, a mortal sin.”—Ibid., qu. 66, art. 6: “A mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity, insofar as charity is the spiritual life of the soul. Charity, however, consists principally in love of God, and secondarily in love of neighbor, to which it pertains that to one’s neighbor we will and work his good. But by theft a man inflicts harm on his neighbor in his goods, and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish. Hence theft, as contrary to charity, is a mortal sin.”—Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 589: “What matter is judged grave in injury? That which by its nature or common estimation is capable of causing another a distress difficult to allay or of dissolving mutual charity.”

Slightness of matter (parvitas materiae) may, of course, render a sin against the property rights of another merely venial, but in itself (in genere suo) this sin is mortal.⁴ For injustice in its innumerable forms is, as a rule, not only inspired by immoral motives and uncontrolled passions, but it grossly violates the justice and charity which every man owes to his neighbors, and is the source of many other sins, e. g., lies, treason, and perjury.

⁴ Is. V, 8–10; XXXIII, 1; Amos VIII, 2–10; Mich. VI, 10–15; Hab. II, 6–14; Zach. V, 3; I Cor. VI, 10 sq.; I Thess. IV, 6.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 118, art. 4: “Avarice, insofar as it is opposed to justice, is by its kind a mortal sin; for it belongs to avarice that a person unjustly take or retain the goods of another, which pertains to robbery or theft, which are mortal sins. Yet it happens that in this kind of avarice something is a venial sin because of the imperfection of the act.”—Ibid., qu. 66, art. 6, ad 3: “Reason apprehends that which is small as though it were nothing. And therefore, in matters that are very small, a man does not reckon that harm is being inflicted on him; and he who takes them can presume that this is not against the will of the one whose property it is. And for this reason, if anyone furtively takes such very small things, he can be excused from mortal sin. If, however, he has the intention of stealing and of inflicting harm on his neighbor, even in such very small things there can be mortal sin, just as there can be in thought alone through consent.”—Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 589: “Injury is of itself gravely opposed to natural right, because it harms the natural and absolute independence of the man whose strict right is violated.”

It is of the greatest importance that every property right be kept sacred. On the other hand, the danger of violating justice is very great, partly because of the sophistry of selfishness and partly because of the difficulty of perceiving the limits that in many concrete cases separate justice from injustice, and hence it is one of the principal duties of priests to awaken and nourish in the souls confided to their care a delicate appreciation of right and justice, based upon the fear of God.⁵ “To inspire a detestation of [theft and robbery],” says the Catechism of the Council of Trent, “and to deter the faithful from this wicked enormity, parish priests shall bestow all care and diligence.”⁶

⁵ J. E. Pruner, Kath. Moraltheol., Vol. II, 3rd ed., p. 179.

⁶ Catech. Rom., P. III, c. 8, qu. 8: “To inspire a detestation of [theft and robbery] and to deter the faithful people from this wicked deed, parish priests shall bestow all care and diligence.”

II. The principal way in which the property rights of others may be violated, besides sinful coveting of their possessions, is damaging them unlawfully (damnificatio) by theft or robbery.⁷

⁷ Ex. XX, 15, 17; Deut. XXV, 13 sqq.; Prov. XX, 23; Matth. XV, 19; XIX, 18.—Cfr. Catech. Rom., P. III, c. 8, qu. 3–6.

1. When property is destroyed or injured, not appropriated, that act is called damnificatio iniusta sive dolosa. It is qualified as “non lucrosa,” because the wrong-doer gets no benefit from his act.⁸

⁸ Sporer-Bierbaum, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 2nd ed., tr. 5, n. 791: “Unjust damaging, or damage unjustly done, is said to be the secret or violent destruction or deterioration of another’s property against the owner’s will. Hence it is called unprofitable damaging, because no gain or advantage thereby comes to the one causing the damage.”—Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, p. 380.

a) To this category of sins belong all real injuries done intentionally or through criminal negligence to the property of others against their reasonable will (invito domino); hence α) All injuries done to the movable or immovable goods (bona fortunae) of others, e. g., houses, tools, crops, etc., and β) All damage inflicted on public institutions or utilities, such as streets, sidewalks, railways, bridges, water works, etc.

b) The sinfulness of the acts just enumerated is determined by the extent of the damage done (damnum emergens), by the foreseeable consequences (lucrum cessans), by the malice inspiring the perpetrator, by the personal relationship existing between the parties concerned, and by the degree of carelessness shown.

The intentional damaging or destruction of religious statues or paintings on buildings or along public highways is not only a crime against justice, but a sin against religion, and if the articles are blessed or belong to the Church, it is also a sacrilege.⁹

⁹ See this Handbook, Vol. IV, pp. 231 sqq.

If the owner of a building sets it on fire or causes some one else to do so (crimen incendiarii), in order to obtain the insurance, he not only inflicts damage, but also commits the sin of fraud.

Simple damnificatio, in contradistinction to the unjust appropriation of the property of others, generally consists in an uncharitable act of destruction bringing no advantage to the destroyer. In such cases the moral evaluation of the sin offers no difficulties. There is a more complicated case, however, which arises out of the intricacies of modern business. Not infrequently a mer- chant seeks and obtains advantages for himself at the expense of his competitor, and nothing is more common than the charge of unfair competition raised by the loser against the winner in the mad race for profits. By the introduction of spinning machinery thousands of weavers lost their jobs and suffered serious damage, yet the inventor of the spinning jenny and those who bought and used his patents were entirely within their rights when they employed this product of human ingenuity for their own enrichment. Every new improvement in machinery might be called an injury to him who is compelled to use the unimproved model, but it is no unjust damnificatio in the moral sense.

Injury done to another without a bad intention, and without culpable negligence, must be regarded as accidental; it is for the positive law to determine whether and to what extent one who unintentionally inflicts an injury on another is to be held liable for the damage done.¹⁰

¹⁰ Linsenmann, Lehrb. d. Moraltheol., p. 596; Cronin, The Science of Ethics, II, p. 381.

2. The unjust appropriation of the property of another (acceptio iniusta), in which may be included the retention of ill-gotten goods (retentio iniusta), may take place secretly and furtively (theft), or openly and violently (robbery), or deceitfully (fraud), by charging an excessive rate of interest on loans (usury), by the careless incurring of debts, by fraudulent bankruptcy, and by refusing to pay wages, interest, or rent due to others.

A) Theft is the secret taking away of the property of another against his reasonable will. It may be simple or qualified. Species of qualified theft are sacrilege and the embezzlement of public funds (peculatus).

“Three things,” says St. Thomas, “combine together to constitute theft. The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take possession of what is another’s. The second thing belongs to theft as distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another’s, not as a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carries off his daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in a thing being taken secretly; and in this respect it belongs properly to theft that it consists in taking another’s things secretly.”¹¹

¹¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 3: “Three things combine in the definition of theft. The first belongs to it insofar as it is contrary to justice, which renders to each his own, and from this it belongs to theft that it usurps what belongs to another. The second belongs to the definition of theft insofar as it is distinguished from sins against the person, such as homicide and adultery; and accordingly it belongs to theft that it concerns a possessed thing. For if anyone takes what belongs to another not as a possession, but as a part (as if he amputates a limb) or as a connected person (as if he carries off a daughter or wife), it does not properly have the definition of theft. The third difference is what completes the definition of theft, namely that what belongs to another is usurped secretly, and accordingly the proper definition of theft is that it is the secret taking of another’s property.” Cfr. Gury, I, n. 591.

a) The sins against the seventh commandment are as various as the social connections of men and their economic condition. Unfortunately small thieves are often punished, while big ones not only go scot free, but are honored as leaders of society. Theft is by its very nature and according to the teaching of Sacred Scripture always a sin, for two reasons: “first, because of its opposition to justice, which gives to each one his due . . . ; secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the thief when he lays hands on another’s property secretly and cunningly.”¹²

¹² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 5: “If anyone considers the definition of theft, he will find two reasons for sin in it: first, because of its opposition to justice, which renders to each his own, and thus theft is opposed to justice insofar as theft is the taking of another’s property; secondly, because of the guile or fraud which the thief commits secretly and, as it were, by ambush in usurping another’s property. Hence it is manifest that every theft is a sin.”—Gury, I, n. 592: “Theft, by whatever name it may be called, is of itself gravely opposed to the natural law, as is evident both from reason and from Sacred Scripture, in which it is numbered among the sins that exclude from the kingdom of heaven. Sacrilegious theft and robbery are graver sins than simple theft and constitute a different species of malice: the former because, in addition to justice, it violates religion; the latter because it adds to injustice an injury to the honor owed to one’s neighbor. Other methods or other objects of theft, however, do not change its species, because by them the nature of the damaging is not changed.”

b) The degree of sinfulness which stealing involves is determined, first, by the greater or less value of the property stolen (pretium absolutum, relativum, affectionis),¹³ and, secondly, by the personal relation of the thief to his victim and the gravity of his obligation to avoid this particular sin. Hence, even though the stolen object be of little value, theft is a mortal sin if the thief, either by reason of his office or by contractual stipulation, is under a particular obligation to protect the victim against property damage. On the other hand, an important or valuable object is required to render a theft mortally sinful if the thief is bound to his victim by the ties of consanguinity, friendship, or marriage. Generally speaking, therefore, the so-called domestic thefts (furta domestica), i. e., those committed by married people against each other, or by children against their parents, must be judged leniently, provided the stolen object is of no great value, because the violation of justice involved in such an act may be presumed to be less invito domino than in ordinary cases.

¹³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 5.

Thefts committed by servants against their masters or employers are more serious, because they involve infidelity and a breach of trust. Note, however, that if servants steal foodstuffs which are not usually kept under lock and key, and not extraordinarily rare or costly, the fault may be extenuated, provided, of course, they do not sell them or take large quantities.¹⁴

¹⁴ Prov. XXVIII, 24; Matth. XV, 4–6.—Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 526, 539 sqq. (ed. Gaudé, II, 36, 48 sqq.).—Gury, op. cit., I, n. 595: “It is asked what matter is required for thefts by wives, children, and servants to become grave. Answer: 1. It is certain among all that, on the part of wives and children, more is required to constitute grave matter than on the part of strangers, because the head of the household is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling, in the former case than in the latter. They say that more probably a sum twice as great is required for these than for strangers, but no general rule can be assigned; for this generally depends on various circumstances of persons or conditions; 2. For servants it depends also on the greater lib- erality or tenacity of the masters, on the quality or location of the thing stolen, e. g., whether it is edible or not, guarded or open, etc. According to many, petty thefts committed by servants in food and victuals which are not usually carefully guarded do not generally amount to mortal sin, provided these things are not sold or carried out of the house and are not of extraordinary value. But if servants steal money or things diligently guarded, a greater quantity is not required for a grave sin, because masters are no less unwilling, and such thefts are punished more severely by civil law.”—Catech. Rom., P. III, c. 8, qu. 9: “Nor are servants and unfaithful custodians of their masters’ property distinguished from thieves; indeed, they are more detestable than other thieves, who are shut out by keys, because nothing at home can be sealed or locked against a thieving servant.”

c) What is the sum required for a grave sin of theft? This is a question which cannot be answered in mathematical terms, but must be gauged by the moral law. Broadly speaking, that is a notable sum of money which is required to supply a man and his family with the necessaries of life for one day. But the amount of one’s possessions and the sum needed for his daily support, are not the only measure for the magnitude of a theft. There must be a certain objective limit beyond which every theft or robbery is a mortal sin, regardless of the wealth of the victim, for the property of the rich, too, needs to be protected against unjust violation. Therefore, in the case of the very wealthy, materia gravis is a sum large enough, on the one hand, to constitute an incitement to theft, and, on the other, to expose the fortune of the victim to considerable danger if it were frequently repeated.

The casuists have long ago endeavored to determine just when the matter of a theft becomes sufficient to constitute a mortal sin. “Since about the time of De Lugo (+ 1660),” says Fr. Slater, “it has been a common opinion among theologians that it is a grave sin of theft to rob a workingman of a sum which is sufficient to support him and his family for a day. The reason for this doctrine is obvious and satisfactory. For that quantity will be sufficient for a mortal sin, whose theft causes a notable injury to the owner, an injury which ordinary men of prudence and sense consider serious, and which is sufficient to upset them considerably. This is the test which is applied in other matters where there is question of the grave breach of a moral law which admits of parvity of matter. . . . In the same way, when we wish to know what sum is sufficient for a grave sin of theft, we consider how important it is for maintaining peace among men that property should be secure; what quantity of money or commodities is looked upon as considerable with a view to the use that can be made of them; and what quantity will, with reason, cause the owner serious concern and chagrin if he is unjustly deprived of it. Now, to a workman, or indeed to any one who has to earn his living, the loss of what will support him and his family for a day is a serious matter; it practically means that he has worked a whole day for nothing, and such a loss causes most men, with reason, to be seriously put out.”

But what about rich men, wealthy companies, governments, etc.? “In such cases we must have recourse to other considerations in order to find what quantity will constitute a grave sin of injustice when stolen. Here we consider, not so much the loss caused to the owner of the property, as the wrong done to public order and to the security of property. . . . The public weal requires that theft of a considerable sum must be forbidden in all cases, as a grave violation of justice, by the natural law. A prohibition, under pain of venial sin, not to steal a considerable sum of money, would not be sufficient to safeguard the right of property. In other words, theft of what is commonly at a certain time and place considered a notable sum of money, will be sufficient to constitute a mortal sin of theft, even when the owner of the property stolen is not sensibly the worse off.”

After reviewing the opinions of recent moralists as to the quantity which public interest requires for a grave sin of theft, Fr. Slater, making due allowance for the depreciation of money, the higher standards of comfort, and, in consequence, the relatively less value attached to money by the working classes throughout the civilized world, independently of its purchasing power, sees “no reason for increasing the quantity which the greater number of modern theologians assign as the absolute sum required for a mortal sin of theft. That quantity is about twenty shillings, and if we attach much importance, as we should do, to the opinions of such classical moralists as Lugo about such a question, the sum will rather be below than above twenty shillings.”¹⁵

¹⁵ Slater, Questions of Moral Theology, pp. 99–115.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 527 (ed. Gaudé, II, 37).—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 593: “Grave matter in theft cannot be rigorously determined. According to the common opinion, which seems altogether to be held, this matter is to be regarded not absolutely in itself, but relatively to the various conditions and necessities of men, so that graver matter is required for a grave sin in theft against a rich man than against a poor man. The reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, depends chiefly on the greater or lesser deprivation, distress, and resistance of will suffered by the one against whom the theft is committed; indeed, everyone sees that the same matter causes now slight, now grave distress according as the owner from whom it is taken is rich or poor. Nevertheless, regard must be had to the resistance of will as it is commonly and reasonably found among men, not in relation to men attracted by a greater or lesser love of money. . . . Yet some absolute matter must be determined that can never be exceeded without grave fault; otherwise, if a complete proportion had to be observed among all conditions, a very great quantity would certainly be required as grave matter in a theft committed against a very rich man, which everyone sees would result in harm to society.”

The Compendium Theologiae Moralis of Sabetti-Barrett, S. J., which is, we believe, used in most of our ecclesiastical seminaries, following Palmieri, Gury-Ballerini, Ojetti, and others, gives about thirty-five dollars as the absolute sum required for a mortal sin of theft.¹⁶ This is a probable opinion and may be safely followed.

¹⁶ Comp. Theol. Mor., 29th ed., p. 369.

d) The object of a theft may be materia gravis not only in itself, but also per accidens, namely, if a number of petty sums are stolen from one and the same person on different occasions, or from several persons. Innocent XI expressly condemned the proposition that “A man is not obliged under pain of mortal sin to make restitution of that which he has stolen in small sums, even though the total amount be considerable.”¹⁷

¹⁷ Prop. damnat. sub. Innoc. XI, n. 38: “No one is bound under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken by a few thefts, however great the total sum may be.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1188).—Cfr. Gury, Vol. I, n. 596 sq.—In determining when there is objective coalescence of small thefts, so that ultimately what is called gravis materia is stolen, theologians seek some connecting link that will bind together the petty pilferings and give them unity; for without such a bond of union they will remain isolated thefts, and will, in consequence, have merely an objective malice against justice, which corresponds to them as individual unjust acts. The intention with which the small thefts are accomplished is pointed out as one means of bringing them into moral connection with one another. When a thief intends from the beginning to arrive at a considerable amount, but, for convenience sake, takes the large sum little by little, then, no matter what length of time intervenes between the different acts of robbery, and no matter whether the objects already stolen are attained or not, there is objective coalescence, and an externally grave sin against justice has been committed. Dr. Harty says on this subject: “It seems to me to be necessary to limit this teaching in some way. Is the intention of which theologians speak a subjective intention, an internal act of the will? If so, the question arises at once: How can an internal intention bring about an objective union between different acts? A mere subjective element cannot create an objective bond of union, cannot unite a number of petty injuries so as to make them one grave injustice. Just as, accord- ing to the opinion which seems the more common in the schools, an internal intention does not directly change the objective justice or injustice of an act, so too, it would seem, an internal intention cannot of itself provide an objective change in the relations of two or more acts of theft to one another; at most it regulates the subjective responsibility of the agent. A suggested solution of this difficulty is that the intention of which theologians speak is not a mere internal intention, but rather an intention which is externated by the different acts which follow from it; but I doubt if this solution, taken by itself, is sufficient to overcome the difficulty of the case, because each individual act of theft externates only an intention which corresponds to itself; nor does the whole series of acts, of necessity, externate any internal connecting intention, as can be seen from two examples, in one of which a certain number of acts of theft are performed without any initial intention of doing so, and in the other of which the same number of thefts are committed at equally long intervals in execution of an initially arranged determination. The difference between the two cases is purely internal. Perhaps the intention, which serves as an objective link between the various small thefts, is an intention which has a separate externation—separate in the sense that it must be distinct from that obtained by the mere repeated acts of stealing. This will frequently be expressly made, and frequently, too, it will be implicitly contained in the modus agendi of the agent. Such an externated intention would supply an objective bond which neither an internal intention nor an intention externated merely by repeated acts can give.” (Irish Theological Quarterly, Vol. II, n. 7).

Besides the objective and material value of the stolen object, there must be taken into consideration such subjective circumstances as the heartlessness or incorrigibility of the thief. He who intends to steal an object of considerable value, but succeeds in stealing only a petty one, commits a mortal sin. So does he who successively steals small sums in order gradually to obtain a large one, and he who co-operates with others in committing grand larceny, no matter how small his personal share in the booty may be.¹⁸

¹⁸ Gury, Vol. I, n. 598: “On the part of the thief, the taking of a slight thing becomes a grave sin in three ways, namely: 1. Through the intention of arriving at grave matter; 2. Through multiplication, if petty thefts amount to a grave sum; 3. Through conspiracy, when several conspire among themselves and the petty thefts of the individuals, taken together, constitute grave matter.” —Ibid., n. 599: “If a thief intending to arrive at a grave sum through petty thefts renews this intention each time he steals, he sins gravely each time. But if from the beginning he intends to steal some determinate sum through petty thefts, v. g., so that he may not be detected, more probably he commits a single sin, because there is a single moral act; for all the particular acts tend determinately toward effecting one thing.”

e) As the appropriation of the property of others is unjust only when it is done against the reasonable will of the owner (rationabiliter invito domino), the taking of things in extreme necessity and occult compensation (v. infra, pp. 366 sq.) are not thefts.

A theft committed in extreme need is the appropriation or use of the property of another by a person who needs that property to save his life or something nearly as valuable as life (e. g., the integrity of the body or liberty).

He who in a state of extreme necessity takes as much of another’s goods as he actually needs, either for himself or for others in the same predicament is not guilty of theft and not bound to make restitution, provided he is actually indigent and has no reasonable hope of ever becoming prosperous.¹⁹ He is merely exercising a right granted to him by the moral law of nature, which ordains that in extreme necessity all things are common property. In such a case, therefore, the consent of the owner may be presumed, and if he protests, his protest may be disregarded as unreasonable, and hence there can be no theft because one of the essential notes of theft is lacking.

¹⁹ Busembaum, Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 5, c. 1, dub. 1, n. 2: “He who takes from another as much as is necessary for himself or another placed in extreme necessity neither steals nor is bound later to restore what has thus been consumed, provided he was needy in fact and in prospect.”

St. Thomas explains this with his accustomed lucid- ity as follows: “Things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right or divine right. Now, according to the natural order established by divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for the purpose of succoring man’s needs by their means. And therefore the division and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not preclude the fact that man’s needs have to be remedied by means of these very things. Hence, whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. . . . Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be relieved by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need. But if the need be so manifest and urgent that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance, when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to relieve his own need by means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly; nor is this, properly speaking, theft or robbery.” And again: “It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and use another’s property in a case of extreme need, because that which a man takes for the support of his life, becomes his own property by reason of that need.”²⁰

²⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 7: “Those things which are of human law cannot derogate from natural law or divine law. Now, according to the natural order established by divine providence, inferior things are ordained so that by means of them human need may be relieved. And therefore the division and appropriation of things proceeding from human law does not prevent human need from being relieved by means of such things. And therefore the things which some possess in superabundance are, by natural law, due for the support of the poor. . . . But because there are many who suffer need and it is not possible from—” “the same thing to relieve everyone, the stewardship of his own goods is entrusted to each person’s discretion, so that from them he may relieve those suffering need. But if necessity is so evident and urgent that it is manifest that the present need must be relieved from whatever things are at hand (for example, when danger threatens a person and he cannot otherwise be relieved), then a person may lawfully relieve his need from another’s goods, whether taken openly or secretly, nor does this properly have the character of theft or robbery.”—Ibid., ad 2: “To use another’s property secretly taken in a case of extreme necessity does not have the character of theft, properly speaking, because through such necessity that which one takes to sustain one’s own life is made one’s own.”—Ibid., ad 3: “In a case of similar necessity a person may also secretly take another’s property in order to aid a neighbor who is thus in need.”

f) The conditions under which a man may make use of this right are the following:

α) His own need, or that of the person for whom he takes the property, must be extreme (necessitas extrema), or at least very grave (necessitas gravissima sive quasi extrema); β) He must have no other means of livelihood; γ) The owner of the property in question must not be in equal need or likely to be subjected to equal need by the taking away of his property; δ) The needy must have the intention of taking only what he absolutely requires at the moment and of making adequate restitution if he is able.²¹

²¹ Prop. damnat. sub Innoc. XI, n. 36: “It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity but also in grave necessity.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1186).—Cfr. Gury, I, n. 601: “A poor person placed in extreme necessity may not take more than is necessary. Hence, if the use alone of a thing, v. g., a horse, suffices, the obligation of restoring it remains when the necessity ceases. If one in extreme need has elsewhere, in fact or in probable prospect, the means from which he can pay, he cannot take another’s property except with the burden of restitution, because the necessity then does not require the thing to be taken gratuitously, if it is relieved by a thing received on loan or lent for use. But one who in extreme want has consumed another’s property is bound to nothing after using the thing, if he has no hope that he will ever be able to restore it, even if afterward he arrives at a better condition.”

g) Akin to taking another’s property in extreme need is occult compensation (compensatio occulta), i. e., the secret appropriation of something to which one has a just claim (debitum ex iustitia), but which one cannot obtain by ordinary means. This is permissible only: (1) if the justice of the claim is indisputable, (2) if occult compensation is the only physically or morally possible means of obtaining one’s own, and (3) if there is no reason for apprehending injury to a third person, e. g., suspicion of theft, or scandal.²² These three essential conditions, which must be present together to render occult compensation licit, hardly ever actually concur, especially since there must be an absolutely certain claim of justice; mere promises or claims of equity do not suffice.²³ Occult compensation is always of doubtful moral value because it is an act of self-help, and no man is an impartial judge in his own case. Therefore Saint Thomas says: “He who, by stealth, takes his own property, if this be unjustly detained by another, sins indeed, yet not because he burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to restitution or compensation; but he sins against general justice by disregarding the order of justice and usurping judgment concerning his own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor to allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbors by acting in this way.”²⁴

²² St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 521–524 (ed. Gaudé, II, 33 sqq.); cfr. Gury, I, n. 602–604.

²³ Cfr. Prop. damnat. sub Innoc. XI, n. 37: “Male and female domestic servants may secretly take from their masters to compensate for their labor, which they judge greater than the wage they receive.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1187).

²⁴ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 5, ad 3: “He who secretly takes his own property when it is unjustly detained by another does indeed sin, not because he burdens the one who detains it, and therefore he is not bound to restore or compensate anything, but he sins against general justice by usurping judgment concerning his own property for himself while disregarding the order of law. And therefore he is bound to make satisfaction to God and to take care that any scandal of his neighbors, if it has arisen from this, be allayed.”—Cfr. Janssen, Der hl. Alfons von Liguori gegen Hoensbroech, pp. 103 sqq.

To steal the intellectual property (ideas, writings, or inventions) of another is called plagiarism. It is a sin if the owner is injured thereby. There is also a sort of ideal plagiarism, which is committed if one seeks to appropriate to himself the reputation or glory of another, but it is often difficult to separate that which is the property of an author or inventor from that which he owes to the intellectual labors of his fellowmen. In the words of Dr. Linsenmann, no matter how firmly we stand on our own feet, the ground which we occupy has been prepared for us by others.²⁵

²⁵ Linsenmann, Lehrb. d. Moraltheol., p. 526.

B) Robbery (rapina) is the act of openly taking away the property of another from his person or in his presence, against his will, and under constraint of fear or force. It differs from theft by the circumstances described and is a more grievous sin for two reasons: first, because it violates personal liberty and, secondly, because it inflicts upon the victim ignominy and injury.²⁶ If violence is employed after theft has been committed in order to ward off persecution, the crime of robbery is superadded to that of theft. Robbery may be perpetrated without the application of violence by embezzling documents, giving false testimony, perjury, bribery of judges, withholding a laborer’s wages, and similar sins.

²⁶ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 4: “Theft and robbery have the character of sin from the fact that the taking is involuntary on the part of the one from whom something is taken. But the involuntary is spoken of in two ways, namely through ignorance and through violence. And therefore robbery has one character of sin and theft another. Therefore on this account they differ in species.”—Ibid., art. 9: “Robbery and theft have the character of sin because of the involuntary on the part of the one from whom something is taken, yet in such a way that in theft it is involuntary through ignorance, whereas in robbery it is involuntary through violence. But something is more involuntary through violence than through ignorance, because violence is more directly opposed to the will than ignorance. And therefore robbery is a graver sin than theft. There is also another reason, because through robbery not only is harm inflicted on someone in his goods, but it also tends toward a certain ignominy or injury of the person, and this outweighs the fraud or deceit that belongs to theft.”

Related to robbery is extortion, i. e., the act or practice of obtaining from another money or other valuables by violence, threats, or compulsion, more specifically the taking of money by an official under color of his office, either when none is due, or in excess of what is due, or before it is due. Extortion approaches fraud if the threat is not applied directly to the unjust appropriation of property, but in order to compel some act or omission which entails a disadvantage to others, for instance, signing a receipt or omitting to bring suit.

C) Fraud (fraus) is an act of deliberate deception, practiced for the purpose of securing something to the prejudice of another.²⁷ Fraud is practiced in numerous forms in legal transactions and contracts, especially in sales, by deceiving the buyer as to the value, the quality or quantity of the object sold, by counterfeiting money and weights, etc. It is a very serious sin, whether regarded in its nature or in its consequences.²⁸ In its nature, because it implies deception and hypocrisy, lying, heartlessness, and injustice, all clothed in the garb of honesty and therefore difficult to discover. In its consequences, because he who commits fraud undermines the social order by destroying mutual confidence and creating distrust. Holy Scripture says that those who wrong and defraud others fall into the pit they themselves have dug, and that their iniquity will be visited upon their own heads and they will “not possess the kingdom of God.”²⁹

²⁷ St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. III, c. 11 (n. 75): “David says: ‘Like a sharp razor you have wrought deceit’ (Ps. 51, 4); reproaching the traitor’s wickedness, because an instrument of this kind is used for a man’s adornment and often wounds.” (Migne, P. L., XIV, 166).—St. Thomas, l. c., qu. 77, art. 1: “To employ fraud in order that something may be sold for more than the just price is altogether a sin, insofar as one deceives one’s neighbor to his detriment.”

²⁸ Lev. XIX, 35 sq.; Deut. XXV, 13–16; Prov. XX, 23.—Cfr. Tertullian, De Idololatria, c. 1: “The nature of fraud, I think, is that someone seize what belongs to another or deny what is owed to another, and surely fraud committed against a man is the name of the greatest crime?” (Ed. Leopold, P. I, 30).—St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. III, c. 9 (n. 65): “All fraud is shameful. Indeed, even in cheap things a deceitful balance and fraudulent measure are accursed. If fraud is punished in the marketplace of saleable things, in the practice of commerce, can it be regarded as blameless among the duties of the virtues?” (Migne, P. L., XVI, 163).

²⁹ Ps. VII, 15–17; Prov. XI, 24; XX, 17; Jer. XXII, 13; 1 Cor. VI, 8–10; 1 Thess. IV, 6; cfr. 1 Pet. II, 1.

Though minor frauds are not per se mortally sinful, yet they may become so by dint of circumstances and are to be avoided all the more because they almost invariably lead to other and more grievous acts of deception. It is this sort of iniquity which the Holy Ghost has particularly in view when He says that it is visited upon a man’s children and children’s children to the third and fourth generation.³⁰ “Those who commit frauds,” says the Angelic Doctor, “do not design anything against themselves or their own souls, but through God’s just judgment it happens that what they plot against others recoils on themselves, according to Ps. vii, 16: ‘He is fallen into the hole he made.’”³¹

³⁰ Ex. XXXIV, 7.

³¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 55, art. 5, ad 3: “Those who commit frauds do not, from their intention, devise anything against themselves or against their own souls, but through God’s just judgment it happens that what they plot against others recoils upon them, according to that saying (Ps. VII, 16): ‘He has fallen into the pit that he made.’”

Particular kinds of fraud are: forging documents and dishonest bankruptcy. Both shake public confidence and tend to undermine the social order. In regard to the latter it is forbidden to conceal or remove portions of property, to falsify or destroy records, etc. If a business man incurs bankruptcy by living beyond his means, or by engaging in wild speculations, he is not guilty of fraud, but commits an injustice in not complying with his duties to his fellowmen.³²

³² J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, p. 71.

Another species of fraud is the use of dishonest means in business competition, such as misrepresenting the quality of goods or their source of production, slandering or otherwise injuring competitors, etc.³³

³³ J. Bachem and H. Roeren, Zur Bekämpfung des unlauteren Wettbewerbes, 2nd ed., Leipsic 1896; H. Mayer, Der unlautere Wettbewerb, Stuttgart 1909.

Akin to fraud is defalcation, in so far as it involves an injustice, i. e., a disadvantage to others or illegal favoring of one’s own person or business. It is committed by fraudulently appropriating money held in trust or not employing due care in the administration of property confided to one’s care, as by the executor of a will, the guardian of a minor child, the curator or administrator of an estate, etc.³⁴

³⁴ Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 71 sq.

D) Usury (usura, fenus) is the exploitation of the necessity of others by unjustly appropriating of their property in exchange and loan transactions.³⁵ Its principal features are the needy condition of the victim and his ignorance or carelessness, of which the usurer takes advantage by charging more for loans than he is entitled to. The term usury is sometimes broadly used to cover dishonest manipulations in grain or other commodities, excessive charges for rent, etc.

³⁵ Funk, Zins und Wucher, pp. 192 sqq.; Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 259 sqq.

Not only the creditor but also the debtor may become guilty of usury, namely, by abusing the confidence of the creditor in order to appropriate his property. Thus bankruptcy proceedings are sometimes used to exploit the good nature or carelessness of creditors. The Catechism of the Council of Trent says: “Those who defraud their creditors, who deny their just debts, and also those who purchase goods on their own or on another’s credit, with an agreement to pay them at a certain time, and do not redeem their pledge, shall be convicted of the crime of rapine, and it is an aggravation of their guilt that, in consequence of their want of punctuality and their fraud, prices are raised, to the no small detriment of the public.”³⁶

³⁶ Catech. Rom., P. III, c. 8, qu. 12: “Defrauders of creditors and repudiators—whoever, having taken a period of time for payment, purchase goods on their own or another’s credit and do not discharge their pledge—will be condemned for the same crime of rapine; their offense is also graver because merchants, on account of their default and fraud, sell at higher prices, to the great detriment of the community; that saying of David seems to apply to them: ‘The sinner shall borrow and shall not repay’ (Ps. XXXVI, 21).”

Hence usury both from the moral and the legal standpoint is as deserving of punishment as fraud, theft, and robbery.³⁷ Economically this crime is committed not only when a higher rate of interest is demanded than law or custom permit, but likewise in all cases where the borrower appropriates so much of the value created by the co-operation of his labor with the capital of others, that the lender is unable to carry on his business.³⁸

³⁷ Ps. XIV, 1, 5; Ez. XVIII, 8 sq., 13; XXII, 12.—Cfr. Conc. Lat. II, can. 13: “We condemn that detestable and shameful, insatiable rapacity of usurers, rejected by divine and human laws through Scripture in the Old and New Testament, and we separate them from every ecclesiastical consolation, commanding that . . . usurers be held infamous throughout their whole life and, unless they repent, be deprived of Christian burial.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 365).—Cfr. Conc. Lat. V, sess. 5; and Holweck, Die kirchlichen Strafgesetze, p. 276.

³⁸ Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 261 sqq.

Usurious manipulation of the food supply is a particularly heinous crime, all the more contemptible because it most severely affects the poor. “Amongst those who are called extortioners by the holy Fathers,” says the Roman Catechism, “are they who, in times of scarcity, hold on to their grain, thus culpably producing dearth and high prices, and this also holds good with regard to all necessaries for food and the sustentation of life.”³⁹

³⁹ Catech. Rom., P. III, c. 8, qu. 14: “Among the number of those who are called extortioners by the holy Fathers are those who, in a scarcity of crops, withhold grain and bring it about through their own fault that the market price is dearer and harsher; this also holds for all things necessary for food and for life.”

“He that hideth up corn,” says Sacred Scripture, “shall be cursed among the people.”⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Prov. XI, 26.

Habitual usury in credit or commodities is reckoned among the sins that cry to Heaven for vengeance.⁴¹

⁴¹ See this Handbook, Vol. II, pp. 89 sq.; cfr. St. Ambrose, De Tobia, c. 2–22 (Migne, P. L., XIV, 761); Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, pp. 286 sqq.

The crime of “usury” is committed also by corrupt and venal judges, who allow themselves to be won over by money or bribes to decide against the poor and the necessitous, no matter how good their cause may be.⁴²

⁴² Ex. XXIII, 8; Deut. XVI, 19.—Catech. Rom., P. III, c. 8, qu. 12.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, 77, 78.—Catechismus Romanus, P. III, c. 8, qu. 1–25.—Sporer-Bierbaum, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 472 sqq.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 518–546 (ed. Gaudé, II, 27 sqq.).—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 587 sqq.—J. E. Pruner, Kath. Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 179 sqq.—IDEM, Lehre vom Recht, Vol. II, pp. 239 sqq.—J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 67 sqq.—F. Lorinser, Die Lehre von der Verwaltung des hl. Buszsakramentes, 2nd ed., pp. 223 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S. J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., n. 1109 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 375 sqq., 380 sqq.—Th. Meyer, S. J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 208 sqq.—J. Rickaby, Moral Philosophy, pp. 255 sqq.—Calvin Elliott, Usury: A Scriptural, Ethical, and Economic View, Millersburg, O., 1902.—P. Cleary, The Church and Usury: An Essay on Some Historical and Theological Aspects of Money-Lending, Dublin 1914.