On Conscience

349. In order that we may be able to tend to the ultimate end, laws are not sufficient, by which the way to be followed is shown in a general mode; but it is required that laws of this kind be applied to each action in particular. Now that application of the rule of morals, in individual cases, is made through the practical reason of each man, which bears judgment concerning the morality of this or that act, all circumstances having been considered, and is, as it were, the proximate and subjective rule of morals. But this practical reason is called conscience. - In the present Treatise, we shall discuss:

I. Concerning the concept and species of conscience.

II. Concerning certain conscience, insofar as it is the proximate rule of morals.

III. Concerning doubtful conscience, and the means of removing doubt.

350. The word conscience, which is derived from knowledge,² designates several things, but especially: (a) the intimate sense, by which we perceive and discern internal sensations; (b) psychological conscience, by which we apprehend our spiritual operations, namely acts of cognition and volition; (c) moral conscience, by which we judge concerning the morality of our acts. Now the intimate sense, which is concerned with sensible things, is something altogether distinct from conscience properly so called, which perceives spiritual things. But psychological and moral conscience are not two distinct faculties, but one and the same faculty, namely reason (or intellect), which, insofar as it is conscious of spiritual operations, is called psychological conscience, - and insofar as it judges concerning their morality, is called moral conscience.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia, q. 79, a. 13; Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 5; Qq. disputatae, de Veritate, q. 17; Quodlibet., III, a. 26-27; Suarez, in Ia IIae, tr. III, disp. XII, n. 1-4; Salmanticenses, Tr. XX, cap. 7; Sayrus, Clavis regia sacerdotum casuum conscientiae, Venetiis, 1618, lib. I, c. 2-5; Billuart, De Act. hum., diss. V; St. Alphonsus, lib. I, n. 2-19; Brocardus, Tr. de Conscientia (Migne, Theol. Curs., t. XI), q. II, art. 1-5; Sporer-Bierbaum, Tr. I, n. 1-30; Elbel-Bierbaum, P. I, n. 113-141; Ball. P., t. I, n. 130-159; Lehmkuhl, n. 41-66; Muller, § 71-74; Bouquillon, n. 253-282; Bautain, La Conscience, Paris, 1869, ch. 13-14; Didiot, n. 233-253; F. Bouillier, De la Conscience en psychologie et en morale, Paris, 1872.

² Cf. Bréal and Bailly, Dict. etymol. latin, Paris, 1898, p. 327-328, where he also notes that the word scire (from which scientia is derived) primarily signifies the same as to discern, or to judge.

Moral conscience is sometimes considered as a habit, insofar as it inclines us to pronounce concerning the liceity of actions; more often, however, as an act, insofar as it brings forth a judgment. But it is an act of the intellect, not of the will; and in this it agrees with psychological conscience; but it differs from it because it is not a mere apprehension of the intellect, but a true judgment or dictate concerning the liceity of an act, or concerning its relation to the rule of morals: whether it is licit or prohibited, whether there is an obligation of placing it or merely a counsel, whether under grave or under light obligation. Nor is it a speculative judgment, but practical, because it does not regard the liceity of an action in general and in the abstract, but in particular and in the concrete; indeed it is a proximately practical judgment, because it is borne concerning an action to be placed here and now, and therefore expresses an order to acting.

351. Moral conscience is therefore distinguished: (a) from synderesis, which is usually defined as the habit of the first moral principles, or a certain innate promptitude of reason for easily knowing the first moral principles, such as these: good is to be done, - what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another, etc. (above, n. 221); (b) from science, which is knowledge of general conclusions deduced from first principles; (c) from prudence, which is the right estimation of all the circumstances regarding the morality of some action. - Yet it depends on these three: for it uses the knowledge of principles and conclusions, and also the prudent consideration of all circumstances, for judging whether this action in particular, all things considered, is licit or not.

Many say that the judgment of conscience is, as it were, the conclusion of some prosyllogism. Namely the major is some general principle, proposed by synderesis, for example, every evil is to be avoided; the first minor declares that such a genus of action is comprehended under the general law, for example, theft is evil; from this moral science infers that theft is to be avoided. Then prudence adds: but the action which is here and now proposed as to be done, all things considered, falls under the concept of theft; and the last conclusion is the practical judgment of conscience: therefore here and now one must abstain from that theft. - For the most part, however, conscience does not explicitly syllogize, but, with all adjuncts considered, by a simple judgment, without any reasoning, decrees that this or that action is to be done, or omitted.

352. Therefore conscience can be defined as a practical judgment concerning the morality of an action to be placed here and now.

This is conscience properly so called, insofar as it is the rule of morals. Yet under the name conscience also comes the judgment which our reason bears concerning the morality of a past act: when it approves this, it is called the testimony of a good conscience; but if it reproves it, it is called remorse or the worm of conscience. Here we treat of conscience properly so called.

1. Many moderns do not distinguish the intimate sense from conscience; Rabier reports their various theories concerning the nature of conscience, Psychologie, ch. 6, p. 52-79. - Some think that conscience is a special faculty distinct from the intimate sense and the intellect: thus Reid, Garnier, Fabre, apud Bouillier, op. cit., p. 54-59.

353. State of the question. Conscience is divided from a manifold head.

(a) By reason of the obligation which it manifests, conscience, like the law itself, is called commanding, forbidding, permitting, according as it commands, prohibits, or permits certain acts (above, n. 208).

(b) By reason of the mode in which it enunciates the judgment, it is certain, when, without prudent fear of erring, it judges that some act is good or evil, and therefore to be done or avoided; doubtful when it hangs suspended concerning the liceity of an action,¹ or at least pronounces not without prudent fear. We shall speak below concerning each.

¹ That suspension of soul is not properly a judgment, but it implicitly supposes the prior conscience that one must abstain from pronouncing concerning the liceity of the action.

(c) By reason of conformity with the objective rule of morals, conscience is true,¹ if it agrees with truth, that is, with divine goodness and reason, or law; erroneous, if it differs from the same. But erroneous conscience is lax or scrupulous: lax, when someone, from a lighter cause, judges something to be licit which truly is not licit, or something light which is grave; scrupulous, if someone, from a futile cause, judges something to be illicit which in fact is licit, or something grave which is light.

¹ Often true conscience is called right; yet there is some distinction between each: right conscience is that which is formed according to the rules of prudence; but sometimes conscience is true, although imprudently formed. But for the most part these two words are taken interchangeably.

From this it is clear that certain conscience differs from true conscience: the former regards the subjective judgment which is borne concerning the morality of an action; the latter the objective conformity of this interior judgment with truth. Wherefore conscience can be certain without being true, such as invincibly erroneous conscience; likewise true conscience can remain doubtful, namely when truly probable arguments are present for the liceity and against the liceity of some action.

Whether and in what sense erroneous conscience is a rule of acting, we shall explain below; but a few things must be pre-noted concerning lax and scrupulous conscience, so that it may be better understood how a right conscience is formed.

354. 1. Notion. Here we treat of lax conscience, especially insofar as it denotes a habit, or a disposition of soul which inclines reason to diminishing or denying moral obligations, and therefore to extending liberty too much. By force of this habit, in a particular case, conscience judges, without sufficient reason, that something which is truly prohibited is licit, or that what is grave is a light sin. - Sometimes, from a long-standing habit of sinning, the moral sense is so clouded that conscience thinks little or nothing of even very grave sins, calling evil good, and drinking iniquity like water:¹ then it is called seared.²

² Bourdaloue excellently explains its causes and dangers, Sermon pour le 3e Dim. de l'Avent, sur la fausse conscience; cf. Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clergé, t. XXIV, 1902, p. 737-743.

¹ Isa., V, 20; Job, XV, 16.

² 1 Tim., IV, 2.

355. 2. Causes. Among the causes which form a lax conscience, these can be numbered: (a) depraved education: for those who from infancy have been instructed not in the law of the Lord, but in worldly corruptions and false opinions, and have had before their eyes examples of all vices, easily are ignorant of not a few precepts of the natural law, and judge as indifferent certain acts shameful and dishonorable in themselves; (b) defect of consideration and counsel: those who do not think before acting, and in more difficult matters do not seek the counsels of the wise, are often deceived, and hold as good or at least indifferent what is truly evil; (c) the impulse of desires: namely, when various passions urge, reason is not rarely clouded: what we vehemently desire appears licit; whatever we will is good, and whatever pleases is holy; movements of anger seem to be nothing other than pious indignation, - unbridled ambition nothing other than noble emulation, - avarice is held as legitimate foresight, - commercial frauds are judged an exhibition of industry, etc.; (d) the habit of doing evil: for, sins having been multiplied, the moral sense is dulled, fear of God and reverence for law gradually vanish; hence those things which at the beginning were judged very grave crimes are soon considered as light or no delicts; (e) presumptuous trust in God: God, they say, good and merciful, will forgive us; for He has known our frame and the infirmity of human flesh; wherefore He is much more inclined to benignity than theologians and preachers, nor does He so strictly reprove what moreover is done by most.

356. 3. Harms. Lax conscience, like the ignorance upon which it rests, can be vincibly or invincibly erroneous, according as it can be corrected by moral diligence having been applied or not, according to what was said above, n. 90-98: yet each is full of dangers.

(A) Even when conscience is invincibly erroneous, it induces many evils;¹ for it is the cause why many acts sinful in themselves and objectively are perpetrated. Now an objectively evil act: (a) is a disorder, since it is opposed to the law which is an ordination of reason, and therefore of itself, without the formal malice of the agent, gradually depresses the moral sense, and, when it is often repeated, generates habits evil of themselves and very harmful; thus he who, even from ignorance, often acts against truth or chastity, even if he does not formally sin, commits something shameful and dishonorable in itself, which gradually dulls his moral sense; (b) it gives scandal: for many, seeing evil acts often committed by others, from this take occasion of sinning, and easily persuade themselves that those acts are not very depraved, indeed perhaps even licit, since they are done daily by so many men; from this, gradually and imperceptibly, morals are corrupted, with great detriment to private persons and to the whole of society; (c) it induces the danger of sinning formally: for by acts against the law often repeated, even ignorantly, habits of themselves vicious are soon acquired; and, when afterward conscience awakens, and their malice clearly appears, they are not easily eradicated; thus one incurs the danger of formally consenting to acts which are now apprehended as evil.

¹ This is clearly explained by Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clergé, t. XXI, 1899, p. 1169-1175.

357. (B) But often lax conscience is vincibly erroneous, and therefore culpable, because it was voluntarily formed, insofar as the agent, entangled in the snares of the passions and burning with pleasure, desired and suggested to himself, while conscience resisted, that this or that action was not prohibited, and afterward suffocated the remorse of conscience; or because, doubting or at least suspecting that the matter was evil, nevertheless he was unwilling to take counsel, lest perchance he discover the truth and no longer be able to enjoy the intended pleasure.² Then indeed he sinned formally, and indirectly or in the cause willed the depraved effects which he foresaw would follow therefrom (above, n. 97 and 171-174).

² If it is actually vincibly erroneous, by that very fact it is not certain, and therefore not to be followed, as is declared below.

Moreover if, at the very time at which he acts, someone doubts or suspects that the matter is evil, and moreover knows that his conscience is lax, he cannot follow it, because he is conscious that it is not a right rule of morals, but is held to reform it by the means soon to be set forth. Wherefore by following it he voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, and therefore actually sins.

By these grave sins often committed the way is prepared for blindness of mind and hardness of heart: for the intellect is clouded insofar as it has become accustomed to approving false things as true, evil things as good; and the will is hardened in evil, insofar as, by indulging pleasure, it acquires a vehement propensity toward depraved acts, so that it obeys conscience only with difficulty.

358. 4. Remedies. As soon as someone becomes conscious that he has entered the way of laxity, he ought seriously to strive, under the guidance of a prudent confessor, to reform his conscience.

(a) First of all he will have recourse to prayer, so that, helped by divine light, he may attain practical knowledge of the rule of morals, - and, relying on divine help, may be able not only to hear, but also to follow the voice of right conscience, notwithstanding human infirmity: "Give me understanding, and I will search your law, and I will keep it with my whole heart."¹ (b) Afterward there is required the agent's own consideration before acting, with a sincere will of knowing and doing what is honorable, and not what pleases; but to discover the truth more easily, let the counsels of skilled and honorable men be sought, and not those of men who are easily deceived by the fallacies of the age; (c) finally let the impediments be removed, namely disordered passions and vicious habits, by which conscience is frequently clouded.

¹ Ps. 118, 34.

But the confessor should receive with paternal affection those who seriously wish to be amended, even if for a long time they have walked in broad ways; and he should instruct them rather than rebuke them, - he should add courage to them, and persuade them that the reformation of conscience, although difficult, is in no way impossible, provided that prayer is joined to good will and assiduous efforts.

359. 1. Notion. Here likewise we treat of scrupulous conscience, insofar as it is a habitual disposition,³ by force of which the agent, from a futile foundation which he thinks solid, believes or doubts that something is illicit which in fact is not, and therefore with anxiety fears lest he frequently sin, and indeed mortally. For the most part this vain trepidation is accompanied by a certain sensible impression or commotion, arising from vivid imagination, which more or less disturbs judgment and vexes the mind with anguish.¹

² Besides the authors alleged, see Scaramelli, Director. asceticum, Augustae Vindelicorum, 1770, tr. II, n. 421-467; Reuter, Neo-Confessarius, Ratisbonae, 1870, n. 255-274; Schram, Instit. theol. myst., Parisiis, 1868, t. I, § 73-83; Lombez, Paix intérieure, 2e p., ch. 7; Dubois, l'Ange conducteur des âmes scrupuleuses, Lille et Paris, 1901; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clergé, t. XXIV, 1902, p. 673-678.

³ A judgment brought by scrupulous conscience is sometimes certain and sometimes doubtful: in the former case, conscience is said to be informed by scruples, and its dictate must be followed, from what will be said below concerning certain conscience; in the latter case, conscience is agitated by scruples, and concerning it we treat here; this is not to be followed, but the doubt is to be put aside by force of a reflex principle handed down by the confessor (n. 364).

¹ The word scruple (scrupulus or scrupus) literally signifies a little stone (pierre pointue); for just as this, inserted between the foot and the shoe, torments the one walking, so scruple vexes the soul.

(A) The principal signs by which scrupulous persons are recognized are these: (a) fear of sinning in all things, even indifferent and honorable things, or the vain apprehension that fault otherwise light is grave; (b) excessive anxiety concerning past confessions, and consequently the desire of making general confessions again and again, especially when from these doubts and anxieties increase; (c) lengthy accusations of circumstances which do not pertain to the matter, even if the confessor has several times said that all these things are useless; (d) pertinacity of judgment, which does not wish to acquiesce in the decisions of the confessor, but to seize upon the counsels of others: from which greater anguishes of soul are born; (e) frequent change of opinion on account of light reasons, and the greatest disturbance of soul in acting, which is sometimes exhibited by ridiculous gestures.

360. (B) Scruples are sometimes concerned with all things and sometimes with one or another object, especially (a) concerning past confessions: whether due examination was premised, and all circumstances rightly declared; whether contrition was had, and indeed at the very time of absolution; whether a good purpose was efficaciously elicited, etc.; (b) concerning depraved thoughts against chastity, or doubts against faith, to which they assert that they have given full consent, or intentions which they suppose to have been evil; (c) concerning scandal which perhaps they gave to others; (d) concerning a habit of acting with serious doubt whether the action is licit, from which it happens that most of their actions are sins, etc.

Scrupulous conscience differs from tender, or delicate, conscience, which perceives the smallest defects, and, on account of love of God, wills to amend them, well knowing that they are not grave, but harm perfection; this disposition indeed is laudable.

361. 2. Causes. Some are natural, others supernatural.

(A) Natural causes are physical or moral. (a) Among physical causes are especially numbered: a melancholic disposition, which often arises from temperament, and injects vain fears; and a certain morbid inclination to despair, arising from character, sickness, or various misfortunes; - excess in labors, abstinence, fasts, vigils, and other austerities, which, by diminishing the strength of the body, depress the strength of the soul; and also long-standing flight from all human conversation and honorable recreation, from which arises an assiduous and morose investigation of one's own conscience. (b) Among moral causes are numbered: weakness and inconstancy of soul, which follows the impressions of a vivid imagination rather than mature judgment; and from this head, more women than men are prone to scruple; - defect of science, whether speculative or psychological, by force of which the extent of duties is exaggerated, or impression is confused with consent; this defect is sometimes increased by the ignorance or imprudence of certain confessors; - excessive fear of divine justice, proceeding from this, that God is held not as a merciful Father, but rather as a severe Judge, scrutinizing and punishing all things strictly; - hidden pride, by which the scrupulous person tenaciously adheres to his own judgment, and does not consent to obey a spiritual director.¹

¹ To these causes, which hold themselves on the part of the subject, external ones are sometimes added: conversation with scrupulous persons, - reading of books favoring rigid opinions, - counsels of a director who is ignorant, or lacking discretion.

(B) To these sometimes supernatural causes are added: (a) namely God indeed does not send false concepts into conscience, but sometimes withdraws His light for a time even from the just, and permits them to be vexed by scruples, so that, by patient tolerance of this trial, they may satisfy more perfectly for past sins, and, by detesting them more efficaciously, may withdraw more vigilantly from dangerous occasions; - and also that, conscious of their own infirmity, they may have recourse to God with greater confidence and obey a spiritual director with more sincere humility.

(b) The devil can also act upon our sensitive faculties, especially upon the imagination, for exciting or increasing vain fears; or, when the soul is already held by sadness, he strives to suggest despair by various persuasions; or, if the conscience is delicate, "he strives to make it much more delicate also, and to drive it into a certain extreme degree of anxiety, so that thus, being miserably disturbed, it may finally fall away from spiritual progress."²

² St. Ignatius of Loyola, Exercitia spiritualia, ed. Roothaan, Romae, 1854, Rules concerning scruples, p. 160; P. Jennesseaux, S. J., rendered it in French, Paris, Poussielgue, 13th edition, 1891, p. 323.

362. 3. Harms. Scruples to which consent is given, from whatever cause they arise, can induce the greatest harms, temporal and spiritual at the same time: -

(A) Temporal indeed; for, when they last for a long time, (a) they weaken or disturb the brain and nervous system: for by force of the intimate union between body and soul, vain fears, sadness, anguishes, and other things of this kind, to which scrupulous persons are liable, lessen physical strength and greatly harm health. (b) The powers having been weakened, the way is prepared for neurasthenia, hysteria, and other illnesses described above, n. 130-133. (c) Indeed, as anxieties increase, sometimes reason itself is dulled, and falls into dementia, if the scruples are universal, or into monomania, if they are concerned with one object.

(B) Spiritual harms: they break the powers of the soul, and gradually turn virtues once acquired into vices: (a) they weaken hope: scrupulous persons, thinking themselves to be in the state of mortal sin, regard God as a most severe exactor and flee from Him. (b) Wherefore they cannot pray: too solicitous concerning the state of their own conscience, and fearing God too much, they do not dare to remain in His presence and be united to Him. (c) From this they lack fortitude: for since they retain only slight confidence in God, and moreover exaggerate their own infirmity, and do not trust their spiritual director, they undertake nothing great, but waste time uselessly in vain anxieties. Hence they are rendered unfit for acting fruitfully for the usefulness of others, and for diligently fulfilling the duties of their state; indeed they are usually burdensome to themselves and to others. (d) They also easily incur the danger of sinning gravely: for, their powers weakened, and exhausted by assiduous efforts against natural inclinations, they sometimes slip into despair, and, for the sake of consolation, loosen the reins to their desires; whence not rarely they fall into extremes, today indulging excessive mortifications, but tomorrow pleasure: for human nature cannot long resist such cruel torture.

363. 4. Remedies. (A) The primary and most efficacious remedy, to which the others are subordinated, is perfect obedience to be shown to a prudent confessor. For a scrupulous person, since he is destitute of the right dictate of conscience, cannot form a right judgment concerning things to be done; and therefore there is no other mode of rightly operating available to him than to submit himself to the judgment of a prudent man, by whose aid he will gradually put aside vain doubts and erroneous judgments. But the prudent man in question can scarcely be anyone other than the spiritual director, to whom the secrets of the heart are trustingly opened.

(a) But the confessor, as soon as he knows that some penitent is agitated by scruples, will strive to win his confidence by paternal benignity, and afterward will address him in these or similar words: I can and will, with God's help, restore peace of soul to you, provided, however, that you will open all things sincerely to me, and obey in all things, having set aside your own judgment for a time; if you promise this, you will certainly be freed from all doubts and anxieties at the opportune time; otherwise, you will be vexed perpetually. For a scrupulous person cannot act rightly by his own counsel,¹ but ought to follow without hesitation the counsel of a prudent man; practically, he never errs who obeys a wise director.

¹ Often he will not acknowledge that he is scrupulous; but the confessor will affirm that the matter is clear from the doubts, fluctuations, and anxieties set forth by the penitent.

(b) The first time, let him allow the scrupulous person to set forth his doubts fully; if he wishes to make a general confession, this can be permitted once, provided that he has not made such a confession to another a little before: let him kindly help him in the examination of conscience and in eliciting the act of contrition; but once this confession has been duly completed, let him no longer be permitted to repeat confessions. If nevertheless afterward he says that he did not confess all things, let the confessor order him to swear that he certainly remembers some sin certainly mortal and certainly never declared in a valid confession: if he fears to swear, let him not be heard; if he swears without hesitation, let it be permitted to him to declare this sin.

364. (c) The confessor will strive to know the cause and object of the scruples, so that he may be able better to hand down practical rules of acting to the penitent. If the cause is physiological, proceeding from weakness of the brain or disturbance of the nerves, he will send him to a wise physician, yet without omitting spiritual remedies. - If the cause is doubt concerning the liceity of such or such an action, he will inculcate in him the rule which is valid at least for the scrupulous: a doubtful law is no law; if, after the action has been performed, he doubts whether he sinned gravely, in practice he ought to act as if he had not sinned gravely, and therefore not abstain from Holy Communion: for he ought not to hold as mortal sin except that which he can swear to be certainly mortal. - He ought to take care that the scrupulous person absolutely obey the rules handed down; whence even if with tears he asks to repeat confessions, or wishes to be absolved from doubtful sins before communion, let him be sweetly but firmly repelled: this severity is the highest clemency. - Nor let him permit him to spend a long time in examination of conscience (which increases scruples), but let him set a brief time, which he should never exceed; the same must be said concerning the act of contrition, about which scrupulous persons are greatly tormented.¹

¹ For theologians deservedly teach that one of the privileges of scrupulous persons is situated in this, that they are not held to examine their conscience with the same diligence as others, nor to accuse all sins, but only those which, after a brief examination, they evidently know to be grave (De Paenitent., n. 204 and 192).

The scrupulous person sometimes objects: the confessor does not know my intimate dispositions well; I myself know them better, and I would not wish to die in this uncertain state. - The director will respond: Unless your conscience had been sufficiently known to me, I would not have prescribed a manner of acting; since you are agitated by scruples, you cannot form a right judgment concerning your own dispositions, but you ought to obey the judgment of the wise, even in the article of death; nor can God damn him who has trustingly submitted himself to a superior.

In all these things let the confessor not speak as one opining and hesitating, but as one certainly knowing and having authority: let him adduce either no reasons, or only very brief ones; otherwise, the discussions will be interminable. - Yet firmness of soul should be tempered by charity, so that the scrupulous person may understand that the confessor is a most devoted friend.

365. (B) Other remedies, besides obedience, to be employed are: (a) fervent prayer to God, as a kind and merciful Father, by which light may be trustingly obtained for seeing the way clearly, and strength for following it assiduously; (b) contempt of scruples, by acting strenuously against them, according to the prescriptions of the confessor; (c) Christian mortification, especially that which consists in immediately expelling vain phantasms, impressions, thoughts, and anxieties: hence assiduous and strenuous labor, and the faithful observance of the duties of one's state are especially useful; for thus the mind is efficaciously turned away from torturing doubts; but the scrupulous person should be warned never to hesitate long, but, after brief consideration, to act deliberately according to the counsels given or presumed of the confessor; (d) right formation of conscience, by which gradually, according to the general rules handed down by the director, he will prudently bear judgment concerning his own actions, as if they were the actions of another.

366. Corollaries. (A) Concerning perplexed conscience. Sometimes a scrupulous person, placed between two precepts, believes that he will sin, whichever part he chooses: then his conscience is called perplexed;¹ such is, for example, one who, assisting a sick person on Sunday, thinks that he sins if he leaves him, and likewise sins if he omits Mass.

¹ Sometimes, however, someone can be perplexed from mere ignorance, because namely he does not know how to form his conscience in the conflict of two obligations: then it suffices to instruct him.

In this case, (a) if the matter admits delay, and is of grave moment, he is bound to defer the action until he can obtain the counsel of a prudent man: for each one ought to avoid what he thinks is sin.

(b) But if the matter does not admit delay (which for the most part happens) or is of slight moment, he ought to choose that which seems to him to be the lesser evil, and therefore rather to transgress a positive law than a natural law. But if he cannot discern the lesser evil, and remains perplexed, whichever part he chooses, he does not sin: for he lacks that moral liberty which is required for sin.

Therefore penitents of this kind are rightly to be instructed so that, laying aside vain anxieties, they may learn that in no case does there exist a necessity of sinning.

(B) Concerning pharisaical conscience. Sometimes also, on account of ignorance or prejudices, conscience is lax in matters of great moment, pertaining to natural or divine right, while it is too narrow and scrupulous in matters of lesser moment, especially those pertaining to merely positive right: then it is called pharisaical, because it imitates the morals of the Pharisees, of whom Christ said:² "Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, who tithe mint, and anise, and cumin, and have left the weightier things of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith... straining out a gnat, but swallowing a camel." - From this vice today they do not sufficiently depart who are too anxious about many devotions, and, on the other side, neglect fraternal charity or the duties of their state. These are to be diligently instructed so that, putting aside superfluous devotions, they may assiduously cultivate the Christian virtues congruent with their condition.

² Matt. 23:23-24; the whole chapter should be read.

We shall set forth two things: 1. what certain conscience is; 2. whether and in what sense it is the rule of morals.

367. 1. Preliminary remarks concerning certitude. Certitude in general is the firm adherence of the mind to some notion or fact, without fear of erring. By reason of the foundation on which it rests, certitude is distinguished as threefold: (a) metaphysical, which is founded in the very essence of things and ideas; thus we are metaphysically certain that the whole is greater than its part, because the truth of this proposition clearly shines forth from the very comparison of the ideas; (b) physical, which is founded in the constancy of natural laws; thus we are physically certain that fire burns, because from constant experience it is established for us that there is in fire the power of burning; (c) moral, which rests on the constancy of the laws of the moral order, or on the common manner of acting of free beings. This is: speculative, if it concerns abstract truths or the liceity of an action in general; and practical, if it concerns the liceity of an action to be placed here and now.

368. 2. Concerning the certitude which belongs to conscience. (A) Now the certitude which belongs to the practical judgment of conscience is moral and practical certitude: for since it pronounces concerning the liceity of such or such an action, not in general and in the abstract, but in the individual and in the concrete, with attention given to all the circumstances, the judgment brought forth is not infallible, but rests on human prudence,¹ which can be mistaken.

¹ Not a few theologians say that conscience sometimes enjoys absolute certitude, because it is founded on a motive altogether infallible; such, they say, is the certitude which is had concerning the precepts of the Decalogue and their proximate conclusions. - But in speaking thus they confuse synderesis or moral science with conscience: for this latter does not judge concerning the precepts of the Decalogue, but concerning the practical question whether such or such an action, in these or those circumstances, is prohibited by the Decalogue or not.

(B) Practical certitude itself admits several degrees: (a) sometimes it excludes every doubt and every fear of erring, and is called strict moral certitude; this can be had with regard to practical judgments altogether evident, for example, here and now I ought to abstain from such a theft; (b) sometimes, however, there is had only practical certitude broadly so called, or prudential certitude, which does not exclude every doubt, but only prudent doubt; thus, for example, we are not absolutely, but only prudently, certain concerning the validity of baptism or of orders received: for it can happen that the minister lacked the required intention; wherefore we have some fear of erring, but that fear, as being slight, does not destroy prudential certitude. This suffices in the moral matter, since often we cannot have another; now reason itself dictates to us that that certitude suffices which is accommodated to the infirmity of human nature; otherwise man would frequently remain perplexed, not knowing what was to be done.

369. (C) But this practical certitude, taken strictly or broadly, can be acquired in two ways, directly or indirectly: (a) directly, when, from the very comparison of the action with the law, we come to a morally certain conclusion; thus, given the law of hearing Mass on a feast day, unless a grave inconvenience is present, I judge morally certainly that I am held by that precept, because I see here and now that in my case there is not a grave inconvenience; (b) indirectly, that is, either from authority, or from an external, or reflex, principle, as they say, when we cannot come to a certain conclusion unless a certain principle extrinsic to the thing itself is called into the middle; thus a judge, after attentive consideration of the proofs brought forward in a criminal case, sometimes doubts whether the accused is truly culpable; then he has recourse to an external, or reflex, principle: in doubt, favor is to be shown to the accused; and therefore practically and morally certainly he concludes: this accused man, all things considered, is to be absolved. - That external principle can be the judgment of a prudent man, and especially of a confessor.

370. (D) Certain conscience is not always true, as we have already noted, but can be erroneous, since one can err even when he prudently judges concerning the liceity of some action: then it is called invincibly erroneous, according to the things said above, where we treated ignorance, n. 92. If conscience is actually vincibly erroneous, by that very fact it is not morally certain; for in this case the agent can expel the error, or at least prudently doubts concerning the liceity of the action here and now to be performed. But it must be said otherwise of conscience previously vincibly erroneous, but which at present is actually invincibly erroneous, because namely the agent does not think about the necessity of inquiring: for this is now morally certain, because, although previously he had thought about the necessity of investigating the truth, now he prudently thinks the action to be licit, without suspecting that the matter must be further investigated. Thus a seminary student, while he was studying theology, foresaw that from his negligence he would give certain erroneous decisions: then his conscience was vincibly erroneous; afterward, however, having forgotten this negligence, he brings forth a false judgment concerning a matrimonial case, without at that instant suspecting that he errs: his conscience is invincibly erroneous, and subjectively morally certain.

371. 1. Principle: Conscience morally and practically certain, and indeed it alone, is the proximate rule of morals.

(A) Conscience morally and practically certain is the proximate rule of human actions. For conscience morally and practically certain, in whatever way this certitude has been acquired, is that which, without prudent fear of erring, judges that some action is licit or illicit, obligatory or permitted; but it cannot happen that he sins who is prudently certain that the action which he does is honorable, or that the one which he omits is illicit. For no action or omission is imputable to anyone unless it is voluntary; but the malice of an action is not voluntary unless it is apprehended as such by the intellect; therefore he does not sin, but acts rightly, who follows a morally certain conscience; therefore this is deservedly called the proximate rule of morals.

372. (a) Concerning this there is assuredly no difficulty when certain conscience is at the same time true: for then it is altogether consonant with the ultimate rule of morals, namely divine reason. - But the same thing must be said even when certain conscience is invincibly erroneous, because, although it disagrees with the law, the defect of conformity is not imputed to the agent, because it is invincibly unknown by him; and therefore an act elicited according to an invincibly erroneous conscience is objectively and materially evil, as often as namely it is opposed to a law commanding or forbidding, - but subjectively and formally good, because it is apprehended and intended as such. - The same thing must be said of conscience here and now invincibly erroneous, which antecedently was vincibly erroneous. For an act placed according to such a conscience not only is materially evil, but can also be called formally evil in its cause (above, n. 97). Nevertheless it is not in itself actually evil: for it is elicited in good faith, and is not apprehended nor intended as evil: "Every human act has the character of sin or merit insofar as it is voluntary; but the object of the will according to its proper character is the apprehended good: and therefore a human act is judged virtuous according to the apprehended good toward which the will is borne of itself, and not according to the material object of the act."¹

¹ St. Thomas, Quodlibet., III, a. 27; cf. I-II, q. 19, a. 7; q. 76, a. 3.

This can be confirmed from proposition 28, condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 December 1690, at least as rash:² "Although invincible ignorance of natural right be given, this, in the state of fallen nature, does not excuse the one acting from formal sin itself"; therefore invincible ignorance, and consequently invincibly erroneous conscience, excuses from formal sin.

² Denzing., n. 1159.

373. (b) This holds even when moral certitude is only prudential, and was had by the aid of a reflex principle. For since the question is concerning things to be done, that certitude suffices which can be obtained in practice; now, when the question concerns performing or omitting such or such an action, not rarely only prudential certitude can be acquired. Sometimes speculative doubts arise which it is impossible to solve directly; from another side the necessity of acting presses; therefore nothing remains except to solve the speculative doubt practically by the aid of some reflex principle (above, n. 369). Thus he who, after all things have been diligently weighed, follows the prudent dictate of conscience, acts rightly before God.

374. (B) Certain conscience alone, morally and practically certain, is the right norm of actions. For he who acts with conscience which is not practically certain, by that very fact voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of transgressing the law, since he prudently and practically doubts whether the action, here and now to be placed, is licit; moreover, he who voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, while he can easily avoid it, by that very fact implicitly wills to sin. Therefore he who practically doubts concerning the liceity of an action here and now to be performed cannot, while the doubt stands, proceed further, but ought to form for himself a practically certain conscience, by the aid of a reflex principle, according to the manner to be explained below.

375. Corollaries. (A) Conscience here and now vincibly erroneous is not a legitimate rule of acting. For, from one side, that conscience is not consonant with the objective rule of morals; and from the other, that defect, as being actually voluntary, is imputable to the agent; since, in this case, the agent prudently doubts concerning the liceity of the action, and therefore ought to inquire further, if he can, and put away the error. - But if he cannot, and from another side the necessity of acting presses, he ought to choose that part in which evil, or the greater evil, is more safely guarded against; for by acting thus, he puts aside the practical doubt, and the error is not imputed to him unto fault. But if he chooses that of whose liceity he practically doubts, by that very fact he sins, by rashly exposing himself to perpetrating evil.

376. (B) To discern whether the conscience of the penitent was vincibly or invincibly erroneous, the confessor will ask: (a) whether the penitent perceived some indecency in the act, or at least doubted concerning its liceity; (b) whether conscience dictated to him that the confessor or another prudent man was to be asked, and he voluntarily neglected the occasion of inquiring. If he sincerely denies both, the error was invincible; if he affirms either, the error must be called vincible. - But the nature and gravity of the sin committed from vincibly erroneous conscience depends on the very disposition of the agent at the time when he acts: if he apprehends the matter rather clearly as of great moment, and as contrary to this or that virtue, he sins gravely against that same virtue; but if the matter seems to him of slight moment, or its malice appears only confusedly, the sin will be venial. - From this it is clear how necessary it is for confessors kindly and prudently to explore the conscience and character of each penitent, so that they may form a true judgment concerning the sins committed by him.

377. Hence penitents are deceived who, after they have acted in doubt, seek in books or from a prudent man whether the action is licit, and lay aside every anxiety if they learn that the matter is not objectively evil: the morality of an action depends on the dictate of conscience brought forth at the very instant at which the action is completed, but not on the judgment which is afterward brought, when the matter has been better investigated. Whence that investigation will indeed be greatly useful for the future, but by no means for the past time.

To certain conscience is opposed doubtful conscience, concerning which we shall set forth two things: 1. what it is and how it can be rendered practically certain; 2. what are the various systems devised for solving practical doubt.

¹ Suarez, Tr. de Actibus hum., disp. XII, sect. 5-6; St. Alphonsus, n. 20-54; Billuart, De Act. hum., diss. V, art. 6; Lehmk., n. 48-51; Ball. P., n. 160-168; Muller, § 73; Bouquillon, n. 267-291; Noldin, n. 196-201; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXII, 1900, p. 369-374.

378. 1. Preliminary remarks concerning doubt and probability. (A) When the mind cannot judge morally certainly concerning the liceity of some action, it can comport itself in a twofold way: either it adheres to neither part and suspends assent, or it assents to one part more than to another, yet with a prudent fear of erring; in the former case, doubt is called strict; in the latter, it is called broad, or opinion.² But opinion is distinguished from suspicion, which is a certain initial adherence, or propensity toward judging, but not a true assent.

² Here opinion is treated insofar as it is a subjective judgment of the mind; the same word often signifies the proposition itself to which the mind adheres with fear of erring, or opinion objectively taken.

379. (B) Sometimes opinion is taken objectively; then it can be more or less probable. Probable, according to the force of the name, is said of that which can be proved; but, from common usage, it signifies that which, although not manifestly true, bears before itself certain signs of truth which can move a prudent man to assent to it. But the degrees of probability depend on the greater or lesser verisimilitude which the opinion seems to have; thus that opinion is called more probable which rests on graver motives than the contrary opinion; on the contrary, the one which is supported by lighter arguments is called simply probable, or less probable; again, an opinion is notably more probable, or most probable, if the excess of probability is very notable: then the opposed opinion is slenderly or doubtfully probable.

(C) This probability indeed is called intrinsic or extrinsic: the former rests on reasons drawn from the very nature of the thing, the latter on the authority of learned or wise men. Often, however, each is joined, and the authority of doctors is worth the more, the greater is the weight of the reasons which they bring forward.

380. (D) Again probability is absolute or relative: absolute, which is supported by those reasons by which the mind of a prudent man is accustomed to be moved; relative, which does not bend all minds, but a certain one in particular, because of his special character, or the special circumstances in which he is placed. For in matters which are not evident of themselves, the will can command the assent of the intellect, because of extrinsic motives, whether legitimate or more or less dishonorable; thus in doubts, those who are right of heart adhere to the part which more favors the divine honor, the good of neighbor, or the peace of the community; on the contrary, those who are prone to laxity not rarely adhere to the part which favors pride or pleasure.

(E) Finally, doubt is speculative or practical: speculative, or remote, which concerns the law considered in itself, or its application in general - namely, whether such a law has been sufficiently promulgated, or has been abrogated by custom, - whether to paint on a feast day is a prohibited servile work, etc.; practical, or proximate, which concerns the liceity of such or such an action in particular, for example, whether it is licit for me to paint on this feast day.

381. 2. Concerning doubtful conscience itself. Merely speculative doubt does not directly affect conscience itself, but pertains to moral science, which weighs those questions; nevertheless often it indirectly affects conscience, by rendering it uncertain concerning the liceity of such or such an action in particular to be placed here and now by the agent; thus, for example, if it is doubted whether painting is a servile work, by that very fact a practical doubt will frequently arise whether Peter can here and now paint on this Sunday.

But here we treat only of practical doubt,¹ and therefore doubtful conscience is called that which either remains suspended concerning the honesty of some action in particular, or pronounces concerning the same not without a prudent fear of erring. - But this state of mind can be induced from the fact that on both sides reasons are present which are equally probable; or because on one side there is a more probable reason, which nevertheless does not remove the probability of the adverse opinion, or a reason only merely but solidly probable. - But for conscience of this kind merely negative doubt does not suffice, which rests on reasons so slight that they would not move a prudent man; for notwithstanding merely negative doubt, we judge concerning the liceity of the action without prudent fear of erring; - hence positive doubt is required, resting on grave arguments, which are accustomed to move a prudent man.

¹ For concerning speculative doubt we have already said something in the Treatise on Laws, and it is treated in the whole course of Moral Theology, by setting forth what opinions are more or less probable.

382. 3. Concerning the manner of solving practical doubt. (A) From what has been said above, n. 374, it is not licit to act with a practically doubtful conscience, but doubt must be shaken off by diligently investigating the matter.

For man ought to try, insofar as he can, to attain truth, and therefore, in a moral matter, to investigate the law and its genuine sense, and also attentively to consider all the circumstances, so that, in the best way that can be done, he may conform his actions to the law, which is nothing other than the manifestation of divine reason and will. Therefore he who, laboring under practical doubt, does not wish seriously to weigh the matter, acts rashly, and voluntarily and culpably exposes himself to the danger of sinning against the law. But, on the contrary, he who uses moral diligence to shake off doubt acts prudently, and the error into which perhaps he involuntarily falls is not imputed to him.

But that examination ought to be more or less diligent according to the gravity of the matter, and the quality or duties of the person; thus, if the question concerns a matter of slight moment, a prolonged investigation is by no means necessary. But this is required if the matter concerns a grave precept, especially concerning the strict rights of another person, or if from office an obligation lies upon some person to solve a doubt which concerns not only his own good, but also the common good.

383. (B) To perform rightly an examination of this kind, that natural prudence which is called right judgment (bon sens, common sense) is indeed required, but it does not suffice; rather, in those who are able to devote themselves to study, there is desired competent knowledge of the principles of moral theology, and in others recourse to prudent men, by whose counsels they may be able rightly to form their conscience. For when the question concerns not only positive right, but also many conclusions of natural right, some aspect often escapes the mind which, if it had been known, would have greatly helped conscience to form a right judgment. For although knowledge of principles pertains directly to synderesis, nevertheless it is especially useful for rightly forming the dictate of conscience: the better the sense of the law becomes known, the easier its application to a particular case becomes.

384. Confessors especially are held to devote themselves to study of this kind, as we have proved elsewhere.¹ Wherefore Benedict XIV admonishes them,² "that in a doubtful matter they should not rely on their own opinion, but, before they decide the cause, should consult very many books, especially those whose doctrine is more solid, and then should descend into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms." (a) Namely, they should not rely on their own opinion, which is often fallacious: for more wisdom is found in the judgment of many than in the judgment of one. (b) They should consult very many books, in order more easily to guard against the same inconvenience; for what could have escaped one author will not so easily escape many, especially if they do not belong to the same school, but to diverse schools: for experience shows how easily authors of the same school, without further examination, confidently repeat the opinions and arguments of their predecessors! (c) But they should choose those books whose doctrine is more solid, those namely which, by knowledge, prudence, and piety, have acquired a greater reputation for themselves, and have weighed the matter expressly, not incidentally: nor are the authors whose works are read to be so much counted as weighed. (d) Let them descend into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Hence, insofar as can be done, attention must be given both to intrinsic reasons and to extrinsic authorities: the arguments brought forward should be critically weighed, with attention given to the circumstances of times and places, and, generally speaking, the authority of theologians should not be estimated at more than the weight of the reasons which they bring forward. Nevertheless, if some conclusion is confirmed by the common doctrine of all schools, by that very fact it has great probability, even independently of the arguments brought forward; nor should one depart from it unless a new reason which up to this time was unknown is brought into the middle.

¹ Syn. Theol. Mor., De Paenit., n. 370-374.

² Benedict XIV, Apostolic Constitution Constit. concerning preparation for the Jubilee, year 1750, § 21.

385. (C) After all these things have been weighed, if conscience cannot bring a morally certain judgment, it remains that we have recourse to a reflex principle, by whose aid the practical doubt may be converted into moral certitude. Now, among reflex principles, some are universal, because they can be applied in any doubt concerning the liceity of an action for forming a practically certain conscience; such are: a doubtful law does not oblige, - in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and others which we shall soon explain in the critical exposition of the systems; others, however, are particular, which can be applied only in certain matters, for example, in doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be proved, - in doubt one must stand for the validity of the act, - in doubt the presumption stands for the superior, etc.; these indeed are explained in the various Treatises. By their aid doubt is shaken off, and a morally and practically certain conscience is formed. If someone, for example, after mature investigation of the matter, has judged that the law of fasting in such a case is truly doubtful, because of grave reasons, and at the same time admits the truth of the principle "a doubtful law does not oblige," he can immediately conclude: a law of this kind does not oblige me in this case; and this judgment indeed is morally and practically certain. For, from one side, probabilists hold as morally certain the principle "a doubtful law does not oblige"; from another side, it is morally certain that in this case the law of fasting is doubtful; therefore it is morally certain that this law does not oblige me.

386. But the uneducated, who have not explicitly learned the use of a reflex principle, nevertheless form for themselves a practically certain conscience, because, rightly using moral sense, they judge that they act prudently, since such or such an action does not seem, all things considered, clearly and certainly prohibited;¹ but if doubt tortures them too much, they approach a prudent man, especially the pastor or confessor, and ask from him what must be done.

¹ Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXII, 1900, p. 753-758.

387. State of the question. While practical doubt remains concerning the liceity of an action to be performed, some reflex principle is necessary for forming a practically certain conscience, as we said above. But what is the universal and morally certain principle by whose aid practical doubt can be solved has been keenly disputed among Catholic doctors for many centuries, and is still much disputed today. For understanding this controversy, a few things must be noted beforehand.

1. When moral certitude, even broad certitude, cannot be obtained, the mind practically doubts whether the law obliges in such a case or not; now the law, or obligation, appears as most probable, or much more probable, equally probable, solidly probable, or slenderly probable, according to the weight of the reasons which are brought forward to prove the obligatory force of the law; and from this it is already given to understand how there can be diverse principles for solving doubt, according to the diverse degrees of probability.

Moreover, from the commonly received manner of speaking, the safe or safer part is called that which favors the law or obligation; but the part which favors liberty is called less safe. Wherefore, if it is asserted that the safer part is to be followed, by that very fact it is signified that the law is to be observed as truly obligatory.

388. 2. The reflex principles proposed by the various systems are not valid, according to all prudent men, except where the matter concerns only the licit or illicit; for if it does not concern only the licit, but the valid, or an effect necessarily to be obtained, generally the safer part is to be followed; which occurs especially in three cases: -

(A) When the matter concerns a means necessary for salvation; for since, eternal salvation having been lost, all goods are lost together, whatever may be the intimate persuasion of the soul, surely nothing is to be done from which eternity is endangered. Thus, where the matter concerns truths to be believed by necessity of means, for example, concerning faith in God incarnate, it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, as is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (4) by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679: "An unbeliever who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief."¹

¹ Denzing., n. 1021; which proposition was reproved at minimum as scandalous and pernicious in practice; cf. Viva, on this proposition.

389. (B) When the matter concerns the validity of a sacrament, as is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (1) by the same Pontiff:² "It is not illicit, in conferring sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of a sacrament, the safer opinion being left aside." Namely, in doubt whether such matter is sufficient for the validity of a sacrament, the minister is bound, on account of reverence for the sacrament and the good of the faithful, to apply the safer matter, if he has it at hand; but if this is lacking, and it is necessary to administer the sacrament, it is right to apply the doubtful matter, in order to provide, insofar as can be done, for the salvation of the faithful. - Yet an exception is given in a case in which the Church can and is reasonably presumed to supply the defect, as sometimes happens for jurisdiction required for the validity of absolution, or for merely ecclesiastical impediments of marriage, as we explain in its own place.

² Ibid., n. 1018.

390. (C) When the matter concerns the danger of temporal or spiritual harm, either one's own or another's, which we are bound to guard against or prevent from justice or from charity. Thus it is not licit, without necessity, to take food probably poisoned; nor to apply doubtful remedies to a sick person when other remedies certainly efficacious are at hand; nor probably to expose oneself or others, without sufficient reason, to the proximate danger of formally sinning; because in all these things probability does not remove some danger of inflicting an evil which, moreover, we are certainly bound to avert.

Outside these cases, when the matter concerns only the licit, there are various systems.

391. No system before the sixteenth century. For very many centuries, no system properly so called was devised and arranged for solving practical doubts; but the Fathers and Theologians, as opportunity was given, solved occurring doubts with a certain benignity, by diverse reflex principles, but especially by teaching that the obligation of a doubtful law was not to be urged.

(A) Among the Fathers, St. Augustine, treating the question agitated in the first centuries whether it was licit for Christians to contract marriage with unbelievers, declares that in the Gospel or apostolic letters the matter had not been defined without ambiguity, and therefore that this was not reputed a sin, "because truly in the New Testament nothing has been prescribed concerning it, and therefore it has either been believed to be licit, or left as doubtful."¹ - Elsewhere, being asked whether, in a case of necessity, it was licit to eat food offered to idols, he responded: "Either it is certain that it is idolothyte, or it is certain that it is not, or it is unknown: therefore if it is certain that it is, it is better rejected by Christian virtue; but if it is either known not to be, or is unknown, it is taken for use of necessity without any scruple of conscience."²

¹ St. Augustine, De fide et operibus, c. 19, n. 35, apud Migne, P. L., XL, 221; cf. De conjug. adult., lib. I, c. 25, n. 31, Migne, P. L., XL, 468-469.

² St. Augustine, Epist. 47, to Publicola, n. 6, Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 187.

Thus also St. Gregory Nazianzen replies to a certain Novatian, asserting that second marriages are illicit: "By what argument do you confirm this? Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot do this, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and facility prevail."³

³ St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 39, In sancta lumina, n. 19, Migne, P. G., XXXVI, 358.

392. (B) But the Scholastics, down to the sixteenth century, did not propose an entire moral system, but taught that an uncertain law either does not bind, or at least does not bind in the same way as a certain law, and they began to distinguish between more or less probable opinions; according to many, the more probable part was to be followed; according to others, a doubtful obligation was not to be urged. But since in those times it was not yet customary to institute an accurate distinction between speculative and practical doubt, and between direct or indirect certitude, it is often difficult to know their mind with certainty.

(a) Thus St. Thomas asserts that no one is bound by a precept except through knowledge or notice of the precept:⁴ "Whence no one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept; and therefore he who is not capable of notice is not bound by the precept; nor is anyone ignorant of the precept of God bound to fulfill the precept, except insofar as he is held to know the precept." But what degree of certitude he requires for knowledge or notice is not clearly explained there; this assuredly excludes merely conjectural opinion, or slenderly probable opinion; but whether more probable knowledge suffices or moral certitude is required is not sufficiently clear from this place. - Elsewhere he declares that he sins who doubts whether he can have several benefices, and nevertheless, while such doubt remains, retains them, because he exposes himself to the danger of sinning;¹ and thus he seems to favor probabiliorism; but since he says "while such doubt remains," some understand this place concerning him who, practically doubting, retains these benefices without having formed a conscience for himself. Wherefore probabiliorists, equiprobabilists, and probabilists try to draw the Angelic Doctor into their own sense; to us his mind seems doubtful, because he arranged no system concerning this matter. - The same can be said of St. Bonaventure, of Scotus, St. Antoninus, and many other Doctors.

⁴ St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 3.

¹ Quodlib., 8, a. 13. - Concerning the mind of St. Thomas, Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., wrote at length in the famous work whose title is: Fundamentum Theologiae moralis, that is, Theological Treatise concerning the right use of probable opinions, diss. IX; you will find a compendium of this work apud Migne, Curs. Theol., t. XI, p. 1397-1476.

393. (b) Nevertheless, as Medina, the first favorer of probabilism, admits, not a few theologians before the sixteenth century held that the more probable opinion was to be followed, the probable one being left aside. Behold his very words:² "The most learned Soto explains this question, difficult enough, in book 3 De Justitia, q. 6, a. 5, ad 4, in this manner: for he says that, although in speculative matters and in the school it is sometimes licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside, nevertheless in morals and in matters which pertain to the right of a third party, it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside. Sylvester feels the same, at the word opinion, § 2, Conradus, in the book De Contract., the last question, and, what moves more, Lord Cajetan in his Summa, at the word opinion." Afterward he sets forth the arguments by which the aforesaid authors supported their opinion: 1. He who follows a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside, exposes himself to the danger of sinning, and chooses that which is less certain, by leaving behind that which is more certain: therefore he sins. 2. In doubts the safer part is to be chosen; but the more probable opinion is safer; therefore it is to be followed. 3. When there is danger on each side, one must incline to that part which is confirmed by greater reasons. 4. A judge who would pronounce sentence against him who adduces more probable testimonies would certainly sin mortally, and would commit injustice; therefore he who follows a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside, without doubt sins. - Therefore, when Medina was writing (in the year 1577), probabiliorism was already flourishing, supported by arguments not to be despised.

² Bartholom. a Medina, Expositio in I-II, q. 19, a. 6, concl. 3, p. 178-179 of the Venetian edition, 1580.

394. 1. System of the old probabilists.³ (A) The first who expressly defended that system is the aforesaid Medina, who, in the cited place, thus declares his mind: "But it seems to me that if an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite one is more probable."

³ Concerning the mind of the old probabilists, Fr. Ter Haar has written learnedly, De systemate morali antiq. probab., Paderborn, 1894.

But he adduces these arguments: (a) in speculative matters, a probable opinion is that which we can follow without danger of error and deception; therefore in practical matters a probable opinion is that which we can follow without danger of sinning. (b) An opinion is called probable from this, that we can follow it without reprehension: for it is that which wise men assert and excellent arguments confirm; therefore it implies a contradiction that it should be probable and that we cannot licitly follow it. (c) A probable opinion is conformable to right reason and to the estimation of prudent men; and although the more probable opinion is more conformable and safer, we are not held to follow it, because no one is obliged to that which is better and more perfect. (d) The opposite opinion tortures fearful souls, by obliging them to inquire which opinion is the more probable. - From another side, whatever adversaries say, he who follows a probable opinion does not expose himself to the danger of sinning, because, although the more probable is safer, the probable is secure and safe. - These arguments can be contracted into one: he who acts probably acts prudently, and therefore does not sin.

395. (B) Medina's system was first spread abroad in Spain, but afterward in the other regions, and soon became common enough down to the seventeenth century. Yet it was defended in a threefold way: (a) some indeed, whom they call moderate, say that a probable opinion is not to be followed when it is doubtfully or much less probable; but that the opinion on behalf of the law is to be chosen when this is certainly or notably more probable; (b) but according to others, who are called simple or pure probabilists, it is licit to follow a probable opinion, even if the contrary opinion is certainly or notably more probable; (c) finally, a few laxists contended that it is licit to follow an opinion even slenderly probable.

396. (a) Among the moderates are numbered not a few distinguished theologians of the Society of Jesus: Suarez (1548-1617), who indeed teaches that it is licit to follow a probable opinion concerning the honesty of an act,¹ but elsewhere added:² "Greater probability is a certain moral certitude, if the excess of probability is certain"; - Rebellus (+ 1608), who writes:³ "But it is certain, as will be shown elsewhere, that no one can with a safe conscience follow an opinion which is known by him to be less probable"; from the context, the question concerns an opinion certainly less probable, and in other places he favors equiprobabilism; - Gregory of Valentia (+ 1603), asserting that it is licit to follow a probable opinion when it is truly doubted which one is true, but not when the other opinion is truly more probable;¹ - Theophilus Raynaudus, who holds the same when the reasons are equally or almost equally valid; - Esparza, writing in the year 1667 that it is right to follow a probable opinion, provided however that the other is not altogether indubitably more probable;² - Terillus (+ 1676) teaches the same, provided the opposite opinion is only a little more probable;³ - Mamianus de Ruvere, who says:⁴ "When the probability of the less safe opinion, speculatively conceived with regard only to material honesty, is equal with the probability of the safer opinion... or when the excess of probability is not very notable... then it is licit to follow such a less safe opinion, the safer one being left aside"; - Rassler (+ 1713), Antonius Mayr, Gabr. Daniel (+ 1728), Joa. Reuter (+ 1762), J. Biner (+ 1766), F. Manhart, etc., taught almost the same.⁵ - With these agree some Dominicans, such as Martinez Prado, Fr. de Arauxo, Passerini de Sextula, and also Benedictines, such as Ant. Perez (1559-1637), Bened. Schmier, - and others, whether regulars, such as Joan. Bossius, O. Barnab., Ant. Cotonius, O.S.F., G. Herincx, O.M., Ant. Schiara, O. Theat., Roncaglia, C.M.D., Eusebius Amort, canon regular, Fr. Sylvius.

¹ De Religione, Tr. IX, I, IV, c. 15, n. 21.

² De Legibus, I, VIII, c. 3, n. 19.

³ De obligat. Justitiae, Religionis et Caritatis, 1608, P. I, l. 3, q. 5, n. 5.

¹ In II-II, disp. V, q. 7, punct. 4, dub. 3.

² De actibus hum., Appendix to q. 23.

³ Tract. de Conscientia probabili, q. 2, n. 15.

⁴ Concordia doctrinae Probabilistarum cum doctrina Probabilioristarum, P. III, 100, ed. 1707.

⁵ F. Ter Haar reviews the opinions of these and of others whom we allege below, op. cit., p. 52-65.

397. (b) Among pure or simple probabilists are numbered many theologians of diverse schools; thus, from the Society of Jesus: Fr. Toletus (+ 1596), Emmanuel Sa (+ 1596), Joa. Azor (+ 1607), G. Vasquez (+ 1604), Lessius (+ 1623), Laymann (+ 1625), Castropalaus (+ 1633), J. Lugo (+ 1660), Cardenas (+ 1684), Dechamps (+ 1701), Lacroix (+ 1714), Mazzotta (+ 1748), Gury Ballerini, Sabetti, Genicot, Noldin, etc. - With these can be joined: Bonacina, bishop of Utica (+ 1631), C. Lupus, O.S.A. (+ 1681), Sporer, O.S.F. (+ 1714), the Salmanticenses, Order of Carmelites (+ 1717-1734), and many others especially of the nineteenth century.

398. (c) Yet certain probabilists did not hesitate to favor laxism more than was fair; sometimes they held that opinions only slenderly or doubtfully probable were truly probable, and therefore licit; sometimes they said that it was licit to follow probable opinions even when the matter concerns those things to which they ought not to be extended (above, n. 388). Thus, for example, Joa. Sanchez, or Sancius (+ 1624), Bauny, S.J. (+ 1649), Leander, O. SS. Trin. (+ 1663), Diana, Theatine (+ 1663), Tamburini, S.J. (+ 1675), Moya, S.J. (+ 1684), J. Caramuel, Cistercian and bishop of Vigevano, in Italy (+ 1682), whom St. Alphonsus calls the prince of the laxists. The Supreme Pontiffs Alexander VII (1665-1666) and Innocent XI (1679) condemned various excessively lax propositions, and the very principle of laxism contained in this proposition: "Generally, when relying on probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not go outside the limits of probability, we do something, we always act prudently."¹

¹ Apud Denzing., n. 1020.

399. 2. Tutiorism. To avoid the excesses of the probabilists, some theologians defended tutiorism, contending that in doubt the safer part is to be chosen, even when the matter concerns only the licit. A twofold tutiorism is distinguished: absolute, according to which it is not licit to follow an opinion favoring liberty, even if it is most probable; mitigated, which holds that the opinion on behalf of liberty cannot be chosen unless it is most probable.

(A) Absolute tutiorism was advocated by Sinnichius, doctor of Louvain (+ 1666), and the Jansenists. For they taught that certain precepts are truly impossible for men, and, in order more easily to maintain this proposition, indulged rigorism, and did not hesitate to impose unbearable burdens on the faithful. It is not licit, they said, voluntarily to expose oneself to the danger of sinning; but by following an opinion even most probable, we incur the danger of sinning, since this can be false.²

² To the point Sinnichius, in the work Saul ex-rex, lib. I, c. 95, n. 357: "No one is ignorant that any human opinion, by this very fact, is liable to the danger of error, because it does not transcend the limits of probability... For if an opinion, whether less probable, or even less than probable, can be true; so on the contrary an opinion more probable, or even most probable, can be false."

Alexander VIII condemned this error, 7 December 1690, by reproving this proposition 3: "It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among the probable."³ And deservedly; for, if certitude strictly so called were required in order to act licitly, and it were not licit in doubts to form for oneself a practically certain conscience from a reflex principle, in many circumstances either one would have to abstain from acting, or one would have to sin; for from one side doubts often occur, and from the other, the human will is so infirm that it cannot always choose the safer way. - Wherefore tutiorism is not truly safe: for by imposing an intolerable yoke, contrary to the mind of the Gospel,⁴ it increases sins, generates despair, and bars many from the practice of religion; with regard to many, therefore, it is a most safe way of damnation.

³ Denzing., n. 1160.

⁴ For Christ says: "For my yoke is sweet, and my burden light" (Matt. 11:30). Cannot that be preached concerning tutiorism which Peter was saying about the Mosaic law: "Now therefore why do you tempt God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" (Acts 15:10.)

400. (B) Mitigated tutiorism was defended by certain doctors of Louvain, who tried to soften Jansenist errors by saying that it is right to follow a most probable opinion; among them were Opstraet (+ 1720), Steyart (+ 1701), Henry of St. Ignatius (+ 1719), Dens (+ 1775), to whom Cardinal Gerdil (+ 1802) adhered. It rested on almost the same argument as above: namely, by following an opinion which is not most probable, we are exposed to the danger of sinning. - This indeed is false; for even when such an excess of probability is not present, a practically certain conscience can be formed from a reflex principle, and thus every danger, at least of formally sinning, is avoided. - Tutiorists indeed reject the reflex principle, but undeservedly; for the most probable opinion, which they permit to be followed, either produces a certain conscience, or it does not; if the former, we fall into absolute and condemned tutiorism; if the latter, conscience remains practically doubtful, and it is not safe to follow it. Wherefore today tutiorism is a thing done with.

401. 3. Probabiliorism. (A) To avoid the rocks of laxism and tutiorism, in the middle of the seventeenth century, probabiliorism, which had already flourished before Medina, was renewed. Certain pontiffs, especially Alexander VII and Innocent XI, contributed not a little to this revival.

The former condemned forty-five propositions "relaxing Christian discipline and bringing ruin upon souls"; and to his exhortation it is especially to be ascribed that the Dominicans, gathered in a general Chapter in the year 1656, decreed to fight against the laxer doctrines. From that time namely almost all defended probabiliorism; among them: Julius Mercorus (+ 1669), J. Gonet (+ 1681), Contenson (+ 1674), Fagnanus (+ 1678), Natalis Alexander (+ 1724), Concina (+ 1756), Billuart (+ 1757), Patuzzi (+ 1769). With these are to be numbered a few Jesuits, such as Antoine (+ 1743), Elizalde; but especially Thyrsus Gonzalez (+ 1681), who, seeing the excesses of probabilism, wrote a Treatise concerning the right use of probable opinions, in which he defended probabiliorism;¹ after many difficulties had been overcome, by the counsel of Innocent XII, he made the same public, and within the space of one year committed it to the press twelve times. From that time, not a few Jesuits advocated the same system, for example, Estrix, D. Nunnez, Blanchet, Bonnet, Malatra, Ehrentreich, Muniessa, Taberna, Gisbert, Gabriel Antoine; many, however, continued to adhere to probabilism. - The Franciscans, very many of whom had defended probabilism, gathered at Mantua in a general Chapter, in the year 1762, decreed to follow the more probable opinion.¹ The General Assembly of the Gallican clergy had already declared the same before, in the year 1700, at the suggestion of Bossuet.² Many other authors, in the same eighteenth century, taught probabiliorism, among whom were F. Genet (+ 1702), L. Habert (+ 1718), J. Pontas (+ 1728), the brothers Ballerini, Peter and Jerome (+ 1764). Indeed Benedict XIV ordered that the moral theology of Father Antoine, S.J., a probabiliorist, be expounded in the Seminary of the Propagation of the Faith.

¹ Gonzalez, Fundam. Theologiae moralis. - Here we subjoin the text of the famous decree of Innocent XI, concerning which there has been sharp dispute between Father Brucker, S.J. (Etudes, t. 86, p. 779 sq., t. 91, p. 831 sq.) and Father Mandonnet, O.P. (Revue Thomiste, Sept. 1901 - Jan. 1903, separately edited as Le decret d'Innocent XI, contre le Probabilisme, Paris, 1903); the genuine text of that decree, long unknown, was made public by the authority of J. B. Lugari, assessor of the Holy Office, on 21 April 1902.

¹ Apud Ter Haar, op. cit., p. 85.

² Bossuet, Oeuvres completes, ed. Vives, t. XXII, p. 768; you will find the doctrine of Bossuet in the same place, p. 712, and t. XXXI, p. 1-20.

402. (B) But Billuart sets forth the doctrine of probabiliorism clearly and moderately thus:³ (a) In the concurrence of two opinions concerning the objective honesty of an action, it is not licit to follow the less probable and less safe one, the more probable and safer one being left aside. (b) In the conflict of two equally probable opinions concerning the objective honesty of an act, we are held to follow the safer one. (c) When the matter concerns only the objective honesty of an act, it is licit to follow the manifestly and solidly more probable less safe opinion, or the one favoring liberty, in the concurrence of the less probable safer one, or the one favoring the law. (d) In order that it be licit to follow the more probable opinion, it is not required that it be most probable, nor does just any slight excess in probability suffice, but a notable and morally grave excess is required, which moves a grave and prudent man to assent to it rather than to the other.

³ Billuart, De Act. hum., diss. VI.

403. But the arguments which he brings forward are reduced to almost these: (a) It is not licit to follow a less safe opinion if it is not properly, solidly, and readily probable; but the less probable opinion in conflict with the more probable is not properly, solidly, and readily probable; for the motives on which it rests do not suffice for obtaining the assent of a prudent man, but only for introducing some fear concerning the opposite: for the force of those motives is broken by the stronger motives, and a prudent man cannot assent to an opinion which he judges more probably false. From another side he cannot form for himself a morally certain conscience by force of the reflex principle: he who operates probably operates prudently, or a doubtful law does not oblige; for that principle is not morally certain, since all anti-probabilists deny it and attack it with reasons at least probable; and therefore the practical conclusion deduced from this principle is not morally certain. (b) Just as in speculative doubts we are held to embrace that opinion which approaches nearer to truth and more excludes the danger of erring, so in doubts concerning the honesty of an action, we are held to follow that opinion which is more verisimilar and more efficaciously turns away from the danger of sinning; but assuredly the more probable opinion is more verisimilar and more removes the danger of sinning.

404. Nevertheless the probabilists try to solve these arguments thus. (a) In this system the order of knowledge is confused with the order of operation: in doubt concerning the truth of some opinion, generally we ought to assent to that which appears more probable, but in doubt concerning the liceity of an action, we do not adhere to either opinion, but, by force of a reflex principle, a practically certain conscience is formed. The probabiliorists themselves ought to use a reflex principle, namely, in doubt it is licit to follow the more probable opinion; now they cannot prove the truth of this principle except through an argument taken from invincible ignorance of the law: but this argument equally proves the truth of the other principle: a doubtful law does not oblige. (b) A moral system cannot be true which in its application seems morally impossible; but such is probabiliorism; for most cannot judge whether such an opinion is more probable or only probable; besides, what appears certainly more probable to one appears only probable to another; thus men of fearful conscience are cast into scruples and perpetual anxieties.

Today there are very few probabiliorists, but three systems flourish: equiprobabilism, probabilism, and compensationism, concerning which we must now speak.

405. (A) Its origin. Equiprobabilism, which does not differ substantially from moderate probabilism as set forth above, had as its principal defender St. Alphonsus de Liguori, who was numbered among the Doctors of the Church on 23 March 1871. He at first had adhered to the Probabiliorists, but, in hearing confessions, understanding well that their system could be applied only with difficulty, he embraced moderate probabilism, and defended it against the probabiliorists in a dissertation, published in the years 1749 and 1755, whose title was: Dissertatio scholastico-moralis pro usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris; but already at that time he reproved the opinion of the laxists no less severely. In the first edition (1749), he had made the system of the probabilists his own in these words: "It is licit to follow a probable opinion in the concurrence of a more probable one, provided that it rests on a grave motive, whether intrinsic, namely from reason, or extrinsic, from the authority of doctors"; but in the second edition he added this restriction: "unless the excess of probability is notable." Afterward, however, fearing lest by this formula certain persons might abuse it for favoring too benign opinions, in the year 1762 he published a new dissertation, in which he established these two things: "When the less safe opinion is equally probable, one can licitly follow it"; - "It is not licit to follow a less probable opinion when the opinion which stands for the law is notably and certainly more probable"; in these words the sum of equiprobabilism is contained. He polished this system more and more, and in the year 1767, in the sixth edition of Theologia Moralis, he explained it thus: "Therefore I say that it is not licit to follow the less probable opinion when the opinion which stands for the law is notably¹ or certainly more probable; I say or certainly, because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything but notably more probable"; - from another side: "When the less safe opinion is equally, or almost equally, probable, one can licitly follow it."² Toward the end of his life, attacked by tutiorists with accusations of laxism, and fearing lest his system be confused with simple probabilism, he openly declared that he was not a probabilist: "I again declare in this brief little Work that I am not a probabilist, nor do I follow probabilism; indeed I reprove it."¹ - It is helpful to observe that the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus was specially praised by the Roman Pontiffs, because "amid the tangled opinions of theologians, whether laxer or stricter, he paved a safe way, by which the directors of the souls of the Christian faithful could walk with unoffending foot."²

¹ This word is omitted in the seventh edition, because it adds nothing to the word certainly; cf. Theologia moralis, cura Gaude, 1905, t. I, p. xx.

² These and other texts of the Holy Doctor you will find in the work Vindiciae Alphonsianae, Rome, 1873, P. I, p. 1-125, - more briefly apud Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. I, p. 911-915. Moreover, concerning the mind of St. Alphonsus there has been much dispute, and there is still dispute today, between equiprobabilists and probabilists; besides the works cited, cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, Appendix I, Diss. de genuina S. Alphonsi sententia circa usum opinionis probabilis, p. 632-706; Bouquillon, n. 315-317; Wittmann, S. Alphonse et le pur probabilisme, Gien, s.d.; Ter Haar, op. cit. p. 99-107; Gaude, De Morali systemate S. Alphonsi; De Caigny, Apologetica de aequiprobabilismo alphonsiano, 1894.

¹ Apud Bouquillon, n. 317; cf. Vindiciae, p. 70-72.

² Decree of 22 March 1871, concerning the concession of the title Doctor; this testimony and very many others are reported by Vindiciae, preliminary dissertation, and more briefly by Marc, Instit. Mor. Alphonsianae, t. I, at the beginning.

The system of St. Alphonsus is defended by Redemptorists, among whom are Konings, Marc, Aertnys, Ter Haar, Wouters, etc.; and by not a few others, Gousset, Del Vecchio, Savini, Pruner, Muller, Simar, C. Martin, and also many Dominicans, who, setting aside probabiliorism, adhere to equiprobabilism.

"Wednesday, 26 June 1680. After a report had been made by Father Laurea concerning the contents of the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzales, S.J., directed to Our Most Holy Lord, the Most Eminent Lords said that it should be written through the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of the Spains, so that he might signify to the said Father Thyrsus, that His Holiness, having kindly received and not without praise read through his letters, commanded that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; and that he should make him certain that whatever he shall have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

"Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness, that he not only permit Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those asserting that in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; but also that he write to all Universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that each one, as it pleases him, freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary opinion; and command them that they wholly submit themselves to the mandate of His Holiness." F. Ter Haar, C.SS.R., gives the history and commentary of this decree in the little work Ven. Innocentii PP. XI de Probabilismo Decreti historia et vindiciae, Tournai and Paris, 1904; Arendt, S.J., explains the same decree in a plainly different sense apud Analecta ecclesiastica, 1902, p. 306 sq. and p. 353 sq. Cf. Revue thomiste, Jan. 1903, May-Oct. 1903, May-June and Sept.-Oct. 1904, where you will find diverse disputations concerning the same decree; Etudes, t. 86, p. 778 and t. 91, p. 831.

406. (B) Equiprobabilism is set forth.³ It can be contracted into these three propositions, according to C. Marc (n. 91-103):

³ Besides St. Alphonsus, Systema morale, cf. Marc, op. cit., n. 88-108; Konings, n. 63-96; Aertnys, n. 80-121; Gousset, Theol. Morale, n. 79-88; Wouters, De minusprobabilismo, 1905.

(a) When opinions equally or almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the existence of a law, it is licit to follow the opinion favoring liberty; thus against the Probabiliorists. For 1. a law truly and strictly doubtful does not oblige; for it is insufficiently promulgated, and can be called invincibly unknown: since on each side there are reasons equally or almost equally probable, morally speaking there is no greater reason for affirming than for denying, and therefore in this case the existence of the law, or obligation, is invincibly unknown. 2. From another side, in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; a principle of this kind, which in the matter of justice is admitted by all, can be extended to the other virtues: for when someone, after diligence has been applied, could not find the truth, he perseveres in possession of his liberty, and therefore cannot be deprived of his right by a strictly doubtful law.

(b) When arguments equally or almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion which favors the law is to be followed; thus against the Probabilists. It is gathered from the principle: in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; for, just as liberty possesses when the law is not certain, so the law possesses when this is certain and it is doubted whether it has been revoked; therefore the law is to be observed until its revocation is established. - This is confirmed from received principles of law, such as, for example: in doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated; now the revocation of a law, or desuetude, or dispensation is a fact which is not sufficiently demonstrated by equiprobable reasons. - Yet these authors note that liberty possesses much more frequently than the law.

(c) In the concurrence of an opinion certainly more probable on behalf of the law, it is not licit to follow the less probable on behalf of liberty; against the probabilists. - For, in this case, the law is not strictly doubtful: for only then does the intellect fluctuate between two opposed parts, when the motives on each side are either none or appear nearly equal; but in the case, the motives on behalf of the law appear certainly stronger than those on behalf of liberty, and thus the force and efficacy of the reasons on which the less probable opinion rests is certainly overcome and broken by the stronger arguments of the contrary opinion; for that reason man does not act prudently by following the less probable opinion, since by his own will he forces the intellect to leave behind what seems more verisimilar, and to adhere to an opinion which appears less verisimilar. - Nor is it licit to have recourse to the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; for this is valid only when the law is strictly doubtful, namely when the mind fluctuates because of arguments nearly equal on each side, but not when it certainly sees stronger arguments favoring the law.

407. (C) The arguments brought against equiprobabilism are set forth. Against the equiprobabilists the probabilists, especially Noldin, n. 219-222, argue thus: (a) Equiprobabilists, in order to establish their system, use these principles: a doubtful law does not oblige, and an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; but from these not equiprobabilism, but probabilism follows by necessary inference; for even a law which more probably exists remains truly doubtful and uncertain, provided that against its existence or force a probable argument is brought forward. Nor can it be said that the lesser probability is broken by the greater probability of the other opinion; for often the lesser probability rests on an entirely independent foundation, and therefore subsists, even if the contrary opinion is truly more probable. - Nevertheless the equiprobabilists respond that, even in this case, the less probable opinion, which considered apart appears probable, when compared with the opposed notably more probable one, is no longer solidly probable.

(b) A moral system which for its use necessarily requires that the moments of reasons be weighed on each side, and that it be established whether adverse opinions are equally or almost equally probable, is less apt for solving difficulties practically: for often it is impossible to determine when probability is equal or almost equal, and those who think that they can furnish this without difficulty deceive themselves and others. - This impossibility by no means exists, say the adversaries, for with ordinary diligence it can be recognized whether such or such an opinion is notably more probable or not, all the more because St. Alphonsus and modern theologians determine this accurately enough.

(c) From another side, the principle: in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, is falsely applied: for it is false that in doubt concerning the cessation of a law, the law previously certainly existing possesses. And indeed in doubt concerning the cessation of a law, liberty is certain and the law is doubtful, since it is truly probable that the law has ceased. - Besides, the right of liberty is in itself prior to the right of law, because liberty, if not in time, at least in nature and reason, precedes law, and therefore in doubt the presumption stands for liberty. - Yet equiprobabilists say that liberty is no longer in possession when it is certainly established that some law has been promulgated; for liberty was morally bound by the very promulgation of the law, and therefore cannot be called immune from obligation until the revocation is sufficiently established.

(D) Conclusion. Equiprobabilism assuredly is supported by solid arguments, and, although it does not perfectly solve some difficulties, it lays down a safe way between the laxer and stricter opinions.¹ Wherefore the Sacred Penitentiary, being asked "whether a professor of sacred theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which Blessed Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology," on 5 July 1831 judged that it should be answered: "Affirmatively, without, however, those being judged reprehensible who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors." - Yet let these last words be noted, from which it is clear that other systems, not reproved by the Church, can freely be defended.

¹ Yet to us it seems that the principle "in doubt, the condition of the possessor is better" is not rightly applied in the case in which the law, as they say, possesses; for whether the matter concerns the existence or the cessation of the law, we do not think that it obliges when the reasons brought forward on each side are equally or almost equally probable: for then there is truly and strictly a doubt, and the Liguorian principle is deservedly applied: a law truly and strictly doubtful does not oblige.

408. (A) The system is set forth:¹ In every doubt, where the matter concerns only the licit, it is licit to follow an opinion certainly and solidly probable, even if the contrary opinion is truly more probable. It is said:

¹ We chiefly borrow the exposition and arguments of probabilism from Lehmkuhl, n. 79-118, and from Noldin, n. 209-216; cf. Ball. P., n. 175-198.

(a) In every doubt, namely whether of law or of fact, - whether the matter concerns human law or divine or natural law, - and indeed concerning the existence of the law or the cessation of the law.

(b) Where the matter concerns only the licit, for even probabilists admit the restrictions enumerated above where the matter concerns the valid, etc., n. 388-390.

(c) It is licit to follow an opinion certainly and solidly probable, but not one doubtfully or slenderly probable. Now, for an opinion truly and solidly probable three things are required: that it rest on a truly grave motive of reason or authority; - that neither a definition of the Church nor a certain reason be opposed to it; - that its motives, compared with the motives of the opposed opinion, retain their probability. These things being posited, the more probable opinion on behalf of the law can be neglected, as long as it itself remains within the terms of probability, and is not morally certain. - But it is required that the opinion be certainly and solidly probable to the very one who follows it; otherwise the law is not truly doubtful and uncertain to him.

This certain and solid probability can be constituted by arguments not only internal, but also external, or taken from the authority of theologians: "For if several authors, and grave ones, call an opinion probable, ordinarily it cannot happen that it is not supported by probable internal reasons... Not only an opinion which is called probable by most theologians, but also an opinion which five or six theologians distinguished for probity, knowledge, and prudence hold as true or probable, ought to be considered truly and certainly probable, unless their authority is weakened either by a declaration of the Church or by manifest reason."²

² Noldin, n. 212.

409. (B) Arguments favoring probabilism are proposed. Two especially are brought forward: (a) A doubtful law does not oblige; but a law against which there is certain and solid probability is truly doubtful; therefore. - The major is declared: a law cannot oblige unless it is sufficiently known: "No one," says St. Thomas,¹ "is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept"; but only certain cognition is true cognition: for he who doubts concerning some law indeed knows the doubt concerning it and the obligation of inquiring, but he does not know the law itself; therefore a doubtful law cannot oblige. - The minor is proved: certitude and opposite probability concerning the same truth mutually exclude one another; therefore as long as the opinion on behalf of liberty is probable, the opposite on behalf of the law cannot be certain, even if it certainly appears truly more probable; therefore the law against which there is certain probability is truly doubtful, and therefore does not oblige.

¹ St. Thomas, De verit., q. 17, a. 3.

(b) An uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; for the right of liberty precedes the right of law, even if not in time, at least in nature and reason, since obligation supposes a free will which is bound; and therefore the certain and prior right of liberty cannot be restricted except by a certain law; but a law against which an opinion certainly and solidly probable fights is truly uncertain, as is clear from the things already said; therefore an uncertain law cannot beget a certain obligation.

Yet Noldin adds, n. 213, with moderate probabilists: "If, however, the opinion on behalf of the law is most probable or notably more probable than the opposite one, we are held to observe the law. For although an opinion of this kind does not attain true certitude, nevertheless practically it is equivalent to a certain opinion, because its opposite is not truly and certainly probable and therefore cannot furnish a norm of acting, since it does not suffice for informing a practically certain conscience." From this head, moderate probabilists come near to equiprobabilists.²

² This St. Alphonsus repeats again and again in all works published from the year 1762; cf. Gaude, n. 38-62.

410. (C) The arguments against Probabilism are set forth. Besides those which have already been proposed by the probabiliorists, above, n. 403, the equiprobabilists and compensationists urge others. (a) The principle "a doubtful law does not oblige" is not valid where the law is certainly more probable than liberty; for a law certainly more probably existing is sufficiently known so that it obliges indirectly, by force of the general principle that we ought sincerely to tend toward truth, and therefore to follow the opinion which approaches truth more closely.³ - Nor can it be said that a certainly more probable law is invincibly unknown: in strict doubt alone, because of the equality of reasons, is the law inculpably unknown; but where the objective obligation is certainly more probable, it is no longer licit to suspend judgment, but the mind ought to adhere to the opinion which is held as more verisimilar. - Nor can it be added that a certain right of liberty cannot be taken away by an uncertain law; for the right of liberty does not remain certain when there is opposed to it an office certainly more probable, but becomes truly doubtful, and indeed less probable than the duty itself.

³ D. N. de Caigny recently tried a conciliation between each system, De Gemino probabilismo licito.

411. (b) Probabilism easily opens the way to laxism; for once the right of following opinions even certainly and notably less probable has been granted to all, easily to each one the opinion which pleases more will appear probable; likewise, once it has been granted that the authority of five or six grave authors suffices for recognizing the probability of some opinion, who is there who, in the long series of probabilist theologians, would not find five or six, otherwise grave, approving an opinion more or less lax? Already in his own time St. Alphonsus wrote:¹ "And truly in the past century very many abuses occurred in opining in order to prove many lax opinions as probable; and therefore the Church proscribed several opinions, because they were undeservedly called probable, such as propositions 27 and 40 proscribed by Alexander VII, and 1, 3, 6, 35, 44 and 57 proscribed by Innocent XI. All these were condemned because in them it was said: it is probable, etc." A little afterward he adds that he too was deceived by the authority of many:² "It is true, in the first printings of my moral theology, led by the authority of several authors, I admitted as probable many opinions not sufficiently firm; but when the matter had been better weighed, I revoked or reformed them."

¹ St. Alphonsus, Homo apost., Tr. I, n. 73.

² Ibid., n. 78.

412. (D) The responses of the probabilists are handed down. Nevertheless the probabilists try to solve these difficulties.³ (a) They observe indeed that an opinion solidly, although less, probable, even when compared with the more probable, retains its probability, nor is its force entirely broken: otherwise the contrary opinion would no longer be more probable, but morally certain. Now, while an opinion certainly and solidly probable stands, the law remains truly and strictly doubtful, and therefore the principle can legitimately be applied: a doubtful law does not oblige. Nor is there present an obligation practically to follow the more verisimilar opinion; for otherwise this would have to be done even when the opinion favoring the law is slenderly more probable, and thus we would fall into probabiliorism. - Wherefore an obligation, even certainly more probable, remains uncertain, as long as the opinion favoring liberty is certainly and solidly probable; nor therefore is it to be strictly imposed under penalty of sin, lest perchance a yoke too burdensome be imposed upon human infirmity and men still weak in virtue be kept away from religion.

³ Lehmk., n. 94-106; Ball. P., n. 198; Noldin, n. 216.

(b) Nor is laxism seriously to be feared, provided that probabilism is prudently applied, that is, only when the opinion favoring liberty, even when compared with the contrary opinion, remains solidly probable, - and from another side with this caution, that a probable opinion is not held as something perfect, but as something strictly speaking licit. Therefore let these words of the probabilist Noldin (n. 216) be attended to: "If a Christian man in the service of God were to do nothing other than what the law strictly demands from the principles of probabilism, he would certainly lead a life little worthy of a Christian; but the practice of probabilists is this: where the question concerns imposing an obligation and judging sins, they are benign in order to avoid the dangers of formally sinning; but where the matter concerns pursuing perfection and the exercise of virtues, they strive toward the highest things, measuring the service owed to God not from the obligation of law, but from love and gratitude toward the divine majesty."

413. Conclusion. These things being posited, we admit probabilism, not indeed as a norm of perfection or of Christian life, but as a system from which there can be discerned the minimum which is required for avoiding sin. For when the matter concerns canonical laws, the Church herself, whose office it is to interpret her laws authentically, equivalently declares that it is licit to follow an opinion certainly probable and favoring liberty; thus, among the Rules of Law in the Sixth, one reads: "It is fitting that odious things be restricted, and favors enlarged" (reg. 15); "In obscure matters the minimum is to be followed" (reg. 30); "In penalties the more benign interpretation is to be made" (reg. 49); "Interpretation is to be made against him who could have stated the law more openly" (reg. 57). - Now what is said of ecclesiastical laws can be said of all others by equal reason; for if God had willed to bind us strictly, under penalty of sin and eternal damnation, He would have manifested His mind clearly to us; therefore where the divine law, whether positive or natural, is uncertain because of a grave doubt concerning its existence, who will dare to say that man is strictly held to observe it, under penalty of damnation?

414. Nevertheless, in order that an opinion be certainly and solidly probable, we do not admit that the authority of five or six grave theologians suffices of itself, when namely a most grave reason, which they have not solved, fights against them.¹ For it can happen that these men, although grave, were deceived, and held as probable an opinion which, all things diligently weighed, is not truly probable; hence their arguments must be seriously weighed, as we warned above, n. 384, and, if they appear weak either in themselves or because of changed circumstances, their opinion must be rejected. - Besides, we make more of the universal sense of the faithful, resting on solid reason, than of the authority of five or six grave theologians, which in a particular case is opposed to the same; wherefore, if an opinion which the common sense of the faithful reproves is called probable by some theologians,¹ we reject it as improbable. - With regard to intrinsic reasons, in a moral matter those are of greater weight which appeal to moral sense than those which are too subtle and deduced from metaphysical principles; for any science has its own genus of proofs: now moral science rests not so much on metaphysical arguments as on moral principles which the practical reason of prudent and honorable men perceives. But those who wish not only to abstain from sin, but to cultivate Christian virtues, will seek rules of perfection not among casuists, but among ascetics, and especially among the sacred authors and the Fathers, who have discussed the virtues.

¹ That this is the mind of St. Alphonsus is clear from the things which he says, l. I, Tr. I, n. 82: "The confessor, before he embraces some opinion, is certainly held to weigh the intrinsic reasons; and when some convincing reason for the safer opinion occurs to him, to which he does not see that an adequate response is available, then he cannot embrace the opposite less safe opinion, although the authority of very many doctors favors it: provided the authority is not of such weight that it seems to him that he must defer to it rather than to the apparent reason."

¹ You have an example in the Treatise concerning the Virtue of Justice, n. 483, where the question concerns error about the person injured, when someone, for example intending to kill Caius, kills Titius.

415. (A) Exposition. Since not a few difficulties are found in the aforesaid systems, certain authors devised a new system for solving doubt from the principle of sufficient reason, or compensation: thus, among others, Manier, Laloux, Potton.² (a) According to them indeed, a doubtful law is not lacking every obligatory force, nor does it have all its force of obliging, but it obliges more or less, according as it is more or less known: as often as the law is wholly known, it has its whole force of obliging in relation to us; as often, on the contrary, as it is altogether unknown to us, it in no way obliges; therefore, if the law is imperfectly known, it binds us imperfectly. Now, so that we can act licitly against a law even imperfectly obliging, some excusing cause, or sufficient reason, or compensation, is required. Or, in other words, a doubtful law is not worth as much as a certain law, but is worth more than no law, and therefore, for relaxing its obligation, some sufficient reason is required, although less grave than for a certain law.

² Manier, Compendium Philosophiae, 10th ed., t. III, Appendix I, p. 539-553; Laloux, De Actibus humanis, diss. IV, p. 42-148 (which work, not yet completed, was published not by the author himself, but by a disciple); Potton, O.P., De Theoria probabilitatis, Paris, 1874.

(b) This is declared in another way: in even a material transgression of a just law, some evil is always found; for, from what has been said, law is an ordination of reason, and he who violates it even ignorantly inflicts some detriment on himself or on others: thus dueling, infanticide, and other things of this kind, although committed ignorantly, truly harm individuals and society; and therefore knowingly to expose oneself to the danger of material evil, without sufficient reason, is a sin, but it is licit if there is a sufficient reason proportionately grave. For here the principles handed down above, n. 175-182, concerning the indirectly voluntary, can be applied: it is licit to place an act in itself good or indifferent, from which an evil effect is foreseen as probably going to follow, provided that there is a proportionately grave reason. Namely, he who violates a doubtful law indeed foresees the evil effect probably going to follow from it, - the material transgression of the law; - but his action is not intrinsically evil, and therefore he is excused from sin, provided that he has a sufficient reason for acting thus; but if there is no reason of this kind, the agent in some way sins, because freely, without cause, he exposes himself to the danger of at least materially transgressing the law. - Wherefore, in order to know whether it is licit to act against some doubtful law, attention must be given: (a) to the gravity of the law and to its probability: the more holy and grave the law is, and the more probable its existence, the greater the reason ought to be so that it may be sufficient; (b) to the goods which are obtained from the transgression of the doubtful law: the greater they are and the higher their order, the more easily the material transgression of the law can be permitted.

416. (B) The system of compensation is weighed critically. The probabilists attack the aforesaid system thus:¹ (a) Compensationism leads to tutiorism: for if a doubtful law always obliges in some degree, unless an excusing reason occurs, the safer part must always be followed, even when the opinion favoring liberty is most probable: which nevertheless was reproved by Alexander VIII, above n. 399. - Yet it can be said that this system does not lead to tutiorism any more than probabilism draws toward laxism: for just as probabilists avoid laxism by rejecting the sufficiency of an opinion slenderly probable, so likewise compensationists escape tutiorism by asserting that a doubtful and uncertain law does not oblige except when a sufficient reason for transgressing it is wholly lacking, and that an altogether slight cause excuses from a very doubtful law.

¹ Gury, Casus consc. 7, concerning Conscience; Montrouzier, in the periodical Revue des Sciences eccles., t. XXI, 1870, p. 220 sq.; two anonymous authors in the same periodical, t. XXV, 1872, p. 383 sq.; whom Potton tries to refute, op. cit., p. 169-240.

(b) It is by no means proved, say the probabilists, that an imperfect obligation is induced from imperfect cognition of the law: what does this half and partial obligation mean? What degree is required for sinning gravely or lightly? Is it not better deduced from an uncertain law that it gives no obligation? - The compensationists respond that there are certain degrees in obligation, since an obligation light is distinguished by all from a grave one, and that those degrees can be discerned from all the circumstances from which grave sin is distinguished from venial.

Nevertheless, in our judgment, a response of this kind does not completely remove the difficulty. For, in a moral matter, a little is reckoned as nothing, and therefore we think that a law whose existence is only slenderly probable imposes no obligation, even under light sin. It can indeed be said that it is better to obey this law if there is no reason for receding from it; but with the common opinion of theologians we judge that no one is held to this.

(c) The probabilists add that there is nothing evil in the material violation of a law; - which assuredly we do not admit, from what was said above, n. 356. They also say that in the aforesaid system the danger of private judgment or private inspiration is incurred, since each one must judge whether in each case a sufficient reason is present or not; - which argument is easily retorted, since in any system someone must judge whether such an opinion is truly probable, equiprobable, or not.

417. Conclusion. Nevertheless we do not admit compensationism as a general system by which practical doubt can be solved; but we think that prudent confessors, in the use of equiprobabilism or probabilism, ought to use a certain prudent compensation: namely, to attend not only to what is licit, but also to what is expedient, and therefore diligently to weigh whether or not there is had a sufficient reason for counseling the use of such or such a probable opinion, in such a determinate case, with attention given not only to external circumstances, but also to the psychological dispositions of the penitent.

418. In so great a conflict of opinions, let it be licit for each one speculatively to assent to one of the systems which are permitted by the Church to free discussion; but in practice, let these things especially be attended to.

1. Let it always be kept before the mind that even probabilists today extend their system only to cases where the matter concerns only the licit or illicit, according to the things set forth above, n. 388-390.

419. 2. It is not licit for the confessor to impose his own system upon a penitent who has formed his conscience according to one of the permitted systems; for the proximate rule of morals is each one's conscience.

Hence if a probabilist penitent wishes to follow an opinion certainly and solidly probable, and from another side is rightly disposed, a probabiliorist confessor cannot deny him absolution; otherwise he would violate the right which the Church leaves to each of the faithful, of following a truly probable opinion. - But if the penitent has not formed a conscience for himself, and asks the confessor what is licit or illicit, the latter, after the dispositions of the penitent have first been investigated, will respond according to the system which he will judge in the Lord to be more expedient for his spiritual good. Thus, if the penitent tends toward better things, to him he will generally advise that which, all things considered, seems better. But if, given the infirmity of the penitent, he foresees that this man will not follow the more probable opinion favoring the law, and from another side knows that the more benign opinion is truly probable, he can suggest this, so that the penitent may continue to frequent the sacraments, and, fortified by divine grace, may gradually tend toward better things; indeed, in many cases, he ought to furnish this from charity: for even if he himself adheres to equiprobabilism, he can permit others to follow probabilism.

But when the doubt concerns the very dispositions of the penitent, it pertains to the confessor himself to judge concerning them, according to his own system: for here the question concerns an action to be placed by the confessor himself; nevertheless let him temper judgment by charity and prudence, according to what was said in the Treatise on Penance, n. 407-409.

420. 3. In any system whatsoever, the confessor ought to weigh not only what is licit, but also what is expedient, all circumstances of times, places, and persons having been attended to: "All things are lawful to me, but all things are not expedient."¹

¹ 1 Cor. 6:12.

Therefore the probabilist who would always recommend to penitents to follow less probable opinions would act altogether imprudently: from the fact that it is not strictly prohibited under sin to follow such opinions, it is rashly inferred that this is good and opportune. An upright Christian, who wishes to cling to the footsteps of Christ, ought not only to avoid mortal sin, but also, according to his condition and powers, to tend toward moral perfection; otherwise he will lead a life little worthy of a Christian, and soon will fall into sin. For he who so indulges himself that he wishes to enjoy all delights which are not strictly prohibited, quickly also desires prohibited pleasures, and, accustomed to delights, is exposed to the danger of sinning. Therefore even if a probabilist knows very well that it is licit to follow all truly probable opinions, very often he will advise well-disposed penitents that, not indeed from fear of hell, but from love of God and of Christ, they turn themselves toward better things. - In this sense temperate probabilism by no means tends toward laxism.

421. 4. When two opposed opinions are truly probable, it is licit for each one to follow either, indeed to use each in various circumstances, yet in such a way that he is practically consistent with himself and violates the rights of no one.

The matter is made clear by an example: let a testament be supposed destitute of legal forms, concerning whose validity there is a twofold truly probable opinion. Titius, as heir, can indeed today use the probable opinion favoring him and enter upon the inheritance, as long as he is not disturbed in his possession by the sentence of a judge; at another time, he can impugn the validity of another testament destitute of legal forms, and enjoy the benefit of the law. But after, relying on a probable opinion, he has accepted the inheritance, he cannot decline the burdens annexed to the inheritance under the pretext that the testament is probably invalid; for he ought to be consistent with himself, and if he receives the inheritance, he ought to pay the legacies: he who feels the advantage ought likewise to feel the burden; otherwise the rights of the legatees would be violated.

Since conscience is the proximate norm of actions, and the right ordering of our life to God depends especially on it, it is of the greatest moment to form it rightly and prudently by means both natural and supernatural.

¹ Bouquillon, n. 280; H. Marion, Lecons de Morale, 2nd ed., Paris, Colin, 1901, p. 387-406; B. Perez, L'Education morale des le berceau, 3rd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1896, p. 29-110; P. Vignot, La Vie meilleure, Paris, 1898, p. 41-142; Thamin, De puerorum indole, Paris, 1895, p. 46.

422. Concerning natural means. (A) Already from infancy the younger are to be diligently and gradually taught by parents and teachers, but especially by those who explain the catechism, that there is a difference between good and evil, that certain actions are conformable to divine reason and will, but others altogether deformed from them. When they do some good thing, let them receive not only praises and rewards, but let them be persuaded that they have fulfilled a duty, and that the principal reward is situated in the testimony of conscience and the approbation of God.¹ On the contrary, if they perform something evil or less right, let them be rebuked sweetly indeed but strongly, as violators of moral obligation; and at the same time let it be explained to them that the greatest punishment is remorse of conscience, and also divine reprobation. Wherefore let the necessity be inculcated upon them of lending attentive ears to conscience, as to the voice of God Himself, and in actions of seeking not pleasure or one's own advantage as the end, but whatever is honorable, whatever is holy, whatever is pleasing to God; but if they doubt concerning the liceity of some action, let them approach skilled and honorable persons, not depraved or imprudent persons. In order that they may know their duties better, and more diligently fulfill the same, it is necessary to explain to them not only what they ought to do, but why, namely by declaring the reasons on account of which they ought to do this and avoid that: for thus they will learn to do good not from blind instinct, but from the intimate persuasion of the soul. - But while horror of sin is instilled into them, let nothing false or less true be said: thus small thefts or lies should not be exhibited as mortal sin, but as something unbecoming and dishonorable and base, although, because of lightness of matter, it is a venial sin.

¹ This, in Virgil (Aeneid, IX, 252-254), wise Aletes excellently promises, before all other rewards, to the most noble youths Nisus and Euryalus:

"What, O men, what worthy rewards for praises so great
can I think can be paid to you? First the fairest rewards
the gods, and your own morals, will give...."

423. (B) Let their conscience be rightly instructed not only by words, but by the examples of those who educate them: for since the younger are accustomed to imitate what they have before their eyes, if they see splendid actions performed by parents, teachers, and other educators, by that very fact they will be moved to acting splendidly, and by acting well they will form for themselves a right conscience; on the contrary, by depraved examples they are easily drawn toward evil, and by acting badly they deprave conscience. But since it can scarcely happen that they are not at some time witnesses of some depraved action, educators will seize this very opportunity to manifest the turpitude of that action, and to inspire horror and hatred of sin into their souls.

They will likewise take care that the young read books in which examples of virtue are praised, but vices are severely condemned: for from the things which they read, their mind and reason are vehemently borne toward good or evil. - Let them likewise frequent those companions who conduct themselves honorably and in a Christian manner: gradually and without sensing it we for the most part embrace the judgments and manner of acting of those with whom we often associate. Nevertheless, because it is almost impossible to avoid altogether those who act perversely, let adolescents learn as soon as possible to despise the judgments of the depraved; and, notwithstanding contrary opinions and examples, let them manfully arrange their life according to the dictate of conscience and the law of God.

424. (C) Let them cultivate perfect sincerity not only with others, but also with themselves, candidly scrutinizing their own conscience, and judging their own actions equitably, as if they had been performed by another.

This pagan philosophers had already commended to their disciples; thus, among others, Seneca:¹ "Knowledge of sin is the beginning of salvation. Epicurus seems to me to have said this excellently; for he who does not know that he sins does not wish to be corrected: you must detect yourself before you amend yourself. Some glory in vices. Do you think that he considers anything concerning a remedy, who counts his evils in the place of virtues? Therefore, as much as you can, convict yourself! Inquire into yourself; first perform the parts of accuser, then of judge, finally of intercessor." - The Fathers advise the same; thus St. Chrysostom:² "Do you not have a book at home in which you write daily accounts? Have likewise a book in conscience, and write daily sins; for example, when you lie in your bed, and there is no one who causes you business, before sleep steals in bring the little book into the middle, and reckon your sins with yourself, saying within yourself: Have I today sinned either in word or in deed?... But when you compute these things, suspend your soul, rend it, open it with fear of gehenna... so that on the next day you may approach more slowly to perpetrating sins." In truth, he who seriously and sincerely recalls and discusses his actions, and investigates the causes of his sins and foresees their consequences, more easily and efficaciously grieves for past offenses, guards against future ones, and in this way rightly forms his conscience; on the contrary, one often offending without penance easily slips into laxism.

¹ Seneca, Epist. 28, to Lucilius, p. 214 ed. Lemaire.

² St. Chrysostom, Appendix on Ps. 50, hom. II, n. 5-6, apud Migne, P.G., LV, p. 581-582.

425. 2. Concerning supernatural means. Among these can be numbered: (A) frequent and fervent prayer to God, who is deservedly called the Father of lights: for in order that conscience be rightly instructed, it ought to be consonant with divine reason and will, which is the supreme rule of morals; now, for detecting the mind of God, nothing surely helps more than prayer, by whose aid we ask the grace of illumination. Therefore let these or similar words often be repeated: "Give me understanding, and I will search thy law, and I will keep it with my whole heart.... Incline my heart unto thy testimonies, and not to covetousness."¹ Let divine strength likewise be urgently asked, by which the law may be more easily fulfilled, and the manner of acting become conformable to the dictate of conscience.

¹ Ps. 118:34-36.

426. (B) The practice of Christian virtues; for just as conscience is easily obscured by depraved actions frequently repeated, so likewise it is not a little illuminated by the assiduous practice of good works: for we perceive moral truths much more distinctly when with a pure heart and sincere will we seek, without any prejudice, what must be done.

Thus experience shows that the conscience of those who devote themselves wholly to cultivating virtues becomes more and more tender and delicate. - Yet excess is to be avoided in this, lest one perhaps slip into scruples: to avoid these, one must diligently distinguish between precepts and counsels, grave and light precepts; sin should indeed be cautiously avoided, even venial sin, indeed the will should tend with all its powers toward perfection; if someone consents to some imperfection, let him indeed grieve for it, but as for an imperfection, not as for sin; nor should he hold venial sins, even deliberate ones, as mortal, but flee them out of love toward God.

427. (C) The frequentation of sacramental confession; for this supposes first of all a serious examination of conscience, whose usefulness the pagans themselves recognized. Besides, by manifesting the secrets of the heart to a wise director, the penitent receives counsels for judging what is good and what is more expedient, what is commanded and what is counseled; by proposing doubts, he can solve them more prudently, with the help of a confessor who excels in greater knowledge and experience; by inquiring concerning the means leading to Christian perfection, he walks more safely in the ways of the Lord, and thus forms for himself an altogether right conscience, under the guidance of him who, bearing the place of God, can declare the divine mind more authentically.¹

¹ The usefulness of a spiritual director, who not only offers counsels, but is held as a witness of actions, pagan philosophers recognized; thus Seneca, epist. 11 to Lucilius (p. 109 ed. Lemaire): "Some good man must be chosen by us, and always held before our eyes, so that thus we may live as if he were looking on, and do all things as if he were seeing. This, my Lucilius, Epicurus prescribed: he gave us a guardian and pedagogue; and not undeservedly. A great part of sins is removed if a witness stands beside the sinner... O happy is he who can so revere someone that he composes and orders himself even at the memory of him."

By these and other means of this kind, a right and true conscience is formed, which, as being conformed to divine reason, is a safe norm of acting: "Follow with heavenly kindness, O Lord, we beseech Thee, the vows of Thy suppliant people; so that they may both see what things are to be done, and may have strength to fulfill the things which they have seen."² - "Deign to direct and sanctify, rule and govern, O Lord God, King of heaven and earth, today our hearts and bodies, our senses, words, and acts in Thy law and in the works of Thy commandments, so that here and forever, with Thee helping, we may deserve to be saved and free, O Savior of the world."³

² Prayer of the Sunday within the Octave of Epiphany.

³ Prayer at Prime.

428. From the things said, man is held to tend toward the ultimate end, through human acts, conformable to law, with conscience directing. But, because of human infirmity or malice, he sometimes deviates from the right path by sin, or transgression of the law: when the sin is grave, man is truly turned away from the ultimate end; if it is light, he is only retarded from the attainment of the end. Each must be treated. But because we are inclined to sin by vicious habits, or by propensities either innate or acquired, we must discuss these also, so that the roots of sin may be better extirpated.