III. On the Excuses for Artificial Sterility and Abortion

132. - Most men alienated from the faith do not defend honorable morals in the matter of chastity in such a way as to exclude every exception from the rules which in themselves they approve and establish. Wherefore, if at any time conception is prohibited by health, if at any time the wife will be unable to bring forth a living fetus without danger, they will permit, or even advise, artificial sterility, indeed abortion or embryotomy, resting openly or tacitly upon these principles: that necessity is immune from law; that all things are to be weighed not by an absolute but by a relative rationale; and that accordingly, in individual actions, one must consider what prevails and what is to be preferred.

133. - They can be answered thus, in brief but efficacious words. Moral uprightness has either an absolute command or one subordinated to this condition: unless great difficulty excuses transgression. An absolute obligation suffers no exception; but a conditional one will consequently be tempered by exceptions in every kind of uprightness. For no reason can be alleged why it would lose its force only in the subject of chastity and when offspring is at issue. What, therefore, if the physical state of the body, or a prolonged separation, should prohibit even imperfect conjugal intercourse? Will they dispense the healthy spouse from the obligation of fidelity? What, moreover, if the gravest harm threatens unless a theft is committed? Very few indeed will admit this, and rightly and deservedly so, on account of the absolute dictate of conscience. But this dictate is general and ought to prevail in every moral matter. Indeed, do they not celebrate as the fruit of the most atrocious war which raged for more than four years the fact that the rationale of right is acknowledged to be absolutely inviolable and can no longer be passed over on account of an alleged excuse of necessity? Will not all confess that there are duties, for example of devotion to the fatherland, on account of which life itself is to be held of no account? Can they, therefore, without absurdity deny such force and efficacy to moral duties that, in order to observe them, less than life itself - a certain delight and pleasure of life - must sometimes be subordinated?

"What kind of philosophy is this," the pagan writer Cornelius Tacitus was already vigorously exclaiming, "which would not bring about the destruction of moral gravity, but would be content with a mediocrity of vices?" ¹.

¹ Annals, 14, 38.

But they deny that there is anything absolute for man, since he himself is wholly relative.

Yet, if man is constituted by an essential relation to God, and if all the things of this world are contingent and subject to relative considerations, nevertheless God is absolute, and by His authority He confirms and sanctions the absolute precepts of the moral order.

Yet we freely admit this: when faith in God has been lost and the hope of a future life has been cast aside, those accidental contrarieties between the honorable and the pleasurable lack a sufficient explanation, and the commands of absolute uprightness cannot be perceived well. But for us they assume the excellent form of divine worship and obedience by which we humbly acknowledge the dominion of God.

Nevertheless, all sensible men feel that nothing is more worthy of man than that, besides the impediments which he is forced to obey physically, so that he must confess, "I am unable," he should equally revere the moral impediments on account of which, without any exception, in private and public life, he says, "I cannot."

But the more vehement the venereal appetite is accustomed to be, the more the firmness of a purpose of this kind honors a man and renders him strong and capable of accomplishing great things.

What of the fact that difficulties concerning the begetting of offspring most often flow from the imprudent levity with which marriages are entered, while consideration of vocation or aptitude is neglected? Shall we say that it is lawful for a man to redeem his fault at the expense of uprightness? On the contrary, will it not be obtained by moral vigor, as a thing greatly to be desired, that marriages be celebrated more circumspectly, with greater happiness for the spouses and for their stock, between persons who are well suited?

Therefore let this be settled and deliberate for us: pleasure, perfect copulation, and solicitude concerning the offspring, if any is born from it, are so joined by nature that it is never lawful to tear these apart in the mind and to admit one while repudiating the others.

134. - But at the same time, to the best of our abilities, we shall procure that parents deter from matrimony a daughter unequal to the burdens of conjugal life, and that they nourish their offspring physically and morally from tender years in such a way that it may become of itself fully capable of matrimony.

It is also to be desired that young men be less solicitous concerning the dowry of a bride than concerning her physical and moral suitability.

For this is among the desires of nature: that those insufficiently suited abstain from matrimony and aspire by another road toward a holy fecundity of good works.