Affability (Friendliness)

Whoever by provocation or ridicule, or by praise or flattery, causes another to commit an injury, or is the cause why reparation is not made for injustice committed, is himself bound to make restitution in the same way as one who is the cause of injustice by counsel.

The potential parts of justice are several. For justice is a virtue toward another, rendering to him what is owed according to equality. Therefore every virtue which by its nature is toward another, but falls short of justice by reason either of debt or of equality, must be joined to justice as a potential part. Now the virtues which fall short by reason of debt, or in other words which regard not a juridical debt but only a moral debt, that is, one to be rendered from the moral goodness of virtue alone, are of two species. For some regard a debt "so necessary that without it moral goodness of conduct cannot be preserved" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 80, single article); and these are truth, gratitude, and vindication. Others regard a debt which "is necessary as contributing to greater moral goodness, without which nevertheless moral goodness can be preserved" (St. Thomas, cited place); and these are liberality and affability. By reason of equality those virtues fall short, or in other words regard a debt which can in no way be rendered according to equality: religion, penance, piety, and observance.

Therefore there are nine virtues which are referred to justice as potential parts; two of them regard a debt toward God, namely religion and penance; the remaining seven have as their object a debt toward the neighbor.

I. Notion of Affability. Affability is a moral virtue inclining man to converse with his neighbor fittingly and pleasantly, according to the prescription of reason illumined by faith. It is said:

1. To converse, that is, in common association as it relates to social life.

2. Fittingly and pleasantly, etc., that is, as the condition of persons and the circumstances require.

II. Object of Affability. 1. The material object is all external words and deeds of which conversation with one's neighbor consists (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 114, a. 1).

2. The remote formal object is the special reason of debt from moral goodness, by which fitting and pleasant conversation is owed to the companions of life; and thus affability is distinguished from friendship, which acts from benevolence. The proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in rendering this debt.

III. Opposed Vices. To affability are opposed: by defect, contentiousness, by which someone contradicts another beyond what is due; by excess, flattery, by which someone desires too much to please another, praising him beyond what is due (St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 115-116).

III. Opposed Vices. By excess there is opposed affectation, by which someone attends too much to the external movements of the body, beyond the measure of right reason; by defect, rusticity, by which someone does not attend enough to the same movements, against the prescription of right reason.

Degrees of Moral Debt.—The remaining potential parts of justice are those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some law, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the greater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.

(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one cannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the character of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from the side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and deeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue of truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor to whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of gratitude to him for his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of gratitude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are readily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular justice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on the witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions has a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social intercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral obligation, one imposed by God but not enforced legally. Compensation for services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the debtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other benefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account of ingratitude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an act of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private person in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but lawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.

(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can preserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of virtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friendship or affability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and to make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because of any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better for this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all. Likewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to money and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to others willingly and generously. Without friendship and liberality the peace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with them it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and distinction.

The Virtues of Affability and Liberality.—These two virtues, though they are not so important as those that preceded, are still most useful to human life (see 2143). Affability (friendliness, politeness) is a virtue which inclines a person to show himself in serious matters properly agreeable to others in order thus to fulfill a duty to society.

(a) Affability has for its object to be agreeable to others, that is, in looks, manner, words and deeds to treat them with kindness and consideration, and so to give them pleasure. Affability is more than mere civility, which avoids rudeness and observes necessary proprieties, but does not manifest a gracious spirit. The gentleman, according to Cardinal Newman (“Idea of a University,” Discourse viii, 10), is one who does not inflict pain and whose great concern is to make others at their ease and at home. The true gentleman is considerate for all his company, guards against unseasonable allusions or topics, is seldom prominent in conversation and never wearisome, makes light of his own favors, never speaks of himself except when compelled, avoids personalities and insinuations of evil, and is indulgent towards opponents.

(b) Affability is as agreeable as is becoming, or proper; that is, it observes the golden mean, attending to moderation and circumstances, suiting its deportment to the time, place, occasion, and persons and observing the recognized laws of etiquette for social, official, business, religious, domestic and other relations. Indeed, there are times when affability should not be shown, as when it is necessary to display severity and displeasure, or even to sadden others, for the sake of some higher good (II Cor., vii. 8, 9).

(c) Its purpose is to fulfill a social duty. Without affability the ways of life are made rougher and more difficult for all, and therefore, since man is a social being, it becomes obligatory that each one should so conduct himself towards others as to avoid the displeasing and to cultivate the pleasing. Thus, affability is less than friendship (see 1110), since it does not include special benevolence and is shown to friend and foe alike; but it is more than polish, for it consists not merely in external good manners but chiefly in an internal sense of responsibility to society and of deference to its requirements. Affability is at its best, however, when prompted by friendship and Christian charity. A modicum of courtesy, if accompanied by sincerity and goodness of heart, is more appreciated than profuse compliment and ceremony behind which there is little genuineness or little affection.

(d) Affability regulates conduct in serious matters, for the regulation of amusements or recreations pertain chiefly to modesty and falls under temperance rather than justice. Aristotle calls the virtue directive of games eutrapelia, which may also be called reasonable relaxation, urbanity, or pleasantness.

Offices of Affability.—All, and especially the clergy, should practise courtesy, imitating St. Paul, who became all things to all men, in order to gain all to Christ (I Cor., ix. 22), and following his advice to be without offense to Jew or Gentile or to the Church of God (I Cor., x. 32). The offices of affability can be reduced to the negative and the positive, as follows: (a) the negative offices are the avoidance of excess (adulation) and defect (surliness); (b) the positive offices are the observance on special occasions of the appropriate forms and usages and on all occasions the exercise of a gentle and thoughtful regard for the feelings of others.

The Sins against Affability.—(a) Adulation is the vice of those who in the effort to please others go beyond what is proper, of the complaisant man who aims to gratify by merely conventional or extravagant compliments, and of the flatterer who seeks to win favors for himself by expressions of fulsome admiration. Adulation is shown by exaggerated debasement of self (servility, obsequiousness), as well as by exaggerated exaltation of others (toadyism). The sin of adulation is not grave from its nature, being only an excessive will to please; but circumstances sometimes make it grave, such as its matter (e.g., when one compliments another’s sins, Is., v. 20), its effect (e.g., when the person flattered will be made proud), or its purpose (e.g., when the flatterer means to seduce the other person, Prov., xxvii. 6). Like to adulation in its exaggeration, but unlike it in manner, is the display of friendliness by offensive familiarity or boisterous conduct.

(b) Surliness is the sin of those who are ungracious in their manners, not because of hate or anger, but because of a desire to be unpleasant and to make others yield to themselves. The surly man is always ready to contradict or argue, he is hard to please, sensitive, sour in visage, gruff in words, and much given to complaint or sullen silence. Surliness is per se worse than adulation but not a mortal sin; for it is farther removed from affability than adulation, but does not necessarily inflict a severe wound on charity. But the smooth palaverer is usually a more dangerous character than the morose man (Ps. cxl. 5). Like to surliness is the boorishness of those who from cynicism or laziness despise refinement, or from greed neglect proper manners at table. But entirely different from surliness is that dignity which can be reserved without being distant or hard of approach, and that seriousness which can be grave or silent without being ungracious.

Modest Behavior or Decorum.—(a) The Virtue.—The movements and gestures of the body should be regulated by reason, both because they are indications of one’s own character and disposition, and because they express one’s disposition towards those with whom one lives. Hence, they are not a matter of indifference, but reason demands that they be suitable both to oneself (i.e., to one’s sex, age, position, etc.) and to one’s neighbor (i.e., to the requirements of good social usage in each business or affair of life). Thus, virtuous decorum employs both sincerity, which makes one honestly respectful in act (2403), and affability, which makes one agreeable in the company of others (2421). That this is an important virtue for individuals and society is declared both by sacred and human authority. Ecclesiasticus (xix. 26, 27) calls attention to the importance for himself of a man’s looks, laughter and gait; St. Augustine says that there should be nothing offensive to others in one’s movements; and Aristotle mentions among the qualities of the high-minded man that he is sedate and dignified in demeanor.

(b) The Opposite Vices.—Modest behavior is offended by various vices of excess and defect. Thus, sincerity is offended by bluntness and affectation, self-respect by stiffness and servility, and consideration for others by flattery and rudeness.

How must right process be instituted? - In a civil case the process must be instituted at the petition of the plaintiff. Plaintiff is so called from action. Action is the right of pursuing in judgment what is owed to oneself. Hence he who proceeds in judgment by actions is called plaintiff.

But it is necessary that he be able to stand in judgment; that he have an action in judgment according to the laws; that he manifestly prove what he seeks. Proofs are made by examination of laws and facts, by sentences given in other similar cases, by presumptions, by sworn witnesses, by writings, by the sworn confession of the party. C. I. 1312 ff., 2142; C. G. 1315 ff., 2275; C. L. 2404 ff. But actions are repelled on the part of the defendant by exceptions, which he himself likewise is bound to prove. "Exception is so called as a certain exclusion, which is customarily interposed against the action of any matter in order to exclude that which has been brought into the intention or condemnation." L. 2 de Except. Wherefore one exception is of fact, another of law. By the former the fact is excluded, for example, the loan received. By the latter the law is excluded, for example, if a homicide, not criminal, was committed in order to defend oneself.

Other proofs having been omitted, either an interrogatory or an oath can be tendered to the defendant. If an interrogatory is tendered, the defendant must answer, and if he has not answered, it will be taken as confessed. C. I. civil procedure 216 ff. But an oath is twofold, decisory and supplementary. A decisory oath is a certain species of settlement for ending a lawsuit, and therefore it is tendered by one party to the other. Hence, if the defendant does not furnish the oath, he is condemned; likewise, if the plaintiff does not furnish the oath tendered to him, he is condemned. But if the defendant furnishes it, even if he is perjured, he is absolved. C. I. 1364 ff.; C. G. 1358 ff. Namely, he is absolved, even if perjured, in the external forum, but he is not freed from obligation in the forum of conscience; for the settlement was made by oath, not by perjury. The oath is tendered concerning one's own fact, and also concerning the fact of another, if there is a presumption that it is known by the one swearing, and if it is necessary for expediting the case to know that fact. A supplementary oath is one which is tendered by the judge to complete proofs, but not to the defendant himself in a criminal case. C. I. penal procedure 232. Cf. L. 11 de Act. rer. amot. ff. As regards the forum of conscience, the judge cannot tender it to one who probably will perjure himself, without injuring charity and justice. For it is in his power to tender it or not. C. I. 1314 ff.; C. G. 1366 ff. Cf. Rules of the S. R. Rota, title 4; L. fin. de Iureiur. ff.; C. L. 2520 ff.

In a criminal case from Roman Law, and also from more recent law as regards the very substance of the matter, the process can be instituted in three ways: 1. By way of accusation, when there is some accuser who promises that he will prove the crimes objected. 2. By way of denunciation, when the one reporting the crime does not wish to assume the burden of proving. 3. By way of inquisition, which the magistrate institutes.

In the accusatory process the whole case is conducted between the accuser and the accused. The accuser objects the crime; the accused responds, denies or confesses the fact, and if he confesses he is as condemned. Witnesses are all examined before both, and orally. For no one is to be condemned unheard and without witnesses. Formerly the defendant was tortured on the rack, so that full proof might be made from his confession. But by present laws no one can be compelled to bear testimony against himself. Then the sentence of innocence or guilt is pronounced, and punishment is imposed by law on the guilty person. If the accuser has failed in proof of the crime and from malice has brought someone into danger of grave penalty, formerly he suffered a similar or talion penalty. Today an action of calumny and defamation is granted against the accuser. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 4; Deut. 24, 19 ff.; Decretal de Calumniator.

The way of denunciation falls back into inquisition. For when the matter has come to the knowledge of the magistrate through denunciation, either from one lodging complaint, or from an informer, or from ministers of public order, then he begins to inquire into the delict and the delinquent. He can inquire into the delict from the slightest indications, but into the delinquent only from grave ones. Once the inquisition has been completed, the delinquent is subjected first to summary examination, then to ordinary examination. Then the criminal process is instructed before him, and witnesses are examined in it. If from it the defendant is proved guilty, he is condemned; if he is proved innocent, he is absolved; if neither is established from the acts and proofs, he is dismissed.

Moreover, inquisition is threefold. The first is general, namely when it is asked in general whether the laws are observed, whether there are transgressors. The second is special, when inquisition is instituted concerning a certain crime and concerning a certain person as its author. The third is mixed, when either the person alone or the crime alone is special, for example, whether Titius is guilty, or who killed Caius. L. 197; S. Th. Quodl. 11, a. 13.

Therefore by whatever way the process is instituted, there is always some accuser, whether a private or public person, whether physical or moral. Accusation can be both formal and virtual. Hence the evidence of the fact, public infamy, or notoriety of the crime supplies the place of the plaintiff or accuser. In judgments three persons are required: judge, plaintiff, defendant. For judgment is an act of justice, which is not toward oneself, as are the other virtues by which man is ordered in himself, but is toward another, ordering man to another. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 67. a. 3.

By canon law a previous admonition of the defendant is often required, for example, in causes of clerics who are concubinarians, and where excommunication is to be inflicted. Trent, sess. 25, c. 3, 14 de R.

Decretals l. 2; L. Qui crimen C. de iis, qui accusare non possunt; L. ult. C. de Accusat. et inscript.; Sanchez, Cons., l. 6, c. 2, proem.; Lessius, l. 2, c. 29, n. 106; Lugo d. 27, n. 75; E. M.

The rack: It is a kind of torment, namely a wooden machine put together in the manner of a horse, cavalletto, upon which those concerning whom there was inquiry about some crime were stretched out and tortured, so that full proof might be made from their confession.

What is an accuser? What is a denouncer? How many kinds of denunciation are there? - An accuser is said to be one who in criminal causes reports a crime to the judge, and from him demands vindication on account of the common good, and at the same time undertakes the obligation of proving the crime objected. But in civil causes, he who as the injured party compels the adversary to the judge is not called accuser, but plaintiff. An accuser differs from a denouncer, who reports a crime to a superior or judge, and nevertheless does not undergo the obligation of proving it.

Denunciation is twofold: one juridical, another evangelical. The former is a report made to a superior as to a judge, so that, once the case has been known, he may proceed from judgment; and its scope is the punishment of the delinquent and the good of others, especially the common good, which redounds from the punishment of the wicked, and also the good of the denouncer himself. The latter is a report made to a superior as to a father; and its scope is not punishment, but the amendment of the neighbor, or the good of the one denounced, through the paternal admonition of the superior intervening, from which, on account of his authority, a more certain amendment is hoped for. When denunciation is made to a Superior as to a father, he cannot himself proceed as judge.

Juridical denunciation can be made judicially, the due forms having been observed, and extrajudicially, by simply manifesting the matter to the superior and committing to his prudence what ought to be done. It pertains to the same virtue to which the vindication of the judge belongs, namely to legal justice.

L. 235; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1, 2 c. ad 3; s. q. 62. a. 3 ad 6; Quodl. 1, a. 16; Quodl. 11, a. 13.

Who are prohibited from accusing? - From natural law, regularly speaking, infamous persons, stained by greater crimes, are prohibited from accusing; for their testimony can be of no authority. Enemies; because accusation is reasonably presumed to proceed from an affection of vengeance. Children against parents, a wife against a husband; for this is repugnant to piety, unless it concerns imminent common damage, or one's own or another's damage which cannot otherwise be avoided. These also are repelled from bearing testimony. L. 236.

From Canon Law clerics are barred from the office of accuser in secular judgment, especially in a case of blood. Except, however, if they accuse the defendant for this end, that they may guard against their own damage, or that it may be repaired to them; then a cleric and religious can accuse the malefactor even before a lay judge. This is lawful not only in one's own case, but also in the case of one's own church, or of relatives to the fourth degree, or even of domestics. Likewise, if common evil or the evil of others cannot otherwise be impeded, they must denounce the delict, even if it is worthy of death. Nevertheless, to avoid danger of irregularity, the cleric and religious must first make protestation before the judge that he does not act unto vengeance, nor unto penalty of blood, but rather for the defense only of himself or his own and for the triumph of justice. If this protestation is omitted, even through inculpable forgetfulness, irregularity is still incurred; because forgetfulness excuses from fault, not from this irregularity, which was introduced by reason of gentleness. C. Praelatis 2 de Hom. in the Sixth; L. 1. 7, n. 468.

Laymen cannot accuse clerics, unless the cleric is a dissipator of the goods of the church, or a heretic, simoniac, sacrilegious person, etc.; or unless the layman prosecutes his own case, or the case of his own, or if damages are to be inflicted on others in the future in such a way that they cannot otherwise be impeded. Likewise clerics cannot accuse religious, who can be accused only by religious of the same Order. L. 238; l. 7, n. 468. Non-tolerated heretics and excommunicated persons cannot be accusers with respect to the faithful. L. 238. "Children are commonly prohibited from accusing parents, subjects prelates, servants masters, likewise public sinners, as is gathered from various Decrees.... Yet all these can denounce when the crime is pernicious to the republic.... For one's own injury anyone can accuse. Moreover, as regards this, an injury is reputed one's own which pertains to himself or to his own." Lugo d. 38, n. 7, 10. Decretals de Accusationib.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1 ad 1, 2; q. 70. a. 1 ad 3, a. 3.

From Roman Law, wards, those below puberty, women, magistrates, infamous persons, those closely joined, that is, children with respect to parents, brothers with respect to brothers, a wife with respect to her husband and conversely, are prohibited from accusing. L. 1 ff. de Accusationibus et inscriptionibus. "It is not permitted to a woman to make anyone a defendant in public judgment." L. 1 de Accus. et Inscript.

From C. I. penal procedure 41, 42, 98, 422 ff., denunciation of a crime can be made by anyone to the General Procurator, the royal Procurator, or another official of judicial police. But the accusation in judgment is sustained by the General Procurator. The same is had from C. G. criminal procedure 22, 29, 30, 271, 284, 315.

When is someone bound to accuse or denounce? - He is bound to accuse or denounce, whether judicially or at least extrajudicially, even without fraternal correction having been sent beforehand: 1. When it concerns avoiding common damage. But crimes against the common good are heresy, rebellion, falsification of coinage, homicides and thefts committed by assassins or highway robbers, subornation of votes in elections to public chairs, offices of magistrates, etc., the sin of a religious bringing damage to religion, etc. "If the crime," says the Angelic Doctor, 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1 c., "has been such that it turns to the detriment of the republic, a man is bound to accusation, provided that he can prove it sufficiently, which pertains to the office of an accuser; for instance, when someone's sin turns to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the multitude." Lugo d. 38, n. 2, 14; L. 236.

2. If grave damage is imminent to an innocent person. For charity obliges us to impede the damage of the neighbor. But by hypothesis this can be done either by accusing or by denouncing. Therefore there will be a grave obligation of making accusation, or at least denunciation. Eccl. 4, 9; L. 236.

Note "nevertheless, that there is not always an obligation of impeding the damage of an innocent person through denunciation of him who inflicts the damage, if this latter person would have to suffer equal damage, because since he is a neighbor, there is no source from which an obligation arises to damage him so in favor of the other; not always, for there is an obligation if the innocent person is very joined to you, for example, if he is your father or your son, or if it would redound to common damage, or if the damager of himself ought to undergo that damage to free the innocent person." La-Croix l. 2, n. 2, n. 219.

3. If someone receives a stipend for this from the republic or from private masters, as do fiscals, or guards of houses or fields, superintendents of customs, etc.; and they are held even with grave inconvenience to themselves. For they are obliged from quasi-contract and from justice, not from mere charity.

Otherwise they are bound to restitution of the damages which come to the republic or masters because of the omission of accusation or denunciation. L. 236. Indeed more than this, these are often held even from office to seize the guilty and hand them over, once seized, to the magistrate to be punished. But whether these are also bound to restore the value of the penalty or fine, if they do not denounce, some from St. Alphonsus 237 "affirm very probably... because, by omitting denunciation, to which they were held by reason of office, they are the cause that the treasury or master does not exact the penalty to which he had a right. But others deny this sufficiently probably... because penal law does not intend that the treasury or masters be enriched by fines, but that they themselves be preserved unharmed, and that transgressors be punished. But indirectly and accidentally the law furnishes a right that fines be exacted from it, but after sentence; for before it neither the treasury nor masters have any right to the penalty. Hence, although fiscals by not denouncing sin against legal justice, nevertheless they do not sin against commutative justice with respect to the fine; and therefore they are bound only to repair the damage of revenues which merchants ought to have paid." Cf. 15.

4. "Someone is sometimes bound to denounce, indeed even to accuse, a delinquent, if this is necessary for avoiding or repairing the damage of his own family, which otherwise would remain dishonored, or destitute of support." L. 237. For this is owed not only from charity but from piety.

5. There is an obligation of denouncing from the precept or edicts of prelates and superiors. Not only ecclesiastical prelates, but also secular Princes can command under various penalties that those who know such and such a delict manifest it at once. And thus Pontifical Constitutions command denunciation of heretics, or of those suspected of heresy; of those soliciting in Confession, or asking the name of an accomplice, with absolution denied unless it is revealed; of hidden leaders of sects; of superiors of lay Institutes, or religious superioresses, daring to induce religious or nuns or sisters to the opening of their own conscience; of those violating the oath prescribed by the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum and unwilling to sign the formula of the same oath; of those injuring or terrifying those who denounce to the Holy Office; of Bishops absent from their dioceses; of impediments of marriages and sacred orders; of pernicious books. Yet where heresies rampage with impunity, this obligation of denouncing heretics is not very urgent, unless the destruction of others were feared and could be impeded by denunciation. L. 1. 6, n. 993; l. 7, n. 214-217; Lugo d. 38, n. 17 ff.; Lehmkuhl, 8th ed., v. 1, n. 812.

Without fraternal correction having been sent beforehand, namely unless perhaps someone firmly judged that by a secret admonition immediately he could impede evils of this kind. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33. a. 7. Indeed, by the Lord's precept concerning admonition to be sent beforehand, the question is chiefly of a sin which harms only the delinquent, or has been committed against us, not of sins to the detriment of the community, or to be punished in judgment for preserving justice. S. Th. 4, d. 10, a. 3, q. 1 ad 4; Sanchez, Cons. Mor., l. 6, c. 2, dub. 14. But no admonition need be sent beforehand whenever it is prudently feared that the defendant, having been warned, may sin more secretly and with greater destruction of the civil or Christian republic. C. I. penal procedure 98, 101, 162, 172, 179, 286, 288; C. G. criminal procedure 29, 30, 317, 321.

When is someone not bound to accuse or denounce? - You are not bound, even with the precept of a superior posited, to accuse or denounce a crime: 1. If the delinquent has been amended, without danger of relapsing, and full satisfaction has been made to the injured party, nor is any danger imminent to others, nor is the crime notorious. The reason is that the infamy of the neighbor would follow without cause. L. 239, 244; Lugo d. 38, n. 23; S. Th. Quodl. 4, a. 12; Quodl. 11, a. 13.

2. If you know the crime under a natural secret committed to you, as counselor, advocate, physician, etc.; unless nevertheless he who committed the secret should unjustly vex an innocent person or the republic and be unwilling to desist. L. 239, 248; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 70. a. 1 ad 2; q. 68. a. ad 3; Quodl. 1, a. 15.

3. If from it grave danger to your life, honor, and goods is imminent, unless the crime redounds to common damage to be averted. The reason is that neither charity nor a positive precept obliges with so great an inconvenience. L. 236, 239, 248; Lugo d. 14, n. 117; d. 38, n. 36; Sanchez, Cons. Mor., l. 6, c. 2, d. 22, n. 2.

4. If you would also be compelled to prove and could not. "But if the sin has not been such that it redounds into the multitude, or even if he cannot adduce sufficient proof, he is not held to attempting accusation; because no one is held to that which he cannot complete in the due manner." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1 c.; L. 239.

5. If the delict is altogether hidden, and does not turn in any way to the common damage, or to the private damage of anyone, but harms only the delinquent; for his right to reputation would be injured. L. 248; S. Th. Quodl. 1, a. 16; Quodl. 4, a. 12. Likewise if the criminal action has been prescribed. Cf. Enchir. Mor., 4th ed., p. 172.

6. "It must be said that a man ought not proceed to accusation unless concerning a matter altogether certain to himself, in which ignorance of fact has no place." S. Th. q. 18, a. 3 ad 1.

7. Whenever the delinquents are sufficiently known to the superior and no fruit is hoped for from denunciation, denunciation can licitly be omitted. The reason is that no one is bound to do a useless thing. Likewise denunciation can be omitted when the delict is indeed against the common good, yet not so gravely harmful that it obliges to accusing; when an injury was brought upon you or your own, which you are not bound to prosecute. Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 38, n. 5; Sanchez, Cons. Mor., l. 6, c. 2, d. 17, n. 2; S. Th. q. 3 de Virtute, a. 2 ad 7. But no one is bound to denounce himself, since this obligation is had by no law; nor the companions of his crime, since this would be the same as denouncing himself. But if someone is legitimately interrogated by the judge concerning a crime, he is bound to denounce both himself and his associates. L. 254, 238; C. I. penal procedure 288-290.

8. But someone can licitly accuse and denounce whenever some delict is public, although by reason of itself it brings damage neither to society nor to another private person, but harms only the delinquent. The reason is that in such a case no right of the delinquent to his own reputation is injured, and denunciation in itself is always useful for the common good by reason of the scandal which is present in that publicity of the delict. And, if "scandal of many arises, now the sin harms not only him, but many." Wherefore the superior can then command that that sin be manifested; and with a just precept of the superior intervening, someone not only can but also must disclose the crime and obey the superior. S. Th. Quodl. 4, a. 12. Someone can also denounce a hidden delict already committed, if it would probably be foreseen that the delinquent would bring damage to others, or that his crime would soon become public. And therefore it is lawful to denounce a thief, murderer, etc., even if his delict is hidden. S. Th. ibid. The same must be said if denunciation is necessary so that you may recover your thing, although you can yield your right. C. I. penal procedure 288-290; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33. a. 7; Roncaglia tr. 6, q. 4 de Eleemos. spirit., rule in practice, observation III; L. 245; l. 6, n. 1000.

Whether, if someone knows the sin of the neighbor, he sins mortally by reporting it at once to his prelate? - The Angelic Doctor, Quodl. 11, a. 13, says: "I say that in these matters one must distinguish concerning the conditions of the subject and of the prelate. For if I know that a brother will be corrected by me, then I ought not denounce this to the prelate. But if it seems that this will be done better through the prelate, and the prelate nevertheless is pious, discreet, and spiritual, not having rancor or hatred against that subject, then this can licitly be denounced to him; and then he does not tell the Church, because he does not tell it to him as prelate, but as to a person profiting toward the correction and amendment of the neighbor. But because, on account of the diverse conditions of prelates and subjects, a general judgment cannot be given in this, because sometimes the prelate is moved to hatred against the subject, or the subject would not bear well the words of the prelate, therefore this must be held as a rule, that in all these things charity must always be preserved, and what seems better and more expedient; and if he intends this, namely the amendment of the neighbor, and preserves the good of charity as much as he can, then by denouncing he does not sin; but if he denounces this to any person from malice, and so that the neighbor may be confounded or oppressed, then the one denouncing or accusing sins mortally.... It must be said that if someone immediately reports to the prelate, applying due circumstances and considering that it is more expedient, he does not act against the precept of the Gospel, because he does not tell this to the Church, but to a person profiting, as was said, and therefore he does not sin mortally." Suarez, de Carit., d. 8, s. 6, n. 7; Lugo d. 14, n. 117 ff.

63 bis. Whether a subject is bound to reveal to a commanding prelate the hidden crime of a brother? - "It must be said that sin can be hidden in two ways. In one way simply; namely in such a way that it has in no way come to the knowledge of many; and such a hidden sin harms only the one doing it. And therefore he who knows such a hidden sin of a brother ought to intend only this, that he procure the salvation of the sinning brother; whence the order of fraternal correction was instituted by the Lord, Matt. 18: that first someone correct a brother sinning secretly between himself and him alone; afterward he should bring two or three witnesses; and then at last, if he is not corrected, tell the Church. If a prelate commands against this order, that the hidden sin of a brother be told to him, he is not to be obeyed, and he himself sins by commanding, because one must obey God rather than men, Acts 2. But if the sin of the brother is not so hidden that it does not come to the knowledge of the multitude through some suspicions, whence scandal of many arises, now the sin harms not only him but many. And because the good of the multitude is preferred to the good of one, therefore the prelate ought to investigate the truth concerning the fact, so that the scandal of the multitude may cease either through the punishment of the sinner or through his excuse. And therefore in such a case he can command one knowing the crime of a brother to manifest it; and he to whom it is commanded is bound to obey the prelate. For thus, since the crime is not altogether hidden, it pertains to the judgment of the prelate; and in this case the Decretal speaks, but not in the first." Quodl. 4, a. 12. Cf. C. Accepimus 16 De Purgatione Canonica.

24. • An accuser is said to be one who in criminal causes brings a crime before the judge, and asks from him vindication on account of the common good, and at the same time undertakes the obligation of proving the crime charged; but in civil causes, one who, as the injured party, compels an adversary to the judge, is called not accuser but plaintiff.

An accuser differs from a denouncer ¹, who brings some crime before the superior or judge, and yet does not undergo the obligation of proving it. - St. Ligorius, n. 253.

¹ ** Understand denunciation here not indeed as fraternal denunciation, whose aim is not punishment but the amendment of one’s neighbor, with the paternal admonition of the superior intervening, from which, because of his authority, amendment is hoped for more certainly; but juridical denunciation, whose aim, no otherwise than that of accusation, is the same as the aim of the judge in punishing, namely the common good, which redounds from the punishments of the wicked. Wherefore juridical denunciation seems to pertain to the same virtue to which the vindication of the judge pertains, namely to legal justice. See note to n. 518, vol. I.

According to Roman Law, all who are not specially prohibited by law can be accusers. But wards, the prepubescent, women, magistrates, the infamous, those closely joined, namely children with respect to parents and vice versa, brothers with respect to brothers, a wife with respect to her husband, and conversely, are prohibited. But by Canon Law there are excluded from the office of accuser 1º clerics in a secular judgment, especially in a cause of blood; 2º laymen with respect to clerics, unless the crime is monstrous, or tends to great harm of the Church; 3º heretics not tolerated, and excommunicated persons, with respect to the faithful. - St. Ligorius, n. 238.

Accusers according to the same Roman Law, if they are convicted of calumny, incur the penalty of retaliation, namely the penalty which they were seeking for the accused they themselves must undergo.

But by French law it is lawful for no private person to institute an accusation, but the whole office of accusing and of proving the crime is reserved only to the magistrate constituted for this, or to the general procurator of the Government. Hence it happens that it is also called the public ministry, because it undertakes and protects the interests of the community and of good morals against the accused.

The accused is said to be he who is accused in a trial, whether criminal or civil, whether he is guilty or innocent. Concerning the accused various doubts occur, especially about confession of the crime and flight. Hence:

25. Questions. - QUESTION 1º. Is the accused, when questioned by the judge, bound to confess the truth?

Resp. 1º No, if he is not legitimately questioned; which happens when the judge is not legitimate, or when he does not observe judicial form, as if he questions without a previous accusation, etc.; they also add, when there is not at least half-full proof of the crime. Thus commonly. - St. Ligorius, n. 272.

Resp. 2º Yes, if the accused is legitimately questioned, because he must obey the just precept of the judge. Except, sufficiently probably, if there is question of undergoing a great penalty; because the law is not judged to impose upon the accused so arduous an obligation, which seems to exceed human strength, namely that he, by confession of the crime, should spontaneously commit himself to the certain risk of a very grave penalty, provided however that grave public damage is not imminent from his silence ². St. Ligorius, n. 274, also says this opinion is sufficiently probable even intrinsically, although he calls the contrary more probable.

² St. Alphonsus expresses this exception thus, after other doctors (Bk. 4, n. 274): “Unless common damage is imminent from the withholding of confession of the crime, for example of heresy, treason, etc.; for then the accused is bound to betray himself, or at least his associates, as much as is necessary to avert the common damage, even if death is imminent to him from the revelation of the associates, from whom he will become convicted in court.” Moreover, two things occur that must be noted. For 1º damage to the republic must be understood not as just any kind, but as very great. For as Lugo says (On Justice, disp. 40, n. 15), human law can oblige a subject with danger of life only very rarely and on account of very great damage to the republic; but in the present case that danger is most certain. 2º Since the reason of averting this damage equally obliges all who are conscious of the crime, even if they have not been called into court, and since a precept which brings certain danger of life presents the greatest difficulty, hence it is plain that some impunity is fittingly granted from time to time to the accused, so that from a fuller knowledge of crimes and delinquents provision can be made more suitably for the public good.

Add also the warning from St. Alphonsus (l.c.): “All agree, as is fitting, in saying that if the accused is in good faith, and it is known that he will be induced with difficulty to confess the crime when questioned by the judge, the confessor must leave him in his good faith.”

QUESTION 2º. Can an innocent accused person reveal the hidden crimes of the witnesses or of the accuser for his own defense?

Resp. Yes, provided 1º the crime is true; 2º the revelation is absolutely necessary for the defense of his innocence; 3º and he himself otherwise would suffer grave damage. - St. Ligorius, n. 277.

26. • QUESTION 3º. Is it lawful for an innocent accused person to flee or resist?

Resp. It is indeed lawful for him to flee and to snatch himself from the hands of the officers; but it is not lawful to repel force by force, by killing or wounding, because he would violate the rights of public power. - St. Ligorius, n. 279.

QUESTION 4º. Is it also lawful for an accused person who has truly committed a crime to flee?

Resp. Yes, if he has not yet been condemned by juridical sentence to the penalty; because no one is bound to pay the penalty before the sentence. Likewise if he has already been condemned to a very grave penalty, and prison has been assigned to him for custody until he is punished with the established penalty. - Thus commonly. - St. Ligorius, n. 280.

They more commonly deny, however, if prison has already been assigned by the sentence of the judge as the penalty. The reason is that the accused is bound to obey in the execution of a just sentence. Nevertheless several except the case if necessary things are not given to him, or if the prison is very hard, because the obligation of not freeing oneself from a very grave penalty seems to exceed human strength, when someone can accomplish this without force and resistance. - Thus St. Ligorius, ibid. ³.

³ ** St. Alphonsus adds in the same place: “Probably by Lugo, Sanchez, and Navarrus with the Salmanticenses, against Sayrus, those condemned to the galleys are excused if they flee from prison, and even from the galleys themselves, as Sanchez, Lugo, Lessius, etc., hold as the more probable.”

QUESTION 5º. Is it lawful for the accused to flee, even if from this the guard will suffer damage?

Resp. Yes, because he uses his own right and does injury to no one, unless charity nevertheless should counsel otherwise because of much graver damage to the guard. Yet it is not lawful for the accused to corrupt the guard with money, because since the obligation lies upon the guard not to let the accused go, he would cooperate in his sin.

612. Notion. Affability,¹⁰⁷¹ which is sometimes also called friendship, courtesy, or civility, is the virtue by which someone, from the duty of social life, conducts himself pleasantly and becomingly toward others in common intercourse, both in deeds and in words.¹⁰⁷²

Explanation. An affable man conducts himself neither too flatteringly nor too harshly in human conversation. Affability is occupied chiefly with serious conversation; for it pertains to eutrapelia to preserve due measure in games and amusements, so that there be neither excess after the manner of a buffoon, nor the defect with which certain boors or rustics are tainted.

Affability pertains to the virtue of justice because it introduces a true due toward another. For man is by the very condition of his nature a social animal and consequently must conduct himself suitably toward other men living together with him. Hence it is evident that the virtue of affability, which rightly orders this intercourse, includes a true due, at least a moral one. This virtue of affability is most useful to every man, but chiefly to priests, who must become all things to all men so that they may gain all for Christ. This virtue is already treated in the ancient Corpus Iuris under the title On the Life and Upright Conduct of Clerics. All modern authors also, as many as have written concerning the conduct of clerics, strongly commend it.¹⁰⁷³

The principal acts of affability are: 1. to hear all kindly and address them willingly and with a cheerful countenance; 2. to show signs of courtesy to all, yet according to the condition of each one and the custom of the country; 3. inwardly and outwardly to have true charity toward one's neighbor and to combat excessive love toward oneself.

Several men think that for the duty of courtesy it suffices to show themselves by external words and gestures as well-educated men are accustomed to do; but this is wholly insufficient. For such courtesy is nothing other than a fraudulent pretense suited to deceiving simple men. This at last is true courtesy which proceeds from the inward conviction that everyone ought according to his ability to contribute to the peaceful and pleasant intercourse of human society, and especially of domestic society.

Opposed vices. Two vices are opposed to the virtue of affability: one by excess, namely, flattery; the other by defect, namely, moroseness or contentiousness.

¹⁰⁷¹ Freundlichkeit, Leutseligkeit, Höflichkeit, politesse, civilité, affabilité [friendliness, affability, courtesy].

¹⁰⁷² Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 114, a. 1.

¹⁰⁷³ Cf. Walter, Der katholische Priester I (Brixen, 1904), c. 2.

613. Flattery is a vice by which someone, in an inordinate and excessive manner in common conversation, endeavors by words or deeds to delight another for the sake of obtaining some advantage.¹⁰⁷⁴

A flatterer is one who praises and approves all the deeds and words of another for the sake of his own utility. Concerning this flattery St. Jerome¹⁰⁷⁵ rightly says: "There is nothing which so easily corrupts the minds of men as flattery." And St. Augustine¹⁰⁷⁶ says: "The tongue of the flatterer persecutes more than the hand of the murderer."

Flattery of itself indeed is not a mortal sin, because it is only an excess in the endeavor to please and delight, which does not appear gravely to conflict with charity; nevertheless, it often becomes a mortal sin because of the evil end of the agent, and notably for a threefold reason:¹⁰⁷⁷ 1. by reason of the matter, as when someone praises another's sin; for this is contrary both to the love of God, against whose justice the flatterer speaks, and to the love of one's neighbor, whom he fosters in sin. Hence it is a mortal sin according to the saying: "Woe to you that call evil good."¹⁰⁷⁸ The flattery practiced by a sycophant was discussed above, n. 106. 2. by reason of intention, as when someone flatters another in order fraudulently to harm him, whether bodily or spiritually. Hence it is said: "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy."¹⁰⁷⁹ Wicked men often use flatteries to corrupt girls. 3. by reason of effect, as when someone by flattering gives another an occasion of sinning gravely, even if he does not intend this. In this case those things which were said concerning scandal must be applied.

¹⁰⁷⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 115, a. 1. Niedrige Schmeichelei, Liebedienerei, flagornerie [base flattery, fawning, flattery].

¹⁰⁷⁵ Epistle to the matron Gelantia, n. 17 (Migne, Patr. lat. 22, 1212).

¹⁰⁷⁶ On Psalm 69 (Migne, l.c. 36, 869). The same St. Augustine (Sermo 353; Migne, l.c. 39, 1561) says briefly but rightly: "Flattery is seduction by deceitful praise."

¹⁰⁷⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 115, a. 2.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Isa. 5:20.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Prov. 27:6.

614. Contentiousness or moroseness¹⁰⁸⁰ is a vice by which someone shows himself difficult in company, rarely acquiescing and often deliberately contradicting the words of another with the intention of saddening the other or at least of not pleasing him.

If this contradiction proceeds from a defect of love uniting souls, it pertains to discord; but if it proceeds from anger, it is opposed to meekness.¹⁰⁸¹ Moroseness is of itself a venial sin, but accidentally it can become a mortal sin when, namely, it gravely injures the charity of one's neighbor and renders human society almost intolerable.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Streitsucht, Rechthaberei; rauhes, mürrisches, rechthaberisches Wesen, grognerie, ergoterie, grumbling [contentiousness, insistence on being right; a rough, sullen, opinionated disposition].

¹⁰⁸¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 116, a. 1.

S. Th. II-II, q. 114-116.

888. Affability (minzaamheid) does not have the perfect account of friendship, which is mutual love, but a likeness of it, insofar as someone bears himself decently toward those with whom he converses as toward friends, not indeed precisely from benevolence, but because it thus agrees with social life. It is also called comity, honesty, urbanity, and sometimes friendship, and can be defined: the virtue effecting pleasant conversation with the neighbor in words and in deeds, so that a man bears himself toward each one according to what is becoming.

It is a virtue, for by it someone, from the debt of social life, bears himself decently toward others in common living, with consideration of the condition of persons and other circumstances, so that his conversation is reasonably pleasing and sweet to all when it ought, and unless reason dictates otherwise.

It is a special virtue, because it has a special object or special account of good, which is in this, that a man be ordered fittingly toward others in common conversation according as social life requires.

It is annexed to justice, because it agrees with it in this, that it is toward another, but it falls short of the account of debt, which in it is neither legal nor proceeding from a benefit received, but considers only the debt of honesty, because we are of a social nature; hence it holds itself more on the part of the one in whom affability is than on the part of the others to whom it is exhibited.

It is a necessary virtue, for without it we are little suited for social life: just as man cannot live in society without truth, so he cannot live well without affability.

889. Two opposite vices are opposed to affability. - Affability holds the mean so that a man bears himself neither too flatteringly nor too harshly in human company. Hence by excess there is opposed to it adulation or flattery; by defect, moroseness or contentiousness.

A. Adulation is when someone beyond the due measure of virtue wishes to delight others by words or deeds in common conversation: if he does this with the sole intention of pleasing, he is called placid; if with the intention of utility, he is a flatterer strictly so called. Adulation can be defined: excessive and unbecoming accommodation to men.

Of itself it is not a mortal sin, because it is a mere excess in the pursuit of pleasing and delighting, which is not repugnant to charity; yet it can become mortal: 1) by reason of matter, as if someone praises another's mortal sin; 2) by reason of the intention of inflicting notable harm; 3) by reason of the effect, or occasionally, as if someone without the express intention nevertheless notably harms, giving occasion of grave sin or grave scandal.

B. Moroseness or contentiousness is when someone presents himself as difficult in company, never acquiescing, always contradicting the words of another, not indeed from defect of love: that is discord, which is opposed to charity; nor from anger: this is opposed to meekness; but from the intention of not pleasing or of saddening, so that someone may comply with his own ways. By St. Thomas it is called contentiousness, because in this way the morose man easily excites quarrels; although these are strictly distinguished: moroseness is harshness of conversation, contentiousness rather is contradiction of the actions of others.

Contentiousness of itself is not a mortal sin, because it only brings some annoyance in company, which is not against charity: for although it harms social life somewhat, nevertheless it does not overturn it. Yet considered according to itself it is graver than adulation, because it is more contrary to affability, which tends more to delighting than to saddening. And although adulation existing with deceit seems baser, nevertheless for this reason it is not of itself graver; but if it is considered according to the final cause, adulation will often be graver, by reason of the end which is intended, as of obtaining undue gain or honor through deception.

2303. • A PLAINTIFF or Petitioner, in civil causes, is he who proposes an action for obtaining reparation of his own damage, and who first summons to judgment, either by himself, or by a procurator. See n. 2316. - A Plaintiff in criminal matters is called an Accuser, and is he who brings a crime before the judge, and asks from him vindication for the common good in writing, with the burden of proving the crime charged.⁵

Note 1. From ROMAN LAW, accusers, if they are convicted of calumny, incur the penalty of retaliation, or ought to undergo the very penalty which they were seeking for the accused. - This penalty, however, from general custom, is no longer inflicted.

2. From MODERN law, private persons are not permitted to institute an accusation; for this function belongs solely to the magistracy constituted for this, i.e. to the general procurator of the State: who therefore, together with others destined for this office, is called the Public Ministry; for it belongs to them to assume and protect the parts of the Community and of good morals against defendants. - In lower tribunals, e.g. before the judge of the region, in a cause, as they say, correctional, the same office is committed to ministers of public security, or even to the first elected municipal Officials. But the general procurator, in fulfilling the parts of his office, is assisted by another official, who is called the Judge of instruction. To this man it generally belongs to collect arguments and indications of offenses before the suspects are cited, to make investigation of guilty persons, and to take care for their arrest, to inform the cause, and to order the suit in that manner which the laws prescribe or permit. - Let recourse be had to the Code of the respective nation.

2304. • The place of accusation is supplied by denouncement, concerning which a more special discussion must be given.

Denouncement in general is defined: the manifestation of someone's crime made to a Superior, with the burden of proving it not assumed. By these last words it is stated in what manner denouncement differs from accusation.

Denouncement is threefold: evangelical, canonical, and judicial. 1. Evangelical or paternal denouncement is the delation of a crime to a Superior as to a father, to the end that the defendant may come to his senses⁶ (See what was said n. 494). - 2. Canonical denouncement (which in certain cases is prescribed by the canons) is the delation of a crime to an ecclesiastical Superior, to the end that the crime may be impeded, or that an unworthy man may be removed from office.⁷ - 3. Judicial denouncement is the delation of a crime to a judge, whether lay or ecclesiastical, to the end that the defendant may be punished, or that damage may be repaired for the injured party. It is held in place of accusation, and lays the way for the judge to inquire.

2305. • The obligation of juridically denouncing arises from a threefold source, namely: from justice, from charity, and from a positive precept.

Principles. I. From LEGAL and COMMUTATIVE justice, those are held to denounce who are deputed to this by office, and are remunerated by the Prince or by masters by an agreed stipend. Of this kind are Fiscals, and other public officials, keepers of fields, of taxes, and of similar things, all of whom, since by office and by quasi-contract they are held to denounce crimes, are also held to repair damages to the Community, or to masters, which have followed from culpable omission of accusation or denouncement. - Recall what was said n. 988.

Gury notes that keepers of woods, fields, etc. sin if they denounce merely accidental damage, and that they are not held to denouncement if the delinquents spontaneously offer themselves to compensate the damage secretly.... But sometimes, he says, they can act more mildly with those causing damage, if the damages, e.g., are of lesser moment, and have not been repeated more often; if it can prudently be presumed that the master does not wish the delinquent to be brought forward; if the delinquent is very poor and not accustomed to offend, etc.; but let keepers carefully beware lest in these things they indulge more than is equitable.⁸

2306. • II. FROM CHARITY, for consulting the good of the Community or of the innocent, private persons are held to denounce certain OFFENSES or CRIMES, namely: 1. a crime turning to the damage of the Faith, or of the Community, as heresy, rebellion, falsification of monies, robbery on the public road, and the like: which each one ought to avert under grave obligation, even with grave inconvenience, because there is question of the common good (cf. n. 442). - 2. A crime from which grave damage threatens an innocent person, whenever no grave inconvenience is prudently to be feared for the denouncer. The reason is, because on the one side the innocent is to be preferred to the voluntarily harmful, but on the other, each one is held from charity to protect the innocent, when he can furnish this without grave inconvenience to himself⁹ (cf. n. 483, Reg. I.).

2307. • III. FROM THE PRECEPT OF A SUPERIOR, or from a MONITION or PUBLIC EDICT, all persons, for the most part, are held to denounce offenses. - But a precept of this kind does not urge, unless the delinquent is defamed, or at least suspected by grave indication, or when the crime turns to the damage of the Community, or of a third party; yet with this difference, that in the case of damage only inflicted or to be inflicted upon some third party, fraternal correction ought to be premised, nor is there obligation of denouncing with one's own damage; but when the offense turns to common damage, there is an obligation of denouncing, even with one's own damage, although the offense were occult; nor is previous correction to be premised, except in the rare case in which by secret warning the evil can be impeded at once (cf. n. 494 sq.).

We have said all persons for the most part; for: 1. by force of a Monition no one is held to denounce himself; for no one can be bound to brand himself with infamy; 2. he is not held to denounce those joined to himself within the fourth degree, except in the case of formal heresy, or of conspiracy against the Prince. "The reason is, because to denounce one joined to oneself is the same as to undergo grave damage or inconvenience: which reasonably excuses, when danger of common damage is absent."¹⁰

2308. • IT IS ASKED. When is it ILLICIT to denounce a crime?

Resp. You are not held, nor ought you (even supposing the precept of the Superior) to denounce: 1. If the crime is not public, nor harmful to society, and fruit is hoped from private warning; for then fraternal correction ought to be premised (cf. n. 494). - 2. If the delinquent has been amended, without danger of relapsing, and satisfaction has been made to the injured party, nor does danger threaten others; because the infamy of the neighbor would follow without cause. (See however what was said n. 1798 concerning solicitors.) - 3. If you know the crime under a committed secret, as consultant, advocate, etc.; unless however he who committed the secret to you were unjustly vexing an innocent person or the Community, and were unwilling to desist from vexing (cf. n. 1187).

Note. From ECCLESIASTICAL LAW these must be denounced: - 1. Heretics and those suspected of heresy (cf. n. 442); - 2. Confessors who solicit (cf. n. 1354; 1794 sqq.); - 3. Confessors who demand that the name of an accomplice be revealed to themselves (n. 1701); - 4. Masons and others enrolled in secret sects (n. 1331); - 5. The unworthy to be promoted to sacred Orders (cf. n. 1916); - 6. Betrothed persons entangled in a diriment impediment and about to enter matrimony already published (cf. n. 2065).¹¹

I. On the accuser.

1071. • He is called an accuser who in criminal causes brings a crime to the judge, and asks vindication from him on account of the common good, and at the same time undertakes the obligation of proving the objected crime: but in civil causes he who, as the injured party, compels the adversary to the judge, is not called accuser, but actor (plaintiff).

The accuser differs from the denouncer, who brings some crime to the Superior or judge for vindication, and nevertheless does not undergo the obligation of proving it. - Therefore denunciation is not understood here as fraternal, whose scope is not punishment but the amendment of the neighbor, with the paternal admonition of the Superior intervening, from which amendment is hoped more certainly on account of his authority, - but juridical. L. V. 235.

By our law the obligation of proving a denounced crime is incumbent only on the magistrate constituted for this, or the procurator of the State. But private persons also are held to denunciation from charity, and indeed under grave obligation and even with grave inconvenience, when it is a question of avoiding common and grave damage, or even, but not with grave inconvenience, if it is a question of averting grave damage from an innocent person.¹

II. On the accused.

An accused person (accused in a criminal cause, defendant in a civil) is called he who is accused in judgment either criminal or civil, whether he is guilty or innocent.

1072. Questions. - Query 1° Whether the accused, questioned by the judge, is held to confess the truth?

Resp. 1° Negatively by our positive law. "Nor shall" (any person) "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."²

Resp. 2° Affirmatively by natural law, if this is necessary to avert common damage. Yet he must be left in good faith if fruit is scarcely hoped from the warning.

Resp. 3° Affirmatively also, if it is a question of an ecclesiastical punishment, which namely is medicinal, provided he is legitimately questioned, i.e. by a legitimate judge, with the judicial form observed and the offense half-fully proved.⁴

Query 2° Whether the accused, although not legitimately questioned, if it is a question of an ecclesiastical punishment, at least from this cause must confess the crime, because otherwise he by whom he was accused or denounced could be held as a calumniator?

Resp. This certainly and altogether must be denied. The reason is that no sane person will hold the accused as falsely accused because the crime has not been confessed, and the accused not confessing who, other proofs failing, is absolved, is held not as innocent, but simply as not convicted. L. V. 277.

Query 3° Whether it is licit for the accused to appeal?

Resp. Distinguish. For either it is a question of a civil cause, or of a criminal. If of a civil, and this either certainly unjust or less probable, it is not licit, as is clear from the things said n. 60. II. 3°; otherwise, if it is doubtful whether the superior judge is justly going to render sentence for the accused, because since the minds of men are diverse, perhaps the opinion which the inferior judge judged less probable will appear more probable to the superior, and the accused can licitly try this.⁵ - If of a criminal cause, generally and practically speaking, among us it will almost always be licit; for 1° the right of an appeal properly so called in a criminal cause is not given here to the accused except by decree of the judge, which it is surely licit for the accused to ask by legitimate means. 2° St. Alphonsus teaches with the common opinion that the accused is not held to abstain from an appeal from a sentence, even an altogether just one, except in the case in which it is certain that the opposite cannot be proved; but in practice that certitude, when a new judgment has been granted, will scarcely ever be present, especially among us, since jurors are very easy in absolving. (q) p. 483.

Query 4° Whether an innocent accused person can reveal occult crimes of witnesses or of the accuser for his own defense?

Resp. Affirmatively, provided 1° the crime is true; 2° the revelation is absolutely necessary for his own defense; 3° otherwise he himself is going to suffer grave damage² (n. 517. III. IV.).

1073. • Query 5° Whether it is licit for an innocent accused person to flee or resist?

Resp. It is indeed licit for him to flee and to snatch himself from the hands of attendants; but it is not licit to repel force by force, by killing or wounding, because he would violate the rights of public power.³

Query 6° Whether it is licit also for an accused person who truly committed an offense to flee?

Resp. Affirmatively, if he has not yet been condemned by juridical sentence to the punishment; because no one is held to pay the punishment before sentence. Likewise if he has already been condemned to a most grave punishment, and prison has been assigned to him for custody until he is struck by the established punishment. - Thus commonly.⁴

But they more commonly deny if prison has already been assigned as punishment by the sentence of the judge. The reason is that the accused is held to obey in the execution of a just sentence. Yet many except if necessary things are not given to him, or if the prison is most harsh: because the obligation of not freeing oneself from a most grave punishment seems to exceed human strength when one can accomplish this without force and resistance.⁵

Query 7° Whether it is licit for the accused to flee, even if the guard is going to suffer damage from it?

Resp. Affirmatively, because he uses his right and does injury to no one, unless nevertheless charity suggests otherwise on account of damage to the guard much graver. Yet it is not licit for the accused to corrupt the guard with money, because, since an obligation is incumbent on the guard of not dismissing the accused, he would cooperate with this man's sin. L. V. 282.

Query 8° Whether it is licit for those who are not ministers of justice to help the accused, so that he can escape from prison?

Resp. Affirmatively, in the case in which this is licit for the accused, and provided 1° the flight of the accused, because, e.g., he is a highway robber or similar, is not pernicious to the Republic, and 2° from this, for example from a break-in, the security of the prison does not perish. The reason is that to help another toward an end licit to him cannot be illicit.²

Query 9° Whether it is licit for the accused to decline a MILDER punishment, for example a fine or a not long prison, to which he was justly condemned, BUT WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN INFLICTED UPON HIM?

Resp. Kenrick:³ "I think all punishments are so established by law and decreed by the judge that they are to be inflicted by the ministers of justice; and therefore I do not dare to condemn him who, another's right being uninjured, withdraws himself" from punishment of this kind, "provided however he does not apply force and does not disturb public order."

FRIENDSHIP, which is also called affability, is a special virtue, by which one is rightly ordered toward other men in ordinary social intercourse, so that in deeds as well as in words one conducts oneself toward each person as is fitting. Thus St. Thomas, article 1. Hence St. Bonaventure, 3rd part, Centil. sect. 44, defines it thus: It is a good will toward someone, for the sake of the one who is loved, with a like intention on the part of the one who loves. The same is found in the opusc. Declaratorio terminorum Theol. St. Doctor includes it in Grace, lib. 5, Compend. Theol. cap. 37, namely because by it human fellowship is preserved and becomes pleasant.

NOTE here that we are not speaking of perfect friendship, which rests on Charity. Of that I have treated in the Tract. de Charitate: nor of another kind, based on the motive of perfect natural goodness, which consists in a special love and communication toward another; but of a certain imperfect friendship, by which one behaves agreeably and decently toward others in ordinary association and living together, lest anything harsh, peevish, inhuman, or rude be shown in words or manners; which is why St. Bonaventure calls it Grace, and St. Thomas Affability.

Now friendship is a potential part of justice, as D. Bonav. teaches in the places cited, and D. Thomas, quaest. 114, art. 2. For it is directed to another, but falls short of the perfect reason of a debt.

There are two contrary vices of Friendship, namely Flattery and Quarrelsomeness. The former exceeds in giving pleasure; the latter holds back, and makes social intercourse bitter.

St. Doctor defines FLATTERY, p. p. Centil. sect. 13: It is speech of praise offered about another, with the intention of pleasing; it is twofold: one kind attributes a good not possessed; another kind extols a good possessed; another nourishes evil by praising evil. Hence Psalm 9: The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul. There is also a kind by which one wishes to please others, though not for God's sake, yet with true praise, of which Galatians 1: If I yet pleased men — that is, wished to please them — not for God's sake, I should not be the servant of Christ. The same is taught in the little work Declaratorio terminorum Theologiae.

QUARRELSOMENESS, indeed, makes social intercourse harsh; therefore St. Francis in his rule, cap. 3, rejects it as an enemy of peace and friendship, as St. Doctor observes there.

Either of these vices can be mortal. Flattery, indeed, by praising another's sin — of these Isaiah 5: Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil. Second, by reason of intention, as if one flatters someone in order to harm him. Third, by reason of effect, when the flatterer's praise is an occasion of sinning for the other, as D. Bonavent. teaches in speculo animae, cap. 1. Many examples of flattery from the Scriptures are brought forward by St. Doctor in the Bibliis pauperum, cap. 69. There Chore and his accomplices are condemned mortally, flattering the people so as to stir them up against Moses, saying: It is enough for you that the whole multitude are holy, Numbers 16. So Absalom, who flattered in order to lead David's subjects into an unjust war, 2 Reg. 15. See other things there.

You have many things from the Holy Fathers on Flattery in D. Bonavent. lib. 3, Pharetrae, cap. 3, §. De adulatione.

But if you flatter out of mere complacency in praising, or even to avoid some evil, it is not mortal. Thus D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cited place, and D. Thom. quaest. 115, art. 2.

I. QUESTION I. Is anyone bound to accuse or to denounce? ANSWER. This distinction between an accuser and a denouncer St. Thomas constitutes, II-II, q. 68, art. 1: that a denouncer intends a brother's amendment, an accuser the punishment of a crime. Those who by office are deputed to this duty, and who receive a stipend from the commonwealth, are bound in justice to accuse offenders inflicting public losses, such as are fiscal officers, watchmen, keepers of fields and woods, and so forth. If a crime turn to public loss, whether temporal or spiritual, even private persons are bound either to accuse or to denounce. Crimes which tend to public loss are the betrayal of one's country, the adulteration of coins, poisonings, heresy, and so forth. Wherefore Alexander VII proscribed the following thesis: Although it be evidently established that Peter is a heretic, one is not bound to denounce him, if one cannot prove it. A denouncer is not bound to prove, but only an accuser. For those who cannot prove a crime are not bound to accuse.