Question Four: On Affability

888. Affability (minzaamheid) does not have the perfect account of friendship, which is mutual love, but a likeness of it, insofar as someone bears himself decently toward those with whom he converses as toward friends, not indeed precisely from benevolence, but because it thus agrees with social life. It is also called comity, honesty, urbanity, and sometimes friendship, and can be defined: the virtue effecting pleasant conversation with the neighbor in words and in deeds, so that a man bears himself toward each one according to what is becoming.

It is a virtue, for by it someone, from the debt of social life, bears himself decently toward others in common living, with consideration of the condition of persons and other circumstances, so that his conversation is reasonably pleasing and sweet to all when it ought, and unless reason dictates otherwise.

It is a special virtue, because it has a special object or special account of good, which is in this, that a man be ordered fittingly toward others in common conversation according as social life requires.

It is annexed to justice, because it agrees with it in this, that it is toward another, but it falls short of the account of debt, which in it is neither legal nor proceeding from a benefit received, but considers only the debt of honesty, because we are of a social nature; hence it holds itself more on the part of the one in whom affability is than on the part of the others to whom it is exhibited.

It is a necessary virtue, for without it we are little suited for social life: just as man cannot live in society without truth, so he cannot live well without affability.

889. Two opposite vices are opposed to affability. - Affability holds the mean so that a man bears himself neither too flatteringly nor too harshly in human company. Hence by excess there is opposed to it adulation or flattery; by defect, moroseness or contentiousness.

A. Adulation is when someone beyond the due measure of virtue wishes to delight others by words or deeds in common conversation: if he does this with the sole intention of pleasing, he is called placid; if with the intention of utility, he is a flatterer strictly so called. Adulation can be defined: excessive and unbecoming accommodation to men.

Of itself it is not a mortal sin, because it is a mere excess in the pursuit of pleasing and delighting, which is not repugnant to charity; yet it can become mortal: 1) by reason of matter, as if someone praises another's mortal sin; 2) by reason of the intention of inflicting notable harm; 3) by reason of the effect, or occasionally, as if someone without the express intention nevertheless notably harms, giving occasion of grave sin or grave scandal.

B. Moroseness or contentiousness is when someone presents himself as difficult in company, never acquiescing, always contradicting the words of another, not indeed from defect of love: that is discord, which is opposed to charity; nor from anger: this is opposed to meekness; but from the intention of not pleasing or of saddening, so that someone may comply with his own ways. By St. Thomas it is called contentiousness, because in this way the morose man easily excites quarrels; although these are strictly distinguished: moroseness is harshness of conversation, contentiousness rather is contradiction of the actions of others.

Contentiousness of itself is not a mortal sin, because it only brings some annoyance in company, which is not against charity: for although it harms social life somewhat, nevertheless it does not overturn it. Yet considered according to itself it is graver than adulation, because it is more contrary to affability, which tends more to delighting than to saddening. And although adulation existing with deceit seems baser, nevertheless for this reason it is not of itself graver; but if it is considered according to the final cause, adulation will often be graver, by reason of the end which is intended, as of obtaining undue gain or honor through deception.