Chapter — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology
VI. On Accusers
What is an accuser? What is a denouncer? How many kinds of denunciation are there? - An accuser is said to be one who in criminal causes reports a crime to the judge, and from him demands vindication on account of the common good, and at the same time undertakes the obligation of proving the crime objected. But in civil causes, he who as the injured party compels the adversary to the judge is not called accuser, but plaintiff. An accuser differs from a denouncer, who reports a crime to a superior or judge, and nevertheless does not undergo the obligation of proving it.
Denunciation is twofold: one juridical, another evangelical. The former is a report made to a superior as to a judge, so that, once the case has been known, he may proceed from judgment; and its scope is the punishment of the delinquent and the good of others, especially the common good, which redounds from the punishment of the wicked, and also the good of the denouncer himself. The latter is a report made to a superior as to a father; and its scope is not punishment, but the amendment of the neighbor, or the good of the one denounced, through the paternal admonition of the superior intervening, from which, on account of his authority, a more certain amendment is hoped for. When denunciation is made to a Superior as to a father, he cannot himself proceed as judge.
Juridical denunciation can be made judicially, the due forms having been observed, and extrajudicially, by simply manifesting the matter to the superior and committing to his prudence what ought to be done. It pertains to the same virtue to which the vindication of the judge belongs, namely to legal justice.
L. 235; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1, 2 c. ad 3; s. q. 62. a. 3 ad 6; Quodl. 1, a. 16; Quodl. 11, a. 13.
Who are prohibited from accusing? - From natural law, regularly speaking, infamous persons, stained by greater crimes, are prohibited from accusing; for their testimony can be of no authority. Enemies; because accusation is reasonably presumed to proceed from an affection of vengeance. Children against parents, a wife against a husband; for this is repugnant to piety, unless it concerns imminent common damage, or one's own or another's damage which cannot otherwise be avoided. These also are repelled from bearing testimony. L. 236.
From Canon Law clerics are barred from the office of accuser in secular judgment, especially in a case of blood. Except, however, if they accuse the defendant for this end, that they may guard against their own damage, or that it may be repaired to them; then a cleric and religious can accuse the malefactor even before a lay judge. This is lawful not only in one's own case, but also in the case of one's own church, or of relatives to the fourth degree, or even of domestics. Likewise, if common evil or the evil of others cannot otherwise be impeded, they must denounce the delict, even if it is worthy of death. Nevertheless, to avoid danger of irregularity, the cleric and religious must first make protestation before the judge that he does not act unto vengeance, nor unto penalty of blood, but rather for the defense only of himself or his own and for the triumph of justice. If this protestation is omitted, even through inculpable forgetfulness, irregularity is still incurred; because forgetfulness excuses from fault, not from this irregularity, which was introduced by reason of gentleness. C. Praelatis 2 de Hom. in the Sixth; L. 1. 7, n. 468.
Laymen cannot accuse clerics, unless the cleric is a dissipator of the goods of the church, or a heretic, simoniac, sacrilegious person, etc.; or unless the layman prosecutes his own case, or the case of his own, or if damages are to be inflicted on others in the future in such a way that they cannot otherwise be impeded. Likewise clerics cannot accuse religious, who can be accused only by religious of the same Order. L. 238; l. 7, n. 468. Non-tolerated heretics and excommunicated persons cannot be accusers with respect to the faithful. L. 238. "Children are commonly prohibited from accusing parents, subjects prelates, servants masters, likewise public sinners, as is gathered from various Decrees.... Yet all these can denounce when the crime is pernicious to the republic.... For one's own injury anyone can accuse. Moreover, as regards this, an injury is reputed one's own which pertains to himself or to his own." Lugo d. 38, n. 7, 10. Decretals de Accusationib.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1 ad 1, 2; q. 70. a. 1 ad 3, a. 3.
From Roman Law, wards, those below puberty, women, magistrates, infamous persons, those closely joined, that is, children with respect to parents, brothers with respect to brothers, a wife with respect to her husband and conversely, are prohibited from accusing. L. 1 ff. de Accusationibus et inscriptionibus. "It is not permitted to a woman to make anyone a defendant in public judgment." L. 1 de Accus. et Inscript.
From C. I. penal procedure 41, 42, 98, 422 ff., denunciation of a crime can be made by anyone to the General Procurator, the royal Procurator, or another official of judicial police. But the accusation in judgment is sustained by the General Procurator. The same is had from C. G. criminal procedure 22, 29, 30, 271, 284, 315.
When is someone bound to accuse or denounce? - He is bound to accuse or denounce, whether judicially or at least extrajudicially, even without fraternal correction having been sent beforehand: 1. When it concerns avoiding common damage. But crimes against the common good are heresy, rebellion, falsification of coinage, homicides and thefts committed by assassins or highway robbers, subornation of votes in elections to public chairs, offices of magistrates, etc., the sin of a religious bringing damage to religion, etc. "If the crime," says the Angelic Doctor, 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1 c., "has been such that it turns to the detriment of the republic, a man is bound to accusation, provided that he can prove it sufficiently, which pertains to the office of an accuser; for instance, when someone's sin turns to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the multitude." Lugo d. 38, n. 2, 14; L. 236.
- If grave damage is imminent to an innocent person. For charity obliges us to impede the damage of the neighbor. But by hypothesis this can be done either by accusing or by denouncing. Therefore there will be a grave obligation of making accusation, or at least denunciation. Eccl. 4, 9; L. 236.
Note "nevertheless, that there is not always an obligation of impeding the damage of an innocent person through denunciation of him who inflicts the damage, if this latter person would have to suffer equal damage, because since he is a neighbor, there is no source from which an obligation arises to damage him so in favor of the other; not always, for there is an obligation if the innocent person is very joined to you, for example, if he is your father or your son, or if it would redound to common damage, or if the damager of himself ought to undergo that damage to free the innocent person." La-Croix l. 2, n. 2, n. 219.
- If someone receives a stipend for this from the republic or from private masters, as do fiscals, or guards of houses or fields, superintendents of customs, etc.; and they are held even with grave inconvenience to themselves. For they are obliged from quasi-contract and from justice, not from mere charity.
Otherwise they are bound to restitution of the damages which come to the republic or masters because of the omission of accusation or denunciation. L. 236. Indeed more than this, these are often held even from office to seize the guilty and hand them over, once seized, to the magistrate to be punished. But whether these are also bound to restore the value of the penalty or fine, if they do not denounce, some from St. Alphonsus 237 "affirm very probably... because, by omitting denunciation, to which they were held by reason of office, they are the cause that the treasury or master does not exact the penalty to which he had a right. But others deny this sufficiently probably... because penal law does not intend that the treasury or masters be enriched by fines, but that they themselves be preserved unharmed, and that transgressors be punished. But indirectly and accidentally the law furnishes a right that fines be exacted from it, but after sentence; for before it neither the treasury nor masters have any right to the penalty. Hence, although fiscals by not denouncing sin against legal justice, nevertheless they do not sin against commutative justice with respect to the fine; and therefore they are bound only to repair the damage of revenues which merchants ought to have paid." Cf. 15.
"Someone is sometimes bound to denounce, indeed even to accuse, a delinquent, if this is necessary for avoiding or repairing the damage of his own family, which otherwise would remain dishonored, or destitute of support." L. 237. For this is owed not only from charity but from piety.
There is an obligation of denouncing from the precept or edicts of prelates and superiors. Not only ecclesiastical prelates, but also secular Princes can command under various penalties that those who know such and such a delict manifest it at once. And thus Pontifical Constitutions command denunciation of heretics, or of those suspected of heresy; of those soliciting in Confession, or asking the name of an accomplice, with absolution denied unless it is revealed; of hidden leaders of sects; of superiors of lay Institutes, or religious superioresses, daring to induce religious or nuns or sisters to the opening of their own conscience; of those violating the oath prescribed by the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum and unwilling to sign the formula of the same oath; of those injuring or terrifying those who denounce to the Holy Office; of Bishops absent from their dioceses; of impediments of marriages and sacred orders; of pernicious books. Yet where heresies rampage with impunity, this obligation of denouncing heretics is not very urgent, unless the destruction of others were feared and could be impeded by denunciation. L. 1. 6, n. 993; l. 7, n. 214-217; Lugo d. 38, n. 17 ff.; Lehmkuhl, 8th ed., v. 1, n. 812.
Without fraternal correction having been sent beforehand, namely unless perhaps someone firmly judged that by a secret admonition immediately he could impede evils of this kind. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33. a. 7. Indeed, by the Lord's precept concerning admonition to be sent beforehand, the question is chiefly of a sin which harms only the delinquent, or has been committed against us, not of sins to the detriment of the community, or to be punished in judgment for preserving justice. S. Th. 4, d. 10, a. 3, q. 1 ad 4; Sanchez, Cons. Mor., l. 6, c. 2, dub. 14. But no admonition need be sent beforehand whenever it is prudently feared that the defendant, having been warned, may sin more secretly and with greater destruction of the civil or Christian republic. C. I. penal procedure 98, 101, 162, 172, 179, 286, 288; C. G. criminal procedure 29, 30, 317, 321.
When is someone not bound to accuse or denounce? - You are not bound, even with the precept of a superior posited, to accuse or denounce a crime: 1. If the delinquent has been amended, without danger of relapsing, and full satisfaction has been made to the injured party, nor is any danger imminent to others, nor is the crime notorious. The reason is that the infamy of the neighbor would follow without cause. L. 239, 244; Lugo d. 38, n. 23; S. Th. Quodl. 4, a. 12; Quodl. 11, a. 13.
If you know the crime under a natural secret committed to you, as counselor, advocate, physician, etc.; unless nevertheless he who committed the secret should unjustly vex an innocent person or the republic and be unwilling to desist. L. 239, 248; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 70. a. 1 ad 2; q. 68. a. ad 3; Quodl. 1, a. 15.
If from it grave danger to your life, honor, and goods is imminent, unless the crime redounds to common damage to be averted. The reason is that neither charity nor a positive precept obliges with so great an inconvenience. L. 236, 239, 248; Lugo d. 14, n. 117; d. 38, n. 36; Sanchez, Cons. Mor., l. 6, c. 2, d. 22, n. 2.
If you would also be compelled to prove and could not. "But if the sin has not been such that it redounds into the multitude, or even if he cannot adduce sufficient proof, he is not held to attempting accusation; because no one is held to that which he cannot complete in the due manner." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 1 c.; L. 239.
If the delict is altogether hidden, and does not turn in any way to the common damage, or to the private damage of anyone, but harms only the delinquent; for his right to reputation would be injured. L. 248; S. Th. Quodl. 1, a. 16; Quodl. 4, a. 12. Likewise if the criminal action has been prescribed. Cf. Enchir. Mor., 4th ed., p. 172.
"It must be said that a man ought not proceed to accusation unless concerning a matter altogether certain to himself, in which ignorance of fact has no place." S. Th. q. 18, a. 3 ad 1.
Whenever the delinquents are sufficiently known to the superior and no fruit is hoped for from denunciation, denunciation can licitly be omitted. The reason is that no one is bound to do a useless thing. Likewise denunciation can be omitted when the delict is indeed against the common good, yet not so gravely harmful that it obliges to accusing; when an injury was brought upon you or your own, which you are not bound to prosecute. Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 38, n. 5; Sanchez, Cons. Mor., l. 6, c. 2, d. 17, n. 2; S. Th. q. 3 de Virtute, a. 2 ad 7. But no one is bound to denounce himself, since this obligation is had by no law; nor the companions of his crime, since this would be the same as denouncing himself. But if someone is legitimately interrogated by the judge concerning a crime, he is bound to denounce both himself and his associates. L. 254, 238; C. I. penal procedure 288-290.
But someone can licitly accuse and denounce whenever some delict is public, although by reason of itself it brings damage neither to society nor to another private person, but harms only the delinquent. The reason is that in such a case no right of the delinquent to his own reputation is injured, and denunciation in itself is always useful for the common good by reason of the scandal which is present in that publicity of the delict. And, if "scandal of many arises, now the sin harms not only him, but many." Wherefore the superior can then command that that sin be manifested; and with a just precept of the superior intervening, someone not only can but also must disclose the crime and obey the superior. S. Th. Quodl. 4, a. 12. Someone can also denounce a hidden delict already committed, if it would probably be foreseen that the delinquent would bring damage to others, or that his crime would soon become public. And therefore it is lawful to denounce a thief, murderer, etc., even if his delict is hidden. S. Th. ibid. The same must be said if denunciation is necessary so that you may recover your thing, although you can yield your right. C. I. penal procedure 288-290; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33. a. 7; Roncaglia tr. 6, q. 4 de Eleemos. spirit., rule in practice, observation III; L. 245; l. 6, n. 1000.
Whether, if someone knows the sin of the neighbor, he sins mortally by reporting it at once to his prelate? - The Angelic Doctor, Quodl. 11, a. 13, says: "I say that in these matters one must distinguish concerning the conditions of the subject and of the prelate. For if I know that a brother will be corrected by me, then I ought not denounce this to the prelate. But if it seems that this will be done better through the prelate, and the prelate nevertheless is pious, discreet, and spiritual, not having rancor or hatred against that subject, then this can licitly be denounced to him; and then he does not tell the Church, because he does not tell it to him as prelate, but as to a person profiting toward the correction and amendment of the neighbor. But because, on account of the diverse conditions of prelates and subjects, a general judgment cannot be given in this, because sometimes the prelate is moved to hatred against the subject, or the subject would not bear well the words of the prelate, therefore this must be held as a rule, that in all these things charity must always be preserved, and what seems better and more expedient; and if he intends this, namely the amendment of the neighbor, and preserves the good of charity as much as he can, then by denouncing he does not sin; but if he denounces this to any person from malice, and so that the neighbor may be confounded or oppressed, then the one denouncing or accusing sins mortally.... It must be said that if someone immediately reports to the prelate, applying due circumstances and considering that it is more expedient, he does not act against the precept of the Gospel, because he does not tell this to the Church, but to a person profiting, as was said, and therefore he does not sin mortally." Suarez, de Carit., d. 8, s. 6, n. 7; Lugo d. 14, n. 117 ff.
63 bis. Whether a subject is bound to reveal to a commanding prelate the hidden crime of a brother? - "It must be said that sin can be hidden in two ways. In one way simply; namely in such a way that it has in no way come to the knowledge of many; and such a hidden sin harms only the one doing it. And therefore he who knows such a hidden sin of a brother ought to intend only this, that he procure the salvation of the sinning brother; whence the order of fraternal correction was instituted by the Lord, Matt. 18: that first someone correct a brother sinning secretly between himself and him alone; afterward he should bring two or three witnesses; and then at last, if he is not corrected, tell the Church. If a prelate commands against this order, that the hidden sin of a brother be told to him, he is not to be obeyed, and he himself sins by commanding, because one must obey God rather than men, Acts 2. But if the sin of the brother is not so hidden that it does not come to the knowledge of the multitude through some suspicions, whence scandal of many arises, now the sin harms not only him but many. And because the good of the multitude is preferred to the good of one, therefore the prelate ought to investigate the truth concerning the fact, so that the scandal of the multitude may cease either through the punishment of the sinner or through his excuse. And therefore in such a case he can command one knowing the crime of a brother to manifest it; and he to whom it is commanded is bound to obey the prelate. For thus, since the crime is not altogether hidden, it pertains to the judgment of the prelate; and in this case the Decretal speaks, but not in the first." Quodl. 4, a. 12. Cf. C. Accepimus 16 De Purgatione Canonica.