Anger

Anger is the inordinate appetite for revenge.

Revenge is the infliction of pain in satisfaction for an injury. As private individuals we are not allowed to avenge injuries which have been done us: “To no man rendering evil for evil. . . . Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath, for it is written: Revenge to me; I will repay, saith the Lord.¹ Sometimes, however, in trivial matters the immediate punishment of an injury is allowed to private persons, in order to prevent a recurrence of the injustice, or under circumstances in which such an action is really an act of self-defence. In other cases private revenge is not allowed, but belongs to those whose duty it is to correct delinquents and to avenge outraged justice. Anger, then, will be inordinate whenever revenge is sought without just cause, or more severe than the cause requires, or when private vengeance is indulged in, or when it is sought merely to satisfy hatred and spite. In these cases anger is of itself a grave sin because it is against justice and charity; if there be merely want of moderation in the manner of seeking or executing lawful vengeance, the sin will be venial.

¹ Rom. xii 17.

To be angry in moderation for a just cause is not sinful: “ Be angry, and sin not.”¹ Sin may even be committed through defect of anger, as when a parent or superior is never moved to anger against the faults of children or subjects, but permits them to go unpunished to their loss and the public inconvenience.

¹ Eph. iv 26.

The daughters of anger, or the sins which spring from the same root, are indignation and the swelling of passion, blasphemy, imprecation, quarrelling, and contumely; fighting, sedition, striking, and wounding; which are for the most part treated of in other chapters, or present no difficulty.

Contumely is an insulting word or gesture said or done in order to dishonour our neighbour. It is against charity, and of itself is a mortal sin except when the matter is trivial. A superior may, however, with moderation and caution treat a subject contumeliously, not in order to dishonour him, but to correct or humble him. Chaffing another about his foibles for the sake of recreation is not sinful unless it goes too far and provokes to anger or cuts too deep.

I. Notion. Anger is the inordinate appetite of vengeance. It is opposed to meekness. According to St. Thomas (II-II, q. 158, aa. 2 and 3), the inordinateness can be: 1. on the part of the object, as if you desire vengeance plainly unjust, or greater than is just, or to be inflicted by private authority, or to be inflicted from hatred, and not for the due end of preserving justice and correcting fault; 2. on the part of the manner of becoming angry, when someone either inwardly blazes up too much or outwardly discloses anger too much (St. Alphonsus, V, 79). "If vengeance is desired ordinately, it is not the sin of anger: as when superiors are angry at the faults of subjects, and punish or avenge them" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

II. Morality. 1. Anger inordinate on the part of the object is mortal from its genus; this is clear first from Sacred Scripture, according to which anger excludes from heaven;¹ then from the fact that it is opposed to charity or even to justice (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, 79).

2. Anger inordinate on the part of the manner is venial, as is every inordinate use of a licit thing. "It can nevertheless become mortal by accident, as if blasphemy or cursing is added" (St. Alphonsus, cited place; St. Thomas, cited place).

¹ Gal. 5:20-21. The printed note at this point appears to be misplaced; the Peter/Luke citations printed near the same marker belong to the following remedy on Christ's meekness.

III. The daughters of anger are:

1. In the heart: indignation; and swelling of mind, by which someone morosely devises diverse ways of vengeance and by these thoughts swells up his soul.

2. In the mouth: shouting, insult, blasphemy, cursing.

3. In deed: quarrel and fights (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 7; St. Alphonsus, V, 80-83).

IV. Remedies of anger: 1. Consider the meekness of Christ.¹ 2. Weigh that you almost always repent of what you have said or done when angry.² 3. Accustom yourself to resist at once the rising movement, and abstain from acting and speaking until anger has cooled.³

¹ 1 Pet. 2:23; Luke 23:34; Matt. 11:29.

² Hence the saying: An angry man, when he has returned to himself, is angry with himself.

³ Cf. Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, n. 979.

The predominant individual motives for sin are as numerous as the different characters of those addicted to sin, and hence it is impossible to classify them. The predominant general motives for sin, on the contrary, can be assigned according to the principal goods that most often move or repel with wills of all who commit sin, as follows: (a) goods of the soul, such as praise and honor, inordinately pursued (the vice of pride); (b) goods of the body, inordinately desired (the views of lust and gluttony); (c) goods that are external, unduly loved (the vice of avarice); (d) one’s own good, not sufficiently wished (the vice of sloth); (e) the neighbor’s good, not suffiviently desired (the vices of envy and anger).

Causes of Fighting.—The remedy of sinful fighting is the removal of its causes. The sources of fighting are proximate and remote.

(a) The immediate cause is anger. The angry man provokes fights (Prov., xv. 18, xxix. 22), for anger, being a desire of revenge, is not content to injure another secretly, but wishes to punish him—that is, to injure him in such a Way that he will know he is being punished and will feel grief on that account. Anger also blinds one to the foolishness of one’s actions, and so leads one precipitately into quarrels and fights (Prov., xviii. 6).

(b) The remote cause of fighting is an inordinate desire of temporal things, such as wealth, power, ease: “Why are there wars and disputes among you? Is it not because of the desires that war among your members?” (James, iv. 1). Those who are overmuch concerned with their own interests, easily take offense at what they consider slights or insults or opposition, their rage bursts forth, and they proceed at once to visit revenge on those at whom they are offended. It was greed and envy that caused the herdsmen of Palestine to fill up the wells dug by Isaac and to fight with his servants for possession (Gen., xxvi. 14 sqq.).

The Causes of Contumely.—(a) Pride is sometimes a cause, inasmuch as those who consider themselves better than others are quick to express the contempt they feel for others, if they hope that this will add to their own glory (Prov., xi. 2). But a proud person will just as often disdain to revile those whom he despises.

(b) Foolishness (see 1621) is sometimes a cause of contumely, for the foolish man speaks without thinking as he should or without caring what damage his words may cause (Prov., xx. 3). Hence, those who speak abusively to others merely in order to raise a laugh among the bystanders, little caring about the disrespect they show, cannot excuse themselves on the plea that it was all a joke.

(c) Anger is the usual cause of contumely, for the angry man seeks to show his revenge in some open and manifest way, and there is no easier or more ready means to this end than bitter, scornful or jeering words. Hence the danger of contumelious reprimands given by superiors. The subject will be enraged by the hard names applied to him, and the superior in his wrath will easily go to extremes, even of mortal sin, on account of the language he uses (e.g., exaggerated invective) or on account of circumstances (e.g., the scandal given).

Anger.—Anger is sinful when it deviates from reason, as to its matter or its manner.

(a) Thus, it is unreasonable as to its matter (i.e., its vengeance) when it punishes unjustifiably (e.g., when the person punished is innocent, when the penalty is excessive, when the legal order is not followed, when the motive is not justice or correction, but hatred, etc).

(b) It is unreasonable as to its manner (i.e., the degree of excitement felt or shown) when temper goes beyond measure. Great anger is not sinful when a great evil calls for it (e.g., the anger of Our Lord against the money-changers in John, vi. 14 sqq.; that of Mathathias against the idolatrous Jew in I Mach., ii. 24); but to fly into a rage at nothings or trifles is sinful.

Gravity of the Sin of Anger.—(a) If anger is sinful on account of its matter, it is mortal from its nature as being opposed to charity and justice. He that is angry against his brother is worthy of hell fire (Matt., v. 21, 22). It may be venial, however, on account of imperfection of the act (e.g., the sudden impulse to strike down those who do not agree with one’s opinions) or the lightness of the matter (e.g., a slap or push or box on the ears given a naughty child when a word of reproof would have sufficed).

(b) If anger is sinful on account of its manner, it is venial from its nature; for excess in an otherwise indifferent passion is not a serious disorder (see 2450). But the sin may be mortal by reason of circumstances, as when an angry person acts like a wild man, curses and swears, breaks the furniture, gives serious scandal on account of his position, or the time or place, or injures his health by the violence of his paroxysm.

Is Anger a Graver Sin than Hatred and Envy?—(a) As to its matter, anger is less grave than hatred and envy, for it pursues evil under the guise of spiritual good, pretending at least that the harm it intends is just, whereas hatred and envy pursue evil precisely as it is injurious to another, or as it is a means to one’s own temporal and external good or glory. Likewise, anger is less grave objectively than concupiscence, for the voluptuous man aims at utility or pleasure, whereas the revengeful man aims at what he makes believe is just.

(b) As to its manner, anger surpasses the vices mentioned in certain of its violent manifestations. The infuriated man, when crossed, creates a scene and makes a fool of himself; his blood boils, his face is flushed, his eyes dart fire, he froths at the mouth and trembles, he pounds, stamps and bellows like an enraged bull.

Anger as One of the Seven Capital Vices.—(a) It has a certain preeminence in evil. Its matter is quite attractive, for revenge is sweet and the cloak of just retaliation makes it seem good; its manner is powerful, for it drives one on to dare even the most shocking crimes.

(b) It is the spring of many sins. In the heart anger produces indignation against the object of displeasure, whom the angry man looks upon as base and unworthy, and soreness about the treatment of self, which fills the mind with plans of revenge. Sins of the mouth due to anger are incoherent cries of rage, words of contumely and blasphemy (Matt., v. 22), while its sinful deeds include quarrels and every kind of injury.

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What is anger? Anger is an inordinate appetite of revenge.

This disorder can occur in two ways: 1. On the part of the mode of being angry, as, for example, if you are too much inflamed inwardly, or outwardly reveal anger too much through signs. - 2. On the part of the object, as, if you desire revenge for a cause plainly unjust, or greater than is just, e.g., by wishing death to an enemy who has not deserved it, or revenge to be executed by one's own authority, or finally, although the revenge is just, nevertheless you do not desire it as just, but as satisfying your malevolent mind. If revenge is desired in an ordered way, there is no sin of anger, as when superiors are angry at the faults of subjects, and punish them, or avenge them. Anger inordinate in the first way mentioned before is from its genus a venial sin; nevertheless it can become mortal by accident, on account of the violation of another virtue, e.g., religion, piety, charity, etc., as if blasphemy, malediction, or scandal is added; and also, if a movement of the soul of this sort is truly vehement and deliberate. Anger inordinate in the second way is from its genus mortal, because it is directly against charity and justice, Gal. 5:20. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 88, a. 5 ad 1; 2. 2. q. 108, 158; L. 79.

What are the daughters of anger? - Some are from the heart: 1. Indignation, which is an inordinate affection from the fact that someone reckons himself treated unworthily by such a person. It is commonly venial. Indeed, if it proceeds from a just judgment of reason, it is nothing. Nevertheless it could be mortal if it increased up to deliberate hatred and grave contempt of the person. 2. Swelling of mind, by which someone morosely thinks out diverse ways of revenge, and by those thoughts puffs up his mind. What kind of sin it is must be judged from the quality of the revenge which is thought out. - Some are in the mouth: 1. Shouting, when an angry person raises his voice, pouring forth many things inordinately and confusedly. It is commonly venial, unless something else is added. 2. Blasphemy against God, and it is mortal. 3. Contumely against men, by which someone casts some evil upon his neighbor, with the intention of dishonoring him. 4. Malediction, by which someone wishes and imprecates evil upon another, under the account of evil. - Some are in deed, as quarrels, fights, seditions, wounds. "Quarrels, by which are understood all harms which are inflicted in deed on neighbors from anger." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 158, a. 7. When "someone intends to harm another, with the latter knowing and resisting, this is imported under the name of quarrel." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 42, a. 1. Quarrels, if they do not exceed measure, as also slight fights, are venial; otherwise, if they progress to seditions, wounds, killings. And these are commonly mortal sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense. L. 80, 83; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 40, 41, 42.

Contumely: From its genus it is mortal. It is only venial if it is small, or only material without the mind of dishonoring, provided that no notable injury to the neighbor's honor follows. And thus many parents are excused at least from mortal sin when they call their children asses, etc.; likewise women, children, and men of the lowest sort, burdening one another with insults, because, since credit is not given to them, honor is not gravely injured. Nor indeed is it a sin if it is done with the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another reason. And thus a superior can cast forth some word otherwise contumelious. Yet in this one can sin if the mode of due correction is exceeded, or the subject is more gravely dishonored than he deserved. Likewise, if for the sake of a joke, through fitting recreation, light defects are cast forth, it is pleasantness, according to S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 2, provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger. Contumely is also done by deed, both indirectly, as if you trample or burn the image or letters of another, etc., and directly, as if you beat an honorable man with a club, set horns at his door, or represent something which injures the honor of another.

To this belongs mocking, derision, and ridicule, when it is done by signs, as by wrinkling the nose, stretching out the lips, etc., intending the neighbor's confusion; and if this is grave, or at least the neighbor is gravely saddened by it, they are mortal. - Concerning these things note that one who has injured another's honor by contumely is bound to restore it, even if reputation has not been injured. But this can be done either through an honorable and friendly greeting, or an invitation to table, or a petition for pardon, sometimes even on bended knees and before witnesses, according as the injury was grave. It is not necessary to explain in confession the varied quality of mortal contumely. L. 81, 82. "Malediction, of which we now speak, is that by which evil is pronounced against someone either by commanding or by wishing. But to will, or by command to move toward, the evil of another, according to itself repugns to charity, by which we love our neighbor; and so according to its genus it is a mortal sin, and so much the graver, the more we are bound to love and revere the person whom we curse.... Nevertheless it happens that a word of malediction uttered is a venial sin, either because of the smallness of the evil which one imprecates upon another by cursing, or also because of the affection of the one who utters the words of malediction, while from a light movement, or jest, or from some surreption, he utters such words, because sins of words are weighed especially from the affection." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 76, a. 3; L. 83.

178. • Anger is an inflaming of the mind, and a disordered movement against someone or something; or it is a disordered appetite of vengeance. Irascibility is a habit of anger. Anger is mortal from its genus, if it is an appetite of vengeance; but venial if it is only a disordered movement of the mind ³.

³ St. Thomas must by all means be read concerning this matter (2.2, q. 158 throughout), who accurately distinguishes the vice of anger from the passion of anger, which, if it is ruled and tempered by reason, can be not only laudable but also commanded. Nor are those things to be neglected which the same Holy Doctor writes (l. c., q. 157) concerning meekness, which can be excellently composed with the virtue of that severity, whose proper office is to be inflexible concerning the infliction of penalties when right reason demands it. And indeed accurate knowledge of all these things is especially necessary to the Confessor, so that he may know how to teach penitents the difficult boundaries of vice and virtue in this matter; and, to say it once, that Part of the Summa of the Angelic Doctor which is called the Second of the Second, where the reasons of all the virtues and of the opposed vices, and, I might almost say, all their fibers are investigated, is the book which ought never to fall from the hands of the Confessor.

The daughters: indignation, rancor, clamor, insults, blasphemies, etc.

Remedies: consideration of the evils of anger, and of the meekness of Christ. - See St. Lig., no. 80 and following.

528. 1. Notion of anger. Anger can be considered under a twofold respect: insofar as it is a passion (above, n. 100), or a vehement movement of the irascible appetite toward repelling a present evil; and insofar as it is an appetite for vengeance. Not rarely these two are joined together and include something immoderate or inordinate. Then anger is defined as an immoderate movement of the soul inordinately seeking vengeance. Therefore it consists of a twofold element: (a) an immoderate movement of the irascible appetite, with commotion of the body, transgressing the just limits prescribed by reason; (b) an inordinate appetite for vengeance, insofar as someone takes or seeks unjust or immoderate revenge from him by whom he has really been injured, or thinks himself to have been injured.

⁵ St. Gregory, Moral., lib. V, c. 45, P. L., 723-727; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, and De Malo, q. 12; N. Alex., op. cit., p. 1112-1148; Descuret, t. II, p. 1-57; Thomas, op. cit., ch. 9, p. 94-103.

Hence anger is not a sin unless it bears before itself something inordinate, either as to the mode of being angry, namely when the movement of anger grows immoderately hot either inwardly or outwardly; or as to the object, when, namely, someone seeks vengeance against the order of reason, for example, desiring that he be punished who has not deserved it, or beyond what he has deserved, or with the order of law not preserved, or on account of an end which is not legitimate, for example, from hatred, not from love of justice or a desire of amendment.

Wherefore just indignation, or zeal by which someone, from love of justice, reproves or chastises the wicked, differs much from anger. Christ showed this zeal when he drove the sellers out of the temple, and poured out the money of the money-changers and overturned their tables;¹ but because Heli did not have zeal with regard to his sons, he deservedly stirred up against himself the movement of divine vengeance.

¹ John 2:13-17.

529. Often anger arises from pride; for when the proud think themselves injured, they are easily inflamed and seek vengeance. Nevertheless, since anger is a passion, not rarely it arises also from temperament itself, and from this head it is more easily excused.

St. Gregory graphically describes an angry man:² "For the heart kindled by the goads of its anger beats, the body trembles, the tongue trips itself, the face burns, the eyes are sharpened, and acquaintances are in no way recognized. With the mouth indeed it forms a cry, but the sense does not know what it says... Sometimes anger, to a troubled soul, as though from judgment, imposes silence; and because it does not express itself outwardly through the tongue, it burns the worse within... And so it happens that the troubled soul feels the greater clamor of its own silence, and the flame of shut-up anger consumes it more heavily."

² Moral., l. c., p. 724-725. - Gregory had been preceded by Seneca, who in Tr. de Ira, l. I, n. 1, thus depicts an angry man: "His eyes flame and flash, there is much redness over the whole face, as blood boils up from the depths of the breast; the lips are shaken, the teeth are clenched, the hairs stand on end and rise up; breath is forced and hissing, the sound of joints twisting themselves, groans and bellowings... You would not know whether the vice is more detestable or deformed."

530. 2. The various degrees of anger. The principal ones are: impatience, by which we are easily moved inwardly and outwardly even by light inconveniences or injuries; outburst, by which we manifest anger inwardly conceived through injurious words and shouts; violence, which incites not only to words, but also to injurious acts and to blows; fury, which adds to violence something unbridled, as it were a certain madness;¹ vengeance, or a vehement and assiduous desire of avenging.

¹ Hence Horace (Epist. I, 2), describing anger, says:

"Anger is a brief madness: rule the soul; unless it obeys, It commands: restrain it with bits, restrain it with chain."

Seneca elegantly describes the various forms of anger:² "For there are certain angers which settle within a cry; certain ones no less persistent than frequent; certain ones savage with the hand, sparing in words; certain ones poured out into bitterness of words and curses; certain ones do not go beyond complaints and aversions; certain ones are deep and grave, and turned inward. There are a thousand other species of this manifold evil."

² De Ira, lib. I, n. 4.

531. 3. The malice of anger. (A) Concerning anger considered in itself. To judge concerning its gravity, one must distinguish between anger insofar as it is a passion, and anger which is an appetite for vengeance.

(a) Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate movement of the irascible appetite, is a sin venial from its kind. For this anger is not inordinate except in the mode, insofar as someone blazes up beyond what the matter deserves, or more often than is fitting; now an inordination which touches only the mode of acting is not grave of itself.

Nevertheless the excess can be so great that it becomes a mortal sin, when someone deliberately grows too ardently heated within, or outwardly manifests signs of anger, so that he loses the peace of soul, or gravely offends his neighbor. Yet often unexpected movements of anger, even more vehement ones, are excused from mortal sin, because they are not sufficiently deliberate.

532. (b) Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate appetite for vengeance, is a sin mortal from its kind. For it is opposed to charity, and sometimes to justice, namely when he concerning whom we wish to take vengeance is truly innocent; now each virtue obliges under grave obligation, as is explicitly taught where these virtues are treated. Here it is enough to report the words of the Master:³ "But I say to you, that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment; but he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be liable to the council; and he who shall say, Fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire." For there he is affirmed worthy of grave punishment who is inwardly angry against his neighbor, or manifests inward anger by grave insults.

³ Matt. 5:22.

Yet not rarely even the appetite for vengeance is excused from grave sin, either on the part of the one desiring, for example when the movement of anger precedes the mature judgment of the intellect, or on the part of the object, when someone seeks to vindicate himself in some slight matter.

533. (B) But if anger is considered in its effects, it is the graver in proportion as the effects are worse.

(a) When it is carried to the extreme, it introduces many grave evils, which Seneca describes:¹ "You will see murders and poisons, mutual filth of accused men, destructions of cities, and ruins of whole peoples, and the heads of princes sold under the civil spear, and torches set under roofs, and fires not confined within walls, but immense spaces of regions gleaming with hostile flame... Look upon so many leaders handed down to memory: one anger stabbed in his bedroom; another anger struck among the sacred things of the table; another it tore to pieces amid the laws and the crowded spectacle of the forum; another it ordered to give his blood by the parricide of his son..." Yet generally anger does not indulge these unspeakable crimes.

¹ De Ira, lib. I, n. 2.

(b) Nevertheless it often brings after itself other effects, which Gregory describes:² through anger wisdom is lost, because the mind, vehemently moved, is soon clouded, and can scarcely know what is to be done and in what order; - the grace of social life is lost, because he acts inhumanely who does not temper by human reason the movement of anger, and thence concord is broken; - justice is abandoned: for while the troubled mind embitters the judgment of its reason, it thinks everything which fury suggests to be right; - grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are excluded: for since he resides only in a quiet soul, by expelling the quiet of mind, we close our soul to the Holy Spirit.

² St. Gregory, Moral., l. c., P. L., 724.

534. 4. Remedies against anger. (A) First indeed, insofar as it can be done, anger is to be forestalled, by removing the causes which can excite it.

Thus if we are irascible by nature, we ought carefully to restrain the first movements of anger, and before we break forth into words, to turn the tongue seven times in the mouth, or, as the Greek philosopher used to say, to pronounce the twenty-five letters of the Greek alphabet. - If anger is inflamed by the provocation of certain persons, these persons must be fled: "Choose simple, easy, moderate persons, who neither call forth your anger nor bear it. Still more will the submissive and humane and sweet be of profit, yet not unto flattery; for too much assent offends angry men."³ - If from too much weariness of body, from disorder of the nerves, attend to health. - If you are much moved by those things which are said against you, do not inquire at all about them: "Do you not wish to be angry? Do not be curious. He who inquires what has been said against himself, who digs out malicious speeches, even if they were held secretly, troubles himself."¹

³ Seneca, De Ira, lib. III, n. 8.

¹ Seneca, ibid., n. 11.

535. (B) But because we cannot avert all causes of anger, we ought to be prepared to tolerate all injuries with an even soul.

Gregory explains this excellently:² "For the first thing is that the solicitous mind, before it begins to do anything, set before itself all insults which it can suffer, so that, thinking of the reproaches of its Redeemer, it may prepare itself for adversities... For he who is caught unprepared by adversity is found by the enemy as though sleeping, and the enemy kills him, because he pierces one not resisting. For he who by solicitude foreknows the evils threatening, awaits hostile attacks as though watching in ambush, and from this is valiently girded for victory." - But in order that we may more patiently tolerate the vexations of others, we must consider our own excesses toward others: "For he patiently tolerates an injury inflicted who piously remembers that perhaps he still has something in which he himself ought to be tolerated. And as fire is extinguished by water, so, when fury of soul arises, each one's own fault is recalled to mind; because he is ashamed not to spare sins, who recalls that he himself has often sinned things to be spared either by God or by neighbor."³

² St. Gregory, Moral., P. L., t. LXXV, 725-726.

³ St. Gregory, op. cit., P. L., LXXV, p. 726.

536. (C) But if anger nevertheless has blazed up, as soon as you notice it arising, restrain it; at the beginning indeed it is rather easy to temper it; but if it has grown strong by long delays, this becomes altogether difficult.

Wherefore the Apostle says:⁴ "Be angry and do not sin; let not the sun go down upon your anger... Let all bitterness, and anger, and indignation, and clamor, and blasphemy be taken away from you, with all malice. Be kind to one another, merciful, forgiving one another, just as God also in Christ has forgiven you." - For the same motive, one ought to establish or decide nothing about the vindication of some wrong unless anger has cooled; otherwise the mind, troubled by commotion, will not be able to contain vengeance, otherwise just, within just limits.

⁴ Eph. 4:26, 31, 32.

537. (D) The best remedy indeed, which Christ taught by word and example, is fraternal benevolence toward all, even enemies, by force of which we do good to those who pursue us with hatred, far from seeking vengeance for their injuries: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those persecuting and calumniating you; that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven, who makes his sun rise upon the good and the evil, and rains upon the just and the unjust."¹

¹ Matt. 5:44-46.

Christ indeed wonderfully performed this; for at the time when we were still enemies, he gave himself over for us: "When he was cursed, he did not curse; when he suffered, he did not threaten, but delivered himself to him judging him unjustly."² The Apostles taught the same:³ "But if your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he thirsts, give him drink: for doing this, you shall heap coals of fire upon his head." The coals which are treated here are not penalties to be inflicted upon enemies, but, as Augustine says,⁴ "burning groans of penance, by which the pride is healed of him who grieves that he has been the enemy of a man by whom his misery is helped." In reality the first Christians patiently tolerated the most savage torments, and, far from being angry with their persecutors, prayed for them and their amendment.⁵ "Patience is," says Cyprian,⁶ "what both commends and preserves us to God. It is what tempers anger, governs the mind, guards peace, rules discipline, breaks the impulse of lust, compresses the violence of swelling pride, extinguishes the fire of rivalry, restrains the power of the rich, refreshes the poverty of the poor, guards blessed integrity in virgins, laborious chastity in widows, undivided charity in those joined and married."

² 1 Pet. 2:23.

³ Rom. 12:20.

⁴ St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana, l. III, c. 16, n. 24, P. L., XXXIV, 75. Whence Séailles did not understand this text, who faults Paul because there the Apostle approves the pleasure of vengeance (Les Affirmations de la Conscience moderne, Paris, Colin, 1903, p. 73-74).

⁵ Concerning patience in persecutions Tertullian discourses eloquently, De Patientia, P. L., I, 1249-1274; and St. Cyprian, De Bono patientiae, P. L., IV, 621-638.

⁶ St. Cyprian, op. cit., c. 20, P. L., 635.

— Notion. 1. The vice of anger, to be distinguished from the passion, is an inordinate appetite of revenge. Revenge, however, is made by the infliction of punishment on account of injustice, and toward this it states a proportion (1, 2, q. 46, art. 6).

But that inordinate appetite can be: 1. On the part of the mode of becoming angry, as if you should grow too heated interiorly, or exteriorly reveal that heat too much by signs; 2. On the part of the object, as if you desire revenge without a just cause, or greater than is just, or to be carried out by your own authority, or finally, if you do not desire it as just, that is, for the due end of preserving justice and correction, but for satisfying your malevolent soul.

Inordinateness on the part of the mode is of itself venial; the other is of itself mortal.

2. As a capital vice, anger begets: indignation, by which someone judges that he is being treated unworthily by someone, which of itself is venial; swelling of mind, by which someone morosely thinks out diverse ways of revenge, whence also the soul grows heated: the malice is measured by the quality of the revenge sought; clamor, when the angry man, lifting up his voice, pours forth many things inordinately and confusedly, which is commonly venial; blasphemy; insult, mortal in its kind, by which someone wills to dishonor the neighbor, while he casts some evil at him; malediction, by which someone wishes or imprecates evil to another. This will be mortal: a) if the evil is truly wished: often only anger is manifested; b) if it is wished with perfect deliberation; c) if the evil wished is grave (St. Alph. 5,83). Finally, it begets quarrels. If they do not exceed measure, they are venial, as are light fights. These are properly sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel: for the other can defend himself, with the moderation of blameless defense.

— Concerning just anger. An ordered appetite of revenge, as when superiors are angry at the faults of subjects and punish them with penalties, is not a sin, but is called anger through zeal. "Severity is inflexible concerning the infliction of penalties, when right reason requires this" (2, 2, q. 157 art. 2).

Neither just anger nor severity is contrary to meekness and clemency. For meekness restrains only the excesses of anger; clemency, through a certain epikeia, tempers penalties established by law according to right reason (2, 2, q. 157 art. 2).

429. Notion. Anger can be defined: the disordered appetite of vengeance. Anger taken in this sense is opposed to the virtue of meekness. Anger is wont to contain a twofold disorder: 1. An immoderate movement of the sensitive appetite, or an immoderate passion of anger. For angry persons are wont also to undergo in the body great and harmful excitations. Seneca⁹⁰ graphically describes this anger: "The eyes blaze and flash, there is much redness over the whole face from blood boiling up from the lowest parts of the heart; the lips are shaken, the teeth are pressed together, the hair bristles and stands up; the breath is forced and hissing, the sound of joints twisting themselves, groans and bellowings.... You do not know whether the vice is more detestable or deformed." Hence not undeservedly, as a most apt remedy of the disordered passion of anger, it is counseled that an angry man look in a mirror at the deformity of his face. 2. A disordered appetite of vengeance, insofar as someone takes unjust and immoderate vengeance on him by whom he has been injured or thinks he has been injured.

Not every anger is illicit, but only immoderate anger. For Christ himself is said to have been angry against those buying and selling in the temple.⁹¹ In the Psalm it is said: "Be angry and sin not."⁹² And indeed anger can be licit, whether it is considered as a rightly ordered passion or as the appetite of just vengeance.⁹³ Licit anger is called anger through zeal; but illicit anger is called anger through vice or also irascibility.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ De ira l. 1, n. 1.

⁹¹ Cf. Io. 2, 14 sqq.

⁹² Ps. 4, 5.

⁹³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 158, a. 1.

⁹⁴ Cf. ib. a. 2.

430. Malice of disordered anger. Anger considered in itself must be especially distinguished from anger with its effects accidentally joined. We speak first of anger according to itself and then of anger with its effects.

Principle 1. Anger according to itself considered, insofar as it is a disordered passion, is a venial sin; but it is a mortal sin from its genus insofar as it is a disordered appetite of vengeance.⁹⁵

The reason for the first part is that in such a disordered passion there is not so great an injury of right order that it constitutes aversion from God and consequently mortal sin. But it is clear of itself that even the disordered passion itself of anger can become a mortal sin by reason of scandal and other evil effects, as will be said in the following principle.

The reason for the other part is that the disordered appetite of vengeance is opposed to charity and sometimes to justice; each of these virtues indeed obliges from its genus under grave sin. Hence Christ himself says: "But I say to you, that whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment."⁹⁶ - By reason of smallness of the object or imperfection of the act, such a disordered appetite of vengeance is not rarely a venial sin.

Principle 2. Anger considered in its effects is a grave or light sin according as those effects could and should have been foreseen and are gravely or lightly repugnant to right reason.

This is clear of itself. For all the effects of his act which he could and should have foreseen are imputed to the sinner. Hence he who from disordered anger inflicts grave harm on his neighbor sins mortally; or a priest who from his disordered anger causes grave scandal commits a grave sin.

⁹⁵ Cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 3.

⁹⁶ Matth. 5, 22.

431. Daughters of anger. By St. Gregory and St. Thomas⁹⁷ the following six daughters of anger are enumerated: indignation, swelling of mind, clamor, blasphemy, contumely, quarrel.

1. Indignation⁹⁸ is irritation against him who is undeservedly judged to have furnished us occasion for anger.

2. Swelling of mind⁹⁹ is the mind filled with thoughts of finding suitable means of harsh vengeance.

3. Clamor is disordered and confused speech, which is wont to be done in a loud voice by an angry man.

4. Blasphemy¹⁰⁰ is injurious speech against God.

5. Contumely¹⁰¹ is injurious words uttered against one's neighbor in order to injure his honor.

6. Quarrel¹⁰² is a private war, by which a man inflamed with anger tries to injure another either by words or by deeds.¹⁰³

⁹⁷ L. c. a. 7.

⁹⁸ Entrustung.

⁹⁹ Rachsucht.

¹⁰⁰ Gotteslasterung.

¹⁰¹ Schmahung.

¹⁰² Streit.

¹⁰³ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 41, a. 2.

432. Remedies of anger are: 1. To forestall the causes. Anger can be born from diverse causes: a) from a temperament too sanguine. A man indeed cannot change his temperament, but he can restrain it, lest it break forth into disordered movements. Wherefore let a man be slow to speak, if he feels himself incited to anger. Seneca^103a rightly says: "The greatest remedy of anger is delay." b) From excitation or weakness of the nerves. For from experience it is clear that a man whose nerves are over-excited feels too vividly all impressions coming from outside, and then easily breaks forth into movements of impatience or even of anger. Hence such excitation of the nerves is to be avoided or cured according to one's powers. c) From diverse extrinsic causes. Thus, for example, parents are not rarely excited to anger by unruly children.

2. To consider the example of Christ and our own imperfections. Christ said to us: "Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart,"¹⁰⁴ and he admonished us: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who persecute and calumniate you."¹⁰⁵ But if someone considers his own excesses toward others, he more easily restrains anger. "For he patiently tolerates an injury inflicted who piously remembers that perhaps he still has something in which he himself ought to be tolerated. And as fire is extinguished by water, when, as the fury of the soul rises, his own fault is recalled by each one to mind; because he is ashamed not to spare sins, who remembers that he has often sinned in ways to be spared by either God or neighbor."¹⁰⁶

3. Vigorously and immediately to resist the movements of anger. As soon as someone notices that movements of anger have arisen, let him at once try to resist, because a spark is extinguished more easily than a great fire: "Let not the sun go down upon your anger.... Let all bitterness and anger and indignation and clamor and blasphemy be taken away from you with all malice."¹⁰⁷

^103a De ira II, 29, 1.

¹⁰⁴ Matth. 11, 29.

¹⁰⁵ Matth. 5, 44.

¹⁰⁶ S. Gregor., Moral. l. 5, c. 45 (Migne, Patr. lat. 75, 725).

¹⁰⁷ Eph. 4, 26, 31.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36 and 158; De Malo q. 10 and 12.

507. Envy is inordinate sadness concerning another's good, esteemed as one's own evil, insofar as that good seems diminutive of one's own excellence. This of itself also can be mortal, as directly against charity, because just as charity rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, so envy is saddened concerning it (cf. treatise on Charity). It is especially concerning those goods in which there is glory and in which men love to be honored and to be in esteem, such as dignities, magistracies, insignia of titles, riches, beauty, adornment, celebrity of name, eloquence, erudition, friendships, piety, virtues, etc., especially wisdom and happiness; but that sin is especially accustomed to be found among the ambitious and women, and among those who are in some way equals, or at least approach in something, for example, in condition, knowledge, virtue, etc.: for such persons wish mutually to be equaled or preferred.

508. From envy five sins generally arise, from the fact that it attempts to do something against neighbor. For in that which it attempts to do, there is something as beginning and principle, something as means, and something as terminus. The principle is that someone intends to diminish the glory of another, which is done secretly by whispering, manifestly by detraction. The means is that one willing to diminish the glory of another either can do so, and then exultation in adversities arises, that is, joy in the evils of neighbor; or he cannot, and then there arises affliction in prosperities, which is not envy itself, but its daughter, when the prosperous things of neighbor happen against the attempt of the envious man who strives to impede them. Finally, the terminus is in hatred of neighbor itself, for just as delight causes love, so sadness causes hatred.

509. Anger is the inordinate appetite of vengeance. It is called inordinate because anger of itself is not evil but indifferent, as being a passion; hence to seek vengeance according to right reason, for example, so that another may be corrected, so that the order of justice may be preserved, so that reason may execute justice more strongly, so that others may be terrified, is good and praiseworthy (cf. treatise on Temperance).

Anger can be evil in two ways: 1. on the part of the object: a) by seeking unjust vengeance against him who has not deserved it, or beyond what he has deserved; b) by seeking vengeance not according to the legitimate order, but to be executed by one's own authority; c) by seeking it not for the due end, but, for example, from hatred, as satisfying one's own evil mind. This anger of itself is mortal, because it is contrary to charity and justice, although it admits lightness of matter, if the vengeance is slight. - 2. On the part of the mode, anger is evil if it is too ardent interiorly, or too much manifested exteriorly. This of itself is venial, because it is a mere excess of an indifferent thing; nevertheless it becomes mortal on account of an effect prohibited under grave matter, such as scandal, blasphemy, notable detriment to health, etc.

But let it be noted that anger is not necessarily inordinate because it is great, but because it is too great; hence a vehement motion is good provided it is proportioned to the quality of the fault, the condition of the sinner, and other circumstances, as is clear in Christ casting the merchants out of the temple.

510. From anger six sins more commonly arise. - Insofar as it is in the heart, from it are born 1. indignation against the man with whom one is angry, while he reckons it unworthy that such an injury has been done to him; and 2. swelling of mind, by which the angry man fills his mind, by meditating on and devising various means of vengeance; - insofar as it is in the mouth, from it arise 3. clamor, or inordinate and confused speech by which man shows anger in words; 4. blasphemy, by which he breaks forth into words injurious to God; and 5. contumely, or injurious speech against neighbor; - insofar as it proceeds even to deed, 6. quarrels arise from it, under which name are comprehended all harms, such as woundings, homicides, beatings, etc., which are brought upon neighbors in deed in anger.

S. Th. II-II, q. 158 and 159.

1036. Two sins are opposed to meekness: irascibility primarily and by defect; secondarily and by excess, lack of anger, by which someone does not stir up anger which he needs for fulfilling an office of justice or charity to which he is bound, for example, to correct, chastise, beat back the contumacious. This is not distinguished in malice from the omission itself of the office, and is not evil except insofar as in it the omission of the due action is judged to be willed.

1037. Irascibility (irascibilite; grammoedigheid) is the inordinate appetite of vengeance. - To be angry of itself is not evil: for anger properly is a passion of the irascible appetite, and passions as such are not evil. Yet a passion can be evil: a) from the object or according to species, as envy from its object is evil, which is sadness concerning another's good, which in itself is repugnant to reason: in this way anger is not evil of itself, since its object, vengeance, can be sought well or badly; b) from the mode, if it rises up more or less than reason dictates: in this way anger is evil, if it abounds more than reason dictates, or even if, when reason dictates, it is deficient. Hence anger is good and praiseworthy, provided both according to the mode of reason and legitimate vengeance are sought, for example, that another be corrected, that the order of justice be preserved, that reason execute justice more strongly, that others be deterred, etc.: then it is called zeal (anger through zeal); on the contrary, it is evil if illegitimate vengeance is sought, or if in legitimate vengeance the mode of reason is passed over (anger through vice). Hence irascibility is rightly defined: an inordinate appetite of vengeance.

1038. Anger (colere; gramschap) can be evil in two ways:

1. On the part of the object: a) by seeking unjust vengeance upon him who did not deserve it, or beyond what he deserved; b) by seeking vengeance not according to legitimate order, but to be executed by one's own authority; c) by seeking it not for the due end, which is the conservation of justice and the correction of fault, but, for example, from hatred as satisfying one's own evil soul, or intending rather the extermination of the sinner than the abolition of the sin. This anger from its genus is mortal, because it is contrary to charity and justice; yet it can be venial, not only from indeliberation, but also from lightness of matter, when one seeks to avenge himself in some small matter, for example, if he pulls a boy a little by the hair or by the ear, or something of this sort.

2. On the part of the mode, anger is evil if it is too burning interiorly, or is manifested too much exteriorly. This of itself is venial; nevertheless it becomes mortal because of an effect prohibited under grave obligation, such as scandal, blasphemy, notable harm to health, etc. But let it be noted that anger is not necessarily inordinate because it is great, but because it is too great; hence a vehement motion of anger is good provided it is required by right reason or conformed to it, for example, if it is proportioned to the quality of the fault, to the condition of the sinner, and to other circumstances. Hence even Christ was moved by grave anger when he cast the merchants out of the temple.

1039. Gravity of anger. - Anger is a capital vice, as was said in the treatise on sins, I, n. 510. Yet it is not the gravest of sins.

For:

1. According to itself and on the part of the appetible object, "anger seems to be the least of sins." Because a) it is a lesser sin than hatred and envy: "on the part of the evil which it seeks, anger agrees with those sins which seek the evil of neighbor, as with envy and hatred; but hatred seeks the evil of another absolutely insofar as it is such, while the envious man seeks the evil of another on account of the appetite of his own glory; but the angry man seeks the evil of another under the account of just vengeance." But "it is worse to seek evil under the account of evil than under the account of good; and it is worse to seek evil under the account of an exterior good, which is honor or glory, than under the account of the rectitude of justice." Therefore it is clear that hatred is graver than envy, and envy than anger. And b) on this side, "the sin of anger also seems to be less than (the sin) of concupiscence, insofar as the good of justice, which the angry man seeks, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which the concupiscent man seeks" (a. 4).

2. But on the part of the mode of becoming angry, anger has a certain special disorder and excellence before those vices, because of the vehemence and swiftness of its motion (a. 4). And under this respect three species of irascibility are distinguished: a) of those suddenly becoming angry and from any slight cause: it is bilious anger, which pertains to the sharp; b) of those remaining in anger and sadness from too much retained memory of an injury inflicted: it is mania, which is called madness, and is found among the grave and bitter; c) of the obstinate, who do not cease from anger unless they complete vengeance: it is fury, which pertains to the difficult and grave, who seek vengeance with an obstinate appetite and do not dismiss anger until they punish.

1040. Vices opposed to clemency. - Clemency mediates between cruelty and excessive mildness. Cruelty is an atrocity of soul in exacting punishments and exceeds the mode in punishing. Mildness contrary to reason mitigates or remits due punishments.

Cruelty (cruaute; wreedaardigheid) is the vice by which punishments are exacted beyond measure from austerity of soul: the excess of punishments externally pertains to injustice, but according to the affection of soul by which one is ready to increase punishments it pertains to cruelty. Therefore this supposes true or usurped authority in the one punishing, and guilt in him who is punished. But if either condition were lacking, there would be ferocity or savagery, which intends to torture innocent men, and takes pleasure in the torment and pains of men.

Excessive mildness (overdreven zachtheid) is a vice equally pernicious to the commonwealth as cruelty, by which punishment is mitigated or altogether remitted contrary to the dictate of reason, when the welfare of the delinquent or the example of others requires just severity. This enervates discipline, and leaves vices unpunished, and disturbs the peace of good citizens.

I. Anger is the inordinate appetite for vengeance.

To be angry of itself is not evil; for anger is properly a passion of the irascible appetite, and passions as such are not evil. Nevertheless a passion can be evil:

a) from its object or according to its species, as envy is evil from its object because it is to be sad concerning the good of another, which according to itself is repugnant to reason. In this way anger is not evil of itself, since its object, vengeance, can be desired well or badly;

b) from the mode, if it rises up more or less than reason dictates. In this way anger is evil if it abounds more than reason dictates, or also if it is lacking when reason dictates.

Whence anger is good and praiseworthy, provided that it is according to the mode of reason and that legitimate vengeance is desired according to right reason, for example so that another may be corrected, that the order of justice may be preserved, that reason may more strongly execute justice, that the rest may be deterred, etc. Then it is called zeal: anger through zeal. On the contrary, it is evil if illegitimate vengeance is desired, or if in legitimate vengeance the mode of reason is exceeded: anger through vice. Hence anger is rightly defined: the inordinate appetite for vengeance.¹

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 1 and 2; Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 12, a. 1 and 2.

II. The species and gravity of anger. - Anger can be evil in two ways:

1. On the part of the object: a) by desiring unjust vengeance against him who has not merited it, or beyond what he merited; b) by desiring vengeance not according to the legitimate order, but to be executed by one's own authority; c) by seeking it, not for the due end or the conservation of justice and the correction of fault, but, for example, from hatred as satiative of one's own evil mind, or intending the extermination of the sinner more than the abolition of the sin.

This anger from its genus is mortal, because it is contrary to charity and justice; nevertheless it can be venial, not only from lack of deliberation, but also from lightness of matter, when someone desires to avenge himself in some slight matter, for example he pulls a boy a little by the hair or by the ear, or something of this kind.

2. On the part of the mode, anger is evil if it is too ardent interiorly, or is manifested too much exteriorly. This of itself is venial; nevertheless it becomes mortal on account of an effect prohibited under grave obligation, such as scandal, blasphemy, notable harm to health, etc.

But let it be noted that anger is not necessarily inordinate because it is great, but because it is too great; whence a vehement movement of anger is good, provided that it is required by right reason or conformed to it, for example if it is proportioned to the quality of the fault, the condition of the sinner, and other circumstances. Whence also Christ was moved by grave anger when He cast the merchants out of the temple.²

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 3; Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 12, a. 3.

III. Anger is a capital vice. - A capital sin is that from which many others arise, especially according to the account of final cause.

But from anger many other sins arise: a) on the part of the object or end, which is very appetible, insofar as vengeance is desired under the account of what is just and honorable, which allures by its own dignity; b) from its impulse, by which it precipitates the mind to do any disordered things whatsoever. Whence anger is a capital vice.

Nor does it stand in the way that anger, because it takes away the use of reason, is the cause not of several sins but of all sins, whence it is called their gate. For it is the cause of all per accidens, as removing what prohibits, that is, insofar as it impedes the use of reason by which man is drawn back from evil; but directly and per se it is the cause of certain special sins, and according to this it is a capital vice.³

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 6; Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 12, a. 5.

IV. Anger has six daughters. - According to St. Gregory, Morals, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), from anger more commonly arise six sins. Insofar as it is in the heart, from it are born: 1. on the part of him against whom a man is angry on account of the injury inflicted, indignation, by which in his mind he magnifies the injury of another and considers him unworthy that he should have inflicted such an injury on him; and 2. on the part of the angry man himself, swelling of mind, by which he fills his mind by meditating on various means of vengeance. Insofar as it is in the mouth, from it arise: 3. clamor, or inordinate and confused speech by which man demonstrates anger in words; 4. blasphemy, by which he breaks forth into words injurious to God; 5. contumely, or injurious speech against the neighbor. Insofar as it proceeds even to deed, 6. from it arise quarrels, by which name are understood all harms, such as woundings, homicides, beatings, etc., which are inflicted on neighbors by deed from anger.⁴

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 7; Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 12, a. 5.

V. Observations. - 1. According to itself and on the part of the appetible object, "anger seems to be the least of sins," says St. Thomas.⁵ For:

⁵ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 4.

a) It is a lesser sin than hatred and envy. "On the part of the evil which it desires, anger agrees with those sins which desire the evil of the neighbor, for example with envy and hatred; but hatred desires absolutely the evil of another as such, while the envious man desires the evil of another on account of the appetite for his own glory; but the angry man desires the evil of another under the account of just vengeance." But "it is worse to desire evil under the account of evil than under the account of good; and it is worse to desire evil under the account of an exterior good, which is honor and glory, than under the account of the rectitude of justice." Therefore it is clear that hatred is graver than envy, and envy than anger.

b) On that part "the sin of anger also seems to be less than the sin of concupiscence, insofar as the good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the delightful or useful good which the concupiscent man desires."

2. But on the part of the mode of becoming angry, anger has a certain special disorder beyond those vices, and an excellence on account of the vehemence and speed of its movement.⁶ And under this respect three species of anger are distinguished:

⁶ Ibid.

a) of those suddenly becoming angry and from any light cause: this is choleric anger, which belongs to the sharp;

b) of those remaining in anger and sadness from a memory of the injury inflicted that is too much retained: this is mania, which is called insanity, and is found among the grave and bitter;

c) of the obstinate, who do not cease from anger unless they complete revenge: this is fury, which belongs to the difficult and grave, who seek vengeance with an obstinate appetite and do not dismiss anger until they punish.

VI. Remedies against anger. - Several remedies can be indicated against anger, whether on the part of the mind or on the part of work.

A. On the part of the mind:

1. To consider how many evils and damages are naturally apt to follow from anger.

2. To propose to oneself the example of the benevolence of God and the meekness of Christ, who spared us.

3. To think that it cannot happen that burdensome, injurious, and ignominious things do not occur in this life.

4. To hold oneself prepared to tolerate anything whatsoever.

B. On the part of work:

a) Before anger, to remove the interior and exterior causes of anger, namely:

1. To guard, insofar as it can be done, against the first movements.

2. Not to speak and act except with a tranquil mind, and after mature consideration and deliberation.

3. Not to inquire what is said or done against us.

4. To flee things or persons which are occasions of anger.

b) In anger:

1. To restrain immediately from the beginning the movements as they are arising or have arisen, especially by turning to other things.

2. To contain the tongue and movement, so that while anger lasts we do or say nothing.

3. To direct a small prayer to God.

c) After anger:

1. To excite in oneself an affection of charity toward the neighbor, to be loved on account of God.

2. To cast away every inordinate purpose of vengeance.

Capital sins are so called because they are as it were the heads or fountains of other sins. Hence they should be called vices rather than properly sins, if they are considered in general.

Seven are enumerated, namely: 1st. Pride; 2nd. Avarice; 3rd. Lust; 4th. Envy; 5th. Anger; 6th. Sloth; 7th. Gluttony. But how fittingly all sins are reduced to seven heads St. Thomas explains excellently, 1-2, q. 84, art. 4.

We shall say very few things here about the individual capital sins, but we shall carefully indicate the places of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus to which recourse must be had for a fuller exposition of the doctrine.

Pride is the disordered love of one's own excellence, and is distinguished into perfect, or complete and consummated in its own genus, and imperfect. It is called perfect when a man so stands in himself and is pleased with himself that he is in the disposition of gravely transgressing the law rather than obeying the commands of superiors. But this, by that very fact, always includes mortal sin in itself. In other cases it is called imperfect, and then of itself it is accustomed to introduce only venial sin. From pride proceed ambition, vain glory, presumption, boasting, ostentation, and hypocrisy. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 162; and QQ. DD. De Malo, qq. 8 and 9.

Avarice is the disordered appetite of temporal goods. It is opposed to justice or to liberality. If the former, it will easily issue into mortal sin, namely as often as it impels one to grave injustice toward the neighbor. - If the latter, of itself it will produce only venial sins. For the rest, excessive affection toward earthly things can impel, and indeed is accustomed to impel, into other even grave sins. From avarice also proceed hardness of heart toward the miserable, disquiet of soul, perfidy, deceit, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 118; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 13.

Lust is the disordered appetite of a venereal thing. Lust is a grave sin from its whole genus; but this is to be understood if venereal delectation is deliberate in itself and directly willed. But if it is only indirectly voluntary, it sometimes admits smallness of matter, as will be said more fully below where the sixth precept of the Decalogue is treated.

Blindness of mind, inconsideration, inconstancy, hatred of God, languor of faith, indeed even loss of faith, are effects of lust. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, qq. 153 and 154; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 15.

Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is judged as one's own evil, or at least as one's lesser good. To it is reduced joy concerning the evil of another, which is judged an increase of one's own good. Envy is directly against charity, and from its genus, although not from its whole genus, imports grave sin. From envy proceed detraction, calumny, whispering, contumely, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 36; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 10.

Anger is the kindling of the soul, and a disordered motion against someone or something; or it is a disordered appetite of vengeance. Irascibility is the habit of anger. Anger is mortal from its genus, if it is an appetite of vengeance; but venial, if it is only a disordered motion of the soul. - Anger generates indignation, rancor, shouting, insults, blasphemies, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 158; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 12. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 80 and seq.

Sloth in general sounds the same as laziness; but more strictly it is torpor of mind and weakness of will, from which distaste for spiritual things flows because of the labor and trouble attached to them. - If it is so great that grave obligations are omitted from it, it must be held grave; if otherwise, it is to be judged slight. Torpor, wandering of the mind, nausea in prayer, etc., are the fruits of sloth. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 35; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 11. - St. Alphonsus, n. 84.

Gluttony is the disordered appetite of food or drink, and from its genus it is nothing but venial sin. But it becomes grave if it gravely harms health, or if it renders someone unfit for duties. - From gluttony come drunkenness, about which more fully presently, dullness of mind, buffoonery, much speaking, and uncleanness of every kind. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 148 and 150; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 14. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 74 and seq.

Note. - It would perhaps be very fitting to consult St. Thomas concerning sobriety. Sobriety is especially concerned with drink having the power of making drunk. For sobriety preserves measure: "and therefore," says the Angelic Doctor, 2-2, q. 149, a. 1, "it especially assigns to itself that matter in which it is especially praiseworthy to preserve measure. But of this kind is drink capable of making drunk, because its measured use contributes much and a moderate excess harms much, because it impedes the use of reason more than excess of food." And ibid. ad 3: "although measure is required in all things, nevertheless sobriety is not properly said in all things, but in those things in which measure is especially necessary." Now then, "it pertains to moral virtue to preserve the good of reason against those things by which it can be impeded. And therefore," he says ibid. a. 2, "where a special impediment of reason is found, there it is necessary that there be a special virtue for removing it. But intoxicating drink has a special account of impeding the use of reason, insofar as namely it disturbs the brain by its fumes. And therefore ... a special virtue is required, which is sobriety." And although "food and drink commonly can impede the good of reason, by absorbing it through immoderation of delectation, ... drink capable of making drunk impedes according to a special account." Would that also the following words of the Angelic Doctor were noted by some: "in all drinks capable of making drunk there is one and the same account of impeding the use of reason. And thus that diversity of drinks is related accidentally to virtue." Ibid. ad 3. No food or drink, speaking according to itself, is illicit. Yet drink can be rendered illicit by accident, either "because by wine [a man] is easily harmed, or because by a special vow he is obliged not to drink wine," or "from the manner of drinking, because namely he exceeds measure in drinking," or "on the part of others who are scandalized by this." Ibid. art. 3. To the objection that the use of wine is totally illicit, because it impedes wisdom without which someone cannot be in the state of salvation, the Angelic Doctor responds: "Wisdom can be had in two ways. In one way according to the common mode, insofar as it suffices for salvation. And thus it is not required for having wisdom that someone altogether abstain from wine, but that he abstain from the immoderate use of wine. In another way according to a certain degree of perfection. And thus it is required in some persons, for perceiving wisdom perfectly, that they altogether abstain from wine, according to the conditions of certain persons and places." ad 1. But for women and young people, if we regard proneness to pursuing bodily pleasures, "for old men in whom reason ought to flourish for the instruction of others, and for Bishops or any ministers of the Church who with devout mind ought to insist upon spiritual offices, and for kings who by wisdom ought to govern the subject people, sobriety is specially enjoined." Ibid. a. 4. - Cf. the places to be cited at n. 148 from St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1; 2-2, q. 150, a. 2.

Drunkenness is a voluntary excess in drink unto disturbance of reason, whether this is done from or with pleasure, or without pleasure. But it is divided into perfect and imperfect. The first is had when the use of reason is altogether taken away, so that the drunk man is incapable of acting morally; but the other is that by which the mind is indeed disturbed, yet still has the power to discern between good and evil.

But many others, following St. Thomas, define the vice of drunkenness as: superfluous drink without necessity and from the pleasure of wine alone unto deprivation of the use of reason.

Perfect drunkenness is always a mortal sin, but imperfect drunkenness of itself is only venial. The reason for the first is gathered both from the consent of theologians and the estimation of God-fearing men, and because to deprive oneself of the use of reason in a violent and unnatural way, and indeed in such a way that it cannot immediately be recovered, gravely repugns rational nature; and finally because in the Scriptures, for example, I Cor. vi, 10, drunkards are excluded from the kingdom of God. But the reason for the second is both because there is no grave disordering as long as one can act morally, and because the consent of theologians so holds. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, art. 2. - St. Alphonsus, n. 75. But St. Thomas speaks thus, 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1: "Concerning drunkenness it must be said that according to its own account it has this, that it is a mortal sin. For that a man without necessity renders himself unable to use reason, through which man is ordered to God and avoids many sins that occur, from the pleasure of wine alone, is expressly contrary to virtue. But that it is venial sin happens on account of a certain ignorance or infirmity, for instance when a man does not know the strength of wine or his own weakness, whence he does not think that he will be made drunk: for then drunkenness is not imputed to him as sin, but only overabundance of drink. But when he is frequently made drunk, he cannot be excused through this ignorance, without his will seeming to choose rather to suffer drunkenness than to abstain from superfluous wine, whence the sin returns to its own nature." Therefore the drunk man is guilty of a twofold disordering according to St. Thomas: by drinking wine from pleasure alone; and by drinking from excess unto the loss of the use of reason without any motive which would justify even the account of excessive drink. Cf. Baller., tr. 4, n. 381, seq. - Azor., l. 7, c. 33, q. 5. - Lessius, lib. 4, c. 3, d. 3, n. 13. - Dicastillo, lib. 1, disp. 3, d. 11, n. 104.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is lawful to use any liquors whatever, as medicine for driving away diseases, for example, typhus, even if drunkenness is foreseen as going to follow, provided nevertheless that it is not directly intended, and the salvation of the soul is not placed in danger. It is required namely 1st. that drunkenness follow only indirectly, and 2nd. that no danger be present that the sick man die without reception of the sacraments. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, a. 2, ad 3. - St. Alphonsus, n. 76. St. Thomas speaks thus: "When someone drinks much according to the counsel of medicine ... the drink is not reputed superfluous." l. c.

2nd. The same seems able to be said of those of our country who take a great quantity of liquor in order to expel or restrain the poison which they have drawn from the bites of serpents; for drunkenness, if any follows in such a case, would be said to have followed only indirectly. In this case it is not taken from the pleasure of wine alone nor without necessity.

3rd. It can never be lawful to assume drunkenness as a means for obtaining some effect, however good, because evils are not to be done that goods may come. But if a great quantity of liquor were taken, not indeed for violent deprivation of the use of reason, but for relaxing and thus soothing the nerves, so that from this some surgical operation may be done more easily, it does not appear why this would be illicit, since it is said to be lawful to use opium or ether for performing similar operations.

4th. Those mothers or nurses are altogether to be condemned who, for quieting the tears of children, use alcoholic or opiated drinks, and thus from the first age introduce an evil custom into them.

5th. A fortiori doctors are to be condemned who recur to the same remedy in order to provoke the sick to gladness or to lessen pains of the body; for those acting thus, although perhaps they can be excused from the sin of drunkenness, because they procure it only indirectly, nevertheless certainly introduce an evil custom into the sick if they recover; or, if they die, expose them to the danger of eternal damnation.

6th. Certainly they sin gravely who by command, counsel, or provocation induce others to drunkenness, or induce them to drink with foresight of future drunkenness: something which here and there is done under the vain pretext of friendship or civility.

7th. Likewise he who drinks to excess in order to free himself from the death which another threatens against him does not drink from the pleasure of wine alone or without cause; hence it is not sin.

Question 1. What must be said concerning the promise not to drink (the pledge) as it is accustomed to be made among us?

Response. Although a promise of this kind is good in itself, and, as daily experience establishes, offers an excellent remedy for amending the life of many, nevertheless the practice of receiving it is not without difficulties. For if it is said openly, what theologically speaking is certainly true, namely that violation of that promise is no sin or only venial sin, it will scarcely not happen that the whole efficacy of the remedy vanishes. But from the other side, if nothing is said, many and grave sins will be perpetrated from an ill-formed conscience; since there are many who judge violations of that promise to be graver sins than perfect drunkenness. Therefore much prudence and discretion is needed in receiving promises of this kind. - Wherefore, if there are those who doubt concerning the quantity of that obligation and inquire about it, or if they are not so untaught that they can easily grasp an explanation, or are not drawn to liquors by an utterly mad and ruined love, it will be useful, indeed necessary, to explain to them what the nature of that promise is; for since this is not a vow, but only a purpose manifested to a priest, it cannot of itself oblige under grave sin. But in the other hypothesis perhaps it would be better to say nothing, and to bear oneself permissively concerning those grave sins which would follow; for the lessening of drunkenness will be a sufficient reason for permitting them. - Cf. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, May 1883, pp. 338 and seq.

Question 2. What must be said concerning those sodalities recently instituted for extirpating the vice of drunkenness?

Response. That they are very good and are preferred by many apostolic laborers to the other remedy which consists in the promise not to drink. The reason is that these more recent remedies, while from one side they foster piety more, which is the beginning of every true conversion, from the other side offer no occasion of new sins. The Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore indeed alluded to these remedies in the following words: "Since monstrous scandals arise from excessive drinking, we exhort pastors, and beseech them by the bowels of Jesus Christ, that they put every zeal into eliminating the vice of drunkenness. To this end, we judge worthy of praise the zeal of those faithful who abstain from every ardent liquor in order to decline more safely the danger of excesses. But those who spontaneously enter a society among themselves, so that by mutual examples of virtues they may help and strengthen one another, ought first of all to employ those aids which Christ the Lord left in the Church, by which human vices are amended and infirmity is sustained; and by prayer, frequent reception of the sacraments, and other exercises of piety, to obtain heavenly aid for themselves, and to trust not in themselves, nor in their purposes, but in God, without whom human effort profits nothing." But the Fathers of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, speaking more explicitly, say: "The societies which come under the name of 'Catholic Union for promoting Total Abstinence' and 'Sacred Thirst,' we acknowledge as worthy of great praise; for they are governed by a truly Catholic spirit, and seek the necessary strength not so much in firmness of their own will as in the power of prayers and of the sacraments. Moreover it is known that the Head of the whole Church and Vicar of Christ on earth has more than once enriched them with his apostolic blessing and with the indulgences of the Church. Therefore we also exhibit to the same the signs of our benevolence, and that they may flourish the more, we commend them to the paternal care of all our priests, that they may not only add courage to them but also always show them the Catholic path." Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, nn. 470 and seq.; and Conc. Plen. Balt. III, nn. 260 and seq.

Very recently special spiritual graces in favor of the faithful enrolled in societies of Temperance or Abstinence from intoxicating drink were conceded by the Supreme Pontiff Pius X on 21 May 1914 - namely: indulgences both plenary and partial, and also an altogether singular favor by virtue of which all Masses which are applied by any priest whatsoever for the soul of some deceased member can assist that soul as if they had been celebrated at a privileged altar. These graces were granted by the Supreme Pontiff wishing to show his more favorable will toward the aforesaid Societies and to find their Members more eager in advancing so salutary a purpose. - Acta Apost. Sed., v. VI, p. 309.

Question 3. Is it lawful to induce someone to drunkenness so that he may be turned away from a greater evil?

Response. Affirmatively, if drunkenness is only material to him; because a material evil can be permitted for a grave cause. Thus commonly against Collet, Concina, etc. But they more commonly deny it if drunkenness is formal; because evils are not to be done that goods may come: nevertheless St. Alphonsus, n. 77, admits the opposite opinion as probable with several others, "because it is lawful to induce another to a lesser evil so that he may be impeded from a greater." For when someone can be deterred from perpetrating a greater evil by no other means, to persuade the lesser evil has the account of good. See below n. 185. Q. 5th.

Note. - 1st. Habitual excessive drink produces enormous harms for the individual, the family, and society. It harms the health, fortune, and morals of individuals: domestic peace departs from the family, horrible crimes are committed, reason itself day by day becomes degenerate and more vicious.

Personal remedies: for all to avoid the occasions of this sin and those persons and assemblies by whom temperance is violated; to acquire strength by exercise of this virtue and of Christian mortification, and by consideration of motives both natural and supernatural by which men may become stronger against the vice of drunkenness, finally by petition of divine aid. - Dictionnaire de Theol. Cath., under the word Gourmandise.

2nd. The use of morphine, chloroform, and other medicines bringing exile of reason must be ruled by these general principles. The use of morphine, etc., for calming grave pains by soothing the senses is permitted in surgical operations, in more difficult births, and in general when there is a just cause. The use of morphine, etc., taken habitually induces an unquenchable thirst, to which follows unfitness for performing grave duties, and servitude under the medicine itself: such use is gravely prohibited; indeed doctors sin gravely who so frequently prescribe these things to the sick that there is proximate danger of inducing this habit or desire for morphine. The use of morphine which does not bring with it this danger but only a lessening of pains is not illicit of itself. The use of morphine, etc., inducing the loss of the exercise of reason for a long time without cause is certainly a grave sin.

The use of morphine, etc., employed with the dying without their consent so that they may remain in a state of semi-wakefulness is a grave sin and against natural right: such use in those circumstances, that is, with one dying, is gravely illicit when he is not prepared by the sacraments for dying, nor is it lawful for him to consent to it. If he is prepared and there is no danger of falling into grave sin, doctors are to be deterred from employing these means. But what if the pains are most bitter and extraordinary, for example, if someone is burned by slow fire in a conflagration, and cannot be removed from the flames themselves, because, say, he is held by the beams of the house? Is it lawful in this case, when there is no danger of falling into a state of sin, without the consent of the dying man so to soothe his senses that he will remain in fainting until death? It is not lawful: because he has a right to acquire enormous merits. What if he himself wishes it, or if there is danger of falling into grave sin? In those most difficult circumstances let the priest assist him with every help and exhortation so that he may suffer the pains bravely. If at last the sacred minister himself fears, let him be silent; indeed it does not seem altogether certainly prohibited so to soothe the senses, because in the case, morally speaking, he is a prepared sick man: to this indeed he is bound, but it is not clear that he is bound to acquire greater merits. It is his right: but whether a grave obligation rests upon him, this is not evident. Cf. Villada, Cas., v. 3, p. 309. Lehmkuhl speaks more severely, n. 892, ed. 11a.

3rd. Nor does artificial sleep seem illicit, by which, induced by medicinal injections, a woman giving birth does not fully perceive the pains of birth. During this state, so it is reported, she is not deprived of the use of the senses; afterward, however, she is said not to remember those things which then happened, and the sleep is called twilight. Moreover we affirm that if the woman in that state is duly protected, if the doctor is prudent, if care is applied so that nothing harmful happens either to the woman or to the fetus, the matter is done licitly. But another thing would have to be said if these conditions were not verified.

Anger is thus described by D. Bonaventure in the third place cited, p. p. Centil. sect. 20, and in the Declaratorium terminorum Theologiae from Cassiodorus: Anger is an agitated movement of the soul, provoking the infliction of punishment. By Rabanus: Anger is every evil movement of the soul to do harm. From Augustine: Anger is sadness arising from the impotence of taking revenge. From Damascene, lib. 2 de fide cap. 16: Anger is the fervor of the blood about the heart, from the ebullition of bile, or from a disturbance striking. From the same: Anger is that which is bold, the avenger of injured concupiscence. From the same: Anger is the desire of vengeance. From Aristotle, 2 Rhet. lib. 2 cap. 2: Anger is the appetite of contrary pain, on account of an apparent examination: and the appetite of inflicting pain on one who opposes oneself, on account of an injury apparently inflicted: which in a certain manner examines, in that, by a due order, it deprives man as regards the judgment of the soul.

From some of these descriptions it is gathered that anger can exist without sin, but according to reason, as D. Thomas teaches, quaest. 156, art. 2. It is proved by that Psalm 4: Be angry, and sin not — whatever Cassian, in the lib. de Institutione Religiosorum cap. 6, and others may say.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure, in 3 d. 15, quaest. ult., because holy zeal for vengeance is with anger; but this can be in the Saints, and it was in Christ, Mark 11, Luke 19, when he cast out the buyers and sellers from the temple. This is called anger through zeal according to the order of reason, as D. Thomas also says.

Secondly, to detest evil and to be angry at evil are the same; and both are good.

Third, because the irascible power was given by God for being angry: therefore it is good.

Hence he concludes that anger can be good, insofar as it signifies an affect of detestation, and could be found in Adam in the state of innocence. And if a disturbance of sense is added besides, it could have been, and was, in Christ, yet without disturbance of mind. Thus it is said: He groaned in spirit and troubled himself, John 11. It is also repeated in the just, with some disturbance of mind, through zeal; of whom D. Gregory says, lib. 5 moral. cap. 35, and lib. 1 cap. 31: Whence the mind, when disturbed, profits, so that it may become clear; as the eye, when a collyrium is applied, is for a time disturbed, that afterwards it may be made clearer.

But truly a disturbance deviating from reason, tending to vengeance, is a vice.

I assert, therefore, that this anger is a vice opposed to meekness. So S. Bonaventure, LL. CC.

It is proved by Job 5: Anger slayeth the foolish man, where D. Gregory, lib. 5 moral. cap. 35: Anger through vice blinds the eye of the mind; anger through zeal disturbs it. It is thus defined by Damascene: the avenger of injured concupiscence.

The Saintly Doctor shows, loc. cit. Centil., why it is opposed to meekness; for the meek man neither wishes to begin to be disturbed toward anger immoderately. He shows that anger the vice differs from anger through zeal by reason of matter; for they are concerned with the same matter, namely with the person whom both wish to punish; but anger the vice wishes the person to be punished, so that vengeance upon the person be sated. Anger through zeal seeks vengeance upon the person, that the vice in the person may be destroyed. It is opposed also to patience, he says, by reason of the end, because patience extinguishes anger, lest it proceed; for he that is patient mitigates stirreth up angers, as Solomon testifies, Proverbs 15.

Hence the inordinateness of anger is apparent from the vengeance which it seeks, not according to reason; for it wills punishment unto the destruction of the person, and therefore either one which he did not deserve, or above his merit, or not according to the right order, and not according to the due end, which is the preservation of justice and the correction of fault; as, on the contrary, zeal seeks in an ordered way.

Secondly, in which anger the vice is discerned, is that within, and often also outwardly, it boils over immoderately. Hence there arise, as it were, species of Anger, from Damascene, lib. 2 de fide ort. cap. 16: the bilious passion, which is a sudden movement of the soul, impatient of injury, and it happens on the part of the body from the commotion of the bile, and on the part of the soul from the corruption of the irascible power; and then the bile is moved to vengeance, that sadness may be expelled. This anger quickly passes. Secondly, Mania, that is, lasting anger. Thirdly, Cotus, which is anger observing the time for vengeance. And this Aristotle means, 4 Eth. cap. 5, teaching that some of the irascible are sharp and sudden, some bitter and persistent, some difficult, who watch for occasions of vengeance; nearly the same has Nyssenus, lib. 4 de viribus animae, cap. 13.

Six daughters are reported of this impious mother: Rixa (Brawling), which is the bold will of avenging proceeding in injury done. Tumor mentis (Swelling of mind), which is the will of avenging fleeing the adversary on account of estimated enmities. Contumelia (Contumely), which is the will of avenging fleeing the adversary on account of estimated enmities. Contumelia (Contumely), which is the vindicating will through the upbraiding of evils. Clamor (Clamour), which is the act of the avenging will, exalting the voice through vituperation, coming to the ears of others. Indignatio (Indignation), which is the will avenging itself through a sign of annoyance outwardly declared. Blasphemia (Blasphemy), which is the will avenging itself through opprobrium inflicted upon God or the Saints. Or, according to Isidore, lib. in Deuter. cap. 16, there are three daughters of anger, namely homicide, clamour, and indignation; for vengeance is inflicted by homicide through the hand, by clamour through the mouth, and by indignation through a sign.

The same are indicated by S. Thomas, art. 2; Tannerus, d. 3, quaest. 3, dub. 7, num. 116.

Nevertheless anger is not altogether deadly, but only if grave vengeance is intended; the eruption outward into signs, or clamour, can be deadly per accidens, through scandal, or for another reason given above. Whence the Gloss on Psalm 4, from Cassiodorus: Anger is venial which is not carried through to effect. So far S. Thomas, art. 3, from the common opinion; D. Bonaventure, in speculo animae, cap. 3, from D. Gregory, lib. 5 moral. cap. 31, and from the Gloss of Cassiodorus in Pharetra, lib. 2, cap. 9.

I assert, thirdly, that Anger is a capital vice. It is evident from the daughters of Anger related above. Hence Proverbs 19: He that is apt to be angry shall be more prone to sin, and cap. 27: Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth, as the Saintly Doctor observes in Diaeta, tit. 1, cap. 5.

The daughters of Anger the Saintly Doctor there enumerates: Hatred, Contention, War, Conflagration, Homicide, Rapine, and many others.

Their birth the Saintly Doctor thus reviews in speculo animae, cap. 3: For it is considered as in the heart, and hence indignation and the murmur of the mind; or it breaks forth at the mouth, and behold clamour, blasphemy, contumely, etc. The will goes forth to works, and behold calumnies, injuries, etc.

Of anger the Saintly Doctor thus speaks in compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3, cap. 24: Anger in its genus is a mortal sin, because, according to Isidore, Anger is the mind agitated to the inflicting of provoked punishment. But such a movement is contrary to charity, which is not provoked, nor thinketh evil. Anger, therefore, either signifies the anger of zeal, which is the detestation of vice — and this is not sin, but of perfection.

One can also be angry at oneself in this manner, as the Gloss says upon that Psalm 4 text, Be angry, and sin not: What is a penitent man, but one angry with himself? Or it signifies a remission of affection toward one's neighbor, whereby a man neither grieves over his neighbor's evil, nor rejoices over his good — although he likewise does not grieve over his good, nor rejoice over his evil, but is indifferent toward him: but this is not mortal, but an imperfection of his charity. Or it signifies actual impatience without the appetite for vengeance; and such a movement, even deliberate, is a venial sin, because it has the incomplete nature of anger, as is evident from the definition cited. Or it signifies impatience with an appetite for vengeance; and this in three ways: sometimes it is from nature, as in melancholics, and thus it is no sin, since it is a natural movement; sometimes from an undeliberate appetite, and it is venial; sometimes from a deliberate will, and it is mortal.

The various kinds of anger, good and evil, the Saintly Doctor reviews in lib. 1 de profectu Relig. cap. 14. Of the nature of anger, its similitudes, effects, and harms, and remedies, wonderful things are those which the Saintly Doctor reviews in Diaeta, tit. 1, cap. 5, and de profectu Religiosi, lib. 1, cap. 30 and 31.

Christ distinguished anger according to three degrees, as it breaks forth in the heart: Whosoever is angry with his brother, Matthew 5; secondly, as it breaks forth into signs: Whosoever shall say, Raca; thirdly, into effects: Whosoever shall say, thou fool. This S. Doctor reports in Pharetra, lib. 2, cap. 9, from D. Gregory, 21 Moral. cap. 4, where he says: He who with subtle examination enumerates the steps of human actions, assigns anger without voice to judgment; anger in voice, to counsel; but anger both in voice and in speech, to the fires of gehenna. Here it is held that all these can be mortal, yet always the later ones graver, as D. Augustine also teaches, lib. 1 de Sermone Domini in monte, cap. 19, where he says: If it is not lawful to be angry with his brother without cause, or to say Raca, or to say thou fool; much less is it lawful to hold something in the mind, so that indignation be converted into hatred.

The same S. Augustine, rule 3, cap. 38: Better is he who, though often tempted by anger, yet hastens to obtain forgiveness from him to whom he acknowledges he has done an injury, than he who is slower to be angry, and slower to incline to asking pardon. Many other excellent things see in Pharetra with the Saintly Doctor, loc. cit.

Examples of anger in Scripture read in the Biblia pauperum, cap. 95, where of the anger of man through zeal, and cap. 96, where of the vice of anger. The Saintly Doctor warns in Confessionali, cap. 2, particula 4: the penitent is to be questioned about Anger, concerning those things in which he breaks forth outwardly into Anger by cursing, reviling, blaspheming, etc.

One must also note, with D. Bonaventure, in Pharetra, loc. cit., from D. Bernard, ep. 69, that there is also given a vice in the extreme opposite to anger, that is, not to be angry when one ought to be angry; for he says this is to be unwilling to amend sin; just as previously to be angry before one ought to be angry is to add sin to sin. The same has the Author of the Imperfect Work on Matthew, homil. 11, and D. Thomas, quaest. 158, art. 8, and Tannerus noted it, disp. 3, quaest. 3, dub. 7, num. 174, and others.

1. Anger is a compound passion, made up of displeasure, desire, and hope: displeasure at a slight received, desire of revenge and satisfaction, and hope of getting the same, the getting of it being a matter of some difficulty and calling for some exertion, for we are not angry with one who lies wholly in our power, or whom we despise. Anger then is conversant at once with the good of vengeance and with the evil of a slight received: the good being somewhat difficult to compass, and the evil not altogether easy to wipe out. (Cf. s.i., n.4, p. 43.)

2. Anger is defined: A desire of open vengeance for an open slight, attended with displeasure at the same, the slight being put upon self, or upon some dear one, unbefittingly. The vengeance that the angry man craves is a vengeance that all shall see. "No, ye unnatural hags," cries Lear in his fury, "I will do such things,—what they shall be yet I know not, but they shall be the terror of the earth." When we are angry, we talk of "making an example" of the offender. The idea is that, as all the world has seen us slighted and set at naught, so all the world, witnessing the punishment of the offending party, may take to heart the lesson which we are enforcing upon him, namely, that we are men of might and importance whom none should despise. Whoever is angry, is angry at being despised, flouted to his face and set at naught, either in his own person, or in the person of one whom he venerates and loves, or in some cause that lies near to his heart. Anger is essentially a craving for vengeance on account of a wrong done. If then we have suffered, but think we deserve to suffer, we are not angry. If we have suffered wrong, but the wrong seems to have been done in ignorance, or in the heat of passion, we are not angry, or we are not so very angry. "If he had known what he was about," we say, or, "if he had been in his right mind, he could not have brought himself to treat me so." But when one has done us cool and deliberate wrong, then we are angry, because the slight is most considerable. There is an appearance of our claims to considerations having been weighed, and found wanting. We call it, "a cool piece of impertinence," "spiteful malevolence," and the like. Any other motive to which the wrong is traceable on the part of the wrong-doer, lessens our anger against him: but the motive of contempt, and that alone, if we seem to discover it in him, invariably increases it. To this all other points are reducible that move our anger, as forgetfulness, rudely delivered tidings of misfortune, a face of mirth looking on at our distress, or getting in the way and thwarting our purpose.

3. Anger differs from hatred. Hatred is a chronic affection, anger an acute one. Hatred wishes evil to a man as it is evil, anger as it is just. Anger wishes evil to fall on its object in the sight of all men, and with the full consciousness of the sufferer: hatred is satisfied with even a secret mischief, and, so that the evil be a grievous one, does not much mind whether the sufferer be conscious of it or no. Thus an angry man may wish to see him who has offended brought to public confession and shame: but a hater is well content to see his enemy spending his fortune foolishly, or dead drunk in a ditch on a lonely wayside. The man in anger feels grief and annoyance, not so the hater. At a certain point of suffering anger stops, and is appeased when full satisfaction seems to have been made: but an enemy is implacable and insatiate in his desire of your harm. St. Augustine in his Rule to his brethren says: "For quarrels, either have them not, or end them with all speed, lest anger grow to hatred, and of a mote make a beam."

4. Anger, like vengeance, is then only a safe course to enter on, when it proceeds not upon personal but upon public grounds. And even by this maxim many deceive themselves.

Readings.—Ar., Rhet., ii., 2; ib., 4, ad fin.; St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 46, art. 2, in corp.; ib., q. 46, art. 3, in corp.; ib., q. 46, art. 6; ib., q. 47, art. 2.