§ 7. Concerning Anger

— Notion. 1. The vice of anger, to be distinguished from the passion, is an inordinate appetite of revenge. Revenge, however, is made by the infliction of punishment on account of injustice, and toward this it states a proportion (1, 2, q. 46, art. 6).

But that inordinate appetite can be: 1. On the part of the mode of becoming angry, as if you should grow too heated interiorly, or exteriorly reveal that heat too much by signs; 2. On the part of the object, as if you desire revenge without a just cause, or greater than is just, or to be carried out by your own authority, or finally, if you do not desire it as just, that is, for the due end of preserving justice and correction, but for satisfying your malevolent soul.

Inordinateness on the part of the mode is of itself venial; the other is of itself mortal.

2. As a capital vice, anger begets: indignation, by which someone judges that he is being treated unworthily by someone, which of itself is venial; swelling of mind, by which someone morosely thinks out diverse ways of revenge, whence also the soul grows heated: the malice is measured by the quality of the revenge sought; clamor, when the angry man, lifting up his voice, pours forth many things inordinately and confusedly, which is commonly venial; blasphemy; insult, mortal in its kind, by which someone wills to dishonor the neighbor, while he casts some evil at him; malediction, by which someone wishes or imprecates evil to another. This will be mortal: a) if the evil is truly wished: often only anger is manifested; b) if it is wished with perfect deliberation; c) if the evil wished is grave (St. Alph. 5,83). Finally, it begets quarrels. If they do not exceed measure, they are venial, as are light fights. These are properly sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel: for the other can defend himself, with the moderation of blameless defense.

— Concerning just anger. An ordered appetite of revenge, as when superiors are angry at the faults of subjects and punish them with penalties, is not a sin, but is called anger through zeal. "Severity is inflexible concerning the infliction of penalties, when right reason requires this" (2, 2, q. 157 art. 2).

Neither just anger nor severity is contrary to meekness and clemency. For meekness restrains only the excesses of anger; clemency, through a certain epikeia, tempers penalties established by law according to right reason (2, 2, q. 157 art. 2).