Circumstances and number of sins

A full, entire, and specific confession of all the mortal sins which have been committed after Baptism is prescribed by divine law. According to the Council of Trent,¹ “ If anyone saith that in the sacrament of Penance it is not necessary by divine law for the remission of sins to confess all and singular the mortal sins which after due and diligent previous meditation are remembered, even those mortal sins which are secret, and those which are opposed to the two last commandments of the Decalogue, as also the circumstances which change the species of a sin ... let him be anathema.”

Theologians distinguish between the material and the formal integrity of confession. The material integrity consists in making known each and all the mortal sins which have been committed and which have not yet been confessed; the formal integrity consists in confessing all the mortal sins which occur to the mind after a diligent examination of conscience, or at least of all the sins which the penitent is bound under the circumstances to confess to the priest. It is formal integrity which is prescribed by divine law, and to procure it the penitent is bound before confession to make a diligent examination of his conscience. He should not be too anxious in making this examination; it will be sufficient if he employ that diligence which prudent men employ in worldly matters of importance. No general rule can be given to measure the length of time which the examination should occupy. Much depends upon the character of the individual, the length of time which has elapsed since the last confession, whether the penitent is accustomed to commit grave sins or not, and on similar circumstances. If the penitent cannot recollect the number of times that he has fallen into serious sin, he should mention the number as nearly as he can, and if he has fallen very frequently and almost continuously over a long period of time, it will be sufficient to mention the approximate number of times that he has fallen in the day or week, together with the length of time during which the habit has lasted.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 7.

A number of special questions must here be considered which touch on the integrity which is required in confession.

The Council of Trent, as we have just seen, teaches that those circumstances which change the nature of a sin must be made known; the theft of a consecrated chalice, which is a sacrilege, would not be adequately confessed by simply saying, “I committed theft.” Not only circumstances which change the specific nature of a sin must be confessed, but also those which make a venial sin mortal and vice versa. The quantity in theft, then, must be indicated sufficiently to enable the priest to judge whether it was a mortal or a venial sin. Divines are not agreed whether circumstances which merely increase the malice of a sin but do not otherwise change its nature or moral quality are necessarily to be confessed. Many, with the Catechism of the Council of Trent, teach that there is an obligation to confess them, but as they give no convincing reason for their opinion and the contrary is held by many approved theologians, we may safely follow the more easy and the more lenient view.

It is not sufficient to confess as an internal sin one which was completed in external act. It would not be sufficient for a penitent to say that he desired to steal when he actually stole. For although the malice of sin is in the internal act of the will, and the external act adds nothing to it per se, yet, considered as human actions, an internal is different from an external act, and therefore as sins are bad human actions, an internal sin is specifically different from the same sin completed in external act.

It is a matter of controversy whether the mere effect of a sin must be confessed. If a man wounds another with the intention of killing him, and then repents and confesses unlawful wounding with the intention of killing, but afterward the man dies, will his assailant be obliged to go to confession again and confess homicide? The opinion is more probable that there is no such obligation, for such an effect of sin is not a sin, and we are only bound to confess sins; a sin is a human action, and when the victim dies his assailant does not act; he would now prevent the death if he could, and so he does not sin.

A vicious habit or custom of committing sin is a cause of sin rather than sin itself, and as sins are the matter of confession, per se it is not necessary to confess a sinful habit. If, however, the penitent did not use sufficient diligence to correct his bad habit, and this caused him inadvertently to commit sin, to blaspheme, for instance, then although the blasphemy, because inadvertent, is not sinful in itself, it is nevertheless voluntary and sinful in its cause, and so the uncorrected bad habit must be confessed. It is sometimes of importance for the confessor to know whether his penitent has contracted a habit of sin in order to be able to direct him, and so the confessor has a right to ask in confession whether a habit has been contracted, and the penitent is then under an obligation to tell the truth.

If many sins have been committed with others it is usually immaterial whether they were committed with one and the same or with different persons. However, if a sin against chastity is committed with a married person, that circumstance must be mentioned, as it causes the sin to be against justice as well as against chastity. Similarly, if one or both accomplices in such a sin are bound by a vow of chastity, that must. be mentioned. A religious who is a priest, and even if he is solemnly professed, would satisfy his obligation of confessing a sin against chastity by mentioning it, and adding that he is under a vow of chastity. For it is probable that there is no specific difference between the violation of a solemn and a simple and even private vow of chastity, and a priest, like a religious, is bound to chastity by vow.

Sins against chastity committed with relations have the special malice of incest, but with the exception of the first degree in the direct line of consanguinity, it is probable that the several degrees of kindred or affinity do not constitute a specific difference in the sin. There is a special malice and difformity in a sin of impurity committed with parent or child, but among civilized peoples this is happily of rare occurrence. Hatred against relations is not only against general charity, but is also contrary to piety, which binds relations to love each other with a special affection. Grave hatred will be a serious sin also against this virtue of piety if it is indulged in against near relations, not if it is against more remote kindred with regard to whom the obligation is not so strict.

Mere superiority or position of itself does not change the nature of a sin committed by rulers, magistrates, and people in authority. And so if a master sin with his servant, the sin does not of itself differ from ordinary fornication. If, however, the sin is also a violation of a special duty, then of course it will have a special malice, and so if a schoolmaster corrupt a youth committed to his care, he must mention this circumstance in confession.

The time at which a sin was committed does not change its nature, and so even though a sin which has been committed recently be confessed as though it were a sin of one’s past life, the confession will be valid, but of course the practice is not to be commended, nor should it be indulged in.

Must Confession be integral; what is this kind of integrity; what is its force? - Resp. Confession must be integral. The reason is that no judgment can be exercised when the cause is unknown; because the confessor must impose salutary penances and prescribe efficacious remedies; because the whole infirmity must be known in order that it may be healed. Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, c. 7; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 9, a. 2. - Integrity is one thing material, another formal. Material integrity is situated in the accusation of all mortal sins which were simply committed, or which after diligent examination of oneself occur to the mind. Formal integrity consists in the accusation of all sins which, after diligent examination of oneself, occur to the mind, and which one here and now, with the circumstances considered, morally can or is bound to confess. Material integrity is not always necessary; for sometimes it is morally impossible because of inculpable forgetfulness; and although sins occur to the mind, from other just causes Confession becomes morally impossible. Wherefore only formal integrity is necessary. Trent, sess. 14, C. 5. - By reason of integrity, the lowest species of sins and their exact number are to be accused under grave obligation, so that it is lawful neither to increase nor to diminish sins. If someone cannot confess the lowest species of sins, he must confess them according to the higher species or genus which he can. Likewise, if someone cannot confess the precisely determined number, he must confess the number which comes nearer to the truth, using, e.g., the particle "about," or, if he cannot even do this, he must say how often approximately in a year, in a month, in a week, in a day, whether frequently, whether rarely, etc. "Sporer rightly notes that the confessor should not be too anxious about seeking the number of sins in a habitual penitent, because it is often impossible to have such a certain number." L. 466; Ithur., Cas. 38, n. 3. - But the particle "about" is generally understood by theologians in this way: about three is 2-4; about ten is 8-12; about thirty is 27-33; about one hundred is 95-105; about one thousand is 950-1050. L. 466; Lugo, d. 16, nn. 78, 81, 94 ff., 644. - E. M.

Resolutions: If someone in Confession has omitted a circumstance necessary to be explained, he must afterward confess it. Wherefore he must again confess the substance of the sin if he cannot otherwise explain it, e.g., if he sinned with a married woman; by no means, however, if he can explain it without that, e.g., if he sinned with a person consecrated to God. "Long-lasting hatred, just as also carnal concupiscence toward a woman, must necessarily be expressed in Confession... because of the number of sins which are repeated in that long delay." L. 467. One who has declared the number of sins around about as much as he can, afterward finding a notable excess, must declare it, because a greater number is not contained in a lesser; but if, on the contrary, he afterward finds a number notably lesser, he is bound to nothing, for the true number was comprehended in the greater. - One who has confessed the number of sins confusedly, as the uneducated, children, and habitual sinners for the most part do, if afterward the sins distinctly come into memory, or only some in particular, must not confess them again; for he already explained all sufficiently in that confused way in which he then could. And therefore he is much less bound afterward either to confess again with greater diligence applied, or with the help of a more learned confessor, in order to explain those sins more distinctly; which would also be exposed to innumerable scruples and anxieties. - For the integrity of Confession, diligent examination is prerequired, Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, according to the capacity of the penitent, the delay of time, and the other circumstances. But for this a moderate diligence suffices, such as a prudent man applies in difficult affairs, such as, morally speaking, learned and fearful persons are accustomed to apply, even if someone thinks he would find more things with greater diligence. Bonacina, t. 1, d. 5, q. 5; Laymann, l. 5, tr. 6, c. 8. But by reason of inadvertence it rarely happens that Confession is sacrilegious because of defect of previous examination. This examination can prudently be supplied by the confessor through discreet questions, and with no greater diligence than the penitent himself is bound to have, according to his condition, especially as regards the uneducated and others concerning whom there is reason to fear that, once dismissed, they will not return again. But it is not necessary to write down sins lest they fall from memory; nor is this to be counseled, because of the danger of publication. - L. 471, 504; Lugo, d. 16, n. 573 ff.; E. M.

Must the external act of sin necessarily be accused? - Resp. In the affirmative, because it is one and the same thing with the internal act in the moral genus, and these two constitute one total act. Besides, the external act is directly prohibited by divine law, e.g., You shall not commit homicide. Moreover, without the declaration of the external act, the confessor for the most part could not perform his office as is fitting, concerning admonitions to be offered, etc. This is also established from the universal custom of the faithful, which explains the law in this sense, and from proposition 25 condemned by Alexander VII. - E. M.

Must the effect of sin necessarily be expressed in Confession? - Some affirm it, because it is evil or a sin at least in its cause; others deny it, because it is evil or a sin only denominatively.

St. Alphonsus affirms it, l. 5, n. 10. "A voluntary omission in its cause," says the holy Doctor, "is also imputed as sin, even if afterward the will cannot operate; for example, if someone makes himself drunk, foreseeing that by reason of the drunkenness he will omit Mass, then he is bound to confess the cause and its effect, namely drunkenness and the omission of the sacred rite, as Salm., etc., with others commonly, better say against Vazquez, etc., provided the will is not retracted before the effect follows, as Sanchez, etc., probably teach; for then it is probable that he is not bound to confess the effect which followed. From this it is also deduced that if the effect happens after retraction, a censure imposed against sinners is not incurred, because this requires contumacy in the act of sin." Cf. also l. 4, n. 149, and l. 7, n. 40.

But Lugo denies it, who has these things: "It must be supposed in a sin, e.g., by which you killed another with poison, that there intervenes first the internal act of the will by which you wished to give him poison; then the external action by which you prepared and gave the poison; then the effect which followed, namely his death.... The first and sufficiently common opinion affirms that the external effect must be explained.... The contrary opinion is broadly defended by Fr. Vazquez, etc. This opinion has always seemed truer to me.... The more common reason... is that the external act, which is denominated free from the actual freedom of the internal act, is truly and properly a sin; but the effect afterward following, e.g., in sleep, is not properly a sin..., but the effect of sin. But in Confession all and only sins must be explained; therefore the external act must be explained when it is a free act, but not the effect afterward following..., because there cannot be actual sin in one who does not actually sin, nor can he actually sin who does not actually act. But the one who sleeps, while his enemy dies from the poison, then does nothing; therefore he does not then sin." De Poen., d. 16, nn. 437, 439, 440, 449. - But this opinion must be limited, unless the penitent has incurred a censure or reserved case because of the effect which followed. Lugo himself has this limitation; indeed he adds: "It can also happen that a censure is incurred by one who has already been justified from the past sin through contrition, or through attrition with the sacrament," n. 453. Cf. also n. 460 and Laymann, l. 1, t. 2, c. 2, n. 5. But, as Ithur., Cas. 40, n. 31 ff.; Cas. 50, n. 26 f., excellently observes, there is no reservation where there is no subject of reservation, or sin, since it has already been absolved. For of no being there are no properties. What is not, is not such. But where only retraction of the will preceded, the cause having been retracted through the will, the effect is no longer culpable in itself. But reservation or censure cannot be incurred when one does not sin through the act.

The same opinion must besides be limited unless the confessor, performing not only the office of judge but also of teacher and physician, prudently questions the penitent about the effect which followed. Instr. pro parv., etc., p. 4, at the end of the Roman Council, published by command of Benedict XIV.

Does it harm the integrity of Confession if someone accuses venials to his ordinary confessor, but mortals to another? - Resp. In the negative, speaking of itself, provided he never receives absolution unless he has first manifested all mortals to one confessor and is absolved by the same. The reason is that grave sins are necessary matter of Confession, and that Confession is integral which embraces all mortals, since venials are not necessarily to be accused. - But in practice attention must be given to the circumstances of penitents and to the motives by which they are led. For those are not to be condemned who sometimes confess graver sins to an unknown confessor, but subject lighter ones to the ordinary, if from shame, by which they would be overwhelmed with a confessor familiarly known, they would commit themselves to the danger of confessing sacrilegiously. Wherefore the confessor would inquire about this matter only from imprudent curiosity; "unless nevertheless on that occasion the penitent remains in a moral occasion of sinning, or goes around for this reason, that he may sin more freely; for then he will sin gravely, and because of defect of attrition the Confession will be null." Hence, although neither occasion nor habit is of itself necessarily to be accused, the confessor nevertheless has a right to inquire both about proximate occasion and about habit, both if there is a prudent suspicion that he is deceived by the penitent concerning his dispositions, and if from this there is a special sin, and so that he may impose a salutary and suitable satisfaction. - Prop. 58 condemned by Innocent XI; Lugo, d. 14, nn. 172, 173; d. 16, n. 57; Suarez, d. 22, s. 3, n. 10; L. 471. Cf. here 707.

Does it harm integrity if someone disguises another voice, lest he be recognized by the confessor? - Resp. In the negative, of itself. Provided he opens all mortals, he performs an integral Confession. Nor is it necessary that he be known by name by the confessor; for it suffices that the confessor intend to absolve the present sinner. But the intention of the confessor of itself is always determined to the penitent. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 1, n. 68.

Must circumstances of mortal sins which notably aggravate them necessarily be confessed? - "There are three opinions, all very probable. - The first opinion affirms it. It is proved, 1. from the Roman Ritual, de Sacram. poenit., from the Roman Catechism, p. 2, c. 5, n. 47.

It is proved, 2. by reason, because the same reason which persuades that circumstances changing the species are to be confessed also urges for circumstances notably aggravating, since both notably change the judgment of the confessor. - The second opinion says that the circumstance what must necessarily be confessed, namely that which touches the substantial integrity of the sin in the individual, as is the quantity of theft. The reason is that otherwise the confessor will not be able to form a due judgment about the substance of the sin. - The third opinion, more probable to me, denies that there is an obligation of confessing aggravating circumstances. It is proved, 1. from St. Thomas, 4 d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, q. 5, who by his authority has indeed given great weight to this opinion. It is proved, 2. by reasons. The first reason: because from the words of Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, the Council seems not obscurely to exclude the obligation of confessing circumstances other than those changing the species, because it sufficiently suggests that these suffice for this: that the confessor form a right judgment about the gravity of crimes and about the punishment to be imposed. The second reason: because otherwise penitents would always fluctuate amid anxieties, since they could always doubt about the integrity of their Confessions in determining which circumstances are or are not notably aggravating. St. Thomas, l. c., q. 5, ad 2. Hence Lugo assigns a reason a priori for this opinion, saying that Christ prescribed nothing other than Confession of sins; but one who explains the circumstances changing the species of sin already truly confesses and explains the essence of the sin, since the quiddity or essence of sin is taken from its specific nature. The third reason: because if we were bound to manifest circumstances notably aggravating, we would also be bound to confess those notably diminishing, namely if someone sinned from anger, fear, more intense passion, from the inducement of others, and similar things, which obligation even the adversaries deny. The last and stronger reason: because no one is bound to observe a doubtful law; hence since the law of confessing aggravating circumstances is very doubtful, we are not bound to it. And therefore, Lugo rightly says, Trent did not explain this obligation of confessing them because the Council could not sufficiently gather it from the words of Christ and the institution of the sacrament." L. 468. - Except: "if the circumstance brings in a censure or reservation, or if the penitent is prudently questioned by the confessor for his necessary direction." L. 467. - Instr. pro parvul., etc., p. 4, at the end of the Roman Council, published by command of Benedict XIII; Lugo, d. 16, s. 3.

Does the circumstance of habit of sin change the species; and must it be manifested in Confession? - Resp. To the first: "It must be said that duration is not a circumstance drawing into another species; similarly neither frequency nor assiduity, unless perhaps by accident from something supervening. For something does not acquire a new species from the fact that it is multiplied or prolonged, unless perhaps in the prolonged or multiplied act something supervenes which varies the species, such as disobedience, or contempt, or something of this kind." St. Thomas, 1. 2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1.

Resp. To the second: "It is necessary to distinguish a twofold habit: one which induces to perpetrating similar sins with one's freedom and advertence; the other which induces to perpetrating sins without freedom and advertence, and therefore in such a way that they are not a new sin, but the sin (in its cause) consists in this, that the habit was freely acquired, or in this, that due effort is not applied to obliterate it; as happens when someone from habit blasphemes or perjures himself without adverting here and now to the malice of blasphemy or perjury. This latter habit, freely induced or not uprooted, must be confessed as a special sin; for we are gravely obliged to lack it. For although one who perjures himself or blasphemes without advertence does not sin here and now, nevertheless he sins if he does not strive to uproot the habit of perjuring or blaspheming thus. But the former habit is then also to be subjected to the keys when someone adverts that through it he is placed in proximate danger of perpetrating new faults; for since exposing oneself to proximate danger of sinning is a sin, one who adverts that through the habit of sinning he is in that danger commits this special sin: that he subjects himself to this danger, or that he does not strive to turn himself away from it. But because men rarely advert to this, for this reason they rarely accuse themselves of this habit, and therefore rarely is there an obligation of manifesting it before the confessor questions about it. "It is indeed true that one who exposes himself to danger of sinning and immediately sins sufficiently explains both sins by confessing the sin committed, with which that other sin, by which he exposed himself to the danger of sinning, morally makes one. But when a notable delay intervenes between one sin and the other, sufficient for a moral interruption, or when someone only exposes himself to the proximate danger of committing some sin, yet does not commit it, then that by which one exposed himself to proximate danger of sinning must be explained separately; for in that very thing there is sin, according to that of Ecclesiasticus 3: 'He who loves danger will perish in it.'" Viva, on prop. 60 condemned by Innocent XI, last part. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 200 ff.; cf. here 704; E. M.

Must the penitent declare the diverse persons with whom he sinned? - Resp. In the negative, of itself. The reason is that it suffices that the number of sins and their species be declared; but sins do not change species for this reason, that they were committed with several persons. - Hence one who fornicated with three different persons, or three times with the same person, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound spontaneously to say whether the accomplice was one or several, whether they were prostitutes or others. Nevertheless, if the confessor asks about this, the penitent is bound to respond, because it is expedient that the confessor know whether perhaps there is a proximate occasion of sinning, as is likely if the sin was committed several times with the same person. But different satisfaction and different remedies will have to be prescribed by the confessor according to the multiplicity and diversity of the persons with whom one has sinned. - La-Croix 1040; Bonacina, de Integr., diss. 3, n. 14; Tamburini, in decal., l. 7, c. 7; Elbel, de Act. hum., 103.

Is one bound by a vow of chastity who sins with another similarly bound required to declare both circumstances? - Resp. In the affirmative. The reason is that there are two plainly distinct sins there, namely a sin against one's own vow, and a sin of cooperation with another toward violating that person's vow. - The very same must be said of a married man having relations with another's wife. "Different in species is the obligation by which he himself must not violate his own marriage, and that by which he must not bring it about that the other violate his own." Lugo, d. 16, n. 258. - La-Croix 1063; Salmant., c. 6, n. 63; L., l. 1, n. 46.

Must a priest or religious sinning against chastity disclose his condition, or only the circumstance of the vow of chastity? - It probably suffices that each manifest the circumstance of the vow, because the species of obligation does not seem to be changed by the special condition either of priest or of religious. For the vow of each is solemn. Therefore the sin of each pertains to the same species of personal sacrilege. The controversy can only be about a simple vow, concerning which cf. vol. 1, n. 500. - Lugo, d. 16, s. 4, § 2.

Must one who has committed incest explain the quality, namely: 1. with one related by blood, or with one related by affinity; 2. the degree of consanguinity or affinity; 3. the line in spiritual relationship; 4. the line and degree in legal relationship? - Resp. To the first: Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, n. 79, and others affirm. Lugo, d. 16, nn. 313-316, and others deny. This opinion is judged more probable by St. Alphonsus, 469, and is proved by authority and reason from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, ad 2. "A person related by affinity," he says, "is joined to someone on account of a person joined by blood; and therefore, because one is on account of the other, consanguinity and affinity make an unbecomingness of the same nature."

Resp. To the second: Suarez, d. 22, s. 3, n. 12, Diana, t. 1, tr. 7, r. 107, and others, from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, and Cajetan there, think that all incests are of the same nature, and that as concerns degree, from this there is had only an aggravating circumstance because of the same virtue of piety and the reverence due to relatives, which is harmed; but greater or lesser connection does not change the species. Ballerinius apud Gur., 486, seems to approve this opinion. - Navarrus, Man., c. 7, n. 4, and others hold that the species of incest is changed from the various degree of connection, because between degree and degree there is special reverence. St. Alphonsus, 470, says this opinion is less probable. - Salmant., de 6 Dec. praec., c. 5, nn. 28, 36, and others, relying also on the authority of the Angelic Doctor, hold that incest differs in species only in the first degree, both of the direct line and of the transverse line, because the reverence due to relatives in that first degree is of a different nature. St. Alphonsus in the cited place says this opinion seems equally probable as the following. - Tamburini, Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 5, § 2, n. 6, and others judge that all incests among blood relatives, except only the first degree in the direct line, are of the same species. The reason is that only in the said first degree is there present a special nature of connection and of reverence due. "And for this opinion," says St. Alphonsus in the cited place, "St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, seems undoubtedly to stand," and he says that it seems altogether to be held, and he adds: "indeed Lugo, d. 16, n. 314, etc., rightly teach that one must explain whether a father sinned with a daughter, or a son with his mother, whose fault has a diverse malice by reason of the special reverence due to the mother." Indeed the first degree of the direct line invalidates marriage by natural law. - But Tamburini, ibid., c. 7, n. 48, states that any incest, whether on account of consanguinity or on account of affinity, whatever the degree may be, does not differ in species. And by reason of parity he affirms that the same is to be said not improbably also about other injuries inflicted as regards parents, brothers, and wife, concerning which he had treated properly, c. 5, § 2, n. 6.

The Angelic Doctor, l. c., ad 3, says: "In the mingling of related persons, there is something which is unbecoming in itself and repugnant to natural reason, such as when mingling is made between parents and children, whose kinship is of itself and immediate.... But other persons, who are not joined according to themselves, but through order to parents, do not have unbecomingness in this way from themselves, but fittingness or unfittingness varies about this according to custom and human or divine law, because the use of venereal things, which is ordered to the common good, is subject to law." But it must be noted that by reason of superiority and the obligation arising from it, the sin is truly different if a father seduces a daughter, stepdaughter, or daughter-in-law, from that which a son commits when seducing his mother, stepmother, or mother-in-law.

Resp. To the third: The line in spiritual relationship does not change the species, whether one sins with her whom he held in baptism, or with her mother. L., l. 3, n. 450.

Resp. To the fourth: As for consanguinity and affinity, so consequently and much more for legal relationship the matter is disputed. - Cf. vol. 1, n. 798.

Must the nearness of persons be declared in sins of hatred or injury? - Resp. To the first: As to hatred, in the affirmative, if it is a question of nearer relationship on account of the strict bond of the virtue of piety. Hence grave hatred toward parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, a spouse, brothers, sisters, and relatives by affinity in the first degree must be declared. - But in the negative, more probably, if it is a question of more remote relationship, namely among other blood relatives or relatives by affinity. For when the connection is more remote, there is had only an aggravating circumstance, and not also one changing the species and necessarily to be expressed in Confession. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 303 ff.

Resp. To the second: Lugo has these things, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 299 ff.: "I think that one universal rule cannot be given on this point; for sometimes the circumstance of the related person against whom one sins will have to be explained; sometimes it will not. This indeed depends on the quality of the offense and on the degree of connection. Hence if parents are struck by a child, if they are killed, if they are affected with insults, if they are defamed, those sins without doubt have a special circumstance against piety, love, and reverence due to parents, which are gravely harmed by sins of this kind. From this, however, it does not follow that every grave injury which is against a father has that other specific malice against piety and must be explained in Confession. For if a son steals from his father that which suffices for a mortal sin of theft against justice, he does not always sin gravely against piety or is bound to explain that circumstance... because... it is not... gravely opposed to that which piety and reverence toward a father demands."

Must the circumstance of dignity and office of the person necessarily be accused, e.g., if the sinner is a superior, magistrate, priest, etc.; if he is a confessor? - Resp. To the first: In the negative, more probably, of itself, i.e., the reason of scandal or office or particular obligation being excluded. The reason is that the circumstance of the dignity of the person sinning does not of itself change the species of sin, but at most aggravates the sin. - But the crime of injured majesty is equated with parricide, e.g., if someone kills the Pope, Emperor, King, or Prince, on account of the same virtue of observance and piety to which it is opposed. - Lugo, d. 16, nn. 309-311.

Resp. To the second: Resp. In the negative, more probably, provided it has no relation to Confession. The reason is that the confessor from his office is bound only to right direction in the tribunal of penance; from this direction no spiritual relationship arises. Moreover no injury is done to the sacrament through this sin, since it has no respect to Confession. Nevertheless it is easily evident that both a penitent of this kind must be entirely deterred from confessing further to that priest, and a confessor of this kind from admitting that penitent further to Confession. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 351 ff.; L., l. 3, n. 451.

Therefore a distinction must be made between the excellence and dignity of the person and his office. The circumstance of excellence and dignity of the person is of itself only aggravating, because from this no special virtue is gravely harmed. But the circumstance of office changes the species if the office induces a peculiar obligation of procuring the spiritual good of another. "For a Bishop, e.g., or a parish priest, from his own office, is pastor and physician of his subjects, and therefore is specially bound to impede their sins and to procure their salvation. Therefore they sin against the duty of their office if they positively attempt to stain those souls for whom they ought specially to watch. This sin not only pertains to the species of scandal, but is also specially against the duty of satisfying the proper office of Bishop or pastor, etc.... On the contrary, this malice is not found in any confessor whatever. For although in the very act of Confession he is pastor and physician, and has a peculiar obligation of governing and caring for the penitent, afterward, however, one who from office does not have that duty does not retain some peculiar obligation by this alone, that he once heard that person's Confession.... This could more easily be conceded in one who, although he is not parish priest or prelate, has nevertheless been specially chosen and assumed by the penitent himself as spiritual father by whom he is governed, which duty he has habitually accepted and retains, and therefore from the habitual duty itself seems to be obliged at least to moderate diligence concerning the salvation of his client, and much more to not positively bring upon him so grave a danger of eternal damnation." Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, nn. 356-358, 179-181; L., l. 1, n. 451; Elbel, de Act. hum., n. 97.

Must the circumstance of sacred time necessarily be accused? - Resp. In the negative. This is evident from the universal practice both of confessors and of penitents; since it is established that neither are the former solicitous about questioning concerning such a circumstance, nor are the latter accustomed to declare it.

Therefore the circumstance of sacred time does not seem to have to be explained, unless certain things are specially prohibited on account of reverence for the time, e.g., lest someone on Good Friday exhibit public games, comedies, or theatrical spectacles. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 520; L., l. 3, n. 273.

Does one satisfy the integrity of Confession who accuses a recent sin as if committed formerly? - "Resp. 1. In the affirmative, of itself, because the circumstance of time by no means pertains to Confession. Hence a penitent satisfies the obligation of Confession who mixes new sins with old ones, or who, making a general Confession, does not distinguish from the others mortal sins committed since the last Confession, even if he does this intentionally to cover the time at which he committed the sins. - 2. But if the penitent lies about the time, e.g., if he denies that he sinned today and declares the sin as if committed at another determined and remote time, the doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not an act placed in the preceding year. Hence he lies in two ways, namely by concealing the sin committed today and by accusing a sin committed at another time. Thus Tamburini, l. c. - Nevertheless there are not lacking theologians who think this lie light." Thus Fr. Gury, 488. - The reason which is adduced for the second case does not exceed mere probability. And indeed it seems to prove too much; for then a lie about any accidental circumstance whatever would render Confession void. Moreover Gury himself in the first case says: "The circumstance of time by no means pertains to Confession." And rightly indeed: for the intrinsic substance of sin, which pertains to Confession, is one thing; the extrinsic accident of sin, which of itself is irrelevant to Confession, is another. Hence the aforesaid reason, insofar as it is urged for denying the sufficiency of that Confession, Lugo himself, d. 16, n. 53, calls merely probable. - Baller., ibid.; D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 309; Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, § 1.

Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus, 425, also affirms it as probable, "unless some circumstance, e.g., changing the species, or reservation of the case, or proximate occasion of sinning, requires otherwise, and sufficient penance is imposed." And St. Alphonsus himself implicitly affirms the same, H. A., tr. 16, n. 4.

Is it always a mortal sin to lie in Confession? - Of itself one sins mortally only when the lie concerns necessary matter of Confession concealed without a just cause, or grave matter falsely supposed, namely by accusing a grave sin not committed. Therefore a lie about matters not pertaining to Confession or to the conscience of the penitent is not of itself mortal, because it is neither gravely harmful to the penitent, as is supposed, nor gravely injurious to the sacrament, since it is not referred to it. "Hence the denial of a venial sin committed, or of a mortal sin already confessed, does not exceed the malice of a simple lie," L. 496, and therefore of itself is neither mortal nor invalidates the sacrament.

Of itself: for "it is sacrilege and the absolution is null... if you deny or lie about sins otherwise duly absolved, when the confessor, as judge or physician, asks something about them as necessary for the present Confession, Lugo, d. 14, s. 10; Tamb., l. 2, c. 10, § 2; otherwise, if it does not concern the present Confession." - "If someone affirms a mortal sin which he did not do, or denies having done what he did, he commits a twofold mortal sin: one of sacrilege against the virtue of religion because of the reverence due to the sacrament, the other of a lie gravely pernicious to himself against the virtue of truthfulness." L. 495-497; H. A. 28; Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, § 6.

Is the penitent bound to unfold the whole Confession again if he notices that the confessor, because of sleep or distraction, did not perceive some sins and he does not know which ones; or did not judge rightly about them? - Resp. To the first: In the affirmative, if the Confession was brief, because he can prudently doubt about each one whether it was understood by the confessor or not. But otherwise if the Confession was lengthy and only a few things seem not to have been perceived; because then he can presume that each thing was understood, nor does it appear likely that Christ imposed the precept of integrity with so great a burden. If, however, the doubt concerned only one or another sin, that would have to be repeated. But the Confession will be invalid if the confessor understood no sin, whether because of sleep, or because of deafness or distraction.

Resp. To the second: "Salmanticenses, etc., teach that a Confession made in good faith to a confessor who does not know how to discern species and number, nor between mortal and venial, even in obvious cases, is not to be repeated. The reason is that... absolution is valid when on both sides the things required for the validity of the sacrament already concur. For thus one must judge that Christ the Lord instituted this sacrament, since such defects happen everywhere. Nevertheless I say this must be understood unless it is established that the number or species were not explained; otherwise the integrity of Confession must certainly be supplied." L. 500. In good faith, because if in bad faith, when the penitent knows that the confessor is of insufficient knowledge, or when he clearly sees that the confessor does not perceive the gravity of his sin, the Confession is to be repeated. For a sin which the confessor did not hear, or did not understand, and consequently about which he did not pronounce sacramental judgment, cannot be remitted by the power of the keys. - L. 198-499.

1. Flavius, a young man, several times stole from his father, from his mother, and from his elder brother the sum of a few lire. He did indeed confess the theft, but omitted that circumstance of father, mother, brother. Hence he thinks that he made a sacrilegious confession.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Flavius, speaking of itself and excluding an erroneous conscience, did not make a sacrilegious confession by the omission of that circumstance. For injuries in the goods of fortune inflicted on parents or on other relatives by no means change the species of the sin, if the case is excepted in which parents or brothers, on account of the amount of the theft, would lose that which is necessary for their sustenance, and which the son or brothers would be bound by piety to supply to them.

But it would be otherwise if there were question of other injuries, for example, of imprecations, insults, etc., against father, mother, brother, sister, etc.; since injuries of this sort, as they are specifically opposed to piety, which strictly obliges among blood relatives, introduce a grave species of sin against piety. G. 456, 457; I. M. 712.

2. Anatolius, a parish priest, when he had unhappily fallen into a sin of the flesh with Rosaura, his maidservant, who at the same time was a parishioner and a daughter of confession or penitent, and afterward had sacrilegiously celebrated, dressed in lay clothing, goes to a distant place for the sake of confessing, and accuses himself that, being bound by a vow of chastity, he had sinned with some woman and had sacrilegiously communicated. Rosaura, however, since she could not easily go elsewhere and was known to all the confessors of the city, nor dared to open her sins to anyone, dressed in male clothing enters by night an oratory in which only men are admitted, and with a simulated masculine voice confesses her sin, saying that she had sinned with a person of the other sex sacred to God.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Anatolius confessed integrally by omitting precisely the circumstance of sin committed with a penitent. The reason is that the confessor from his office is strictly bound only to the right direction of the penitent in the sacred tribunal. Nor indeed is there any kinship between confessor and penitent arising from confession. Yet there would be present a new species of sin, namely of sacrilege, if solicitation had preceded in confession or on the occasion of confession. Cf. I. M. 713.

Anatolius also confessed integrally by omitting the circumstance of maidservant. For service does not change the species of the sin, since a contract of this sort extends itself only to temporal things, namely to the price to be paid for yearly or monthly service. Nor indeed does the master, by admitting the maidservant to service, intend to bind himself as if from office to undertake spiritual care of her soul. But it would be otherwise if a younger girl were explicitly entrusted by her parents to the master's guardianship, because then a quasi-contract would intervene.

But Anatolius did not confess integrally by omitting the circumstance of parishioner. For it belongs to the parish priest from his office diligently to guard his sheep and to turn them away from sins.

Nor also did Anatolius satisfy the integrity of confession by passing over the celebration of Mass in the state of mortal sin. For by saying only that he had sacrilegiously communicated, he was silent both about the unworthy celebration of the sacrifice and about the unworthy administration of the Eucharist to himself. But, excluding the circumstance of the celebration of Mass, he probably satisfied by saying that he was bound by a vow of chastity. G. 458-461; I. M. 353, 710, 713.

Rosaura expressed her sin sufficiently. For there was no obligation for her to confess the circumstance of maidservant, parishioner, and penitent. But she fittingly expressed the carnal sin with a priest, who, by a solemn vow of chastity, is a person sacred to God. Nor indeed is it an obstacle to the integrity of confession that she simulates the male sex. "The reason is that the confessor hears and absolves the sinner present, of whatever state, condition, or sex the person may have been. For the error of the minister concerning the sex of the penitent is something merely accidental as to confession and absolution. For the confessor must not pass judgment concerning sex, but concerning sins; but sins do not change species according to the diverse sex. This also holds if a woman, confessing under the appearance of a man, were to accuse sins committed with a different sex, because the judgment of the confessor is not essentially changed." G. 438.

But what if Rosaura had procured abortion in herself? Would it have sufficed to say: I procured abortion? The answer is negative, because thus she would not express that she had brought death upon her own offspring, and therefore would conceal a most grave species of sin against piety. G. 439.

But if a proximate occasion of sin were present, as can easily happen in practice, Anatolius is altogether bound to dismiss that maidservant; and the maidservant likewise is altogether bound to depart from this house. And the same must be said if at least there were scandal of others from their suspicions and public murmurs. Among the Cases of Conscience of the Diocese of Bologna, in the year 1767, in the month of August, the following proposed Case appears under n. 1.º: "A certain priest frequents the house of a certain woman, without any wicked end, but only for the sake of recreation and honorable friendship. Yet neighbors who observe the frequency, but do not know the end, murmur and perhaps suspect something evil. Is that priest, knowing a murmur of this sort among the neighbors, bound to abstain from frequenting that house? The answer is affirmative. The reason is that that priest, knowing the murmur of the neighbors, can prudently doubt both about some grave scandal of theirs, and also lest the reputation and good name of both himself and that woman be endangered; and therefore from charity both proper to himself and toward his neighbor he ought at once to abstain from frequenting the house and from conversation with that woman."

482. • Circumstances of various kinds are distinguished in sins:

1. Some change the species, namely, those which by reason of themselves add to the act a malice specifically distinct from that which the act has by reason of its object; thus the circumstance of a vow or of marriage adds to fornication the malice of sacrilege or adultery.

2. Others are aggravating only, but notably or lightly, according as within the same species they notably or lightly increase the malice of the sinful act by reason of duration, intensity, degree, manner, time, person, place, etc.

3. Others are diminishing, inasmuch as they render the malice of the sin less, for example, a defect of advertence, etc. - Recall what was said on Human Acts, no. 27.

483. Principles. - I. It is certain that circumstances which change the species must be accused ¹. The reason is that they constitute a new sin of themselves; and this is established from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 5, and canon 7.

¹ Understand this if the malice of a different species which the circumstance introduces is grave. For if it is light, for example, the light irreverence of one who steals another's hat in a Church, it is not necessary, according to what is established concerning venial sins, to express it in confession.

II. It is certain that lightly aggravating or diminishing circumstances need not necessarily be accused, although it is better to disclose them ². The reason is that venial sins are not necessary matter of the Sacrament of Penance.

² This must be understood with a grain of salt. Otherwise even the confession of persons otherwise pious, who are accustomed to bring forward a few venial sins, will be drawn out for at least half an hour while they endeavor diligently to disclose all the adjuncts by which their faults can be lightly aggravated or diminished.

III. It is also certain that circumstances must be expressed by reason of which a sin venial from its genus becomes mortal. Likewise, circumstances must be disclosed which so diminish a sin that what, apart from them, would have been mortal becomes by reason of them either no sin or only venial.

484. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Must circumstances NOTABLY AGGRAVATING the malice of mortal sins within the same species necessarily be accused?

Reply. There is a twofold probable opinion ³.

³ Carefully note that even the adversaries freely concede the probability of the opinion which denies. Therefore, according to the opinion of all, it is probable that no one is bound to this. This obligation therefore cannot be urged; even the rigorous Cabassutius admits this consequence here.

The FIRST OPINION, more common and more probable, denies it absolutely. The reason is: 1. because the Council of Trent requires nothing other than the confession of the number and species of sins, and therefore seems to exclude the obligation of confessing other circumstances. Add that otherwise both penitents and Confessors would always fluctuate amid perplexities, since it is difficult to distinguish which circumstances are notably aggravating; for no rule, at least generally, can be assigned by which they may be recognized, for example, with respect to duration, intensity, manner, etc. - Thus St. Lig., no. 467.

Some except circumstances which regard the quantity of the thing, as in theft ⁴; but others with St. Liguori think that even this exception is not to be admitted of itself, provided the quantity is declared grave; for the reason is the same, because quantity does not change the species of the sin.

⁴ The exception can better be stated: unless an extrinsic reason is added, for example, a reservation which concerns some determinate gravity of theft or degree of incest.

The SECOND OPINION affirms it. The reason is: 1. because the same reason holds for accusing aggravating circumstances as for accusing circumstances which change the species ⁵; 2. because a sin increased by notably aggravating circumstances is equivalent to several sins ⁶; 3. because if they were not accused, the Confessor could not impose a proportionate penance ⁷. - Collet, sect. 3; Billuart, diss. 7, art. 2, sec. 3; Concina, ch. 6, and others.

⁵ This is plainly false; because the Synod of Trent prescribes confession with regard to circumstances which change the species, but not with regard to others which are merely aggravating. If the reasons proved equally concerning both kinds of circumstances, the Council would have limited that entire doctrine to circumstances which change the species without cause; for it should have spoken of both in general, without limitation and distinction. Thus Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 115).

⁶ This reason also is too weak, both because in many matters it would require this uselessly, and because no one has ever sought a multiplication of sins in the same act from the possible division of the matter.

⁷ To this reason it can be replied that so exact an equality is not always required in imposing penance. Thus Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 120).

There are also those who object with these words of the Roman Catechism (De Poenit., no. 47): Nor indeed must grave sins alone be explained by recounting them, but also those things which surround each sin and greatly increase or diminish its wickedness.

But it can be answered that these words are explained there in such a way that it is not necessary to understand them of merely aggravating circumstances. And indeed: 1. it immediately adds: For certain circumstances are so grave that the character of mortal sin arises from them alone; wherefore all these things must always be confessed. But the character of mortal fault does not arise from a circumstance alone unless it changes either the moral or the theological species. - 2. This is confirmed by the fact that it prescribes the confession of greatly diminishing circumstances. For even the adversaries concede that this has force only when the diminution changes the theological species (see St. Alph., no. 468, at proof 3 from reason). - 3. The Catechism confirms its doctrine from the necessity of expressing the circumstance of a sacred person in homicide and of marriage in intercourse. But these pertain to circumstances which change the moral species. - 4. Finally, if it speaks of the gravity of theft, it cannot be proved that it is not there treating of a circumstance which changes the theological species; and what it says about one gold coin can fittingly be understood as an example of a circumstance which, regard being had to absolute quantity, makes the fault light and therefore introduces a different theological species.

Moreover, in practice the faithful are accustomed, ordinarily speaking, to declare the more notable circumstances; and this contributes both to greater peace of conscience and also to receiving more abundant fruit, both by reason of the humility in the confession itself and by reason of the more suitable direction which they receive ⁸.

⁸ According to the opinion of all, however, except the case in which there is question of sins against the sixth precept. For beyond that which may perhaps be necessary for declaring the species of the sin, nothing further is to be inquired into or permitted to be narrated by the penitent. I said which may perhaps be necessary for declaring the species of the sin, etc.; for the Doctors also commonly warn that the grave danger of handling this filthy matter can sometimes require that even inquiry into the species be spared.

485. • QUESTION 2. Must the circumstance of a custom of sin necessarily be accused?

Reply. More probably, negative, speaking of itself. The reason is: 1. because nothing other than the number and species of sins must necessarily be declared; 2. because the custom need not necessarily be explained, whether under this name is understood an evil habit or the repetition of the same sin. For a custom taken as a habit induced by repeated evil acts, although it is a vice, is nevertheless not a sin ⁹; while a custom taken as the repetition of the same sin already declared on other occasions does not cause the sin committed again, and to be confessed here and now, to be either graver on the part of the object ¹⁰ or different in its species. Except if the Confessor asks, as is established from Proposition 58 condemned by Innocent XI, which reads thus: We are not bound to confess to the Confessor, when he asks, a custom of some sin.

⁹ There can nevertheless be a sin of negligence in employing the means necessary for correcting the vice; this voluntary negligence indeed causes even indeliberate acts, toward which an evil custom is of itself apt to impel, to be voluntary and imputable (see Note at no. 300, vol. I).

¹⁰ This reason seems less pertinent; because even if some greater gravity accrued from this circumstance of custom, nevertheless it has already been said (see above, no. 484) that circumstances which merely aggravate within the same species need not necessarily be disclosed. This reason would nevertheless be pertinent when the circumstance of custom and at the same time of negligence in correcting it caused acts which of themselves were either semi-deliberate or even wholly indeliberate to assume grave guilt in their cause, that is, in the voluntary negligence (see preceding note).

I said speaking of itself, because sometimes it must be declared per accidens, so that the Confessor may judge the state of the penitent in relation to granting or denying absolution; this occurs when the penitent can prudently doubt his own disposition of soul, or can rightly fear that perhaps he is mistaken in this ¹¹.

¹¹ Not only because of the circumstance of custom, but whenever a penitent notices either that he is certainly not rightly disposed to receive the grace of the sacrament, or that there is a prudent reason for a defect of that disposition, he is bound to disclose it to the Confessor, lest, namely, he receive the sacrament unworthily.

Moreover, in practice it is better to exhort penitents to disclose their custom of sinning to a Confessor who is not their ordinary one ¹².

¹² The diligence by which penitents seek the aid of a Confessor for more efficaciously procuring the correction of vices is certainly always to be commended.

486. • QUESTION 3. Must the circumstance of the degree of incest committed with blood relatives or relatives by affinity be declared?

Reply 1. More probably, incest among blood relatives and relatives by affinity does not differ in species; therefore, the circumstance of consanguinity or affinity does not seem necessarily to be expressed. - St. Lig., Homo Apostolicus, tract 9, no. 7.

Reply 2. According to the more common opinion of the Doctors, the circumstance of relationship in the first degree of the direct line must be disclosed, namely, between father and daughter, mother and son, father-in-law and daughter-in-law ¹³. Say the same concerning the circumstance of the first degree of consanguinity in the collateral line, namely, between brother and sister. Nevertheless, St. Lig., no. 18, calls the contrary opinion probable ¹⁴.

¹³ For the same reason add also between a mother-in-law and son-in-law, etc.

¹⁴ Suarez (De Poenit., disp. 22, sect. 3, no. 12): Concerning degrees of consanguinity, insofar as they are circumstances of incest... it is more probable that they do not change the species of the sin, as Cajetan teaches at length, 2.2, q. 154, art. 9, and tom. I, Opusc., last tract, reply 5; Soto; and Cano.

And Diana (tom. 1, tract 7, resol. 107), after adducing the opinion of those who admit a diversity of species in incest, adds (no. 2): But according to the opinion of St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 154, art. 9, and Cajetan there, because incest among blood relatives and relatives by affinity does not differ in species in the moral genus, and in the sacramental judgment it suffices that he who sinned with his sister say: I committed incest once or twice, without explaining the person related to him. And although incest with a daughter or mother is graver than with a sister or niece or the female cousin of one's wife, nevertheless, because this gravity increases the malice within the same species, it need not necessarily be confessed. And this opinion of St. Thomas pleases me more, which Filliucius calls probable in Quaest. Moral., tom. 2, tract 30, ch. 5, no. 97. Therefore it must be said with Nugno that diversity of degrees does not make a specific diversity in incest, but is an aggravating circumstance, which I probably think need not necessarily be explained in confession. And Gyptius teaches the same in express terms, as do, among our own, Fr. Megala and others.

Reply 3. More probably, however, the other degrees of consanguinity or affinity need not necessarily be declared. - Thus more commonly. - St. Lig., no. 469 and following.

QUESTION 4. Must the circumstance of the dignity of the person necessarily be accused, for example, if the sinner is a Superior, Magistrate, Priest, etc.?

Reply. More probably, negative of itself, that is, apart from the consideration of scandal, office, or a particular obligation. The reason is that the circumstance of the dignity of the person sinning does not of itself change the species of the sin, but at most aggravates the sin.

487. • QUESTION 5. Must the circumstance of a sin committed by a Confessor with a penitent necessarily be declared?

Reply. More probably, negative, provided it has no relation to confession. The reason is that by this sin no injury is done to the Sacrament, since it has no relation to confession ¹⁵. - St. Lig., on the sixth precept, no. 451; Lugo, disp. 16, no. 451; Lacroix, etc.

¹⁵ Some have thought that there is a certain spiritual relationship between Confessor and penitent, on account of which the sin contains some malice of incest. But this is commonly rejected (see Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 359 and following). Nevertheless, it is readily evident that both such a penitent must altogether be deterred from confessing further to that priest and such a Confessor from admitting that penitent further to confession.

QUESTION 6. Must the circumstance of a sacred time necessarily be accused?

Reply. Negative. This is evident from the universal practice both of Confessors and of penitents; for it is established that neither are the former solicitous to ask about such a circumstance, nor are the latter accustomed to declare it. Therefore, the circumstance of sacred time does not seem to require explanation, unless certain things are specially prohibited out of reverence for the time, for example, that one should not present public games, comedies, or theatrical spectacles on Good Friday. - St. Lig., bk. 3, no. 273; Lugo, no. 520; and others commonly.

488. • QUESTION 7. Does he satisfy the integrity of confession who accuses a recent sin as though committed long ago?

Reply 1. Affirmative of itself, because the circumstance of time pertains in no way to confession. Hence a penitent satisfies the obligation of confession who mingles new sins with old ones, or who, when making a general confession, does not distinguish from the others the mortal sins committed since the last confession, even if he does this deliberately to conceal the time at which he committed the sins. - Thus the Doctors commonly. - See Lugo, disp. 16, no. 53 ¹⁶; Tamburini, Methodus Confessionis, bk. 2, ch. 1.

¹⁶ Cardinal De Lugo (disp. 16, no. 47), after adducing the opposite opinion of some, adds: Others more correctly deny an obligation in the penitent to explain that he had not confessed those sins previously. Thus Bonacina, Homobonus, Diana, Sanchez, Suarez, etc. The reason... is that the sin is the same, whether he confessed it previously or not, unless perhaps the change of time brings with it a circumstance different in species.... But when the sin is the same, there is no reason why the circumstance of time must be explained. Since, therefore, the sin is the same whether he confessed it previously or not, and that circumstance in no way varies the sin, there is no reason why it must necessarily be explained. But, resolving the arguments of the contrary opinion (no. 54), he adds these things: Nor does it hinder that the penitent says that he wishes to make a general confession; for by this he does not say that he wishes to confess only old sins, but that he wishes also to comprehend those; for a general confession embraces all sins up to this hour. Nor does it matter that the Confessor understands it to be an old sin, for the penitent did not say this; and therefore the intention of absolving is not regulated by the private estimation of the Confessor, but he intends to absolve from the sins which the penitent brought to judgment, whatever they may be.... Finally, it does not matter that the penitent seems implicitly to indicate that they are old sins; for he truly has the intention of speaking about new sins and wishes to speak about them, although he desires not to be understood in this respect by the Confessor.

Reply 2. But if the penitent lies about the time, for example, if he denies that he sinned today and declares the sin as though committed at another definite and remote time, the Doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not the act placed a year ago. Hence he lies in two ways, namely, by concealing the sin committed today and by accusing a sin committed at another time. - Thus Tamburini in the place cited.

There are nevertheless Theologians who think this lie light. - See Lugo, ibid. ¹⁷.

¹⁷ Lugo aptly observes (loc. cit., no. 54) that this case differs from the preceding. Therefore, he says, it is not the same thing to speak obscurely and expressly to deny; because in the first case the words truly signify that which he wishes to confess, and therefore he presents a true sin; but in the second case the words cannot signify the true sin, but a false one. And I said false because, as the patrons of the contrary opinion object, in this way you seem in reality both to accuse a sin which you did not commit and to conceal that which you did commit.

Nevertheless, insofar as this argument is urged to deny the sufficiency of this confession, Lugo himself (ibid., no. 53) calls it merely probable. And indeed, as Tamburini observes (Exped. Conf., bk. 2, ch. 1, no. 6), a disorder of this kind, by which you seem to accuse a sin never committed and to conceal one truly committed, occurs equally from other circumstances also which are falsely added, as even the adversaries freely admit. Thus, for example, if you say that you killed Paul when you killed Andrew; or that you sinned with a stranger when you sinned with an inhabitant; or that you stole from Lucius when you stole from Caius; or that you detracted from someone at home when you detracted from him on the road or in the theater; or that you read a heretical book by Melanchthon when the book was by Osiander; or that you struck a Capuchin when you struck a Carmelite. That these lies do not hinder sufficient integrity of confession is also evident from the fact that, if they happened to be uttered inadvertently, no one compels the penitent to correct the error in the following confession. And to this pertains what the Author says, that this lie is thought light by certain Theologians.

Moreover, scarcely any use of these opinions bears upon practice, unless perhaps the Confessor, with one who undertakes to confess the sins of his whole life, thinks it superfluous from the adjuncts to inquire whether he had previously confessed this or that sin. For otherwise the faithful, ignorant of theological subtleties, are never accustomed to use these artifices. Indeed, even for those acquainted with these doctrines it would not always be lawful, whether because of a circumstance which changes the species at a different time, or because of the reservation of cases which can be present according as the sin was or was not previously absolved and duly confessed, or because of the adjuncts of a proximate occasion or evil custom which require the particular care of the Confessor.

489. • QUESTION 8. Must the external act of sin necessarily be accused?

Reply. Affirmative, because in the moral genus it is one and the same thing with the internal act, and these two constitute one whole. Moreover, the external act is directly prohibited by divine law, for example, You shall not kill. Besides, without declaration of the external act the Confessor generally could not discharge his office as is fitting with regard to providing admonitions, etc. This is established also from the universal custom of the faithful, which explains the law in this sense.

490. • QUESTION 9. Must the effect of a sin necessarily be expressed in confession?

Reply. The Doctors disagree; but the opinion which denies it has always seemed truer to me, says Lugo, disp. 16, no. 440, who draws the reason from the distinction between the external act of the sin and the effect of the sin thus (ibid., no. 449): The more common reason for this difference is that the external act, which is denominated free from the actual liberty of the internal act, is truly and properly a sin; but the effect which afterward followed, in sleep for example, is not properly a sin, as we have said, but the effect of a sin. But in confession all and only sins must be explained; therefore, the external act must be explained when it is actually free, but not the effect which afterward followed... because there cannot be an actual sin in him who is not actually sinning; nor can he actually sin who does not actually act; but he who sleeps while his enemy dies from poison does nothing at that time; therefore, he does not sin at that time. Thus far Lugo ¹⁸; see the rest in him, and you will not regret it.

¹⁸ Here there is question merely of obligation, just as in the question whether sins doubtfully committed or merely aggravating circumstances must be expressed in confession. And since in the present controversy also the obligation must be called entirely doubtful, as the disagreement of the Doctors proves, by the general principle the obligation of expressing the effect of a sin in confession neither ought nor can be imposed upon anyone. To this pertain the things which St. Alphonsus (Homo Apostolicus, tract 16, no. 29) has concerning the question of the necessity of expressing merely aggravating circumstances: Such a law, he says, is doubtful; and no one is bound to doubtful laws, as has been shown. Nor does it hinder to say here that in the matter of the Sacraments we cannot follow merely probable opinions; because this applies when there is question of the validity of the sacrament; otherwise with respect to integrity.

491. • QUESTION 10. Must a penitent declare the different persons with whom he sinned?

Reply. Negative of itself. - Thus Bonacina, disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 2, point 2, sec. 3, diff. 3, no. 14; Tamburini, In Decalogum, bk. 7, ch. 7; Lacroix, no. 1040; and others commonly.

The reason is that it suffices for the number and species of sins to be declared; but sins do not change species merely because they were committed with several persons. Hence he who fornicated with three different persons, or three times with the same person, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound of his own accord to say whether his accomplice was one or several, or whether they were prostitutes or others. - Nevertheless, if the Confessor asks about this, the penitent is bound to answer, because it is expedient that the Confessor know whether perhaps there is a proximate occasion of sinning, as is likely if the sin was committed several times with the same person.

492. • QUESTION 11. Must one bound by a vow of chastity, when sinning with another similarly bound, declare both circumstances?

Reply. Affirmative. The reason is that there are two entirely distinct sins there, namely, a sin against one's own vow and a sin of cooperating with the other in violating that person's vow. Precisely the same must be said of a married man having relations with another man's wife; for he commits a twofold adultery. - Lacroix, no. 4063; Lugo, disp. 16, no. 258; Salmanticenses, ch. 6, no. 63, etc.

277. Among circumstances, some change the species of the sin, because namely they constitute a new malice specifically distinct from the malice of the sin itself: for example, the circumstance of a sacred thing in theft adds to the sin of injustice the special malice of sacrilege; but others only aggravate the malice within the same species, whether by reason of intensity, or by reason of duration, or of mode, etc.: thus the sin of homicide is certainly aggravated by the circumstances by which death is inflicted, for example, by first amputating hands and feet, or gouging out the eyes.

278. Principle: For the integrity of confession it is necessary to accuse circumstances which change the species of the sin, if the new malice thus introduced is grave and is apprehended as such. It is certain.

For Trent defines² that it is necessary to confess "the circumstances which change the species of the sin." The reason is that those circumstances, by the very fact that they change the species, constitute a new and distinct sin, since they violate a distinct law or are opposed to a distinct virtue.

² Sess. XIV, can. 7.

But if the new malice, superadded to the sin, is not grave, or, even if objectively grave, is not apprehended as such by the subject, it does not constitute a grave sin, and consequently need not necessarily be declared.

279. Corollaries. The principal circumstances which are able to change the species are explained here only briefly,³ since they are declared more fully in various Treatises:

³ For a fuller exposition of this matter cf. Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 144-390; Suarez, disp. XXII, sect. 4; Salmantic., cap. 8, n. 51-114.

(a) The circumstance of the person sinning changes the species when an external sin against chastity is committed by a person consecrated to God by vow of chastity or by sacred order: for then it is personal sacrilege; - or when the person sinning is married: for it is adultery; - or when someone scandalizes a person whose spiritual care he has by force of his office, for example, if a pastor sins with parishioners, parents with children, a teacher with pupils: for these are bound by justice or piety to promote the spiritual good of subjects, and therefore they sin against one or the other virtue.

(b) Likewise the circumstance of the person with whom or against whom sin is committed changes the species in the matter of chastity, if someone sins with a married person (adultery), or with one related by blood or affinity (incest); - in the matter of charity or justice, if someone has hated, or struck, or calumniated parents, or children, or grandparents, grandchildren, or relatives by affinity in the first degree: for then piety is offended.

(c) The circumstance of place changes the species when sacrilege is introduced from this, for example, when an external act against chastity is committed in a church, or sacred things are stolen there.

(d) The circumstance of end changes the species when in itself it is gravely sinful, for example, if someone utters shameful things with the intention of seducing an innocent person.

280. What is certain? In order to separate certain things from uncertain ones, we establish these points: according to all, circumstances which do not notably aggravate the malice of a sin are not necessarily to be accused. Besides, circumstances whether of scandal, or of erroneous conscience, or of quantity, etc., which make some sin mortal from venial, must be accused; for example, to speak slightly shameful things before innocent children, who from this will take occasion of sinning gravely; - to steal ten asses when someone thinks this is a grave sin; - the quantity of the theft, insofar as it is necessary for discerning whether the sin is grave or slight. Likewise, circumstances which import a censure or reservation must be manifested.

281. What is disputed? But setting aside these cases, it is controverted whether circumstances notably aggravating the malice of a sin within the same species must necessarily be accused.

(a) Suarez, Billuart, Collet, Lacroix, and others¹ affirm. 1) For although Trent does not expressly teach this, nevertheless it insinuates it; since it declares that the circumstances of a sin are to be accused because otherwise it cannot be done that confessors "can rightly judge concerning the gravity of crimes, and impose the penalty which is fitting for those penitents"¹; but the same reason has force for notably aggravating circumstances; for some of these seem to increase the malice of sin more than some circumstances which change the species; thus he who deliberately and cruelly mutilates an innocent person, by amputating his hands and arms and gouging out his eyes, and afterward kills him, sins more gravely than he who, suddenly moved by anger, kills another with one blow in a church. Besides, a much greater penance must be imposed upon him who stole a thousand gold pieces than upon him who stole only twenty.

¹ Suarez, disp. XXII, sect. 3, n. 5; Billuart, diss. VII, a. 2, § 3; Collet, VI, 321, apud Migne, p. 484; Lacroix, n. 977, and others cited by these authors.

¹ Sess. XIV, ch. 5.

2. The Roman Catechism, the best interpreter of the Council, expressly teaches this:² "Nor indeed is it fitting only to explain grave sins by narrating them, but also those things which surround each sin, and greatly increase or lessen its depravity."

² De Sacram. Paenitent., n. 39.

3. Reason itself agrees; for, if the penitent is silent about these circumstances, he implicitly denies that his sin has such great gravity: for since there is a twofold manner of committing that sin, one ordinary, the other extraordinary and with peculiar deformity, when the penitent confesses the sin in a simple manner, the confessor neither can nor ought to understand that he sinned otherwise than in the ordinary manner, and so he is deceived with respect to the gravity of the sin.³

³ Thus almost Suarez, n. 10.

(b) A few others with Sporer (n. 410) think that the circumstance what, for example, the quantity of the theft, must necessarily be confessed, because it touches the substantial integrity of the sin, but not the others.

282. (c) Yet the more common opinion denies this,⁴ with St. Thomas, St. Alphonsus, and most moderns. For 1) while Trent explains the necessity of confessing mortal sins and their circumstances, it always adds this limitation: "circumstances which change the species of the sin"; but such a limitation seems to exclude other circumstances; for if someone, explaining the necessity of confessing sins, were always to add this limitation, "sins which are mortal," he would certainly seem to exclude all venial sins; so likewise the Council, by limiting the obligation of confessing circumstances to those which change the species, deservedly seems to exclude others.

⁴ St. Thomas, in 4 dist. 16, q. 3, a. 2, quaestiunc. 5; Opusc. 7 (alias 10) ad Lectorem Bisunt., q. 6. After the instruction given for the Roman clergy by Benedict XIII "concerning this matter I think there must not even be disputation" (D'Annibale, III, n. 303, note 20).

Nor should it be said that the Council implicitly taught the obligation of confessing other circumstances, on account of the argument brought above (n. 281); for the confessor can form a prudent judgment as soon as he knows the species of the sin, since circumstances, even notably aggravating ones, do not substantially increase the malice of the sin; for the quiddity of the sin is taken from its specific determination; therefore, by declaring the species, the essence of the sin is sufficiently declared. With respect to penance to be imposed, an equality in every respect is not required, but only a certain equality or proportion between the sin and the satisfaction; moreover this proportion can certainly be determined once the species of the sin is known, without circumstances, even notably aggravating ones, being manifested.

2. The Roman Catechism, when the context is inspected, is not opposed to our opinion, because from the examples adduced there it is clear that there is question here of those circumstances which make a sin mortal from venial, or change the species; for it says, after the words cited by the adversaries: "for certain circumstances are so grave that the character of mortal sin is established from them alone"; afterward it asserts the necessity of declaring the circumstance of a sacred person in homicide, or of a married person in fornication; and it adduces other examples pertaining to those circumstances which change the species. In the same place it prescribes that circumstances greatly lessening the sin are to be confessed: moreover all acknowledge that this is true only of those which change the species, or make a sin venial from mortal. Therefore the Catechism, rightly understood, rather favors our opinion.

3. Besides, Christ did not will confession to be a torture chamber of consciences, with Trent as witness; but if it were necessary to declare all circumstances notably aggravating the sin, both confessors and penitents would be in straits, since it is often difficult to determine which circumstances are notably aggravating, and consequently necessarily to be accused.

283. As regards practice, the faithful are accustomed to declare the more notable circumstances; and this indeed is generally to be advised to the faithful, not as a precept but as a counsel, both for greater peace of conscience and for receiving richer fruit from absolution. Yet the matter of chastity is excepted, concerning which nothing further is to be inquired beyond that which is necessary for knowing the species of the sin, lest perhaps penitents be scandalized¹ and the confessors themselves be exposed to temptations. - Hence, if penitents in good faith have been silent about circumstances of this kind in previous confessions, they are not to be compelled to repeat confessions, since the obligation of accusing them is at least very doubtful.

¹ Not only can penitents be scandalized in this case, but they can also make sacrilegious confessions; for certain persons are extremely ashamed to report these aggravating circumstances in shameful matter and are silent about them, even if they falsely think that these pertain to the integrity of confession and must be set forth. Cf. Gaume, Manuel des Confesseurs, n. 60.

284. Yet, according to all, per accidens there is an obligation of declaring them when the confessor legitimately asks about them. Now he has the right of asking about them when this is necessary for rendering a right judgment concerning the state of the penitent, for example, for knowing whether the penitent is a habitual sinner or not, whether he is in a proximate occasion, or is a recidivist. This is clear from the condemnation of proposition 58 by Innocent XI (March 2, 1679): "We are not bound to confess to a confessor asking us the habit of some sin";¹ for the same reason holds concerning a proximate occasion and frequent relapse as concerning habit.

¹ Apud Denzing., n. 1075. - See this proposition explained apud Viva, Damnatae Theses, in prop. 60, n. 16-18.

369. 3. Circumstances changing the species of mortal sins must be declared in confession. This is evident from the Council of Trent.¹⁹³ Which circumstances change the species of a sin was stated above, I, nn. 117 and 373. The general rule is: a circumstance changes the species of a sinful act when it adds a new malice gravely repugnant to another virtue. Thus, for example, theft injures the virtue of justice; but theft committed in sacred things additionally injures the virtue of religion; fornication injures the virtue of chastity, but fornication committed with blood relatives additionally injures the virtue of piety. Besides these circumstances which change the moral species of the sin, there are still others which change the theological species, that is, which render mortal a sin per se venial; for example, the theft of a small coin is a venial sin, but the circumstance of a large quantity in theft, for example, the theft of 1,000 francs, constitutes a grave sin. These circumstances are also customarily called "aggravating unto infinity," and it is evident of itself that they are to be declared in confession.

There is, however, a grave controversy as to whether other circumstances which change neither the moral nor the theological species, but only aggravate the malice, must also be manifested in confession.

All indeed agree that circumstances which aggravate only slightly need not necessarily be accused; but if there is question of notably aggravating circumstances, theologians do not agree. Some, for example, Suarez, Billuart, Concina, Lacroix, and others, defend the affirmative opinion; others, for example, St. Antoninus,¹⁹⁴ St. Thomas,¹⁹⁵ St. Bonaventure,¹⁹⁶ St. Alphonsus,¹⁹⁷ and almost all modern authors, deny such an obligation, although in practice they counsel the confession of all notably aggravating circumstances. Neither opinion is certain, but the negative opinion seems better, whatever Concina may say.¹⁹⁸

For a) the Council of Trent maintains a profound silence concerning this matter in that place where it accurately declares what must be manifested in confession, namely, all and each mortal sin and the circumstances which change the species of the sin. It is altogether impossible to understand why the Council, explaining ex professo the necessary matter of confession and designating circumstances changing the species, should have omitted notably aggravating circumstances if their confession were absolutely necessary. Moreover, nothing is had concerning such an obligation either in Sacred Scripture, in tradition, or in the Code of Canon Law, c. 901. Therefore it can be said with moral certainty that notably aggravating circumstances need not per se necessarily be manifested. Per accidens such an obligation will often be present, as will be explained below.

b) St. Thomas also denies that notably aggravating circumstances must always necessarily be accused. For he says: "Certain persons say that all circumstances which add some notable quantity to a sin must of necessity be confessed if they occur to the memory. But others say that only circumstances which draw the act into another genus of sin must of necessity be confessed, and this is more probable, ... the reason for which is that venial sins need not of necessity be confessed, but only mortal sins, which in a certain manner have an infinite quantity."¹⁹⁹ And elsewhere he writes: "A man is not bound to confess aggravating circumstances which do not draw the act into another genus of sin, just as neither is he bound to confess venial sins, although it is praiseworthy that a man confess them."²⁰⁰ Certain persons respond to these texts that St. Thomas indeed taught thus when he was younger, but that it was more likely that he would have changed this opinion if he had lived longer. But to answer thus is to divine rather than to teach. Others say that the Angelic Doctor speaks only of those circumstances which are after the manner of a venial sin and therefore aggravate the malice only lightly, but not of notably aggravating circumstances. This explanation also pleases little, because it is difficult to reconcile with the texts themselves which were adduced.

Since these things are so, a strict obligation always to declare notably aggravating circumstances is not to be asserted. For confession is already sufficiently burdensome of itself, and therefore the burden of accusing notably aggravating circumstances is not to be added unless a clear divine or ecclesiastical precept is present. But no one can prove the existence of such a precept, whatever Concina may assert.²⁰⁰ Nor should anyone say that the very nature of sacramental judgment necessarily requires such a manifestation. For sacramental judgment cannot be perfect in every respect, since the confessor often cannot judge clearly, for example, when hearing the confession of a sinner who has not confessed for a long time, or when giving absolution to a dying person deprived of his senses, to those who are half-witted, to children, and so forth. Therefore, from the will of Christ alone depends the degree to which perfection must be present in sacramental judgment. But the will of Christ has not been manifested to us concerning the confession of notably aggravating circumstances.

Almost the sole argument for the affirmative opinion is taken from the Roman Catechism,²⁰¹ whose authority is assuredly the greatest and which seems to defend this opinion: "Nor is it necessary only to explain grave sins by recounting them, but also those things which surround each sin and greatly increase or diminish its depravity." Diverse explanations of this text have been devised, namely, that the Roman Catechism speaks only of those circumstances which change either the moral or theological species; or, if it speaks also of other circumstances, that it establishes this obligation only per accidens, or rather counsels it than inculcates it. Whatever the case, a strict obligation to confess such circumstances cannot be established from the cited text alone.

¹⁹³ Ibid.; cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 901.

¹⁹⁴ S. theol. P. 3, tit. 14, c. 19, § 7.

¹⁹⁵ IV Sent., dist. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5.

¹⁹⁶ IV Sent., dist. 17, P. 3, a. 2, q. 3.

¹⁹⁷ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 468.

¹⁹⁸ De sacr. poenit., diss. 4, c. 6.

¹⁹⁹ IV Sent., dist. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5.

²⁰⁰ Opusc. 12, Ad lectorem Bisuntinum. Blessed Albert the Great, the teacher of St. Thomas, says concerning the same matter: "I answer without prejudice, according to the ancient doctors, that circumstances need not be confessed except those which draw the act into another genus of sin; it is safe also to state the others, especially if conscience pricks someone, but nevertheless they say that he is not bound by precept" (IV Sent., dist. 16, a. 24, sol.).

²⁰¹ P. 2, c. 5, q. 47.

1360. - I. All mortal sins, committed after Baptism, must be accused by divine law, as far as this can morally be done.

It is clear 1° from the very words of the institution of the Sacrament of Penance; for thus Christ the Lord says: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained. Hence the Council of Trent concludes in these words: "Our Lord Jesus Christ, when about to ascend from earth to heaven, left priests, His own vicars, as presidents and judges, to whom all mortal crimes should be brought, into which the faithful of Christ have fallen; that, according to the power of the keys, they might pronounce the sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is clear that priests could not have exercised this judgment, the cause being unknown, if they themselves had declared their sins only in general, and not rather in species and singly. From these things it is gathered that all mortal sins, of which, after a diligent discussion of themselves, they have consciousness, must be enumerated by penitents in Confession, even though they are most hidden."

It is clear 2° from the same Council of Trent, which thus defined: "If anyone shall say that in the Sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins, it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and each mortal sin, of which memory is had after due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of the sin, ... let him be anathema."

II. To material integrity belong grave sins as to - number, - moral species, - certain circumstances, - the external act, - bad effects joined with the action and morally imputable. This is clear from what has been said and from what is to be said below.

III. Material integrity is not always necessary for the validity and fruit of Confession; for sometimes it is morally impossible, either from inculpable forgetfulness, or from other causes. But God does not command impossible things. Therefore, etc. It is also clear from these words of Trent: "But the other sins, which do not occur to one who thinks diligently, are understood to be included in the same Confession universally; for these we faithfully say with the Prophet: From my hidden sins cleanse me, O Lord."

IV. For the integrity of Confession there is prerequired a diligent examination, according to the capacity of the penitent, concerning sins committed since the last valid Confession; for he who is held to the end is held also to the necessary means.

1361. Resolves. - 1° We are held, in the Confession of mortal sins, to accuse not only the generic species of sins, but also the lowest species; for these are properly called species; and the Council of Trent requires the accusation of all species.

2° He who cannot disclose the lowest species must manifest the higher, or generic, species: e.g. if someone, knowing that he sinned against chastity, does not remember the specific sin, he must say that he sinned gravely against chastity.

3° He who knows that he has sinned mortally, but is ignorant of, or does not remember, the species, even the generic species, of his sin, must say in general that he sinned gravely, but that he does not remember of what sin he is guilty.

4° He who cannot remember the certain number is held to accuse the more probable number, or the one which more nearly approaches the truth, adding the particle about. But he who cannot even give a likely sum of sins is held to say how often approximately in a month, in a week, in a day, etc. He who cannot even indicate this should say whether he always consented to the temptation and whether it occurred often. Cf. what was said n. 216-227 and what is to be said n. 1424. III. c).

5° The confessor cannot exempt from the obligation of confessing integrally on account of a great crowd of penitents, e.g. on some more solemn feast day. This is clear from what has been said, and also from the 59th proposition condemned by Innocent XI. See p. XVII.

6° A defect of sincerity concerning even one mortal sin, which is omitted, constitutes a grave sin; because the divine precept of Confession is violated in a grave matter.

1362. Questions. - Query 1° What number is judged to be comprehended in the particle about?

Resp. This cannot be determined by an entirely certain rule; nevertheless not every excess is comprehended, nor a notable defect: but only a moderate one, greater however or lesser proportionately to the number expressed. Thus Theologians commonly establish it: a moderate excess or defect will be, relatively to about five sins, to add or subtract one unit on either side; relatively to about ten, two; relatively to twenty, three or four; relatively to forty, four or five; relatively to one hundred, five or six; ... and prudently in the first case the penitent will be judged to have sinned four, five, or six times; in the second, to have sinned eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve times; and resolve similarly concerning the others.

Query 2° Must a notable excess afterward be declared, if it is found after Confession?

Resp. Affirm. The reason is clear from what has been said; for since a notable excess is not comprehended in the number declared by the particle about, the penitent has not satisfied the obligation of Confession as to that excess. Therefore... Thus all.

Query 3° If someone has erred notably by exaggerating the number, must he afterward declare this also in Confession?

Resp. Neg., if in good faith he expressed that notably greater number. The reason is that he fully and integrally satisfied the obligation of Confession; for the true number was comprehended in the greater one, and therefore remitted.

Query 4° Is it always a mortal sin to lie in Confession?

Resp. Of itself one sins mortally only when the lie is concerned with necessary matter of Confession concealed without a just cause, or with grave matter falsely supposed, namely by advertently, not from scruple or simplicity, accusing what was not committed, or what is doubtful as certain, or by exaggerating the number.

A lie therefore concerning things not pertaining to Confession or to the conscience of the penitent is not of itself mortal; because neither is it gravely harmful to the penitent, as is supposed, nor gravely injurious to the Sacrament, since it is not referred to it. - Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus against a few who say that every lie in Confession is mortal. - But if the penitent lies concerning sins, even sins already confessed and absolved, when the confessor as judge or physician asks something about them, as necessary for the present Confession, he sins gravely, because he deceives in substantial matters. Cf. pp. 58a. among the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVII.

Query 5° Does it prejudice the integrity of Confession if someone accuses venial sins to his ordinary confessor, but mortal sins to another?

Resp. 1° Neg., speaking per se, provided that he never receives absolution unless he has manifested all mortal sins to one confessor and is absolved by the same. The reason is that that Confession is integral which includes all mortal sins, since venial sins are not necessarily to be accused.

Resp. 2° In practice, however, attention must be paid to the circumstances of penitents and to the motives by which they are led. For those are not to be condemned who sometimes confess graver sins to an unknown confessor, but submit lighter sins to the ordinary one, if, from the shame with which they would be suffused with a confessor familiarly known, they would put themselves in danger of confessing sacrilegiously. Wherefore the confessor should never inquire curiously about this, and much less vex with questions a penitent perhaps trying to conceal it, nor, if he knows it, show that this displeases him, but rather that the use of the liberty which the Church permits most amply is approved by him, while she makes available to the faithful an abundance of several confessors. - Nevertheless they would sin gravely, and because of defect of due disposition would confess invalidly, who for that reason remained in the occasion or habit of sin, or went around for this reason, that they might sin more freely. Say the same with Bouvier concerning a seminarian who with a base habit (n. 1523. q. 13°) wishes to ascend to Holy Orders and for this reason approaches an unknown confessor, lest he be troubled.

Query 6° Does it prejudice integrity if someone feigns another voice, lest he be recognized by the Confessor?

Resp. Neg. per se; for provided that he opens all mortal sins, he accomplishes an integral Confession.

Circumstances of various kinds are distinguished in sins. (See n. 27.)

1364. Principles. - I. It is certain that circumstances changing the species are to be accused, if the malice of a diverse species which the circumstance induces is grave (for if it was light, e.g. a light irreverence of him who in a Church steals the image of another, it is not necessary, as is established concerning venial sins, to express it in Confession). The reason is that they constitute a new sin, and indeed a mortal one, of itself; and this is clear from Trent.¹

II. It is certain that circumstances lightly aggravating, or diminishing, are not necessarily to be accused, although to expose them is of itself better. The reason is that venial sins are not necessary matter of the Sacrament of Penance.

III. It is also certain that circumstances must be expressed by reason of which a sin venial from its kind becomes mortal. Likewise circumstances are to be opened which so diminish the sin that what, with them set aside, would have been mortal, becomes by reason of them either no sin, or only venial (n. 204).

1365. Questions. - Query 1° Must circumstances notably aggravating the malice of mortal sins within the same species necessarily be accused?

Resp. There is a twofold probable opinion.

Opinion I, the more common and more probable, denies absolutely. The reason is: 1° because Trent requires nothing else than the Confession of the number and species of sins, and therefore seems to exclude the obligation of confessing other circumstances.² 2° Because otherwise Confessions made in good faith would have to be repeated, and penitents would have to be commonly admonished for the future about explaining aggravating circumstances. But a precept so doubtful does not oblige.

But per accidens even aggravating circumstances are also to be declared, namely by reason - either of number, and thus the circumstance of quantity of time through which hatred or concupiscence toward a woman endured is to be declared; - or of censure or reservation; - or of necessary direction, as in the case of those in habit, those in occasion, and generally when there is question of the obligation to restitution.³

Opinion II affirms. The reason is, 1° because the same reason holds for accusing aggravating circumstances as for accusing circumstances changing the species; 2° because a sin increased by notably aggravating circumstances is equivalent to several sins; 3° because, if they were not accused, the confessor could not impose a proportionate penance; 4° because the Roman Catechism teaches thus.¹ - But the patrons of the first opinion reply:

To the 1st reason: "If the reasons proved equally concerning both circumstances, without cause the Council would have limited that whole doctrine to the circumstances which change the species: for it ought to have spoken concerning both in general without limitation and discrimination." Thus Lugo.²

To the 2nd. No one ever sought the multiplication of sins in the same act from the possible division of the matter.

To the 3rd. "So exact an equality is not always required in the penance to be imposed." Thus the same Lugo.³

To the 4th. The text objected here is: "Nor indeed is it necessary only to explain grave sins by narrating them, but also those things which surround each sin and greatly increase or diminish its depravity." But it can be replied that these words are explained in the same place in such a way that it is not necessary to understand them concerning merely aggravating circumstances. And indeed - a) immediately the Catechism adds: "For some circumstances are so grave that the nature of mortal sin consists from them alone: wherefore it is always necessary to confess all these." But the nature of lethal fault is not had from a circumstance alone, unless this changes either the moral or the theological species. - b) This is confirmed from the fact that it prescribes that circumstances greatly diminishing are to be confessed. For even the adversaries concede that this holds only when the diminution changes the theological species.⁴ - c) The Catechism confirms its doctrine from the necessity of expressing the circumstance of a sacred person in homicide, and of Matrimony in intercourse. But these pertain to circumstances changing the moral species.

Query 2° Must the circumstance of the degree of incest committed with blood relatives or relatives by affinity be declared?

Resp. 1° More probably, incest between blood relatives and relatives by affinity does not differ in species, since it makes no difference whether the conjunction arises from blood or from Matrimony; for intercourse with blood relatives is prohibited from the same motive from which it is prohibited with relatives by affinity: therefore the circumstance of consanguinity or affinity is not necessarily to be expressed.¹

Resp. 2° According to the common opinion of Doctors, the circumstance of conjunction in the first degree of the direct line is to be opened, namely between father and daughter; mother and son; father-in-law and daughter-in-law; mother-in-law and son-in-law; stepmother and stepson; stepfather and stepdaughter (p. 258), on account of the debt of reverence. Indeed it must be explained whether a son has sinned with his mother, by reason of the special reverence owed to the mother. - They say the same concerning the circumstance of the first degree of consanguinity in the collateral line, namely between brother and sister. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus calls the contrary opinion equally probable.²

Resp. 3° More probably, however, the other degrees of consanguinity or affinity are not necessarily to be declared.³ Cf. n. 495.

Query 3° Must the circumstance of the dignity of the person necessarily be accused, e.g. if the one sinning is a Superior, Magistrate, Priest, etc.?

Resp. Neg. more probably per se, i.e. with the reason of scandal, of office, or of a particular obligation set aside. The reason is that the circumstance of the dignity of the person sinning does not change the species of sin per se, but at most aggravates the sin.

Query 4° Must the circumstance of a sin committed by a confessor with a penitent necessarily be declared?

Resp. Neg. more probably, provided that it has no relation to Confession. The reason is that by this sin no injury is done to the Sacrament, since it has no respect to Confession.⁴ Nevertheless it is easily clear that both such a penitent is wholly to be deterred from further confessing to that priest, and such a confessor from further admitting that penitent to Confession.

Query 5° Must the circumstance of sacred time necessarily be accused?

Resp. Neg. This is clear from the universal practice both of confessors and of penitents; indeed it is certain that the former are not solicitous about asking concerning such a circumstance, nor the latter accustomed to declare it. The circumstance of sacred time does not seem to have to be explained, unless certain things are specially prohibited on account of reverence for the time, e.g. lest someone on Good Friday present public games, comedies, or ludicrous spectacles.¹

Query 6° Does he who accuses a recent sin as committed long ago satisfy the integrity of Confession?

Resp. 1° Affirm. per se. "The reason,... because the sin is the same, whether he had confessed it before or not, unless perhaps the change of time brings with itself a circumstance diverse in species," or the reservation, as regards this confessor, of a sin not confessed, or the occasion or habit of sin demands something else, and provided that a sufficient penance is imposed. ... "Nor is it an obstacle that" the penitent "says that he wishes to make a general Confession; for by this he does not say that he wishes to confess only old sins, but that he wishes also to comprehend those," i.e. old ones; "for a general Confession includes all sins up to this hour. Nor also does it matter that the confessor understands that that is an old sin, for the penitent has not said this. ... Finally it does not matter that the penitent seems implicitly to indicate that they are old sins; for he truly has the intention of speaking about new sins, and wishes to speak of them, although he desires not to be understood as to this by the confessor," ... who "intends to absolve from the sins which the penitent has brought forward."²

Resp. 2° But if the penitent lies about the time, e.g. if he denies that he sinned today; and declares the sin as committed at another determined and remote time, the Doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not an act placed in the past year. Hence he lies in two ways, namely by concealing the sin committed today, and by accusing a sin committed at another time. - Thus Tamburinus.³ Yet Theologians are not lacking who think this lie light. - See Lugo.⁴

Query 7° Must the external act of sin necessarily be accused?

Resp. Affirm., because it is one and the same thing with the internal act in the genus of morals, and these two constitute one total thing. Moreover the external act is directly prohibited by divine law, e.g. You shall not commit homicide. Besides, without the declaration of the external act the confessor generally could not perform his office, as is fitting, concerning admonitions to be given, etc. This is also clear from the universal custom of the faithful, which explains the law in this sense.

Query 8° Must the penitent declare the number of persons with whom he sinned?

Resp. Neg. per se. - Thus Bonacina,¹ Tamburinus,² Lacroix,³ and others commonly.

The reason is that it suffices that the number of sins and their species be declared; but sins do not change species because they were committed with several persons. Hence he who fornicated with three different persons, or three times with the same, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he held spontaneously to say whether the accomplice was one, or several; whether they were prostitutes, or others. - Nevertheless the penitent is held to declare it if there is a proximate occasion of sinning, as because sin was committed several times with the same person.

Query 9° Must the nearness of persons be declared in sins of grave hatred?

Resp. 1° Affirm., if there is question of nearer nearness, on account of the strict bond of piety. Hence hatred against parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, spouse, relatives by affinity in the first degree of the direct line, and, at least if very grave evil is wished, brothers must be declared.⁴

Resp. 2° But neg. more probably, if there is question of remote nearness, namely among the other blood relatives or relatives by affinity. - Lugo,⁵ and others, against others who think the circumstance of nearness must be declared even in the fourth degree of consanguinity.

St. Th., Suppl., q. 9, a. 2.

521. Principle I. Confession must be integral, so that to one and the same confessor all necessary matter not yet rightly subjected to the keys is subjected at once, i.e., all and each mortal sin are declared which must be declared.

Integrity is twofold: 1) formal or subjective, which consists in the accusation of all mortal sins which the penitent here and now, with all circumstances considered, according to his capacity, after diligent examination, morally can and ought to confess according to the practical dictate of conscience, although he omits some things from a just cause; 2) material or objective, which absolutely embraces all mortal sins which after Baptism have really been committed and have not yet been rightly subjected to the keys. From these things it is clear that confession can a) be integral materially and not formally, as if someone confesses all mortal sins with the due circumstances, but erroneously thinks that a venial sin which he committed is mortal and conceals it; b) on the contrary, be integral formally and not materially, as if someone confesses all the mortal sins which after diligent examination he has found, but omits one from inculpable forgetfulness; c) finally, be integral materially and formally at the same time, as if someone after diligent examination remembers all the mortal sins which he has committed and accurately confesses them.

Now each integrity is necessary by divine right for the validity of the sacrament of Penance, yet in such a way that formal integrity is necessary by necessity of means, and in reality, and therefore is always necessary, and is always of precept; material integrity is necessary by necessity of means only in desire, and by necessity of precept of itself and regularly, so that excusing causes can exist. Hence, speaking of itself, confession must be materially integral; accidentally formal integrity suffices; so that he sins gravely who omits some sin which here and now he can and ought to declare. Each point is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5.

The said integrity is required:

1. On the part of the remission of sins: for confession is necessary by divine right for the remission of mortal sins, just as contrition is. But one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. Therefore confession, just as contrition, must extend itself to all mortal sins. "The priest," says St. Thomas (ad 2), "hearing confession bears the place of God, and therefore confession must be made to him in the same way as contrition is made to God. Hence just as there would not be contrition unless someone were contrite for all sins which occur to memory, so neither would there be confession unless someone confesses all things which have occurred to memory."

2. On the part of the office of judge and physician with which the confessor is marked, because without the integrity of confession he can neither a) rightly exercise the sacramental judgment, namely by estimating that the dispositions of the penitent are proportioned to the quantity of fault, nor b) preserve equity in establishing punishments (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5). St. Thomas declares this thus, in the body of the article: "In bodily medicine it is necessary that the physician know not only one disease, against which he must give medicine, but also universally the whole condition of the sick person himself, because one disease is aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine which would befit one disease would bring harm to another. And similarly it is with sins, because one is aggravated by the addition of another, and that which would be suitable medicine for one sin would furnish an incentive to another, since sometimes someone is infected with contrary sins... And therefore it is of the necessity of confession that a man confess all sins which he has in memory; but if he does not do this, it is not confession, but a simulation of confession."

522. Principle II. For the integrity of confession by divine right, all mortal sins must necessarily be declared according to number, lowest species, and circumstances changing the species. - Thus the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7. And indeed they must be declared:

1. according to number, for each mortal sin by itself alone constitutes a distinct cause, which must necessarily be brought before the tribunal of the keys;

2. also according to species, and circumstances changing the species: for things which are subjected to a judicial sentence must become known to the judges, at least speaking of themselves and regularly, not only in common, but in particular and according to the lowest species;

3. finally, all mortal sins at once, because it is impossible to seek remission of one mortal sin without at the same time seeking remission of all which burden the conscience.

Therefore there must be declared:

A. The mortal sins themselves, says the Council, l. c., and not only their malices, and indeed:

1. According to the interior act of reason and will.

2. And according to the act itself, even external, if the sin has been consummated by an external work, because

a) this also is prohibited by God, e.g., you shall not kill, you shall not steal;

b) it is one thing in the genus of morals with the internal act and is a true sin, an inordinate voluntary act, although not distinct in number and malice from the internal sin; indeed the external act integrates the sin and is the part finally consummating the other co-part, namely the internal act, from which it differs as the complete species from the incomplete and the consummated work from the work begun;

c) because universal custom understands the law of integrity in this way. Hence it does not suffice to accuse: I had the intention or purpose of committing theft or adultery, but: I stole or committed adultery.

3. Indeed also, for similar reasons, according to the external effect foreseen in some way at least, voluntary and culpable, e.g., death from a wound inflicted or poison administered, abortion from a drug taken, pollution from bad reading, blasphemies or omission of Mass from drunkenness, because this itself either is the external sin or at least completes and finally terminates the act of sin, and thus is a voluntary disorder. But a merely materially evil effect, as altogether involuntary, or efficaciously retracted before it has occurred, is not to be declared, unless accidentally by reason of a penalty, irregularity, reservation to be incurred, or by reason of reparation to be made.

B. Sins according to number: all and each, says the Council, i.e., as many must be accused as have been committed, for otherwise something would be hidden. Hence:

a) If someone remembers a certain and precise number, this must be said; e.g., of itself it does not suffice to confess: I blasphemed several times, I more often omitted Mass, etc.; and he sins gravely who knowingly or from culpable negligence sets forth a greater or lesser number.

b) If someone after diligent examination remembers only an approximate number, this must be said with the addition of the particle about or more or less; this particle signifies that the number said differs from the real number by a small quantity by excess or defect, and indeed according to proportion to the quantity of the number: thus, e.g., according to St. Alphonsus, about 3 is understood as 2-4, about ten times as 8-12, about thirty as 27-33, about one hundred as 95-105, about one thousand as 950-1050.

c) If someone cannot recall even an approximate number, he should state the approximate number of sins committed on individual days or weeks or months or years. This is verified especially among sinners who have a habit of sin; e.g., it suffices that a prostitute say: for two years I remained in a brothel and as often as there was occasion, even with married persons, or also sometimes with clerics, I offered myself; or a concubinary: for three years I lived in concubinage; or another: I desired any women who came my way, even relatives, married women, sacred persons; or: concerning base matters, on any given occasion, I spoke with companions. In various cases he should at the same time indicate in some way the greater or lesser frequency of the sin.

d) If the penitent can recall nothing precisely or approximately, he should say whether he sinned very frequently, frequently, or sometimes with determinate sins, from childhood, before or after marriage entered, on occasion of living together, etc. Thus, e.g., for very frequent merely internal sins: for several hours I indulged in depraved thoughts; for a month I frequently wished grave evil; for two months I was in depraved desires.

e) If after an approximate confession a notable excess is discovered, so that the accusation was notably less, it is necessary to correct it; but not if the excess is small, because this is included in the approximate number, or if a defect is discovered, so that the accusation was notably greater, because the lesser is included in the greater. On the contrary, he who expressed a certain number, if afterward he remembers that he sinned even one more time, is bound to declare the omitted instance because it was not included in the accusation.

C. Sins according to the lowest moral species: not in genus but in their species, says the Council, i.e., not the supreme species but the lowest, according to the obvious and proper sense of the words, or according to their formal malice by which they are distinguished from others, insofar as some sin is constituted by its own complete object and is distinguished from others, or insofar as it is opposed to a virtue or precept in particular and in its own proper formal mode is opposed. Otherwise they would not be declared as they are. Thus, e.g., it does not suffice to declare that one has sinned mortally, or against justice, or against chastity or charity, but what kind of sin was committed against them: whether theft, insult, or detraction; whether rash judgment, hatred, discord, or scandal; whether fornication, adultery, deflowering, pollution, etc. Cf. Alexander VII, prop. 25.1

But if someone has not sufficiently distinguished the lowest species or does not remember it, it suffices for him to confess the supreme species or genus, or only that he sinned mortally, according as he has distinguished or remembered more or less concerning the sin. Thus, e.g., he who does not distinguish between depraved thoughts and desires should say: I gave consent to base thoughts; he who does not distinguish bad speech about obscene things, impious things, sins committed and joyfully recalled, provocation to evil, sufficiently accuses by saying that he had base speech.

D. Sins according to circumstances changing the species, as the Council of Trent expressly has it, and can. 901, which, namely, add a new and diverse moral species and constitute a sin of a diverse species. This evidently must be understood of only those circumstances which add a grave or mortal species. Thus, e.g., the circumstance of sacredness for theft of a sacred thing or from a sacred place; for scandal, the circumstance of a superior person who from piety or justice has spiritual care over someone; the circumstance of a married person in a sin of lust, etc. On these things cf. the treatise on Human Acts and Sins and the special treatises on the virtues and precepts.

Circumstances lightly aggravating or diminishing are not to be accused; indeed, it is not proved that even notably aggravating circumstances are to be accused, both because they do not substantially change the state of the sinner, and because the Council of Trent recalls only circumstances changing the species. And this is the opinion of St. Thomas.¹ Yet except:

¹ On IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5.

a) of itself, if circumstances so aggravate that they make a venial sin mortal, or vice versa, because thus the state of the sinner is substantially changed and free matter becomes necessary, or conversely;

b) accidentally, if it is necessary by reason of a penalty or inability or reparation; or if the confessor as judge interrogates about them in order to know, or better know, the state, dispositions, and obligations of the penitent, or as physician in order to indicate remedies, e.g., about habit, occasion, relapse, effects, complicity, etc. Cf. prop. 58 condemned by Innocent XI.²

² "We are not held to confess to the confessor asking the habit of some sin."

For the rest, the faithful are accustomed to declare circumstances notably aggravating, and they are to be exhorted to this unless they are scrupulous, because such declaration conduces both to procuring peace of conscience, and to promoting humility, and to the fuller manifestation of the soul of the penitent, whence the confessor will be able perfectly to exercise toward the penitent the office of judge and physician. - Yet except sins against chastity; in this matter, at least ordinarily, those things which are strictly necessary are to be declared, and indeed in a shamefaced manner.

But it should be noted that all the aforesaid things are to be declared not according to the greater or theological knowledge and science which someone later acquired, but according to the knowledge and science which he had concerning the sins at the moment in which he committed them, because according to this alone they are voluntary. For nothing is willed unless it has first been known.

1. "He who has had copulation with an unmarried woman satisfies the precept of confession by saying: I committed with an unmarried woman a grave sin against chastity, without explaining copulation."

XXI. Fr. Gobat, tract 7, no. 324: “The malice of a circumstance changing the species is not contracted, and consequently is not to be confessed, unless the penitent, when he was committing the sin, at least doubted whether such a circumstance were not present, and whether on account of it a peculiar sin were not contracted. So the common sense of theologians holds. Use, my good man, this rule FREQUENTLY, especially in hearing the confessions of rustics, and namely when the malice of the circumstance is known to the learned alone.”

I. That is called a circumstance which accidentally stands about a human act, which takes its species from an object either good or evil. One circumstance is physical, as if a man kill another with a dagger, with poison, with a firearm; another moral, which in the genus of morals changes the species, or adds a new species of malice, as if a man kill his father, a religious, and so forth. For besides homicide there is added the crime of parricide, of sacrilege, and so forth. There is an obligation of confessing circumstances not physical but moral, which change the species, as all confess. Seven circumstances are enumerated, contained in this verse:

Who, what, where, by what helps, why, how, and when.

II. The circumstance who betrays the state, qualities, and profession of the penitent, as if he be a cleric, a priest, a monk, married, bound by a vow, an advocate, a judge, a father of a family, and so forth.

III. QUESTION I. What is to be said of the opinion denying the duty of confessing circumstances changing the species, when the sinner does not doubt of them? ANSWER. Fr. George Gobat, tract 7, no. 524, says: “The malice of a circumstance changing the species is not contracted, and therefore is not to be confessed, unless the penitent, when he was committing the sin, at least DOUBTED whether such a circumstance were present or not, and whether on account of it a peculiar sin were not contracted. So indeed the COMMON SENSE OF THEOLOGIANS. Use, my good man, this rule frequently, especially in receiving the confessions of the rude, and namely when the circumstance is known to the vulgar of the Doctors alone.”

IV. What vulgar of the Doctors is that? Sinners commit adultery, fornicate, or perpetrate incest, having their soul absorbed with the delight of the outrage, and think of nothing else besides the circumstance changing the species. Is no one therefore bound to confess circumstances changing the species, unless the penitent, says Fr. Gobat, at least doubted when he was committing the sin? That after the deed committed with his sister, with another's wife, with a virgin consecrated to God, he should know the duty of manifesting a circumstance specifically diverse, matters nothing. He must, when he sins, at least doubt, in order to be bound to confess. Use, my good man, this rule frequently. Beware, all confessors, I subjoin, of this false rule.

V. QUESTION II. Is a religious initiated in sacred Orders bound to explain the circumstance of the solemn vow? ANSWER. The Salmanticenses, Diana, Malfesius, Castropalao, and Antony of the Holy Ghost deny it. But other grave theologians affirm it, whose opinion is true. He who sins with a novice, male or female, in the year of probation is bound to confess this circumstance, whatever some say to the contrary. Since although they have not emitted a vow, they are nevertheless first-fruits, victims destined to be immolated to God in sacrifice. To violate these hosts and victims pleasing to God bears before the common sense an enormous deformity. A bride and bridegroom knowing one another carnally, or knowing themselves with others, ought according to the more probable opinion to manifest this circumstance.

VI. A virgin who spontaneously fornicates for the first time ought to lay open this circumstance: because this virgin inflicts a peculiar injury, as upon her parents, so upon God, from whom she received the gift of virginity, when she squanders such virginity.

VII. QUESTION III. Is a confessor who sins with a penitent bound to confess it? ANSWER. The discourse is not of a confessor soliciting, but of a confessor absolutely sinning with a penitent. Some deny it, as the Salmanticenses relate. But other grave theologians affirm it, whose opinion is true. What? A confessor is a judge, a teacher, and a physician. He becomes a wolf devouring the sheep; and is this not to be manifested in confession? Our opinion is favoured by the reservation made to themselves by bishops in various dioceses concerning an act, or an attempt, toward base things with a spiritual daughter.

VIII. If a bishop or a prelate of a Religion fornicate, commit adultery, get drunk, and so forth, he is bound to explain the circumstance, on account of the grave scandal which he brings at least to his accomplice, whatever some say to the contrary. Similarly governors of a city, judges, rectors, and the like, who by office are bound to hinder thefts and crimes of injustice, if they themselves steal, are not bound, as some say, to manifest this circumstance, although they ought to lay open the omission by which they did not hinder others' thefts. But this opinion is to me false. For they are bound to confess this circumstance. Similarly false to me is the opinion teaching that a priest striking a layman with shedding of blood is not bound in confession to manifest that he is a priest. For a priest by reason of his dignity perpetrates a malice distinct from the malice of simple striking. A eunuch, or a frigid fornicator, is bound to explain the circumstance of impotence for natural copulation, because he perpetrates a sin against nature.

IX. QUESTION IV. What is to be said of the opinion of those denying the duty of confessing a habit of sinning? ANSWER. Fr. Claude La Croix, Book 6, part 2, no. 968, answers that, speaking of itself, such a habit is not to be laid open; and for this opinion he cites Suárez, Vásquez, Reginald, and Lupus. The same opinion the Salmanticenses defend, and cite Diana and Castropalao. This is the reason which Fr. La Croix assigns: “No one, speaking of itself, is bound to confess the same sin twice. But past sins, by which the habit was caused, have been confessed heretofore, as is supposed; and the present sin is not aggravated but rather diminished BY REASON OF THE PRECEDING HABIT, which in some manner diminishes liberty. Therefore it is not necessary to make mention of past sins, or of the habit.”

X. Fr. Dominic Viva in his Course of Theology, Vol. II, part 6, question 5, no. 2: “Although a penitent be bound to answer a confessor questioning him concerning a habit of sin, since the opposite opinion was condemned by Innocent XI … nevertheless, speaking of itself, a habit of this kind is not to be laid open.”

XI. Speaking of itself, this doctrine is false and condemned, contained in proposition 58 condemned by Innocent XI. Speaking of itself, is a sick man not bound to lay open to his physician the state, the habit, and the length of his bodily infirmity? If crowds, if husbandmen, if plebeian men themselves and minds not learned in the academies but rude, polished by the light of nature alone, were to read doctrines of this kind, they would suffer grave scandal. What? Is sin diminished by an inveterate habit? Do obstinate, hardened, and inveterate sinners therefore sin less than those who sin once or twice? A habit, you say, diminishes liberty. What of this? This diminution is voluntary. The sinners themselves freely fabricate their own fetters. All the Fathers affirm that those who sin from habit sin from a depraved malice. Here the diminution of liberty in those who from habit perjure themselves, blaspheme, and fornicate is consequent, not antecedent, as the true theologians teach with St. Thomas, I-II, q. 78, art. 2, and question 76, article 4, reply 1. It aggravates therefore, and does not diminish, the malice of the sin.

XII. I prove that the described doctrine of Frs. La Croix, Viva, de Lugo, and others is contained in this condemned thesis 58: We are not bound to confess to a confessor questioning us a habit of some sin. A confessor can by right question only concerning those sins which a penitent is bound to manifest. Therefore if a confessor can by right question concerning a habit of sinning, a penitent is bound to manifest it. What to this? He ought to manifest it, reply the casuists, if he be questioned, but otherwise if the confessor keep silence. A vain cavil. The duty of manifesting precedes the right of questioning. For unless there were in the penitent a duty of manifesting, the confessor could not question; since he can question only concerning those things which the penitent is bound to lay open. But, reasonings being dismissed, let the common sense of all Christians be consulted, who, being sincerely contrite, first of all set forth the state, the habit, and the custom of sinning. Scarcely would the recounted doctrine have come into the mind of any Christian, had not the casuists devised it. Hence gather how true it is that which I have more often indicated, namely that by one arbitrary little distinction the theses condemned by the Church are eluded, and the most clear testimonies of holy Scripture itself.

XIII. QUESTION V. What is to be said of sins perpetrated from habit? ANSWER. Fr. Claude La Croix proposes this question, namely whether sins which from a morally evil habit are afterwards done inadvertently are to be confessed. He answers, Book 2, part 1: “If we suppose that when those things are done there is present no advertence at all to the malice, such things will have no new malice, as is established from what is said in Book 5, question 2, no. 16 and following; and consequently, since these things are not sins of themselves, nor externally complete any internal sin, but are only effects of sin according to what is said at no. 974, there is no obligation of confessing them. … Which is true according to many with Dicastillo, although that habit be not retracted.”

XIV. When therefore Christians blaspheme, perjure themselves, and desire to commit adultery from a habit not retracted and morally evil, if there be present no advertence, are these crimes not to be confessed? Why? Because they are not new sins. Therefore the precepts of not perjuring oneself, of not blaspheming, of not desiring another's wife are impossible to those who sin from a habit not retracted. Therefore you defend Jansenism. Concerning this opinion let the wise judge.

XV. QUESTION VI. What is to be said of the opinion of Fr. Tamburini saying that the degrees of consanguinity of a sin perpetrated with a mother, or with a cousin, are not to be manifested? ANSWER. Fr. Tamburini, Book 2, Method of Confession, chapter 7, § 7, no. 48, writes these things: “I say it is probable, from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 16, art. 9, and Cajetan in the same place, that consanguinity does not differ in species from affinity, nor one degree of these from the others. So Filliucci, saying that it is the opinion of St. Thomas, Cajetan, Soto, and almost the Thomists; Gregory; Megala — both in Diana. Whence, although without doubt it be graver to offend against one degree, for example against the first with a mother, than against another, for example with a cousin, nevertheless because the species is not changed, I think that these are not specially to be manifested in confession.”

XVI. Scarcely is it possible to find any one of the rustics or idiots who, if he lay with his mother or with his sister, would not conceive a horrid malice, and would not be exceedingly ashamed to manifest so great a crime. And does Fr. Tamburini with Fr. Filliucci exempt Christians guilty of so great a crime from the obligation of laying open so enormous a circumstance? Will it be enough for these to say, I have committed incest, without declaring whether with a mother or with a sister? There is no need that I should refute this false opinion at greater length. Let the wise judge. Most injuriously is this opinion here fastened upon St. Thomas, as will presently be plain.

I. With a full pen I have treated this question in Vol. IX, Book 6, part 1, dissertation 4, chapter 4. In few words I shall here touch upon it. You steal one gold piece, or a hundred, or a thousand. The sin is within the same species of theft. But a theft of a thousand gold pieces is notably graver than a theft of one gold piece. Theologians dispute on either side whether penitents are bound to confess circumstances of this kind morally aggravating within the same species.

II. First of all the doctrine of St. Thomas is to be vindicated. The Salmanticenses Scholastici, most excellent maintainers of the doctrine of St. Thomas, object the following testimony from Book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 16, question 3, article 2: For some say that all circumstances which add some notable quantity to a sin are of necessity to be confessed, if they occur to the memory. But others say that they are not of necessity to be confessed, unless they be circumstances which draw to another genus of sin. And this is more probable. Here those illustrious theologians stop, and determine that St. Thomas stands on their side. But if the whole doctrine of the Angelic Doctor be regarded, I do not see whence the Salmanticenses can glory in his patronage in this cause. For thus St. Thomas straightway goes on: But it must be added, those which draw to another species of mortal sin. … OF WHICH THE REASON IS (N.B.) that venial sins are not of necessity of confession, BUT ONLY MORTAL, which have in a certain manner an infinite quantity: because circumstances which do not give another species to a sin, or which do indeed give one, BUT NOT OF MORTAL SIN, are not of necessity of confession; and yet to confess these belongs to the perfection of confession, as has been said of VENIAL SINS.

III. A threefold malice can lie in a circumstance: first, that which changes the species; second, that which increases the malice within the confines of venial sin; third, that which mortally increases the malice. St. Thomas in the testimony adduced teaches that circumstances which either do not change the species, or do not mortally increase the malice, are not necessarily to be confessed. For if it increase only venially, within the limits of venial sin, even notably, their confession is not necessary. For one venial sin is graver than another, as is plain in the theft of one farthing and of one chicken. These circumstances are not of necessity to be confessed, says the Angelic. For what do these words betray, which govern the whole doctrine of the article? OF WHICH THE REASON IS, that venial sins are not of necessity of confession, but only mortal, which have in a certain manner an infinite quantity. Our opponents cry out that St. Thomas expressly treats of circumstances which add some notable quantity. It is true that he teaches this at the beginning of the article; but these words, which bear an ambiguity as to whether St. Thomas is speaking of a notable quantity venial or mortal, the same holy Doctor forthwith in the course of the article expounds as to be understood of a notable venial quantity. THE REASON IS, because venial sins are not of necessity of confession. Tell me: is one venial sin given notably graver than another? All affirm it. By what daring therefore do you wrench this notable quantity by main force to the mortal, when the Angelic plainly asserts that he speaks of a notable venial addition? The reason is, because venial sins, and so forth. But that the mouths of our adversaries may be utterly stopped, these other words of the Angelic are to be recalled beneath the eyes: Aggravating circumstances which do not attribute another species to a sin, or which do indeed attribute one, BUT NOT OF MORTAL SIN, are not of necessity of confession. Of which the reason is, that we are not bound necessarily to confess venial sins. So decisive, so peremptory are these things that they leave no place for arguing and cavilling. If you desire more, consult Vol. IX, in the place cited.

IV. The doctrine of St. Thomas being briefly vindicated, I say that circumstances mortally aggravating within the same species are to be manifested in confession. I prove this opinion, which the graver theologians defend, by the authority of the Tridentine Catechism, which, part 2, chapter 5, § 43, teaches these things: “The circumstances of sins are to be laid open when a man confesses. But in confession that highest care and diligence is to be employed which we are wont to put forth in the gravest matters; and all study is to be conferred upon this, that we may heal the wounds of the soul and tear out the roots of sin. Nor is it enough only to explain grave sins by narrating them, but also those things which stand about each sin, and greatly increase or diminish its depravity. For certain circumstances are so grave that from them alone the character of a deadly sin is constituted. Wherefore all these things it behoves always to weigh. For if a man kill another, it must be explained whether that man was initiated in sacred things, or profane; and likewise if he lay with a woman, he must needs lay open whether she was free by the law of matrimony, or another's wife, or a kinswoman, or consecrated to God by the promise of some vow. For these constitute diverse kinds of sins: so that the first indeed is called by the Doctors of divine things simple fornication, the second adultery, the third incest, the fourth sacrilege. Theft also is to be numbered among sins. But if a man steal a gold coin, he sins altogether more lightly than he who steals a hundred, or two hundred, or some vast quantity of gold, and especially he who has carried off sacred money. The same account pertains also to place and to time, whose examples are better known from many books than that they should be enumerated by us. These things therefore, as we have said, ARE TO BE ENUMERATED. But those which do not greatly increase the depravity of the matter can be omitted without crime.”

V. As the Fathers of Trent, so the authors of the Catechism always followed the doctrine of St. Thomas, which you see here declared and confirmed. This doctrine the most learned Salmanticenses, to be looked up to by me under many titles, ought to have meditated.

VI. The Venerable Innocent XI condemned this thesis: We are not bound to confess to a confessor questioning us a habit of some sin. These two things — the right of questioning and the duty of manifesting — are so conjoined that the one cannot subsist without the other. Nay, the duty of manifesting precedes the right of questioning, as I have said. A habit of fornicating or of perjuring oneself does not change the species, but only aggravates the malice within the same species. The doctrine denying the duty of answering has been condemned. Therefore the doctrine denying the duty of manifesting an aggravating circumstance has been condemned.

VII. Our opinion is demonstrated by reason. He who knowingly keeps silence about an accession of mortal malice does not make a formally whole confession. He who steals a hundred gold coins, of which each constitutes the matter of a mortal theft, perpetrates a theft which is equivalent to a hundred deadly thefts. Therefore he who confesses only the grave matter, namely of one gold piece, keeps silence about ninety-nine mortal sins. By a single act of the will you covet ten persons specifically diverse in the genus of morals — suppose a mother, a daughter, a nun, a married woman, a virgin, a boy, and so forth. Does he make a formally whole confession who does not confess these persons morally diverse in species coveted by a single act? You deny it. Therefore he does not make a formally whole confession who by a single act perpetrated a hundred mortal thefts numerically distinct; or who by a single act coveted several persons distinct by moral number alone. I prove the consequence. You are equally bound to confess mortal sins distinct by number and by species, as all teach. Therefore a virtual numerical multiplication is equally to be confessed as a virtual specific multiplication. See more in the place cited.

I. QUESTION I. What are the significations of the circumstance what? ANSWER. It signifies the quantity and quality of the sin, and of the person with whom one sins. They dispute whether the person is to be expressed concerning whom a man takes morose delight, which would have to be manifested if the deed followed. The affirmative opinion is to me true, the negative false: since common sense itself execrates as something most enormous a venereal delight conceived from lying with a mother.

II. Fr. La Croix, Book 6, part 2, no. 1030, writes: “He who without any desire looks upon a person with a lustful eye is not bound to say (in confession) of what sort the person was.” He subjoins there at no. 1031: “He who without desire touched a girl lustfully, according to Diana, satisfies by saying that he touched her so many times basely, saying nothing of the parts in which he touched her.” He subjoins again: “Others say PROBABLY that it is to be expressed if he touched a shameful part.” He leaves it to the reader, after the sceptical manner, to choose for himself what pleases him more. And why ought he not to express that he looked lustfully upon his mother, his sister, a nun, and so forth? Why ought he not to manifest that he touched a hand, cheeks, breasts, or shameful parts? What is the reason of the silence? The opinions probably denying the duty of manifesting the aforesaid circumstance are false.

III. Fr. La Croix goes on in the same place, no. 1040: “He who has fornicated with three at one time, or thrice with one, satisfies by saying that he has thrice fornicated; nor is he bound to say whether it was one or several, whether they were harlots or others, provided he has not cooperated to the hindering of generation. Bonacina, Tamburini.”

IV. Unless the casuists had devised figments of this kind, any Christian by the light of nature would express the three women, because they are three most grave and diverse scandals. But why ought he not to express the three women? Because the yoke is sweet, they say, and it ought not to be made heavy. The aforesaid opinion is false and improbable.

V. The same La Croix in the same place, no. 1041: “If a priest fornicate with a daughter of confession, St. Thomas, Soto, Sánchez, and other most grave authors, whom he relates and follows, and Aversa, part 16, § 14, still say that a new species of malice is contracted: because canon law calls it a certain adultery or incest; and in fact it seems to be a species of irreverence and sacrilege against the sacrament. On the contrary, that it is simple fornication, and that it can be kept silent that she was a daughter of confession, teach Ledesma, Vásquez, Sá, Bonacina, Filliucci, Sánchez, Pontius, Hurtado, Ochagavia, Dicastillo, Tamburini, Diana, Lupus — because from confession no spiritual kinship arises, and so forth. … Each opinion is probable. The first is more conformable to canon law; but the second seems from reason the more probable.”

VI. Probabilism creeps everywhere. Each is probable, the true and the false. The first is more conformable to canon law; the second from reason more probable, says Fr. La Croix. And why? Because Vásquez, Bonacina, Filliucci, Hurtado, Ochagavia, Dicastillo, Tamburini, and Diana comprehended the rights of reason more deeply than the Fathers, than the Councils, than the Pontiffs founders of canon law. This opinion, which Fr. La Croix calls the more probable, is false and lax, as the most wise Pontiff Benedict XIV declared it, when he took away from confessors the authority of absolving from this crime. Do the Pontiffs then publish canons without reason? Is there an appeal from the sacred canons to the tribunal of reason? Is not reason darkened by original sin? More things would occur to be said of this first circumstance; but see them, Vol. IX, dissertation 4, chapter 7.

VII. QUESTION II. What does the circumstance where betray? ANSWER. It indicates the place, and changes the species, as if a man in a sacred place shed human blood, fornicate, pollute himself, steal, or violate ecclesiastical immunity. He who in a sacred place steals a sacred thing perpetrates a sacrilege on a twofold title, and this ought to be expressed in confession. He who steals in a sacred place a profane thing — suppose a purse from a rich man — perpetrates a sacrilege, as authors commonly teach. Fr. Viva nevertheless after his manner adverts, citing de Lugo, Lessius, and Henríquez, that it can probably be thought not to be sacrilege, save when the thing has been placed in the Church for custody. But this figment is arbitrary and false. Fr. La Croix, Book 6, part 1, no. 1090, introduces Dicastillo, who acknowledges an almost equal probability in each opinion, yet nevertheless inclines to the first. The first alone is true, the other false.

VIII. Homicide perpetrated in a church without shedding of blood is sacrilege. He who, being in a church, kills another outside the church is sacrilegious. Similarly he who, being outside a church, kills with a missile another within the church is sacrilegious. He who strikes another with shedding of blood commits sacrilege. It is required nevertheless, says someone, that the shedding of blood be great, because shedding signifies a copious flow. A mortal wound made with a dagger emits only a few drops of blood. He therefore who strikes with a dagger unto death will not be sacrilegious. What will be the measure of that great flow? But why do I waste time in refuting a false opinion? False also is the opinion of others teaching that a pollution secretly done in a church is not sacrilege.

IX. QUESTION III. What is to be said of the opinion denying that immodest touches in a church are sacrilegious? ANSWER. That it is false is certain to me.

X. For whence will you gather that to kiss women and to touch their breasts and other parts, even publicly in a church, is not sacrilege? This doctrine terrifies me. Timorous and pusillanimous the probabilists have said I am. Be it so. But I reject this opinion as altogether false. Then only, subjoins Fr. La Croix, would sacrilege be committed, when a man should publicly touch a harlot immodestly in the presence of the altar. But if a man, behind the altar, or further from the altar, in the middle of the church, should publicly touch a harlot or another woman immodestly, would he not commit sacrilege? Ought it not to be expressed that the deed was done in a sacred place? Whether these be paradoxes repugnant to common sense, let the judgment be others'.

XI. QUESTION IV. What do the circumstances by what helps and why indicate? ANSWER. The circumstance by what helps signifies the counsels, persuasions, and means which a man uses for sinning. Why betrays the end on account of which a man sins, as if he steal for the sake of committing adultery. A sin of itself venial can become deadly on account of a mortally depraved end, as when a man lies that he may induce a woman to fornication.

XII. The circumstance how includes duration of the fault, contempt, and habit. You killed a man. How? Treacherously. Did you rage against the corpse? For how long a time had you the mind of killing? The circumstance when indicates the time in which the sin was perpetrated. Upon these last two circumstances also some dispute not a few questions; but I pass them over as of lesser moment.