Article II: On the Integrity of Confession

St. Th., Suppl., q. 9, a. 2.

521. Principle I. Confession must be integral, so that to one and the same confessor all necessary matter not yet rightly subjected to the keys is subjected at once, i.e., all and each mortal sin are declared which must be declared.

Integrity is twofold: 1) formal or subjective, which consists in the accusation of all mortal sins which the penitent here and now, with all circumstances considered, according to his capacity, after diligent examination, morally can and ought to confess according to the practical dictate of conscience, although he omits some things from a just cause; 2) material or objective, which absolutely embraces all mortal sins which after Baptism have really been committed and have not yet been rightly subjected to the keys. From these things it is clear that confession can a) be integral materially and not formally, as if someone confesses all mortal sins with the due circumstances, but erroneously thinks that a venial sin which he committed is mortal and conceals it; b) on the contrary, be integral formally and not materially, as if someone confesses all the mortal sins which after diligent examination he has found, but omits one from inculpable forgetfulness; c) finally, be integral materially and formally at the same time, as if someone after diligent examination remembers all the mortal sins which he has committed and accurately confesses them.

Now each integrity is necessary by divine right for the validity of the sacrament of Penance, yet in such a way that formal integrity is necessary by necessity of means, and in reality, and therefore is always necessary, and is always of precept; material integrity is necessary by necessity of means only in desire, and by necessity of precept of itself and regularly, so that excusing causes can exist. Hence, speaking of itself, confession must be materially integral; accidentally formal integrity suffices; so that he sins gravely who omits some sin which here and now he can and ought to declare. Each point is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5.

The said integrity is required:

1. On the part of the remission of sins: for confession is necessary by divine right for the remission of mortal sins, just as contrition is. But one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. Therefore confession, just as contrition, must extend itself to all mortal sins. "The priest," says St. Thomas (ad 2), "hearing confession bears the place of God, and therefore confession must be made to him in the same way as contrition is made to God. Hence just as there would not be contrition unless someone were contrite for all sins which occur to memory, so neither would there be confession unless someone confesses all things which have occurred to memory."

2. On the part of the office of judge and physician with which the confessor is marked, because without the integrity of confession he can neither a) rightly exercise the sacramental judgment, namely by estimating that the dispositions of the penitent are proportioned to the quantity of fault, nor b) preserve equity in establishing punishments (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5). St. Thomas declares this thus, in the body of the article: "In bodily medicine it is necessary that the physician know not only one disease, against which he must give medicine, but also universally the whole condition of the sick person himself, because one disease is aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine which would befit one disease would bring harm to another. And similarly it is with sins, because one is aggravated by the addition of another, and that which would be suitable medicine for one sin would furnish an incentive to another, since sometimes someone is infected with contrary sins... And therefore it is of the necessity of confession that a man confess all sins which he has in memory; but if he does not do this, it is not confession, but a simulation of confession."

522. Principle II. For the integrity of confession by divine right, all mortal sins must necessarily be declared according to number, lowest species, and circumstances changing the species. - Thus the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7. And indeed they must be declared:

1. according to number, for each mortal sin by itself alone constitutes a distinct cause, which must necessarily be brought before the tribunal of the keys;

2. also according to species, and circumstances changing the species: for things which are subjected to a judicial sentence must become known to the judges, at least speaking of themselves and regularly, not only in common, but in particular and according to the lowest species;

3. finally, all mortal sins at once, because it is impossible to seek remission of one mortal sin without at the same time seeking remission of all which burden the conscience.

Therefore there must be declared:

A. The mortal sins themselves, says the Council, l. c., and not only their malices, and indeed:

1. According to the interior act of reason and will.

2. And according to the act itself, even external, if the sin has been consummated by an external work, because

a) this also is prohibited by God, e.g., you shall not kill, you shall not steal;

b) it is one thing in the genus of morals with the internal act and is a true sin, an inordinate voluntary act, although not distinct in number and malice from the internal sin; indeed the external act integrates the sin and is the part finally consummating the other co-part, namely the internal act, from which it differs as the complete species from the incomplete and the consummated work from the work begun;

c) because universal custom understands the law of integrity in this way. Hence it does not suffice to accuse: I had the intention or purpose of committing theft or adultery, but: I stole or committed adultery.

3. Indeed also, for similar reasons, according to the external effect foreseen in some way at least, voluntary and culpable, e.g., death from a wound inflicted or poison administered, abortion from a drug taken, pollution from bad reading, blasphemies or omission of Mass from drunkenness, because this itself either is the external sin or at least completes and finally terminates the act of sin, and thus is a voluntary disorder. But a merely materially evil effect, as altogether involuntary, or efficaciously retracted before it has occurred, is not to be declared, unless accidentally by reason of a penalty, irregularity, reservation to be incurred, or by reason of reparation to be made.

B. Sins according to number: all and each, says the Council, i.e., as many must be accused as have been committed, for otherwise something would be hidden. Hence:

a) If someone remembers a certain and precise number, this must be said; e.g., of itself it does not suffice to confess: I blasphemed several times, I more often omitted Mass, etc.; and he sins gravely who knowingly or from culpable negligence sets forth a greater or lesser number.

b) If someone after diligent examination remembers only an approximate number, this must be said with the addition of the particle about or more or less; this particle signifies that the number said differs from the real number by a small quantity by excess or defect, and indeed according to proportion to the quantity of the number: thus, e.g., according to St. Alphonsus, about 3 is understood as 2-4, about ten times as 8-12, about thirty as 27-33, about one hundred as 95-105, about one thousand as 950-1050.

c) If someone cannot recall even an approximate number, he should state the approximate number of sins committed on individual days or weeks or months or years. This is verified especially among sinners who have a habit of sin; e.g., it suffices that a prostitute say: for two years I remained in a brothel and as often as there was occasion, even with married persons, or also sometimes with clerics, I offered myself; or a concubinary: for three years I lived in concubinage; or another: I desired any women who came my way, even relatives, married women, sacred persons; or: concerning base matters, on any given occasion, I spoke with companions. In various cases he should at the same time indicate in some way the greater or lesser frequency of the sin.

d) If the penitent can recall nothing precisely or approximately, he should say whether he sinned very frequently, frequently, or sometimes with determinate sins, from childhood, before or after marriage entered, on occasion of living together, etc. Thus, e.g., for very frequent merely internal sins: for several hours I indulged in depraved thoughts; for a month I frequently wished grave evil; for two months I was in depraved desires.

e) If after an approximate confession a notable excess is discovered, so that the accusation was notably less, it is necessary to correct it; but not if the excess is small, because this is included in the approximate number, or if a defect is discovered, so that the accusation was notably greater, because the lesser is included in the greater. On the contrary, he who expressed a certain number, if afterward he remembers that he sinned even one more time, is bound to declare the omitted instance because it was not included in the accusation.

C. Sins according to the lowest moral species: not in genus but in their species, says the Council, i.e., not the supreme species but the lowest, according to the obvious and proper sense of the words, or according to their formal malice by which they are distinguished from others, insofar as some sin is constituted by its own complete object and is distinguished from others, or insofar as it is opposed to a virtue or precept in particular and in its own proper formal mode is opposed. Otherwise they would not be declared as they are. Thus, e.g., it does not suffice to declare that one has sinned mortally, or against justice, or against chastity or charity, but what kind of sin was committed against them: whether theft, insult, or detraction; whether rash judgment, hatred, discord, or scandal; whether fornication, adultery, deflowering, pollution, etc. Cf. Alexander VII, prop. 25.1

But if someone has not sufficiently distinguished the lowest species or does not remember it, it suffices for him to confess the supreme species or genus, or only that he sinned mortally, according as he has distinguished or remembered more or less concerning the sin. Thus, e.g., he who does not distinguish between depraved thoughts and desires should say: I gave consent to base thoughts; he who does not distinguish bad speech about obscene things, impious things, sins committed and joyfully recalled, provocation to evil, sufficiently accuses by saying that he had base speech.

D. Sins according to circumstances changing the species, as the Council of Trent expressly has it, and can. 901, which, namely, add a new and diverse moral species and constitute a sin of a diverse species. This evidently must be understood of only those circumstances which add a grave or mortal species. Thus, e.g., the circumstance of sacredness for theft of a sacred thing or from a sacred place; for scandal, the circumstance of a superior person who from piety or justice has spiritual care over someone; the circumstance of a married person in a sin of lust, etc. On these things cf. the treatise on Human Acts and Sins and the special treatises on the virtues and precepts.

Circumstances lightly aggravating or diminishing are not to be accused; indeed, it is not proved that even notably aggravating circumstances are to be accused, both because they do not substantially change the state of the sinner, and because the Council of Trent recalls only circumstances changing the species. And this is the opinion of St. Thomas.¹ Yet except:

¹ On IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5.

a) of itself, if circumstances so aggravate that they make a venial sin mortal, or vice versa, because thus the state of the sinner is substantially changed and free matter becomes necessary, or conversely;

b) accidentally, if it is necessary by reason of a penalty or inability or reparation; or if the confessor as judge interrogates about them in order to know, or better know, the state, dispositions, and obligations of the penitent, or as physician in order to indicate remedies, e.g., about habit, occasion, relapse, effects, complicity, etc. Cf. prop. 58 condemned by Innocent XI.²

² "We are not held to confess to the confessor asking the habit of some sin."

For the rest, the faithful are accustomed to declare circumstances notably aggravating, and they are to be exhorted to this unless they are scrupulous, because such declaration conduces both to procuring peace of conscience, and to promoting humility, and to the fuller manifestation of the soul of the penitent, whence the confessor will be able perfectly to exercise toward the penitent the office of judge and physician. - Yet except sins against chastity; in this matter, at least ordinarily, those things which are strictly necessary are to be declared, and indeed in a shamefaced manner.

But it should be noted that all the aforesaid things are to be declared not according to the greater or theological knowledge and science which someone later acquired, but according to the knowledge and science which he had concerning the sins at the moment in which he committed them, because according to this alone they are voluntary. For nothing is willed unless it has first been known.

1. "He who has had copulation with an unmarried woman satisfies the precept of confession by saying: I committed with an unmarried woman a grave sin against chastity, without explaining copulation."

523. Question: What is to be done in doubt whether something must be declared? - Here it is necessary to recall, from the treatise on prudent conscience: A) that doubt can concern three things: 1) whether a sin was committed, 2) whether a sin certainly committed was grave, 3) whether a sin certainly committed and grave was confessed; B) that one doubt is a) negative, founded on no or slight reason, and another b) positive, founded on a grave and solid, although not certain, reason.

Now A. Negative doubt, because it is founded on a slight reason, is judged not to be present and to be nothing. Hence if there is no or slight reason for thinking that a sin was committed, or that a sin committed was grave, there is no obligation of confessing. On the contrary, if there is no or slight reason for thinking that a grave sin committed was confessed, the obligation of confessing remains. Thus according to the principle: better is the condition of the one possessing.

B. In positive doubt 1) concerning the commission of a grave sin, of itself there is no obligation to confess it, both because the Council of Trent says that there is an obligation of confessing sins of which we have consciousness, i.e., certain knowledge, and not: according as they are in conscience; and because absolution regularly cannot be given concerning a doubtful sin, whence it is not necessary matter of the sacrament. Accidentally there can be an obligation, namely for asking counsel in a practical doubt whether something is licit, lest afterward by acting uncertainly someone sin; likewise also in the article of death, if perfect contrition is lacking, confession should be made at least by declaring some certain sin.

2. In doubt concerning the gravity of a sin committed, Probabilists deny the obligation of confessing because an uncertain law does not oblige, even if more probable; Probabiliorists and Equiprobabilists affirm it if it is more probable that the sin is grave, because in doubt the more likely must be done. And this is the common usage among the faithful, approved by St. Thomas, q. 6, a. 4, ad 3.

3. In doubt concerning the confession of a grave sin committed, Probabilists deny the obligation of confession, because the obligation becomes uncertain and therefore in practice is null; recent Probabiliorists and Equiprobabilists affirm it if it is not more probable that the sin has already been confessed, because a certain law is not satisfied by doubtful fulfillment; in other words, the obligation remains until it is more likely that it has been fulfilled.

Thus speculatively; but in practice each one should follow his own system, yet not impose it on others. Moreover, the categories, qualities, and circumstances of penitents are also to be considered, by which, as by conjectures, doubt can often be solved from presumption; namely:

a) in the first doubt: if those habituated in sin doubt that they committed it, the presumption is that they did commit it and that the obligation is present; on the contrary, if the timorous doubt, they are judged not to have committed it and are not obliged to confession;

b) in the second doubt: if the rude or ignorant doubt about grave matter, they are bound to confess because they do not know how to form conscience by saying that they are not obliged; indeed they can scarcely discern what is mortal. On the contrary, the learned are not bound. Likewise, if the scrupulous and timorous doubt about full advertence and consent, they are judged not to have sinned gravely; on the contrary, if the lax doubt, they are judged to have sinned gravely;

c) in the third doubt: those who are accustomed to make diligent examination, if after much time a doubt occurs, are not bound, because it is morally certain that the sin was confessed;

d) moreover, accidentally there is an obligation, as was said under B, in the first point;

e) finally, to confess doubtful sins is always to be advised to all, except the scrupulous.

524. Corollary. - From the aforesaid it follows that the obligation of again accusing a sin already accused as doubtful, but now known as certain, is not proved.

St. Alphonsus urges the obligation, because according to the Council of Trent we must confess sins of which we have consciousness, i.e., certain knowledge; but a certain accusation is not included in a doubtful accusation.

Nevertheless this is uncertain, because that sin was directly remitted, since the priest absolved from it conditionally: if it was truly committed. Hence it ought not be accused again, just as neither the eleventh sin concerning which someone would now be certain who confessed himself to have sinned about ten times; or just as a sin which neither the penitent nor the confessor knew to be mortal, if afterward it is certainly known to have been mortal. These two cases also are admitted by St. Alphonsus.

To the argument deduced from the Council of Trent, it is answered: that dictum is true of sins not yet directly subjected and remitted.

525. Principle III. From the material integrity required for confession, a just cause, whether of ignorance, or of physical or moral impossibility, can excuse, so that then formal integrity alone suffices. - For no one is held to the impossible; indeed, a positive law does not oblige with grave extrinsic inconvenience. The cause, namely, can be not only physical, but also moral, or a great difficulty; not indeed that difficulty which is intrinsic to confession and of itself joined to it, however grave it may be, such as great repugnance or shame, fear of reproof, loss of reputation before the confessor, as if a religious must confess a grave sin to a secular priest, a parish priest to his own vicar and nephew, a pious and known penitent to his own confessor, etc.; but an extrinsic inconvenience which accidentally renders confession very difficult.

This cause excuses as long as it exists. Hence 1) the cause must truly exist not only with respect to one confessor, but also with respect to any confessor who can be approached without grave inconvenience; - 2) the obligation remains of confessing the omitted sins, so that they may be directly remitted, and therefore, when the excusing cause ceases, they must now be declared in confession; - 3) nevertheless they are not to be accused as soon as possible in such a way that confession must be made immediately, but only in the next following confession, as is evident from proposition 11 condemned by Alexander VII.1

The excusing causes are reduced to three, which are ignorance or forgetfulness - physical impossibility - moral impossibility.

A. Ignorance or forgetfulness excuses from integrity 1) if the penitent, after a diligent examination has been made, does not remember some mortal sin; - 2) if he remembers it in the examination, but omits it in confession through inadvertence; - 3) if from ignorance or error not gravely culpable he judges that the sin committed was venial and does not confess it. This is true even if the ignorance proceeds from preceding grave fault, e.g., by delaying confession beyond a year, provided the ignorance itself is not gravely culpable.

But it should be noted, for avoiding forgetfulness, that one who is furnished with a weak memory is not bound to write down his sins: for this is an exquisite diligence and an extraordinary means to which no one is obliged, and it easily includes a certain danger of manifestation; whence it is not the common practice nor the usage among the timorous and diligent.

B. Physical or absolute impossibility can arise from defect of strength, from defect of time, and from defect of speech.

1. From defect of strength: a) if strength so fails that the penitent is not able sufficiently to speak or think, e.g., if a sick person faints after confession has been begun, or if he is in danger of fainting before the confession is finished, or, a fortiori, if he is already deprived of his senses; b) if the priest himself is probably going to die before he is able to hear the whole confession.

2. From defect of time, namely when shipwreck, fire, or battle is imminent, so that all upon whom death threatens cannot be heard; this also holds if those infected by plague in a public hospital cannot all be heard because of the narrowness of time. In which case a brief confession of some less infamous sin can suffice, or all together by some sign can confess themselves to be sinners and to be sorry for sin (e.g., by raising the hands or striking the breast), and then be absolved with one form: I absolve you from all censures and sins.

Yet a great crowd of penitents on a more solemn feast does not excuse, for if this reason were admitted, many would purposely approach the sacrament at such a time and there would be danger of absolving the unworthy. Besides, penitents whose confession cannot be heard can be deferred to another day, which inconvenience is not sufficiently great to excuse from the integrity of confession. Hence Innocent XI also proscribed the contrary practice (prop. 59). Hence the confessions of pious persons, or of those who confess at greater length, are usefully sent to other days, if this can be done.

3. From defect of speech: a) a mute: if he has not been sufficiently educated so that he can confess integrally by signs, he is bound to write, or if he cannot even do this, to manifest his sins by nods insofar as can be done; but if the confession is written, the confessor must see to it that the writing is immediately torn up; - b) one ignorant of the confessor's language, if he cannot approach another confessor by whom he may be understood: he should confess his sins in the best way he can, by words or signs, which suffice at least for expressing some sin in species, or, if this is impossible, for the manifestation of sins in general.

Yet he is not bound to use an interpreter (Holy Office, Feb. 28, 1533), both because of the danger of revelation and because it is a heavier burden to confess to a layman.2 Nevertheless confession can be made through an interpreter, if this is pleasing, provided abuses and scandal are guarded against, and the interpreter is warned of the obligation of keeping the secret (S. C. de P. F., July 16, 1638; can. 903 and 889, § 2). "This can be done in this way (Haine, Th. M. III, q. 49): a) let the interpreter turn his face away from the penitent; b) let him recite to him in his own language the general questions, made in a loud voice by the confessor, concerning the precepts of the decalogue and of the Church; c) meanwhile let the penitent, at each question, signify to the confessor by a nod whether he has sinned or not, and at the same time express the number of sins with his fingers, as far as can be done. - Moreover, a missionary who is ignorant of the language of the region will be able rather conveniently to receive confessions if he says the names of the principal and more frequent sins from the language of the region, and pronounces them before the penitent, who by a nod of the head will signify that he has offended, where there will be need."3

C. Moral impossibility generally excuses those who cannot confess integrally without grave inconvenience extrinsic to confession, whether of themselves, or of the confessor, or of a third person, whether it be temporal or spiritual. Hence these three conditions are required for it at the same time: a) that another confessor cannot be found before whom confession can be made without grave inconvenience; b) that confession here and now be necessary and cannot conveniently be deferred; nevertheless there is a sufficient reason for not deferring if the precept of annual confession or of Easter communion urges, if there is a moral necessity of communicating or celebrating so that it cannot be omitted without scandal or infamy, or if otherwise the penitent would be forced to remain for a long time (i.e., beyond three days, indeed for one day according to others), with danger of death or of eternal salvation, in the state of mortal sin; c) that only those sins or circumstances be omitted which cannot be declared without grave inconvenience, e.g., internal sins of lust even with the lowest species and the occasion of internal sin must be accused, if the external genus cannot be accused in species.

The grave harm of the penitent, of the confessor, or of a third person, which excuses, can be:

1. Danger of life, if in time of plague the confessor fears contagion, or in time of persecution the penitent gravely fears agents sent against him: for then, after one or another sin has been heard, the priest can absolve.

2. Danger of reputation, when it is reasonably feared that, from an integral confession, the penitent would be gravely defamed, not indeed before the confessor, but before others:

a) If the penitent cannot confess except while others are hearing, who cannot be removed; this can happen in hospitals when another sick person lies near the one confessing or in the same bed; with the wounded when the physician must be present or others who care for them; with women giving birth when the physician or midwife must be present. - This is also verified in the case of a deaf or somewhat deaf person whose deafness the confessor notices only in the progress of confession, in circumstances in which he could not be led to the sacristy without suspicion arising that he had committed a grave sin: for then the confessor should abstain from questions, nor command in a loud voice that he return at another time, and he should impose a light penance, lest otherwise those standing around understand that grave sins had been committed by the penitent. But when deafness is noticed before the beginning of confession, the penitent is regularly to be led to the sacristy or another place where he can be questioned without danger of revelation, unless, however, a prudent reason prevents it.

b) If confession, in order to be integral, must be very lengthy, in those circumstances in which those standing by would very probably infer from its length that the penitent was guilty of many and grave sins; as if a priest soon to celebrate, or a dying man who had already before confessed sacrilegiously and was going to receive viaticum, or a child about to approach first communion, or one to be ordained already prepared to receive orders, needed a general or more lengthy confession and could not confess integrally without those standing by suspecting him guilty. Yet this excuse is not always present whenever a lengthy confession must be made, for in ordinary circumstances no notable danger of infamy arises from this, since certain penitents are accustomed for various reasons to draw out a long delay with confessors.4

3. Danger of violation of the seal: a) if for a grave reason the penitent fears that the confessor will break the law of the seal and reveal the confession, whether directly (which surely is very rare), or indirectly, e.g., by raising his voice higher when mortal sins are accused, so that those standing by can hear him; or lest from the indiscretion of the confessor the penitent undergo deprivation of office or support; b) if the confessor himself could not confess his own sin without manifesting sins heard in confession, e.g., if, immediately after hearing a confession, he were to say that he had sinned gravely by asking the name of an accomplice, or by absolving a simoniac badly: for thus it would be manifested that the penitent had committed some mortal sin.

4. Danger of scandal, which would be feared as arising from confession either to the penitent or to the confessor or to both: a) if the penitent, because of his frailty known and experienced by himself, fears that by recalling base sins longer or minutely he may consent to them again; b) if he seriously fears that, by confessing certain carnal sins, he will be solicited to base things by the confessor, because, e.g., he knows this has happened to himself or to others; c) if he seriously fears that, by an integral confession, the confessor, whose frailty he has discovered, would be led into sin, e.g., by accusing depraved desires of sinning with him; d) if the confessor, because of his own frailty or that of the penitent, very probably fears that, by questioning more diligently, he will scandalize himself or the penitent; these surely very rarely occur.

5. Danger of spiritual or temporal harm: a) if the penitent is morose and excessively scrupulous in accusing and explaining sins: for since there is there great difficulty of confession and harm to the penitent is feared, and lest confession be made hateful, a prudent confessor, when he has judged it necessary for the good of the penitent, can interrupt the confession and absolve; b) if for a grave reason the penitent fears that from the manifestation of a sin he may incur the hatred of the confessor, unjust persecution, deprivation of office or support, or that the confessor may use the knowledge acquired to the harm of the neighbor, e.g., by dismissing the maidservant with whom the penitent sinned.

But it should be noted that these various causes are not to be explained to the faithful in preaching, lest by deceiving themselves they invent new excuses and be exposed to the danger of withholding many things: these things are necessary for the confessor to know, not for the faithful.

1. "Sins omitted or forgotten in confession because of imminent danger of life or because of another cause, we are not bound to express in the following confession."

2. Nor does the saying of St. Thomas, q. 9, a. 3, ad 2, stand in the way: when we cannot confess in one mode, we ought to confess according as we can; for this is understood within the breadth of the precept.

3. Also useful can be the schema elaborated by d'Herbigny, The Prudent Confessor of Sixteen Languages Even Without Any Knowledge of Languages.

4. Therefore it is required, notes Vermeersch, Th. M., III, n. 542, c, that "a lengthy confession would be as it were a certain argument of many sins." Hence, says Noldin, Th. M., III, n. 286, 1, "this nevertheless does not hold except in those circumstances in which those standing by must necessarily conclude from a lengthy confession to a great quantity of sins... But in ordinary circumstances it is not lawful to conclude from a lengthy confession to a multitude of sins except by some vague suspicion, because there are several other reasons on account of which penitents remain longer with the confessor (cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, V, n. 249); but the danger of a vague suspicion is not a reason excusing from the integrity of confession."

526. Whether there is an obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be explained without danger of defaming a third person or even of revealing the accomplice himself? - Theologians ask this on occasion of the integrity of confession: for there can be danger of defaming a third person who was the occasion or object of sin, e.g., a pregnant sister who was beaten, a pregnant widow who was killed; or even of revealing the accomplice, as can often happen concerning sins which are committed between spouses, parents and children, blood-relatives or relatives by marriage, or partners in the same affairs. Now:

1. The penitent is bound to hide another's crime as much as he can, and therefore a) certainly he is bound to approach another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, if this can be done without inconvenience and a just and proportionate cause does not excuse; b) likewise the penitent cannot and is not bound to declare a sin which is not necessary matter of confession (namely, a remitted mortal sin, or a venial sin), lest by confessing it the grave sin of another be manifested: because a proportionate and sufficient reason is lacking.

2. Outside these cases the penitent can, indeed more probably ought, to confess integrally, even with danger of manifesting the grave sin of another. For it is licit to reveal the crime of another for a just and legitimate reason, especially since the revelation is not harmful when there is no danger of further divulgation, because the confessor is strictly bound to secrecy.³ Besides, an accomplice committing sin and knowing that the other must confess seems to yield his right and implicitly to permit that revelation. And this is the common practice of the faithful, nor do they doubt concerning its liceity or obligation, although nevertheless, because some think otherwise, they cannot be strictly obliged to the manifestation of another's sin.

³ Thus St. Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 5 ad 5; opusc. ad lect. Bisunt. Likewise St. Raymond, St. Bonaventure, St. Antoninus, Cajetan, Sylvester, Medina, Billuart, Suarez, Lugo; and St. Alphonsus, who holds this as more probable. Cano, P. de Soto, Ledesma, Navarrus, Valentia, Bonacina, Diana deny it.

But a sufficient reason for manifesting is necessity or great utility, e.g., a) if the danger of death or the precept of annual confession or Easter communion urges, b) if a special utility is present, namely of receiving communion soon, c) if it is grave for the penitent to omit confession or communion, d) if otherwise he would be deprived of the benefit of an extraordinary indulgence, e) if otherwise he would be forced to remain for the whole day in mortal sin and this would be hard for him, f) if the penitent could open his conscience to another confessor only with reluctance, or would be deprived of the special consolation which he finds with his ordinary confessor.

3. The confessor can never oblige the penitent to reveal to him, as confessor, the name of the accomplice under penalty of absolution being denied (which Benedict XIV severely prohibited, in 1745 and 1746, under penalty of suspension ferendae sententiae; cf. can. 888, § 2); indeed regularly he cannot even inquire directly. And it would be a mortal sin from its genus, because this practice renders the sacrament hateful and without cause induces the penitent to defame the accomplice. Nevertheless, for a proportionate reason, the confessor can either inquire by an indirect means, or impose the denunciation of the accomplice to be made outside confession.

a) Hence he is not prohibited from making questions about the qualities of the accomplice which seem necessary for the integrity of confession or for detecting the nature of the proximate occasion, even if from this the accomplice is indirectly known, e.g., whether he remains in the same house, is bound by a vow, is a blood-relative, a relative by marriage, etc., in one word: not who he is, but of what quality he is.

b) Indeed, for a most grave cause, on account of the common good (e.g., for avoiding the corruption of others), he can oblige the penitent, even under penalty of absolution being denied, to denounce the accomplice outside confession to a superior, e.g., to a father, master, teacher, etc., indeed also to himself if he is at the same time the superior.

c) And he himself can licitly receive the name of the accomplice if the penitent wishes to denounce him rather indirectly through the confessor than directly to the superior; in which case let him ask that the denunciation be received outside confession, lest confession be made hateful to those who perhaps will hear about this matter. Generally, however, denunciation through the confessor is not expedient, unless the penitent does not wish to manifest the matter to another.

527. Corollaries. - From what has been said above it is understood:

1. That a specific and distinct accusation is required of itself for necessary matter, namely for mortal sins not yet duly subjected, nor does a generic accusation suffice for validity; unless in a case of necessity.

2. On the contrary, in free matter, a specific and distinct accusation is not of itself required, but a generic one suffices for validity, because on the one hand there is always the same essence of the sacrament, and on the other hand there is no necessity of confessing free matter; unless perhaps the whole matter were declared altogether generally, and no sin more determinately. - But for liceity, certainly an altogether vague and general confession does not suffice of itself, both because the universal custom of the Church requires a confession distinct in some way (just as it also requires a vocal one), and because of itself and in ordinary circumstances, outside a case of necessity, judgment requires matter determined in some way in species. Hence if someone confesses only venial sins or sins already remitted, it does not suffice to say: I accuse myself of sins, or I confess my venial sins, or formerly I sinned gravely; but he must at least indicate the genus of sin, or against what virtue or precept it was.

We said: of itself; unless perhaps... For an altogether general confession can be invalid indirectly and accidentally from grave illicitness, as is evident from what has been declared.⁴

⁴ Hence this is more true speculatively than practically, as Suarez notes, disp. 23, sect. 1, n. 10: "Perhaps, speaking speculatively only, this can be defended... Nevertheless, practically it must be denied because of the uncertainty of the matter. I say therefore, although a man is not absolutely held to confess the species of venial sins, nevertheless, supposing that he wishes to confess, he is held to exhibit matter altogether certain, if he can, and therefore he ought at his own judgment to confess some venial sin in its particular; but with the necessity or impossibility added of saying anything else, without doubt that matter will be sufficient."

3. Doubtful matter or mere imperfections are not sufficient matter. Hence in such a case let the penitent add at least a venial sin; and if he does not do this, let the confessor question about sins which are more commonly committed (e.g., against charity, patience, truthfulness, the duties of one's state, etc.), and if he obtains nothing certain, let him ask about a sin of past life. But as to imperfections, there often lies hidden in them some venial sin of an inordinate motive or of a bad intention, namely when they are not done from a reasonable motive; hence if frequent imperfections are accused, venial sins are mixed in with them, but penitents are to be exhorted rather to say from what motive or inordinate affection they placed these acts.

528. Remarks. - 1. For confessing one's sins integrally, an examination of conscience is required of itself and regularly, to be made with ordinary diligence. Concerning this, see our Questions on the Various Categories of Penitents, c. 1, q. 1.

2. The penitent ought to set forth his sins clearly and distinctly, as much as he can, with all the requisites; and if he notices that the confessor has not heard or not understood them, he is bound to repeat them, as can happen if someone confesses under the sound of the organ, or to a somewhat deaf or sleepy confessor. Indeed, if someone purposely confessed in such a way that he would not be understood, he would commit sacrilege and the confession would have to be repeated.

3. In the case in which a confession is known to be incomplete, it must be completed in the next following confession (prop. 11 condemned by Alexander VII), otherwise this would not be integral; - if it is known for whatever cause to be invalid, it must be repeated, and indeed distinctly and entirely if it is made before another confessor; but if before the same one, in a general or more or less special manner according as is necessary so that he may confusedly recall the state of the penitent or of the past confession; - if it is known to be sacrilegious, the sin of sacrilege must additionally be accused, or even several sins if there were other confessions made with memory of the preceding sacrilege.⁵

⁵ Concerning repeating confession, as also concerning general confession, more is said in the work Questions on the Various Categories of Penitents, c. 1, q. 6.