Chapter — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Chapter III. On the Specific Distinction of Sins
373. The Council of Trent100 teaches that in the sacrament of penance mortal sins must by divine right be manifested according to their species and number. Therefore penitents, and especially the confessor, must know the rules of distinction, both specific and numerical, of sins. These rules, as to specific distinction, are customarily expressed in these little verses:
Object, virtue, diverse precepts, and mode Give species to sins, and diverse guilt of the thing.
St. Thomas101 draws specific distinction from objects formally diverse. For just as the object is the first foundation of morality,102 so also the disordered moral object is the first specifying principle of sin. For acts are specified from the object. But the disordered moral object, as it is taken here, also includes those circumstances which redound to the moral essence. Cf. what was said above in n. 144 sqq. concerning the morality of acts arising from circumstances and end.
Scotus103 repeats the specific distinction of sins from the diverse virtues to which sins are opposed; thus, for example, lust is distinguished in species from theft, because lust is opposed to the virtue of temperance, but theft to the virtue of justice. St. Thomas104 also knew this rule and did not reject it; yet he writes: "Sins are distinguished in species more according to objects than according to opposites, although, even if they are distinguished according to opposed virtues, it would come back to the same thing; for virtues are distinguished in species according to objects."
Vasquez105 thinks that the specific distinction of sins must be drawn from morally diverse precepts to which individual sins are opposed. For sin is a voluntary transgression of law or precept, and therefore where there are diverse precepts, there are diverse sins. But if someone asks why the precepts are diverse, he will have no other response except that such precepts have diverse moral objects. Therefore the fundamental reason on account of which sins are specifically distinguished must be drawn from an object formally diverse in the genus of morals. That objects only physically diverse cannot specify sins is clear of itself; for example, the act of stealing an ox and of stealing a horse have a physically diverse object, but the moral object is altogether the same. But when are objects distinguished in moral being? When they have a special and distinct repugnance with the eternal law or right reason. But that a special repugnance of this kind is present is discerned when acts:
a) Are opposed to diverse virtues. For just as each special virtue has a special and distinct goodness, so the act opposed to it has a special malice. Thus an act of lust is opposed to the virtue of temperance, but an act of theft to the virtue of justice. Further, since the virtue of temperance is specifically distinct from the virtue of justice, acts of lust and acts of theft also are specifically distinct sins. If one physical act wounds several virtues diverse in species, it contains as many sins specifically distinct as the virtues it has wounded; for example, he who kills his own father wounds the virtues of justice and piety, and therefore commits two sins distinct in species.
b) Are opposed to the same virtue, but in a morally diverse mode, for example, one act by excess, another by defect, or in other modes which according to prudent judgment are held as altogether diverse; for example, prodigality and avarice are opposed to the same virtue of liberality, but the former by excess and the latter by defect, and therefore they are two sins specifically distinct; or theft, robbery, detraction, and calumny are all opposed to the one virtue of justice, and indeed by defect, but in modes morally so diverse that they are held as special sins.
c) Are opposed to precepts not materially but formally diverse. Precepts are judged only materially diverse when they have indeed been made at diverse times or by diverse lords, but on account of the same intrinsic motive of virtue. But if the intrinsic motive is diverse, the precepts are judged formally diverse. Thus, for example, theft, which is prohibited by a precept civil, natural, and divine, is only one sin in species, because those three precepts have one intrinsic motive, namely to preserve the order of justice. On the contrary, a priest who violates chastity, to which he is bound by force of a vow and by force of the virtue of chastity, commits a twofold sin specifically distinct, because he transgresses two precepts formally diverse, namely the sixth precept of the Decalogue and the precept of the vow.
Recapitulation. From what has been said thus far it follows that sins are specifically distinguished according to morally diverse objects. But objects are morally diverse when they have a specific disorder against right reason and the eternal law. But that specific disorder is recognized from the fact that sins:
a) are opposed to diverse virtues;
b) are opposed to one virtue but in a diverse way;
c) are opposed to formally diverse precepts.
100 Sess. 14, can. 7 de poenit. (Denz. n. 917); cf. prop. condemned (2) of Peter de Osma (Denz. n. 725).
101 S. theol. 1, 2, q. 72, a. 1.
102 Cf. above n. 111.
103 In 2, dist. 37, q. 1, n. 9.
104 S. theol. l. c. a. 1 ad 2.
105 Disp. in 1, 2 S. Thom. disp. 98, c. 2.
374. Resolutions. 1. A brother having carnal intercourse with his married sister commits three specifically distinct sins, because he wounds three virtues, namely chastity, piety, and justice.
Lascivious thoughts, lascivious words, fornication, self-abuse, etc., are sins diverse in species in the matter of lust, because they are indeed opposed to one and the same virtue of chastity, but in diverse modes, since they have special disorders against right reason and against the virtue of chastity.
If someone culpably violates the fast of Friday in Lent, to which he is bound a) from a precept of the Church, b) from the salutary penance of confession, c) from a vow, he commits a threefold sin specifically distinct, because there is a threefold disorder and a threefold precept formally diverse. For there is a threefold intrinsic motive, namely the virtues of temperance, penance, and religion.
375. Scholion. On the specific difference between mortal and venial sin. Since, according to the truer opinion explained above, the notion of sin belongs not univocally but only analogically to mortal and venial sin; but since on the other hand it is most certain that mortal sin differs maximally from venial sin, theologians are accustomed to say: Mortal and venial sin differ according to theological species, because the first turns away from God and the other does not. But other sins, whether mortal or venial, differ among themselves according to moral species, as lust differs from blasphemy, or as a jocose lie differs from an idle word. Nevertheless venial sin can be referred to the same moral species to which mortal sin is referred. Thus theft of one obol, which is a venial sin, is referred to the same moral species of theft to which theft of 1000 francs is referred, which is a mortal sin.