Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
1. The Necessity and Extent of Integrity
366. A. Necessity. As is evident from the text of the Council of Trent cited above, a man is bound to confess all mortal sins committed after baptism, insofar as this can morally be done. Hence a twofold integrity is distinguished: a) material, which comprises absolutely all mortal sins committed after baptism and not yet directly remitted, according to species, number, and circumstances changing the species; b) formal, which comprises all those mortal sins which the penitent, here and now and with all the circumstances considered, can and must confess.
Principle 1. The material integrity of confession is not always necessary for the valid and licit reception of the sacrament of penance.
For Christ in His merciful benignity did not wish to require from sinful man something which is morally or physically impossible, as material integrity sometimes is. Moreover, the law concerning the integrity of confession is a positive law. But a positive law ordinarily does not oblige in a case of grave inconvenience, as was said above in the treatise on laws. Hence the Council of Trent186 also says: "But the remaining sins which do not occur to one thinking diligently are understood to be included universally in the same confession; for these we faithfully say with the Prophet: From my hidden sins cleanse me." What holds for sins omitted through forgetfulness also holds for sins not accused because of another grave cause. What the just causes excusing from material integrity are will be stated below, n. 378.
Principle 2. Formal integrity is altogether required for a valid and licit confession.
This integrity is equally as necessary for the sacrament of penance as water is for the sacrament of baptism. For the divine precept of declaring all mortal sins committed certainly refers to those sins which here and now can and must be declared. The same is evident from the Council of Trent,187 which declares it necessary by divine law to confess all and each of the mortal sins of which memory is had with due and diligent examination beforehand, even hidden sins and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of the sin.
B. The extent of integrity is to be considered as regards 1. the species of sins, 2. their number, 3. their circumstances, 4. the external act, 5. the effects, 6. doubtful sins.
367. 1. The lowest species, both theological and moral, of mortal sins must be declared. This follows manifestly from the Council of Trent,188 which says: "... Priests could not have exercised this [sacramental] judgment without the cause being known, nor indeed could they have preserved equity in imposing penalties, if they [the penitents] had declared their sins only in general and not rather in species and individually." These words "in species" are to be understood of the lowest species, because the name of species is always to be understood thus unless the contrary is altogether apparent. The reason for this precept is that otherwise the confessor cannot judge sufficiently concerning the state of the penitent.
Therefore the divine precept of making confession is not satisfied if, outside a case of necessity, the penitent accuses himself in the following ways: I have sinned mortally; I have sinned against justice, against chastity, and so forth. I say: outside necessity; for if the penitent cannot, because of forgetfulness, danger of death, scandal, and so forth, confess the lowest species of mortal sins, a generic accusation now suffices, as was said above, n. 325.
Sometimes it is morally impossible to ascertain from penitents who are little instructed the lowest species especially of internal sins. For they are unable to distinguish, for example, between morose delectation, joy, and desire, or between obscene words and words which are merely filthy. But in these cases the confessor should abstain from inopportune questions, since they are useful for nothing and instead disturb the penitents or affect them with weariness. The same holds for ascertaining the exact number of these sins. For, as St. Alphonsus rightly observes, such penitents then answer whatever comes into their "mouth."
188 Ibid.
368. 2. The number of mortal sins must likewise be declared in confession, insofar as this is morally possible. For the Council of Trent189 says that all and each of the sins are to be accused. Therefore the penitent does not confess sufficiently by saying, for example: I have fornicated often; but he is bound according to his strength to accuse himself of the correct and certain number of sins. Likewise, he sins if he notably increases or diminishes the number. Hence, if a false number of grave sins was indicated, the penitent must declare the true number in the following confession. Theologians nevertheless teach that a penitent who in good faith expressed a notably greater number is not bound to correct this error, because the true number is contained in the greater number indicated. It is otherwise if the number was notably diminished.
A penitent who, after making a diligent examination of conscience, could not find the exact number of sins must determine it in the best way he can by employing the word "approximately." What number is judged to be comprehended in the particle "approximately" cannot be determined by an altogether certain rule. Certain authors say: approximately three is understood as 2 or 4; approximately ten as 8 or 12; approximately thirty as 27 or 33; approximately one hundred as 95 or 105; approximately one thousand as 950 or 1,050.190 But if not even a probable number can be had, the habit of sinning, the duration, and the frequency in a day, week, or month are to be stated. Hence Noldin,191 from Sporer-Bierbaum, notes that it suffices, for example, if a prostitute says: For two years I remained in prostitution and, as often as there was an occasion, I made my body available even to married men, and so forth; or if a man given to lust says: I lusted after any women who came my way, even relatives, married women, and so forth; or: On every given occasion I spoke with any companions about most filthy matters. A penitent who in confession in good faith indicated the number of mortal sins approximately is not bound to confess again if afterward he should happen to find the accurate number. The reason is that the confessor was already able to judge sufficiently concerning the state of this penitent.192
189 Ibid.
190 Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 466.
191 De sacr.17, n. 277.
192 St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 478.
369. 3. Circumstances changing the species of mortal sins must be declared in confession. This is evident from the Council of Trent.193 Which circumstances change the species of a sin was stated above, I, nn. 117 and 373. The general rule is: a circumstance changes the species of a sinful act when it adds a new malice gravely repugnant to another virtue. Thus, for example, theft injures the virtue of justice; but theft committed in sacred things additionally injures the virtue of religion; fornication injures the virtue of chastity, but fornication committed with blood relatives additionally injures the virtue of piety. Besides these circumstances which change the moral species of the sin, there are still others which change the theological species, that is, which render mortal a sin per se venial; for example, the theft of a small coin is a venial sin, but the circumstance of a large quantity in theft, for example, the theft of 1,000 francs, constitutes a grave sin. These circumstances are also customarily called "aggravating unto infinity," and it is evident of itself that they are to be declared in confession.
There is, however, a grave controversy as to whether other circumstances which change neither the moral nor the theological species, but only aggravate the malice, must also be manifested in confession.
All indeed agree that circumstances which aggravate only slightly need not necessarily be accused; but if there is question of notably aggravating circumstances, theologians do not agree. Some, for example, Suarez, Billuart, Concina, Lacroix, and others, defend the affirmative opinion; others, for example, St. Antoninus,194 St. Thomas,195 St. Bonaventure,196 St. Alphonsus,197 and almost all modern authors, deny such an obligation, although in practice they counsel the confession of all notably aggravating circumstances. Neither opinion is certain, but the negative opinion seems better, whatever Concina may say.198
For a) the Council of Trent maintains a profound silence concerning this matter in that place where it accurately declares what must be manifested in confession, namely, all and each mortal sin and the circumstances which change the species of the sin. It is altogether impossible to understand why the Council, explaining ex professo the necessary matter of confession and designating circumstances changing the species, should have omitted notably aggravating circumstances if their confession were absolutely necessary. Moreover, nothing is had concerning such an obligation either in Sacred Scripture, in tradition, or in the Code of Canon Law, c. 901. Therefore it can be said with moral certainty that notably aggravating circumstances need not per se necessarily be manifested. Per accidens such an obligation will often be present, as will be explained below.
b) St. Thomas also denies that notably aggravating circumstances must always necessarily be accused. For he says: "Certain persons say that all circumstances which add some notable quantity to a sin must of necessity be confessed if they occur to the memory. But others say that only circumstances which draw the act into another genus of sin must of necessity be confessed, and this is more probable, ... the reason for which is that venial sins need not of necessity be confessed, but only mortal sins, which in a certain manner have an infinite quantity."199 And elsewhere he writes: "A man is not bound to confess aggravating circumstances which do not draw the act into another genus of sin, just as neither is he bound to confess venial sins, although it is praiseworthy that a man confess them."200 Certain persons respond to these texts that St. Thomas indeed taught thus when he was younger, but that it was more likely that he would have changed this opinion if he had lived longer. But to answer thus is to divine rather than to teach. Others say that the Angelic Doctor speaks only of those circumstances which are after the manner of a venial sin and therefore aggravate the malice only lightly, but not of notably aggravating circumstances. This explanation also pleases little, because it is difficult to reconcile with the texts themselves which were adduced.
Since these things are so, a strict obligation always to declare notably aggravating circumstances is not to be asserted. For confession is already sufficiently burdensome of itself, and therefore the burden of accusing notably aggravating circumstances is not to be added unless a clear divine or ecclesiastical precept is present. But no one can prove the existence of such a precept, whatever Concina may assert.200 Nor should anyone say that the very nature of sacramental judgment necessarily requires such a manifestation. For sacramental judgment cannot be perfect in every respect, since the confessor often cannot judge clearly, for example, when hearing the confession of a sinner who has not confessed for a long time, or when giving absolution to a dying person deprived of his senses, to those who are half-witted, to children, and so forth. Therefore, from the will of Christ alone depends the degree to which perfection must be present in sacramental judgment. But the will of Christ has not been manifested to us concerning the confession of notably aggravating circumstances.
Almost the sole argument for the affirmative opinion is taken from the Roman Catechism,201 whose authority is assuredly the greatest and which seems to defend this opinion: "Nor is it necessary only to explain grave sins by recounting them, but also those things which surround each sin and greatly increase or diminish its depravity." Diverse explanations of this text have been devised, namely, that the Roman Catechism speaks only of those circumstances which change either the moral or theological species; or, if it speaks also of other circumstances, that it establishes this obligation only per accidens, or rather counsels it than inculcates it. Whatever the case, a strict obligation to confess such circumstances cannot be established from the cited text alone.
193 Ibid.; cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 901.
194 S. theol. P. 3, tit. 14, c. 19, § 7.
195 IV Sent., dist. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5.
196 IV Sent., dist. 17, P. 3, a. 2, q. 3.
197 Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 468.
198 De sacr. poenit., diss. 4, c. 6.
199 IV Sent., dist. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5.
200 Opusc. 12, Ad lectorem Bisuntinum. Blessed Albert the Great, the teacher of St. Thomas, says concerning the same matter: "I answer without prejudice, according to the ancient doctors, that circumstances need not be confessed except those which draw the act into another genus of sin; it is safe also to state the others, especially if conscience pricks someone, but nevertheless they say that he is not bound by precept" (IV Sent., dist. 16, a. 24, sol.).
201 P. 2, c. 5, q. 47.
370. Per accidens, notably aggravating circumstances must often be manifested, for example:
a) By reason of reservation.
Thus the striking of a religious or of a cleric not constituted in a dignity, at the instigation of the devil, is a case reserved to the proper Ordinary; but the striking of a bishop or Cardinal is punished with excommunication specially reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. Therefore the penitent must confess the character of the striking, although this circumstance of the sin of sacrilege is only aggravating and does not change the species.
b) By reason of the occasion or habit of sinning.
For although the occasion or habit of sinning does not essentially change the sin itself, for example, the sin of fornication committed from habit does not differ essentially from fornication rarely committed, nevertheless it is certain that the confessor can question the penitent concerning the habit and occasion, and that the penitent must then answer truthfully. This is evident from proposition 58 condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679: "We are not bound to confess to a confessor questioning us the habit of some sin." The reason is that otherwise it is impossible for the confessor to form a right judgment concerning the state of the penitent and the means to be employed.
c) By reason of satisfaction and of other things to be performed after confession.
This occurs especially in restitution to be made. Thus, for example, the confessor will act differently with a penitent who stole 50 francs and with one who defrauded another of 50,000. He will impose one satisfaction upon him who, once aroused by anger, hated an enemy, and another upon him who has already had implacable hatred for an entire year. Billuart202 treats excellently the controversy concerning the obligation of confessing notably aggravating circumstances.
202 De poenit., diss. 7, a. 2, § 3.
371. Admonition. In practice penitents are to be strongly exhorted to confess notably aggravating circumstances, both to render the judgment of the priest easier and to exercise humility and avoid errors in their own cause. In the matter of the sixth commandment, however, it is commonly better to manifest nothing except the species and the circumstances changing the species. For there are in this matter certain notably aggravating circumstances whose manifestation penitents dread, and which the confessor himself ought to forestall, since it is not altogether necessary, because of the sanctity of the sacrament and for other grave causes.
372. Solutions. From what has been said, practical solutions easily follow.
a) Incest between blood relatives and relatives by affinity do not differ in species, and therefore it suffices simply to accuse oneself of incest.203 According to the most common opinion, the first degree of the direct line must be expressly declared in confession, namely, carnal sins between father and daughter, mother and son, father-in-law and daughter-in-law, son-in-law and mother-in-law. In practice at least the first degree of the collateral line must also be manifested because of the proximate occasion of sinning, which is then customarily present.204
b) The circumstance of a sacred time need not per se necessarily be manifested, unless, however, the sinner specially intended the violation of the sacred time. Therefore it need not necessarily be stated whether, for example, lust was committed on a Sunday or on Easter, and so forth.205
c) The number of persons with whom someone sinned need not per se necessarily be accused. It suffices to state the number of sins.206 Therefore one who fornicated with three different prostitutes confesses sufficiently by saying: I fornicated three times. But if the confessor suspects that the penitent lives in a proximate occasion or that a multiple injury arose from the sin, he has the right to ask whether there was one accomplice or more than one. The penitent is then bound to tell the truth.
d) A religious priest sinning against chastity confesses sufficiently by saying: I sinned against the public vow of chastity. The reason is that the vow emitted in the subdiaconate and the public vow emitted in religion are made from the same motive. Theologians commonly teach, however, that in this case the public vow must necessarily be manifested; hence an accusation of the transgression of a simple private vow would be insufficient. The reason is that the transgression of a public vow, even a simple one, is true sacrilege, which cannot be said so certainly of the violation of a simple private vow.207
e) In sins of hatred the condition of the person held in hatred must be declared if from the hatred not only charity but also another virtue is gravely injured. Therefore the penitent must confess, for example, hatred of his father.
203 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 154, a. 9 ad 2.
204 Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 470.
205 Cf. above, II, n. 492.
206 Thus the more common opinion, which Concina (De sacr. poenit. l. 1, c. 31) nevertheless thinks too lax.
207 Cf. above, II, n. 544.
373. 4. An external act is often joined with an internal sinful act. Although sin is essentially situated in the internal act of the will, nevertheless all theologians teach that not only the internal but also the external act of sin must necessarily be declared. Therefore it does not suffice, for example, if an adulterer confesses: I had the intention of committing adultery; but he must say: I committed adultery. The reason is that otherwise the confessor cannot judge rightly concerning the state of the penitent. For he will judge differently concerning a penitent who actually committed adultery and concerning a penitent who only intended adultery. Under the name of an external act is understood not only a positive act perpetrated, but also the omission of a prescribed external act. Therefore neither does it suffice to confess: I had the intention of omitting Mass; but one must say: I omitted Mass.
374. 5. The external and foreseen effect of a sin is commonly to be accused in confession, and thus also holds the universal custom of the faithful who confess. The reason is the same; for even the foreseen effect of a sin, although it does not have a malice proper to itself, just as neither does the external act, nevertheless participates in the malice of the internal act and constitutes with it one moral whole. All theologians teach that the effect of a sin must sometimes be accused per accidens, for example, if from the effect a censure or reservation or obligation of restitution is incurred. But even per se such an obligation more probably exists when the effect was not retracted to the extent possible and was foreseen at least in a confused manner. For such an effect is the completion of the internal act and is voluntary at least in its cause.208
Thus, for example, a young man reading an obscene book and foreseeing that pollution would thence follow must confess: I read an obscene book with foresight of the future pollution, which also actually occurred; or a man making himself drunk and foreseeing that omission of Mass would thence follow must say in confession: I was drunk with foresight of the omission of Mass, which also actually occurred; or more briefly: I was voluntarily drunk and thence omitted Mass. But if the effect of the sin was retracted in the mind, although it could no longer be retracted externally, certain authors, especially Lugo,209 deny that a strict obligation of confessing it is present. The reason is that such an effect is not properly a sin but only something physical following from sin. But sins alone are to be manifested in confession. Thus, for example, according to these authors, one who administered deadly poison to an enemy must confess: I gave deadly poison to an enemy, and he can remain silent about the death which actually followed from it. Nevertheless, in practice this opinion is to be abandoned, and in fact it is customarily abandoned both by confessors and by penitents.
208 Several theologians, according to Lugo (De poenit., disp. 16, n. 440), teach the contrary.
209 Ibid.; cf. Gury-Ballerini, Comp. Theol. mor. II, n. 490.
375. 6. Doubtful sins need not necessarily be accused if the doubt concerning the existence of a mortal sin or concerning its confession not yet having been made is negative or little founded. Thus all authors. The reason is that otherwise a broad way would be prepared for innumerable scruples and anxieties. On the contrary, doubtful sins which are much more probably mortal and not yet confessed are to be accused, although some slight reason exists that they are not mortal or have already been accused. The reason is that so slight a reason does not excuse from confession, and otherwise the reins would be given to laxism.
But if the doubt is positive and truly founded, then one must act otherwise. The doubt can concern: a) the very act of sin; b) the gravity of an act certainly committed; c) the confession of a certainly grave sin. Therefore a threefold question can be proposed:
Must sins necessarily be accused which are: a) doubtfully committed, b) doubtfully mortal, c) doubtfully confessed?
There are authors, such as Ballerini,210 Noldin,211 Génicot,212 and Tanquerey,213 who answer all three questions simply in the negative, or deny that there is a strict obligation of confessing them; but these authors and all theologians also counsel the confession of doubtful sins unless the penitent is scrupulous. For the sake of clarity, each question must be answered separately:
a) If there is question of a sin doubtfully committed, there is not per se a strict obligation of confession. Thus the more common and more probable opinion.214 The reason is that a sin doubtfully committed is not even sufficient matter for absolution, since absolution cannot be given, at least absolutely, concerning a sin doubtfully committed. Therefore, a fortiori, such a sin is not necessary matter of confession. Moreover, the Council of Trent requires only the confession of mortal sins of which the penitent has consciousness. But it cannot be said absolutely that the penitent has consciousness of a sin if a true doubt exists.
Nor does St. Thomas seem to be opposed to this opinion, although this is said by its adversaries. Behold the words of the Angelic Doctor:215 "When someone doubts concerning some sin whether it is mortal, he is bound to confess it while the doubt remains. For he who commits or omits something concerning which he doubts whether it is a mortal sin sins mortally by exposing himself to danger. And likewise he exposes himself to danger who neglects to confess that which he doubts to be mortal; nevertheless, he should not assert that it is mortal, but should speak doubtfully and await the judgment of the priest, whose office it is to discern between leprosy and leprosy." For the Angelic Doctor does not seem here to speak of a sin doubtfully committed, but of a sin certainly committed yet doubtfully grave, because a sin doubtfully committed is not certainly leprosy; nor does the confessor then discern between leprosy and leprosy, but between leprosy and non-leprosy.
Per accidens, however, sins doubtfully committed must be manifested: a) at the point of death, and an act of contrition does not seem to suffice if there is then an available confessor,216 for a man is then bound to choose that which is safer; b) in a practical doubt, in order to seek counsel for the future.
210 In the notes to Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. II, 477 sqq.
211 De sacr.17, n. 280.
212 Theol. mor. II, 290.
213 Synopsis Theol. mor., De poenit., n. 289.
214 Cf. Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. II, n. 477.
216 St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 473) thinks that an act of contrition alone then suffices.
376. b) If there is question of a sin certainly committed but doubtfully grave, the following practical rules are to be observed, according as there is question either of doubtfully grave matter or of perfect consent doubtfully given. For this doubt cannot arise except from this twofold source; for example, someone took 5 francs and doubts whether this matter of theft is grave; or someone lingered for some time in morose delectation and doubts whether he gave full consent.
Rule 1. In doubt concerning the gravity of the matter, penitents, especially the uninstructed, must declare sins of this kind. For it is almost impossible for the penitent alone then to form a right conscience for himself.
Rule 2. In doubt concerning full consent or perfect advertence, the principle admitted by all is to be employed: "One must stand for that for which the presumption stands."217 If the penitent is of a timorous conscience and is not accustomed to sin gravely, the presumption stands for him, and therefore he is not bound to confess a sin to which he did not certainly give consent. But if the penitent is of a lax conscience and often falls into mortal sins, the presumption stands against him, and therefore he is bound to confess that doubtful sin. Finally, if the penitent keeps a middle way between scrupulosity and laxity, then, unless it is much more probable that sufficient consent or advertence was lacking, the doubtfully grave sin must be manifested, "because this seems to be the universal and inveterate practice of the faithful, and therefore it is supposed to have emanated from the institution of Christ and to have been observed through tradition until now."218
217 St. Alphonsus very well observes: "Likewise, those who are of a timorous conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely and deliberately must be exempted from the obligation of confessing doubtful mortal sins. For these, in doubt, can reasonably, indeed with moral certainty, believe that they did not consent, because the presumption is taken from things which commonly occur.... The a priori reason for this is that he who habitually adheres to God and greatly fears lest he be deprived of divine grace, if it happens at some time that he turns away from Him, must inflict great violence upon himself in order to despise the remorse of conscience and cast himself deliberately into sin. But he cannot do this unless he certainly adverts to the evil which he embraces, for, as the most learned Father Alvarez says: Full consent in mortal sin is such iniquity that it cannot be hidden or unknown, but while recent it is easily recognized. Hence the Lord said to St. Teresa: No one loses Me unless he certainly knows it.... Conversely, the opposite is to be judged concerning one who is accustomed easily to fall into mortal sins, because in doubt this man is presumed to have consented; for if he had resisted, he would certainly remember that effort which he made to repel the temptation. Hence Croix rightly concludes that scarcely ever in men of this kind, of both the first and the second class, is there a merely negative doubt. For the presumption establishes the probability of consent given or dissent" (Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 476).
218 St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 474.
377. c) If there is question of a mortal sin certainly committed but doubtfully confessed, it must be accused, unless, however, the doubt concerning the confession having been made is very slight. The reason is that, since the mortal sin is certain, the obligation of confessing it is also certain. But a certain obligation cannot be satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment.
Thus authors commonly teach who are not pure probabilists, with St. Alphonsus,219 who nevertheless adds: "Nor do I reject ... that one who was diligent in confessing his sins, if afterward he doubts whether he omitted some sin after much time has elapsed since he committed it, is not bound to confess it, since in that case he can believe with moral certainty that he has already confessed it. And Father Concina adds that if someone previously fell into many sins from a depraved habit and afterward was truly converted through constant integrity of life; if he then doubts whether in a general or particular confession made with due diligence he omitted some sin or circumstance, the confessor should forbid him even to think again about his past life, but rather should command him to spend his time in pious meditations." Therefore, in practice, a penitent who seriously and with foundation doubts whether he omitted a mortal sin or a specific circumstance in his last confession, made not so long before, must declare this sin or circumstance in the following confession. But if the penitent doubts about the confession of some sin committed a long time ago and always had the custom of confessing well, he is not bound to manifest this doubtfully confessed sin. The confessor should not permit scrupulous penitents to accuse again sins doubtfully confessed, because otherwise their scruples are customarily increased still further.
219 Ibid., n. 477.