Point III. On the Circumstances of Sins

482. • Circumstances of various kinds are distinguished in sins:

1. Some change the species, namely, those which by reason of themselves add to the act a malice specifically distinct from that which the act has by reason of its object; thus the circumstance of a vow or of marriage adds to fornication the malice of sacrilege or adultery.

2. Others are aggravating only, but notably or lightly, according as within the same species they notably or lightly increase the malice of the sinful act by reason of duration, intensity, degree, manner, time, person, place, etc.

3. Others are diminishing, inasmuch as they render the malice of the sin less, for example, a defect of advertence, etc. - Recall what was said on Human Acts, no. 27.

483. Principles. - I. It is certain that circumstances which change the species must be accused ¹. The reason is that they constitute a new sin of themselves; and this is established from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 5, and canon 7.

¹ Understand this if the malice of a different species which the circumstance introduces is grave. For if it is light, for example, the light irreverence of one who steals another's hat in a Church, it is not necessary, according to what is established concerning venial sins, to express it in confession.

II. It is certain that lightly aggravating or diminishing circumstances need not necessarily be accused, although it is better to disclose them ². The reason is that venial sins are not necessary matter of the Sacrament of Penance.

² This must be understood with a grain of salt. Otherwise even the confession of persons otherwise pious, who are accustomed to bring forward a few venial sins, will be drawn out for at least half an hour while they endeavor diligently to disclose all the adjuncts by which their faults can be lightly aggravated or diminished.

III. It is also certain that circumstances must be expressed by reason of which a sin venial from its genus becomes mortal. Likewise, circumstances must be disclosed which so diminish a sin that what, apart from them, would have been mortal becomes by reason of them either no sin or only venial.

484. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Must circumstances NOTABLY AGGRAVATING the malice of mortal sins within the same species necessarily be accused?

Reply. There is a twofold probable opinion ³.

³ Carefully note that even the adversaries freely concede the probability of the opinion which denies. Therefore, according to the opinion of all, it is probable that no one is bound to this. This obligation therefore cannot be urged; even the rigorous Cabassutius admits this consequence here.

The FIRST OPINION, more common and more probable, denies it absolutely. The reason is: 1. because the Council of Trent requires nothing other than the confession of the number and species of sins, and therefore seems to exclude the obligation of confessing other circumstances. Add that otherwise both penitents and Confessors would always fluctuate amid perplexities, since it is difficult to distinguish which circumstances are notably aggravating; for no rule, at least generally, can be assigned by which they may be recognized, for example, with respect to duration, intensity, manner, etc. - Thus St. Lig., no. 467.

Some except circumstances which regard the quantity of the thing, as in theft ⁴; but others with St. Liguori think that even this exception is not to be admitted of itself, provided the quantity is declared grave; for the reason is the same, because quantity does not change the species of the sin.

⁴ The exception can better be stated: unless an extrinsic reason is added, for example, a reservation which concerns some determinate gravity of theft or degree of incest.

The SECOND OPINION affirms it. The reason is: 1. because the same reason holds for accusing aggravating circumstances as for accusing circumstances which change the species ⁵; 2. because a sin increased by notably aggravating circumstances is equivalent to several sins ⁶; 3. because if they were not accused, the Confessor could not impose a proportionate penance ⁷. - Collet, sect. 3; Billuart, diss. 7, art. 2, sec. 3; Concina, ch. 6, and others.

⁵ This is plainly false; because the Synod of Trent prescribes confession with regard to circumstances which change the species, but not with regard to others which are merely aggravating. If the reasons proved equally concerning both kinds of circumstances, the Council would have limited that entire doctrine to circumstances which change the species without cause; for it should have spoken of both in general, without limitation and distinction. Thus Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 115).

⁶ This reason also is too weak, both because in many matters it would require this uselessly, and because no one has ever sought a multiplication of sins in the same act from the possible division of the matter.

⁷ To this reason it can be replied that so exact an equality is not always required in imposing penance. Thus Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 120).

There are also those who object with these words of the Roman Catechism (De Poenit., no. 47): Nor indeed must grave sins alone be explained by recounting them, but also those things which surround each sin and greatly increase or diminish its wickedness.

But it can be answered that these words are explained there in such a way that it is not necessary to understand them of merely aggravating circumstances. And indeed: 1. it immediately adds: For certain circumstances are so grave that the character of mortal sin arises from them alone; wherefore all these things must always be confessed. But the character of mortal fault does not arise from a circumstance alone unless it changes either the moral or the theological species. - 2. This is confirmed by the fact that it prescribes the confession of greatly diminishing circumstances. For even the adversaries concede that this has force only when the diminution changes the theological species (see St. Alph., no. 468, at proof 3 from reason). - 3. The Catechism confirms its doctrine from the necessity of expressing the circumstance of a sacred person in homicide and of marriage in intercourse. But these pertain to circumstances which change the moral species. - 4. Finally, if it speaks of the gravity of theft, it cannot be proved that it is not there treating of a circumstance which changes the theological species; and what it says about one gold coin can fittingly be understood as an example of a circumstance which, regard being had to absolute quantity, makes the fault light and therefore introduces a different theological species.

Moreover, in practice the faithful are accustomed, ordinarily speaking, to declare the more notable circumstances; and this contributes both to greater peace of conscience and also to receiving more abundant fruit, both by reason of the humility in the confession itself and by reason of the more suitable direction which they receive ⁸.

⁸ According to the opinion of all, however, except the case in which there is question of sins against the sixth precept. For beyond that which may perhaps be necessary for declaring the species of the sin, nothing further is to be inquired into or permitted to be narrated by the penitent. I said which may perhaps be necessary for declaring the species of the sin, etc.; for the Doctors also commonly warn that the grave danger of handling this filthy matter can sometimes require that even inquiry into the species be spared.

485. • QUESTION 2. Must the circumstance of a custom of sin necessarily be accused?

Reply. More probably, negative, speaking of itself. The reason is: 1. because nothing other than the number and species of sins must necessarily be declared; 2. because the custom need not necessarily be explained, whether under this name is understood an evil habit or the repetition of the same sin. For a custom taken as a habit induced by repeated evil acts, although it is a vice, is nevertheless not a sin ⁹; while a custom taken as the repetition of the same sin already declared on other occasions does not cause the sin committed again, and to be confessed here and now, to be either graver on the part of the object ¹⁰ or different in its species. Except if the Confessor asks, as is established from Proposition 58 condemned by Innocent XI, which reads thus: We are not bound to confess to the Confessor, when he asks, a custom of some sin.

⁹ There can nevertheless be a sin of negligence in employing the means necessary for correcting the vice; this voluntary negligence indeed causes even indeliberate acts, toward which an evil custom is of itself apt to impel, to be voluntary and imputable (see Note at no. 300, vol. I).

¹⁰ This reason seems less pertinent; because even if some greater gravity accrued from this circumstance of custom, nevertheless it has already been said (see above, no. 484) that circumstances which merely aggravate within the same species need not necessarily be disclosed. This reason would nevertheless be pertinent when the circumstance of custom and at the same time of negligence in correcting it caused acts which of themselves were either semi-deliberate or even wholly indeliberate to assume grave guilt in their cause, that is, in the voluntary negligence (see preceding note).

I said speaking of itself, because sometimes it must be declared per accidens, so that the Confessor may judge the state of the penitent in relation to granting or denying absolution; this occurs when the penitent can prudently doubt his own disposition of soul, or can rightly fear that perhaps he is mistaken in this ¹¹.

¹¹ Not only because of the circumstance of custom, but whenever a penitent notices either that he is certainly not rightly disposed to receive the grace of the sacrament, or that there is a prudent reason for a defect of that disposition, he is bound to disclose it to the Confessor, lest, namely, he receive the sacrament unworthily.

Moreover, in practice it is better to exhort penitents to disclose their custom of sinning to a Confessor who is not their ordinary one ¹².

¹² The diligence by which penitents seek the aid of a Confessor for more efficaciously procuring the correction of vices is certainly always to be commended.

486. • QUESTION 3. Must the circumstance of the degree of incest committed with blood relatives or relatives by affinity be declared?

Reply 1. More probably, incest among blood relatives and relatives by affinity does not differ in species; therefore, the circumstance of consanguinity or affinity does not seem necessarily to be expressed. - St. Lig., Homo Apostolicus, tract 9, no. 7.

Reply 2. According to the more common opinion of the Doctors, the circumstance of relationship in the first degree of the direct line must be disclosed, namely, between father and daughter, mother and son, father-in-law and daughter-in-law ¹³. Say the same concerning the circumstance of the first degree of consanguinity in the collateral line, namely, between brother and sister. Nevertheless, St. Lig., no. 18, calls the contrary opinion probable ¹⁴.

¹³ For the same reason add also between a mother-in-law and son-in-law, etc.

¹⁴ Suarez (De Poenit., disp. 22, sect. 3, no. 12): Concerning degrees of consanguinity, insofar as they are circumstances of incest... it is more probable that they do not change the species of the sin, as Cajetan teaches at length, 2.2, q. 154, art. 9, and tom. I, Opusc., last tract, reply 5; Soto; and Cano.

And Diana (tom. 1, tract 7, resol. 107), after adducing the opinion of those who admit a diversity of species in incest, adds (no. 2): But according to the opinion of St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 154, art. 9, and Cajetan there, because incest among blood relatives and relatives by affinity does not differ in species in the moral genus, and in the sacramental judgment it suffices that he who sinned with his sister say: I committed incest once or twice, without explaining the person related to him. And although incest with a daughter or mother is graver than with a sister or niece or the female cousin of one's wife, nevertheless, because this gravity increases the malice within the same species, it need not necessarily be confessed. And this opinion of St. Thomas pleases me more, which Filliucius calls probable in Quaest. Moral., tom. 2, tract 30, ch. 5, no. 97. Therefore it must be said with Nugno that diversity of degrees does not make a specific diversity in incest, but is an aggravating circumstance, which I probably think need not necessarily be explained in confession. And Gyptius teaches the same in express terms, as do, among our own, Fr. Megala and others.

Reply 3. More probably, however, the other degrees of consanguinity or affinity need not necessarily be declared. - Thus more commonly. - St. Lig., no. 469 and following.

QUESTION 4. Must the circumstance of the dignity of the person necessarily be accused, for example, if the sinner is a Superior, Magistrate, Priest, etc.?

Reply. More probably, negative of itself, that is, apart from the consideration of scandal, office, or a particular obligation. The reason is that the circumstance of the dignity of the person sinning does not of itself change the species of the sin, but at most aggravates the sin.

487. • QUESTION 5. Must the circumstance of a sin committed by a Confessor with a penitent necessarily be declared?

Reply. More probably, negative, provided it has no relation to confession. The reason is that by this sin no injury is done to the Sacrament, since it has no relation to confession ¹⁵. - St. Lig., on the sixth precept, no. 451; Lugo, disp. 16, no. 451; Lacroix, etc.

¹⁵ Some have thought that there is a certain spiritual relationship between Confessor and penitent, on account of which the sin contains some malice of incest. But this is commonly rejected (see Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 359 and following). Nevertheless, it is readily evident that both such a penitent must altogether be deterred from confessing further to that priest and such a Confessor from admitting that penitent further to confession.

QUESTION 6. Must the circumstance of a sacred time necessarily be accused?

Reply. Negative. This is evident from the universal practice both of Confessors and of penitents; for it is established that neither are the former solicitous to ask about such a circumstance, nor are the latter accustomed to declare it. Therefore, the circumstance of sacred time does not seem to require explanation, unless certain things are specially prohibited out of reverence for the time, for example, that one should not present public games, comedies, or theatrical spectacles on Good Friday. - St. Lig., bk. 3, no. 273; Lugo, no. 520; and others commonly.

488. • QUESTION 7. Does he satisfy the integrity of confession who accuses a recent sin as though committed long ago?

Reply 1. Affirmative of itself, because the circumstance of time pertains in no way to confession. Hence a penitent satisfies the obligation of confession who mingles new sins with old ones, or who, when making a general confession, does not distinguish from the others the mortal sins committed since the last confession, even if he does this deliberately to conceal the time at which he committed the sins. - Thus the Doctors commonly. - See Lugo, disp. 16, no. 53 ¹⁶; Tamburini, Methodus Confessionis, bk. 2, ch. 1.

¹⁶ Cardinal De Lugo (disp. 16, no. 47), after adducing the opposite opinion of some, adds: Others more correctly deny an obligation in the penitent to explain that he had not confessed those sins previously. Thus Bonacina, Homobonus, Diana, Sanchez, Suarez, etc. The reason... is that the sin is the same, whether he confessed it previously or not, unless perhaps the change of time brings with it a circumstance different in species.... But when the sin is the same, there is no reason why the circumstance of time must be explained. Since, therefore, the sin is the same whether he confessed it previously or not, and that circumstance in no way varies the sin, there is no reason why it must necessarily be explained. But, resolving the arguments of the contrary opinion (no. 54), he adds these things: Nor does it hinder that the penitent says that he wishes to make a general confession; for by this he does not say that he wishes to confess only old sins, but that he wishes also to comprehend those; for a general confession embraces all sins up to this hour. Nor does it matter that the Confessor understands it to be an old sin, for the penitent did not say this; and therefore the intention of absolving is not regulated by the private estimation of the Confessor, but he intends to absolve from the sins which the penitent brought to judgment, whatever they may be.... Finally, it does not matter that the penitent seems implicitly to indicate that they are old sins; for he truly has the intention of speaking about new sins and wishes to speak about them, although he desires not to be understood in this respect by the Confessor.

Reply 2. But if the penitent lies about the time, for example, if he denies that he sinned today and declares the sin as though committed at another definite and remote time, the Doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not the act placed a year ago. Hence he lies in two ways, namely, by concealing the sin committed today and by accusing a sin committed at another time. - Thus Tamburini in the place cited.

There are nevertheless Theologians who think this lie light. - See Lugo, ibid. ¹⁷.

¹⁷ Lugo aptly observes (loc. cit., no. 54) that this case differs from the preceding. Therefore, he says, it is not the same thing to speak obscurely and expressly to deny; because in the first case the words truly signify that which he wishes to confess, and therefore he presents a true sin; but in the second case the words cannot signify the true sin, but a false one. And I said false because, as the patrons of the contrary opinion object, in this way you seem in reality both to accuse a sin which you did not commit and to conceal that which you did commit.

Nevertheless, insofar as this argument is urged to deny the sufficiency of this confession, Lugo himself (ibid., no. 53) calls it merely probable. And indeed, as Tamburini observes (Exped. Conf., bk. 2, ch. 1, no. 6), a disorder of this kind, by which you seem to accuse a sin never committed and to conceal one truly committed, occurs equally from other circumstances also which are falsely added, as even the adversaries freely admit. Thus, for example, if you say that you killed Paul when you killed Andrew; or that you sinned with a stranger when you sinned with an inhabitant; or that you stole from Lucius when you stole from Caius; or that you detracted from someone at home when you detracted from him on the road or in the theater; or that you read a heretical book by Melanchthon when the book was by Osiander; or that you struck a Capuchin when you struck a Carmelite. That these lies do not hinder sufficient integrity of confession is also evident from the fact that, if they happened to be uttered inadvertently, no one compels the penitent to correct the error in the following confession. And to this pertains what the Author says, that this lie is thought light by certain Theologians.

Moreover, scarcely any use of these opinions bears upon practice, unless perhaps the Confessor, with one who undertakes to confess the sins of his whole life, thinks it superfluous from the adjuncts to inquire whether he had previously confessed this or that sin. For otherwise the faithful, ignorant of theological subtleties, are never accustomed to use these artifices. Indeed, even for those acquainted with these doctrines it would not always be lawful, whether because of a circumstance which changes the species at a different time, or because of the reservation of cases which can be present according as the sin was or was not previously absolved and duly confessed, or because of the adjuncts of a proximate occasion or evil custom which require the particular care of the Confessor.

489. • QUESTION 8. Must the external act of sin necessarily be accused?

Reply. Affirmative, because in the moral genus it is one and the same thing with the internal act, and these two constitute one whole. Moreover, the external act is directly prohibited by divine law, for example, You shall not kill. Besides, without declaration of the external act the Confessor generally could not discharge his office as is fitting with regard to providing admonitions, etc. This is established also from the universal custom of the faithful, which explains the law in this sense.

490. • QUESTION 9. Must the effect of a sin necessarily be expressed in confession?

Reply. The Doctors disagree; but the opinion which denies it has always seemed truer to me, says Lugo, disp. 16, no. 440, who draws the reason from the distinction between the external act of the sin and the effect of the sin thus (ibid., no. 449): The more common reason for this difference is that the external act, which is denominated free from the actual liberty of the internal act, is truly and properly a sin; but the effect which afterward followed, in sleep for example, is not properly a sin, as we have said, but the effect of a sin. But in confession all and only sins must be explained; therefore, the external act must be explained when it is actually free, but not the effect which afterward followed... because there cannot be an actual sin in him who is not actually sinning; nor can he actually sin who does not actually act; but he who sleeps while his enemy dies from poison does nothing at that time; therefore, he does not sin at that time. Thus far Lugo ¹⁸; see the rest in him, and you will not regret it.

¹⁸ Here there is question merely of obligation, just as in the question whether sins doubtfully committed or merely aggravating circumstances must be expressed in confession. And since in the present controversy also the obligation must be called entirely doubtful, as the disagreement of the Doctors proves, by the general principle the obligation of expressing the effect of a sin in confession neither ought nor can be imposed upon anyone. To this pertain the things which St. Alphonsus (Homo Apostolicus, tract 16, no. 29) has concerning the question of the necessity of expressing merely aggravating circumstances: Such a law, he says, is doubtful; and no one is bound to doubtful laws, as has been shown. Nor does it hinder to say here that in the matter of the Sacraments we cannot follow merely probable opinions; because this applies when there is question of the validity of the sacrament; otherwise with respect to integrity.

491. • QUESTION 10. Must a penitent declare the different persons with whom he sinned?

Reply. Negative of itself. - Thus Bonacina, disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 2, point 2, sec. 3, diff. 3, no. 14; Tamburini, In Decalogum, bk. 7, ch. 7; Lacroix, no. 1040; and others commonly.

The reason is that it suffices for the number and species of sins to be declared; but sins do not change species merely because they were committed with several persons. Hence he who fornicated with three different persons, or three times with the same person, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound of his own accord to say whether his accomplice was one or several, or whether they were prostitutes or others. - Nevertheless, if the Confessor asks about this, the penitent is bound to answer, because it is expedient that the Confessor know whether perhaps there is a proximate occasion of sinning, as is likely if the sin was committed several times with the same person.

492. • QUESTION 11. Must one bound by a vow of chastity, when sinning with another similarly bound, declare both circumstances?

Reply. Affirmative. The reason is that there are two entirely distinct sins there, namely, a sin against one's own vow and a sin of cooperating with the other in violating that person's vow. Precisely the same must be said of a married man having relations with another man's wife; for he commits a twofold adultery. - Lacroix, no. 4063; Lugo, disp. 16, no. 258; Salmanticenses, ch. 6, no. 63, etc.

QUESTION 12. Must a Priest or Religious sinning against chastity disclose his condition, or only the circumstance of the vow of chastity?

Reply. It is controverted. It probably suffices that each manifest the circumstance of the vow, because the species of the obligation does not seem to be changed by the special condition either of Priest or Religious ¹⁹. - Lugo, disp. 16, no. 149; Lacroix, etc., against some.

¹⁹ The vow of each is solemn; therefore the sin of each pertains to the same species of personal sacrilege. There can therefore be place for controversy only when one is bound by a solemn vow but the other by a simple vow, the violation of which more probably is not reduced to the species of sacrilege strictly so called. But enough was said elsewhere concerning these things, where the vow was treated (vol. I, no. 286).

493. • QUESTION 13. Must the relationship of persons be declared in sins of hatred?

Reply 1. Affirmative, if there is question of a closer relationship because of the strict bond of the virtue of piety. Hence grave hatred toward parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, relatives by affinity in the first degree ²⁰, godfathers, godchildren, one's spouse, and brothers and sisters must be declared. - Lugo, disp. 16, no. 303 and following; and others commonly. Reply 2. More probably, negative, however, if there is question of remote relationship, namely, among other blood relatives ²¹ or relatives by affinity. - Lugo, ibid., and others, against others who think that the circumstance of relationship even in the fourth degree of consanguinity must be declared.

²⁰ The virtue of piety properly exercises its office toward blood relatives, but not toward relatives by affinity. See St. Thomas (2.2, q. 101, art. 1) and Cardinal De Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 16, nos. 303-308), who make no mention of relatives by affinity.

²¹ In sins against other relatives or more remote blood relations, that is, apart from parents and brothers, although a circumstance of this kind aggravates and increases the malice, it nevertheless does not introduce a different species which must necessarily be explained in confession. Thus Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 16, no. 308). But he says that this circumstance need not necessarily be explained because this malice, although of a different species, is nevertheless not judged grave.