What faith is

FAITH is here understood in the sense in which it is used by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews¹ and elsewhere in Holy Scripture. It is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth of a proposition, not because it is evident to reason, but because its truth is vouched for by someone who knows and whom we can trust. The word has this sense among others in English. We say: ‘I should not like to pin my faith to such a proposition on that writer’s authority.” Here there is question of human faith resting on human authority. God can manifest the truth to us, and we believe that he has done so. ‘‘ God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by his Son.” Whatever God makes known to us mediately or immediately we are justified in believing on his authority. He can neither deceive us nor be himself deceived; and we are bound to believe all that we know God to have spoken or revealed, otherwise we implicitly accuse God of lying or of ignorance. An act of divine faith, then, is an act by which we believe whatever God has revealed on the authority of God himself. God has taken care that we should know for certain what he has revealed in times past for man’s benefit and guidance by founding the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church is the pillar and the ground of truth, whose chief function it is to bear witness to God’s revelation, and to teach it to all men even to the consummation of the world. God’s Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Truth, ever abides with the Church, to enable her faithfully and infallibly to perform her task. Faith, then, considered as a habit, is a theological virtue by which we believe all that God has revealed and the Church proposes to our belief on the authority of God himself. An act of faith is an act of this virtue.

¹ Heb. xi.

In order that we may acquire full knowledge of this virtue, its notion, division, object, subject, and properties must be inspected.

I. Notion of Faith. Faith is a theological virtue inclining man to assent firmly to truths revealed by God, on account of the authority of God revealing. It is said:

1. To assent firmly. By this firmness "faith is distinguished from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, through which there is not a firm adherence of the intellect to something" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 1).

2. On account of the authority of God revealing. For this is the formal object of theological faith, by which it is distinguished both from science, which is assent on account of the intrinsic truth of the thing, and from human faith, by which we assent on account of the authority of man.

II. Division of Faith. Faith is divided:

1. By reason of charity, into formed and unformed faith. It is called formed if charity accompanies it; for charity, although it is not intrinsic to faith and therefore cannot be called its substantial or accidental form, nevertheless that which is left in faith from charity is intrinsic to faith. It is unformed when the virtue of faith is in a faithful subject lacking charity.

2. By reason of object, into explicit and implicit faith. Explicit faith is said to be that by which those things are believed which have been revealed in their proper terms; implicit faith, that by which revealed things are believed which are contained implicitly and formally in what is explicitly revealed.

3. By reason of believers, into Catholic and theological or divine faith. Catholic faith is said to be that which obliges all the faithful, since the object has been proposed by the Church with infallible authority as revealed. Theological or divine faith is that which obliges only those who perceive that the object has been revealed by God, when an infallible definition of the Church proposing it to all as revealed is lacking.

III. Object of Faith. 1. Material object. The material object of faith in general is all and only revealed truths. I say all and only revealed truths, because on the one hand only truths which have been spoken by God can be believed on account of the authority of God revealing; on the other hand, all truths spoken by God can be admitted on account of this authority, whether they have been manifested by public revelation or, as seems altogether to be admitted against a few, by private revelation. Moreover, observe:

a) Revealed truths, or truths manifested by God, are said to be those which God has manifested either explicitly or implicitly formally. Now He has explicitly manifested those which He has revealed in their proper terms; He has implicitly formally manifested those which the human mind deduces by a merely explicative discourse from explicitly revealed truths. But if an illative discourse is required for the deduction of truths, the things so deduced are called implicitly virtually revealed, and since assent to these truths rests in our intellect, they cannot be believed by theological faith. When such conclusions are confirmed by the infallible magisterium of the Church, they must of course be admitted by irrevocable assent; but theologians dispute whether the assent then ought to be called an act of divine faith or of ecclesiastical faith. More probably it must be held to be an assent of ecclesiastical faith, because it immediately rests on the authority of the Church; nevertheless the assent is reduced to the habit of divine faith, since the authority of the Church has been revealed by God.

b) The material object of divine faith is twofold: primary, or that which the virtue of faith attains by reason of itself; and secondary, which the virtue of faith attains only by reason of the primary object.

The primary object is God Himself, the first truth in being. For the primary object of faith, since faith is a participation in divine cognition, is the same as the primary object of divine cognition. And the primary object of divine cognition is God Himself, as the first truth in being (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 171, a. 6).

The secondary object is constituted by all the other revealed things, since these have been manifested by God for this reason, that we may have a fuller knowledge of Him and a more fervent love toward Him.

2. Formal object. As concerns the formal object of the theological virtue of faith, it is of faith that the motive is the authority of God revealing. For the Vatican Council defined: "If anyone says that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge about God and moral things, and that therefore it is not required for divine faith that revealed truth be believed on account of the authority of God revealing, let him be anathema."¹ Now:

a) The authority of God arises from His veracity and wisdom. This is clear both from the same Council, which teaches that by divine faith we believe on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive,² and from reason, because the irrevocable assent of faith supposes in the one testifying that he absolutely knew the truth communicated and communicated it without falsity.

But if it is further investigated whether both essentially constitute the formal object, the answer must be given with a distinction. With regard to veracity, it must be said affirmatively. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture, which assigns the veracity of God as the motive of faith,³ and also from reason; for the veracity of God makes the statement supremely credible, and into it the assent of theological faith is ultimately and formally resolved.

As regards wisdom, it is certain that it is required presuppositively and by connotation for constituting the formal reason which can deserve irrevocable assent; but it is not required for this formally and directly. For supreme veracity, such as divine veracity is, of itself imports absolute conformity both with the mind of the speaker and with the things spoken. If it did not import this absolute conformity, veracity would not be supreme, since a veracity which always testified words conformed to things would be greater. From this it follows that wisdom does not essentially constitute the formal object of theological faith, but nevertheless concurs toward it as a condition without which not.

b) Revelation itself can be considered actively and passively. Active revelation consists in the very will of God to reveal, or is the act of will by which God orders His concepts to men. Passive revelation is the effect immediately produced by God for testifying to some truth, or is the act which manifests divine truth outwardly. Now it must more probably be said that active revelation, like veracity, essentially constitutes the formal object of theological faith. For the assent of faith is the conjunction of the intellect with the thing revealed, constituted by the formal object as by an efficient cause. Now the veracity of God taken simply abstracts from conjunction with the object to which the believer assents; therefore veracity alone cannot efficiently constitute the assent of the believer, but for this there is required veracity testifying to the truth. But this testification is formally constituted by active revelation. Therefore.

I say that it is formally constituted by active revelation; for by this revelation infinite truth enjoys veracity. Passive revelation, however, is necessary only to this extent, that the believer may be able to know that God has in fact ordered His concepts to him, i.e., to the believer, through active revelation. Therefore passive revelation does not enter essentially into the formal object of theological faith, but is a condition without which there is no act of it.

¹ Session 3, canon 2, on faith.

² Chapter 3, on faith.

³ For example, 1 Thess. 2:13; 1 John 5:9 sq.

IV. Subject of Faith. The subject of some virtue is distinguished as twofold: the subject by which and partial, which is the power itself in which the virtue resides; and the subject which and total, which is the person himself who possesses some virtue. Now:

1. The subject by which and partial of theological faith is the intellect. This is clear from Sacred Scripture: "bringing every intellect into captivity unto the obedience of Christ."¹ It is also confirmed by reason: for theological faith is the principle of an act which is occupied around revealed truth; but an act of this kind is an intellective act; hence the habit of faith also resides in the intellect (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 2). Although, however, the act of faith is an act of the intellect, nevertheless, in order that it take place, a prior motion of the will is required. For the proper terminus of the intellect is the vision of some truth; but this vision is not had in the act of faith, since that act is always placed on account of extrinsic authority. Therefore, in order that the intellect assent on account of this extrinsic authority, it is required that the will, piously affected by grace toward the object of faith, by a certain weight impressed on the intellect, draw it to firm and perfect assent (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14, a. 1).

2. The subject which and total of theological faith are: 1. all just wayfarers; for sanctifying grace is always joined with faith; and since the souls in purgatory, with respect to the beatific vision, are still on the way, they too are the subject "which" of faith; 2. all wayfaring sinners who nevertheless have not sinned directly against faith.² This is clear from the Council of Trent.³ Those who are in no way wayfarers, or wayfarers who are formally heretics, lack faith. With regard to the Blessed, this is clear because they have vision; with regard to the damned, it follows from their impossibility of tending toward the supernatural end; with regard to wayfarers who are formally heretics, it is clear from the Council of Trent.⁴

¹ 2 Cor. 10:5.

² Although by sins which are not directly against faith the formal object of faith is not destroyed, and therefore the sinner perpetrating such sins can still believe all revealed things, nevertheless, since all infused virtues flow from habitual grace as properties from a nature, when this is lacking, faith too ought of itself to be lacking. Therefore there is a special law, mercifully established by God, that the virtue of faith remains notwithstanding the loss of grace. But we can know the existence of such a law from revelation alone.

³ Session 6, chapter 15 and canon 28.

⁴ Session 6, chapter 15.

V. Properties of Faith. Five properties of faith are suitably assigned, namely truth, certitude, obscurity, liberty, and necessity. Although these properties immediately pertain to the act of faith, mediately, namely by means of the act, they are also predicated of the habit by whose help the act is placed. Therefore we wish to discuss them briefly here.

1. Truth of faith consists in this, that the act of faith essentially and necessarily is occupied around revealed truth; so that by force of this property, faith can never elicit an act regarding an estimated but not real revelation, whether this estimated revelation is in itself a truth or a falsity. That faith has this property is openly clear from the Council of Trent, which says that the certitude of faith is such that falsity cannot underlie it.¹ Besides, it is clear by reason itself; for what has not been revealed by God cannot be believed on account of His authority; but what has been revealed is necessarily true. Hence it follows that both the formal and the material object of faith are lacking whenever someone admits either some truth not revealed, or, a fortiori, some falsity, as a revealed truth. In either case someone can think that he elicits an act of faith, but he does not truly elicit it.²

2. Certitude of faith consists essentially in this, that the believer assents to what is revealed by an assent firm above all things. Therefore, although the assent of faith excludes every prudent fear, nevertheless the essence of the property of certitude is not to be placed, not even partly, in this negative element; for the exclusion of prudent fear is proper to every certitude strictly so called. The essence of this property is solely in the positive element, namely in firm assent above all things.

Nor is the certitude of faith firmer than every other certitude in the sense that it more strongly excludes every prudent fear; on the contrary, in this respect it can be called weaker, since intellectual vision is more opposed to the possibility of doubt than assent on account of an extrinsic cause, even the firmest, as occurs in the act of faith. But it is more certain than every other certitude in the sense of infallibility and therefore of adherence. This greater firmness or certitude is founded: 1. on the fact that the authority of God revealing is more essentially opposed to falsity than any other cause of certitude. Hence St. Thomas teaches: "As to firmness of adherence, faith is more certain than every act of understanding and science, because the first truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a stronger cause than the light of reason, which causes the assent of understanding or science" (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14, a. 1, ad 7; II-II, q. 4, a. 8). It is founded: 2. on grace, without which an act of supernatural faith cannot be elicited; for grace is never given for assent to falsity. From this we conclude that the believer ought to be so disposed in soul that he rejects as absolutely erroneous any doctrine whatever which is certainly opposed to doctrine certainly revealed.

3. Obscurity of faith consists in this, that the believer in the act of faith assents to the revealed object not on account of the intrinsic evidence of the object, but on account of the extrinsic authority of God attesting the truth of the object. This obscurity, which flows from the formal object, is necessarily joined with every act of faith; and it alone must be called essential. The reason for the former is that without the formal object, which in the act of faith is the authority of God, there cannot be an act of faith. The reason for the latter is that according to the more probable opinion even truths evidently known to reason, or admitted on account of their intrinsic evidence, can be believed by divine faith. Once this is posited, only the obscurity which flows from the formal object of faith is essential; but the obscurity which is often present in the material object, as, for example, in mysteries to be believed, or which proceeds from the non-evidence of the fact of divine testimony, is only accidental.

4. Liberty of faith is that property by which the assent of faith is immune from every necessity. Hermes denied that this is a property of faith, teaching that faith consists in a necessary persuasion induced by compelling reasons, so that when this necessity is lacking, nothing remains except vain credulity.³ The Vatican Council condemned this error: "If anyone says that the assent of Christian faith is necessarily produced by reason, let him be anathema."⁴ This liberty of faith arises from the fact that in the act of faith the intellect assents to the object to be believed not on account of intrinsic evidence. Hence the act of faith is free with the liberty both of exercise and of contrariety. But if you posit a case in which the material object by its own evidence, acquired by reasoning, is present to the intellect, the liberty of contrariety perishes, yet liberty of exercise remains, because either the assent of science or the assent of faith can be chosen.

5. Necessity of faith. a) The habit of faith, or habitual faith, is necessary for salvation for all by an absolute necessity of means. For no one is saved without sanctifying grace. But the habit of faith is infused together with sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as sanctifying grace is necessary by necessity of means for individual men, so also is the habit of faith.

b) In what respect the act of faith, or actual faith, is necessary will rather be explained in Book II, where the discussion will concern the exercise or cultivation of virtues.

¹ De iustificatione, session 6, chapter 9.

² Nevertheless he has the merit of faith from the pious affection of credulity, since he is prepared to subject himself to divine authority.

³ Collectio Lacensis, t. VII, p. 529 (17).

⁴ Session 3, on faith, canon 5.

“For even if the matter concerned that submission which is to be rendered by an act of divine faith, it would nevertheless not have to be limited to those things which have been defined by express decrees of ecumenical Councils, of the Roman Pontiffs, and of this Apostolic See; but it would also have to be extended to those things which are handed down as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world, and which therefore are held by the universal and constant consent of Catholic theologians to pertain to the faith. But since the matter concerns that submission by which, in conscience, all those Catholics who devote themselves to speculative disciplines are bound, so that by their writings they may bring new benefits to the Church, therefore the men of that same assembly ought to recognize that it is by no means enough for Catholic scholars to receive and venerate the aforesaid dogmas of the Church, but that it is also necessary that they subject themselves both to those decisions pertaining to doctrine which are issued by the Pontifical Congregations and to those heads of doctrine which by the common and constant consent of Catholics are held as theological truths and conclusions so certain that opinions opposed to those same heads of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, nevertheless merit some other theological censure.” Pius IX, Letter to the Archbishop of Munich and Freising, 21 Dec. 1863.

186. • Faith in general is assent on account of the authority of one speaking. More precisely for our matter, Faith, insofar as it is a virtue, is defined: A supernatural, infused habit inclining the intellect to assent firmly to truths revealed by God and proposed by the Church, on account of the authority of God revealing. But insofar as it is an act, it is called the firmest assent given to things revealed by God on account of the authority of God revealing. - St. Lig. n. 2.

Faith is 1º habitual or actual, according as it is a habit or an act.

2º Explicit or implicit by reason of the object, according as this is expressed and unfolded in itself, or only contained in another. Thus, for example, if you say: I believe in the Most Holy Trinity, you elicit an act of Faith explicit in that mystery. But if you say: I believe all things which the Church teaches are to be believed, you elicit an act of Faith implicit in the several revealed dogmas.

3º Formal or virtual, according as faith either is actually elicited, or, persevering in the mind without advertence, by its force influences actions.

4º Formed, or living, or unformed, or dead, according as it is joined, or not, with the works of Charity.

Sins opposed to Faith are 1º infidelity, or the lack of Faith in unbaptized men; 2º heresy, or a pertinacious error in one baptized against a truth of Faith proposed by the Church.

Infidelity, or heresy, is called negative or material in him who labors under invincible ignorance, or to whom the true Faith has not been sufficiently proposed.

The treatment must be chiefly 1º concerning the necessity, 2º concerning the object of Faith.

193. • The formal object of Faith, or the reason on account of which one believes, is the authority of God speaking, as being endowed with infinite wisdom as well as truthfulness. - Thus more commonly.

But the material object, concerning which alone the treatment here is made, consists of the things to be known and believed. Hence one must treat of things to be known and believed both by necessity of means and by necessity of precept.

Usefulness. The treatise on Faith, which is the solemn beginning of dogmatic theology, also vindicates for itself no slight moment in moral theology.

For the virtue without which it is impossible to please God ¹ founds the whole Christian life; and while we are instructed concerning its excellence and merit, we have matter from which to arouse or foster spiritual fervor; while it discerns the varied necessity by which revealed things are to be explicitly believed or professed, it supplies us with norms useful in administering the sacraments, especially baptism. Nor are difficult cases lacking to be examined and solved concerning the positive duties of faith. Today also, in so great a disturbance of errors, it is of very great importance that we know how rightly to weigh the guilt of heresy and infidelity, and accurately discern what, in their intercourse with those who err, can be permitted to Catholics and what must be prohibited.

Order of speaking. - After the notion and excellence of Faith have been set forth, we shall treat, in distinct titles, of the duty of believing; of the duty of professing Faith; of infidelity and of sins opposed to Faith; finally of the legal safeguards of Faith.

¹ Heb. 11, 6.

— Faith is a theological virtue by which man is able to believe, as he ought, on account of the authority of God revealing, those things which God has revealed.

The act of faith denotes assent to the first truth; by which assent the believer participates in divine truth. This assent is formally in the intellect. Considering its formal object, which is the authority of testimony, and because the evidence of the primary object, which is God, is lacking, this assent is free; and hence it is commanded by the will under the aspect of good. But we believe as we ought, insofar as no created reason, but the divine knowledge and veracity itself in speaking, constitutes the sole motive of assent; and insofar as the firmness of this assent surpasses the firmness of natural evidence. This greater firmness is to be derived from the benefit of grace alone.

Insofar as we are illuminated by the very light of the divine intellect, faith is our immense dignity; insofar as we take the intellect captive unto the obedience of faith, that is, renounce our own criterion in order to apply the divine criterion, faith is glorious to God; insofar as we furnish this from the command of a free will, faith is greatly meritorious in the just man. Cf. concerning these points the dogmatic treatise on faith.

— The act of faith is distinguished: a) formal and quasi-virtual. It is formal when the motive of faith (the authority of God revealing) explicitly occurs to the mind. But the habitual persuasion which frequent exercise of faith leaves after itself can pass into act without express memory of the motive of faith. Then an assent is made which truly rests upon that motive, and hence is an act of faith; but because the motive of faith has not been explicitly proposed, this implicit assent is improperly called a virtual act of faith. Properly, on the part of the formal object, the act of faith cannot be virtually contained in any other act: in no act of a theological virtue, for hope and charity presuppose faith; in no other act of a moral virtue, for this is of an inferior order. But on the part of the material object, properly virtual faith is had. Thus, by believing whatever things God has revealed, a man virtually believes the individual truths which have come to us by God's speaking.

b) Internal, or contained in the judgment of the mind alone, and external. The latter, made before witnesses, is at the same time a profession of faith, either formal or virtual, according as one directly testifies to his faith, or performs acts which demonstrate faith: as when someone confesses his sins, approaches the sacred table, or devoutly assists at Mass.

Excellence and usefulness of faith. Faith is the beginning and root of all justification. The act of faith is our first free response full of our vocation to the supernatural end. This vocation looks to this, that we will to be wayfarers, making our way toward possessing God in Himself. If we direct our steps to this most sublime goal, we are freed from servitude to present things, and, elevated above earthly things, we begin in some way to understand the mysterious order of this world, mixed with miseries and evils, and we hold the principle of victory over evil desires, and of consolation in any adverse things whatever. At the same time we are impelled to act worthily of so great an end, so that a manner of acting not only honorable but strong, noble, magnanimous, becomes connatural to us. Wherefore not undeservedly does the Apostle (Heb. XI) not hesitate to turn all things gloriously done to the praise of faith. And thus it happens that human life, turned from perishing into immortal, from low into divine, becomes most useful not less to universal human society than to one's own eternal salvation.

Aids for faith to be acquired, preserved, and increased by us. For heavenly gifts, such as Faith is, we can dispose ourselves negatively, by removing obstacles, and, by the facility of acquired habits, can as it were complete and strengthen the infused virtues themselves. But positively we cannot dispose ourselves for Faith without the prevenient and assisting grace of God. Since, however, as is explained at length in the school of dogma, the assent of Faith, most firm above every other assent, pertains elicitively to the intellect and requires the command of the will, for acquiring, preserving, and increasing Faith, the dispositions of the will must be cared for by us no less than those of the intellect.

Therefore let us strive to have a sound mind, alien from cavils, not excessively hesitating, capable of firm judgment or opinion; a will truly loving and zealous for the good, humble, devoted to God. Let that will apply the intellect to the luminous rather than to the obscure aspects of religion, to the direct motives for adhering, more than to solving difficulties. Let us practically cultivate the spirit of faith in our whole conduct, so that according to the norms of faith we may judge, feel, speak, and act. Let us act as if we already possessed great faith. In this way, since the true and the good are one, already by the very experience of good works we shall in a manner prove the truth of our faith.

— I. Faith is defined: a theological virtue by which a man is habitually capable of believing, as he ought, on account of the authority of God revealing, those things which God has revealed.

The assent of Faith, although it is formally in the intellect, is nevertheless free, so that it is commanded by the will, under the aspect of good; it rests upon the divine knowledge and veracity alone in speaking; and, by the benefit of grace, it has a firmness proportioned to the motive, which surpasses the firmness of our natural evidence.

Faith is necessary for man in the present state, honorable to the believer, glorious to God, very meritorious for the just man.

II. The act of faith is distinguished: 1. Formal and virtual. On the part of the material object, we formally believe truths of faith which explicitly occur to the mind; but virtually, truths which are contained in a more general assent: as when we believe whatever the Church proposes to us as to be believed. On the part of the formal object, the act of faith is properly contained, or can be contained, in no other act. Yet because habitual persuasion can pass into act without explicit memory of the motive, there is distinguished formal faith, which exists when we explicitly remember the motive of faith, and quasi-virtual faith, which is that of one adhering to revealed truth without an explicit proposal of the motive of faith;

2. Internal and external: internal is contained in the judgment of the mind alone; external is contained also in external signification. The external, when it is made before witnesses, is at the same time a profession of faith, whether formal, when one expressly affirms his faith, or virtual, when he does those things which per se suppose and demonstrate faith.

III. The excellence and usefulness of Faith is made manifest from this, that from it has its beginning the divine direction of our life, by which, freed from earthly servitudes and made superior to every misfortune, we are rendered ready for doing honorable and magnanimous things.

For faith to be more easily acquired, preserved, and increased by us from the grace of God, obstacles are removed by a mind sound, right, firm; by a will zealous for the good, humble and devoted to God; by attention to the positive motives of credibility; by the custom of acting according to the principles of faith.

478. Various meanings of the word faith. In Sacred Scripture and in theology the word faith is taken in many and diverse senses; yet all of these can be reduced to two classes, namely, either they are referred to the will, or they designate acts or habits of the intellect.

Insofar as faith expresses a certain perfection or act of the will, three acceptations especially are to be noted:

1. Fidelity in promises. In this sense it is used by St. Paul: "Will their unbelief make void the faith of God? God forbid. But God is true."⁴

2. The promise itself. Thus St. Paul rebukes widows "because they have made void their first faith";⁵ for they vowed chastity, but did not keep the vow.

3. The estimation of probity. Thus, for example, it is said: "He who lays bare the secrets of a friend loses faith, and will not find a friend according to his mind."⁶

But insofar as faith is referred to the intellect, three acceptations likewise occur chiefly:

1. Conscience. Thus St. Paul says: "Everything that is not from faith is sin."⁷ Concerning this acceptation it was already said above, n. 307, in the treatise on conscience.

2. Veracity (credibility). Thus it is said: "Faith has perished and has been taken away from their mouth";⁸ and in almost the same sense a certain article in the Code of Law is superscribed: "On the faith of instruments."⁹

3. The revealed truths themselves. In this sense it is said: "You have not denied my faith";¹⁰ and in the Athanasian Creed: "Whosoever wishes to be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith," i.e. the Catholic truths.

Having left all these acceptations aside, faith is still taken in two ways, of which our concern in the present treatise is greater, namely: 1. faith is the habit by which we give assent or believe on account of the authority of the one speaking. If the one speaking, whom we believe, is man, there is human faith; but if that one speaking is God himself, then there is divine or theological faith.¹¹ 2. Protestants, when speaking of salvific faith, take the word faith for a firm trust by which someone thinks he has seized the merits of Christ.¹² By this faith alone, or trust without works, Protestants think a man is justified. The falsity of this opinion is shown below, n. 480.

Real definition. Especially a twofold definition of theological faith is given, one from St. Paul, the other from the Vatican Council.

⁴ Rom. 3, 3 sq.

⁵ 1 Tim. 5, 12.

⁶ Ecclus. 27, 17.

⁷ Rom. 14, 23.

⁸ Jer. 7, 28.

⁹ c. 1812-1818.

¹⁰ Apoc. 2, 13.

¹¹ Authors usually distinguish between divine and Catholic faith, simply divine faith, and ecclesiastical faith. Divine and Catholic (or public) faith is revelation made to the whole Church and extends to all dogmas defined by the Church. Simply divine (or private) faith is private revelation and extends to particular divine revelations which someone certainly had and therefore must believe, e.g. the revelations of St. Bridget. Ecclesiastical faith is that which must be given to those truths which are taught by the Church, but not as dogmas of faith, e.g. theological conclusions. For the rest, these expressions are not accepted by all in the same sense. The first who used the terminology "ecclesiastical faith" seems to have been the Archbishop of Paris, Péréfixe, in 1764. (Cf. Marin-Sola, L'évolution du Dogme catholique n. 230.)

¹² Thus, e.g. Reinhold Seeberg (Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte II 239) explains Luther's opinion: "Faith is thus not a theoretical holding-for-true, but it is the practical confidence that we ourselves, through Christ's work, are in grace with God."

479. Definition of St. Paul: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things not appearing."¹³ St. Thomas¹⁴ observes concerning this definition: "All other definitions, whatever are given concerning faith, are explanations of this one which the Apostle sets down." Indeed this Pauline definition has not been proposed in philosophical form, but it can easily be reduced to this form under these words: Faith is a habit of the mind, by which eternal life is begun in us (the substance of things to be hoped for), causing our intellect firmly to assent to things not appearing (evidence is the same as firm conviction).

Definition of the Vatican Council: "Faith is a supernatural virtue by which, with the grace of God inspiring and assisting, we believe the things revealed by him to be true, not because of the intrinsic truth of the things, seen by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive."¹⁵

For explaining these two definitions more fully, one must treat separately of the act and of the habit or virtue of faith.

¹³ Hebr. 11, 1.

¹⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 4, a. 1.

¹⁵ Conc. Vatic. sess. 3, Const. de fide cath. c. 3 (Denz. n. 1789).

Definition. The act of faith is a supernatural, firm, and free assent given to revealed truths on account of the authority of God speaking, or, as St. Thomas says:¹⁶ "an act of the intellect assenting to divine truth by the command of the will moved by God through grace." By these words there is indicated concerning the act of faith 1. the subject, 2. the object, 3. the properties, concerning which we shall treat in separate paragraphs.

¹⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 2, a. 9.

480. By the name of subject we here understand either a) the power which proximately and formally elicits the act of faith, or b) the persons who are able to elicit the act of faith. The power is the proximate subject, but the persons are the remote subject.

a) The proximate subject of the act of faith is the speculative intellect^16* or: The act of salutary faith is an act of the intellect, namely it is an assent given to truths. This doctrine is against Protestants teaching that faith is trust; this was condemned in the Council of Trent:¹⁷ "If anyone says that justifying faith is nothing else than trust in the divine mercy remitting sins on account of Christ, or that this trust alone is that by which we are justified, let him be anathema." That faith is an act of the intellect is manifestly taught in Sacred Scripture, which says concerning salutary faith: "Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he who comes to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to those who seek him."¹⁸ But to believe is manifestly an act of the intellect. Moreover Sacred Scripture clearly says that faith is not trust, but rather its cause and foundation. Thus, e.g. it is said: "In whom we have trust and access in confidence through his faith";¹⁹ and: "For those who have ministered well will acquire for themselves a good degree and much confidence in the faith which is in Christ Jesus."²⁰ All the Fathers unanimously teach the same doctrine.²¹ Let one be heard, St. Augustine: "To believe itself is nothing other than to think with assent ... everyone who believes thinks; and in believing thinks, and in thinking believes."²² St. Thomas²³ teaches concerning this matter: "To believe is immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of this act is the true, which properly pertains to the intellect. And therefore it is necessary that faith, which is the principle of this act, be in the intellect as in its subject."

Note. The force of the will in the act of faith. Although the act of faith is formally and immediately an act of the intellect, nevertheless the will also has a great part in it; for not only must the will move the intellect to the exercise of the act, as it moves in any act of the intellect (for the will moves even to the act of science); but in addition the will must command the very assent in the act of faith. For the object of faith, or the things to be believed, are not evident in themselves and therefore do not compel the intellect to assent, as natural truths do (e.g. that twice two are four), but are truths obscure for us, exceeding our natural capacity. Notwithstanding this obscurity, the will moved by divine grace commands assent in the act of faith. Therefore St. Thomas teaches: "Faith is not in the intellect except insofar as it is commanded by the will; hence although that which is on the part of the will can be called accidental to the intellect, nevertheless it is essential to faith."²⁴ Indeed: "In the knowledge of faith the will has the principal place; for the intellect assents through faith to those things which are proposed to it, because it wills, and not because it is necessarily drawn by the very evidence of the truth."²⁵

In order that this proposition, which is of such great importance, may be understood more clearly, it is useful to recall certain things from philosophy concerning the acts of our intellect. Among the acts of our intellect the first is the simple apprehension of an object. The second act is judgment, or assent, by which we affirm or deny something concerning the object apprehended. Thus by simple apprehension we know a triangle; but by judgment we assert that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles. With respect to the object of judgment, the intellect can stand in many ways; for it can be ignorant, doubt, suspect, assent. But the intellect offers assent plainly and perfectly to some proposition in three ways:²⁶

1. Because, when the subject and predicate of the proposition are known, immediately it appears true, e.g. thus the intellect assents to this proposition: The whole is greater than its part; for once the notions of whole and part are had, it is at once necessarily understood that the whole is greater than its part. An act of the intellect of this kind is called intellectual vision.

2. Because some proposition is evidently and necessarily deduced from principles known through themselves. Thus the intellect assents to conclusions evidently deduced from certain principles, e.g. the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Although this conclusion is not evident in itself to the intellect, it is nevertheless evident on account of the necessary connection with principles evident in themselves. Such an act of the intellect is called science, and the assent following from it is necessary.

3. Because some proposition, although it is evident neither in itself nor in its principles, is announced to us by some competent and trustworthy person. Before the intellect assents to that proposition, it must perceive: a) the knowledge and veracity of the one testifying; b) the fact of the testimony. This twofold knowledge produces the judgment of credibility. The act of the intellect assenting to truths of this kind is called faith. Since the truth of such propositions is not evident in itself, the intellect does not assent to them necessarily, but it is necessary that the will accede, commanding assent. And therefore faith is rightly called a commanded assent.²⁷

From this necessary influence of the will it follows that the act of faith is most free and meritorious. On the other hand, since, notwithstanding the obscurity of the object, the assent of faith must be most firm, supernatural divine grace is required for giving the act of faith; whence St. Paul says: "For by grace you are saved through faith, and this not from yourselves; for it is the gift of God."²⁸ Below, n. 487 sqq., discussion will return concerning the firmness, freedom, and supernaturalness of faith, when the properties of faith are treated.

b) The remote subject of faith, i.e. the persons who can elicit the act of faith, are: a) all men living on this earth, except formal heretics and unbelievers.²⁹ For formal heretics deny the infallibility of the Church, which is a dogma of faith; and therefore they hold that some dogma can be false and that not all revealed things are true. But this is to destroy the formal object by which of faith and faith itself (cf. 327). b) The souls in purgatory, since they still lack the beatific vision.

The angels and the blessed in heaven do not have faith, because they see God face to face.³⁰ Nor also do demons or the damned have faith (at least theological faith).

^16* De verit. q. 14, a. 4.

¹⁷ Sess. 6, can. 12 de iustif. (Denz. n. 822).

¹⁸ Hebr. 11, 6.

¹⁹ Eph. 3, 12.

²⁰ 1 Tim. 3, 13.

²¹ See testimonies in Bouquillon, Tract. de virtut. theol. p. 19 sq.

²² De praed. sanct. c. 2, n. 5 (Migne, Patr. lat. 44, 963).

²³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 4, a. 2.

²⁴ De verit. q. 14, a. 3 ad 10.

²⁵ Contra Gent. l. 3, c. 40.

²⁶ In opinion there is indeed also assent of the mind, but not perfect assent (cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 2, a. 1).

²⁷ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 17, a. 6.

²⁸ Eph. 2, 8.

²⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 5, a. 3.

³⁰ Ib. a. 1.

481. Scholion. On the modernistic concept of faith. The Modernists (Myers, James, G. Lansing Reymond), following some Protestants, such as Schleiermacher, Jacobi, Strauss, etc., think that faith is some sense of religion or act of the subconscious. This falsity must be abjured by all who take the anti-modernist oath by mandate of Pius X: "I most certainly hold and sincerely profess that faith is not a blind sense of religion breaking forth from the hidden places of the subconscious under the pressure of the heart and the inclination of the will morally informed."

Preliminary note. A threefold object is usually distinguished, namely material, formal which (it is also called the subject or object of attribution), and formal by which, or under which.

The material object is everything about which a power, habit, or act is occupied.

The formal object which is that which is first and per se attained by a power, habit, or act, and by reason of which all other things are attained.

The formal object by which, or under which, is that by means of which the formal object which is attained; - e.g. the material object of the visual power is all corporeal things; the formal object which is color, because that which the eye first perceives is color; the formal object by which is light, because no thing can be seen unless it is illuminated.

482. Proposition 1. The formal object which, or object of attribution, of faith is the First Truth in being, or God himself as exceeding natural reason (but not God as he can be known by natural reason, e.g. in Theodicy). Thus is the unanimous opinion of theologians.

It is proved. That is the formal object which of some act or habit which is principally attained by it, and by reason of which all other objects are attained. But the first truth, or God, is that which is first and principally attained by faith; but all other things, such as the humanity of Christ, the efficacy of the sacraments, eternal retribution, etc., are believed in order to God. Therefore God as God is the formal object which, or of attribution, of faith.

The same can also be shown in this way: The beatitude of man consists in the vision of the divine essence, or of God as he is in himself; but faith is already the beginning of that beatitude ("the substance of things to be hoped for," as St. Paul says). Therefore faith must be occupied first and principally about the very essence of God.³¹

³¹ St. Thomas writes to the point: "If we consider materially the things to which faith assents, it is not only God himself, but also many other things, which nevertheless do not fall under the assent of faith except insofar as they have some order to God; namely insofar as, through some effects of divinity, man is aided toward tending into divine fruition. And therefore also from this side the object of faith is the first truth, insofar as nothing falls under faith except in order to God, just as also the object of medicine is health, because medicine considers nothing except in order to health" (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 1, a. 1).

483. Proposition 2. The formal object by which, or under which, or the internal motive of faith, is the authority of God revealing, or the first truth in speaking.

This doctrine is drawn from Sacred Scripture; it has always been handed down by the Holy Fathers and by the Scholastics; and it has been defined by the Vatican Council. Every Christian, when asked why he believes, immediately answers: because the articles of faith are the word of God revealing. Therefore the proposition is proved:

1. From Sacred Scripture. St. Paul says: "Therefore faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ";³² and Christ himself says: "I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and have revealed them to little ones."³³ Hence St. Paul, praising the faith of the Thessalonians, writes: "Therefore we also give thanks to God without ceasing, because when you had received from us the word of the hearing of God, you received it not as the word of men, but, as it truly is, the word of God, who works in you who have believed."³⁴

2. From the authority of the Holy Fathers and Doctors. Let the single testimony of St. Thomas stand for all:³⁵ "In faith, if we consider the formal reason of the object, it is nothing other than the first truth. For faith, of which we are speaking, assents to something only because it is revealed by God. Hence faith rests upon the divine truth itself as upon its medium."

3. From the Vatican Council: "If anyone says that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge about God and moral things, and therefore that for divine faith it is not required that revealed truth be believed on account of the authority of God revealing, let him be anathema."³⁶

Since, therefore, the act of faith is assent on account of the authority of God revealing, it follows that the formal object by which, or the intrinsic motive of faith, is constituted by a twofold truth, namely: God is infallible in knowing and speaking, and: God has revealed this thing.³⁷ Man ordinarily knows the fact of revelation through the proposition of the Church; yet this proposition does not enter into the formal object by which of faith. For true divine faith can be had without the proposition of the Church, namely through private divine revelations granted to some saints, e.g. the Patriarchs, Prophets, Apostles. Hence also, when the Church dogmatically defines a thing previously disputable, e.g. the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, it does nothing other than authentically remove doubt concerning the fact of divine revelation already existing for a long time. Therefore the proposition of the Church is indeed the rule, but not the intrinsic motive of divine faith.

Proposition 3. The material object of faith is everything truly and formally revealed by God.

³² Rom. 10, 17.

³³ Matt. 11, 25.

³⁴ 1 Thess. 2, 13.

³⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 1, a. 1.

³⁶ Sess. 3, can. de fide cath. 3, 2 (Denz. n. 1811).

³⁷ See Chr. Pesch, Prael. dogm. t. VIII, prop. 13.

484. It is proved. The material object of some act or habit is everything which is attained by that act or habit, and indeed under the light of the formal object by which. But God has revealed and proposes to us to be believed, first, himself and his perfections, and besides many other things. Therefore all these revealed things pertain to the material object of faith. The Vatican Council³⁸ designated the material object of faith in these words: "By divine and Catholic faith all those things are to be believed which are contained in the written or handed-down word of God and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed." - By solemn judgment (of an ecumenical council or of the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra),³⁹ dogmatic definitions themselves (e.g. the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary), but by the universal magisterium also other truths (e.g. the eternity of the punishments of hell), are proposed to us to be believed. All and only those things are the object of faith which have certainly been revealed by God. Therefore every divine word is the object of faith.

A twofold revelation is usually distinguished: one formal, the other virtual. Something is formally revealed either a) explicitly, when namely it has been announced to us by God in conceived and clear words, e.g. the Trinity of divine persons; or b) implicitly, when it has not indeed been said by God in express words, but nevertheless is formally and without discourse included in another truth certainly revealed. Thus, e.g., it has been explicitly revealed that Christ assumed a true human nature; implicitly contained in this revelation is that Christ had a body and a soul. All those things which are revealed either explicitly or implicitly are contained under the material object of divine faith.

Virtual revelation is occupied about the so-called theological conclusions, which are deduced by discourse properly so called from two premises, of which one is of faith, the other is certainly known from human reason.

Theologians unanimously teach that the credible object is constituted by formal revelation, whether explicit or implicit. The reason is that revealed truths of this kind are truly the word of God. But theologians are by no means in agreement whether virtual revelation also suffices for this, that some truth be believed by divine faith (even previously to a definition of the Church perhaps supervening). Melchior Cano,⁴⁰ Vasquez,⁴¹ Ripalda,⁴² Maurus,⁴³ and others teach the affirmative opinion. Suarez,⁴⁴ Lugo,⁴⁵ the Salmanticenses,⁴⁶ and commonly Thomists teach the negative opinion. This opinion indeed seems to be better, because for establishing such a theological conclusion there concur both divine revelation and human reason. Therefore the motive of believing it is not the divine authority alone, but also the authority of human reason. But the object of faith is believed from divine authority alone.⁴⁷ If, however, the Church by her infallible magisterium has defined something virtually revealed, e.g. the immortality of the soul, then certainly that is to be believed by divine faith.

In particular cases formal revelation is often distinguished with difficulty from virtual revelation. Thus, e.g., theologians do not agree whether the following propositions are formally revealed, and therefore to be believed by divine faith:

1. This Supreme Pontiff (Pius XI) has been legitimately elected successor of St. Peter in the primacy and therefore is infallible.

2. This man born and not yet baptized is in original sin.

3. This baptized infant is in the state of sanctifying grace.

For the rest, in practice controversies of this kind bring little utility, since the cited propositions and other similar ones are altogether certain, indeed also to be believed by ecclesiastical faith; and without doubt he would sin gravely who pertinaciously denied them.

³⁸ Sess. 3, Const. de fide cath. c. 3 (Denz. n. 1792).

³⁹ Cf. Cod. iur. can. c. 1323.

⁴⁰ De loc. theol. l. 6, c. 8 ad 10, § "Sed id postremo," and l. 12, c. 5 near the end.

⁴¹ In 1, disp. 5, c. 3, n. 6-8.

⁴² De fide disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 44.

⁴³ 3, q. 140, n. 7.

⁴⁴ De fide disp. 3, sect. 11, n. 7.

⁴⁵ De fide disp. 1, sect. 13, n. 258 and 261.

⁴⁶ De fide disp. 11, dub. 4, n. 144.

⁴⁷ Cf. Chr. Pesch, Prael. dogm. VIII, n. 258 sqq.

485. Scholion 1. On symbols and on the profession of faith. As appears from the words of the Vatican Council just cited, the whole object of faith is contained in the written and handed-down word of God, or in Sacred Scripture and in Tradition; but this whole divine revelation was handed over to the Church to be guarded and explained, and therefore it is called the deposit of faith; a brief but authentic summary of it is contained in diverse symbols and in the so-called professions of faith. Symbol by force of the name signifies collection or token (συμβολή or σύμβολον). A symbol of faith was necessary so that faith could more easily be proposed to all and known by all. There are indeed several symbols of faith, but three are more principal: 1. the Apostles' Symbol, which now is usually divided into twelve articles; this division was not always in use, whence St. Thomas⁴⁸ divides it into fourteen articles and indicates another division as secondary. 2. The second more principal symbol, which is called by St. Thomas the symbol of the Fathers, is the Niceno-Constantinopolitan, because it was begun by the Fathers in the Council of Nicaea and enlarged in the Council of Constantinople (it is usually said in the Mass). 3. The third is called Athanasian, although more probably it was composed not by St. Athanasius but by a Latin author toward the end of the fifth century. It begins "Whosoever wishes to be saved." - To the symbols there have been added professions of faith, of which the more celebrated is that which, against the heresies of Luther and Calvin, was prescribed by Pius IV and afterward enlarged by Pius IX, and is still in use before the reception of sacred orders and of several ecclesiastical offices.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 1, a. 6.

⁴⁹ Cf. below n. 506.

486. Scholion 2. On the analysis and genesis of the act of faith. Just as chemical analysis is the dissolution of some body into its elements, so the analysis of faith is the resolution of it into its ultimate principles. The ultimate and essential principle of the act of faith is its formal object by which, or its intrinsic motive. Therefore theologians ask what is the ultimate reason why we believe; for it is certain that the formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing. Moreover, how can we know that God has truly revealed some truth? If someone said: from Sacred Scripture or from the proposition of the Church, immediately the question returns: Whence do we know that Sacred Scripture contains genuine divine revelation, or that the Church is infallible in proposing articles of faith? We must answer: Because God has revealed it so. Therefore we would have a manifest vicious circle. For solving this difficulty, now for several centuries several responses, and those by no means agreeing among themselves, have been thought out. Alois Schmid⁵⁰ enumerates more than forty diverse opinions. - In so great a diversity of opinions, of which none is certain, and which there is no time to enumerate, it suffices briefly to note the following:

Before faith there is prerequired certain knowledge of the authority of God and of the fact of revelation. This knowledge is usually called the preambles of faith,⁵¹ because it precedes faith and can be acquired by the natural light of reason. The fact of revelation must necessarily be known before someone can elicit the act of faith. For how could someone believe some truth as divinely revealed, unless he first certainly knew that God truly revealed this truth?

486. Hence proposition (21) was condemned by Innocent XI: "The supernatural assent of faith, and useful for salvation, stands with only probable knowledge of revelation, indeed with fear by which someone fears lest God has not spoken."⁵² According to the ordinary mode of revelation, the fact is usually known through instruction received from parents and teachers, and especially through the proposition of the Church.

Moreover the so-called "motives of credibility" can be known by natural reason. The motives of credibility are, chiefly, miracles and prophecies, and the Church herself. The Vatican Council writes to the point:⁵³ "In order that the obedience of our faith might be consonant with reason, God willed that, with the internal helps of the Holy Spirit, there be joined external arguments of his revelation, namely divine facts, and especially miracles and prophecies, which, since they clearly show God's omnipotence and infinite knowledge, are most certain signs of divine revelation and accommodated to the understanding of all. Wherefore both Moses and the Prophets and most of all Christ the Lord himself produced many and most manifest miracles and prophecies, and concerning the Apostles we read: 'But they, going forth, preached everywhere, the Lord working with them and confirming the word by the signs that followed ...'⁵⁴ Moreover, the Church even by herself, namely on account of her admirable propagation, eminent sanctity, and inexhaustible fruitfulness in all good things, on account of Catholic unity and unconquered stability, is a certain great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefragable testimony of her divine legation. By this it happens that she herself, as 'a sign lifted up among the nations,'⁵⁵ both invites to herself those who have not yet believed, and makes her sons more certain that the faith which they profess rests upon a most firm foundation."

Nevertheless all these motives of credibility, although they cause faith to be reasonable, nevertheless do not pertain to the internal and specifying motive of it; for they can be understood by natural reason, and therefore can beget nothing except a purely natural act and merely natural certainty. Moreover, the certainty of faith must be supernatural. Therefore all motives of credibility are only something extrinsically attracting, but not something intrinsically and efficaciously and sufficiently inducing one to give the firm assent of faith. But that which intrinsically and efficaciously causes the assent of faith is divine grace, which God bestows according to his good pleasure. St. Thomas⁵⁶ clearly and briefly expresses this truth in this way: "As to the assent of man to those things which are of faith, a twofold cause can be considered: one indeed inducing externally, such as a miracle seen, or the persuasion of a man inducing to faith; neither of which is a sufficient cause. For of those seeing one and the same miracle and hearing the same preaching, some believe and some do not believe. And therefore it is necessary to posit another interior cause, which moves man interiorly to assenting to those things which are of faith. But the Pelagians posited this cause to be only the free choice of man; and on account of this they said that the beginning of faith is from us; namely insofar as from us it is that we are prepared to assent to those things which are of faith, but the consummation of faith is from God, through whom there are proposed to us those things which we ought to believe. But this is false; because since man, by assenting to those things which are of faith, is elevated above his own nature, it is necessary that this be in him from a supernatural principle moving interiorly, which is God. And therefore faith as to assent, which is the principal act of faith, is from God moving interiorly through grace." From this doctrine of the Angelic Doctor it appears lucidly how great is the influence both of grace and of the will in the assent of faith.

486. Hence the same holy Doctor says: "Although that which is on the part of the will can be called accidental to the intellect, nevertheless it is essential to faith."⁵⁷ For "the intellect of one believing is determined to one thing, not by reason, but by the will, and therefore here assent is taken for an act of the intellect according as it is determined by the will to one thing."⁵⁸ Indeed he says: "But in the knowledge of faith the will has the principal place; for the intellect assents through faith to those things which are proposed because it wills, and not because it is necessarily drawn by the evidence itself of the truth."⁵⁹ From all these things it can also be understood why many, although they are endowed with the best talent and have the most efficacious motives of credibility, nevertheless do not believe; for good will is lacking to them, and therefore grace also is lacking. From this likewise it shines forth why all Christians are bound to pray to God that he increase and conserve faith in their hearts, since it does not depend on natural powers to conserve or increase this virtue.

Therefore the genesis of the act of faith is this: Man, from instruction, preaching, study, or other means, understands that God exists and that he has revealed several truths, which indeed are found in Sacred Scripture or in Tradition. That all these truths have truly been revealed by the most truthful God is manifested to man by the so-called motives of credibility (credenditatis). The notions which man acquires up to this point do indeed prepare, but in no way enter into the supernatural act of faith itself. With these things presupposed, God mercifully bestows upon a man rightly disposed the light of faith, or grace, which a) illuminates the intellect for sufficiently knowing the object both material and formal by which of faith; b) principally implants in the will the pious affection of credulity, by which there is commanded to the intellect a most firm assent to truths, although still obscure and imperfectly known.

From what has been said, we briefly respond to the very celebrated controversy concerning the ultimate analysis of the act of faith in this way: The objective motive of the act of faith is the authority of God revealing, not known but believed. But this objective motive is believed most firmly, yet freely, on account of the supernatural light of faith, which both moves the will and illuminates the intellect; or in other words: The assent of faith is resolved formally into the authority of God revealing, dispositively into the motives of credibility, directively into the authority of the Church proposing, effectively into supernatural grace, which flows into the intellect and will. The whole difficulty in this analysis seems to have arisen because many theologians did not sufficiently notice that the act of faith is born not from discourse but from simple understanding. - If the genesis and analysis of the act of faith is perceived thus, already all difficulties seem to vanish, and the act of faith remains totally supernatural both on the part of the object and on the part of the principle.⁶⁰

⁵⁰ Untersuchungen über den letzten Gewissheitsgrund des Offenbarungsglaubens (1879).

⁵¹ The preambles of faith are taken by some authors for all things which precede the act of faith; but better, with St. Thomas (S. theol. 1, q. 2, a. 2 ad 1), they are restricted to those things "which can be known about God through natural reason," and which are usually the object of Theodicy.

⁵² Denz. n. 1171.

⁵³ Sess. 3, Const. de fide cath. c. 3 (Denz. n. 1790, 1794).

⁵⁴ Mark 16, 20.

⁵⁵ Is. 11, 12.

⁵⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 6, a. 1.

⁵⁷ De verit. q. 14, a. 3 ad 10.

⁵⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 2, a. 1 ad 3.

⁵⁹ Contra gent. l. 3, c. 40.

⁶⁰ Whoever desires more on the analysis of faith should go to Wilmers, De fide divina libri quattuor, prop. 13, 69-80, or Alois Schmid, Untersuchungen etc., or Garrigou-Lagrange, De revelatione l. 1, c. 14, a. 3. Older authors have little on this controversy; from the sixteenth century onward certain theologians treated this matter more than was due.

The properties of faith are not enumerated in the same way by different theologians; some enumerate more, some fewer. But among all the properties of faith the following four seem to be more principal: supernaturalness, freedom, infallibility, firmness or constancy, each of which must be briefly explained. These properties belong not only to the act, but also to the habit of faith.

487. 1. The supernaturalness of faith. That the act of faith is supernatural on the part of the object and on the part of the objective motive (or on the part of the formal object which and by which) has already been sufficiently said above; it remains that we show that it is also supernatural on the part of the principle. That the act of faith is entirely supernatural, so that it cannot be elicited except from the powers of grace, is proved:

a) Very many texts of Sacred Scripture manifestly announce this: "This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent."⁶¹ "For by grace you are saved through faith, and this not from yourselves; for it is the gift of God."⁶²

b) This truth has been defined several times in Councils, especially in the Second Council of Orange:⁶³ "If anyone says that without the grace of God mercy is divinely conferred on us when we believe ... but does not confess that it happens in us that we believe ... through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit; and either subjects the help of grace to human humility or obedience, and does not agree that it is the gift of grace itself that we are obedient and humble, he resists the Apostle saying: 'What do you have that you have not received?'⁶⁴ and 'By the grace of God I am what I am.'"⁶⁵ - But the Vatican Council⁶⁶ expressly says: "Faith is a supernatural virtue by which, with grace assisting and inspiring, ... we believe. ... No one can consent to the evangelical preaching as is necessary for obtaining salvation without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting to the truth." But the grace which is necessary for faith is referred both to the intellect and to the will; or it is the illumination of the intellect and the motion of the will. This grace elevates the intellect by means of the light of faith, that it may assent to truths exceeding its capacity; it heals and strengthens the will, that it may induce the intellect to assent firmly to truths which for practical life not rarely demand fairly hard sacrifices; for true faith is that which works the works of all the virtues. Therefore theological faith is a special gift of God, which can in no way be acquired by natural powers.

c) The same can easily be proved by theological reason: For "faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification."⁶⁷ Moreover, it is impossible that man by merely natural powers place the beginning of supernatural salvation. For natural powers cannot produce a supernatural effect. Hence the Council of Trent⁶⁸ defined: "If anyone says that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his assistance man can believe ... as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred on him, let him be anathema."

⁶¹ John 6, 29.

⁶² Eph. 2, 8.

⁶³ Can. 6 (Denz. n. 179).

⁶⁴ 1 Cor. 4, 7.

⁶⁵ 1 Cor. 15, 10.

⁶⁶ Sess. 3, Const. de fide cath. c. 3 (Denz. n. 1789, 1791).

⁶⁷ Conc. Trid. sess. 6, c. 8 de iustif. (Denz. n. 801).

⁶⁸ Sess. 6, can. 3 de iustif. (Denz. n. 813).

488. 2. The freedom of faith. Here we are not treating of moral freedom, as if no moral obligation existed of eliciting acts of faith; for it is certain that man is wholly bound, and indeed by necessity of means, to elicit acts of faith, as we shall prove below, n. 495. We are speaking at present of physical freedom; this indeed is twofold, namely freedom of exercise, consisting in the possibility of turning thought away from the object considered; and freedom of specification, consisting in the possibility of doubting about the truth to be believed, indeed even of denying it. But now it is certain that the act of theological faith is free not only by freedom of exercise, but also by freedom of specification. (Hermes alone seems to have taught the contrary.⁶⁹)

a) For in Sacred Scripture those not believing are reproved, believers are praised, the faithful are rewarded; all these things show that the act of faith is something free; for no one is reproved or punished for acts which he cannot avoid. Let only one or another text be brought forward here: "Going into the whole world, preach the Gospel to every creature. He who believes shall be saved; but he who does not believe shall be condemned."⁷⁰ "He who believes in him is not judged; but he who does not believe is already judged, because he does not believe in the name of the only-begotten Son of God."⁷¹

b) The same is clear from Councils; e.g. the Council of Trent⁷² teaches: "They are disposed to justice when, awakened and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing those things to be true which have been divinely revealed and promised"; and the Vatican Council⁷³ says: "Its act [namely of faith] is a work pertaining to salvation, by which man gives free obedience to God himself, by consenting to and cooperating with his grace, which he could resist," and:⁷⁴ "If anyone says that the assent of Christian faith is not free, but is produced necessarily by arguments of human reason, let him be anathema."

c) The Angelic Doctor writes to the point:⁷⁵ "The assent of science is not subject to free choice, because one who knows is compelled to assent by the efficacy of the demonstration; and therefore the assent of science is not meritorious. But the actual consideration of a thing known is subject to free choice; for it is in man's power to consider. ... But in faith each is subject to free choice, and therefore as to each the act of faith can be meritorious."

d) The intrinsic reason why the assent of faith has freedom, both of exercise and of specification, is that the object of faith is not something evident, but something obscure, as being "the evidence of things not appearing." But what is obscure does not compel the intellect to assent; therefore it would not assent unless it were induced to this by the free will. Although the truths of faith which we believe are in themselves obscure and inevident, or as the Vatican Council⁷⁶ says, "covered by a veil and wrapped in a certain as it were darkness," nevertheless they are evidently credible on account of the extrinsic motives of credibility; hence the Psalmist says: "Your testimonies have been made exceedingly credible."⁷⁷

⁶⁹ Cf. Christkath. Dogmatik 3. Teil (Münster 1834), § 28 s. Hermes distinguishes faith of cognition (Vernunftglaube) from faith of the heart (Herzensglaube). The former is necessary, but not the latter.

⁷⁰ Mark 16, 15 sq.

⁷¹ John 3, 18.

⁷² Sess. 6, c. 6 de iustif. (Denz. n. 798).

⁷³ Sess. 3, Const. de fide cath. c. 3 (Denz. n. 1791).

⁷⁴ Ib. can. 5 (Denz. n. 1814).

⁷⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 2, a. 9 ad 2.

⁷⁶ L. c. c. 4 (Denz. n. 1790).

⁷⁷ Ps. 92, 5.

489. 3. The infallibility of faith. This property follows from the quality of the formal object by which, which is the veracity of God revealing. For God is supreme truth, which can neither deceive nor be deceived. Moreover, the magisterium of the Church, which proposes to us the truths to be believed, and divine grace, which illuminates us and moves us to assent, can in no way lead us into error; hence Richard of St. Victor⁷⁸ could truly say: "Lord, if there is error [in faith], we have been deceived by you."

From this complete infallibility of faith there follow three corollaries, namely:

a) That an appreciatively most firm assent, or most perfect certainty, is begotten in the mind of the believer. Certainty is the state of a mind firmly adhering to some truth without any fear of erring. Certainty admits degrees, not indeed on the part of fear of erring, since any true certainty excludes every fear of erring, but on the part of adhesion; for a man can adhere to one truth more firmly than to another. Faith is more certain than every natural cognition by reason of adhesion.⁷⁹

b) Since the firmness of the assent of faith depends on grace illuminating the intellect and moving the will, in diverse men the firm adhesion of faith is not equal, but is diverse according to the diverse fervor by which each one, with grace assisting, elicits acts of faith.⁸⁰

c) He who has rightly embraced the right Catholic faith can never have sufficient reasons for falling away from or even doubting about the faith; therefore not only heresy, but also voluntary doubt about some revealed truth is a grave sin. Discussion will return concerning doubt in faith below, n. 520.

⁷⁸ De Trin. l. 1, c. 2 (Migne, Patr. lat. 196, 891).

⁷⁹ Cf. St. Thomas, De verit. q. 14, a. 1 ad 7, and S. theol. 2, 2, q. 4, a. 8.

⁸⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 5, a. 4.

490. 4. The firmness or constancy of faith. St. Paul admonishes "that henceforth we be no more little children tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine in the wickedness of men, in craftiness unto the circumvention of error."⁸¹ Therefore Christian faith must be so firm and constant that man is prepared to lose life rather than faith. All the Martyrs of every age and sex have given wonderful examples of constancy in the profession of faith, e.g. St. Agnes, St. Lawrence, St. Peter Martyr.

⁸¹ Eph. 4, 14.

491. Scholion. On the divisions of faith. After the nature of faith has been briefly set forth, as by way of a crown certain divisions of faith, which are sometimes brought forward by authors, are added here. Therefore there are distinguished:

1. Explicit faith and implicit faith. To believe something explicitly is to believe it known in particular and according to its proper terms; but to believe something implicitly is to believe it as contained in another, as in a universal principle explicitly known.⁸² All are bound to believe explicitly, e.g. the existence of a personal God. But uneducated men believe the individual articles of faith implicitly, although they do not know them clearly; for they believe whatever the Catholic Church proposes to be believed.

2. Formal faith and virtual or exercised faith. An act of faith is formally elicited when someone explicitly gives assent to some revealed truth, e.g. by reciting the Apostolic Symbol. But someone virtually elicits an act of faith when he indeed performs another act which nevertheless includes a profession of faith, e.g. when someone, by genuflecting before the altar, manifests his faith concerning the presence of the Eucharistic Christ.

3. Formed faith (perfect, living) and unformed faith. Faith is called formed or living when it is joined with supernatural charity, or with the state of sanctifying grace. But if that charity is lacking, faith is called unformed.

Besides these divisions, another division is assigned by some authors, namely faith properly so called and faith broadly so called. Faith properly so called is that which we have explained up to this point; but faith broadly so called is that which does not rely upon the testimony of positive divine revelation, but which is a cognition of God existing and rewarding, acquired by natural powers and possessed perfectly with the help of actual grace. We shall prove in the following chapter, n. 498, that such faith broadly so called by no means suffices for obtaining salvation.

Several modern authors in addition bring forward other distinctions of faith, e.g. divine faith, Christian faith, Catholic faith, theological faith, etc. For moral practice all these divisions are of little utility, since ordinarily there is not given except one salvific faith, namely Catholic faith. Under the name of divine faith these authors understand that faith which was had in the Old Testament and which is had by certain saints who receive private revelations. Christian faith is that which was handed down to us through Christ. Catholic faith is the dogmas which are proposed by the Catholic Church as divinely revealed. Finally, theological or supernatural faith is opposed to natural or human faith. For the rest, as was already said above, these expressions are not taken in the same sense by diverse authors; therefore confusions must diligently be avoided.

⁸² Cf. St. Thomas, De verit. q. 14, a. 11.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 2, a. 1 seqq.; St. Alphonsus, II, tr. 1; ed. G., I, p. 295; H. Ap., IV, 1; Lugo, de Virt. Fid., disp. XV; Suarez, disp. I and VII; Wilmers, de Fide divina; Lahousse, de Virt. theol., p. 70; Scheeben, Dogmat., I, § 38, etc.

420. Things to be noted beforehand. The name faith signifies assent which is given to another's sayings on account of his authority. If this assent is given on account of the authority of man, it is human faith; if on account of the authority of God, it is divine faith. This, if it is considered in act, is called actual; if in habit, it is called habitual.

DEFINITION. Faith is a theological virtue infused by God, inclining us to assent firmly, on account of divine veracity, to all things which God has revealed, and has proposed to us through the Church as to be believed.

In the definition are expressed: 1. the material object of faith; 2. the formal object of faith; 3. the subject of faith. - A few things concerning each.

421. The primary MATERIAL object of faith is God himself, the highest Truth in being; the secondary object is other truths revealed by God to us. To the point, thus the Vatican Council (Const. Dei Filius, III): "All those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by ordinary and universal magisterium, as divinely revealed and to be believed."

The Holy Council says 1. Which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down; both to indicate the twofold font of the whole of revelation, that is, Sacred Scripture and tradition; and to exclude any other revelations whatsoever made to certain Saints, which of themselves cannot become the object of Catholic faith.

2. Proposed by the Church as divinely revealed, to indicate the divinely instituted organ by which alone men can be taught what things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith.¹

3. Which are proposed whether by solemn judgment..., to indicate the extraordinary mode which the Church is accustomed from time to time to use in proposing truths to be believed with divine and Catholic faith; when namely, through the Supreme Pontiff speaking ex cathedra, or through the episcopate gathered in an ecumenical council, it singularly and determinately defines certain points and enjoins them to be believed. Truths thus solemnly proposed are called defined dogmas of faith, and the contrary and pertinacious error is held as heresy. By the same appellation those truths also are to be denoted which appear immediately contained in Sacred Scripture, for example, Christ's birth in Bethlehem, his agony, scourging, etc.; for these truths also become known through the solemn proposition of the Church, namely through that general proposition by which it defined the whole of Scripture to be divinely inspired.

4. Or by ordinary and universal magisterium, to indicate the ordinary mode which the Church uses in proposing truths of faith: when namely, through its pastors and doctors, it universally affirms that certain truths are revealed by God; although they may have been defined by no decrees of councils or of Roman Pontiffs. And points of faith of this kind must be believed with divine-Catholic faith.

Truths which have been revealed by God in a particular mode are to be believed with faith simply divine; but explicitly by those alone to whom they become known in a certain mode, for example, by that theologian alone who evidently finds the truth in Sacred Scripture, by that person alone who has received the divine revelation (VII, 262).

422. The FORMAL object of faith is the authority of God revealing, who, since he is the highest Truth, can neither be deceived nor deceive. Whence the most holy Vatican Council (l. c.) defined: "faith ... to be a supernatural virtue, by which ... we believe the things revealed by him to be true; not on account of the truth of the things seen through by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive."

From these things you will gather: 1. The assent of faith is formally resolved into the first truth revealing, or the very authority of God revealing (Becanus, de Virt. theol., c. 8, q. 8; Tanquerey, II, 618).

We said: resolved formally; for dispositively, it is resolved into the motives of credibility; directively, into the authority of the Church proposing and deciding what is to be believed; effectively, into God and the infused habit of faith. Cf. n. 423.

2. The knowledge of faith is more certain than any natural knowledge. Thus St. Thomas (2.2, q. 5, a. 8, ad 2).

3. Divine and Catholic faith is necessarily universal, that is, comprising all truths divinely revealed and proposed as such by the Church. The reason is that the formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing. Therefore he who knowingly rejects one article of faith, for example the eternity of the punishments of hell, cannot have theological faith as regards the others.

423. The SUBJECT of faith is the intellect, which is moved by the will so that it assents to things to be believed. This is expressed in the definition by these words: inclining us to assent.

Faith is in the intellect as in its subject; but because faith pertains to the intellect according as it is moved by the will, there ought also to be a habit in the will, namely charity, so that the act of faith may be perfect, that is, so that it may proceed connaturally from both powers and be meritorious; not, however, so that it may be perfect in the notion of assent: for to this a firm adhesion of the intellect from the pious motion of the will, without the habit, suffices (Billuart, de Fide, Diss. 3, a. 1).

From the things said, the ACT OF FAITH can be defined: An act by which the intellect, illuminated by God through grace, from the command of the will likewise excited and aided by divine grace, assents to things to be believed.

256. • The formal object of Faith, or the reason on account of which one believes, is the authority of God speaking, as endowed with infinite wisdom and veracity.

But the material object, of which alone the discussion here treats, consists of the things to be known and believed by necessity both of means (which being omitted, even inculpably, salvation is not obtained) and of precept.

§ I. On The Things Necessarily To Be Known And Believed By Necessity Of Means.

257. • It is certain that two things are to be known and believed by necessity of means: 1° that God is: He who approaches God must believe that He is;¹ - 2° that He is a rewarder: He must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him.² - But whether other things must be believed explicitly by necessity of means for salvation is controverted; hence concerning them:

258. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is explicit Faith in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation required by necessity of means?

Resp. There is given a twofold probable opinion.

The first opinion affirms altogether. The reason is:

1° As to the Incarnation, because salvation is not given except through Christ; therefore that means must necessarily be explicitly known and believed.

2° As to the Most Holy Trinity, because Faith in this mystery is the foundation of our salvation; for Baptism, which is the Sacrament of Faith, must be conferred in the name of the Father, etc. ... But what is the foundation of salvation ought to be the primary object of Faith, and therefore to be believed according to itself and explicitly. - Thus Collet, Antoine.³ - Concerning this opinion St. Alphonsus⁴ says that it is more common and seems more probable.

The second opinion, which also seems sufficiently probable to St. Alphonsus,⁴ denies. The reason is because before Christ implicit Faith in these mysteries sufficed; therefore even after His coming it ought to suffice. For Christ did not change the means. - Thus Suarez,⁵ Lugo.⁶ Nor does the proposition condemned by Innocent XI under n. 64 stand in the way, they say; it sounds thus: A man is capable of absolution however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ. It does not stand in the way, they say; for it could rightly be condemned by reason of the first part, in which it is asserted that a man is capable of absolution however much he generally labors under ignorance of the mysteries of Faith. See p. XVII.

There are those who think that each opinion can be reconciled in this way. They teach, namely, that explicit faith in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and the Incarnation now, that is, after the coming of Christ, is required by necessity of means hypothetically, or secundum quid; namely, for all to whom the Gospel has been sufficiently announced and who are not so dull that in no way can they perceive these mysteries, explicit faith in these mysteries is absolutely necessary by necessity of means; but for those to whom the Gospel has not been preached, implicit faith in them is necessary by necessity of means, which implicit faith they recognize in him who believes that God will save men through means known to Himself; which faith, they say, certainly includes Christ the Redeemer, and consequently the Most Holy Trinity. And with this distinction indeed they say the words of Acts⁷ must be understood: In every nation, he who fears Him and works justice is acceptable to Him. With the same distinction employed, there is, they say, no necessity of a miracle for saving observers of the natural law who lack explicit knowledge of these mysteries, nor by any reason will it be possible to say that the condition of the human race after Christ was changed not for the better but for the worse, since before Christ implicit faith in these mysteries sufficed.

Quaer. 2° Can he be absolved who is ignorant of those things which are certainly of necessity of means?

Resp. Negatively. Neither licitly nor validly. Thus all. The reason is because that person, through defect of a means simply necessary, is incapable of justification; therefore he is also incapable of absolution. Otherwise no one can have hope of salvation unless he believes that God is a rewarder.

259. • Quaer. 3° Can one ignorant of the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation be absolved?

Resp. 1° He cannot licitly be absolved outside a case of necessity which altogether urges; the reason is because a confessor absolving this person exposes the Sacrament to danger of nullity, as is clear from the preceding Question 1. - Hence the confessor ought either first to instruct the penitent, or dismiss him until he has been sufficiently instructed.¹ Yet observe with St. Alphonsus² these words of St. Leonard of Port Maurice: "It is not good counsel to dismiss such ignorant persons, that these things may be taught them by others, because no other fruit will be hoped for except that they so remain ignorant; and therefore it is expedient to teach them briefly the principal aforesaid mysteries, causing at the same time that they elicit with him acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition, obliging them nevertheless that in the future they have themselves instructed perfectly concerning the other mysteries necessary to be known by necessity of precept."

But if the question concerns penitents of this sort to whom it would be a great embarrassment or offense to be interrogated about these things, it will be fitting for the confessor simply and clearly to propose these mysteries to them, and then to elicit an act of faith with them.

Resp. 2° Speculatively it can be doubted whether he can validly be absolved who is situated in invincible ignorance of these mysteries. The reason is deduced from the things said in the second opinion of the first Question. But in practice confessions performed in good faith with such ignorance will have to be repeated (see the things said at n. 67, 2°). But whether in a case of necessity he can licitly be absolved can be doubted, since the S. Congregation of the Office on May 10, 1703 declared that "a missionary," before he confers Baptism on "an adult, even one dying, who is not altogether incapable," is held to "explain to him the mysteries of Faith which are necessary by necessity of means, such as," it says, "the principal mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation." Nevertheless in necessity, but under condition, he concerning whom it is doubted whether he perceives these things and can perceive them must be absolved,¹ as also the dying person who is altogether incapable here and now of perceiving them. But if there is not certainty concerning his present incapacity, and death is not altogether proximate, he will have to be instructed briefly; but if after absolution, conferred without previous instruction because of death which was thought altogether proximate, he survives, after brief instruction he will have to be absolved again.

§ II. On The Things Necessarily To Be Known And Believed By Necessity Of Precept.

260. • Any faithful person, in order to establish a Christian life, when he has come to the use of reason, besides those things which he must know by necessity of means, is also held, by necessity of precept, explicitly to believe and to know, at least in a rough mode, summarily and as to substance - in such a way indeed that he who did not know them in that mode would sin mortally, unless invincible ignorance or incapacity excused him - 1) the Symbol of the Apostles: as the Christian profession itself demands, because in it is compendiously contained whatever concerning God, concerning Christ, and concerning the Church must chiefly be believed; the practice of the faithful and the Roman Catechism confirm this; - 2) the Lord's Prayer; for this was commanded by Christ and contains all things to be sought from God. They add the Angelic Salutation from the use of the faithful, but under light obligation according to the common opinion; - 3) the Precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, for that the individual ones may be observed, the individual ones must be known; - 4) the Sacraments especially necessary, as Baptism, Eucharist, and Penance; the others, when one is about to receive them, that he may rightly receive them.

I said: 1° At least in a rough mode, summarily and as to substance, from St. Charles Borromeo;² for not all are held under mortal sin to know the aforesaid things by memory, or in that order and with those words by which they are proposed in the Catechism; but as to the Symbol, the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and the Sacraments, it suffices that, when asked, they answer sufficiently to the individual points. - As to the Lord's Prayer it suffices if they know that all good things are to be sought from God; for the Doctors say that not to hold it by memory is only venial, provided when asked they know how to answer in general.

I said: 2° Unless invincible ignorance or incapacity excuses; thus those are excused for whom either a teacher was lacking, or to whom the obligation of learning such things never came into mind, or who are so rude that they can in no way comprehend them or retain them by memory; for there is no obligation of impossible things.

I said: 3° When he has come to the use of reason; for then begins the obligation of learning them, since the obligation begins of directing oneself through them to the ultimate end.

261. • Quaer. Can those who are ignorant of those things which must be known by necessity of precept be absolved?

Resp. Affirmatively. If they are sorry, in the case in which the ignorance was gravely culpable, with the purpose of learning them, and have not otherwise, after being admonished, neglected to learn them - in which case they are to be treated as recidivists - they can immediately be absolved. If otherwise, let them learn these things first before they are absolved.

659. Faith according to the name (pistis from peitho, peithomai, I trust, I have been persuaded) primarily and according to origin designates voluntary trust or confidence, given either to the authority (or truth) or testimony of another through our intellect,¹ or to his goodness or promise through the will itself.²

¹ Heb. XI; I Cor. XIII, 13; I Thess. I, 8; II Thess. II, 12; II Cor. V, 7.

² Jas. I, 6: "Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering"; John II, 23; Matt. VI, 30; VIII, 26; IX, 2; XIV, 31; Eccli. VII, 28; XXVII, 17; I Cor. IX, 17, and often in the Scriptures, though not always, as the Protestants falsely assert.

From the derivation of this latter signification, faith is also taken: a) for fidelity in promises;³ b) for the promise itself and vow;⁴ c) for the things promised.⁵

³ Rom. III, 3; Matt. XXV, 21; Luke XIX, 17; I Cor. IV, 2.

⁴ I Tim. V, 12: "they have made void faith (that is, the promise of chastity)."

⁵ For example, to keep the faith of marriage.

From the derivation of the former signification, faith is also taken: a) for truth in testifying;⁶ b) for the very things testified, for example, for the doctrine to be believed, as in Eph. IV, 5: "One Lord, one faith," and the Athanasian Symbol: "This is the Catholic faith...";⁷ c) for trust given either to one's own opinion, when full evidence is not present, or to the dictate of one's own conscience, as in Rom. XIV, 23: "That which is not from faith (that is, from persuasion of conscience) is sin"; in which sense also someone is said to be of good or bad faith.

⁶ Apoc. III, 14: "the faithful and true witness"; Jer. VII, 28.

⁷ Acts VI, 7; Apoc. II, 13; Gal. III, 25.

660. Faith taken in the strict sense is said of the voluntary assent of the intellect (actual faith), or of the habit inclining to furnishing such assent (habitual faith), on account of the authority or testimony alone of another. If that authority is human, it is called human faith; if it is divine, it is called divine faith.

Divine faith could be given concerning merely natural things; nevertheless, in the present order in which we are destined to a supernatural end, it concerns supernatural and divine things (and other things in order to eternal life), and therefore it is more strictly divine, not only by reason of motive but also by reason of matter, whence it is called theological.

661. Theological faith is described by the Apostle, Heb. XI, 1: But faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing. It is said:

1. the substance of things to be hoped for, that is, the first inchoation of beatitude in us, and the first foundation (which stands under the others and therefore founds the others), as St. Thomas explains; or, more conformably to the Greek text: the firm and certain subsistence (hypostasis) of beatitude in our mind, insofar as faith makes us so certain of the things to be hoped for as if they were already present and possessed by us;

2. argument (elenchos) metonymically for its effect itself, namely, the conviction which it causes;

3. of things not appearing (ou blepomenon); faith is an argument, that is, a full conviction, a certain persuasion of things which are seen neither by the senses nor by the mind, but are admitted on account of the authority of God.

St. Thomas shows that this description is a true definition, II-II, q. 4, a. 1 (cf. De Verit., q. 14, a. 2), whence from his time it is customarily explained in the schools as the classic definition. For by this definition faith is distinguished from all other things:

a) by the fact that it is said to be the substance of things to be hoped for, it is distinguished from faith commonly so called, for example, from human faith, which is not ordered to hoped-for beatitude;

b) by the fact that it is called an argument, it is distinguished from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, by which the intellect is not fully convinced nor firmly adheres to any truth;

c) finally, by the fact that it is said to be of things not appearing, it is distinguished from science and from the understanding of principles, by which things appear to the intellect. Whence if someone wished to place the doctrine of the Apostle in the form of a definition, he could say: "faith is a habit of mind by which eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to things not appearing."

662. The Vatican Council explains the definition of the Apostle, while it expounds the nature of faith (Dei Filius, c. 3): "This faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue by which, with the grace of God inspiring and helping, we believe the things revealed by Him to be true, not on account of the intrinsic truth of the things, seen by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. For faith is, as the Apostle testifies, the substance..." There is indicated:

1. the genus to which faith pertains: supernatural virtue;

2. the act proper to the virtue of faith, by which it is distinguished from other virtues: by which we believe things to be true;

3. the matter concerning which it is concerned: things revealed by God;

4. the motive of faith: on account of the authority of God revealing;

5. the cause of faith: with grace inspiring, that is, preventing, and helping.

That this definition is real and adequate will be shown throughout the whole treatise.⁸

⁸ For doctrine on faith, the following can usefully be consulted: throughout, St. Thomas, Q. D. de Veritate 14; and II-II, q. 1-16, with the commentaries of Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Sylvius, the Salamancans, Gotti, and Billuart; likewise Billot, De Virtutibus infusis; - also sometimes, though less safely: Suarez, Lugo, Franzelin; - likewise Scheeben, Heinrich, Mannens, Tanquerey, Van Noort in their Dogmatic Theology; - Brouwer, De Fide divina; Bouquillon, De Virtutibus theologicis, with annotations by Waffelaert; Mazzella and Schiffini in their respective treatise De Virtutibus infusis; Theologia Mechliniensis, De Virtutibus; Masi, De Virtute Fidei; Garrigou-Lagrange, De Revelatione; Lumbreras, De Fide; - likewise Goudin, Philosophia, p. 4, diss. 2, q. 4, a. 5; R. Martin, De Necessitate credendi et credendorum; Gardeil, Credibilite et Apologetique; Bainvel, La Foi et l'acte de foi; Lefebvre, L'Acte de Foi d'apres S. Thomas; Ansgar Stolz, Glaubensgnade und Glaubenslicht; Al. Janssens, Het Geloof; Janvier, Conf. de N.-D.: La Foi; Harent in Dict. de Theol., art. Foi; - for the more practical part: St. Alphonsus and other more recent moralists: Lehmkuhl, Ballerini, Aertnijs, Marc, Haine, Genicot, Noldin, Prummer, and Vermeersch.

But the treatise on faith does not pertain, as it has seemed to some, to dogmatic theology, but to moral theology. For to believe is a human act by which one must tend to the supernatural end. And therefore, although the more principal objects of faith are merely speculative or dogmas only to be believed, which are explained in Dogmatic Theology, nevertheless faith itself is something practical, which is to be known to the extent that at the same time it is to be done and led into practice. Whence the whole treatise, as great as it is, pertains to moral theology.

663. Division of the treatise. - The treatise on faith comprises five parts:

The first part treats of the object of faith, which is more known than the act of faith, whence it must also be explained first: 1. concerning the formal object; 2. concerning the material object: a) concerning the material object in itself; b) concerning its conditions; c) concerning its evolution; d) concerning the Church proposing it.

The second part treats of the act of faith, which is more known than the habit of faith: A. concerning the interior act: 1. concerning its essence; 2. concerning its analysis, namely, both a) of the act of faith itself, and b) of the pious affection of credulity, and c) of the judgment of credibility, that is, concerning the preambles of faith; 3. concerning the necessity of the act of faith; B. concerning the exterior act or confession of faith.

The third part treats of the habit of faith: 1. concerning faith itself: a) relative to the subject, b) relative to the other supernatural virtues, c) relative to the other intellectual virtues; 2. concerning those who have faith; 3. concerning the cause and effects of faith; 4. concerning the gifts corresponding to faith.

The fourth part treats of opposed vices and sins: 1. concerning sins directly opposed to interior faith: a) concerning infidelity; b) concerning heresy and apostasy; 2. concerning sins indirectly opposed to faith: a) concerning communication with unbelievers and heretics; b) concerning cooperation in infidelity and heresy; c) concerning the reading or dissemination of prohibited books; d) concerning the admission or profession of doctrine which is dangerous for faith; 3. concerning blasphemy, which is directly opposed to the confession of faith.

The fifth part treats of the precept of faith.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 1.

664. The object of faith is first truth, God, as will be proved below. He Himself is first truth in a threefold way: a) in being, because His essence is the first being and therefore the first eternal truth; b) in knowing, because His wisdom from eternity knows all things as they are; c) in speaking, because by His veracity from eternity He has the highest propensity for speaking the truth, if He speaks.

665. The object of faith is twofold: material and formal. - For in every power and habit, just as in every act, a twofold object is distinguished:

1. The material object, or that which is actually attained, the matter about which the act is concerned, for example, for cognition, that which is known, such as a conclusion. Moreover the material object is twofold: for there is something which is first, through itself and by reason of itself, attained, which consequently is called the primary object, and by reason of which the other things are attained, which are called the secondary material object.

2. There is had the formal object, or that through which, by means of which, the material object is immediately attained, or the proximate motive on account of which it is attained; for example, for cognition, the medium through which something is immediately known, such as the syllogism by which the conclusion is known.

Let the example be in vision: the secondary material object is the things seen, the primary material object is the colored thing, the formal object is light.

666. Observations. - 1. Lest confusion arise, it should be noted that certain theologians call the primary material object the formal object which; but these call the formal object the formal object by which, or the formal motive or formal reason.¹

¹ For the primary object is the formal reason under which, or that by means of which, the secondary object is attained, and thus it is as it were the formal object with respect to the secondary object. Nevertheless it is that which is attained, indeed first and per se; whence it is better called material than formal, so that the designation "formal object" may be reserved for that which is only formal, or that by which we attain. And St. Thomas speaks thus here in article 1.

2. In catechisms, the material object is designated by the particle what, for example, when it is asked what we ought to believe; and the formal object is expressed by the particle why or wherefore, for example, why we ought to believe.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 1; De Verit., q. 14, a. 8.

667. Thesis. The formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing, or first truth in speaking. - The formal object of faith is that on account of which that which is believed is believed. But this, as the Vatican Council defines, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 3, is the authority of God revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive; indeed authority not in commanding but in affirming and testifying, or the truth of God in speaking, and indeed the truth of God as revealing. These words indicate two things:

1. That God, when He speaks, from infinite perfection says nothing except the true, and therefore has the right that we believe Him; whence the formal object of faith is said to be first truth in speaking.

2. But it is not sufficient that God, when He speaks, says the true; for faith it is also required that He in fact has spoken; whence the formal object of faith is said to be the authority of God as revealing, or first truth revealing. For if we ask someone why he believes, he will answer: because God has said it (behold the second); and he believes that God has said it because God in speaking is true (behold the first). - But:

3. For the authority of God by which He is true in speaking, it is not sufficient that God be infinitely truthful, that is, that He cannot from malice deceive anyone, but it is also required that He be infinitely wise, that is, that He cannot be deceived in knowing from ignorance. Therefore theologians say that the formal object of faith is first truth in speaking, insofar as it supposes first truth in knowing. Nevertheless the immediate and ultimate motive of faith is only first truth revealing.

(St. Thomas, q. 1.)

[Faith is taken in various senses: 1° For fidelity in promises, as 1 Cor., X, 13: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, and elsewhere. 2° For conscience, Rom., XIV, 23: All that is not of faith is sin. 3° For confidence, Jas., 1, 6: Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. Faith understood in this sense is abused by Lutherans and Calvinists, who say we are justified by faith, that is, by the confidence by which we trust that sins are forgiven us through Christ. Which acceptation of faith, although in this sense it is to be rejected, is nevertheless to be admitted absolutely as an effect of faith, indeed even of hope; for from the fact that we believe God and hope in him, confidence in him is born. 4° For veracity or the inclination to speak the truth, 2 Tim., II, 11: A faithful saying: for if we be dead with him, we shall also live with him. 5° For the doctrine itself, that is, the object of faith, Rom., X, 8: This is the word of faith which we preach.]

Faith is here taken 6° and properly for the supernatural virtue by which we believe truths revealed by God; and it is defined by the Apostle, Hebr., XI, 1: The substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. But, because every habit is specified by its object, and from that its nature is known, the Author begins this treatise from the object of faith, treating of the habit of faith itself below, q. 4. Adhering to which method,

I say 1°: The formal object which, or, as others call it, the object of attribution of faith, is first truth in being,² or God himself as God, exceeding natural reason; which I add, because God, as natural author, can be known by natural light independently of faith. ² 2ae 2ae, q. 1, a. 1, o.

It is proved.³ That is the formal object of some habit which is principally attained by it, and by reason of which the other things are attained: thus health is the formal object of medicine, because it is principally attained by medicine, and by its reason the other things, pulse, urine, remedies, etc., are attained. Now first truth in being, or God, as true God, is that which is principally attained by faith; but the other things, as those pertaining to the humanity of Christ, to the sacraments, and whatever else is contained in the Sacred Scriptures, are attained in order to God as to that which is most excellent among all things, and that he may be known more and more. Therefore. ³ Ibid., et ad 1 et 2.

I say 2°: The formal object by which, or the proper quo, of faith is first truth in speaking, or the divine veracity revealing, connoting first truth in knowing, or the infinite wisdom of God.^{4 4} 1ª p., q. 1, a. 1, o.

It is proved as to the first part. The formal object by which of faith in common is the veracity of the speaker; for in this the assent of faith is distinguished from scientific assent, that the motive of the assent of faith is the authority of the speaker, while the motive of scientific assent is the truth of the principle from which the conclusion is elicited. Therefore the formal object under which of divine faith is the veracity of God speaking and revealing.

It is proved as to the second part. Faith is certain and infallible. Therefore it must rely on an infallible motive. — I subsume. Now the divine veracity revealing does not have that it be infallible unless it connote the infinite wisdom of God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. That the divine veracity revealing be infallible, it does not suffice that it cannot deceive out of malice, but it is required that it also cannot deceive out of ignorance, and therefore that God himself cannot be deceived in knowing. Now that God cannot be deceived in knowing proceeds from his infinite wisdom, by which he knows all things as they are, without any admixture of falsity. Therefore.

I say 3°: The adequate material object of faith is everything revealed by God: God himself primarily, the rest secondarily.

It is proved. The adequate material object of some power or habit is all that which it can attain, as it lies under its object, or under the formal ratio under which: thus every colored body is the adequate material object of the visual power, because it can attain it, as it lies under light, which is its formal ratio under which. Now faith attains everything revealed, as it lies under the truth of God revealing, which is its formal object under which, as was said: God however primarily, the rest secondarily, as was also said in the first conclusion. Therefore.

You will object against the first part of the second conclusion: The formal object by which of faith, or, which is the same thing, the motive of the assent of faith, is that into which the assent of faith is ultimately resolved. Now that into which the assent of faith is ultimately resolved is not first truth in speaking, but first truth in being, or the Godhead. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. To one asking why you believe the mysteries of faith, v. g., that God is trine, you rightly answer: « Because God revealed it. » And to one asking further why you believe God revealing, you rightly again answer: « Because he is first truth in speaking. » But finally to one asking why God is first truth in speaking, nothing else remains to answer than: « Because God is, or he is first truth in being. » Therefore.

Nothing else remains to answer, than that because God is, assigning the cause of the thing, I concede; assigning the cause of the assent, I deny. Indeed for this reason God is truthful or first truth in speaking, because God is; but not for that reason do I believe the mysteries of faith, v. g., that God is trine, because God is, or he is first truth in being, but because he is truthful. For the assent of faith (which is to be diligently observed) is not discursive, but simple, and it rests solely in the testimony of the speaker, otherwise it is no longer the assent of faith: thus to one telling me that Rome exists, I assent because he is truthful, and there faith rests; but if you ascend and ask further: « Whence is he truthful? » now you run outside faith. Similarly therefore, to one asking why I believe God revealing, I rightly answer: « Because he is truthful », and there faith or the assent of faith rests, nor could it be asked except foolishly why I believe truth or veracity; but if you ask further why God is truthful, now I shall answer, not as a believer, but as a theologian: « Because God is. »

The question is commonly proposed thus, but it comes to the same as if you asked what the motive of faith is. This can be understood in two ways: either of the motive for assenting to revealed truths, or of the motive or rule for discerning which things are revealed. The first is disputed among Catholics, the second between Catholics and heretics.

[Protestants commonly hold that the motive and rule for discerning revealed truths is sacred Scripture, or the private spirit of each one, that is, the understanding breathed by the Holy Spirit into each one of the Scriptures he inspires.]

I say 1°: The motive for believing and assenting to revealed truths is the authority and veracity of God revealing, not the testimony or proposition of the Church.

It is proved — the first part, from the second conclusion of the preceding article. The motive for believing revealed truths is the formal object quo of faith; for that is called the formal object quo of a habit which is the medium and motive for attaining the formal object quod, as is clear from what has been said. Now the veracity of God revealing is the formal object quo of faith, as was said. Hence, to one asking why I believe God to be triune, I rightly answer: « Because God, who revealed it, is true. »

It is proved — the second part. The proposition or testimony of the Church in no way pertains to the formal object quo of faith. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° Because it is something created; but nothing created can enter into the formal object of faith, any more than of hope and charity, otherwise they would not be purely divine and theological virtues. 2° The proposition of revealed truths through the Church is related to faith just as the proposition of goodness is related to love; for just as the will cannot love an object unless it is proposed and known, so the intellect cannot believe unless revealed truths are proposed to it. Now the proposition of goodness, in relation to the will and love, is not its formal object, but only the application of the object and a condition sine qua non. Therefore, similarly, the proposition of revealed truths through the Church, in relation to the intellect and faith.

I say 2°: The rule for discerning revealed truths is not Scripture, nor the private spirit, but the Church alone.

It is proved — the first part. The rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be incorruptible; otherwise it would expose one to error. Now Scripture is not incorruptible; for it can be corrupted and is corrupted daily, whether through the carelessness of typesetters or the malice of men; hence nothing certain can be drawn from it so long as it is not proposed by the Church as authentic and as containing the revealed truths. Therefore. The same must be said of the Creed, which, being scripture, is also liable to corruption, and besides does not contain all the revealed truths, any more than sacred Scripture does.

It is confirmed. Scripture is obscure in many places. Therefore another rule must be assigned for drawing out its true and legitimate meaning.

It is proved — the second part. 1° The rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be certain, and not doubtful. Now the Spirit breathed by God into each one is not certain, but doubtful; for Calvinists deny that it is in Lutherans, Lutherans in Calvinists, and both in Catholics. 2° A sufficient rule for discerning revealed truths from non-revealed ones must be able to settle controversies in this matter. Now the private spirit of each one not only cannot settle controversies about revealed and non-revealed matters, but rather from it there have continually sprung schisms and dissensions, just as if in civil affairs everyone were constituted judge in his own cause. For if a Calvinist says, from his private spirit, that this article is revealed, a Lutheran will deny it, and a Catholic too will deny it, equally from his private spirit. Who will settle the controversy? Who will be able to instruct and convince the other? And hence so many sects mutually opposed among the heretics themselves. 3° Here we are not dealing with private revelation which God can extraordinarily make to some private person, as he once made to the first parents, the patriarchs, the prophets, and the Apostles — in which case the interior light given, or the immediate revelation itself, would be the rule for discerning what must be believed; but we are dealing with revelation common to the whole society of the faithful, and therefore the proposition must be common, not private. On both parts of this see more in the following treatise, dissertation III, article 6.

The third part follows from what has been said, and it is proved both from the notes of the Church and the motives of credibility, of which below, and from the Scriptures, from which we have that the Church is directed by the Holy Spirit and infallible: Matt., XVI, 18: The gates of hell shall not prevail against her. 1 Tim., III, 15, she is called the pillar and firmament of truth.⁵ Matt., XXVIII, 20: Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world. ⁵ Editor's note: the print reads "I Tim., II, 15", but the verse quoted ("columna et firmamentum veritatis") is I Tim. III, 16; this appears to be a printer's error.

The heretics have one thing to object, namely that we commit a circle in the resolution of our faith. For, they say, we believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church, and we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation.

I answer. 1° We believe the authority of the Church not only on account of revelation, but also and primarily on account of the notes of the Church herself and the motives of credibility. Hence in this respect there is no circle. 2° Even if we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation, it is not under the same aspect under which we believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church, but under a different one. We believe revelation on account of the authority of the Church as applying that revelation; but we believe the authority of the Church on account of revelation or divine veracity, as on account of the formal motive of assent; and thus in a different genus of cause. Now it is the ordinary case that causes are causes of one another in different genera. Thus fire depends upon application, as upon a condition, in order to burn, and the application depends upon the combustive power of fire, as upon an efficient cause. From this it is clear that our circle, in this respect, is only material, and not formal, nor vicious; a circle is vicious whose nature is to run from one thing to another and back again under the same aspect.

This twofold answer is usually explained by the familiar and common example of a messenger carrying the letters of a king. When the trustworthiness of the messenger is not certain, his signs are looked into; once it is established, the letters of the king are accepted on account of the trustworthiness of the messenger: but what is contained in the king's letters is believed, not on account of the trustworthiness of the messenger, but on account of the trustworthiness of the king; and if in the king's letters the trustworthiness of the messenger is asserted, it is thereby confirmed and more firmly believed on account of the trustworthiness of the king. Apply this to the case.

The Church proposes that this and that is revealed by God. Concerning the veracity and infallibility of the Church we have certainty from her notes and motives of credibility, on account of which these things are accepted and believed to be revealed in Scripture or tradition; but the revealed truths themselves contained in Scripture or tradition we believe on account of the authority and veracity of God revealing. Hence you see that the knowledge of the veracity of the Church, though it is strengthened by Scripture, nevertheless does not depend upon it necessarily; for when the Church was being born, there was no Scripture, and yet the veracity of the Church was noted and certain; but it is had primarily from her notes and motives of credibility, though we do not deny that it is confirmed by Scripture: and thus, on the one hand, there is no circle at all, and, on the other, there is no formal and vicious circle, in which one returns to the same thing under the same aspect — just as, conversely, happens in the private spirit of the heretics themselves; for they say they know that this Scripture is true, because their private spirit dictates it to them, and they say they know that they have a private spirit, because Scripture says so.

I insist. According to this solution, it follows that the certainty of our faith is not supreme and divine. — It is proved — the inference.

It hangs, as from an antecedent, upon the veracity of the Church, which is had at first only from the notes and motives of credibility. Now the certainty of the consequent is measured and taken from the certainty of the antecedent. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the inference. To the proof of the antecedent, I distinguish the minor. The certainty of the consequent is measured and taken from the certainty of the antecedent in discursive knowledge — I concede: thus the certainty of the conclusion is derived and measured from the certainty of the antecedent from which it is drawn. In simple knowledge, such as the knowledge of faith is, I deny it. This is clear in the very knowledge of principles, which is simple; for principles are not proved. Although a teacher may set before his disciples many preliminaries, examples, comparisons, suppositions, and other things, to explain them, once these have been explained and made known, the intellect gives its assent with certainty, even though the preliminaries were not certain, but at one time only probable, at another false; for the intellect does not assent to the principles on account of those things, but on account of their clearly seen truth.

Similarly in the case at hand. The proposition of the Church precedes as a preamble explaining what is revealed; once this has been explained and taken as supposed, the intellect assents to the revealed truth, not on account of the Church proposing it — for that is something extrinsic to the assent of faith — but on account of the veracity of God revealing, just as we said above that assent is given to what is contained in the letters of the king on account of the veracity, not of the messenger, but of the king.

[It is objected also: If the judgment of the Church is required in order that what must be believed with divine faith may become known, her sentence will have to be awaited, so that it may become certain that some doctrine pertains to the faith. Hence the faithful could not even have believed the divinity of Christ with divine faith before the Council of Nicaea. But this is repugnant. Therefore.]

I answer. This argument confuses the definition given by the Church concerning the articles to which the heterodox object, with the general and public consent of the Church. Whatever is known with certain and infallible reason to be contained in the word of God pertains to divine faith. That becomes known both from the constant sense and doctrine of the Church, and, where this doctrine seems darkened by new errors, through the decretorial judgment of the Church, which then does not create and introduce a new truth, but authentically and solemnly affirms her constant and universal faith, so that the Christian people, fortified against error, may be confirmed and strengthened in their former and ancient faith.

It is objected besides: The Catholic way, as proposed, abounds in so many and so great difficulties that the multitude cannot follow it. Therefore the opposite way is to be preferred. — Proof of the antecedent. For a Catholic to be secure in his faith, he must know: 1° whether the Church is infallible; 2° whether the Roman Church is the true Church of Christ; 3° what the subject of infallibility is; 4° what this infallible Church teaches; 5° whether her decisions are clothed with all the conditions required for a legitimate judgment; 6° what the meaning of each judgment is; and many other things of this kind. Now it is far more difficult to discuss all these than to investigate the truth of the dogmas by way of examination. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. To the proof, answering the first part: I deny the minor. For even if all these things had to be examined by a Catholic, there would be the greatest difference between a discussion of this kind and the examination of each individual dogma, as is clear. — Answer to the second part: I deny the major. If once a Catholic is persuaded that he is in the true Church of Christ, he will at once understand that, by following her, he cannot stray from the truth. Moreover, the arguments that demonstrate the divine origin and infallibility of the Church are obvious and suited to convince even unlearned minds. Protestants alleged that among Catholics there is dispute about the subject of infallibility. But it has always been believed among us that the supreme power of judging in matters of faith was conferred by Christ upon the teaching Church, that is, the body of pastors. This rule, certain and safe from every danger of error, surely sufficed for the faithful. The greater and sounder part of theologians ascribed this magisterium personally to the Roman Pontiff, and at the same time to ecumenical councils, that is, assemblies of bishops judging together with the same Pontiff. After the Vatican Council, of which below, all Catholics firmly hold that the Roman Pontiff, fulfilling the office of teacher of all Christians and defining doctrine concerning faith or morals, is infallible — which takes nothing away from the collective infallibility of the Church together with the supreme Pastor teaching. Now this rule of faith is simple, obvious to all, and easiest in use. Therefore.

You will ask whether private revelations pertain to faith.

I answer. Private revelations concerning things that are ordered to God as their supernatural author pertain to faith as it is a theological virtue, not as it is catholic.

The reason of the former part is that for the notion of faith as a theological virtue only this is required: that it have God for its formal object quod, and the veracity of God revealing for its formal object under which; and this is found here. But the proposition of the Church is something extrinsic and accidental to faith as a theological virtue, as is clear in the angels in the wayfaring state, the first parents, the patriarchs, the prophets, and the Apostles, who had theological faith without the proposition of the Church.

Confirmation. 1° The Council of Trent, session VI, chapter 12, decrees: « apart from special revelation, it cannot be known whom God has chosen for himself. » And canon 16 defines: « If anyone shall say that he will certainly have that great gift of perseverance unto the end, with absolute and infallible certainty, unless he shall have learned this by special revelation; let him be anathema. » Therefore the sacred synod presupposes that private revelation can confer certainty of faith, and by that very fact that it is possible; otherwise the exception supposed in these places would become absurd.

Confirmation. 2° Sacred Scripture, especially in Heb., XI, recounts very many revelations made to the Fathers of the Old Testament, and elsewhere narrates similar ones which the Blessed Virgin, St. Joseph, Zacharias, and others received from God, and no one doubts that these pertained to their theological faith. In ecclesiastical history not a few examples of revelations of this kind are found concerning predestination and the death of certain saints, and other events, which it would be rash to refuse belief.

The reason of the latter part is that catholic faith, that is, universal, is concerned only with truths universal and common to the whole Church and to be proposed through the Church. Hence, if God were to reveal to some private person something pertaining to religion, that private person would be bound to believe it, but not others, even if he swore that it had been revealed to him; because it would not be proposed by the Church, which is the catholic rule for discerning revealed truths, as was said.]

FIDES is said from fit (is made), and that is said to be made which is said. So St. Augustine, epist. 19, ad Hieronymum. He took this, however, from Tully, lib. 1, offic., where he says: Credimus, quia fiat, quod dictum est, appellatam fidem.

FROM this, ten modes have flowed forth in which Fides is taken according to St. Bonaventure. First it is taken for a Betrothal (Sponsio), in which sense the Apostle says of some, 1 Timoth. 5: Habentes damnationem, quia primam fidem irritam fecerunt — that is, the first faith owed by vow, because they vowed and did not render it, as St. August. explains, psalm. 75; and in the same sense, L. de Spiritu et lit. cap. 31: Aliter (he says) dicimus, non mihi habuit fidem: aliter autem, non mihi servavit fidem. Nam illud est, non credidit quod dixi: istud, non fecit quod dixit. Hence Fides is taken secondly for Fidelity in keeping a promise. Thus God is called faithful, Psalm. 144 and 1 Corinth. 10; the same, conversely, says of men, Hierem. 7: Periit fides in terra. Thirdly, Fides is taken for Conscience, Rom. 14: Omne, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est. Fourthly it is taken for the Sacrament of faith, or Baptism, in which sense St. August., epist. 23, ad Bonifacium, says: Non est aliud, parvulos habere fidem, quam habere fidei Sacramentum. Fifthly it is taken for the Assent to a conclusion proved by reason. In accordance with this Boët. says: Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae, faciens fidem. Sixthly it is taken for the Knowledge of comprehension. Thus it is said, Rom. 1: Iustitia Dei revelatur ex fide in fidem. Gloss: In fidem spei, quae dicitur fides, quia fidentissima et certissima est. Seventhly it is taken for the Habit of unformed faith, James 2: Fides sine operibus mortua est. Eighthly, for the Habit of faith formed, Rom. 1: Iustus ex fide vivit. Ninthly, for the Act of faith, as St. Augustine says, Tract. 40 in Ioan.: Fides est credere, quod non vides. Tenthly it is taken for the Object of faith, as it is said in the Athanasian Symbol: Haec est fides Catholica. Apoc. 2: Non negasti fidem.

It is taken also more broadly for a good reputation: as when someone is said to be of no one's fides. Eccl. 17: Qui detegit arcana, fidem perdit; conversely, he is called worthy of credit (fide dignus) who is said to have obtained belief.

In these modes Fides is named by a certain analogy. But in this disputation we shall treat of Theological faith, which is a Habit belonging to the intellect, by which we believe infallibly, and without any misgiving, the things revealed by God, on account of the authority of God revealing; and it is the beginning of our Justification and the Root and Foundation of the remaining virtues.

FURTHER, that faith of which James, chap. 1, says, Postulet autem in fide, nihil haesitans; and Matth. 14: Modicae fidei, quare dubitasti? and Marc. 11: Si habueritis fidem, dicetis monti huic, etc. — is rather reduced to Hope, and is confidence (fiducia), as Suarez admonishes, sect. 1, although Caspensis, disp. 1, sect. 1, wishes it to include Catholic faith, which I do not refuse. For this reason I judge the Apostle said: Et si habuero omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferam, etc., 1 Corinth. 13.

The definition of faith handed down, Heb. 11, shows faith conjoined with its Hope: Est sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium. It is called substantia, or subsistence of things hoped for, because it is the foundation of hope, for through it the things we hope for in some manner subsist in us, because it is proper to faith to buttress Hope and Confidence; for a man could not hope unless he believed. It is called argumentum, or conviction, because faith ought to be an assent no less firm from Divine authority than that evident assent is by which the intellect is convinced and induced by necessity. Non apparentium is added, because faith ought to be about things that are not seen. So it is expounded by St. Bonavent., quaest. 3, drawing on St. Augustine lib. 2 de peccatorum meritis et remiss. cap. 21 and other Fathers. Whence Erasmus, tastelessly and insolently, denies that this is a definition of faith. See the Holy Doctor, and Valencia disp. 1, quaest. 4, puncto 1, with St. Thom. quaest. 4, art. 1; Morandus, Tract. de fide, quaest. 12. To this agree the other definitions of faith adduced by the Fathers, some of which Tannerus reports, quaest. 7, dub. 5.

That this is the true definition of faith, all Theologians teach with the holy Fathers: Basil on psalm. 115, Gregory of Nyssa, lib. de vita Moysis, before the middle; Chrysostom, homil. 21 in epist. ad Heb.; Augustine, above; Hieron., in cap. 5 epistolae ad Galat.; Bernard, epist. 190. St. Thomas nevertheless confesses that it is not handed down in Scholastic terms.

It is proved, however, by St. Bonaventure that this definition is quidditative, to which St. Thomas and Richardus, 3 dist. 23, subscribe. For the Habit of a virtue can be made known from two heads, namely from the Object and the ultimate End; in the first way indeed a certain firm and certain intellectual habit is called the substance of the habit of virtue, which is the beginning and foundation of salvation, and hence the inchoation of eternal life. For just as substance is the prop of accidents, and the matter of the form and of the accidents themselves, so transumptively faith is called substance, because it is the foundation of the whole spiritual edifice; and therefore St. Damascene, lib. 4 de fide, cap. 11, defines it thus: Fides est hypostasis eorum, quae sperantur; et redargutio eorum, quae non videntur, as the Holy Doctor observes, ad 1.

¶ Then its essence is expounded from the acts and the object; for habits are distinguished, or even specified, by acts, and acts by objects. It therefore expounds its act concerning the ultimate end believed, that is, God, who is not yet possessed, but hoped for, and therefore it says: sperandarum. And that that assent concerning the ultimate end may be shown not evident, it says: non apparentium — for in this Faith is distinguished from science; and yet that that assent may be acknowledged most certain, it says argumentum, or convictio, as others read.

That the Apostle is there speaking of Theological Faith is evident from the Councils, which, to show the necessity of faith, bring forward testimonies from this passage of the Apostle. It is confirmed, for there, chap. 10, the Apostle adduces that word of Habacuc, Iustus ex fide vivit. See the Holy Doctor on several Martyrs, sermone 18.

You object first: No habit is a substance; Faith is a habit: Therefore.

The Holy Doctor answers that faith is called substance transumptively, as I said.

You object secondly: No virtue is an argument. Faith is a virtue: Therefore. If you say that argument is taken transumptively: On the contrary; because it implies being an argument, and yet of things not apparent.

The Holy Doctor answers that argument is said in two ways, properly and transumptively. Properly it is taken in four ways. First, Ratiocination is called argument, which is divided into six principal species: Syllogism, Induction, Enthymeme, Example, Sorites, and Dilemma. Secondly, argument is called a brief collection of a prolix discourse. Thirdly, the argument is called the very medium, in which the strength of the argu­ing stands. Fourthly, the argument is called the very maximal proposition, in which consists the whole force of the illation. In all these ways faith is called argument, because it convinces and illuminates the mind to adhere firmly to the object. And it is called the argument of things not apparent: because it makes one adhere more firmly to the object believed than a Demonstration makes one adhere to the object demonstrated.

You object thirdly. This definition can also fit Hope, which is the substance of things hoped for and the argument of things not apparent; because through it we are certified that we shall have the things we do not see.

It is answered that Faith is the substance, or foundation, of all the virtues; but not Hope, which is neither an argument, etc., because it does not make one assent to the truth.

You object fourthly. To Faith it belongs to believe also the eternal punishments, which are not hoped for, but feared: Therefore it is not sufficiently called the argument of things hoped for.

The Holy Doctor answers that the punishments are contained under the things hoped for, as it were under the end, though not as under the object; for one believes eternal punishments precisely in order that he may attain the eternal goods to be hoped for.

You object fifthly. A thing prior ought not to be defined by things posterior and less known: But Faith is posterior to Hope, and better known than the things that are not apparent: Therefore.

St. Bonaventure answers by denying the Minor; For it is defined by the end and the object; and although the end of faith itself, which is the things hoped for, is posterior in execution, yet it is prior in intention. And although the object of faith, not apparent in truth, is unknown to the infidel man, yet it is known to the man having faith. And even if it is unknown what sort of thing it is, yet it is known that it does not appear, and thus the definition is not by the posterior and the less known, but by what is prior and known.

You object sixthly. For the clearness of a definition it belongs that prior things be set before posterior ones. If, therefore, cognition precedes affection, and faith, insofar as it is an argument, regards cognition, while insofar as it is the substance of things hoped for it regards affection: therefore the definition is confused, while it says first: substantia rerum sperandarum.

The Holy Doctor answers that the intellect follows the affection when it is inclined to assent to a thing by the command of the will, and in this way faith is a Virtue, because its assent is from the principle of the will; and therefore rightly the Apostle puts first that which regards the affection before that which pertains to the intellect.

You object seventhly. Faith is the foundation not only of Hope, but also of Charity, and of the whole spiritual edifice: Therefore it is the substance also of things to be loved, and not only of things to be hoped for; and the more it ought to have enumerated these, the more noble they are. Item, it is about things both past and future: Therefore it is badly defined as being only of things hoped for.

The Holy Doctor answers that faith is defined in order to the end toward which it tends; and therefore it is defined in order to the things to be hoped for, which are the end of the virtue, and of our whole expectation of beatitude in the wayfaring state, which stands in the vision and love of God.

You object eighthly. Unformed faith is true faith; and yet it is not the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore it is badly defined as formed faith alone.

The Holy Doctor answers in corpore that if foundation be taken for what is actual and sufficient, formed faith alone is understood, for unformed faith is still an unformed foundation. This same St. Thomas intends, quaest. 5, art. 7, ad 4, as Valencia notes, ad 3.

You object ninthly. A believer in despair has faith without hope.

Valencia answers: For this reason faith is said to be the foundation of the things to be hoped for, not hoped. From what has been said the definitions of Calvin and Kemnitius collapse — that faith is a certain credulity of the Divine benevolence and grace toward us. For these suppose that heresy, that we are held to believe that we ourselves are predestined, and in grace.

That we may find the most excellent definition and essence of FAITH, we must examine the object, from which the essence is taken, or at least is known a posteriori.

D. Bonaventure observes in the body of the text that a twofold object is assigned, one material, called the Quod (That which); the other formal, the Quo (That by which), concerning which see p. 1. tract. 1. quaest. 4. The material is the thing considered; the formal is the ratio by which, and under which, it is considered.

All concede that God is the principal Quod object of our faith, against Calvin, book 2. Institut. cap. 6., who holds that not God alone is the object of faith, but also Christ, as He is Man. So the Holy Doctor here, and D. Thomas here, and p. 1. quaest. 1. art. 7.; Alensis 3. p. quaest. 79. membr. 6.; Albert. 3. dist. 23. art. 12.; Durand. ibi quaest. 1.; Capreolus in Prol. sent. quaest. 4. art. 2. around the fifth conclusion; Caiet. ad art. cit. of D. Thomas; Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 1. punct. 1.; Caspens. tract. 15. sect. 1.; Morand. tract. unico in 2. 2. quaest. 1.; Scotus 3. dist. 23. quaest. un.; G. and his followers; Mastrius tom. 3. disp. 6. quaest. 1. art. 1.; Vulpes tom. 2. p. 3. disp. 30. art. 2.; Arriaga tom. 5. tract. 1. disput. 1. sect. 1.; Suarez disp. 2. sect. 1. and 2.; Cardinal Lugo tract. de fide disp. 3. sect. 2.; Amicus tom. 4. disp. 1. sect. 1. and following; Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 1. dub. 2., who say it is the common view. Yet some deny that God is the object of attribution as God, but will have it to be God complexly, as willing to beatify. So Vulpes with Gregory quaest. 4. prol. art. 2. and other Nominalists. They rely on John 20. These things are written, that you may believe, and that believing you may have life in his name; but this opinion is refuted even by the Scotists; nor does it rest on Scotus, as Mastrius notes num. 8. Arriaga indeed grants that God is the principal object of faith; but he denies that He is the object of attribution; and Mastrius notes that many Recentiores stumble here, confusing the principal object with the object of attribution, which many call the adequate object.

OTHERS, however, distinguishing these two objects, assert that God is the object in both ways. So Morandus.

OTHERS distinguish the principal object, and the material object of attribution, from the adequate, as Caspensis with Suarez. These, however, are disputes of no great weight.

D. Bonaventure holds that the principal material object, and the object of attribution, is God; yet it is not the adequate material object. This is the common opinion, from Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 1. dub. 2. and Fulsens. lib. 3. cap. 1.

I ASSERT first, that the principal object, and the object of attribution, of faith is God.

It is PROVED first from D. Bonav., because Faith is a Theological virtue, which has God for its object. For this reason Faith is often denominated from God: Mark 11. Have the faith of God. John 14. You believe in God, believe also in me. Ephes. 4. One Lord, one faith. From the unity of God note the unity of faith: 1 Thessal. 1. In every place your faith, which is towards God, has gone forth. Hebr. 6. Not casting aside again the foundation from dead works, and of faith towards God. Hebr. 11. He that comes to God must believe that he is. It is confirmed by the Holy Doctor from the Symbol: I believe in God. The same is taught by the Holy Fathers: Aug. lib. 4. de civit. cap. 20.; Cyril of Jerusalem catech. 5.; Irenaeus lib. 4. cap. 13.; and others. So argue Caspens. and others.

It is PROVED second from D. Bonav. Every simple habit ought to have one object, to which all things are reduced; but faith is one habit, and has no other to which all objects are reduced than the Uncreated True, that is, God: Therefore. The major is clear. The minor is proved first from the Apostle, who often testifies that our faith is ordered to the knowledge of God. So Ephes. 1. Coloss. 2. and 3., as cited by Valentia; and from D. August. l. 1. de civitate, cap. 2. It is confirmed: for God is the most excellent object of faith.

I ASSERT second, that the adequate material object comprises many things besides God.

It is PROVED from S. Bonav. first from the Symbol, in which are proposed, besides God, the things to be believed: Creation, Incarnation, and other Mysteries of the Redemption, the Universal Judgment, the Church, the remission of sins, the resurrection, and eternal life.

It is PROVED second from D. Bonav. Faith is of as great amplitude as charity; for we believe the things that are to be loved, and the things that are believed are loved supernaturally. Indeed faith believes even things not to be loved, as eternal punishments; but charity loves not only the Uncreated Good, but also our neighbor and other created things: Therefore.

I. Question I. What is faith? Answer. Theological faith, as distinct from the other virtues, is described by the Apostle in Hebrews 11 in these words: Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. The common notion among the Theologians is this: Faith is an infused habit, by which we firmly assent to the truths revealed by God and proposed by the Church. Theological faith, therefore, rests upon the divine authority; and this revelation is established for us through the divine Scriptures, the proposal of the Church coming in addition.

II. Question II. Of how many kinds is faith? Answer. Faith is divided into actual and habitual. Actual faith is a supernatural assent, firm and certain, excluding all doubt, given to the things revealed by God on account of the authority of that same divine revelation. Habitual faith is an infused virtue, which renders us permanently apt for eliciting acts of faith with the help of actual grace. Again, it is distributed into formed, or living, faith, which is nourished by habitual grace and charity, which works through love and brings forth fruits worthy of eternal life; and into unformed, or dead, faith, which lacks habitual grace and charity. The former is found in the just, the latter in sinners. Finally, one faith is explicit, by which an article revealed by God is expressly believed; another implicit, by which an article is believed in another article that has been revealed. You believe the mystery of the resurrection, and in it you implicitly believe the resurrection of the just.

III. Question III. What, and of how many kinds, is the object of faith? Answer. The object of faith is what is proposed to the mind to be believed. It is twofold. One is the material object, which is also called the formal object which [formale quod]; and these are all the things that are believed, of which God is the primary object, and all the rest are the secondary object. The other is the formal object by which [formale quo], or the reason why we believe; and it is the first truth obscurely revealing. This formal reason, or divine revealing truth, which induces us to believe, demands as a necessary condition the proposal of the Church. A second condition is the firmness of the assent. The third is obscurity. A threefold act of faith is usually distinguished: namely, to believe God revealing [credere Deo], to believe God as the truth revealed [credere Deum], and to believe unto God [credere in Deum], inasmuch as we tend toward him as our last end.

IV. Question IV. Is the confidence by which one certainly believes that his sins have been forgiven him a theological faith necessary to salvation? Answer. The Protestants — Lutherans and Calvinists — affirm it; and their error the Council of Trent condemned, session 6, chapter 9. For theological faith is an assent given to the articles revealed by God, as has been said. But confidence in the divine mercy, by which each one applies to himself the divine promises of the remission of sins, is an act of hope, necessary for justification, but by no means effecting justification, as the Lutherans fable.

V. Question V. Are the things which the Church proposes to be believed as revealed by God evidently credible? Answer. It is one thing to be evidently true, another to be evidently credible. An evident truth offers itself of itself to the mind. That is called evidently credible which luminous and grave arguments propose as worthy that assent be given to it. The articles of faith are evidently credible, says the Royal Prophet, Psalm 92: Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible. The arguments of this evident credibility are touched upon briefly.

VI. 1. The vaticinations of the Prophets. 2. The propagation of the faith through the whole world — not by the din of arms, not by abundance of riches, not by the enticements of eloquence, not by the allurements of pleasures, but by the unskillfulness, the poverty, and the humility of twelve fishermen. 3. The sanctity of the Christian religion. 4. The immense multitude of miracles. 5. The innumerable host of Martyrs. 6. The dignity of witnesses above all exception. These and other arguments of credibility, which I have explained in Tome I on the Decalogue, book I, dissertation I, chapter 5, Parish priests ought to expound to the people, that their obedience may be reasonable. For these arguments of credibility prepare the mind for a firmer assent of faith.

VII. Question VI. Must a pious affection of the will precede faith? Answer. It is affirmed. That faith may be prudent, he who believes must have arguments which prove that the things to which he must give his assent are worthy of belief. But because these arguments of credibility do not remove the obscurity of the thing to be believed, the intellect cannot assent to the object of faith unless it be aided by an internal movement of the will. For an obscure object cannot bend the mind. This defect of the object the pious affection of the will must supply.

VIII. Question VII. What men are apt for theological faith? Answer. Men who are wayfarers. Wherefore faith is found neither in the damned nor in the demons, since they are deprived of every supernatural gift. They believe indeed, and tremble; but with a natural faith, not a theological one. Nor is faith found in the blessed, because what they believed, they now see. But in the souls of Purgatory faith remains, because what they believe they do not yet see; just as hope also perseveres in them. Sinners who are not infidels retain the faith, though languid and, as it is called, dead. But in Heretics there is no faith: for while they deny one article, they reject the formal reason of believing — namely, the divine revelation proposed by the Church. They assert indeed that they believe on account of revelation; but this divine revelation is proposed by each of them singly, not by the Church.