Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 1. On the subject of the act of faith
480. By the name of subject we here understand either a) the power which proximately and formally elicits the act of faith, or b) the persons who are able to elicit the act of faith. The power is the proximate subject, but the persons are the remote subject.
a) The proximate subject of the act of faith is the speculative intellect16* or: The act of salutary faith is an act of the intellect, namely it is an assent given to truths. This doctrine is against Protestants teaching that faith is trust; this was condemned in the Council of Trent:17 "If anyone says that justifying faith is nothing else than trust in the divine mercy remitting sins on account of Christ, or that this trust alone is that by which we are justified, let him be anathema." That faith is an act of the intellect is manifestly taught in Sacred Scripture, which says concerning salutary faith: "Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he who comes to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to those who seek him."18 But to believe is manifestly an act of the intellect. Moreover Sacred Scripture clearly says that faith is not trust, but rather its cause and foundation. Thus, e.g. it is said: "In whom we have trust and access in confidence through his faith";19 and: "For those who have ministered well will acquire for themselves a good degree and much confidence in the faith which is in Christ Jesus."20 All the Fathers unanimously teach the same doctrine.21 Let one be heard, St. Augustine: "To believe itself is nothing other than to think with assent ... everyone who believes thinks; and in believing thinks, and in thinking believes."22 St. Thomas23 teaches concerning this matter: "To believe is immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of this act is the true, which properly pertains to the intellect. And therefore it is necessary that faith, which is the principle of this act, be in the intellect as in its subject."
Note. The force of the will in the act of faith. Although the act of faith is formally and immediately an act of the intellect, nevertheless the will also has a great part in it; for not only must the will move the intellect to the exercise of the act, as it moves in any act of the intellect (for the will moves even to the act of science); but in addition the will must command the very assent in the act of faith. For the object of faith, or the things to be believed, are not evident in themselves and therefore do not compel the intellect to assent, as natural truths do (e.g. that twice two are four), but are truths obscure for us, exceeding our natural capacity. Notwithstanding this obscurity, the will moved by divine grace commands assent in the act of faith. Therefore St. Thomas teaches: "Faith is not in the intellect except insofar as it is commanded by the will; hence although that which is on the part of the will can be called accidental to the intellect, nevertheless it is essential to faith."24 Indeed: "In the knowledge of faith the will has the principal place; for the intellect assents through faith to those things which are proposed to it, because it wills, and not because it is necessarily drawn by the very evidence of the truth."25
In order that this proposition, which is of such great importance, may be understood more clearly, it is useful to recall certain things from philosophy concerning the acts of our intellect. Among the acts of our intellect the first is the simple apprehension of an object. The second act is judgment, or assent, by which we affirm or deny something concerning the object apprehended. Thus by simple apprehension we know a triangle; but by judgment we assert that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles. With respect to the object of judgment, the intellect can stand in many ways; for it can be ignorant, doubt, suspect, assent. But the intellect offers assent plainly and perfectly to some proposition in three ways:26
Because, when the subject and predicate of the proposition are known, immediately it appears true, e.g. thus the intellect assents to this proposition: The whole is greater than its part; for once the notions of whole and part are had, it is at once necessarily understood that the whole is greater than its part. An act of the intellect of this kind is called intellectual vision.
Because some proposition is evidently and necessarily deduced from principles known through themselves. Thus the intellect assents to conclusions evidently deduced from certain principles, e.g. the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Although this conclusion is not evident in itself to the intellect, it is nevertheless evident on account of the necessary connection with principles evident in themselves. Such an act of the intellect is called science, and the assent following from it is necessary.
Because some proposition, although it is evident neither in itself nor in its principles, is announced to us by some competent and trustworthy person. Before the intellect assents to that proposition, it must perceive: a) the knowledge and veracity of the one testifying; b) the fact of the testimony. This twofold knowledge produces the judgment of credibility. The act of the intellect assenting to truths of this kind is called faith. Since the truth of such propositions is not evident in itself, the intellect does not assent to them necessarily, but it is necessary that the will accede, commanding assent. And therefore faith is rightly called a commanded assent.27
From this necessary influence of the will it follows that the act of faith is most free and meritorious. On the other hand, since, notwithstanding the obscurity of the object, the assent of faith must be most firm, supernatural divine grace is required for giving the act of faith; whence St. Paul says: "For by grace you are saved through faith, and this not from yourselves; for it is the gift of God."28 Below, n. 487 sqq., discussion will return concerning the firmness, freedom, and supernaturalness of faith, when the properties of faith are treated.
b) The remote subject of faith, i.e. the persons who can elicit the act of faith, are: a) all men living on this earth, except formal heretics and unbelievers.29 For formal heretics deny the infallibility of the Church, which is a dogma of faith; and therefore they hold that some dogma can be false and that not all revealed things are true. But this is to destroy the formal object by which of faith and faith itself (cf. 327). b) The souls in purgatory, since they still lack the beatific vision.
The angels and the blessed in heaven do not have faith, because they see God face to face.30 Nor also do demons or the damned have faith (at least theological faith).
16* De verit. q. 14, a. 4.
17 Sess. 6, can. 12 de iustif. (Denz. n. 822).
18 Hebr. 11, 6.
19 Eph. 3, 12.
20 1 Tim. 3, 13.
21 See testimonies in Bouquillon, Tract. de virtut. theol. p. 19 sq.
22 De praed. sanct. c. 2, n. 5 (Migne, Patr. lat. 44, 963).
23 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 4, a. 2.
24 De verit. q. 14, a. 3 ad 10.
26 In opinion there is indeed also assent of the mind, but not perfect assent (cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 2, a. 1).
27 Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 17, a. 6.
28 Eph. 2, 8.
29 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 5, a. 3.
30 Ib. a. 1.
481. Scholion. On the modernistic concept of faith. The Modernists (Myers, James, G. Lansing Reymond), following some Protestants, such as Schleiermacher, Jacobi, Strauss, etc., think that faith is some sense of religion or act of the subconscious. This falsity must be abjured by all who take the anti-modernist oath by mandate of Pius X: "I most certainly hold and sincerely profess that faith is not a blind sense of religion breaking forth from the hidden places of the subconscious under the pressure of the heart and the inclination of the will morally informed."