Treatise: On Divine Faith

659. Faith according to the name (pistis from peitho, peithomai, I trust, I have been persuaded) primarily and according to origin designates voluntary trust or confidence, given either to the authority (or truth) or testimony of another through our intellect,¹ or to his goodness or promise through the will itself.²

¹ Heb. XI; I Cor. XIII, 13; I Thess. I, 8; II Thess. II, 12; II Cor. V, 7.

² Jas. I, 6: "Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering"; John II, 23; Matt. VI, 30; VIII, 26; IX, 2; XIV, 31; Eccli. VII, 28; XXVII, 17; I Cor. IX, 17, and often in the Scriptures, though not always, as the Protestants falsely assert.

From the derivation of this latter signification, faith is also taken: a) for fidelity in promises;³ b) for the promise itself and vow;⁴ c) for the things promised.⁵

³ Rom. III, 3; Matt. XXV, 21; Luke XIX, 17; I Cor. IV, 2.

⁴ I Tim. V, 12: "they have made void faith (that is, the promise of chastity)."

⁵ For example, to keep the faith of marriage.

From the derivation of the former signification, faith is also taken: a) for truth in testifying;⁶ b) for the very things testified, for example, for the doctrine to be believed, as in Eph. IV, 5: "One Lord, one faith," and the Athanasian Symbol: "This is the Catholic faith...";⁷ c) for trust given either to one's own opinion, when full evidence is not present, or to the dictate of one's own conscience, as in Rom. XIV, 23: "That which is not from faith (that is, from persuasion of conscience) is sin"; in which sense also someone is said to be of good or bad faith.

⁶ Apoc. III, 14: "the faithful and true witness"; Jer. VII, 28.

⁷ Acts VI, 7; Apoc. II, 13; Gal. III, 25.

660. Faith taken in the strict sense is said of the voluntary assent of the intellect (actual faith), or of the habit inclining to furnishing such assent (habitual faith), on account of the authority or testimony alone of another. If that authority is human, it is called human faith; if it is divine, it is called divine faith.

Divine faith could be given concerning merely natural things; nevertheless, in the present order in which we are destined to a supernatural end, it concerns supernatural and divine things (and other things in order to eternal life), and therefore it is more strictly divine, not only by reason of motive but also by reason of matter, whence it is called theological.

661. Theological faith is described by the Apostle, Heb. XI, 1: But faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing. It is said:

1. the substance of things to be hoped for, that is, the first inchoation of beatitude in us, and the first foundation (which stands under the others and therefore founds the others), as St. Thomas explains; or, more conformably to the Greek text: the firm and certain subsistence (hypostasis) of beatitude in our mind, insofar as faith makes us so certain of the things to be hoped for as if they were already present and possessed by us;

2. argument (elenchos) metonymically for its effect itself, namely, the conviction which it causes;

3. of things not appearing (ou blepomenon); faith is an argument, that is, a full conviction, a certain persuasion of things which are seen neither by the senses nor by the mind, but are admitted on account of the authority of God.

St. Thomas shows that this description is a true definition, II-II, q. 4, a. 1 (cf. De Verit., q. 14, a. 2), whence from his time it is customarily explained in the schools as the classic definition. For by this definition faith is distinguished from all other things:

a) by the fact that it is said to be the substance of things to be hoped for, it is distinguished from faith commonly so called, for example, from human faith, which is not ordered to hoped-for beatitude;

b) by the fact that it is called an argument, it is distinguished from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, by which the intellect is not fully convinced nor firmly adheres to any truth;

c) finally, by the fact that it is said to be of things not appearing, it is distinguished from science and from the understanding of principles, by which things appear to the intellect. Whence if someone wished to place the doctrine of the Apostle in the form of a definition, he could say: "faith is a habit of mind by which eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to things not appearing."

662. The Vatican Council explains the definition of the Apostle, while it expounds the nature of faith (Dei Filius, c. 3): "This faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue by which, with the grace of God inspiring and helping, we believe the things revealed by Him to be true, not on account of the intrinsic truth of the things, seen by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. For faith is, as the Apostle testifies, the substance..." There is indicated:

1. the genus to which faith pertains: supernatural virtue;

2. the act proper to the virtue of faith, by which it is distinguished from other virtues: by which we believe things to be true;

3. the matter concerning which it is concerned: things revealed by God;

4. the motive of faith: on account of the authority of God revealing;

5. the cause of faith: with grace inspiring, that is, preventing, and helping.

That this definition is real and adequate will be shown throughout the whole treatise.⁸

⁸ For doctrine on faith, the following can usefully be consulted: throughout, St. Thomas, Q. D. de Veritate 14; and II-II, q. 1-16, with the commentaries of Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Sylvius, the Salamancans, Gotti, and Billuart; likewise Billot, De Virtutibus infusis; - also sometimes, though less safely: Suarez, Lugo, Franzelin; - likewise Scheeben, Heinrich, Mannens, Tanquerey, Van Noort in their Dogmatic Theology; - Brouwer, De Fide divina; Bouquillon, De Virtutibus theologicis, with annotations by Waffelaert; Mazzella and Schiffini in their respective treatise De Virtutibus infusis; Theologia Mechliniensis, De Virtutibus; Masi, De Virtute Fidei; Garrigou-Lagrange, De Revelatione; Lumbreras, De Fide; - likewise Goudin, Philosophia, p. 4, diss. 2, q. 4, a. 5; R. Martin, De Necessitate credendi et credendorum; Gardeil, Credibilite et Apologetique; Bainvel, La Foi et l'acte de foi; Lefebvre, L'Acte de Foi d'apres S. Thomas; Ansgar Stolz, Glaubensgnade und Glaubenslicht; Al. Janssens, Het Geloof; Janvier, Conf. de N.-D.: La Foi; Harent in Dict. de Theol., art. Foi; - for the more practical part: St. Alphonsus and other more recent moralists: Lehmkuhl, Ballerini, Aertnijs, Marc, Haine, Genicot, Noldin, Prummer, and Vermeersch.

But the treatise on faith does not pertain, as it has seemed to some, to dogmatic theology, but to moral theology. For to believe is a human act by which one must tend to the supernatural end. And therefore, although the more principal objects of faith are merely speculative or dogmas only to be believed, which are explained in Dogmatic Theology, nevertheless faith itself is something practical, which is to be known to the extent that at the same time it is to be done and led into practice. Whence the whole treatise, as great as it is, pertains to moral theology.

663. Division of the treatise. - The treatise on faith comprises five parts:

The first part treats of the object of faith, which is more known than the act of faith, whence it must also be explained first: 1. concerning the formal object; 2. concerning the material object: a) concerning the material object in itself; b) concerning its conditions; c) concerning its evolution; d) concerning the Church proposing it.

The second part treats of the act of faith, which is more known than the habit of faith: A. concerning the interior act: 1. concerning its essence; 2. concerning its analysis, namely, both a) of the act of faith itself, and b) of the pious affection of credulity, and c) of the judgment of credibility, that is, concerning the preambles of faith; 3. concerning the necessity of the act of faith; B. concerning the exterior act or confession of faith.

The third part treats of the habit of faith: 1. concerning faith itself: a) relative to the subject, b) relative to the other supernatural virtues, c) relative to the other intellectual virtues; 2. concerning those who have faith; 3. concerning the cause and effects of faith; 4. concerning the gifts corresponding to faith.

The fourth part treats of opposed vices and sins: 1. concerning sins directly opposed to interior faith: a) concerning infidelity; b) concerning heresy and apostasy; 2. concerning sins indirectly opposed to faith: a) concerning communication with unbelievers and heretics; b) concerning cooperation in infidelity and heresy; c) concerning the reading or dissemination of prohibited books; d) concerning the admission or profession of doctrine which is dangerous for faith; 3. concerning blasphemy, which is directly opposed to the confession of faith.

The fifth part treats of the precept of faith.