Article — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Article I. On the Theological Virtue of Faith
In order that we may acquire full knowledge of this virtue, its notion, division, object, subject, and properties must be inspected.
I. Notion of Faith. Faith is a theological virtue inclining man to assent firmly to truths revealed by God, on account of the authority of God revealing. It is said:
To assent firmly. By this firmness "faith is distinguished from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, through which there is not a firm adherence of the intellect to something" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 1).
On account of the authority of God revealing. For this is the formal object of theological faith, by which it is distinguished both from science, which is assent on account of the intrinsic truth of the thing, and from human faith, by which we assent on account of the authority of man.
II. Division of Faith. Faith is divided:
By reason of charity, into formed and unformed faith. It is called formed if charity accompanies it; for charity, although it is not intrinsic to faith and therefore cannot be called its substantial or accidental form, nevertheless that which is left in faith from charity is intrinsic to faith. It is unformed when the virtue of faith is in a faithful subject lacking charity.
By reason of object, into explicit and implicit faith. Explicit faith is said to be that by which those things are believed which have been revealed in their proper terms; implicit faith, that by which revealed things are believed which are contained implicitly and formally in what is explicitly revealed.
By reason of believers, into Catholic and theological or divine faith. Catholic faith is said to be that which obliges all the faithful, since the object has been proposed by the Church with infallible authority as revealed. Theological or divine faith is that which obliges only those who perceive that the object has been revealed by God, when an infallible definition of the Church proposing it to all as revealed is lacking.
III. Object of Faith. 1. Material object. The material object of faith in general is all and only revealed truths. I say all and only revealed truths, because on the one hand only truths which have been spoken by God can be believed on account of the authority of God revealing; on the other hand, all truths spoken by God can be admitted on account of this authority, whether they have been manifested by public revelation or, as seems altogether to be admitted against a few, by private revelation. Moreover, observe:
a) Revealed truths, or truths manifested by God, are said to be those which God has manifested either explicitly or implicitly formally. Now He has explicitly manifested those which He has revealed in their proper terms; He has implicitly formally manifested those which the human mind deduces by a merely explicative discourse from explicitly revealed truths. But if an illative discourse is required for the deduction of truths, the things so deduced are called implicitly virtually revealed, and since assent to these truths rests in our intellect, they cannot be believed by theological faith. When such conclusions are confirmed by the infallible magisterium of the Church, they must of course be admitted by irrevocable assent; but theologians dispute whether the assent then ought to be called an act of divine faith or of ecclesiastical faith. More probably it must be held to be an assent of ecclesiastical faith, because it immediately rests on the authority of the Church; nevertheless the assent is reduced to the habit of divine faith, since the authority of the Church has been revealed by God.
b) The material object of divine faith is twofold: primary, or that which the virtue of faith attains by reason of itself; and secondary, which the virtue of faith attains only by reason of the primary object.
The primary object is God Himself, the first truth in being. For the primary object of faith, since faith is a participation in divine cognition, is the same as the primary object of divine cognition. And the primary object of divine cognition is God Himself, as the first truth in being (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 171, a. 6).
The secondary object is constituted by all the other revealed things, since these have been manifested by God for this reason, that we may have a fuller knowledge of Him and a more fervent love toward Him.
- Formal object. As concerns the formal object of the theological virtue of faith, it is of faith that the motive is the authority of God revealing. For the Vatican Council defined: "If anyone says that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge about God and moral things, and that therefore it is not required for divine faith that revealed truth be believed on account of the authority of God revealing, let him be anathema."1 Now:
a) The authority of God arises from His veracity and wisdom. This is clear both from the same Council, which teaches that by divine faith we believe on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive,2 and from reason, because the irrevocable assent of faith supposes in the one testifying that he absolutely knew the truth communicated and communicated it without falsity.
But if it is further investigated whether both essentially constitute the formal object, the answer must be given with a distinction. With regard to veracity, it must be said affirmatively. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture, which assigns the veracity of God as the motive of faith,3 and also from reason; for the veracity of God makes the statement supremely credible, and into it the assent of theological faith is ultimately and formally resolved.
As regards wisdom, it is certain that it is required presuppositively and by connotation for constituting the formal reason which can deserve irrevocable assent; but it is not required for this formally and directly. For supreme veracity, such as divine veracity is, of itself imports absolute conformity both with the mind of the speaker and with the things spoken. If it did not import this absolute conformity, veracity would not be supreme, since a veracity which always testified words conformed to things would be greater. From this it follows that wisdom does not essentially constitute the formal object of theological faith, but nevertheless concurs toward it as a condition without which not.
b) Revelation itself can be considered actively and passively. Active revelation consists in the very will of God to reveal, or is the act of will by which God orders His concepts to men. Passive revelation is the effect immediately produced by God for testifying to some truth, or is the act which manifests divine truth outwardly. Now it must more probably be said that active revelation, like veracity, essentially constitutes the formal object of theological faith. For the assent of faith is the conjunction of the intellect with the thing revealed, constituted by the formal object as by an efficient cause. Now the veracity of God taken simply abstracts from conjunction with the object to which the believer assents; therefore veracity alone cannot efficiently constitute the assent of the believer, but for this there is required veracity testifying to the truth. But this testification is formally constituted by active revelation. Therefore.
I say that it is formally constituted by active revelation; for by this revelation infinite truth enjoys veracity. Passive revelation, however, is necessary only to this extent, that the believer may be able to know that God has in fact ordered His concepts to him, i.e., to the believer, through active revelation. Therefore passive revelation does not enter essentially into the formal object of theological faith, but is a condition without which there is no act of it.
1 Session 3, canon 2, on faith.
2 Chapter 3, on faith.
3 For example, 1 Thess. 2:13; 1 John 5:9 sq.
IV. Subject of Faith. The subject of some virtue is distinguished as twofold: the subject by which and partial, which is the power itself in which the virtue resides; and the subject which and total, which is the person himself who possesses some virtue. Now:
The subject by which and partial of theological faith is the intellect. This is clear from Sacred Scripture: "bringing every intellect into captivity unto the obedience of Christ."1 It is also confirmed by reason: for theological faith is the principle of an act which is occupied around revealed truth; but an act of this kind is an intellective act; hence the habit of faith also resides in the intellect (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 2). Although, however, the act of faith is an act of the intellect, nevertheless, in order that it take place, a prior motion of the will is required. For the proper terminus of the intellect is the vision of some truth; but this vision is not had in the act of faith, since that act is always placed on account of extrinsic authority. Therefore, in order that the intellect assent on account of this extrinsic authority, it is required that the will, piously affected by grace toward the object of faith, by a certain weight impressed on the intellect, draw it to firm and perfect assent (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14, a. 1).
The subject which and total of theological faith are: 1. all just wayfarers; for sanctifying grace is always joined with faith; and since the souls in purgatory, with respect to the beatific vision, are still on the way, they too are the subject "which" of faith; 2. all wayfaring sinners who nevertheless have not sinned directly against faith.2 This is clear from the Council of Trent.3 Those who are in no way wayfarers, or wayfarers who are formally heretics, lack faith. With regard to the Blessed, this is clear because they have vision; with regard to the damned, it follows from their impossibility of tending toward the supernatural end; with regard to wayfarers who are formally heretics, it is clear from the Council of Trent.4
1 2 Cor. 10:5.
2 Although by sins which are not directly against faith the formal object of faith is not destroyed, and therefore the sinner perpetrating such sins can still believe all revealed things, nevertheless, since all infused virtues flow from habitual grace as properties from a nature, when this is lacking, faith too ought of itself to be lacking. Therefore there is a special law, mercifully established by God, that the virtue of faith remains notwithstanding the loss of grace. But we can know the existence of such a law from revelation alone.
V. Properties of Faith. Five properties of faith are suitably assigned, namely truth, certitude, obscurity, liberty, and necessity. Although these properties immediately pertain to the act of faith, mediately, namely by means of the act, they are also predicated of the habit by whose help the act is placed. Therefore we wish to discuss them briefly here.
Truth of faith consists in this, that the act of faith essentially and necessarily is occupied around revealed truth; so that by force of this property, faith can never elicit an act regarding an estimated but not real revelation, whether this estimated revelation is in itself a truth or a falsity. That faith has this property is openly clear from the Council of Trent, which says that the certitude of faith is such that falsity cannot underlie it.1 Besides, it is clear by reason itself; for what has not been revealed by God cannot be believed on account of His authority; but what has been revealed is necessarily true. Hence it follows that both the formal and the material object of faith are lacking whenever someone admits either some truth not revealed, or, a fortiori, some falsity, as a revealed truth. In either case someone can think that he elicits an act of faith, but he does not truly elicit it.2
Certitude of faith consists essentially in this, that the believer assents to what is revealed by an assent firm above all things. Therefore, although the assent of faith excludes every prudent fear, nevertheless the essence of the property of certitude is not to be placed, not even partly, in this negative element; for the exclusion of prudent fear is proper to every certitude strictly so called. The essence of this property is solely in the positive element, namely in firm assent above all things.
Nor is the certitude of faith firmer than every other certitude in the sense that it more strongly excludes every prudent fear; on the contrary, in this respect it can be called weaker, since intellectual vision is more opposed to the possibility of doubt than assent on account of an extrinsic cause, even the firmest, as occurs in the act of faith. But it is more certain than every other certitude in the sense of infallibility and therefore of adherence. This greater firmness or certitude is founded: 1. on the fact that the authority of God revealing is more essentially opposed to falsity than any other cause of certitude. Hence St. Thomas teaches: "As to firmness of adherence, faith is more certain than every act of understanding and science, because the first truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a stronger cause than the light of reason, which causes the assent of understanding or science" (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14, a. 1, ad 7; II-II, q. 4, a. 8). It is founded: 2. on grace, without which an act of supernatural faith cannot be elicited; for grace is never given for assent to falsity. From this we conclude that the believer ought to be so disposed in soul that he rejects as absolutely erroneous any doctrine whatever which is certainly opposed to doctrine certainly revealed.
Obscurity of faith consists in this, that the believer in the act of faith assents to the revealed object not on account of the intrinsic evidence of the object, but on account of the extrinsic authority of God attesting the truth of the object. This obscurity, which flows from the formal object, is necessarily joined with every act of faith; and it alone must be called essential. The reason for the former is that without the formal object, which in the act of faith is the authority of God, there cannot be an act of faith. The reason for the latter is that according to the more probable opinion even truths evidently known to reason, or admitted on account of their intrinsic evidence, can be believed by divine faith. Once this is posited, only the obscurity which flows from the formal object of faith is essential; but the obscurity which is often present in the material object, as, for example, in mysteries to be believed, or which proceeds from the non-evidence of the fact of divine testimony, is only accidental.
Liberty of faith is that property by which the assent of faith is immune from every necessity. Hermes denied that this is a property of faith, teaching that faith consists in a necessary persuasion induced by compelling reasons, so that when this necessity is lacking, nothing remains except vain credulity.3 The Vatican Council condemned this error: "If anyone says that the assent of Christian faith is necessarily produced by reason, let him be anathema."4 This liberty of faith arises from the fact that in the act of faith the intellect assents to the object to be believed not on account of intrinsic evidence. Hence the act of faith is free with the liberty both of exercise and of contrariety. But if you posit a case in which the material object by its own evidence, acquired by reasoning, is present to the intellect, the liberty of contrariety perishes, yet liberty of exercise remains, because either the assent of science or the assent of faith can be chosen.
Necessity of faith. a) The habit of faith, or habitual faith, is necessary for salvation for all by an absolute necessity of means. For no one is saved without sanctifying grace. But the habit of faith is infused together with sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as sanctifying grace is necessary by necessity of means for individual men, so also is the habit of faith.
b) In what respect the act of faith, or actual faith, is necessary will rather be explained in Book II, where the discussion will concern the exercise or cultivation of virtues.
1 De iustificatione, session 6, chapter 9.
2 Nevertheless he has the merit of faith from the pious affection of credulity, since he is prepared to subject himself to divine authority.
3 Collectio Lacensis, t. VII, p. 529 (17).
4 Session 3, on faith, canon 5.