Following an erroneous conscience

Florus, making a general confession, accuses himself that, while still a boy, he once or twice had had pollution, and had never confessed it, because at that time he did not think it a sin. He adds besides that, now as an adolescent, he shamefully looked at and touched his cousin, and that he confessed this only generally, omitting the circumstance of the cousin, which he did not think necessary. Moreover he says that he often nourished evil thoughts in his mind, but he did not confess them either, thinking for a long time that sin existed only in the work. Likewise he confesses that, having been called into court, although he had given an oath to tell the truth, he told a lie, yet he judged this altogether necessary for saving a friend from a long and hard imprisonment. Lastly, he confesses that, laboring under a grave illness for a year and more, he omitted Mass and did not observe abstinence and fasting.

Q. 1. What is erroneous conscience, and can one follow it? 2. Whether and how did Florus sin?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 98 seqq. To the second: Florus could absolutely, in boyhood, have been ignorant at first of the malice of pollution. Therefore, if in good faith he did not confess that sin because he had no consciousness of sin, he does not seem to be disturbed. I. M. 110.

Likewise he does not seem to be disturbed on account of the omitted circumstance of the cousin, whose special malice of incest he could more easily have been invincibly ignorant of. But this circumstance changes the species in itself with respect to touches, by no means with respect to looks. I. M. 784.

With respect to evil thoughts, good faith and invincible ignorance are admitted with more difficulty. Nevertheless, if Florus affirms that he was ignorant of this sin of thoughts, the confessor must indeed attend and investigate what kind those thoughts were, and whether Florus believed that from a culpably or inculpably erroneous conscience. For if, after prudent investigation has been made, from the rudeness of Florus his good faith appears, he does not seem to be disturbed in this either with respect to past confessions; but he is only to be instructed if he is still in error. For this must besides be attended to here, that good faith and ignorance can also be rather in fact than in law, that is, it can rather be concerning the consent given to the thoughts than concerning the very malice of evil thoughts, if consent accedes to them. I. M. 108.

From the fact that Florus judged a lie necessary for saving his friend, it does not truly follow that he erred in good faith and by invincible ignorance. Therefore Florus is to be questioned further, since it is a matter of grave perjury because of the added oath: whether in fact he thought that he could then lie, indeed perhaps even that he ought to because of the enormous danger in which his friend was placed.

Lastly, Florus did not sin by omitting Mass while held back by grave illness, since a necessity of sinning is not given. The same must be said of abstinence and fasting not observed for the same reason of infirmity; and although perhaps he omitted Mass and abstinence and fasting when he was already beginning to recover, it indeed seems difficult that he truly persuaded himself that he sinned gravely in this matter, if he had still not in fact recovered sufficiently. - Elbel 124-133; G. 37-42; I. M. 98 seqq.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 10 passages

Vol. I, Treatise On Conscience, Chapter I. On Right and Erroneous Conscience

- DEFINITION. Right conscience is that which represents the object as it is in itself; otherwise it must be called erroneous; and indeed it is called invincibly or vincibly erroneous according as the ignorance or error is inculpable or culpable.

Principles. - I. A right conscience commanding must always be followed, because conscience is the proximate rule of the will, derived from the first and highest rule of all human actions. - St. Lig., no. 3.

II. An invincibly erroneous conscience commanding must likewise be followed in every case; because it is altogether to be equated subjectively with right conscience, and because, according to the Apostle, Everything which is not from faith (or according to conscience) is sin. - St. Lig., no. 5.

III. An invincibly erroneous conscience permitting exempts from every sin, because there can be no sin where no malice is apprehended. - St. Lig., ibid.

IV. It is not licit to follow a vincibly erroneous conscience permitting or commanding, because, since by hypothesis the error is vincible, whoever acts with such a conscience errs voluntarily. Nor is it licit to act against it when commanding, because one so acting does that which he judges to be prohibited, and therefore sins. Therefore before action that conscience must be laid aside through inquiry into the truth ¹. - St. Lig., no. 4.

¹ These things hold concerning him who here and now in some way adverts to or suspects the necessity of inquiring before he acts. But it can also happen, as Croix warns (book 1, no. 42), that an error indeed was once culpable, which nevertheless at present someone no longer adverts to, for example, if a confessor once did not sufficiently cultivate theology, or from negligence interrupted its study for too long. And concerning this it is most truly said with St. Thomas (On Truth, q. 17, art. 8, objection 8), that he is never excused from sin, whether he acts according to conscience or against it. And the reason is clear, because that old sin is always present, namely culpable ignorance of those things which one is held to know. Nor is this guilt incurred while someone is now about to act; but it is the fault of diligence once omitted, and independent of the present action; therefore its gravity must be taken not from the action now to be posited, but from the common principles concerning sins of ignorance. And from here the true reason also is clear why in the case he who acts against conscience is more guilty than he who acts according to it. For the latter has only the aforesaid guilt of ignorance. But the former, besides this, adds another present guilt of an action posited against conscience. But if someone has retracted the fault of ignorance by suitable penance and by adding diligence, as is fitting, it is clear that he is to be equated with one who labors under invincible ignorance.

You Will Resolve. - 1. He who thinks that it is a fast when it is not, on account of erroneous conscience sins against the precept if he does not fast.

If someone lies in order to free his neighbor from danger of life, inculpably thinking that from charity he is held to this, he does a good act; and if he does not lie, he sins against charity.

He who with some doubt thinks that he must lie or steal in order to assist his neighbor cannot follow such a conscience nor act against it; but he ought, if he can, to inquire, lay it aside, and afterward act; for such an error is vincible.

YOU WILL ASK. By what signs can the Confessor know that error is vincible in the penitent?

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Conscience in…, Second Question: On Consci…, Article I: On the Rectitude of Conscience · Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Second Part: On the Virtue…, Ch. I, Question One: On the Obligation and Means of Solicitously Forming a Right Conscience

I answer. Let him ask 1. whether he adverted to some indecency in this act? 2. whether his conscience dictated to him that at least the Confessor, or another prudent man, should be asked? 3. whether he neglected the occasion of asking from shame ² or fear? If the penitent responds affirmatively to one or the other of these, he can be considered to be in culpable error; otherwise, if he denies all. - See Cases, no. 37.

² Nevertheless certain persons, as experience teaches, are sometimes prevented by shame from asking even about those things which have no guilt.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 7 passages

Vol. II, Fundamental Moral Theology…, On Conscience

n. 371.

II. In What Sense Is Certain Conscience the Rule of Morals?

1. Principle: Conscience morally and practically certain, and indeed it alone, is the proximate rule of morals.

(A) Conscience morally and practically certain is the proximate rule of human actions. For conscience morally and practically certain, in whatever way this certitude has been acquired, is that which, without prudent fear of erring, judges that some action is licit or illicit, obligatory or permitted; but it cannot happen that he sins who is prudently certain that the action which he does is honorable, or that the one which he omits is illicit. For no action or omission is imputable to anyone unless it is voluntary; but the malice of an action is not voluntary unless it is apprehended as such by the intellect; therefore he does not sin, but acts rightly, who follows a morally certain conscience; therefore this is deservedly called the proximate rule of morals.

n. 372.

(a) Concerning this there is assuredly no difficulty when certain conscience is at the same time true: for then it is altogether consonant with the ultimate rule of morals, namely divine reason. - But the same thing must be said even when certain conscience is invincibly erroneous, because, although it disagrees with the law, the defect of conformity is not imputed to the agent, because it is invincibly unknown by him; and therefore an act elicited according to an invincibly erroneous conscience is objectively and materially evil, as often as namely it is opposed to a law commanding or forbidding, - but subjectively and formally good, because it is apprehended and intended as such. - The same thing must be said of conscience here and now invincibly erroneous, which antecedently was vincibly erroneous. For an act placed according to such a conscience not only is materially evil, but can also be called formally evil in its cause (above, n. 97). Nevertheless it is not in itself actually evil: for it is elicited in good faith, and is not apprehended nor intended as evil: "Every human act has the character of sin or merit insofar as it is voluntary; but the object of the will according to its proper character is the apprehended good: and therefore a human act is judged virtuous according to the apprehended good toward which the will is borne of itself, and not according to the material object of the act."¹

¹ St. Thomas, Quodlibet., III, a. 27; cf. I-II, q. 19, a. 7; q. 76, a. 3.

This can be confirmed from proposition 28, condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 December 1690, at least as rash:² "Although invincible ignorance of natural right be given, this, in the state of fallen nature, does not excuse the one acting from formal sin itself"; therefore invincible ignorance, and consequently invincibly erroneous conscience, excuses from formal sin.

² Denzing., n. 1159.

n. 373.

(b) This holds even when moral certitude is only prudential, and was had by the aid of a reflex principle. For since the question is concerning things to be done, that certitude suffices which can be obtained in practice; now, when the question concerns performing or omitting such or such an action, not rarely only prudential certitude can be acquired. Sometimes speculative doubts arise which it is impossible to solve directly; from another side the necessity of acting presses; therefore nothing remains except to solve the speculative doubt practically by the aid of some reflex principle (above, n. 369). Thus he who, after all things have been diligently weighed, follows the prudent dictate of conscience, acts rightly before God.

n. 374.

(B) Certain conscience alone, morally and practically certain, is the right norm of actions. For he who acts with conscience which is not practically certain, by that very fact voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of transgressing the law, since he prudently and practically doubts whether the action, here and now to be placed, is licit; moreover, he who voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, while he can easily avoid it, by that very fact implicitly wills to sin. Therefore he who practically doubts concerning the liceity of an action here and now to be performed cannot, while the doubt stands, proceed further, but ought to form for himself a practically certain conscience, by the aid of a reflex principle, according to the manner to be explained below.

n. 375.

Corollaries. (A) Conscience here and now vincibly erroneous is not a legitimate rule of acting. For, from one side, that conscience is not consonant with the objective rule of morals; and from the other, that defect, as being actually voluntary, is imputable to the agent; since, in this case, the agent prudently doubts concerning the liceity of the action, and therefore ought to inquire further, if he can, and put away the error. - But if he cannot, and from another side the necessity of acting presses, he ought to choose that part in which evil, or the greater evil, is more safely guarded against; for by acting thus, he puts aside the practical doubt, and the error is not imputed to him unto fault. But if he chooses that of whose liceity he practically doubts, by that very fact he sins, by rashly exposing himself to perpetrating evil.

n. 376.

(B) To discern whether the conscience of the penitent was vincibly or invincibly erroneous, the confessor will ask: (a) whether the penitent perceived some indecency in the act, or at least doubted concerning its liceity; (b) whether conscience dictated to him that the confessor or another prudent man was to be asked, and he voluntarily neglected the occasion of inquiring. If he sincerely denies both, the error was invincible; if he affirms either, the error must be called vincible. - But the nature and gravity of the sin committed from vincibly erroneous conscience depends on the very disposition of the agent at the time when he acts: if he apprehends the matter rather clearly as of great moment, and as contrary to this or that virtue, he sins gravely against that same virtue; but if the matter seems to him of slight moment, or its malice appears only confusedly, the sin will be venial. - From this it is clear how necessary it is for confessors kindly and prudently to explore the conscience and character of each penitent, so that they may form a true judgment concerning the sins committed by him.

n. 377.

Hence penitents are deceived who, after they have acted in doubt, seek in books or from a prudent man whether the action is licit, and lay aside every anxiety if they learn that the matter is not objectively evil: the morality of an action depends on the dictate of conscience brought forth at the very instant at which the action is completed, but not on the judgment which is afterward brought, when the matter has been better investigated. Whence that investigation will indeed be greatly useful for the future, but by no means for the past time.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 2 passages

Vol. I, Its Subject, Norm, and Object, Morality, Its Subject, Norm, and Object, Ch. III, Section 3: Requisites of a Normal Conscience

n. ¶2.

Conscience is called erroneous (conscientia erronea) when its dictates are not in harmony with the moral law.¹ The mistake may be owing to a false conception of the law (error iuris), or to a wrong application of its provisions to a concrete fact (error facti), or to a faulty conclusion formed with regard to the latter (iudicium facti).²

¹ Cfr. Rom. XIV, 23; 1 Cor. VIII, 7; X, 25 sqq.; John XVI, 2.

² Cfr. St. Thomas, De Veritate, qu. 17, art. 2: "Conscience is nothing other than the application of knowledge to some particular act. In this application error can occur in two ways: in one way, because that which is applied contains an error in itself; in another way, because it is not applied correctly. —Cfr. 1 Cor. VIII, 1-13.

n. ¶3.

If a mistake is made that could have been avoided, the conclusion is said to be vincibly erroneous (error vincibilis). In this case an act may be sinful, not because the agent has obeyed his conscience, but because the error was willed in the cause (voluntarium in causa). An er roneous conscience is invincible (error invincibilis) if the mistake committed was absolutely unavoidable. To follow the dictates of an invincibly erroneous conscience is no sin, even when the act performed is objectively evil. On the contrary, it would be sinful to act against one's conscience, even if, in acting against it, one would be objectively in the right. Of course, the mistake must be corrected as soon as it is realized.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 8 passages

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. I, Chapter I: On True and Erroneous Conscience

n. ¶15.

Definition. True conscience is that which dictates the truth of the thing. It rightly concludes from true principles that something is lawful or unlawful, which in reality is such. Erroneous conscience is that which dictates the false as true, whether it assumes for itself a false principle, or deduces false conclusions from a true principle (I, 3).

True conscience, strictly speaking, is not the same as right conscience, although it is sometimes used promiscuously; for true is said according to what is, but right according to what is apprehended. Namely, TRUE is that which in reality is such in itself; RIGHT is that which is done according to the rules of prudence, in other words, that which truly and really is conformed to right appetite, as St. Thomas says (Eth., VI, 1. 2). Hence right conscience can be predicated, although per accidens, even of him who labors under invincibly erroneous conscience, as will be said below. Cf. Beaudouin, q. 1, § 1.

n. ¶16.

Division. Erroneous conscience is either invincibly or vincibly erroneous.

Invincibly erroneous conscience is that whose error morally cannot be overcome or laid aside; because, a) either the thought or doubt of error in no way, not even confusedly, comes into the mind of the one acting, while he places the action or its cause; or because, b) although doubt of error has come into the mind, nevertheless, with moral diligence applied for attaining the truth, the error cannot be driven away.
Vincibly erroneous conscience is called that whose error man does not lay aside through neglect. Therefore he operates with vincibly erroneous conscience who a) either already notices the error in some way, or b) at least

doubts about the error, and at the same time notices the obligation of overcoming it, and nevertheless does not inquire into the truth.

But diligence in inquiring into the truth is not required to be the greatest; ordinary and common diligence suffices, such as prudent men of the same condition are accustomed to apply in like circumstances.

Note. Those things which later in the various treatises, on Laws, on Sins, on Censures, etc., will come to be said concerning ignorance will explain the present matter more perfectly. See n. 22.

n. ¶17.

Principles. I. We are always bound to obey a true conscience, whether prescribing or prohibiting. This is clear from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 14:23): But all that is not from faith (that is, from the dictate of conscience) is sin. And from Innocent III (c. Litteras, de restit. spol.): "Whatever is done against conscience builds toward gehenna." The reason is that true conscience is the right application of the law, and a manifestation of the divine will, to which it is always unlawful to resist.

St. Bonaventure very beautifully expresses this office of conscience, saying: "Conscience is like the herald of God and His messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as though from God, as a herald when he publishes the edict of the king" (L. 2 Sentent., dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3).

n. ¶18.

II. We can obey a true conscience permitting or counseling, but we are not bound. For 1. it belongs to a permitting conscience truly and absolutely to dictate that some action is neither prescribed nor prohibited, therefore; 2. but it belongs to a counseling conscience to declare that something is better and of counsel. But this is the nature of counsel, that it indeed brings in the merit of reward in the one carrying it out, but no guilt of fault and penalty in the one omitting it. Hence that saying: "He who passes over counsel does not sin, provided contempt is absent" (St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 17, a. 3 and 4).

n. ¶19.

Nevertheless it must be noted that what the law in general only counsels or permits can in the particular case be prescribed or prohibited by conscience, namely when there are peculiar circumstances which, in a special case and for a determined person, clearly manifest the obliging will of God; as will be clear from the things to be said concerning vocation to the clerical or religious state (cf. n. 1916, q. 3 and n. 2141).

n. ¶20.

The principal means by which the treasure of a true and right conscience is acquired are these: 1. knowledge of the law of the Lord, in which each one can progress by continual study, by reading good books, by consulting the doctors of the Church, and especially by questioning and humbly listening to the Church herself, who is the supreme mistress of consciences. 2. Mortification of vices. This mortification is absolutely necessary, because the practical judgment of reason, on account of the evil inclination of the will, often turns away from the truth. 3. Prayer, or assiduous conversation with the Divine Teacher, who speaks within without the noise of words, and raises up to Himself a docile mind in a point of time so that it grasps more reasons of eternal truth than if it had studied in the schools for ten years (Imit. Chr., l. 3, c. 43).

n. ¶21.

III. It is right to follow an invincibly erroneous conscience permitting; one must follow it when it prescribes or prohibits. The reason for both is that "a human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the apprehended good, toward which the will is borne of itself, and not according to the material object of the act" (St. Thomas, quodl. 3, a. 27; St. Alphonsus, I, 5).

The first is also clear: 1. From the words of the Lord (John 15:22): If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin. 2. From the saying of St. Augustine (de Lib. arb., l. 3, c. 19, n. 53): "That which you unwillingly do not know is not imputed to you as fault." 3. From the second proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: "Although there be invincible ignorance of the natural law, this does not excuse the one acting from formal sin." So Baius and Jansenius (cf. Viva, on this proposition).

The second is proved: 1. From the doctrine of the Apostle (Rom. 14:22), saying that one who eats meats which he judges it unlawful to eat, as having been sacrificed to idols, truly sins, because he acts against faith, that is, conscience.

From reason: the will is borne toward the object not according as it is in itself, but according as it is proposed by reason. Hence St. Thomas says (1.2, q. 19, a. 5): "When erring reason proposes something as a precept of God, then it is the same thing to contemn the dictate of reason and the precept of God."¹ Hence he who acts against an invincibly erroneous conscience (if it obliges) commits sin of the same species as if he acted against a true conscience.

It is useful to note that one acting with invincibly erroneous conscience not only does not sin, but also more probably acquires merit for himself. "The reason is that, in order to call some act good, at least inadequately, it suffices that it be directed by the dictate of reason and prudence. Therefore, since the one acting acts prudently, without doubt he ought to merit on account of the good end by which he is led in acting, namely the end of the glory of God or of charity toward neighbor, etc.; just as, on the contrary, he would demerit who does a good work, but apprehended as evil, on account of the evil end by which he carries out that work" (I, 6). So the doctors very commonly with St. Bernard, "who teaches that a subject obeying a prelate from a right intention acts meritoriously, although materially he errs against the law" (de Praec. et disp., c. 14, n. 21). Cf. I, 7 and 173, 174.

n. ¶22.

IV. No one can follow a vincibly erroneous conscience permitting, nor contemn one prescribing or prohibiting; but each one is bound to lay it aside. For 1. By operating according to a permitting conscience of this kind, a man sins, because he does what in reality is evil in itself; nor does ignorance excuse him from fault, since, as vincible, it makes his act voluntary in its cause (cf. n. 288). Thus a judge who already notices that he does not sufficiently know a case debated in court cannot cast his vote for either side; but he is bound to acquire for himself a more perfect knowledge of the matter, so that he may thus be able to render a just sentence; otherwise he would rashly commit himself to the danger of erring, and accordingly would stain himself with sin. 2. By operating against an obliging conscience of this kind, he likewise sins, because he chooses what he judges to be evil. Thus, he who erroneously judges that he must lie or steal in order to help his neighbor, and at the same time notices the obligation of further inquiring into the truth, cannot follow such a conscience, nor act against it (I, 4).

Yet in order that one sin by acting against erroneous conscience, his action must be free. Hence the ignorant man does not sin, even if he believes himself to sin, when, being unable, he omits to hear Mass on a feast day; when he suffers involuntary distractions in prayer, or nocturnal pollutions in sleep.

Note. That the confessor may more easily judge whether the conscience of a penitent was vincibly or invincibly erroneous, let him ask him: a) whether he truly doubted concerning the lawfulness of the act, b) whether he attended to the obligation of searching into the matter further? If he answers affirmatively, we have one laboring under a vincibly erroneous conscience. Nevertheless the responses of a scrupulous person must be weighed according to the things soon to be said. Cf. n. 319, 337.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 8 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract IV. On Conscience, Chapter II. On True And Erroneous Conscience

n. 306.

306. Principle 1. Man is bound to apply serious solicitude toward always having a true or right conscience.

The reason is obvious. For conscience is the proximate norm of morality, which ought to direct our whole moral life. Now man is bound to inquire into the right norm of morality, since otherwise great dangers of salvation arise. Therefore the Angelic Doctor²⁶ says: "The inquiry of reason is necessary before judgment concerning things to be chosen."

The principal means for obtaining a true and right conscience are:

a) Diligence in knowing the laws governing moral life. The highest diligence indeed is not required, but ordinary diligence suffices, which God-fearing men are accustomed to have by attending to the condition of persons and the gravity of the law.

b) The seeking of counsel made among experts, especially if there is question of difficult and unclear matters. Hence, when a doubt exists, a confessor or ecclesiastical superior is to be consulted.

c) Prayer. For God is to be prayed to: "Give me understanding, and I shall learn Thy commandments,"²⁷ and: "Teach me goodness and discipline and knowledge."²⁸

d) Removal of impediments, which are disordered passions, depraved habits, the darkness of sins not yet remitted, etc.

²⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 14, a. 1.

²⁷ Ps. 118, 73.

²⁸ Ibid. 66.

n. 307.

307. Principle 2. Man is bound to follow conscience commanding or prohibiting: a) if it is true or right; b) if it is invincibly erroneous.

I said deliberately: commanding or prohibiting; for if conscience permits some act or only counsels it, then there is no strict obligation of following this conscience.

The first part of the principle stated is easily proved; indeed, it is clear per se.²⁹ For since from the things said above it is established that conscience is nothing other than the application of law in a particular case, it follows that, just as a just law commanding or prohibiting obliges, so also the right application of law made through conscience induces a moral obligation. Therefore in this case true and right conscience obliges gravely or lightly, in the same way as the law commanding or prohibiting obliges.

The other part of the principle is proved both from authority and from reason. And first indeed from authority. Jesus rebukes the Pharisees, saying: "If you were blind, you would not have sin; but now you say: Because we see. Your sin remains."³⁰ Here the Savior speaks of spiritual blindness, that is, of an invincibly erroneous conscience, which would have excused the Pharisees if it had truly been present.³¹ St. Paul³² says: "All that is not from faith is sin." St. Thomas³³ and exegetes commonly understand this text not so much of supernatural faith as of belief, persuasion, or conscience, so that its sense is: whatever man does against his own persuasion or conscience is sin. That this interpretation is legitimate follows from the context; for St. Paul speaks in the cited place concerning the eating of foods which are not evil in themselves, but which certain Christians judged to be evil and unclean, as prohibited by the Mosaic law; and then he teaches that one sins gravely who, truly thinking eating of this kind to be gravely illicit, nevertheless eats. - Innocent III³⁴ says: "If he acts otherwise [against conscience], he builds toward Gehenna." The Angelic Doctor³⁵ asserts: "Simply every will discordant from reason, whether right or erring, is always evil," and: "When erring reason proposes something as a precept of God, then to contemn the dictate of reason and the precept of God is the same." - From the authorities brought forward thus far it is abundantly established that man always sins when he acts against conscience.

Reason also manifestly proves the principle stated: a) Everything is formal sin which is against the known rule of morals. But conscience is the proximate rule of morals, as was said above. Therefore whatever is against conscience becomes sin. b) Goodness and malice are taken from the object, not as it is in itself, but as it is proposed by reason or conscience; for the will is a blind power following the guidance of reason and seeking nothing unless proposed by reason, and indeed in that mode in which it is proposed. Therefore if reason or conscience proposes (although invincibly erroneously) an object as morally evil, then the will embracing such an object wills evil and sins formally.³⁶

²⁹ Even Cicero said: "In his whole life it is not fitting that anyone depart a fingernail's breadth from right conscience" (Ep. ad Attic. 13, 20).

³⁰ John 9, 41.

³¹ Cf. also John 15, 22.

³² Rom. 14, 23.

³³ Lect. III in cap. 14 ep. ad Rom. and S. theol. 1, 2, q. 19, a. 5.

³⁴ c. 13, X 2, 13.

³⁵ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 19, a. 5; cf. also De verit. q. 17, a. 4.

³⁶ Cf. Billuart, De consc. a. 2.

n. 308.

308. Corollaries very much to be noted in practice are derived from the principle thus explained.

1. Conscience clearly commanding or prohibiting has been constituted in our soul by God as king or leader, whom not to obey is always unlawful. Hence conscience must be obeyed rather than any created power.

2. He who by erring invincibly thinks that he ought to lie in order to save a friend is bound to lie, and by lying he commits not a formal sin, but only a material one. But if in this case he did not lie, he would commit a formal sin, because he would act against conscience (although erroneous).

3. He who by erring invincibly thinks that today there is a prescribed fast, which nevertheless in reality there is not, and notwithstanding such conviction does not fast, commits a formal sin of disobedience toward the Church, although there is no material injury of ecclesiastical law, since it does not exist. The reason is that he contemns a precept of the Church which he thinks exists.

n. 309.

309. Exceptions. 1. He who posits an act with which he erroneously thinks a penalty is joined, for example, a censure, reservation, etc., indeed sins, but in reality does not incur this penalty. Hence he who certainly but erroneously thinks that some book has been prohibited by the Church under penalty of excommunication, and notwithstanding such conviction reads that book, indeed sins gravely, because he contemns the Church, but he is not excommunicated, because this penalty has not been enacted except against those who read books really and not only putatively prohibited under penalty of excommunication.

2. He who from erroneous conscience thinks that he sins from the involuntary omission of an act impossible for him does not sin in reality; for example, if someone detained in prison were to think that he sins from the omission of Sunday Mass, which in reality he cannot hear because of incarceration, he does not sin, notwithstanding his erroneous conscience. The reason is that this omission is involuntary and no sin is given unless voluntary. Yet the better reason is that no one of sound mind can persuade himself that he is bound to something altogether impossible; and therefore in the case conscience is already not invincibly erroneous, or, if it truly is so, such a man, as scrupulous or demented, is not capable of sin.

n. 310.

310. Principle 3. It is not licit to follow a vincibly erroneous conscience; nor yet is it even licit to act against such a conscience; but the error is to be laid aside before action.

Thus the opinion more common today, to which nevertheless several writers, especially older ones, in some way contradict, such as Billuart (l. c.), John of St. Thomas, etc. A man acting with a vincibly erroneous conscience is never excused from sin, whether he acts according to or against conscience. The reason is that he voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, which indeed in the case is already sin. Therefore in this case man is bound either to desist from the action or to lay aside the erroneous conscience.³⁷ - But if such danger of sinning is absent, then it is licit to act with a vincibly erroneous conscience. For example, if someone with an erroneous conscience thinks that he ought to hear Mass, he is not bound first to lay aside this vincibly erroneous conscience if in reality he hears Mass; for to hear Mass is a good act. Therefore the following rule is to be observed by him who labors under a vincibly erroneous conscience:

1. Let him lay it aside by seeking the truth through suitable means, for example, through prayer, deliberation, petition for counsel, etc.; 2. but if he cannot lay it aside, let him desist from the action; 3. but if he cannot even desist from the action, let him choose that which is safer.

³⁷ Cf. what was said above in n. 45 sqq. concerning invincible and vincible ignorance.

n. 311.

311. Signs for discerning an invincibly erroneous conscience from a vincibly erroneous one are chiefly the following: let the confessor ask the penitent whether he noticed any indecency in this act, or at least whether conscience dictated to him that investigations concerning the licitness of the act were to be made. But if the penitent denies both, his conscience was invincibly erroneous.

n. 312.

312. Specific moral malice of an act committed against an invincibly erroneous conscience. The sin of one acting against an invincibly erroneous conscience is of the same species and gravity as if he acted against right conscience in the same matter. Therefore St. Thomas³⁸ teaches: "When erroneous conscience dictates that something is to be done, it dictates it under some aspect of good, or as if it were a work of justice or temperance, and so concerning the others; and therefore the transgressor incurs a vice contrary to that virtue under whose species conscience dictates that thing; or if it dictates that thing under the species of a divine precept, or only of some prelate, he incurs the sin of disobedience by transgressing conscience." Hence, for example, he who omits a lie which from invincible error he thinks that he ought to tell in order to save a friend sins against charity or even against justice; he who omits in sacramental confession an objectively indifferent act which from invincible error he thought necessarily had to be declared commits the sin of sacrilege.

Grave or light theological malice. It sometimes happens that a penitent apprehends only in general the malice of some act, not thinking whether the act is gravely or lightly evil, for example, in the reading of depraved books. Then an act of this kind is to be judged by the confessor as grave or light according as the penitent is of lax or God-fearing conscience. For if he is of lax conscience, the presumption stands against him; but if he is of God-fearing conscience, the presumption stands for him.

Admonition. Confessors, preachers, and other directors of souls should observe carefully that they instruct the faithful committed to them rightly and without exaggerations. First, let them not propose as commands properly so called those things which in reality are only counsels or pious customs; for example, let them most urgently recommend morning and evening prayers to the faithful, but at the same time say openly that their omission is not a proper sin per se. Moreover let them avoid all exaggerations by insinuating that something is a grave sin which in reality is only a light transgression. "Hence let it be observed," says St. Alphonsus,³⁹ "into what danger those thrust themselves who, following rigid doctrine, easily condemn men for mortal sin in those matters in which grave malice does not appear by evident reason, thus exposing them to the danger of eternal damnation; and the same must be said of those who easily brand with the mark of laxity opinions which do not seem openly improbable."

All these things agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas,⁴⁰ who teaches: "Every question in which inquiry is made concerning mortal sin is determined dangerously unless the truth is had expressly; ... the error by which something is believed to be mortal which is not mortal binds from conscience to mortal sin."

³⁸ De verit. q. 17, a. 4 ad 9.

³⁹ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 52.

⁴⁰ Quodl. 9, a. 15.

n. 313.

313. Scholion. On the moral goodness of an act committed from invincible error. Especially in the eighteenth century it was disputed most sharply among theologians whether invincibly erroneous conscience not only obliges so that to go against it is sin, but also whether to follow it is good, indeed even meritorious. For example, is he who from invincibly erroneous conscience lied not only free from formal sin, but also, by lying, has he performed a good act? That such a man is free from formal sin is certain against Lutherans and Jansenists. For Alexander VIII condemned the proposition (31): "Although invincible ignorance of natural right be granted, in the state of fallen nature this does not excuse one acting from it from mortal sin." But is the act produced from invincibly erroneous conscience truly morally good? - St. Alphonsus⁴¹ calls the affirmative opinion more probable and most common, because, as St. Thomas testifies,⁴² "a human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the apprehended good to which the will is borne per se, and not according to the material object of the act." Against this opinion Concina⁴³ inveighs vehemently, especially insisting on the adage admitted by all: "Good is from the whole cause, evil from any defect whatever." He also proclaims that it is an intolerable absurdity that someone from a crime, for example, from idolatry committed with invincible ignorance, should merit eternal life. Thus he says: "What is more opposed to common sense than that crimes and horrendous wicked deeds should by a portentous metamorphosis be transformed into virtues, into merit of eternal life? By what power? - Divine? - Far from it. - By what then? Hear and be astonished: by the power of human error. Therefore the error of our mind is another God." - This controversy seems to us to be purely theoretical and to produce no practical usefulness. For each opinion concedes these two things: 1. a material sin committed from invincibly erroneous conscience induces no moral fault; 2. the good intention joined to this work is a virtuous and meritorious work (the other requisites being posited). Therefore the only difference consists in determining whether a materially evil work, namely accepted separately, has good morality or evil morality. Or, so that the matter may be shown in a concrete example: did the Patriarch Jacob, exercising carnal intercourse with Leah, whom he invincibly thought to be his legitimate wife, perform a less good work than if he had performed the same act with his legitimate wife? - Speaking theoretically, Concina's opinion does not seem to us altogether to be despised because of the reasons brought forward by him and because of the authority of St. Thomas, who says: "That which is done against law is always evil; nor is it excused by the fact that it is according to conscience."⁴⁴ Already St. Bernard⁴⁵ discusses this controversy at greater length and concludes: "A depraved intention altogether condemns the good, and a right intention does not wholly excuse the evil. Therefore whether you think evil to be good, which perhaps you do, or good to be evil, which you perform, each is sin." But perhaps one would say more rightly that such a work, evil in itself materially (with the good intention prescinded), is amoral, because it is not voluntary in the genus of morals.

⁴¹ L. c. l. 1, n. 6. R. Beaudouin, O. Pr., De conscientia p. 24; E. Muller, Theol. mor. I, § 72; many moderns teach the same opinion.

⁴² Quodl. 3, a. 27.

⁴³ De consc. diss. 1, c. 5. Concina's opinion has obtained few followers. Cf. La Croix, Theol. mor. lib. 1, n. 14-34.

⁴⁴ Quodl. 8, n. 13. Yet these words can rightly be understood of merely objective malice. Cf. Billuart, De conscientia a. 2, obj. 4.

⁴⁵ De praecept. et dispensat. c. 14 (Migne, Patr. lat. 182, 883).

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 5 passages

Vol. I, Treatise on Conscience, Ch. I, False, and Perplexed Conscience

n. ¶33.

33. Definition. - True conscience is that which from true principles rightly concludes that something is lawful or unlawful, which truly is such; as if someone from this true principle: it is not lawful to obey parents commanding sin, should infer: therefore it is unlawful for me to perpetrate this theft which they command me. - True conscience, strictly speaking, is not the same as right conscience, although sometimes they are used promiscuously; for true is said according to what is, but right according to what is apprehended. Namely, true is that which really in itself is such; but right is that which is done according to the rules of prudence. Hence right conscience can be predicated even of him who labors under an invincibly false conscience; for he acts prudently, since he acts from an intimate and insuperable persuasion. You have an example in him who, from invincible error, thinks that it is not a fast day when it truly is. His conscience is not indeed true, but nevertheless is right.

n. ¶34.

34. - False (or erroneous) conscience is that which dictates as true and lawful that which nevertheless in itself is false and unlawful.

A twofold false conscience is distinguished: invincible and vincible. Invincible is that which morally cannot be overcome, since no thought or doubt of error, not even in the confused, comes into the mind of the one acting while he places the action or its cause. But vincible is that which the one acting can and ought to overcome, because a) he has already noticed the error, or at least doubts about it, and b) at the same time notices the obligation of overcoming it; nevertheless c) he neglects to overcome it. Thus conscience is invincibly erroneous in him who, not even confusedly noticing that it is a fast day, eats meat; but vincibly erroneous in the same person if, suspecting that it is a fast day, he notices the obligation of inquiring about the matter, and nevertheless neglects to inquire.

n. ¶35.

35. Principles. - I. True conscience, commanding, must always be followed. For conscience is the herald of law, or of God, in the case truly commanding; therefore he who refuses to obey true conscience refuses to obey God Himself.

II. Invincibly erroneous conscience, whether commanding or prohibiting, must likewise be followed in every case. It is proved: a) From Sacred Scripture: Everything that is not from faith (according to the dictate of conscience) is sin.¹

b) From reason. For the object of the will is good and evil, not in whatever way, but formally insofar as it is in the apprehension of the intellect; whence, when the intellect apprehends something as a moral good that is necessary and commanded, although in reality it is not good nor commanded, indeed is evil and prohibited, the will, by rejecting it, consents to a transgression of law. Again, if the intellect apprehends something and proposes it to the will as morally evil and prohibited, although in reality it is not evil nor prohibited, indeed is good or permitted and even commanded, the will, by embracing it, consents to an evil and prohibited object, and therefore sins. Thus he who thinks that there is a fast when there is not, on account of erroneous conscience sins against the precept if he does not fast.

III. Invincibly erroneous conscience permitting exempts from every sin, because there can be no sin where no malice is apprehended. Thus he does not sin who lies in order to free his neighbor from danger of life, invincibly thinking that this is lawful for him in the case.

IV. It is not permitted to follow a vincibly erroneous conscience, whether permitting or commanding, because, since by hypothesis the error is vincible, whoever acts with such a conscience errs voluntarily. Nor is it permitted to act against it when it is commanding or prohibiting, because by acting thus he does that which he judges prohibited, and therefore sins.

Therefore before the action that conscience must be laid aside through inquiry into the truth. Thus he who with some doubt thinks that he must lie or steal in order to assist his neighbor cannot follow such a conscience nor act against it; but he must, if he can, inquire, lay it aside, and afterwards act; for such error is vincible.

Nevertheless, one acting against a vincibly erroneous conscience does not incur penalties latae sententiae against transgressors of that law against which by error he thinks that he is acting; because penalties are inflicted on transgressors of the law truly, not putatively. Thus, for example, he who strikes a layman, thinking him to be a cleric, does not incur excommunication.

n. ¶36.

36. Practical admonitions. A) A confessor will be able more easily to judge that the conscience of his penitent was invincibly erroneous:

1° If the thing ignored is not concerning the first moral principles, or concerning conclusions proximately connected with them; for these are inscribed by nature itself in the hearts of all. Hence, if someone admits that in his past life he perpetrated openly dishonorable things, but did not have them as sins, do not easily believe him, unless the matter is of a sin committed by a child or an uneducated person, or with some circumstance apparently making it honorable, and not prolonged for a longer time.

2° If it is not concerning the obligations of one's own state; for this ignorance is ordinarily culpable in its cause. Hence St. Thomas teaches that a judge who errs in passing sentence is not excused on the ground that he is ignorant of laws which, by reason of his office, he was bound to have learned.¹ - But by length of time vincible ignorance can become invincible. For just as it happens that you forget those things which you once learned, so a fortiori it happens that the memory of your ignorance entirely slips away from you; in which case, indeed, new errors and errors of good faith will not be culpable in themselves, but in the cause, or as effects of culpable ignorance, so long as the cause itself has not been retracted, at least indirectly, through penance.

3° If the penitent is sufficiently diligent and accurate in fulfilling those things which are wont to be performed by others of the same condition; or, if noticing that through ignorance he has violated a precept, he grieves and is saddened; for through these things his good faith is rightly presumed.

B) Erroneous conscience can in no way bind unless the matter is placed in the free choice of man. Hence they do not sin who unwillingly are agitated either by obscene imaginations, or by blasphemous and heretical thoughts, although they falsely believe that they are either giving consent to these things, or even by error judge it a great fault to be touched by thoughts so horrible.

C) Great prudence is required in the theologian, preacher, confessor, instructor of boys, nurses, parents, in a word in all those who must direct others, lest by exaggerating erroneous conscience they induce it in them. Yet do not understand this in such a way as if, when preaching, it were not permitted to you with more vehement speech to censure certain things which, although they are not in themselves mortal, are exceedingly dangerous. See St. Alph. L. III. n. 55. § cum ego munus, etc.

n. ¶37.

37. - Perplexed conscience is called that by which someone thinks that he sins whichever of two incompatible precepts he neglects. Such would be the conscience, for example, in him who, assisting a sick person, thinks that he would sin both if he should leave the sick person in order to be present at Mass, and if, conversely, he should omit Mass in order to remain at home in the care of the sick person.

He who labors under a perplexed conscience, if he can suspend the action without grave harm, is bound to suspend it until he has consulted experts; for each person must avoid that by which he thinks God is offended. But if he cannot suspend his action, as ordinarily happens, he is bound to choose the lesser evil; for the will cannot tend into that which appears the greater evil, because thus it would freely choose this excess of malice. But if he cannot discern which is the lesser evil, then whichever part he chooses, he does not sin; because he is indeed free physically by reason of the act, but he is not free morally by reason of sin; for there can be no sin in that which in no way can be guarded against.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 167 passages

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Conscience in…, Second Question: On Consci…, Article I: On the Rectitude of Conscience

n. ¶1.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 3, 5, 6; De Veritate, q. 17, a. 2, 3, 4; II Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 3; Quodlibet III, 26, 27.

n. 206.

206. Notions. - Conscience must be right. Now by reason of the object, or of conformity with the law, conscience is distinguished as twofold: true and erroneous, according as it dictates the truth of the thing or falsity. True conscience, namely, is that which from true principles dictates that something in particular is licit or illicit which really is such, namely, which is truly good or evil. Erroneous conscience is that which from false principles, nevertheless reputed true, dictates that something in particular is licit or illicit which really is not such, for example, that what in itself is good or indifferent is evil, or that what in itself is evil is good. It is erroneously vincible if it can be conquered by moral diligence, but voluntarily is not conquered, whether directly by design, or indirectly from negligence; invincibly, if it cannot be conquered by moral diligence, either because someone has in no way, not even confusedly, thought about the truth to be inquired into, or because, sincerely inquiring into the truth, he has not arrived at it. But if conscience errs from an error which before was vincible, but now is invincible, although the preceding error was a sin and so much graver as the greater evils foreseen as to follow from it were greater, nevertheless the actual judgment of conscience itself is truly invincible.

n. 206.

Now it is asked whether both consciences, true and erroneous, are a rule of acting and in some way sufficiently right. To solve this question, many have distinguished negative conformity and positive conformity with conscience, saying that every conscience always obligates lest we act against it, but that not every conscience, namely erroneous conscience, always obligates us to act according to it: negatively, namely, it is licit to act against no conscience, but it is not always required that we act positively according to it. But that distinction is generally useless: for one who does not act according to a conscience commanding and prohibiting, but does not do what it commands or does not avoid what it prohibits, by that very fact also acts against conscience, because he does what it prohibits or omits what it commands. Hence by equal reason, in the mode of one response, we shall answer both at the same time.

207. Principle I. True conscience is per se the rule of acting, so that if it is commanding or prohibiting, we are bound to conform ourselves to it both negatively, by not acting against it, and positively, by acting according to it.

It is said: a) per se, that is, from its nature, because it faithfully exhibits the law as it is in itself, whence it binds absolutely and in every event, and therefore an act conformed to it is per se good;

b) if it is commanding or prohibiting: for if it counsels or permits, to act against it is not illicit, because we are not bound to do or omit what is commanded or prohibited by no law; for conscience counseling binds us not to contemn it, not that we fulfill it. But we can always act according to a true conscience; indeed we also have the right so to act.

It is proved: 1) from Scripture, Rom. XIV, 23: Everything that is not from faith (uit goeder trouw, de bonne foi) is sin, that is, he who does not act from belief, persuasion, the judgment of conscience, sins, as the Fathers commonly understand.

By reason: conscience, because it intimates and applies the law, is the proximate rule of human acts, according to which their moral being is measured. But true conscience rightly applies the law, for it is a faithful herald. Therefore an act which departs from it is not conformable to the law but is morally evil. This is confirmed: true conscience is the law itself certainly known by us and applied to the act. But we are bound to follow the known law. Therefore.

208. Principle II. Invincibly erroneous conscience is per accidens the rule of acting, so that if it is commanding or prohibiting we are bound to conform ourselves to it both negatively, by not acting against it, and positively, by acting according to it.

It is said: a) per accidens, that is, not from its nature, because it is not conformable to the law, but by reason of ignorance, because it is believed to be conformable to it; whence it does not bind in every event but under a condition, if it endures and as long as it is not laid aside; and therefore an act conformed to it is good per accidens;

b) if it is commanding or prohibiting: for if it counsels or permits, to act against it is not illicit, because invincible error excuses from sin; nevertheless we do not have the right of acting according to it, because there is no right to follow error.

It is proved: 1) from the Scriptures: he who acts against an invincibly erroneous conscience does not act from faith or from persuasion, and accordingly according to the Apostle (Rom. XIV, 23) he sins. This is clearer from the context in which the Apostle, speaking of the eating of foods which in themselves are not evil but by many were erroneously held to be unclean, as if prohibited by the Mosaic law, teaches that those sin who truly think the eating illicit; for in v. 14 he says: I know and trust in the Lord Jesus that nothing is common (that is, unclean) through itself except to him who esteems that it is common; that is, I am certain that no food from its nature is unclean except for him who thinks that it is unclean. And in v. 23: But he who distinguishes, if he eats, is condemned, because not from faith; that is, he who doubts concerning the liceity of food, if he eats what he doubts to be unclean, is condemned because he has not acted from the persuasion (good faith) of conscience; a fortiori he who would eat what he certainly judged to be unclean. Similarly I Cor. VIII, 7: But some, with conscience even now of the idol, eat as idolothyte, and their conscience, since it is weak, is polluted. Likewise Gal. V, 3: I testify to every man circumcising himself that he is a debtor to do the whole law; that is, he who falsely thinks circumcision necessary for himself unto salvation, while this judgment of conscience remains, is consequently bound to observe the whole law. Whence Christ the Lord teaches that invincible error excuses, but not vincible error (Jn. IX, 41; XV, 24).

By reason: a) if invincibly erroneous conscience proposes something as the law of God, this is taken by the erring person as the law itself; therefore if he withdraws from this, he wills to withdraw from the law of God and thus contemns it, and acts badly. Thus, if someone falsely believed that the precept of a legate was the emperor's, by contemning the precept of the legate he would contemn the precept of the emperor (a. 5, ad 1 and 2).

b) A human act tends into the object as it is proposed by reason; therefore if erring reason proposes something as evil and man wills it, he does something which he judges evil, and thus is borne toward it under the aspect of evil and wills evil. And conversely concerning good. This is confirmed: the will is a blind power; whence its goodness and malice do not depend upon the object as it is in itself, but as it is proposed by reason and in the mode in which it is proposed (a. 5; Quodlibet III, 27).

209. Principle III. Vincibly erroneous conscience is not a legitimate rule of acting. For although it obligates that we conform ourselves to it when commanding, under the condition that it not be laid aside, nevertheless there is present the obligation of laying it aside if perhaps it is a cause of acting evil or of omitting a prescribed good; whence we can neither act against it nor according to it.

Let it not be said that in the case man necessarily sins, and is perplexed, not knowing what he should do in order to avoid evil. For, as St. Thomas says, q. 19, a. 6, ad 3: "Just as in syllogistic matters, when one unsuitable thing has been given, others necessarily follow, so in moral matters, when one unsuitable thing has been posited, others follow of necessity; as, supposing that someone seeks vainglory, whether on account of vainglory he does what he is bound to do, or omits it, he will always sin; nor nevertheless is he perplexed, because he can lay aside the evil intention. And similarly, supposing an error of reason or conscience which proceeds from ignorance not excusing, it is necessary that evil follow in the will; nor nevertheless is man perplexed, because he can recede from the error, since the ignorance is vincible and voluntary." Similarly in Q. D. De Veritate 17, a. 4, ad 8: "It must be said that he who has the conscience (vincibly erroneous) of committing fornication is not simply perplexed, because he can do something by which, when it has been done, he will not fall into sin, namely, lay aside the erroneous conscience; but he is perplexed in a certain respect, namely, while the erroneous conscience remains. And this is not unsuitable, that, something being supposed, man cannot avoid sin; as, when an intention of vainglory is supposed, one who is bound to give alms cannot avoid sin: for if he gives from such an intention, he sins; but if he does not give, he is a transgressor."

It is proved: 1) he who acts against such a conscience does what he judges evil and thus sins; but he who acts according to it does that which he cannot rightly judge to be good, because he has negligently judged concerning its morality, and therefore he exposes himself to the proximate danger of acting formally badly and operates rashly and acts badly. This is confirmed: for since he notices that there must be further inquiry concerning the truth, he voluntarily neglects this; whence he ought to fear that his action is evil, and cannot have security concerning its goodness (Jn. IX, 41; XV, 24).

He who does not lay aside a vincibly erroneous conscience by this very fact acts badly, because at least indirectly the evil which he operates is willed, since the ignorance itself (or erroneous conscience) from which it follows is willed. And indeed vincible ignorance does not excuse from fault; therefore it does not excuse from actual fault, if it is actually vincible.

n. 210.

210. Which conscience is right.

n. 210.

Many call right only true conscience. Others call invincibly erroneous conscience right if it is conformable to the law, as happens if it proceeds from speculative error, for example, the conscience of Jacob approaching Lia whom he thought to be Rachel, and not right if it is difform from the law, as happens if it proceeds from practical error, for example, the conscience of one who thinks theft is licit. Others call invincibly erroneous conscience right if it is logically deduced from a false principle, not right if it is illogically deduced. Finally, others call every invincibly erroneous conscience, as prudently formed, right, not simply, but in a certain respect, and with respect to the agent or as to us, in order to acting, because it is the right and legitimate rule of acting: for although speculatively it is false, nevertheless practically it is true and dictates practical truth, namely, that which truly is licit here and now, and conformable to right appetite or an honorable will: namely, it is true that in these circumstances this is licit or illicit for me. In other words, the dictate of such a conscience is from the right intention of doing good and avoiding evil, which is conformable to the higher true principle of morality: Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided, and in this way it is conformable to the eternal law of God. That this is true will appear more from the treatise on Prudence.

211. Corollaries.

From the aforesaid it is easily concluded:

That conscience binds: true conscience per se, and erroneous conscience until it is laid aside; but invincibly erroneous conscience excuses, not however vincibly erroneous conscience.

That man has an absolute right of following an altogether true conscience, and this is liberty which in the strict sense is liberty of conscience. As to invincibly erroneous conscience, although man in the internal forum can and must follow it, he does not have to this truly and properly a right, which is founded in objective relations of things, but only a reputed right; and especially he does not have an absolute right to follow it by an external act: for legitimate authority cannot indeed punish him who is proved to have followed the dictate of conscience, but can prevent him from following it in an external mode, for example, a Catholic State can prevent the exercise of heretical or infidel worship, although adherents not rarely follow the dictate of their conscience.

That there can be an act or sin against the law which is not against conscience, when the latter is ignorant of the law, but then the act is not formally but only materially evil. On the contrary, there can be an action or sin formally against erroneous conscience which is not against the law actually existing; nevertheless it is against the reputed law, whence, although it is not materially against the law, nevertheless it is against it formally, and it is against the eternal law, which dictates that one must not act against that which is thought to be commanded or prohibited. Finally, every formal sin against law is also against conscience.

Hence it is understood that conscience per accidens in some sense obligates more than the law of God: "Conscience obligates not by its own virtue but by virtue of the divine precept: for conscience does not dictate that something is to be done by reason of the fact that it seems so to itself, but by reason of the fact that it is commanded by God; hence per accidens, from the virtue of the divine precept, it obligates insofar as it dictates as commanded by God, and therefore conscience obligates more than the divine precept in whose virtue it binds. As is clear if the precept of a king did not reach the people except by means of some prince; if the prince said: this is commanded by the king, although it were not true, his dictate would obligate as the precept of the king" (II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3).

Yet purely erroneous conscience, or erroneous conscience as such, cannot per se obligate, for obligation supposes a law not imaginary but existing and applied to the subject. Hence in the case of invincibly erroneous conscience we are obligated, not from the law which is not present and which conscience erroneously affirms, but from the higher certain principle of law, or from the universal natural law: Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided, which forbids acting against that which after diligent consideration we think to be good and commanded by God, or evil and prohibited. Hence such a conscience is in some way true, namely, practically, because it is true that, such a conscience standing, it is licit to act according to it; and it is right, as conformable to a right intention, which itself is right because conformable to a higher principle and thus to the eternal law.

This is to be applied to every erroneous conscience here and now invincible, even if it arises from ignorance antecedently vincible and culpable, provided it is actually invincible because it is not adverted to. Such a conscience was culpable in its cause, but it is a legitimate rule of acting here and now, and the action following from it is not culpable in itself, although it can be culpable in its cause.

In this sense, in a. 6, St. Thomas absolutely affirms culpability.