Chapter I. On Right and Erroneous Conscience

37. • DEFINITION. Right conscience is that which represents the object as it is in itself; otherwise it must be called erroneous; and indeed it is called invincibly or vincibly erroneous according as the ignorance or error is inculpable or culpable.

Principles. - I. A right conscience commanding must always be followed, because conscience is the proximate rule of the will, derived from the first and highest rule of all human actions. - St. Lig., no. 3.

II. An invincibly erroneous conscience commanding must likewise be followed in every case; because it is altogether to be equated subjectively with right conscience, and because, according to the Apostle, Everything which is not from faith (or according to conscience) is sin. - St. Lig., no. 5.

III. An invincibly erroneous conscience permitting exempts from every sin, because there can be no sin where no malice is apprehended. - St. Lig., ibid.

IV. It is not licit to follow a vincibly erroneous conscience permitting or commanding, because, since by hypothesis the error is vincible, whoever acts with such a conscience errs voluntarily. Nor is it licit to act against it when commanding, because one so acting does that which he judges to be prohibited, and therefore sins. Therefore before action that conscience must be laid aside through inquiry into the truth ¹. - St. Lig., no. 4.

¹ These things hold concerning him who here and now in some way adverts to or suspects the necessity of inquiring before he acts. But it can also happen, as Croix warns (book 1, no. 42), that an error indeed was once culpable, which nevertheless at present someone no longer adverts to, for example, if a confessor once did not sufficiently cultivate theology, or from negligence interrupted its study for too long. And concerning this it is most truly said with St. Thomas (On Truth, q. 17, art. 8, objection 8), that he is never excused from sin, whether he acts according to conscience or against it. And the reason is clear, because that old sin is always present, namely culpable ignorance of those things which one is held to know. Nor is this guilt incurred while someone is now about to act; but it is the fault of diligence once omitted, and independent of the present action; therefore its gravity must be taken not from the action now to be posited, but from the common principles concerning sins of ignorance. And from here the true reason also is clear why in the case he who acts against conscience is more guilty than he who acts according to it. For the latter has only the aforesaid guilt of ignorance. But the former, besides this, adds another present guilt of an action posited against conscience. But if someone has retracted the fault of ignorance by suitable penance and by adding diligence, as is fitting, it is clear that he is to be equated with one who labors under invincible ignorance.

38. You Will Resolve. - 1. He who thinks that it is a fast when it is not, on account of erroneous conscience sins against the precept if he does not fast.

2. If someone lies in order to free his neighbor from danger of life, inculpably thinking that from charity he is held to this, he does a good act; and if he does not lie, he sins against charity.

3. He who with some doubt thinks that he must lie or steal in order to assist his neighbor cannot follow such a conscience nor act against it; but he ought, if he can, to inquire, lay it aside, and afterward act; for such an error is vincible.

YOU WILL ASK. By what signs can the Confessor know that error is vincible in the penitent?

I answer. Let him ask 1. whether he adverted to some indecency in this act? 2. whether his conscience dictated to him that at least the Confessor, or another prudent man, should be asked? 3. whether he neglected the occasion of asking from shame ² or fear? If the penitent responds affirmatively to one or the other of these, he can be considered to be in culpable error; otherwise, if he denies all. - See Cases, no. 37.

² Nevertheless certain persons, as experience teaches, are sometimes prevented by shame from asking even about those things which have no guilt.