II. On Certain Conscience

What is certain conscience; and what is its directive force? - Certain conscience properly is that conscience which rests upon a certain motive; and consequently judges concerning the honorableness or shamefulness of the action to be done without fear of erring. Less properly, however, it is that which judges simply without any fear of erring concerning the honorableness or shamefulness of an action. This latter is only subjectively certain; the former is also objectively certain. It can likewise be certain strictly and broadly, or morally. Strictly certain excludes every doubt, both prudent and imprudent. Broadly or morally certain excludes only every prudent doubt. Its directive force is declared by the following propositions.

It is unlawful to act without conscience subjectively certain concerning the honorableness of the action. - Proof. He who acts without this conscience wills an action concerning whose honorableness or shamefulness he is uncertain. But to will an action concerning whose honorableness or shamefulness someone is uncertain is nothing other than to will it whether it is good or evil. But again, to will an action whether it is good or evil is illicit; for this is a will consenting to evil. Therefore. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 3. 5, Quodl. 3. a. 27 ad 2, Quodl. 8. a. 13; L. 1. 1. n. 3; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 3; E. M.

Note: 1. Sin, precisely because it is against conscience, does not have a special malice, unless it is done so that conscience may be conquered. The first reason is because this is intrinsic and common to every sin, that it is against conscience. The second reason is because then there is had a directly willed contempt of the rule of every good operation, and thus someone exposes himself to the danger of all crimes, which, as is clear, is a special and most grave disorder of the will, against the natural inclination of the will toward good. - Lessius on q. 19. a. 6. d. 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 14. a. 1. 4.

2. Likewise it is a special sin if someone sins from certain malice through contempt, by casting aside and removing that which could impede the election of sin; and it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. - Six species of this are enumerated: desperation, presumption, impenitence or the resolve not to repent, obstinacy or the resolve to cling to sin, attacking acknowledged truth so that one may sin more licentiously; envy of fraternal grace, by which someone envies not only the person of his brother, but also the grace of God increasing in the world.

Only conscience subjectively certain is the rule of morals. But morally certain conscience suffices. Proof of the 1st part. For, as is clear from the preceding proposition, n. 100, without this conscience no one can act. Besides this conscience no other subjectively more perfect conscience is given. Therefore with this alone can someone act; and therefore this conscience alone is the rule of morals. Proof of the 2nd part. 1. From the common opinion of doctors and universal practice. 2. Because most often another certainty cannot be had; and no one necessarily sins. 3. Because, while this moral certainty stands, someone acts prudently, for moral certainty, although it does not exclude every doubt, both prudent and imprudent, nevertheless excludes every prudent doubt. Therefore. Rom. 14:23; C. Litteras 13 de Restit. spoliat.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 70. a. 2.

It is lawful to act according to a certain conscience which is nevertheless invincibly erroneous. - Proof. He who acts in this way wills, as much as is in him, a good action, and consents only to a good action. But it is right to will this action. Therefore. The major is proved, for nothing is willed unless first known. Therefore, while an invincibly erroneous conscience stands, he who acts according to it wills, as much as is in him, a good action, and consents only to a good action. - L. 1. 1. n. 5; Elbel 126.

It is unlawful to act against a certain conscience which is nevertheless invincibly erroneous. - Proof. He who would act in this way would will an action which he judged prohibited; he would not will one which he judged commanded. But it is unlawful to have this will, because it is a will consenting to evil. Therefore. "It must be said that simply every will discordant from reason, whether right or erring, is always evil." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 5, 2. D. 39. q. 3. a. 3, Quodl. 3. a. 27; L. l. c.; Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 19. a. 5; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 4.

It is lawful to act according to a certain conscience, even though vincibly erroneous. - Proof. Because when the action is judged honorable or shameful with certainty, the will acting according to this conscience pursues the honorable and flees the shameful, which is altogether licit. But that this conscience is vincibly erroneous does not make it so that, when someone actually acts according to it, he sins; rather, it makes it so that the fault is only in the cause, whence also it is that judgment about its gravity or lightness must be made not from the grave or light effect, but from the grave or light negligence in seeking the truth. Now when someone actually acts, if in no way does he attend to the erroneous conscience which he has, and has no suspicion about it, since by hypothesis the conscience is certain here and now, he is already acting not from a vincibly erroneous conscience, but from an invincible conscience. La-Croix l. 1. n. 42. 43. 757. 760; Kenrick ed. 2. Mechl. 1860. n. 36.

It is unlawful to act against a certain conscience which is nevertheless vincibly erroneous. - Proof. Because then someone would act against a certain judgment; and would will the action which he judges prohibited, and would not will the action which he judges commanded; which will is evil, for it is affected toward evil. Therefore. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 5. 6; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 4; Elbel 122. 137. 138; L. 1. 1. n. 4; La-Croix l. 1, n. 42. 43. 757. "And therefore it must be said that every conscience, whether right or erroneous, whether in things evil per se or in indifferent things, is obligatory; so that he who acts against conscience sins." S. Th. Quodl. 3. a. 27, Quodl. 8. a. 15.

Note: "A sin committed against conscience has its species from the particular matter in which it is thought to be concerned; or from order to the particular precept which it is thought to oppose. For example, if you think the thing which you take is not yours, yet in fact it is yours, it will be the sin of theft; if you think it is against the obligation of a vow, it will be the sin of sacrilege. The reason is that sins receive species from the object either of the external action or of the will. Nor does it matter whether this object is evil in reality, but whether it is apprehended as evil, because the will is borne toward it according as it is proposed by reason." Lessius on q. 19. a. 6. d. 3; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 5 ad 3.

Can someone labor under an invincibly erroneous conscience as regards depraved desires and other merely internal acts, namely if no exterior action follows? - Speaking explicitly and generally about desire, Elbel has this, n. 127: "That many, at least among the more uneducated and less instructed, can inculpably persuade themselves that desires of this kind are not evil unless they are completed by deed, seems sufficiently certain; and Sanchez, Stoz, and La-Croix expressly teach this." This opinion, says S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 9, "I have never been able to judge probable.... With other learned recent authors I judge it little probable." The reason for this opinion is that if someone certainly knows the malice of the external action, and nevertheless wills to execute it, he already knows that he wills evil. How then will he be excused from sin? But as regards simple delectation, that invincible ignorance can more easily be present; for the tendency of the will toward evil is not so evident as in desire efficacious of itself. And the same also seems to have to be said of inefficacious desire.

Can there be an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning the precepts of natural law? - "It is certain that in the first principles of natural law, as also in the proximate conclusions and certain obligations of one's own state, invincible ignorance is not given, because by the very light of nature such things are known to all, except to him who closes his eyes lest he see them.... On the contrary, however, the unanimous opinion of theologians is... that in mediated and obscure conclusions, or those remote from the principles, invincible ignorance is indeed given and must be admitted." L. 1. 1. n. 8. 170 seq.; Struggl tr. 3. q. 1. n. 10-13; S. Th. Quodl. 3. a. 36, De Verit. q. 17. a. 2; De Malo q. 3. a. 8; Rom. 2:14. 15. In the first principles of natural law, for example: good is to be done, evil avoided; the highest good is to be loved, evil detested; what you do not wish for yourself, do not do to another; thanks are to be given to benefactors, etc. In proximate conclusions, for example: God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored, theft is not to be committed, etc. In remote conclusions, for example: private revenge is not to be exercised, abortion is not to be procured, etc. Eternal law, existing in the divine mind, most perfectly exhibits the order of things. Natural law, which is the application of eternal law, exists in the human mind. Therefore natural law, by the very fact that it is manifested through human reason, falls short of the highest perfection of eternal law.

Hence it happens that not always what we think and judge, in more difficult matters, corresponds to the rules of the divine mind, and remains obscure and unknown to us. Whence that thing, although materially and in itself it pertains to natural law, nevertheless does not pertain formally and as regards us, since it has not been sufficiently promulgated to us by the natural light. - Wirceburg. De Actib. hum. c. 1. a. 3.

Can children invincibly be ignorant of the malice of pollution? - R. Affirmatively, absolutely speaking, at least in some rare case, and at the beginning of a depraved habit. The reason is that the fact that an immodest look or touch, or the capturing of pleasure from procured pollution, or even from that which has naturally arisen, etc., are morally evil and illicit, is not so evidently made known from the very comprehension of the first principles, but discourse is needed to detect their malice. Therefore their malice can at least for some time be inculpably unknown. From this a prudent confessor will easily conclude that in such a contingency of fact one must proceed cautiously and prudently; and this caution and prudence, if it must always and with all be observed, especially in the matter of chastity, must be observed most of all with boys and girls. Elbel 128; Struggl l. c. n. 13.