Chapter — Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Chapter I. On Right and Erroneous Conscience

30.

Right conscience, which some prefer to call true, is that which represents the object as it is in itself; otherwise it must be called erroneous, and indeed it is called invincibly or vincibly erroneous, according as ignorance or error is inculpable or culpable.

31.

Principle

Right conscience, if it commands, must always be followed, because conscience is the proximate rule of the will, derived from the first and supreme rule of all human actions; but if it permits, it altogether exempts from every sin, because there can be no sin there where it is known that no objective malice is present. But erroneous conscience, if it is such vincibly, must not be followed, whether it commands or permits, because vincible error is considered voluntary, and is imputable as demerit; but if it is invincibly erroneous, then the same must be said of it as of right conscience, because subjectively it is compared to it. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 3 and 5.

32.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He who thinks it is a fast when it is not, because of erroneous conscience sins against the precept which he supposes, if he does not fast.

2nd. If someone lies in order to free his neighbor from danger of life, thinking inculpably that from charity he is bound to this, he performs a good act; and if he does not lie, he sins against charity.

3rd. He who, with some doubt, thinks that he must lie or steal in order to aid his neighbor, cannot follow such a conscience, nor act against it; but he must, if he can, inquire, lay it aside, and afterwards act; for such error is vincible.

4th. He who acts from a vincibly erroneous conscience is never immune from sin. For his very ignorance is voluntary and culpable; and this is always present, whether he acts according to conscience or against conscience, and it was committed when he omitted due diligence for knowing the things necessary to be known. Such a man, if when about to act he does not advert here and now to his error and acts against conscience, is stained with a twofold guilt, the former sin in its cause and the present actual fault contracted when he violates the dictate of conscience; but if the same man acts according to conscience here and now, as is evident, he does not sin, because he does not advert to his error, but nevertheless the former guilt of sin in its cause remains. But if when about to act he adverts in some way to his ignorance, he is surely bound to inquire and to obtain due knowledge. Moreover, if he retracts the fault of that ignorance by true penitence and applies a sufficient effort to driving away the ignorance, even if perhaps it remains, it will no longer be held culpable. Cf. Baller., Op. Mor., vol. 1, tr. 2, n. 32 sqq.

Question. By what signs can the confessor know that error is vincible in a penitent?

Response. Let him ask, 1st, whether he adverted to some indecency in this act; 2nd, whether his conscience dictated to him that at least the confessor or another prudent man should be asked; 3rd, whether from shame or fear he neglected an occasion of asking. If the penitent answers affirmatively to one or another of these, he can be judged to be living in culpable error; otherwise, if he denies all of them. And generally, if there is question of first principles and obligations of state, vincible ignorance ought to be presumed; but invincible ignorance if the penitent is diligent in those things which the pious are accustomed to observe, or grieves when he adverts to the error, which grief is rather a sign that no present fault is present, not that there was none past in the cause. Cf. Baller. tr. 11, n. 43.