Infidelity

26. Definition. 1. Infidelity properly so called is the lack of faith in a man not baptized: for properly that man is called an unbeliever who has not received the infused habit of faith. Infidelity improperly so called is any defect of internal faith; in this sense infidelity also comprehends heresy and apostasy from faith.

2. Infidelity properly so called is one thing when negative, which is the lack of faith in him who has never heard anything concerning faith; another when privative, which is the lack of faith in him who neglects to acquire for himself the knowledge of faith when the occasion has been given; another when positive, which is the lack of faith in him to whom the truths of faith have been sufficiently proposed.

27. Moral malice. 1. Negative infidelity is not a sin, because it is not voluntary; therefore Baian proposition 68 was condemned.¹

2. Privative infidelity is a grave sin of omission, by which the means necessary for salvation is neglected. A similar sin is committed by him who neglects the inquiry of truth after reasonable doubt concerning the truth of his own religion.

3. Positive infidelity is a grave sin of commission, by which the means necessary for salvation is rejected; besides this, it contains formal contempt of God revealing.

The species of infidelity are paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, deism, atheism, pantheism: they are taken from the diverse errors to which unbelievers adhere, but these errors do not pertain to moral theology.

¹ Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin.

All who have sufficient knowledge of the Gospel are bound to embrace and believe it: “‘ He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned.¹ A grave sin, then, is committed by one who rejects the faith when it has been sufficiently made known to him with adequate grounds for believing, and this grave sin is called infidelity. This positive infidelity is distinguished from privative and negative infidelity. One who has the opportunity of knowing the faith, and recognizes the obligation of making inquiries about it, but neglects to do so, commits the sin of privative infidelity. This is also a grave sin if the degree of negligence be grave. One who has no opportunity of learning the faith, or who does not advert to the obligation of making inquiries, is in negative infidelity. This is not sinful, but St Thomas² teaches that it is the penalty of sin, inasmuch as if a man were faithful to the light that he has in natural reason, God would take care that he should have an opportunity of knowing the faith even if it were necessary to send him a special messenger, or an angel from heaven, to make the Gospel known to him. If, then, the Gospel is not preached to every man, not God but men are to be blamed for it.

¹ Mark xvi 16.

² De Verit., q. 14, a. 11, ad I.

III. In order that someone be subject to positive law, it is required that he be the subject of the respective legislator, and, if there is question of human law, that he habitually enjoy the use of reason. I said:

1. That he be the subject of the respective legislator, that is, that he be subject to his jurisdiction in such matter.

2. That, if there is question of human law, he habitually enjoy the use of reason. Namely:

a) The divine legislator can bind all, at least in first act, and, as authors commonly seem to teach, He has in fact bound all.

b) A legislator lower than God is not considered to have received the power of binding, not even in first act, those human beings who cannot know the law and be directed by it. Therefore infants and the perpetually insane are excluded; but not the half-witted or those who have lucid intervals, nor those who lack the use of reason only actually, such as the drunk or sleeping. One who induces these latter, for example a drunk man, to violate positive law does not of itself commit the sin of scandal, because the drunk man lacks formal fault, but he sins against the law to whose material transgression he incites him. Moreover, observe that a perpetually insane person, although he is not subject to the directive obligation of law, nevertheless participates in the rights and other effects of laws. Thus, for example, their acts, that is, acts placed in their name by a guardian, can be invalidated, etc.

Corollary I. All human beings are subject to universal divine positive law. Hence Christ declares: "Going, teach all nations... teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you."¹

Corollary II. All baptized persons habitually enjoying the use of reason are subject to universal ecclesiastical law (cf. can. 12). So, at least generally.

Therefore unbelievers are excluded, as those who are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Church. Hence the Apostle says: "What is it to me to judge those who are outside?"² Therefore it is licit, for example, to set meat before the aforesaid persons on days of abstinence.

I said: so, at least generally; for 1. concerning some, certain special things must be noted, which we shall do in § III; 2. concerning subjects of the Eastern Church, can. 1 is to be observed: although in the Code of Canon Law the discipline of the Eastern Church also is often referred to, nevertheless the Code regards only the Latin Church and does not oblige the Eastern Church, unless there is question of those things which from the very nature of the matter affect the Eastern Church also.

Corollary III. To a particular law, whether ecclesiastical or civil, there are subject those who habitually enjoy the use of reason and, if there is question of a law established for a territorial community,³ are both of the territory and in the territory, with the prescription of can. 14 remaining firm. I said:

1. They are of the territory; in other words, it is required that they have domicile or quasi-domicile in the territory of the community. This condition, if there is question of an inferior legislator, for example of a bishop, is necessary, because only through domicile or quasi-domicile is someone constituted a subject of an inferior legislator placed over a territorial community (can. 94). But if the Supreme Pontiff imposes a law on a community of this sort, he is presumed to bind only those who are subjects of the governor of that community, and therefore have domicile or quasi-domicile in his territory.

2. They are in the territory; in other words, it is required that they actually dwell in the territory of the community, namely, a territorial law does not affect subjects except by means of the territory. And this holds also as regards those who have gone out of the territory in fraud of the law, as it is said, that is, for the purpose of being exempted from the law.

3. With the prescription of can. 14 remaining firm, which canon concerns travelers and vagi; considering that canon, some are at times held by territorial law, although they are not in the territory or lack domicile or quasi-domicile in it (n. 131).

¹ Matt. 28:19-20.

² 1 Cor. 5:12.

³ For example, for a diocese.

I. Infidelity. 1. Notion. Infidelity is the lack of faith in a non-baptized man.

2. Division. Three kinds are distinguished, namely positive, privative, and negative. Positive infidelity is when an unbaptized person knows that God has spoken, and nevertheless denies or doubts that which God has manifested; privative infidelity is when an unbaptized person doubts that God has spoken, or suspects that revelation has taken place and neglects inquiry. Negative infidelity is when an unbaptized person does not doubt his religion or does not suspect that revelation has taken place (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, aa. 1 and 5; St. Alphonsus, II, 17).

By reason of the diverse errors there are enumerated: Paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, Atheism, Pantheism, Deism, Rationalism, etc. Yet those of the enumerated classes who have been baptized are rather heretics or apostates.

3. Morality. a) Positive and privative infidelity are grave sin from their whole genus. For reverence due to divine truthfulness requires that, if it is clear that it has spoken, we assent to it; if it is doubtful, we inquire whether and what it has taught, with this end, that if we have learned that it has spoken, we adhere to it. Yet privative infidelity by accident, that is, on account of the obligation of inquiring not being sufficiently perceived, can more easily be venial or even no sin. Negative infidelity is not sin, as is clear. Hence proposition 68 of Baius was rightly condemned: "Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is sin" (St. Alphonsus, II, 17).

b) Positive infidelity and heresy do not differ in species, as we shall explain at once. But it is disputed whether positive infidelity (and heresy) differ in species from privative infidelity. Many affirm this, because positive infidelity (and heresy) directly injure divine authority; privative infidelity only indirectly, insofar as it prevents me from knowing that God has spoken and from being able to subject myself to Him speaking; these seem to differ in species (St. Alphonsus, VII, 301).¹ The diverse physical species of infidelity (Paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, etc.) do not differ in moral species, although diverse species of irreligiosity can be attached to them.

¹ If someone neglects inquiry because he does not wish to submit himself to God revealing, there is privative infidelity, which does not differ in species from positive infidelity.

V. Applications. In making applications we distinguish the diverse things by which both denial and dissimulation of faith can be done, namely words, signs more strictly taken, clothing, and deeds.

1. Words. One who is questioned about the faith, even by a private person, cannot respond in such a way that he must certainly be believed to deny the true faith. Hence he cannot respond, for example, that he is a Calvinist, or that he adheres to the faith of the kingdom, if the kingdom as such professes a false faith (St. Alphonsus, II, 13).

2. Signs more strictly taken. The distinctive signs of Freemasons (nods, movements of hands or fingers, a particular way of signing letters) contain profession of a false sect, since they are equivalent to words by which someone signifies that he belongs to a false sect.¹ Nor do the aforesaid signs seem to lose their signification from the fact that some who do not belong to the sect use them, for example so that they may be treated amicably; for these seem rather to lie than to make the signs lose their signification. Besides, those who use signs of this sort at least proximately intend that they be taken, at least probably, for Freemasons; but to use such a means is illicit.

3. Clothing. Among clothing: 1. Some garments are distinctive of a people or nation, as the cap of the Turks. It is licit to use these from a just cause, because garments of this sort, although they may be worn in a region of unbelievers, nevertheless of themselves do not involve profession of any faith. 2. Other garments are distinctive of a sect. It is not licit to use these, because one who uses them, considering the circumstances, signifies that he belongs to that sect.² Many, however, permit the use of garments "which do not have a peculiar sign of professing error, but are only an indication of more elegant dress, as formerly the cloaks of preachers in Germany; or of a more eminent life among their own, as the robes of bonzes in Japan. The same must be said concerning signs which the Jews used, for example, a yellow ring on the cloak at Frankfurt, etc.; because these are merely political signs and distinctive of one class of men from another, and not properly professive of faith" (St. Alphonsus, II, 15, 9).

4. Deeds. a) The eating of meat on a day of abstinence does not contain profession of a false religion. But to eat out of shame is not licit. Likewise it is illicit if someone is provoked to eating in contempt of religion, unless there is a grave cause and the one provoked protests that he is not acting in contempt of religion, but because the Church for a grave cause does not urge the law (St. Alphonsus, II, 15, 10).

b) Active assistance³ at the sacred rites of non-Catholics is illicit. The reason is that assistance of this sort either constitutes part of a worship that must be reproved or, as it is taken here, involves proximate cooperation in such worship. Hence can. 1258, § 1: It is not licit for the faithful in any way actively to assist or to have part in the sacred rites of non-Catholics. And can. 2316: Whoever in any way spontaneously and knowingly assists the propagation of heresy, or who communicates in divine things with heretics contrary to the prescription of can. 1258, is suspected of heresy. And so it is illicit, for example, to take a non-Catholic supper; to hear the Mass of a non-Catholic, even if on a feast of precept no other can be heard;⁴ to chant psalms or play the organ in their assemblies;⁵ to perform the office of sponsor in their baptisms;⁶ etc. Besides, compare what is to be said about cooperation (n. 557).

c) Assistance at sermons and merely passive assistance⁷ at sacred functions of non-Catholics contain at most material and remote cooperation, and therefore, considered under this respect, are licit for a just cause. But scandal is easily added and, if more frequent assistance is in question, danger of perversion. Hence the Holy Office⁸ declared that "regularly it is not licit for Catholics to be present at the sermons (baptisms and marriages) of heretics or schismatics" (cf. can. 1258, § 2). If civil authority orders Catholics, for example soldiers, to assist at the sermons and rites of non-Catholics, practically there is a cause excusing, while precautions against danger of perversion must nevertheless be employed.

It is licit, scandal being excluded, to enter the church of schismatics and there privately, not as if acting together with them, to adore the Most Holy Sacrament.⁹ Yet if this were done regularly, it would certainly provide scandal and occasion for religious indifferentism.

Besides this, the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide,¹⁰ to the doubt: "Whether it is licit for Catholics to adore the Most Holy Sacrament, carried by a schismatic parish priest in the public way, whether to a sick person or otherwise," responded: "Not only is it licit, but Catholics must adore the Most Holy Sacrament; nevertheless they must abstain from accompanying it."

Entry into the churches of non-Catholics in order to look at them involves nothing illicit.

d) Passive presence at funerals and weddings of non-Catholics. Passive or merely material presence can be tolerated, for the sake of civil office or honor, on account of a grave reason to be approved by the Bishop in a case of doubt, at the funerals, weddings, and similar solemnities of non-Catholics, provided danger of perversion and scandal is absent (can. 1258, § 2). It is said passive presence; hence if the wedding is entered into before a heretical minister as such, it is not licit to function as witness. Nor is it lawful to undertake the office of paranymph, if this office is as it were to offer the spouses to the heretical minister so that he may join them. It is said provided danger of scandal is absent; now in many regions scandal certainly would be present if there were question of cremating the body or of carrying out burial with the insignia of the Masonic sect.

e) Selection of a non-Catholic sponsor. The Holy Office said "that it is preferable that Baptism be conferred without a sponsor than with a non-Catholic."¹¹ Finally, can. 795, among other things, requires for validity that the sponsor in Baptism "be enrolled in no heretical or schismatic sect."

f) Flight in time of persecution is per se licit, because it involves neither denial nor dissimulation of faith, but only the use of the right to protect one's life. Practically:

alpha) It is illicit if, by your flight, the honor of God or the salvation of souls would suffer detriment; as if pastors of souls, that is, bishops and parish priests, were to flee.

beta) It is licit if your presence is indeed useful, but not necessary, and you cannot remain without grave inconvenience.

gamma) It obliges: 1. if by remaining you would harm rather than benefit the common good; 2. if by remaining you would expose yourself to danger of denying the faith (St. Alphonsus, II, 14, 6).

Note 1. For dissimulating the faith it is more easily licit to omit signs of Catholics than to use signs of non-Catholics.

Note 2. One who is converted to the faith is indeed bound, on the occasion of Baptism, to profess the faith; but if there are grave causes for dissimulating the faith for a time, and for that end for not observing certain precepts of the Church or even for passively assisting at rites of non-Catholics, this is licit (n. 498 sq.). Nevertheless it is preferable to explain the matter to the Ordinary, or even, if the dissimulation of faith will have to endure only for a short time, to defer Baptism. Yet the aforesaid should not per se be applied readily to one who has departed from the faith and desires to return to it, since he is also bound to repair scandal.

¹ According to some, these things are not to be extended to the signs by which Masons usually recognize one another; this does not seem equivalent to a profession of this sect, but is a means so that they may be treated amicably by members of the sect. But signs by which Masons usually recognize one another, if others do not use them, truly signify that someone belongs to the sect; this is and remains profession of the sect, although the said signs may be used as a means so that they may be treated amicably by members of the sect.

² Objection. Garments which are distinctive of a sect are not necessarily protestative of the sect. Now it is licit to use garments non-protestative of the sect, although distinctive, from a grave cause. Thus several authors. Response: Leaving aside the word protestative, I would say: one who uses garments distinctive of a sect signifies that he belongs to the sect; this is profession of the sect and denial of the true faith at least externally.

³ Active assistance is had when the one assisting has a part in the sacred rites of non-Catholics (can. 1258, § 1).

⁴ Holy Office, August 7, 1704 (Collectanea, n. 267).

⁵ Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, July 8, 1889 (Collectanea, n. 1713).

⁶ The Holy Office, May 10, 1770 (Collectanea, n. 478), responded that "it is absolutely not licit, either by oneself or through others, to perform the office of sponsor in Baptisms which are administered by heretics to the children of heretics"; likewise June 30 and July 5, 1864 (Collectanea, n. 1257).

⁷ Merely passive assistance is had if the one assisting, unlike one actively assisting, has no part in the sacred rites of non-Catholics (cf. can. 1258, § 1).

⁸ May 10, 1770.

⁹ Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, December 15, 1764 (Collectanea, n. 458, ad 1).

¹⁰ December 15, 1764 (Collectanea, n. 458, ad 4).

¹¹ May 3, 1893 (Collectanea, n. 1831).

I. Christ the Lord entrusted the deposit of faith to the Church, so that she herself, with the Holy Spirit continually assisting, might guard revealed doctrine holily and expound it faithfully (can. 1322, § 1). This is clear from Sacred Scripture.²

II. The Church, independently of any civil power, has the right and duty of teaching the evangelical doctrine to all nations (can. 1322, § 2). This likewise is taught by Sacred Scripture.³

III. As regards the persons upon whom the aforesaid right and duty rests, the Code teaches: The office of preaching the Catholic faith is committed chiefly to the Roman Pontiff for the universal Church, and to Bishops for their dioceses (can. 1327, § 1). Bishops, however, are bound by the duty of preaching the Gospel personally by themselves, unless they are prevented by a legitimate impediment; and besides, in addition to parish priests, they must also take other suitable men as helpers for carrying out this office of preaching salutarily (can. 1327, § 2). But to those who are not taken up by legitimate authority, public preaching is forbidden, according to these words of the Code: No one may exercise the ministry of preaching unless he has received a mission from a legitimate Superior, by a faculty particularly given, or by an office conferred, to which by the sacred canons the office of preaching is attached (can. 1328). I said public preaching; for private preaching belongs to all. Yet disputation properly so called is prohibited, for example, to those for whom it would be dangerous; sometimes it is prescribed, for instance if someone were equal to that duty and the honor of God or the salvation of neighbor required it. Yet can. 1325, § 3 must be attended to: "Let Catholics beware lest they have disputations or conferences, especially public ones, with non-Catholics, without permission of the Holy See or, if the case is urgent, of the local Ordinary."

IV. As regards preaching to non-Catholics specifically, note:

1. Local Ordinaries and parish priests should have non-Catholics dwelling in their dioceses and parishes commended to themselves in the Lord (can. 1350, § 1).

2. In other territories the entire care of missions among non-Catholics is reserved uniquely to the Apostolic See (can. 1350, § 2); and the Holy See exercises that care especially through the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, and, if Easterners are in question, through the Sacred Congregation for Orientals. But so that the said Congregations may be able to attain the end:

a) Religious institutes to which some mission has been entrusted should provide for it according to their strength.

b) Bishops, parish priests, and others, when opportunity is given, should foster an apostolic spirit in young men. "And you," thus Benedict XV in the Encyclical Maximum illud⁴ addresses the Bishops, "will do a thing especially worthy of your love of religion, if both in the clergy and in the diocesan Seminary you carefully foster the seeds of apostleship which someone perhaps has shown to be present in himself. Nor should any appearance of right deceive you, or any human reason move you, as if what you have permitted to foreign Missions you seem to have detracted from the usefulness of your diocese. For in place of one whom you send away abroad, God will raise up for you at home several very useful priests."

c) Let all assist missionaries: 1. by prayers, "which prayers, if ever at other times, certainly cannot lack effect in this cause, than which none is more excellent, none more pleasing to God";⁵ 2. by alms.⁶

Whether some priest in particular, on account of the spiritual necessity of nations, must come to their aid, see in the treatise on the cultivation of charity.

Question. To what extent can some authority compel unbelievers to hear or embrace the faith?

Response 1. The Church cannot compel unbelievers to hear the faith, since she lacks jurisdiction over them; the temporal prince of unbelievers can do this.

Response 2. No authority can directly compel unbelievers to embrace the faith, even sufficiently proposed, since conversion is a matter of persuasion and will, not of coercion (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 12, a. 1, ad 3). Yet they can be compelled indirectly, for example by hope of a good not owed or fear of an evil otherwise owed. Besides, the secular prince can compel unbelievers to bid farewell to errors and rites opposed to natural law; indeed the prince cannot tolerate the said errors and rites except on account of a most grave cause⁷ (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, a. 11; St. Alphonsus, II, 18).

Response 3. The Church per se can compel heretics and apostates to return, and this by penalties both spiritual and temporal (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, a. 8); this power of compelling heretics and apostates, according to the determination of the Church, can also belong to secular princes, as protectors of the Church, and must be exercised by them insofar as the Church prescribes it.

¹ Cf. Aertnys-Damen, II, n. 315 bis.

² Matt. 28:19-20; John 14:16, 17, 26.

³ Matt. 28:19; Mark 16:15.

⁴ November 30, 1919 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1919, p. 452).

⁵ Benedict XV, in the cited Encyclical.

⁶ Benedict XV, in the cited Encyclical.

⁷ Leo XIII, Encyclical Immortale Dei, November 1, 1885; Encyclical Libertas, June 20, 1888.

An infant of non-Catholics, that is, of unbelievers, heretics, schismatics, and Catholics who have fallen into apostasy or heresy or schism, is licitly baptized:

I. When he is in such danger of life that it is prudently foreseen that he will die before he reaches the use of reason (canon 750, § 1), or when "it is very prudently doubted that, from the infirmity by which they are actually affected, they will not live, but will die before the age of discretion."¹

Therefore a probability founded on this, that in some place, for example, half of infants die before the use of reason, does not suffice; nor a probability arising from this, that in some region a contagious disease is raging and there is grave danger that the disease may be transferred to infants.² If it is doubted whether an infant who is in danger of death has reached the use of reason, "let the missionaries try to instruct them in the better way in which it can be done; otherwise let them be baptized conditionally."³

II. When the infant appears perpetually insane;⁴ in this case there can be no discussion of education properly so called (St. Alphonsus, VI, 130).

III. Outside the case of danger of death or insanity, the infant is licitly baptized, provided that his Catholic education is safeguarded: 1. if the parents or tutors, or at least one of them, consents; 2. if the parents, that is, father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, or tutors, are lacking, or have lost their right over him, or can in no way exercise it (canon 750, § 2). It is said:

1. Provided that his Catholic education is safeguarded. Now, considering the responses of the competent Authority,⁵ it suffices that, all things considered, the Catholic education be in some way safeguarded, or that, all things having been seen, a noteworthy hope of Catholic education shines forth. Here, however, note that this kind of hope is more easily present in the case in which either parent is Catholic and the Catholic party consents, than in the case in which each parent is non-Catholic.

2. If the parents... consent; and so even the consent of the mother alone or of a female tutor suffices. And this holds even if it is foreseen that the other parent will afterward see to it that the infant is baptized by a heretical minister.⁶ Now the said consent is required per se if it is a question of an infant of unbelievers. This is clear from the Instruction of Benedict XIV Postremo mense;⁷ the same is taught by the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide.⁸ But the reason seems to be that the Church, by conferring Baptism on the offspring of parents over whom she has no right, places that offspring in such a condition that it can and per se must be separated from the parents. But this seems to involve a violation of right (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, a. 12; St. Alphonsus, VI, 132). If the discussion concerns an infant of baptized non-Catholics, consent is not required per se, because the Church has a right over them as her subjects. It is, however, commonly required per accidens, because if it is lacking, hope of Catholic education will commonly be absent. Hence canon 751 declares that, with respect to infants of two heretics or schismatics, or of two Catholics who have fallen into apostasy or heresy or schism, generally the norms established by canon 750 are to be observed.

3. If the parents... have lost their right over him, or can in no way exercise it. The case would occur if the infant had been entrusted to a Catholic, or had been abandoned and received in a Catholic hospital or by a Catholic.⁹ But if the parents have entrusted the infant to a Catholic to be educated, per se he ought not afterward be returned to them, even if they ask for him back and the infant has not yet been baptized; since the prior offering and acceptance ought not afterward be rescinded to the prejudice of the eternal salvation of the one offered (St. Alphonsus, VII, 130).

4. Finally, it is permitted to baptize infants offered by unbelievers if the missionary has a well-founded motive for believing that their parents too will in the future seek Baptism.¹⁰

¹ Holy Office, 18 July 1894 (Collectanea, n. 1877); Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, 15 February 1781.

² Instruction of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, 17 April 1777, reply to VIII (Collectanea, n. 522).

³ Instruction of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, 17 April 1777, reply to VIII (Collectanea, n. 522).

⁴ Holy Office, 18 July 1892.

⁵ Instruction of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, 17 April 1777 (Collectanea, n. 522).

⁶ Cf. Holy Office, 12 October 1600; 29 November 1672, reply to I (Collectanea, n. 205); Instruction of the Holy Office, 1827; Holy Office, 6 July 1898, reply to IV (Collectanea, n. 2007).

⁷ 28 February 1747.

⁸ Holy Office, 29 November 1672, reply to I (Collectanea, n. 205).

⁹ The cited Instruction of Benedict XIV.

¹⁰ Holy Office, 11 December 1850, reply to IV (Collectanea, n. 1054).

IV. The application of the special fruit. I said of the special fruit; for the general and most special fruits do not need application. The former, by the very fact that the sacrifice is offered, comes to the whole Church; the latter, by the very fact that he offers worthily, comes to the priest offering. But the special fruit needs the application of the priest; hence something must be said about it.

1. The notion and division of application. Application is the intention of the priest of specially offering Mass for some cause or causes, or for some person or persons. Application can be distinguished as twofold, public and private. Public application is had when the faithful are publicly advised of the Mass to be offered for such a one, or when someone's name is inserted into the prayers. Private application is had when neither are the faithful publicly advised nor is a name inserted into the prayers.

2. The power of applying. The priest can apply the special fruit; this is clear both from universal practice and from the condemned doctrine of the Synod of Pistoia.¹ If the application is positively excluded, the special fruit remains in the treasury of the Church. If it is applied expressly to no one, or to one incapable, according to some the fruit remains in the treasury of the Church; according to others, it comes to the priest himself or to those for whom he is specially bound to offer, because they judge that the priest implicitly intended this (St. Alphonsus, VI, 336).

3. The persons for whom application can be made. It is permitted to apply Mass for any of the living, and also for the dead expiating their sins in the fire of purgatory, with the prescription of canon 2262, § 2, n. 2 saved (canon 809). Therefore:

a) As regards the living, Mass can be applied for all. Nevertheless: 1. it is permitted only privately, and scandal being removed, to apply it for the excommunicated; heretics and schismatics are regarded as such by the external judgment of the Church, but not unbelievers. Hence, if scandal is absent, it can also be applied publicly for these;² a fortiori catechumens are not excluded from it. 2. For an excommunicated person to be avoided, it is permitted to apply it only privately and for his conversion alone (canon 2262, § 2, 2).

b) As regards the dead, the damned being excluded, Mass can likewise be applied for all. Nevertheless for those excluded from ecclesiastical burial (canon 1240), it is permitted to apply it only privately; for any funeral Mass, even anniversary, and other public funeral offices must be denied to these (canon 1241).

Note 1. Let the priest take care that there is not something of evil, error, or superstition in unbelievers offering alms.³

Note 2. Even if someone were excluded by the Church from application, nevertheless the priest could pray for him by private intention in the Memento of the living; likewise he could apply to him the fruits coming to the priest ex opere operantis, insofar as this is of the priest, but not the fruits ex opere operato, or ex opere operantis insofar as this is done in the name of the Church.

Note 3. Masses can also be offered or applied in honor of the Saints; this is clear from these words of the Council of Trent: "If anyone says that it is an imposture to celebrate Masses in honor of the Saints and for obtaining their intercession before God, as the Church intends, let him be anathema."⁴ In what sense, or for what end, this is done, the same Council teaches in these words: "And although the Church has sometimes been accustomed to celebrate certain Masses in honor and memory of the Saints, nevertheless she does not teach that sacrifice is offered to them, but to God alone, who crowned them. Hence neither is the priest accustomed to say: I offer sacrifice to you, Peter or Paul; but giving thanks to God for their victories, he implores their patronage, so that they may deign to intercede for us in heaven, whose memory we make on earth."⁵

4. The requisites for valid application are:

a) That it be made by the celebrant himself, who cannot leave it to be made by anyone, not even Christ. Namely, Christ, who conferred upon the priest the power of applying, is judged to have committed its exercise to the priest alone. Hence the application would be invalid: "I apply the Mass to him to whom Christ applies it." It must be said otherwise of this application: "I apply the Mass to him to whom Christ is more pleased that it be applied" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 334).

b) That it be made before the sacrifice is perfected as regards its essence; hence according to some, before the consecration of the blood; according to others, before every consecration. In practice, so that every danger of frustration may be guarded against, let it be made before the consecration. Indeed, it is better to make it before the Offertory, or rather before Mass, so that both the Offertory and the other liturgical prayers and actions may benefit the one giving the stipend.

c) That it be made through at least a habitual intention, that is, one made and not retracted. A habitual intention suffices, because application is made by way of donation, which obtains its effect even if time or acts intervene between the conceived intention and the execution given to it (St. Alphonsus, VI, 335). Nevertheless, it is advised that application not be extended for too long a time, and that at least sometimes, for example at the beginning of the month for the whole month, it be determined. An interpretative intention, since it does not truly exist, does not suffice.

d) That it be determined as regards the person or cause. Hence if someone has received a stipend from five persons, or five stipends for different deceased persons, the intention of applying for one of the five does not suffice if no one has been determined explicitly or implicitly. Nevertheless an implicit determination suffices, for example the intention: 1. of applying for him who offered the stipend, or who has been assigned by the celebrant in the booklet for this day; 2. of applying according to the mind of him who transmitted the stipend, provided that he formed the intention; 3. of applying according to the order established by another, for example by a superior or by the rector of the church. It is no obstacle that the celebrant perhaps does not know the intention or errs about it. Likewise a disjunctive determination suffices, as if someone says: "I say Mass for the intention of the pastor, if he has established one for me; otherwise for that intention" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 335).

If a priest has collected a heap of stipends and does not know in what order they were given, the intention of celebrating according to the order in which they were in fact given or accepted suffices; or, with respect to several stipends given at the same time for different persons, according to the order in which they were destined by the one giving, if the designation occurred; otherwise, in proportion to the right of each one comprehended in the number. All these things are at least known to God. Likewise the intention of applying all and each Masses, in proportion to the right, to all for whom they were given suffices. Namely, since the fruit of the Mass is divisible, after all the Masses have been celebrated each one has obtained his own.

If the priest himself did not collect the Masses but received a heap from another, for example from a bishop or from the administrator of a pious place, it is per se the part of the distributor to set the order beforehand, and of the celebrant to apply according to the order set beforehand. But if the distributor did not set the order beforehand, the priest can celebrate according to either order explained above (St. Alphonsus, VI, 335).

e) That it not be made under a suspensive condition, for example for the intention of him who will first offer the stipend. For an application made in this way regards a future intention, and therefore would involve suspension of the effect. Hence canon 825, 1: "It is never permitted to apply Mass to the intention of one who, after an alms has been offered, is going to ask for the application, but has not yet asked, and to retain the alms given afterward for a Mass previously applied." Nevertheless this does not prevent a Mass from being celebrated, for example, for a deceased person for whom it is foreseen that a Mass will be requested; and afterward, if a Mass is requested, from signifying that some Mass has been said, and from accepting the stipend if it pleases the one asking. Such an application does not depend on a future intention, and therefore does not suspend the effect (St. Alphonsus, VI, 337), nor does it depend on the intention of the one who will ask for the application. For the rest, an intention under a condition about the past or present is always valid, except in the case about which we are now going to speak.

f) That it not be made under a condition not naturally knowable; since God, who has disposed things conformably to a human mode of acting, is not judged to have conferred upon the priest the faculty of applying dependently upon such a condition. Hence the application seems invalid: "I apply the Mass for you, if you are predestined."

What if someone has elicited two contrary intentions?

Response 1. The later prevails, if he conceived it while mindful of the prior intention.

Response 2. If he conceived the later while forgetful of the prior intention, the later likewise prevails, unless, as it seems must be said, he made the prior intention in such a way that he willed it to prevail even if through forgetfulness he were going to elicit another. For the rest, in doubt which intention prevails, afterward let Mass be celebrated for the intention which did not prevail, and thus all things are safe.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1530.

² Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, 11 March 1848 (Collectanea, n. 1028); Holy Office, 12 July 1848 (Collectanea, n. 1274).

³ Holy Office, 12 July 1865 (Collectanea, n. 1274).

⁴ Session 22, canon 5.

⁵ Session 22, chapter 3.

The Sin of Unbelief.—Unbelief in general is a want of faith. It is of two kinds, negative and positive.

(a) Negative unbelief is the absence of faith in a person who has never heard of it at all, or only insufficiently. Thus, the Indians in America before the coming of Christian missionaries were negative unbelievers. This kind of unbelief is a punishment, since it results from original sin; but it is not a sin itself, and those who die in negative unbelief are lost, not on account of this, but on account of sins against the natural law (John, xv. 22; Rom., x. 14). With this kind of unbelief we are not here concerned.

(b) Positive unbelief is the absence of faith in one who has heard it sufficiently, so that the lack of it is due to his own fault. This kind of unbelief is, of course, a sin, for it supposes that one is acting against the light one has received.

Positive unbelief is either a refusal or a renouncement of faith. (a) Ordinary unbelief is a refusal of faith, that is, non-acceptance of faith by one who has never had faith; (b) apostasy, or desertion, is the abandonment of faith by one who formerly accepted it. This is not a distinct kind of unbelief, since, like ordinary unbelief, it has for its object or term the denial of revealed truth; but it is an aggravating circumstance of unbelief (II Peter, ii. 21).

The sin of unbelief is, committed either directly or indirectly. (a) It is committed directly, when one rejects what pertains to faith (its acts, objects or motive); (b) it is committed indirectly, when one guiltily places oneself or others in the occasion or danger of unbelief. The dangers against faith will be considered after the sins of unbelief (see 848-886).

Direct sins of unbelief are those opposed to the elements that belong to the nature of faith and that are contained in its definition (see 751, 798). (a) Opposed to the act of assent are sins of non-assent or dissent (see 817-839); (b) opposed to the certitude and firmness of assent are sins of doubt (840-846); (c) opposed to the right object of faith are sins of credulity (847); (d) opposed to the motive of faith is rationalism (847).

Sins of non-assent are those by which one omits to make an act of faith when one should. This kind of sin will be treated when we come to the commandments of faith as to its internal and external acts (see 925 sqq.)

Sins of dissent are sins of commission, and are of two kinds: (a) privative unbelief, which is the want of faith in one who has heard the faith sufficiently and should realize the obligation of embracing it, but who refuses to believe, although he makes no opposition to faith; (b) contrary unbelief, which is the want of faith in one who has heard the faith and its motives of credibility sufficiently to know the duty of embracing it, and who not only refuses to believe, but even accepts the errors opposed to faith.

Contrary unbelief (see 818), which not only refuses to believe but also assents to contrary errors, has three degrees according to the greater or less number of truths denied or errors admitted in these three degrees. Some theologians see different species of unbelief, while other theologians regard them as only accidental modes or circumstances of the one species of sin.

(a) The most extensive denial of faith is found in infidelity, which rejects both Christ and His revelation. To this form of unbelief belong atheism, agnosticism, pantheism, paganism, polytheism, animism, and denials of Christ and Christianity. The chief religious bodies today that profess such errors are: Confucianism, Taoism and Shintoism (founded in China and Japan), which are polytheistic and practise idolatry and ancestor worship; Brahmanism (founded about 14 centuries before Christ), which is polytheistic or animistic: Buddhism (founded 6th century B.C. in India), which is polytheistic and practises idolatry; Zoroastrianism (founded in Persia about the 7th century B.C.), which is dualistic; Mohammedanism (founded in Arabia in the 6th century A.D.), which makes Mohammed and his religion superior to Christ and Christianity, and rejects the Trinity and the Incarnation. (b) A less complete departure from faith is found when Christ and His revelation are accepted as contained in the figures and prophecies of the Old Testament, but rejected in their fulfillment and development in Jesus and the New Testament. This is the error of Judaism, which today has about 15 million adherents.

(c) A still smaller degree of rejection of faith exists when Christ is recognized as leader and teacher, but not all of His revelation is accepted. This kind of error is called heresy, and those bodies which profess it are known as sects. The chief heresies in times past were Gnosticism and Manicheism in the first centuries; Arianism and Macedonianism in the fourth century; Nestorianism, Monophysism and Pelagianism in the fifth century; Monothelism in the seventh century; Iconoclasm in the eighth century; Photianism in the ninth century; Albigensianism in the eleventh century; Waldensianism in the twelfth century; Wicliffism in the fourteenth century; Hussism in the fifteenth century; Protestantism in the sixteenth century, and Modernism in the twentieth century. Today, the erring Christian groups outside the Church are the Orientals, called Orthodox, and the Protestants.

What is the order of gravity in unbelief, as between infidelity, Judaism, heresy?

(a) The gravity of a sin against faith is to be determined primarily from the subjective resistance made to faith, so that he sins more against the light to whom greater light was given. The sin of unbelief in one who has received the Gospel (heresy), is greater than the same sin in one who has accepted only the Old Testament (Judaism); in one who has received the revelation of the Old Testament (Judaism) the sin of unbelief is more serious than the same sin in one who has not received that revelation (infidelity).

(b) The gravity of unbelief is measured secondarily from the objective opposition of error to truth, so that he is farther away from faith who is farther away from Christ and the Gospel. Thus, a Buddhist denies Christian truths more radically than a Jew, and a Jew more radically than a Protestant. Hence, of three apostates, one to Protestantism, another to Judaism and a third to Buddhism, the second sins more grievously than the first, the third more grievously than the second.

Dangers of Profession of Unbelief.—The principal dangers of making external profession of false religion, if not of losing faith itself, are the following: (a) membership in forbidden societies; (b) communication in sectarian services; (c) cooperation in activities whose tendency or principles are erroneous.

You will resolve: Every man is subject to natural law. For natural law is the very reason and divine will commanding the order to be preserved and forbidding it to be disturbed, promulgated through the very light of reason, namely insofar as God inserted it into the mind of men to be known naturally. But every man enjoys reason. Therefore it is not licit to provoke infants, drunkards, and the insane to intrinsically evil actions. L. 153. 155. - All and only those habitually possessed of reason, who exist under the jurisdiction of the legislator, can be subject to a positive law commanding or prohibiting human action. For law is a rational and stable rule for the common good. But men habitually lacking the use of reason cannot be directed by a rational and stable rule to the common end of society. Hence meats are licitly given to infants not yet having obtained the use of reason, and to the perpetually insane, on prohibited days. They are illicitly given to those insane for a short time and to drunkards. L. 153. 155; Elbel n. 355 seq.; Struggl q. 3. n. 8 seq.

The legislator is not bound directly by his laws as such, that is, as regards the obliging and coercive force; nevertheless indirectly, as regards the merely directive force, from a certain equity he is bound to conform himself as head to the members, namely as regards those laws which befit his state. Hence "it is probable, scandal being excluded, that he is bound only under light fault, because he is bound to the law only from honorableness." L. 154. Scandal being excluded: for if scandal were present in a public transgression of the law, he would be bound to observe it; by no means however in that case would he also be subject to the penalties which he himself imposed on transgressors. Likewise he is also bound to use equal condition in contracts. C. Iustum Dist. 9; L. 154; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96. a. 5; Struggl q. 3. n. 1; Lessius De Iur. et Iustit. l. 2. c. 35. dub. 5. n. 33; Suarez De Legib. l. 3. c. 35.

Infidels, not yet baptized, are not obligated by the laws of the Church, although they are bound to enter the Church. 1 Cor. 5:12. On the contrary, heretics, schismatics, and the excommunicated are of themselves held by ecclesiastical laws. This must be understood of the excommunicated as regards acts not interdicted by the excommunication itself. But as regards heretics, in places where they are tolerated, penal laws have no effect. Trent sess. 7. c. 8 de Bapt.; Schmalz. l. 4. t. 1. n. 378-380, t. 3. n. 99, l. 5. t. 7. n. 171-174; Reiffenst. l. 1. t. 2. n. 274; L. 154.

Greek Catholics, and generally Orientals, although they are held by definitions of catholic doctrine concerning faith and morals, nevertheless are not bound by disciplinary laws of the universal Church, unless something is established concerning them, either by express mention made of them, or by reason of the matter implicitly extended to them by the law. Indeed Constitutions of Roman Pontiffs made for one oriental rite are not extended to other rites without express extension. Nor indeed is it licit for Catholics to depart from the custom and observance of their own rite approved by the Holy Roman Church. E. M. de Stat. partic. 213; Bened. XIV, C. Etsi pastoralis, May 26, 1742, § 9. n. 24, C. Allatae, July 26, 1755; Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 113. 1999.

What is prudence, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? R. To the first. It is a certain special virtue of the practical intellect, by which in any business occurring we know what is honorable, what shameful. And thus prudence is the right reason of things to be done, or the virtue rightly ordering those things which are toward the end of the whole of life. But every virtue is in the mean; the mean is to do those things which virtue commands, when one ought, where one ought, as one ought; and accordingly the office of prudence is to find a mean of this sort, which is one thing as a mean of reason, another as a mean of the thing. - The acts of prudence are: 1. To take counsel, namely by inquiring what means and what circumstances are necessary, so that the work may be done honorably. 2. To judge concerning the things found, i.e., after diligent consideration, to conclude what is to be done, in what way, in what place and time, and with what other circumstances. 3. To command, namely by prescribing what and when it is to be done, by applying to operation those things which have been counseled and judged. 4. To operate solicitously the things commanded. For solicitude is that moderated speed by which, by the cleverness and vigilance of the soul, that which has been consulted and defined is quickly committed to execution.

Hence a precept of prudence is not given by reason of itself, but only by reason of another thing, namely of a virtue to be exercised and a sin to be avoided. Therefore as all precepts pertain to prudence, because it is directive of all virtuous acts, so universal Moral Theology pertains to prudence, and especially the treatise on Conscience; since the whole of Moral Theology and the aforesaid treatise in particular hand down rules so that we may act prudently and rightly. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 64; 2. 2. q. 47; q. 56.

R. To the second. The integral parts of prudence, which concur toward its perfect act, are: 1. Memory, which is knowledge of past things. For since experience is required for prudent persons, and experience is from many memories, the memory of many things is required for prudence. 2. Understanding or intelligence, not as it is a certain power, but as it is a certain right estimation of some ultimate principle. For every deduction of reason is from some principle, and prudence is the right reason of things to be done. 3. Docility, by which someone is prompt and easy in receiving instruction from others and acquiring knowledge from them. For prudence consists about particular things to be done, which someone cannot always know all by himself alone. 4. Shrewdness, which is an easy and prompt conjecturing, by which, when something occurs unexpectedly, someone quickly by himself finds what is fitting. 5. Reason. For it belongs to a prudent man to be good at taking counsel; but counsel is a certain inquiry proceeding from certain things to others, which is the work of reason. 6. Foresight, which imports a respect of something distant, or future, to which those things which occur in the present are to be ordered. Therefore foresight is the right ordering of suitable means to the end, and accordingly includes rectitude of counsel, judgment, and command. 7. Circumspection, by which that which is ordered to the end is compared with the things which surround it, and therefore is an accurate consideration of all circumstances. For something is good in itself and fitting to the end, which nevertheless, from certain concurrent things, is rendered either evil or not opportune to the end. 8. Caution, which is consideration of evils and extrinsic impediments, through which it happens that they are avoided, lest good be impeded by evil, lest evil be mixed with good. Of these eight parts, the first five pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive; but the three later according as it is preceptive, applying knowledge to work. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 49.

The subjective parts of prudence are: 1. Prudence simply so called, which is ordered to one's own good. 2. Royal prudence, which is the prudence of the king himself, which rules a city or kingdom. For it belongs to prudence to rule and fittingly to command. And therefore to the king, to whom it pertains to rule a city or kingdom, a more special prudence belongs. For a rule is so much the more perfect, the more universal it is, extending itself to more things and reaching a further end beyond itself. 3. Political prudence, and this is that by which men rule themselves in obeying Princes in order to the common good of the city or kingdom. 4. Economic prudence, by which men direct themselves toward living well according to domestic intercourse, for the common good of the house or family. 5. Military prudence, by which harms from enemies are repelled. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 47, aa. 10, 11, 12; q. 48, 50.

The potential parts of prudence are: 1. Eubulia, or the virtue of taking counsel well, whose office is to suggest good counsel. 2. Synesis, which is the virtue of judging well concerning particular things to be done, according to common rules. 3. Gnome, which is the virtue of judging about things to be done beyond common principles; and consequently it imports a certain perspicacity of judgment. These parts are potential parts of prudence, because the principal act of prudence is to command execution, to which taking counsel well and judging well are directed. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 57, aa. 4-6; 2. 2. q. 48; q. 51.

R. To the third. Imprudence is opposed to prudence. It is either such privatively, or contrarily. "But negatively it is not properly so called, namely so that it properly imports only the lack of prudence, which can be without sin. Privatively, indeed, imprudence is so called insofar as someone lacks prudence which he is naturally apt and ought to have; and according to this, imprudence is a sin by reason of negligence, by which someone does not apply effort to having prudence. But contrarily imprudence is taken according as reason is moved or acts in a contrary mode to prudence; for instance, if the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent person spurns counsel; and so concerning the other things which must be considered in the act of prudence. And in this way imprudence is sin according to the proper account of prudence. For this cannot happen, that man acts against prudence, except by turning aside from the rules by which the reason of prudence is rectified. Hence, if this happens by aversion from divine rules, it is a mortal sin; for instance when someone, as if contemning and repudiating divine documents, acts precipitately. But if he acts beside them without contempt and without detriment of those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 53, a. 1.

Generally speaking, every sin is against prudence, as follows from the very nature of prudence and imprudence. But specifically one sins against prudence by excess and by defect. By defect: by precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, negligence. By excess, or rather by a certain species of prudence: by prudence of the flesh, cunning, deceit, fraud, solicitude about temporal things, solicitude about future things.

Precipitation is that which, some end having been proposed, immediately undertakes the work, or at least judges concerning the means and mode of executing it, deliberation being omitted, against the office of prudence to take counsel. It is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconsideration is that which judges while diligent inspection of things from which right judgment proceeds has been omitted, against the office of prudence to judge well. Likewise it is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconstancy is that by which, without just cause, one's opinion is changed, and one contemns commanding those things which according to right reason had previously been judged and proposed, against firmness of judgment. It is not grave unless from some extrinsic circumstance, e.g., of scandal, precept, vow, someone is bound to persist in the opinion. - Negligence is that which imports defect of due solicitude, and omits to commit to execution at the opportune time a thing deliberated and judged, against the vigilance of reason in executing. It is not grave except in a grave matter.

Prudence of the flesh is that which thinks out suitable means for accomplishing the works of the flesh, so that one may follow the instinct and motions of corrupted flesh. The sin is grave or light by reason of the depraved affection, grave or light, which underlies it. Under prudence of the flesh is comprehended the prudence of the age and of the world, because we also desire the exterior things of the world on account of the flesh. - Cunning generally is the manner of doing something in a hidden mode. But here it is taken specifically for knowledge of depraved means suitable for deceiving, joined with an affection of executing them. It has place in those things which regard the neighbor. For no one hides something from himself. Therefore cunning is a sin by which someone uses not true ways, but false and simulated ways, for obtaining some end, whether good or evil. It is a grave or light sin according to the account of the affection which underlies it, and the harm which follows for the neighbor. - Deceit is the execution of cunning, whether by words or deeds; for it is a general name. Therefore deceit is the assumption of ways that are not true, but simulated and apparent ways, according to the execution of the work. It differs from cunning because cunning is the assumption of ways of this sort, not in execution, but only in the thinking out of them. Fraud is the execution of cunning through deeds, as when someone spends adulterated coin, and is something more restricted than deceit. Deceit and fraud are used especially in contracts, and they are a grave or light sin according to grave or light harm of neighbor. Concerning fraud and deceit the Rules of Law are: "Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one," C. Ex tenore 16, de Rescr.; "Fraud is not done to him who knows and consents," L. Nemo de Reg. Iur.

Solicitude about temporal things is excessive occupation of mind, proceeding from inordinate love of having, or fear of losing. For solicitude imports a certain effort applied to obtaining something. - Solicitude about future things is excessive occupation of soul concerning future things, especially so that the necessities of life may be had, joined with anxiety and little confidence in Providence. Each solicitude is a grave or light sin, according as by it someone is prepared to violate a precept in a grave or light matter. S. Th. 2. 2. qq. 53-55; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Prud.

As to the Eucharist. - All must know and believe the real presence of Christ in it. Likewise, according to the common opinion, it must be believed explicitly that Christ is whole under each species, and more probably also that he is offered in sacrifice, since all must assist at the sacrifice of the Mass. But transubstantiation is more probably not to be believed explicitly. Lugo, d. 13, n. 121.

Can those be absolved who are ignorant of those things which by necessity of precept and under mortal sin must be known? - R. Affirmatively, because although they have sinned by omitting to learn, nevertheless they can be sorry for this, with the purpose of learning. But the parish priest, like a parent his children, is bound under mortal sin, by himself or through another, to teach his sheep at least those things which they are bound under mortal sin to know. L. 3.

Pontifical Constitutions concerning the Chinese and Malabar rites are to be had as doctrinal, by no means as disciplinary; and therefore, except for censures, they still hold force. S. O. 5 Aug. 1891. The doctrine concerning Eschatological Renewal must be reproved. S. O. 2 Mar. 1910. It cannot safely be denied, or called into doubt, that the text of St. John in 1 Ep. c. 5, v. 5, concerning the three giving testimony in heaven, is authentic. S. O. 15 Jan. 1897. Those cannot be absolved who hold that the fire of hell is not real, but metaphorical. S. Poenit. 30 Apr. 1890.

With all reverence and submission of soul, all propositions condemned by the Holy See up to the year 1794, in which the propositions of the Synod of Pistoia were condemned, must be reproved. With like reverence and submission of soul must also be reproved: the Propositions condemned by Pius IX in the Encyclical Quanta cura, 8 Dec. 1864, and the Errors of our age, 80, condemned in the Syllabus transmitted to the whole Christian world; the 40 Propositions condemned from recently published works under the name of Antonio Rosmini Serbati, Decr. S. O. 7 Mar. 1888, Post obitum, approved and confirmed by Leo XIII; the doctrines of Americanism, condemned by the same Leo XIII, Brief of 22 Jan. 1899 to Card. Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore; the 65 Propositions condemned by the Decr. S. O. Lamentabili sane exitu, 3 July 1907, containing the chief errors of reformism or modernism, afterward proscribed by Pius X through the Encyclical Letter Pascendi dominici gregis, 8 Sept., and through the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, 1 Sept. 1904. E. M. 356, 357, 359.

Is there also given a precept of the external act of faith? As to the external act of faith, there is given a negative precept, prohibiting the denial of the true faith or the profession of a false one. Likewise there is given an affirmative precept, obliging sometimes to confess the faith even with danger to life. Proof of the first part. To deny the true faith, or to profess a false one, is to deny God and Christ. But Christ says: He who shall deny me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven. Matt. 10:33. Proof of the second part. For ordered charity, which we owe to God and neighbor, requires that, when God's honor and the spiritual utility of the neighbor would be withdrawn privatively or contrarily, for professing the faith we should sometimes spurn temporal goods and even life. - Privatively, as if therefore great honor to God and great utility to neighbor would cease. Contrarily, as if otherwise God would be affected by injury, or the neighbor by grave evil, e.g., if the conversion or perversion of others, contempt of religion, scandal, depended on it. Suarez, d. 4, s. 2; L. 10; Laymann, c. 11, n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 3, aa. 1, 2; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1647, 1648, 1653, 1657, 1683, 1827.

By positive law all to be baptized are bound to profession of faith, either by themselves or through sponsors; converted heretics; Bishops before consecration, and before the dispatch of letters of their own provision, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; Sixtus V, C. Romanus; Gregory XIV, C. Onus Apostolicae; all regular Prelates, Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis, id. Nov. 1564; nevertheless this Constitution has not been received in use as to those regular Prelates who are not immediately set over government by the Holy See, but either by chapter or by a higher superior, Thesaurus, de Poenis, c. 1, v. Fides, cf. 550; those about to have ecclesiastical benefices, and those who must assemble in a diocesan synod, Trid. l. c.; likewise those provided with a benefice with care of souls, within two months from possession obtained, before the Bishop himself, or if he is impeded, his vicar general, otherwise they do not make the fruits their own; canons and dignities of a cathedral church, who likewise within two months from begun possession are bound to do this also in chapter; otherwise neither do they make the fruits their own, although they can gain distributions for their choir assistance, S. C. C. 1726; Trid. s. 24, C. 12, de R.; Primates, Archbishops, Bishops in the first provincial synod which they attend, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; those to be chosen for the government and chairs of Universities and public gymnasia; and also those to be promoted to scholastic degrees of doctor, master, etc., Pius IV, C. In Sacrosancta, 13 Nov. 1654, § V. But Doctors and Masters of Universities at the beginning of any year must issue a solemn oath by which they are bound to hand down orthodox doctrine, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R. It belongs to the Rector or Prefect to see that this is observed. - Profession of faith can be emitted immediately after institution or collation of a benefice, and before possession, S. C. C. 11 May 1782; but cf. here below, paragraph Non manet, and it must altogether be made in the form proposed by Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis. But a few things are to be added, so that account may also be taken of the Decrees of the Vatican Council, S. C. C. 20 Jan. 1877. Made otherwise, it will not profit toward avoiding the canonical penalties laid against those who omit this profession. Conc. Rom. Bened. XIII, tit. 1, c. 1; Bened. XIV, Inst. 60; Ferrar., v. Fidei professio; L. 41; Collectan. cit., n. 1670; E. M. 364.

Those who are announced as doctors in Sacred Scripture are bound to furnish an oath according to the prescribed formula approved by the Motu Proprio of Pius X, 29 June 1910. Likewise an oath, according to the prescribed formula, must be furnished by all those who are listed in the Motu Proprio of Pius X, Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910, a profession of faith having been premised; - and also, by reason of office, synodal examiners and parish-priest consultors and those who are listed in C. Sapienti consilio, Order of Service in the Roman Curia, and others, concerning all of whom cf. below n. 550. This obligation of profession of faith seems grave, unless it has been derogated by legitimate custom. The penalty of restoring the fruits probably needs a declaratory sentence of the delict. Sanchez, l. 2, c. 5; Tamburini, l. 2, c. 1, D. 12, n. 4. The faculty made by the Council of Trent no longer remains, by which those provided with any benefices whatever can emit profession of faith within two months from the day of possession obtained; and consequently in the future profession of faith must be emitted before possession of the benefice. S. C. Cons. 1 Mar. 1911.

In external confession of faith and divine worship, the rite of one's own church, Latin or Oriental, is to be observed. Cf. for the Ruthenian rite constituted in the United States of North America, Apostolic Letter of Pius X, 18 Kal. 1907, and for the same rite constituted in the Canadian region, Decr. S. C. de Pr. I., 18 Aug. 1913. E. M. 365.

Blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith. For by it man in heart or mouth, according to intellect or affection, attributes to God things which do not befit him, or denies things which befit him. The vice of blasphemy thus pertains to unbelief. Speech concerning it will occur in the second precept of the Decalogue. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 13.

Are you bound to give up temporal goods in order to avoid scandal? R. Negatively, ordinarily speaking; for either a great loss of money must be suffered, and charity toward neighbor does not urge with so great an inconvenience; or there is only a light loss of money, and this, since it could occur rather often, already easily becomes grave. Besides, it would harm the common good, because an occasion would be given to wicked persons of extorting and seizing others' things, and it would be harmful to the wicked themselves, since thus they would be confirmed in their depraved will. Ordinarily speaking; for if, in some particular case, grave inconvenience ceases, and the scandal were not of Pharisees but of little ones, then either temporal goods must be given up, or the scandal must be calmed through some admonition. L. 52; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 8.

What about the obligation of denying the sacraments to the unworthy who ask? - Generally and under grave obligation, speaking in itself, the minister is bound to deny the sacraments to the unworthy, because natural law obliges the dispenser to dispense the goods of the Lord faithfully and according to his will; moreover the certain will of Christ is that the sacraments not be conferred on the unworthy, according to that saying of Matthew 7:6: Do not give what is holy to dogs, nor cast your pearls before swine. Roman Ritual de SS. euch. sacr., de Sacr. extr. unct. - Cf. Lugo d. 8, n. 164, 180, 193; Suarez d. 8, s. 2. Indeed, as St. Alphonsus 43 notes, "in certain sacraments, for the minister to show himself a faithful dispenser, it does not suffice if he does not know the petitioner to be unworthy, but further he is bound to have a prudent reason that he is worthy; for in the sacrament of penance, since the disposition of the penitent is altogether required for validity, the minister, as judge constituted for this, must make himself certain about it. Likewise in the sacrament of order, the bishop must have certain knowledge concerning the dignity of the one to be ordained, since for order, as directed to the public good, no one has a right unless he is called by God, as Aaron was. But in matrimony the assisting priest must inquire into impediments, since he is constituted for this by the Church. But in the other sacraments, they are not to be denied to those who live as Catholics, unless the unworthiness of the penitent is established... The reason is that all the faithful have a right to these other sacraments and the ministers are not judges, but dispensers; hence in these they do not have a right of inquiring, but only the duty of dispensing to all who ask, provided they are not positively unworthy." Cf. Decr. Ne temere de Spons. et Matr., S. C. C., Aug. 2, 1907.

To a public sinner, whether asking secretly or publicly, the sacrament is to be denied; because there is no reason why an exception should be made to the general rule; indeed grave scandal of the faithful would follow from the concession of the sacraments. St. Thomas 3 p., q. 80, a. 6; L. 44. But in the case of doubt whether someone has sinned, it is to be conceded; in doubt whether he has done penance, it is to be denied. L. 48. "Yet excepted is a sinner constituted at the point of death,"

L. 44, because everyone is then presumed to wish to dispose himself rightly, and necessity removes scandal, as does the hidden penance itself of the dying person, to be made public by the minister if the sacraments were to be publicly ministered to him. La Croix 143. Very rare is the case in which the denial of the sacraments is extended even to penance. But the obligation is always present, as regards penance itself, of denying absolution to one indisposed.

Likewise the sacrament is to be denied to a hidden sinner asking secretly; because reverence toward the sacrament and charity toward one's neighbor demand this in these circumstances, St. Thomas 3 p., q. 80, a. 6; L. 50, except the case in which the crime was known from Confession; for then it is not even licit for the minister to warn the sinner. And this is forbidden even if the confessor could deny the sacrament under the pretext of other causes. L. 50, 51. - But the sacrament is not to be denied to a hidden sinner asking publicly. The reason is drawn from the inconveniences which would follow from denial of the sacrament; for scandals and disturbances would arise in the Church, and especially the faithful, brought into suspicion lest they be prohibited from the sacraments, would withdraw from them. But he who ministers sacraments to an unworthy person cooperates only materially in his sin, and such cooperation is licit from a grave proportionate cause. Cf. 374. St. Thomas p. 3, q. 80, a. 6; L. 49, 50; Lugo d. 8, n. 176; Roman Ritual de Euch. sacram. - E. M.

Resolutions: The marriage of unbelievers, although it is valid in the notion of contract, nevertheless is not a sacrament. St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 59, a. 2. Whether the marriage of a faithful person with an unbeliever, with the Pope's dispensation acceding, is a sacrament, some deny, others affirm. But a marriage contracted by unbelievers, when both spouses are converted to the faith, passes into a sacrament by the reception of baptism. - Heretics and schismatics who, in entering marriage, observe the laws of the Church as regards the substance of marriage, validly contract and are fortified with the sacrament. - All Christians who are altogether unwilling to receive the sacrament do not validly contract, even if they wish to contract marriage; and if they truly wish to contract marriage, they also receive the sacrament, even if they do not wish to make the sacrament. - Lugo, de Sacr., d. 8, n. 120-130; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 302-304; t. 19, n. 164-176; Ferraris, v. Matrimonium, a. 1, n. 19; Clericatus, de Matr., decis. 4, n. 25.

Is marriage governed by civil or ecclesiastical authority? - Since among Christians the contract itself of marriage is a sacrament, marriage cannot, insofar as it is contract, be governed by civil power, and insofar as it is sacrament, by ecclesiastical power; nor at the same time, insofar as it is contract and sacrament, be governed by both powers, civil and ecclesiastical; but it must be governed exclusively, both as contract and as sacrament, by the authority of the Church.

Wherefore to the Church alone it belongs to establish especially those things which regard the substance of this contract, both as regards the incapacity of persons and as regards the form and solemnity to be constituted, namely as regards diriment impediments to be established. And likewise to the Church alone belong matrimonial causes and causes of betrothals and of other impediments immediately and directly impeding marriage. Trent, sess. 24, c. 4, 12; Benedict XIV, Const. Singulari, sections 7, 9; Leo XIII, Encyclical Arcanum, and Letter to the Bishops of the Province of Venice, February 3, 1893; Syllabus, prop. 68 ff. - But since families are members of Civil Society, hence marriage in Civil Society produces civil rights and obligations, which are called the civil effects of marriage.

Therefore if civil Princes can do anything over marriages, those things only are regarded which are situated in the civil order. Leo XIII, Encyclical Arcanum, and Letter dated February 8, 1893. - But marriage is not a certain civil contract, but is most of all natural. The contract of marriage was instituted by God Himself at the beginning of the world, Gen. 2:18; and furthermore it always was and is a sacred thing, sacred indeed not only by natural law, but also by the supernatural ordination of God. Trent, sess. 24, Doctrine on the Sacrament of Matrimony; Leo XIII, cited Encyclical.

Hence marriage, as regards unbelievers, both as natural contract and as sacred thing, by no means depends on the civil power and jurisdiction of Princes as regards impediments diriment of it, according to the opinion of many grave doctors. But there are other doctors who think that the marriages of unbelievers, since they are not sacraments, and therefore cannot be governed by canon law, lest those contracting be without law in so grave a matter, are governed by the power and jurisdiction of Princes, whether faithful or unbelieving. St. Thomas seems to adhere to this second opinion, 4 d. 39, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, since "those things which pertain to the law of nature are determinable by positive law; and therefore if by some positive law among those unbelievers marriage with unbelievers of another rite is prohibited, disparity of worship impedes marriage among them." - St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 42, a. 2; 4 d. 34, q. 1, a. 1; Quodl. 5, a. 15; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 360 ff.; t. 18, n. 2-8; Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1089; E. M.

Is an exception given as regards the aforesaid firmness of marriage? - A threefold case must be excepted. 1. Ratified and non-consummated marriage of Christians can be dissolved, for a grave cause, by dispensation of the Pope, from the power divinely conceded to him. This is clear from the fact that the Supreme Pontiffs have already used this power many times, as St. Gregory VII, Paul III, etc.; Benedict XIV, Const. Dei miseratione. Cf. Perrone, de Matr., t. 3, s. 2, c. 6, a. 4. Moreover, this faculty is to be extended to marriages consummated in unbelief, if the spouses after baptism, by which the union becomes ratified, have not again consummated it; and likewise to marriages consummated in unbelief, when the spouse converted and baptized is permitted, by Apostolic Authority, to remain with the wife who was converted and baptized with him, as with a legitimate wife, the others having been dismissed, although she is not his first wife; or, because the absent unbelieving spouse cannot be warned, when it is permitted by Apostolic Authority that the spouse converted to the faith and baptized contract marriage with any faithful person. Indeed this marriage is valid and firm, even if afterward it becomes known that the prior unbelieving spouse could not justly declare his or her will because of an impediment, and had also been converted to the faith at the time the second marriage was contracted. This is most clearly established from the Letters of St. Pius V, August 2, 1571; Gregory XIII, January 25, 1585; Urban VIII, October 20, 1624; September 17, 1627. - Non-consummated, namely by an act of itself suitable for the effect of generation; and consequently, St. Alphonsus 1036, St. Thomas, 4 D. 41, q. 1, a. 1, q. 4, ad 2, by an act perfect on both sides. - Consummated marriage of Christians can in no way be dissolved, Matt. 19:6; Trent, sess. 24, C. 7, de M., and the same must be said if marriage is contracted by a faithful person with an unbeliever from dispensation of the Roman Pontiff. Clement XIII, August 2, 1759; Holy Office, August 1, 1753. - L. 955, 956, 959; Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1308.

Dispensation from ratified non-consummated marriage is to be obtained exclusively from the Supreme Pontiff. The Bishop in this cause cannot, without a special faculty obtained from the S. C. of Sacraments, institute the process. But in other causes the Bishop is the competent judge in first instance.

2. Ratified and non-consummated marriage can be dissolved through the solemn religious profession of one spouse, and this from a special privilege conceded by Christ and declared by the Church. C. Verum, C. Ex parte, de Convers. coniugat.; Trent, sess. 24, c. 6. Solemn: i.e., not of simple vows, even in the Society of Jesus, but solemn vows. Profession; not mere entrance into Religion. - But so that the spouses may deliberate about the use of this privilege, by the law itself they have two months conceded to them after the nuptials, during which time they are not bound to render the debt. C. Verum, C. Ex publico, de Convers. coniug. And "either spouse can licitly deny the debt within the two-month period, although he does not have the intention of entering Religion, because he uses his own right." L. 956. Indeed after that two-month period also, if the marriage has not been consummated even through illicit denial of the debt, this privilege remains. Nor is it impeded by fornication had between the spouses before the celebration of marriage, unless the marriage is necessary for legitimating offspring, or for repairing scandal, or the honor of the bride. If within the two-month period violence is applied, and the marriage is thus consummated while the bride was in fact thinking about embracing religion, although the marriage is now indissoluble, nevertheless the bride can even in this case enter Religion. But he sins who contracts marriage with the intention of entering Religion without warning the other party. - L. 870, 958; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 61, a. 2, 3; Schmalzgrueber, l. 3, t. 32, n. 11 ff.

There are those who judge that a right of this sort is not conceded except to those who, after nuptials have been contracted and not yet consummated, deliberate about entrance into religion. But in this sense that right would be void, for then immediately after the contract of marriage each one would be bound to render the debt. For who is so mad that, while deliberating about entrance into religion, he would contract marriage?

3. Even consummated marriage of unbelievers can be dissolved from divine concession, when either spouse is converted to the Christian faith, although not Catholic but heretical, through reception of baptism, and the other refuses to cohabit peacefully with him, or does not cohabit except with injury to the Creator and contempt of the Christian Religion, or makes an attempt to draw the faithful party into mortal sin. This divine concession is drawn from the words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 7:12-15, where he says: If any brother has an unbelieving wife and she consents to dwell with him, let him not dismiss her...; but if the unbeliever departs, let him depart, for the brother or sister is not subject to servitude in such matters; but God has called us in peace. Innocent III explains the same more fully in C. Quanto 7, de Divortiis. - L. 955, 956; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 59, a. 3-6; E. M.

Interpellation of the unbelieving spouse is to be made, if the other, while that one remains in unbelief, is converted and wishes to enter a new marriage. Provided it is clear that the spouse is unwilling to live peacefully from that one's response, or from a process at least summary that he or she was unwilling to give any response, or dispensation from making interpellation has been obtained from the Holy See, marriage can be contracted.

Note: Marriage is not dissolved immediately by reception of baptism; Crimes are dissolved in baptism, not marriages, C. Gaudemus 8, de Divortiis, C. Si quis 28, q. 2; but when the converted and baptized spouse enters a new union. Even after intercourse has been had after the conversion of either party, if the other party is unwilling to cohabit peacefully without insult to the Creator, the marriage can still be dissolved, whatever time has elapsed. But when the spouse converted passes to other nuptials, since the prior marriage is now dissolved, even the spouse who remains in unbelief can validly and licitly contract another marriage. - Regularly, from the prescription of the Law, C. Quanto 7, de Divortiis, interpreting the Pauline privilege, But if the unbeliever departs, let him depart, the converted party cannot pass to other vows before the unbeliever, having been interpellated, has either absolutely refused to cohabit with the converted party, or at least has been unwilling to cohabit without insult to the Creator. - If the unbeliever cannot be interpellated, because he or she is far absent and has fled, or lies hidden, several judge, apud Sanchez, l. 7, d. 74, n. 13-15, that interpellation can be omitted, because there is no obligation of impossibilities; nor is there need of it, since it is now clear with moral certainty that the unbelieving spouse is unwilling to be converted, nor willing to live peacefully. Others, with whom Benedict XIV agrees, de Syn., l. 6, c. 4, n. 3, think pontifical dispensation necessary; and the S. C. C., January 17, 1722, adhered to this opinion apud the same Benedict XIV, l. c., and the Holy Office, September 16, 1824. Cf. Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1328. The case would certainly be different if the unbelieving spouse is absent from the spouse by some compulsion and wishes to be joined with that spouse; for then the unbeliever neither departs nor can depart, in which case Apostolic dispensation would be needed for the converted unbeliever, and then indeed in this sense the dispensation from interpellation which is given can be well understood. - When, in some places, by law or custom, in order to remove a peculiar danger of perversion, it is prohibited that the converted party cohabit with the unbeliever unless this one also wishes to be converted to the faith, not only must the unbeliever be interpellated whether he consents to cohabit peacefully, but also whether he wishes to embrace the Christian faith. But if, when the time prefixed by law or custom has elapsed, he has declared that he is unwilling to be converted to the faith, although from another source he would wish to cohabit peacefully, the converted spouse recovers liberty and is permitted to fly to new nuptials. For by the judgment of the Church, according to the circumstances of places, the pertinacity alone of the unbeliever in unbelief is judged to present danger for the perversion of the faithful spouse, and for insult to the Creator. - By the Pauline privilege, it is not conceded to the converted party that he can enter a new marriage with another unbeliever, or even with a catechumen, but only with a baptized faithful person. S. C. de P. F., January 16, 1683; August 7, 1891, Collectanea cit. n. 2183; L. 956, 957; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 59, a. 3, 6; Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 13, c. 21; Sanchez, l. 7, d. 73; Monit. Eccles., v. 11, p. 533.

When one of two unbelieving spouses is converted to the faith, the other remaining in unbelief, the converted one can receive sacred orders or profess religion. In the first case the marriage is not dissolved, and therefore if the other spouse is converted, he or she cannot contract a new marriage. Sanchez, l. 7, d. 76, n. 11. But in the other case, "it must altogether be held," says Sanchez, l. c., n. 9, "that the prior consummated marriage is dissolved through profession, just as it would be dissolved through subsequent marriage." - Ferraris, Supplementum, v. Privilegium Paulinum; E. M.

What and of how many kinds is an impediment of marriage; by what law is it constituted, and by what superior; whom does it affect? Impediments of marriage are certain conditions or circumstances constituted by law, which prohibit from contracting marriage. By law, for a particular precept or prohibition made to someone or to some persons is not customarily called an impediment. - Impediments which forbid entering marriage licitly are called impedient; those which bar from validly contracting marriage are called diriment. Contracting, for if perhaps they supervene when it has already been contracted, they by no means render it invalid. Diriment impediments fall into inhabiting and invalidating laws. Wherefore regularly neither ignorance nor force nor fear even of death excuses from incurring them. - All diriment impediments are established either by natural law, or by divine law, or by canon law. Nor can Bishops constitute them, but only the Roman Pontiff. Impediments introduced by Christian Princes are neither diriment, nor properly impedient, and therefore do not oblige in conscience except merely per accidens, from damage that would occur if they were not observed. - Impediments of natural and divine law oblige all, even unbelievers. Impediments of canon law oblige only Christians, C. 4, de Consang., C. 8, de Divort., namely Catholics and heretics; and thus the Holy See, when permitting mixed marriages of Catholics and non-Catholics, if some diriment impediment is present, first dispenses it. And if marriage is entered by a faithful person with an unbeliever, an impediment of ecclesiastical law certainly does not directly affect the unbeliever; nevertheless it directly affects the faithful person, and because marriage is a contract, and a contract is between two and cannot be invalid on one side and valid on the other, the impediment indirectly affects even the unbeliever, as is seen in the impediment of disparity of worship, crime, etc. C. 1, de Conv. infid. - Trent, sess. 24, c. 3, 4; Sanchez, l. 7, d. 5, d. 78, n. 3; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 375; t. 7, n. 46; La-Croix, l. 6, p. 3, n. 525; Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 8, c. 14, n. 5; l. 13, n. 23; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 45, n. 4; E. M.

“68. Purely negative infidelity, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin.” Proposition of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V.

“28. If the Pope with a great part of the Church should hold an opinion in one way or another, and should not even be in error, it is still not a sin or heresy to hold the contrary, especially in a matter not necessary for salvation, until the one opinion has been rejected and the other approved by a universal Council.” Proposition of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

“5. Although it is evident to you that Peter is a heretic, you are not bound to denounce him if you cannot prove it.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

1. Marcellinus the missionary proposes the following doubts:

1. Is it licit for Christians to rent houses and workshops to gentiles? The reason for doubting is that the gentiles, in the nobler place of those houses, burn incense, exhibit reverence to an idol, and exercise other superstitious things.

R. "It is licit, if it is established that the houses are sought for inhabiting and the workshops for an indifferent use; yet it is not licit if they are expressly sought for constructing a shrine." S. C. de P. F., 8 Feb. 1806.

2. Is it licit for Christians to lease farms belonging to a temple?

R. Here is in summary the instruction given by the S. C. de P. F., 15 Jan. 1807. 1. It is licit to lease farms belonging to a temple; especially if a cause consonant with reason for contracting concurs; for the thing is of its own nature indifferent. 2. To pay the lease price is a debt of justice, even if the lessee thinks it will be expended for the sake of the temple. 3. Scandal which perhaps arises for Christians from a thing of this sort, insofar as it is born from ignorance, or is scandal of the little ones, must be restrained by protestation and instruction; insofar as it is produced by the malice of the wicked, or is pharisaic, it must be contemned. 4. The lessee is to be exhorted to abstain from the lease if from this some danger of perversion or occasion of scandal is feared.

2. Christians buy territories on which there are idols or oratories of idols. Can they admonish the gentiles, to whom the territory previously belonged, to remove them from the territory?

R. "They cannot, if the ownership of these idols or oratories is annexed to the territory, and passes with the dominion of the land to the buyer, who is held to remove and destroy them, or so change their form that every occasion of superstitious worship is removed, and no appearance of an oratory consecrated to idols appears any longer. But if such idols or oratories are of public right and under the power of the prince, it is not licit for Christians to remove or destroy them, but rather they should abstain from buying those territories in which these profane images and oratories are found." Holy Office, month of May, year 1781.

3. Gentiles who preserve the tablets of the progenitors of the family are converted to the faith. Can they hand over tablets of this sort to pagan relatives, to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them from their house, or hide them, to be handed over afterwards if they are demanded by relatives or by prefects, and they are compelled to this? Likewise, to what are proselytes held who have with themselves the idols of other pagans, which they preserve by way of deposit?

R. "If those superstitious tablets by special dominion belong to the converted gentile, he cannot preserve them at home, nor hand them over to other pagans of the family, but must altogether destroy them; and thus it is to be taught and enjoined by the missionaries. But if these tablets belong jointly to others of the family, the Christian is held to remove them from his house; but he can hand them over to others of the family to whom they belong, or admonish them to remove them and take them for themselves; for thus he will confess his faith, and will render to another his own right. By equal right, the idols of pagans which the proselyte preserves for the sake of deposit are to be restored to their owners." Holy Office, 20 Aug. 1778.

4. The bishop of Sergiopolis, Apostolic Vicar of Kiang-nan, proposed a case to the S. C. de P. F.: "Whether Catholics can be permitted, with boats and carrying-chairs, by which they are accustomed indiscriminately to transfer all persons from place to place, also to convey those gentiles who, bringing with themselves incense, idols, and other superstitious things, approach the sepulchers of their ancestors, or other places, so that there they may exercise superstitions."

The S. C. de P. F., 14 Sept. 1868, transmitted the response of the Holy Office, July 1854, given to a similar question:

"Since the actions of which there is discussion are in themselves licit, or at least indifferent, and do not directly influence superstition, provided that scandal is not present, and grave damage is imminent, those Catholics are not to be disturbed; and provided that it is not in contempt of religion, and a protestation is made by the Christian sailors, insofar as it can conveniently be done, that they do not intend toward superstition." Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2195.

5. Marcellus, a missionary, proposes the following doubts:

1. In order to avoid some tumults against Christians, is it licit for Christians to contribute money which is demanded, to be spent in the new year on idolatries of demons, and at the same time on other indifferent demonstrations of the people's joy?

R. "The Chinese Christians can contribute money, provided that through contributions of this sort they do not intend to concur in superstitious acts, the cause which is narrated being supposed, especially a protestation having been premised, if it can conveniently be done, that they furnish the taxes imposed only in order to the joy of the people and to indifferent acts, or at least to acts not repugnant to the worship of the Christian Religion." S. C. de P. F., 12 Sept. 1645.

2. Is it lawful for Christians to contribute money which, if one is unwilling to give it, he is prohibited from entry into the market of goods; which money partly falls to the leading men, partly to repairing the market, and partly to burning incense to a false deity?

R. "The payment of the tax can be permitted to Christians, especially with a protestation premised." S. C. de P. F., year 1816; Holy Office, 21 Apr. 1849.

3. What if the tax to be paid is imposed solely for a superstitious end, for constructing pagodas, for making sacrifices to idols, etc.?

R. That indeed is not licit, even with any protestation premised. For this contribution bears before itself at least external consent with the superstition of the gentiles, which is altogether illicit. Holy Office, 16 Nov. 1769.

4. By the edict of the king Christians are now compelled to erect shrines to idols and to progenitors. Moreover, in very many places where pagans and Christians are mixed, Christians make an agreement with pagans that they themselves will sustain, according to their choice and as they can, a greater and some special part of public and licit works in the village, provided that the pagans do not disturb them concerning superstitions nor betray and accuse them before the Mandarins, and furthermore handle the superstitious business before the Mandarin for the whole village according to their choice and as they can. By acting thus, the Christians do not intend that the pagans perform superstitious things in their place, but only to free themselves from doing superstitions, and to hide themselves from the Mandarins. Moreover, the pagans do not do more superstitions, either greater or more in number, than they do according to their custom. - Q. Is such an agreement between Christians and pagans licit, with attention to the things said above, with attention also to the reason that, unless Christians make an agreement with pagans in such a way, they will either perform superstitions, or will be compelled to sustain innumerable vexations?"

R. "As it is explained, it can be tolerated, or they are not to be disturbed." S. C. de P. F., 10 Aug. 1841, Vicar Apostolic of Western Tonkin.

6. "Christians, few in number, cannot avoid using the society of gentiles: they find themselves daily at their tables and banquets; but because pagans have it as a custom that they offer to idols foods prepared not only directly for the worship of idols, but for the ordinary eating of the family, and place them indifferently on the table, Christians who sit there, timid, likewise eat indifferently, because it would be shame to themselves and injury to the gentiles if they refused to use the foods placed there."

"Q. Can those Christians eat of these, when scandal is not given?"

R. "It is licit to eat feasts placed indifferently, although offered to idols, provided that it is not in a temple, nor in a place sacred to idols, and provided that every appearance of worship or veneration of idols and of superstition is absent, and no danger is present of scandalizing the faithful or infidels." Holy Office, 15 Dec. 1768. Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1703.

7. The wives, daughters, and maidservants of pagans are compelled to cook foods for the common meal of the family. But some part of these foods will afterwards be offered to an idol.

Q. In the case, can the aforesaid persons licitly cook foods?

R. "It is generally licit to cook and prepare foods if there is question of ordinary servants and cooks, who through the whole time of the year are assigned to a ministry of this sort; if extraordinary banquets of this sort are made primarily for the joy of the family, for guests, and for other occasions by no means superstitious, although it is not unknown that some part of them is to be offered to idols; if the dishes are not distinguished, so that some are made for a superstitious offering, others for the food of the guests, but the destination depends on the judgment of the father of the family; if no dishes are specially directed and prepared for the idol; if in the division of the feasts, nor in their exposition at the place of sacrifice, or at the table of the idol, they do not cooperate.

"It is not licit for maidservants and children of the family to buy, cook, or in any way prepare extraordinary foods accustomed to be deputed to sacrifice or superstitious offering, when they well know that such foods are destined by masters, husbands, or parents for sacrifice or offering to be made to their deceased. Nor is this licit for the same persons because of grave fear or damage which probably or certainly threatens themselves, even if a protestation is premised, that their mind is altogether alien from superstition. Likewise this is not licit for the same persons even when those extraordinary foods are bought, cooked, etc., in a greater quantity than is necessary for furnishing the said table serving superstition, when the primary end of the said preparation is to make the aforesaid superstitious table, although the part of the foods which remains over serves occasionally and accessorily for licit eating." S. C. de P. F., 13 Jan. 1793.

205. • DEFINITION. Infidelity, taken generally, is the lack of Faith in a non-baptized man. For those are called infidels who have not received the habit of Faith through Baptism.

DIVISION. A threefold infidelity is distinguished, namely positive, negative, and privative.

1º Positive, or formal, infidelity is the lack of Faith in him to whom it has been sufficiently proposed, and who positively rejects it.

2º Negative, or material, infidelity is the lack of Faith in him who has never heard anything about the true Religion ¹.

¹ Add, also in him to whom revelation has been proposed in some way, but not yet sufficiently, so that he is now bound to believe, although perhaps he can be bound to inquire. Recall the 21st proposition from those condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: The assent of supernatural faith, useful for salvation, stands with only probable knowledge of revelation, indeed with fear, by which one fears lest God has not spoken.

3º Privative infidelity is the lack of Faith in him who neglects to obtain for himself knowledge of the Faith, when occasion is given.

The principal species of infidelity are: Paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and other sects, to which Deism, Atheism, Pantheism, and Rationalism can be joined, which in our times ravages so widely.

206. Principles. - I. Infidelity, both positive, or formal, and privative, is a most grave sin. The reason is that the former explicitly, the latter virtually, contains grave injury to and contempt of the first truth, or the authority of God revealing ².

² The guilt of privative infidelity must be measured by the lesser or greater negligence in inquiring; but the obligation of inquiring supposes prudent reasons or at least suspicions concerning the necessity of this inquiry; for if a reason or suspicion of this sort is slight, not even in the gravest affairs shall we find a grave fault of negligence.

II. But negative, or purely material, infidelity in itself is not sin, but only a punishment of sin. The reason is that there cannot be sin where there is invincible ignorance. - Moreover it is clear from the condemnation of the 68th proposition of Baius, proscribed by Pius V and Gregory XIII, which lies thus: Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is sin. - Nevertheless infidels, even negative ones, are most miserable, since they wander far from the way of salvation ³.

³ Yet that the way which lies open through baptism of desire is not closed to them, St. Thomas excellently intimates, 1. 2. q. 89. art. 6.

III. The rites of infidels can never be approved or fostered by Christian Princes: nevertheless it is sometimes lawful to tolerate them, when by their prohibition greater evils would be brought in, or greater goods would be impeded ⁴. - But Jews are more easily tolerated, because from their preservation a great good comes to the Church, namely the testimony of our Faith.

⁴ ** It is one thing to tolerate on account of these most grave causes, but another to regard all sects and cults or all religions in the same place. This latter, in which recent impiety places liberty (as they say) of conscience or of worship, is true apostasy of Government, to which someone will perhaps think that prophetic word of Paul is to be referred (2. Thess. 2.3.): Unless the falling away (in the Greek text, ἀποστασία) comes first; seeing in it, namely, the πρόδρομον of the Antichrist.

207. • Q. Can infidels do good works in the state of infidelity?

Resp. 1º Affirm. with regard to works naturally honorable. This is clear 1º from Sacred Scripture, Rom. 2.14: The Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do the things that are of the law. - 2º From various condemned propositions, namely from the 25th prop. of Baius, condemned by Pius V: All the works of infidels are sins... - From the 8th prop. condemned by Alexander VIII: It is necessary for an infidel to sin in every work. The reason for the condemnation is that there is not sin where there is no violation of law, nor a vicious end; but many works of infidels can be of this kind: therefore, etc.

Resp. 2º Affirm. also with regard to works of the supernatural order, prior to formal Faith, which infidels perform aided by divine grace.

667. Infidelity taken broadly is any defect of internal faith, and under this respect it also comprises heresy and apostasy. Taken strictly, insofar as it is distinguished from heresy and apostasy, it is the lack of faith in those who have not been baptized, and who therefore have not received the habit of faith.

(a) There are merely negative infidels, namely those who have heard nothing concerning the faith, or to whom faith has not been sufficiently proposed, so that they are not conscious of the obligation of believing. These certainly do not sin: nothing is willed unless it has been known beforehand. Hence deservedly this proposition 68 of Baius was condemned by Pius V, Oct. 1, 1567: "Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin."¹

¹ Apud Denzing., n. 948. - In our days there are many infidels of this kind, not only among foreign nations, but also among Christian nations, especially in great cities; many, I say, were not baptized, nor have they heard anything concerning the Catholic religion except that it is hostile to all progress and liberty.

668. (b) But there are others who have heard of the Christian faith, and at the same time have had the opportunity of inquiring further concerning its truth, but have knowingly and willingly neglected this; their infidelity is called privative, and of itself is gravely culpable, because in a matter of such great moment they are bound to inquire seriously. Yet certain persons are excused from grave sin if they are not conscious of this grave obligation.

(c) There are also those to whom the Christian faith has been sufficiently proposed, with motives of credibility accommodated to their intelligence, so that they understood the obligation of believing, and who nevertheless denied assent. Their infidelity is called positive, and it is a grave sin, because it includes contempt of God revealing and rejection of the means necessary for salvation: "He who does not believe shall be condemned."²

² Mark 16:16.

Therefore it is of the greatest moment to adhere to those associations which furnish preachers to infidels, by whom they may be able to be converted to the true faith. To bring help to these by alms, prayers, and other opportune means is a work supremely pleasing to God and especially efficacious for not only preserving but also increasing faith.

Opposed to the virtue of faith are doubt, heresy, infidelity, schism, apostasy, and superstition.

1. DOUBT.—Doubt is the state of a mind hesitating whether to give assent to a truth or to withhold it.¹ As the formal object or motive of religious faith is the infallible authority of God, it would be irrational, and therefore sinful, to doubt anything that is contained in divine Revelation.

¹ Cfr. John Rickaby, S.J., First Principles of Knowledge (Stonyhurst Series), p. 44.

“The faithful,” says the Catechism of the Council of Trent, “can have no doubt touching those things of which God, who is truth itself, is the author. Hence we understand how great is the difference between this faith which we have in God, and that which we yield to the writers of human history.”²

² Cat. Rom., P. I, c. 1, qu. 1: “No doubt can occur to the faithful concerning those things of which God, who is truth itself, is the author. From this it is evident how great a difference there is between this faith which we have in God and that which we give to human histories.”

To doubt a doctrine which cannot stand the test of reason, either because it is not proposed by legitimate authority, or because all or some part of it is contradictory, is morally licit. Consequently, doubt is not forbidden per se, that is, not every kind of doubt is sinful, but there is a doubt that is reasonable and permissible.

A distinction must therefore be drawn between speculative doubt (also called theoretical or negative) and practical or positive doubt. The former has its origin in the intellect. When it is not directed against the substance of a revealed truth, but merely against the form in which that truth is couched, or against the arguments alleged in its support, or when it questions whether the dogma under consideration is really revealed by God or not, doubt is no sin, but rather a legitimate weapon against credulity, superstition, and intellectual sloth, and may prove an incitement to penetrate more deeply into the teaching of religion. When, on the other hand, a man harbors doubts against a truth of which he knows that, because proposed by the Church, it is surely contained in divine Revelation, he commits a sin, either of heresy or of infidelity.

Practical or positive doubt arises from the heart. It is the state of mind of him who, in the words of Jesus Christ, will not believe because he loves darkness rather than light.³ This kind of doubt is the product of a corrupt heart and logically leads to a denial of the faith and, in the end, to infidelity. “He that is of God, heareth the words of God; therefore you hear them not, because you are not of God.”⁴

³ John III, 19.

⁴ John VIII, 47; XVIII, 37; Rom. III, 4; IV, 19–22; 1 Thess. V, 21; Tit. II, 2.—Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 3.—St. Anselm, De Fide Trin., c. 2: “For no Christian ought to dispute how that which the Catholic Church believes in her heart and confesses with her mouth is not so; but, always holding the same faith without doubt, loving it, and living according to it, he should humbly seek, as far as he can, a reason for how it is so. If he can understand, let him give thanks to God; if he cannot, let him not thrust in his horns for butting, but bow his head in veneration.” (Migne, P. L., CLVIII, 262).

There is a third species of doubt which is to be regarded as a temptation and is not sinful so long as the mind withholds assent. This form of quasi-doubt is sometimes a trial inflicted by God, sometimes the result of natural causes, physical or intellectual, and sometimes the product of carelessness, pride, self-conceit, or the sign of a secret repugnance to the truths of faith. It should be treated like scrupulousness, to which it is related.⁵

⁵ See this Handbook, Vol. I, pp. 199 sqq.—Cfr. F. Hense, Die Versuchungen, 3rd ed., pp. 237 sqq.; C. Krieg, Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung, Vol. I, Freiburg 1904, pp. 242 sqq.

2. HERESY.—Heresy (αἵρεσις, from αἱρεῖσθαι, to choose) is error repugnant to the faith, pertinaciously held (error pertinax) by one who professes the Christian religion. It may be negative or positive. Negative heresy implies a denial of, or refusal to accept, a truth proposed by the Catholic Church; positive heresy asserts as a revealed truth something which the Church does not teach as such.

Heresy, again, may be internal or it may be external. It is internal (haeresis interna) if held purely as a matter of conviction; external (haeresis externa) if expressed in words or manifested by deeds.⁶

⁶ Cfr. Acts XXIV, 5; XXVI, 5; 1 Tim. I, 3; IV, 2; 2 John X; Gal. I, 6–9; Tit. I, 11.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 11, art. 1.

Formal heresy involves rebellion against God and is a very grievous sin because it destroys the foundation of the means of salvation. “A man that is a heretic,” says the Apostle, “after the first and second admonition, avoid, knowing that he, that is such a one, is subverted and sinneth, being condemned by his own judgment.”⁷ “To have erred,” declares St. Augustine, “is human; pertinaciously to persevere in error is diabolical.”⁸

⁷ Tit. III, 10 sq.

⁸ Serm., 164 (al. 22, De Verbis Apost.), c. 10, n. 14: “To err was human; to remain in error through obstinacy is diabolical.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 901).—Cfr. A. Seitz, Die Heilsnotwendigkeit der Kirche, pp. 83 sqq.

Material heresy (haeresis materialis) is the error of those who do not pertinaciously reject the teaching of the Church, but err in good faith, i. e., sincerely desirous of knowing the truth. This kind of heresy is sinful only when the error is inexcusable. A non-Catholic who is in good faith and believes that he has the true religion, lives in a state of excusable error. If serious doubts arise in his mind concerning the truth of what he believes, he is bound to enquire, and if his enquiry results in the conviction that the Catholic Church is the true Church of Christ, he must give up his erroneous belief, else his heresy will cease to be material and become formal. For every honest man is obliged to renounce, both internally and externally, a religion which he recognizes as false and to accept that which his conscience tells him is true. He who knowingly persists in religious error incurs the condemnation of Christ, who says: “He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, in this adulterous and sinful generation, the Son of man also will be ashamed of him, when He shall come in the glory of his Father with the holy angels.”⁹

⁹ Mark VIII, 38; cfr. John XII, 48.

A heresy is never formal, or grievously sinful, if it involves no real error against the faith (positivus assensus falsi seu dissensus veri), or if the holder is not a professed Christian, or the error is not deliberate and pertinacious.¹⁰ Involuntary error or error based upon ex- cusable ignorance is not even venially sinful. The distinctive mark of formal heresy, therefore, is wilful and obstinate rejection of a Catholic dogma. Hence the declaration of sincere Catholic writers: “I may err, but I shall never be a heretic.”¹¹

¹⁰ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. XVIII, c. 51, n. 1: “Heretics [are] those who under the Christian name resist Christian doctrine.” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 612).—IDEM, Epist., 43 (al. 162), c. 1, n. 1: “Those who defend their opinion, however false and perverse, with no obstinate animosity, especially an opinion which the audacity of their own presumption did not produce, but which they received from parents seduced and fallen into error, and who seek the truth with cautious solicitude, ready to be corrected when they have found it, are by no means to be numbered among heretics.” (P. L., XXXIII, 160).—IDEM, De Gestis Pelagii, c. 6, n. 18: “It matters how much, it matters whence, finally it matters whether, upon being admonished, he corrects it, or by obstinately defending it even makes into a dogma what he had said through levity, not as a dogma. Therefore, although every heretic is consequently also a fool, not every fool is immediately to be called a heretic.” (P. L., XLIV, 351).—IDEM, De Anima, l. III, c. 15, n. 23: “These things, if each is defended obstinately, can make as many heresies as there are opinions numbered.” (P. L., XLIV, 522).—IDEM, De Bapt. contra Donat., l. IV, c. 16, n. 23: “I do not yet call him a heretic, unless, after Catholic doctrine has been manifested to him, he chooses to resist the faith and chooses that which he held.” (P. L., XLIII, 169).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 5, art. 3.—A. Seitz, Die Heilsnotwendigkeit der Kirche, pp. 59 sqq., 89 sqq.

¹¹ Cfr. St. Celestine I, Epist., 25, n. 3: “Nor shall I give to this perfidy the name of error; not every impiety is error.” (Migne, P. L., L, 550).—Conc. Lateran. IV., c. 2 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 432).—Cicero, Phil., XII, 2: “It belongs to any man to err; to none but a fool to persevere in error.”—A. M. Weiss, O. P., Lutherpsychologie, 2nd ed., pp. 29 sq.

As against heretical errors, the teaching of the Church is called by St. Paul “sound doctrine” or “the sound word.”¹² “Heretics,” says St. Ignatius of Antioch, “are scarcely to be cured; there is one physician, ... Jesus Christ our Lord.”¹³

¹² 1 Tim. I, 10; Tit. I, 9; II, 1, 8; cfr. 2 Tim. II, 17.

¹³ Epist. ad Ephes., c. 7 (Funk, Patres Apost., Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 218, 17).

The chief sources of heresy are ignorance and pride.¹⁴ St. Augustine says that if there were no pride in the hearts of men, there would be neither heresy nor schism.¹⁵ It seems strange to have this truth confirmed by Martin Luther. “Every heretic and proud man,” he says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, written while he was still a Catholic, “is first misled by ignorance of the divine truth. Then he accepts as true what seems to him to be true, and is already trapped, because he proceeds securely, as if he were true and free, beyond snares and imprisonment. In course of time he objects to everything that does not suit him and turns away his ears. Finally he gets angry and zealously defends the creatures of his brain, persecuting his opponents, slandering them, and inflicting all manner of injury upon them. The consequence is that he becomes utterly blind and cannot see what others see, and while all the rest rise up, he remains lying on the ground, defending his opinions.”¹⁶

¹⁴ Cfr. Matt. VII, 15 sq.; XV, 14; XXIII, 2 sqq.; Luke VI, 39; Acts XX, 29 sq.; Col. II, 8.

¹⁵ De Vera Religione, c. 25, n. 47: “If this [pride] did not exist, there would be neither heretics nor schismatics, nor those circumcised in the flesh, nor worshippers of creatures and images.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 142).—IDEM, Enarr. in Ps., 124, n. 5: “Do not think, brethren, that heresies could arise through certain small souls. None but great men have made heresies; but the greater they were, so much the more evil were those men.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1652).—IDEM, ibid., 134, n. 18: “There are learned men who afflict the Church by making schisms and heresies.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1750).—IDEM, ibid., 106, n. 14: “They [the heretics] are leaders, they are learned, they are great, they are precious stones.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1429).—IDEM, Serm., 46 (al. 165, De Temp.), c. 8, n. 18: “In different places there are different sects, but one mother, pride, has begotten them all.” (P. L., XXXVIII, 280).

¹⁶ Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, fol. 241b, apud Denifle, Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 478.

3. INFIDELITY.—By infidelity (ἀπείθεια, infidelitas) we mean an absolute lack of faith in the Christian religion.

a) If this lack of faith arises from invincible ignorance, it is called negative and is no sin, but merely an evil or a penalty of sin. If, on the other hand, infidelity arises from unwillingness to know or accept the truths of Revelation (infidelitas positiva), it is per se sinful. “If I had not come and spoken to them,” says our Divine Saviour, “they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin.”¹⁷

¹⁷ John XV, 22.—Cfr. Prop. Damnat. Baii, n. 68: “Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1068).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 1: “Infidelity can be taken in two ways: in one way according to pure negation, so that one is called an unbeliever from this alone, that he does not have faith; in another way infidelity can be understood according to contrariety to faith, whereby, namely, someone resists the hearing of the faith or even despises it; and in this the nature of infidelity is properly completed, and according to this infidelity is a sin. But if it is taken according to pure negation, as in those who have heard nothing of the faith, it does not have the nature of sin, but rather of punishment, because such ignorance of divine things followed from the sin of our first parent.”

Positive infidelity, as a rule, amounts to more than mere negation; it opposes to the true faith, which it rejects, some false doctrine of its own invention. Its sources are ignorance, pride, sensuality, and malice.¹⁸ The degree of sinfulness involved in each case is to be measured by the gravity of the underlying cause.

¹⁸ Cfr. Luke XVI, 27–31; John III, 19 sq.; V, 44–47; VIII, 42–47; X, 24–26; Eph. IV, 17–19; 1 Tim. I, 19 sq.—P. Segneri, Incredulus non Excusabilis, Dillingen 1696.—A. Guyot, Les Causes de l’Incredulité, 6th ed., Paris 1904.—A. Kirchberger, Der Unglaube und die Vernunft, Ravensburg 1907.—Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, 4th ed., St. Louis 1921, pp. 52 sq.

The sinfulness of infidelity may be judged from what has been said above¹⁹ on the necessity of faith. The subjective guilt involved in each case varies according to the degree of consciousness and pertinacity with which the truth is rejected and is objectively graver if it disfigures the truths it denies.²⁰

¹⁹ Supra, pp. 6 sqq.

²⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 3: “Every sin formally consists in turning away from God. Hence a sin is the graver, the more a man is separated from God through it. But through infidelity man is especially removed from God, because he does not have a true knowledge of God; and through a false knowledge of Him he does not approach Him but is removed farther from Him. Nor can it be that one who has a false opinion of God knows Him in some respect, because that which he supposes is not God. Hence it is manifest that the sin of infidelity is greater than all sins which occur in the perversity of morals. It is otherwise with the sins opposed to the other theological virtues.”

Infidelity is really the most grievous of all sins because by it a man departs farther than by any other sin from God, who is man’s last end.²¹ The terrible consequences of unbelief are variously described in Holy Writ. “He that believeth not shall be condemned;”²²—“He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him;”²³—“If you believe not that I am he, you shall die in your sin;”²⁴—“The wrath of God cometh upon the children of unbelief,”²⁵ etc.

²¹ St. Augustine, Tr. in Ioa., 89, n. 1: “He wishes a certain great sin to be understood, not every sin as though under a general name. For this is the sin by which all sins are held fast; if anyone does not have it, all sins are forgiven him.” (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1856).

²² Mark XVI, 16.

²³ John III, 36.

²⁴ John VIII, 24; XII, 48; Rom. XI, 20.

²⁵ Col. III, 6; Heb. III, 18; Apoc. XXI, 8.

b) There are various forms of infidelity.

α) Indifferentism (latitudinarianismus), or carelessness in religious matters, based upon the assumption that all religions, or at least all Christian denominations, are equally true or equally false (theoretical indifferentism),²⁶ or sloth in the fulfilment of the duties imposed by religion (practical indifferentism).²⁷

²⁶ 2 Cor. VI, 14–16.—Encyclical of Pius IX, Dec. 9, 1846: “To this pertains that horrible system of indifference concerning any religion, most repugnant even to the natural light of reason, by which those deceivers, having abolished every distinction between virtue and vice, truth and error, decency and disgrace, imagine that men can attain eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever, just as though there could ever be any fellowship of justice with iniquity, any society of light with darkness, or any agreement of Christ with Belial.” (Syllab. Error., n. 15–18; Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1715 sqq.).

²⁷ Apoc. III, 15 sq.

β) Eclecticism, so called, i. e., the arbitrary se- lection from the body of religious or philosophical truths presented by the Church of certain doctrines and combining them into a system; γ) Scepticism, which regards uncertainty or doubt as the product of reflection and the normal state of the human mind, and thereby completely renounces the knowledge of truth; δ) Formal or positive atheism in its various forms (Pantheism, Materialism, Naturalism, Rationalism), all of which agree in rejecting God and divine Revelation.²⁸

²⁸ Pii IX. Syllab. Error., n. 1–14 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1701 sqq.).—J. Engert, Der naturalistische Monismus Häckels, Vienna 1907, pp. 208 sqq., 247 sqq.—W. Monod, Aux Croyants et aux Athées, 2nd ed., Paris 1910.—G. Grupp, Jenseitsreligion, Freiburg 1910, pp. 41, 95.

All these forms of unbelief are grievously sinful, though the personal guilt of individual unbelievers is often diminished by the influence of a wrong or defective training, by the power of deeply rooted prejudices or lack of proper instruction.

The reason why so many refuse to accept divine Revelation is not that they think too deeply, but that they do not think deeply enough. It is often asserted that a thorough training in the natural sciences (now-a-days called “Science” par excellence) destroys religious conviction. But this claim is untrue and can be easily refuted by the example of the many great scientists who have openly professed belief in God and the existence and knowability of miracles.²⁹

²⁹ K. A. Kneller, Das Christentum und die Vertreter der neueren Naturwissenschaft, 2nd ed., Frei- burg 1904 (tr. by T. M. Kettle, Christianity and the Leaders of Modern Science, St. Louis 1911). Father Kneller brings overwhelming evidence to show how the real leaders of scientific thought are forced to recognize, if not always the truth of revealed religion, at least that of the groundwork on which it rests. See also the three volumes of James J. Walsh’s excellent work, Catholic Churchmen in Science, Philadelphia, The Dolphin Press, 1913 sqq.—G. Sortais, La Providence et le Miracle, Paris 1905.—E. Dennert, Vom Sterbelager des Darwinismus, 6th ed., Stuttgart 1905 (English tr., At the Deathbed of Darwinism, by E. V. O’Hara and J. H. Peschges, Burlington, Iowa, 1904); C. Gutberlet, Vernunft und Wunder, Munich 1905.

To solve the problem offered to the human mind by miracles we must try to view them from the viewpoint of Almighty God rather than from our own limited coign of vantage. Miracles are not detached phenomena, but parts of a wonderful system of government. They are wrought by the same God who has conceived and created the universe. This is the true metaphysical harmony. “To the Lord was his own work known from the beginning of the world.”³⁰

³⁰ Acts XV, 18.

Why should the chemist, the physicist, the botanist, the zoölogist, the meteorologist, the astronomer, the anthropologist, the physician or the technician be hindered in his work by accurate notions of God, the world of spirits, the human soul, or the origin, purpose, and end of man? In every field of scientific research there have been and are eminent men who have not only preserved, but deepened and strengthened their religious faith. He who proclaims religion and science to be irreconcilable merely proves that he is ignorant of the true meaning of dogma, the real significance of religious ceremonies, and the authentic interpretation of the mysteries of faith. Unfortunately, those who have achieved eminence in some branch of science as a rule devote little or no time to the study of religion. A learned mind needs more than the elementary instruction imparted in the catechism. Religion, like science, has its technical literature, and its representatives are ready to explain and defend whatever the Church teaches. Those who attack the Christian religion usually have but a vague notion of its sources and methods, even though they constantly harp on the need of original research and critical acumen in their own chosen field. Now he who neglects or refuses to devote serious study to philosophy and theology, has no right to draw philosophical or theological conclusions from the data furnished by natural science. To do so is to mistake the essence of religion, which, though it may be practiced by all, even the most ignorant, can be scientifically demonstrated only by those properly equipped for the task. Theology, like every other science, must be studied from its own sources and by its own methods, though, of course, there are many points of contact between it and the natural sciences. Thus the law of causation, the teleological principle, the laws of nature, and other data furnished by natural science lead the mind almost imperceptibly and with a kind of elemental necessity from the contemplation of the results of empirical research to religious speculation and a study of the supernatural.

4. SCHISM (σχίσμα) technically denotes a formal separation from the unity of the Church, and in this sense is not a direct antithesis of faith. But experience teaches that a state of pure schism, i. e., schism without heresy, cannot continue long, at least in the case of a large number of men. St. Jerome says: “Schism, at the beginning, may be understood as something different from heresy, but there is no schism which does not invent for itself some heresy, in order to justify its secession.”³¹

³¹ In Tit., c. 3, quoted by St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 39, art. 1.

5. APOSTASY (ἀποστασία) is of three kinds.

a) Apostasy from the faith (apostasia a fide)³² implies formal abandonment of the religion of Christ, coupled with the profession of some anti-Christian system (Judaism, Mohammedanism, paganism).

³² Thess. II, 3; 1 Tim. IV, 1 sq.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 12.

b) Apostasy from ecclesiastical obedience (apostasia ab ordine) is committed by a Catholic who wilfully and contumaciously sets at nought the authority of the Church.

c) Apostasy from religious profession or from Holy Orders (apostasia a religione) is the sin of those who without permission abandon the religious order in which they are professed, or, after having received major orders, renounce the clerical profession and return to the dress and customs of the world.

Essentially, all three kinds of apostasy consist in abandoning or denying the truths of Revelation and embracing a religious system opposed to Christianity. Wilfully and contumaciously to abandon the Catholic faith is a sin against the Holy Ghost.³³ A Catholic can never have a le- gitimate reason for leaving his Church.³⁴ “There is no parity,” declare the Fathers of the Vatican Council, “between the condition of those who have adhered to the Catholic truth by the heavenly gift of faith, and of those who, led by human opinions, follow a false religion; for those who have received the faith under the teaching of the Church, can never have any just cause for changing or doubting that faith.”³⁵ Sacred Scripture attributes apostasy from the faith to the Devil, who is the author of evil and the father of lies. False apostles, says St. Paul, “are deceitful workmen, transforming themselves into the apostles of Christ, and no wonder, for Satan himself transformeth himself into an angel of light.”³⁶

³³ Heb. VI, 4–6; X, 26–29; 2 Pet. II, 21. See this Handbook, Vol. II, pp. 91 sqq.

³⁴ Prop. Damnat. sub Innocentio XI., n. 20: “Hence someone can prudently repudiate the supernatural assent which he had.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1170).

³⁵ Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, c. 3: “The condition of those who have adhered to Catholic truth through the heavenly gift of faith is by no means equal to that of those who, led by human opinions, follow a false religion; for those who have received the faith under the teaching authority of the Church can never have any just cause for changing that faith or calling it into doubt.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1794).

³⁶ 2 Cor. XI, 13 sq.; cfr. Gal. V, 7 sq.

6. CREDULITY (temeraria credulitas, in opposition to pius credulitatis affectus) means proneness to believe without sufficient evidence. In matters pertaining to faith and morals credulity is immoral because it runs counter to reason. The Catholic Church admonishes all men to scrutinize carefully whatever is offered in the name of religion without the warrant of divine authority.³⁷ Credulity leads to superstition, “the twin-sister of unbelief,” or at best to an emotional pietism without true religious conviction and genuine faith.

³⁷ Matt. VII, 15; Rom. XII, 1; 1 Thess. V, 21; 1 Pet. III, 15; 1 John IV, 1.—St. Augustine, De Utilitate Credendi, c. 11, n. 25: “Believing is then blameworthy when either something unworthy is believed about God, or something is easily believed about a man.” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 83).—St. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I, n. 2: “Just as right order demands that we believe the profound things of the Christian faith before we presume to discuss them by reason, so it seems negligence to me if, after we have been confirmed in faith, we do not strive to understand what we believe.” (P. L., CLVIII, 362).

It is charged that Christianity demands a sacrifice of the intellect (sacrificium intellectus). This is true in a sense, and could not be otherwise, as Christianity is a divinely revealed religion. However, the Church does not demand blind obedience, but merely “a reasonable service,”³⁸ which enables the believer to say with the Apostle: “I know whom I have believed.”³⁹ Ours is an enlightened faith, which fills us with joy and confidence and gives us the strength which we need to perform our duties. The ideal state of the soul is as far removed from credulity as from scepticism. He who believes too readily is as easily deceived as he who deliberately shuts his mind to the truth.

³⁸ Rom. XII, 1; cfr. 2 Cor. X, 5.

³⁹ 2 Tim. I, 12.

Because of the importance of the true faith, the Church has taken special precautions to keep it pure. These precautions are embodied mainly in the organization against evil literature which is generally called the Index, and consists of three parts—preventive censorship, the prohibition of books, and the Index itself. The consideration of these measures belongs more particularly to Canon Law, and we will therefore confine ourselves to a few necessary remarks towards the end of this volume.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Infra, pp. 399 sqq.

READINGS.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 28 sqq.—Ern. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 5th ed., Vienna 1887, pp. 37 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Compendium Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., Barcelona 1918, pp. 186 sqq.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, New York 1908, pp. 174 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, pp. 236 sqq.

On doubt and skepticism in religious matters: J. L. Balmes, Cartas a un Eseptico, Barcelona 1851 (English tr., Letters to a Sceptic, Dublin 1875).—F. Hettinger, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. I, 9th ed. (edited by E. Müller), pp. 5 sqq.; in English under the title, Natural Religion, London 1890.—B. Kuhn, Formes Actuelles du Doute, Bruxelles 1906.—P. Jäger, Zur Überwindung des Zweifels, Tübingen 1906.—L. J. Walker, S.J., art. “Scepticism,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIII, pp. 516 sqq. (See also the literature cited in Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, 4th ed., St. Louis 1921, p. 54).—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 35 sqq.

On heresy: J. Wilhelm in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VII, pp. 250–262.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, Paris 1905, pp. 369–374.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., Barcelona 1918, pp. 187 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 30 sqq.

On infidelity: P. Segneri, Incredulus non Excusabilis, Dillingen 1696.—A. Guyot, Les Causes de l’Incrédulité, 6th ed., Paris 1904.—Ch. H. Vosen, Das Christentum, 5th ed. (by S. Weber), Freiburg 1905, pp. 46 sqq.—A. Kirchberger, Der Unglaube und die Vernunft, Ravensburg 1907.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, Paris 1905, pp. 378–390.

On schism: St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 39.—J. Forget in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIII, pp. 535–539.

— Infidelity designates the state of him who does not believe, with an assent of faith at least implicit, the things which have been revealed by God so that they may be believed by him.

With an assent of faith, I say, because an inferior adherence, if there is any, by no means suffices, nor can it in any way supply for the assent of faith.

With an assent at least implicit: because very many, not to say all, of the faithful lack an adequate knowledge of revealed religion; and very many implicitly believe what they explicitly deny: as happened, before the defined dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and Pontifical Infallibility, to those who in good faith denied each truth. And because of their implicit faith, those who mix revealed and non-revealed things in a manner even culpable are very improperly called unbelievers (Cf. Billot, De Fide, before thesis XXIV).

The things which have been revealed so that they may be believed by him: because a revelation not universal, such as that of the Old Law, did not have to be positively believed by one who was not a Jew (Cf. Billot, p. 348, before thesis XXIV). Say the same concerning private revelations of others.

— Infidelity is distinguished as negative and privative. Negative is that of him to whom the truth of faith has not been sufficiently proposed - and this without his fault; privative, or culpable, can be merely privative or indirectly contrary to faith, and directly contrary. Merely privative infidelity, although culpable, does not exclude the will of believing what is sufficiently proposed by God. Wherefore it can be composed with the formal object of faith; it is not directly opposed to faith so that it takes away the habit of faith. Directly contrary infidelity is repugnant to the formal object of faith. For it is an unwillingness to believe the things which are sufficiently proposed as revealed: whether, after one has recognized the credibility, he nevertheless was unwilling to command the act of faith; or whether he impeded the very proposition of the truth, unwilling in any case to believe; or whether he pertinaciously rejected the proposition of truth through the Church.

Now he refuses to believe who deliberately doubts, and consequently has as doubtful or uncertain what is divinely revealed and to be believed.

As opposed to the formal motive itself of the virtue, or of faith considered according to its primary and principal act, this infidelity is a grave sin in its whole genus, and necessarily draws with itself the loss of the infused habit of faith.

Affected ignorance of the motives of credibility, if it is dictated by fear lest you have to believe, is not contrary infidelity.

Various Opinions. — Infidelity, etymologically, designates the state of him who is not faithful. Because, in the present order, faith is due to every man, every infidelity can be called privative. Thus Coninck, apud Lugo, d. 18, n. 4.

Nevertheless most, even in the present state, distinguish a certain negative infidelity from privative. They understand this distinction in different ways. For some, thus the Salmanticenses, tr. 21, c. 3, n. 1, admit only a two-membered division, while most separate privative from contrary infidelity. But others, as Struggl, tr. 4, q. 2, n. 1, understand privative infidelity to be the voluntary omission of the assent of faith in him to whom faith, or an article of faith, has been sufficiently proposed (Struggl thinks this is not exclusive of the habit of faith previously infused, while Ballerini, Opus theol., tr. 5, n. 73, on the contrary, opines otherwise); but positive or contrary infidelity they say is a positive assent contrary or contradictory to true faith.

Suarez, d. 16, sect. I, n. 7, recognizes privative infidelity in men to whom the true faith has not yet been proposed: this sin is committed through negligence alone and is opposed to the precept of hearing the faith; it is negligence in seeking and investigating a sufficient proposition of faith. Whereas by being unwilling to believe the things heard, contrary infidelity is committed.

Lugo, d. 18, n. 3, defines the proper sin of infidelity as "that which from its object is so opposed to actual faith that, as long as it is not retracted, the man cannot have the will of believing by a true and proper act of faith." Therefore it is only an unwillingness to believe opposed to sufficiently proposed faith. Wherefore the will, even gravely sinful, by which someone would be unwilling to hear the faith and Christian doctrine, would not yet be the proper sin of infidelity, because, with that will, there could stand an efficacious will of believing most firmly the revelation, as often as it was sufficiently proposed.

— Contrary infidelity is customarily distinguished as threefold: either that of him who has never received the Christian faith, and it is paganism (under which name Islamism is then also contained); or that of him who received that faith in type, and it is Judaism; or that of him who received the Christian faith in baptism, and it is heresy or apostasy. Yet apostasy signifies a more complete withdrawal from the Christian faith. But so that the infidelity may be contrary, it is necessary that the pagan, the Jew, or the one enrolled in heresy have resisted the truth sufficiently proposed.

On Heresy. — Heresy, in the broadest signification, is an erroneous judgment against faith, committed by him who has received the baptismal character.

By that erroneous judgment, what is false or doubtful is pronounced concerning something which, as revealed by God, he himself must believe: whether it has been proposed by the Church, or not.

Wherefore heresy so accepted is divided into heresy of the forum of God alone and heresy of the exterior forum, or canonical heresy. The former is merely internal heresy, or even exterior heresy, but one regarding revealed truths which have not been proposed by the Church: whether they are in the revealed sources but not yet authentically defined, or whether they have been privately revealed. The latter, or canonical heresy, is committed through external withdrawal from the social magisterium divinely constituted for the authentic proposition of revelation (Cf. Billot, De Fide, at thesis XXIV). This is heresy properly so called, whether it takes place through adherence to a sect separated from the Church, or through full repudiation of Christian revelation (which more strictly is called apostasy), or through the denied assent of faith even to one article which the Church has proposed as a dogma of faith.

Each heresy, both that more broadly and that more properly so called, can be material and formal. Material heresy is that of one erring without pertinacity, without judgment of credibility, and without a will averse from the formal object of faith; formal heresy is that of one erring pertinaciously either concerning some other revealed thing or concerning the authority of the Church; that is, of one erring with a will averse from the formal object of faith, or unwilling to believe what has been sufficiently proposed to him as revealed, or even what would be sufficiently proposed. Hence, c. 1325, § 2: "After baptism has been received, if anyone, retaining the Christian name, pertinaciously denies any of the truths to be believed by divine and Catholic faith or doubts concerning it, he is a heretic; if he totally withdraws from the Christian faith, he is an apostate..."

In the canonical forum, all are presumed formally heretics who knowingly withdraw from the authority of the Church proposing dogma. But the proposition can be made either by the solemn definition of an ecumenical Council or of the Supreme Pontiff speaking ex cathedra, or by the ordinary and universal magisterium. For: "c. 1323, § 1. All those things are to be believed by divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the written or handed-down word of God and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal magisterium, as divinely revealed and to be believed. § 2. To pronounce a solemn judgment of this sort belongs both to an Ecumenical Council and to the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra."

Corollaries. — 1. Canonically, a heretic is one who externally indicates as false or doubtful what is proposed by the Church to be believed; or what is undoubtedly believed by the faithful to be contained in Scripture. For the Church proposes the whole of Scripture to be believed.

2. Canonically, he also is a heretic today who, being ignorant of what the Church says is to be believed, utters these words: "Whatever the Church holds concerning this point, I deny it." For by these words he denies the infallibility of the Church, which is a defined dogma.

3. He is a heretic only before God, and consequently immune from censures, who by a merely internal act rejects an article defined by the Church: for example, the Most Holy Trinity; or who even externally denies what he falsely thinks has been defined by the Church: for example, that the Blessed Virgin was virginally conceived by her mother.

4. He is not a heretic who, after hearing some proposition of dogma, turns his mind away and abstains from judgment. Yet he will easily be a heretic before God, insofar as the reason for his silence is this: that, notwithstanding the definition, he virtually esteems the matter doubtful. He who labors under affected ignorance, whether concerning the authority of the Church or concerning an article defined by the Church, insofar as he rejects investigation, will be before God a heretic or not according to the interpretation of his will, which could have been that of believing if he knew the article to be revealed, and consequently merely of fleeing a sufficient proposition, or that of not believing in any case.

5. He who through gravely culpable ignorance or neglected investigation denies what the Church in reality has defined is not formally a heretic, since pertinacity is lacking. Indeed he can be called materially a heretic only improperly, since he preserves the rule of faith and continues to belong to the very body of the Church. Cf. Billot, De fide, before thesis XXIV, p. 348.

6. Heresies among themselves, as such, do not differ in species; neither do heresy and apostasy; nor contrary infidelities. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 413.

7. He who says: "If the Church were to define some such thing, manifestly absurd, I would not believe it," is not a heretic, because he does not act against conscience, unless he wished to affirm that it could happen that the Church define some such thing: which is not to be presumed. Cf. concerning a similar case, Lugo, De fide, d. 17, n. 83; Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, tr. 5, c. 4, n. 91.

Wherefore those who are anxiously troubled about suggestions of this kind can easily be calmed, but they are to be dissuaded from imagining cases of this kind. But the response which such a suggestion manifestly deserves is this: The Church will propose nothing absurd to be believed.

8. He is not a heretic who only exteriorly denies the faith or adores an idol. For he himself does not err. Nor does he incur censures, although in the external forum he is to be regarded as a heretic.

Scholia. — 1. In a man not baptized, the act of faith is necessary so that he may be informed by the infused virtue of faith. Wherefore, whether in a culpable or inculpable way the judgment of credibility is lacking to him, the faith necessary for salvation is wanting in him. But he who, even unconsciously, for example in baptism, has received habitual faith will not be despoiled of this without a will formally contrary to faith. Therefore habitual faith is more easily preserved by an adult than it is acquired.

2. Since, in order that you may elicit an act of faith, to the judgment of credendity there must accede a free act of the will commanding the act of faith, it can happen that someone recognizes the truth of religion, yet refuses to believe, and thus becomes formally a heretic. This formal heresy at the same time contains a great sin of pride, by which someone rejects a supernatural vocation, or is unwilling to subject himself to the authority divinely constituted, or (which seems scarcely possible) is unwilling to believe God whom he knows as revealing.

To deny faith to a truth which is known as revealed is a sin against the Holy Spirit, which is rarely committed; but if it is committed, it will also obscure the judgment of credendity. For the most part, however, the very judgment of credibility is absent from the non-believer, or has been destroyed in him. Therefore most unbelievers are guilty of neglected diligence in seeking out the truth, or they have a judgment clouded by passions. But such persons are not formally heretics in the forum of God.

3. They are accustomed to ask whether, without the formal sin of heresy, some Catholic can come to persuasion concerning the falsity of the Catholic Church or of Christian revelation, or whether a formal sin against faith must always precede that apostasy. The matter is disputed.

That "those who have received the faith under the magisterium of the Church can never have any just cause of changing or of calling the same faith into doubt" was defined by the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 2 (Denz., n. 1612). But this definition can be restricted to an objectively just cause. Wherefore, after Tanner, De Fide, q. 2, dub. 5, n. 139; Platelius, De Fide, n. 61; Tanquerey, n. 659, thinks that it can happen per accidens that, without a formal sin against faith, imprudence may lead a Catholic to unbelief; indeed he seems to deny the necessity of grave fault itself. Aertnijs-Damen, n. 323, Quaer. 3, concedes the same, abstracting from the gravity of the sin, and alleging Pesch, De Fide, n. 383.

We think that a distinction must be made between doubt and contrary persuasion. That someone, because of objective imprudences of readings and conversations, and because of a less pure life, can come to a state of doubting and of a certain rather universal skepticism, we judge must be conceded; but that someone, without violence done to his own intellect, or without an internal lie which almost necessarily contains contempt of divine authority and consequently the formal sin of heresy, should come to contrary persuasion: this seems to us psychologically impossible. For this seems too much to be repugnant to the force of the arguments for faith and to the testimony of the soul naturally Christian.

Nor, in a man instructed in a Catholic manner and taught concerning his duties, do we think it must be affirmed that this can happen without grave sin.

— This is noteworthy today, because of the subtle investigations which are being made concerning the salvation and psychology of non-Catholics: according to the opinion of C. de Lugo, ibid. n. 200-201, from formal heresy or contrary infidelity there can be excused a man who, from culpable ignorance, yet is truly persuaded that no church, but only private revelation, is to be believed, provided that he preserves the will of believing God as often as His revelation is evidently credible; indeed even one who considers any revelation of God impossible. Such a man certainly cannot elicit an act of faith; yet he can have a conditioned will of believing God if God could reveal something to men. For by this will he is not injurious to the divine veracity. Wherefore, although he is not a Catholic or faithful person absolutely, if he had faith infused in baptism, he has not for that reason lost it, and can be called a Catholic or faithful person conditionally, because of that will. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, l. c. n. 94. But these things, as is clear, are not to be proposed everywhere to the faithful.

— He who has been instructed in a non-Catholic sect does not necessarily lack the supernatural virtue of faith; and, as long as he does not doubt, he is only materially a heretic, is bound by no special obligation, nor is he truly excommunicable. - If he seriously doubts, he ought to inquire; but if he has culpably neglected this, whether through carelessness, or levity of soul, or fear of discovering the truth and apprehension of the difficult duty which would follow from it, he will indeed sin, and per se gravely, against faith, but only privatively, not yet contrarily through heresy. - He will then only be formally a heretic if he neglects inquiry because he absolutely refuses to embrace Catholic truth, even if he recognized it. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 425, 2.

Although, however, in soul, or because of good faith, he is Catholic, nevertheless one enrolled in a heretical sect cannot be admitted to the sacraments before, after the errors have been rejected, he has been reconciled to the Church. This is expressly established by canon 731, § 2, so that the more benign opinion which Laymann, l. 2, t. 1, c. 13, n. 2, and after him Busenbaum, De praec. Fidei, dub. 3, Resolves 5, and Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, tr. 5, c. 4, n. 97, held concerning the unlearned can no longer be admitted. Yet the severity is tempered in danger of life, in the manner which will be stated; nor is it to be applied to those who wish to come to the Church at an age at which formal abjuration is not yet required by the Church, that is, who have not yet completed fourteen years from birth (S. Off., Nov. 1878, Coll. P. F., 1st ed. n. 660; 8 March 1882, Coll., 1st ed. n. 1680; 2nd ed. n. 1566).

Observe how differently Catholics and most non-Catholics stand when they doubt in the matter of faith or religion. Indeed, not only to cast off faith but even to have it as doubtful is lawful for neither without sin; but doubt concerning the Church, or concerning her authentic magisterium, or concerning an article proposed by the Church, is already, for a Catholic faithful person, doubt concerning faith; while for a non-Catholic of the Protestant Reformation, since, the authentic magisterium being excluded, he admits private interpretation of Sacred Scripture, doubt concerning his church or concerning a point as contained in Sacred Scripture is not yet doubt concerning faith. Now indeed from our human conclusions there is by no means excluded a reason for doubting, which, when there is question of the assent of faith, can never be had. Wherefore, when doubt has arisen concerning the truth of their sect, non-Catholics themselves are logically led to an examination whose fruit, with the help of the grace of God, if serious effort is applied, will easily be recognition of the true Church and conversion.

— Heresy, apostasy, and heresies among themselves do not differ in species; nor do sects, insofar as they err; yet they differ insofar as they exercise diverse superstitions contrary to the virtue of religion, or are insulting to God in diverse ways. Wherefore he who has culpably adhered to a sect must indicate that sect, if, however, he ever thought about those diverse malices ¹.

¹ Already from the fact that it is exercised by non-Catholics as such, divine worship becomes illegitimate (Lehmkuhl, Casus, I, 443). Yet I would not call this superstitious. These things therefore must be distinguished.

— Conversion of a person per se says the will of directing oneself wholly toward one end or term. Therefore the fuller the aberration was, the stricter is the conversion of him who, error having been laid aside, embraces the truth. Hence he who, ignorant of God, cared only for temporal things, is converted most fully when he begins to live for God. A pagan is converted more fully than a Mohammedan or a Jew: these are converted insofar as they intend to serve Christ or to glorify Christ in all things; a Mohammedan or a Jew is converted more fully than a heretic, who only has to convert himself to the Church.

Moreover, for receiving a heterodox person into the bosom of the Church, these things are to be done in order:

1. He is to be instructed in the faith.

2. If, because he was not baptized or received a baptism certainly null, baptism is to be conferred absolutely, no abjuration of heresy is required. If baptism is not to be repeated except perhaps conditionally, first a formal abjuration of the sect and profession of faith is to be made according to the formula which in the City is handed down by the Holy Office, outside the City by the Ordinary. The Ordinary of the place can permit that it be done not publicly but privately before two witnesses. (The minister can be one of the two.)

3. After the profession has been made, if the case demands it, baptism is administered under condition. Sacramental accusation, by which the penitence necessary for baptism is assisted, can be placed before this.

4. Absolution is given, conditioned or absolute, from heresy and connected censures. The form, otherwise not essential, is indicated in the written instruction which the minister will receive.

5. Confession is made, or, if accusation has already been made, it is resumed in a few words, and sacramental absolution is conferred. As is said in the tract on Penance, a probable opinion exempts from complete accusation those whose baptism was truly doubtful, so that with true probability, in the repeated conferral of baptism, the sins prior to it were deleted. Cf. La Croix, l. 6, p. 1, n. 324; Bucceroni, Theol. moral., III, 672, 672-bis; Ballerini-Palmieri, Op. th., V, 22. Yet the opposite opinion is held by Lehmkuhl, II, 425 sq.; by Noldin, III, 226; by Chr. Pesch, S.I., Prael. Dogm., VII, 394 ss.; by Zitelli, Apparatus, p. II, n. 721 (ed. 1897), etc.

6. If he is an adult, no grave cause standing in the way, let him immediately hear Mass and communicate. Cf. Code c. 753, § 2. (Immediately can be taken morally. A just cause suffices so that this not be done immediately.)

N. B. If any have not completed the age of fourteen years, they are simply admitted, without abjuration, to baptism or other sacraments, and they are not absolved from censures in the external forum.

On Temptations Against Faith. — Properly, only a free faculty is tempted. But it is tempted when it inclines spontaneously, or by an act which is called primo-primus, toward an illicit object. Therefore a temptation against faith is not yet formally had because some difficulty, even without a positive solution, is presented to our intellect; but we begin to be tempted if, because of a difficulty of this kind, the will inclines toward revoking the command by which the most firm assent had been commanded. Therefore those who, from a difficulty of this kind, are cast into fear concerning their faith are by no means actually tempted, since fear rather betrays affection for faith.

But temptation can be prepared by an intellectual difficulty. But when a true temptation of doubting concerning faith has arisen, he who by a contrary act of the will rejects the inclination to doubt or turns the mind away himself merits; he who in a semi-conscious way favors it sins venially; he who assents to it by deliberate doubt or denial becomes gravely guilty of a sin against faith by which faith itself is lost. Nor is it lawful to tolerate that inclination in the will as if by bearing oneself neutrally; but we must positively cast it away, because tolerance of a motion of the will makes that same motion deliberate. Cf. I, n. 72, 2.

He to whom an article to be believed has been proposed, and who experiences a difficulty concerning it, certainly cannot choose a neutral position, or positively suspend assent, or even deliberately and definitively abstain from an act of faith; but to defer the act of faith until he is better instructed, this is indeed lawful for him.

— You ask in what way that celebrated saying is to be understood: "Temptation against faith is to be conquered by flight." It is, unless we are mistaken, in this way.

a) Contrary to what can be done in less dangerous matters, and sometimes is advisable, namely, that we intentionally call up the object of temptation (for example, an occasion of anger or impatience) in order to win a more illustrious victory over it, here it is by no means expedient, after the occasion has been excited, to give place to a specious temptation against faith, so that we may as it were test and exercise our strength.

b) While the temptation itself is pressing, it will often be better at that time to divert the mind to other things, rather than to institute an examination of the difficulty.

But a formal general act of faith is by no means to be dissuaded, whether in the temptation itself, or before temptations which someone has foreseen as future. Yet often to protest concerning the faith in the temptation itself is in no way necessary.

And, after the temptation has receded, a quiet examination concerning the difficulty with which the temptation was connected is by no means to be disapproved; just as also a more skilled or more learned man is opportunely questioned.

Finally, the positive exercise of faith, even in daily conversation, by acts either formal or virtual, is altogether to be recommended.

— 1. Infidelity, or the state of him who does not believe, with an assent of faith at least implicit, the things which are to be believed by him, is negative or not culpable, and privative, or sinful. Moreover, privative infidelity is that which, although culpable, nevertheless does not exclude the will of believing the things which are revealed and sufficiently proposed. - Contrary infidelity is recognized by this exclusion, and is a grave sin in its whole genus, and removes habitual faith itself. - Yet others divide infidelity otherwise.

A threefold contrary infidelity is distinguished: that of pagans, who are unwilling to receive the Christian faith; that of Jews, who are unwilling to complete their faith in Christ; and that of heretics or apostates, who withdraw from the faith received in baptism, wholly if apostates, in part, that is, retaining at least the Christian name, if heretics.

2. Heresy taken more broadly says an erroneous judgment, by which a baptized man pronounces false or doubtful what he ought to believe to be revealed by God. It then embraces denial or deliberation concerning any truth whatever which he ought objectively to believe, and it can be entirely internal. Taken more strictly, it says an exterior withdrawal from the truth which the Church proposes as to be believed as revealed, or a repudiation, externally manifested, of the magisterium of the Church.

Heresy can be material, in him who errs without pertinacity, or who is not conscious of denial or doubt opposed to revealed truth; and formal, in him who errs with a will averse from faith, that is, of not believing revealed things. Formally heretics are presumed to be all who deny or call doubtful a dogma which they know to have been proposed by the Church. Improperly is he called materially a heretic who, adhering to the magisterium of the Church, errs concerning the dogmas of the Church, so that because of antecedent ignorance he denies a point defined as of faith. Even material heresy can be gravely culpable in its cause.

Formal heresy and apostasy, and heresies among themselves, do not differ in species; nor do sects as erring: yet these can exercise superstitions of various species.

3. The fuller the aberration was, the more truly he is said to be converted who, error having been laid aside, embraces the true faith. Moreover, in the conversion of a heterodox person these things are to be furnished: instruction in the faith, formal abjuration of the sect and profession of faith; conditional baptism, if the former is presumed or proved to be doubtful; conditional or absolute absolution from heresy and connected censures; confession, or, if before baptism it was made, a brief resumption of the accusation, and sacramental absolution; finally, if he is an adult and nothing stands in the way, communion through the Mass which he will immediately hear.

Minors who have not completed fourteen years are admitted without abjuration; nor in the external forum, since they do not contract penalties latae sententiae, are they absolved from censures.

4. Temptation against faith is properly had when the will itself inclines toward deserting faith by denial or doubt. Temptations of this kind are not deliberately to be called up; but in temptation, or before temptation, it will be expedient to elicit an act of faith, and to turn the mind away from the object of temptation. Afterwards, a quiet examination of the difficulty and questioning of a more learned man are to be recommended. To this add the positive exercise of faith.

510. Proposition 1. Negative or material infidelity is not a sin.

The reason is that what is caused by invincible ignorance is not a sin. But negative infidelity arises from invincible ignorance; for if an unbeliever knows that he is in error and nevertheless does not embrace faith, he already labors under positive infidelity and not merely negative infidelity. Hence proposition (68) of Baius was condemned: "Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin."¹⁰

Proposition 2. Positive or formal infidelity is a very grave sin.

The reason is a) because it is a grave contempt of the authority of God revealing; b) because it rejects a means altogether necessary for salvation, such as faith is; c) because on account of this infidelity man will be condemned in the other life, according to that saying: "But he who does not believe shall be condemned."¹¹

¹⁰ Denz. n. 1068. Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 10, a. 1.

¹¹ Mark 16, 16.

511. Proposition 3. a) Pagans and Jews, although they are not to be impelled violently to embrace the Catholic faith, can nevertheless be compelled not to impede Catholic worship or afflict it with reproaches;

b) by Christian princes the rites and worship of unbelievers can sometimes, for a grave cause, be tolerated.¹³

a) As to the first part of this proposition St. Thomas writes:¹² "There are some unbelievers who have never received the faith, such as gentiles and Jews; and such are in no way to be compelled to the faith so that they themselves believe, because to believe belongs to the will. Yet they are to be compelled by the faithful, if there is the ability, not to impede the faith either by blasphemies or by evil persuasions or even by open persecutions. And on account of this the faithful of Christ frequently wage war against unbelievers, not indeed that they may force them to believe, because even if they had conquered them and had them captive, they would leave it to their liberty whether they wished to believe; but for this reason, that they may compel them not to impede the faith of Christ."

b) But as to the other part of the proposition the same Holy Doctor writes:¹⁴ "Human rule is derived from divine rule, and ought to imitate it. But God, although He is omnipotent and supremely good, nevertheless permits certain evils to be done in the universe, which He could prohibit, lest by those evils being removed greater goods should be taken away or even worse evils should follow. Thus, therefore, in human rule those who preside rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be impeded, or even lest worse evils be incurred; as Augustine says: 'Take away prostitutes from human affairs, and you will disturb all things by lusts.' Thus, therefore, although unbelievers sin in their rites, they can be tolerated either on account of some good which comes from them, or on account of some evil which is avoided." - But a grave cause is required in order that a Christian prince can licitly sometimes tolerate the public worship of unbelievers. For the so-called unlimited "liberty of cults" has several times been proscribed by the Supreme Pontiffs, because the same liberty is not to be granted to error and truth. Thus, e.g., Pius IX in the Syllabus condemned the following propositions:¹⁵ "In this our age it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion be held as the only religion of the state, all other cults whatsoever being excluded"; "Hence it has laudably been provided by law in certain regions of Catholic name that it be permitted to men immigrating there to have the public exercise of each one's own cult"; "Indeed it is false that civil liberty of every cult, and likewise full power attributed to all of manifesting openly and publicly any opinions and thoughts whatsoever, conduces to more easily corrupting the morals and minds of peoples and to propagating the pest of indifferentism."

From this doctrine of Pius IX the Catholic Church can by no means be accused of so-called "intolerance."

For even if the Church cannot admit dogmatic tolerance, i.e. permit errors in faith to be spread, nevertheless she exercises civil tolerance, i.e. she not only tolerates non-Catholics, but also pursues them with true Christian love. Wherefore, e.g., she has never persecuted the Jews, as modern Antisemitism does.

¹³ Leo XIII teaches the same, Encyclical "Immortale Dei," November 1, 1885.

¹² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 10, a. 8.

¹⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 10, a. 11.

¹⁵ Prop. 77-79 (Denz. n. 1777-1779).

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10.

734. Infidelity in general. - Infidelity (ongelovigheid), insofar as it is a state, is a defective lack of faith, namely, in one in whom faith ought to be; hence the blessed and man in the state of pure nature, although they do not have faith, are not infidels, because faith ought not to be in them; on the contrary, little children not baptized are infidels because they lack faith which they would have had, if they had not sinned in Adam.

The state of infidelity is threefold: a) negative infidelity or lack of faith in one who has never heard anything of faith; b) privative infidelity or lack of faith in one who has neglected to acquire for himself sufficient notice of faith; c) contrary and positive infidelity or lack of faith in one to whom it has been sufficiently proposed and who positively contemns it (by the will) and rejects it (by the intellect). This is infidelity properly so called, because it alone comes from the sin of infidelity.

735. The sin of infidelity. - Infidelity, insofar as it is a sin, is an act by which someone deliberately disbelieves some truth which is sufficiently proposed to him as revealed by God. This act on the part of the object is directly opposed to the act of faith, for to will to believe and not to will to believe, voluntarily to believe or to judge that this is true, and voluntarily to disbelieve or to judge that this is not true, are directly opposed by their object. Hence this act by its nature excludes faith, and therefore, so long as it is not retracted, man cannot believe; and the loss of the habit of faith necessarily follows from it. It is said in the definition:

a) an act, so that the sin of infidelity may be distinguished from the state of infidelity;

b) by which someone deliberately disbelieves, that is, refuses assent or adherence; for just as the act of faith is voluntarily to assent to revealed things, so the act of infidelity is voluntarily to dissent from them. Hence St. Thomas says that the sin of infidelity is in the intellect: it is not a mere omission or ignorance of faith, but a sin of commission by which someone positively resists faith and rejects it, which nevertheless has ignorance joined to it (a. 3, ad 2);

c) some truth revealed by God, for the denial or doubt of one article or point suffices for someone to lose faith. For he who rejects the authority of God revealing in one thing cannot receive it in another, because always and in all things it is of equal weight and value. Hence if a heretic adheres to other articles, he does this now not from divine faith on account of the authority of God, but either by human faith, or by his own opinion (n. 678);

d) which is sufficiently proposed: if some truth is invincibly unknown, indeed even if from negligence and altogether culpable ignorance it is insufficiently known, for this reason faith in it is not denied, nor is the sin of infidelity had, nor is faith excluded or lost:¹ for the will not to inquire concerning faith is not the will not to believe; indeed together with it there can stand the will of believing the truth if it is sufficiently proposed, because by their object they are not directly opposed, as is clear in him who does not will to inquire concerning faith, and who, compelled to hear the faith, believes.

¹ If affected ignorance is present, there is present the will not to believe, yet not formal infidelity, because dissent of the intellect is lacking, since the truth has not been proposed. Yet there is present a sin of the will of the same malice.

Therefore the sin of infidelity arises from contempt of the will and pertinacity of the intellect, and therefore it can also be defined: a voluntary error resisting faith with pertinacity.

736. Corollaries. [The printed heading omits the number.] - From the aforesaid doctrine it follows:

1. That positive infidelity alone includes the sin of infidelity: for negative infidelity, since it is invincible, is no sin (John XV; Rom. X; condemned prop. 68 of Baius), whence, says St. Thomas: "those who are infidels in this way are indeed damned on account of other sins, which cannot be remitted without faith, but they are not damned on account of the sin of infidelity"; but privative infidelity does not include the sin of infidelity (which is of commission), but the sin of ignorance in faith (which is of omission), by which someone voluntarily lacks sufficient knowledge of faith. This sin, if it comes from grave negligence, will be mortal.

2. The merely external denial of faith is not properly infidelity, and therefore does not exclude the virtue of faith, because together with it there can stand the will of believing internally, since they are not directly opposed by their object.

3. Since the sin of infidelity supposes a sufficient proposition of faith, it follows that no one loses the habit of faith without fault² (Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3 and can. 6). Whence a special property belongs to faith on the part of the subject, namely, irrevocability.

² Yet we do not say: that without fault one cannot leave the body of the Catholic Church, or the profession of faith. For although this cannot happen from an objectively just cause and grace helps lest it happen, and therefore per se and ordinarily it is not without the graver fault of infidelity; nevertheless in exceptional circumstances some think that per accidens it can happen without fault or at least without grave fault of infidelity, though not many. Nor was this explicitly condemned by the Vatican Council, as is established from the history of the Council. Cf. Granderath, Constitutiones Conc. Vat. explicatae.

737. The sin of infidelity is mortal from its whole genus (Mk. XVI, 16), because it always contains contempt of the authority of God revealing, and therefore is a sin against the Holy Spirit, as rejecting from contempt a means necessary for salvation. And it is per se most grave, with hatred of God alone excepted. For since through the theological virtues we are directly and principally turned to God, hence sins directly opposed to them directly and principally import aversion from God, and therefore they are graver than sins directly opposed to the moral virtues: thus by infidelity man is more separated and removed from God, because he does not even have true knowledge of God.

Moreover, infidelity is graver than despair, because it is opposed to the truth of God as it is in itself; but despair is against God according as His good is participated by us. But hatred of God is graver, because that by which all other sins are sins, that is, voluntary aversion from God, is directly and per se intended in this sin, and is its very essence.

Yet often infidelity is a less grave sin on account of circumstances, for example, ignorance.

738. Diverse modes of infidelity. - Infidelity can be considered 1. on the part of the act and the mode in which it is committed; 2. on the part of the object as to species; 3. on the part of the conditions of the one sinning.

The mode in which it is committed is manifold: 1. as to the formal object: a) by denying God's truth in speaking or by doubting concerning it; b) by denying the fact of revelation or by doubting concerning it; c) by admitting revealed truth, not on account of God's authority, but exclusively on account of one's own reason; - 2. as to the material object: a) by denying proposed revealed truth, or by assenting to an opinion incompossible with revealed doctrine; b) by assenting to revealed truth not firmly, but with fear of the opposite; c) by deliberately and positively doubting concerning it, that is, by suspending assent, not indeed because someone wills either now to attend to other things, or not to fatigue the mind, or to inquire into motives for assenting more suitably, or something similar, but precisely because he positively thinks or fears that the proposed truth can be false. For all these things manifestly exclude the will of believing firmly and firm voluntary adherence on account of God revealing, and thus at least implicitly are a denial of faith.

739. Species of infidelity. - On the part of the object infidelity can be regarded:

1. According to the corruption of the truths of faith, and thus its species are indefinite, because errors can be multiplied indefinitely: these species are diverse but only according to physical being, and not according to moral being, because they do not include diverse repugnance to reason.

2. According to diverse relation to faith, and thus at present three principal species are distinguished: paganism (to which Mohammedanism, deism, atheism, etc., are referred), Judaism, and heresy. A pagan is one who acknowledges no faith or redemption; a Jew acknowledges the redeemer but thinks Him still to be coming; a heretic acknowledges Christ the redeemer, but corrupts His dogmas. These are three morally distinct species, because errors are opposed to faith under a diverse reason, either to faith which is not received, or to faith which is received³ either in figure, or in manifestation of truth; besides, they often include diverse superstitions or are punished with diverse penalties. Hence those species are to be declared in confession.

³ Objectively as to the account of evil; now:

They can be considered in two ways:

a) if they are considered according to the corruption of the truths of faith and the number of errors, paganism is graver than Judaism and Judaism than heresy;

b) but if they are considered according to diverse relation to faith, heresy is graver than Judaism and this than paganism, because it is graver to resist faith which is received in manifestation of truth than faith which is received in figure, and this than to resist faith which is not received, just as it is graver not to fulfill what someone has promised than what he has not promised.

2. Hence also subjectively on the part of the one sinning, as to the account of fault, ordinarily heresy is graver, because heretics ordinarily have greater knowledge of faith than Jews, and therefore are more voluntarily opposed to it and with greater pertinacity; - similarly Jews than pagans. Yet in an extraordinary case they could have equal knowledge of faith.

1. Faith is received objectively, not always subjectively.

740. Are infidels to be compelled to faith? - Unbaptized infidels cannot be compelled by external force to receiving faith, because to believe is of the will; for neither can they be compelled by the Church, to whose power they are not subject, nor by civil society, which does not enjoy spiritual jurisdiction. Yet they can be compelled not to impede the preaching or exercise of faith by blasphemies, persuasions, persecutions in their places, because the Church received from Christ the right of preaching everywhere. Indeed, by their own princes they can be compelled both to observing the law of nature (and natural religion), in whose observance the right civil order is founded, and also sometimes to hearing faith.

But baptized infidels can be compelled by spiritual and corporal penalties, so that they may return to faith and the Church, because through Baptism they have been made subjects of the Church (Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 14).

741. Are the rites of infidels to be tolerated? - The rites of infidels cannot be approved or fostered by Christian princes (Syllabus, prop. 77-79); but they can sometimes be tolerated, if greater evils would be feared from their prohibition, or greater goods would be impeded: thus God tolerates evils in the world lest worse things be incurred, or better things impeded. Hence the rites of Jews are moderately tolerated, from whose preservation we have a great testimony of our faith (Const. Imm. Dei; encyclical Libertas of Leo XIII).

742. Observation. - The children of infidels regularly cannot be baptized against the will of their parents; concerning which see the treatise on Baptism, and can. 750 and 751.

Infidelity, taken generally, is lack of faith, and a threefold kind is distinguished, namely: 1st. positive or formal, which is lack of faith in him to whom faith itself has been sufficiently proposed, and who positively rejects it; 2nd. negative or material, which is lack of faith in him who has never heard anything concerning the true religion, or indeed has heard, yet not sufficiently; 3rd. privative, which is lack of faith in him who, when the occasion has been given, neglects to obtain for himself knowledge of faith.

I Say. As infidelity both positive and privative is a most grave sin, so negative infidelity is no sin, but only the penalty of sin. The reason for the first is that in positive infidelity there is had explicitly, and in privative infidelity virtually, contempt of the first truth and of the authority of God revealing. But the reason for the second is both because no sin can exist where invincible ignorance is had, and because the following proposition, which is the 68th of Baius, "Purely negative infidelity in those among whom Christ has not been preached is a sin," was condemned by St. Pius V and Gregory XIII.

Unbelief in general is the absence of faith³⁸. And it is either negative, privative, or contrary. Negative unbelief is the absence of faith in one who has heard nothing of the faith, or has not heard sufficiently. Privative unbelief is the absence of faith in one who has heard sufficiently of the faith and does not will to assent to it, without however asserting the contrary. Contrary unbelief is the absence of faith in one who, though sufficiently instructed concerning the faith, not only refuses to embrace it, but even asserts the contrary and maintains a positive error against the faith. ³⁸ Hic q. 10, a. 1, o.

You will ask 1° whether unbelief is a sin.

I answer. 1°. Merely negative unbelief is not a sin, but a punishment of sin³⁹. ³⁹ Ibid.

Proof. 1° Christ, Ioann., XV, 22, says of the Jews: If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin. Expounding this, Aug., Tract. LXXXIX in Ioann., says that Christ speaks of the sin by which they did not believe in Christ. But Christ spoke to negative unbelievers neither by himself nor through his ministers, at least not sufficiently. 2° No one sins by omitting what he cannot do.

How shall they believe in him whom they have not heard? It is just as if he had said: « They cannot believe. » 3° This proposition, the 68th among those of Baius: « Purely negative unbelief, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin, » was condemned by St Pius V, October 1, 1567, by Gregory XIII, January 29, 1579, and by Urban VIII, March 6, 1641.

I answer. 2°. Privative and contrary unbelief is a sin⁴⁰. ⁴⁰ Ibid.

1° Because no one is condemned except on account of sin. But he who will not have believed shall be condemned, Marc., XVI, 16. 2° Because faith is the necessary medium unto salvation. Therefore he to whom it is sufficiently proposed is bound to accept it.

You will ask 2° whether all the works of unbelievers are sins.

I answer. Negatively⁴¹. We weighed this question expressly in the treatise on Grace, dissertation III, § 1. Look for it there. ⁴¹ Ibid., a. 4, o.

You will ask 3° how many species of unbelief there are.

I answer. That three are commonly assigned, namely paganism, Judaism, and heresy⁴². For the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith. But one can resist the faith in three ways. For either one resists the faith which he has not yet professed himself to receive as true, and this is the unbelief of the pagans, who are so called from the pagi into which, expelled from the cities by command of the Christian emperors, they withdrew to worship their idols: before that time they were called gentiles. Or one resists the faith which he professed in figure, and this is the unbelief of the Jews. Or finally one resists the faith which he professed in the manifestation of the truth, and this is the unbelief of heretics. ⁴² Ibid., a. 5, o.

I said: « Which he has professed himself to receive; » because for Judaism or heresy there seems not to be required that one have truly received the faith in figure or in manifested truth, but it suffices if he have outwardly professed himself to receive it. Hence unbaptized infants of heretics, who therefore never received the faith, are called heretics because in estimation they profess together with their parents the faith of Christ.

To paganism belong atheists, deists, and Mohammedans; because they have never professed themselves to receive the faith of Christ, whether in figure or in truth. For although the Mohammedans acknowledge Christ as a prophet, they do not acknowledge him as God.

Apostasy seems not to be distinguished from heresy except according to more and less; for the apostate abandons the whole faith which he professed, the heretic only a part: understand this objectively. Similarly other forms of unbelief can be reduced to one of the aforementioned.

[You will ask 4° whether unbelievers are to be compelled to the faith.

I answer. Those who have never received the faith, whether they be subject to Christian princes or not, are by no means to be compelled to embrace the faith; they can, however, be compelled not to impede the faith and the preaching of the faith by blasphemies, wicked persuasions, or open proclamations.

The first part is clear; because the Church has no jurisdiction over those who have not received the faith, according to that saying, I Cor., V, 12: What have I to do to judge those who are without? And the Council of Trent, session XIV, chapter 5, declares that « the Church exercises judgment upon no one who has not first entered her through the door of baptism. » Christian princes likewise have no jurisdiction over foreigners, but over subjects they have jurisdiction by which they govern them politically; this jurisdiction nevertheless does not include the right of compelling them to the faith. And although they can compel subjects to abandon idolatry, which is against the natural law, of which every prince is the guardian, their power nevertheless does not extend to the law of faith, which is of the supernatural order.

This conclusion is confirmed by the decisive words of Leo XIII, in the Encyclical Immortale Dei, November 1, 1885: « If, he says, the Church judges it unlawful that the various kinds of divine worship hold the same right as the true religion, she does not on that account condemn those moderators of commonwealths who, for the sake of obtaining some great good or preventing some great evil, patiently bear by custom and usage that each of these things hold a place in the state. — The Church likewise greatly takes care that no one be compelled to embrace the Catholic faith against his will; because, as Augustine wisely admonishes, Tract. XXVI in Ioann., n. 2, man cannot believe unless he is willing. »

The second part is also clear. For the Church has from Christ the command, and consequently the right, of preaching the Gospel in the whole world, Matth., XXVIII, 19. If therefore barbarians impede this preaching, Christian princes can, and at times must, wage war against them and subdue rebels, that they may guard the violated rights of the Church and defend the innocent, both those who have the right of preaching and those who have the right of hearing.]

I. Infidelity is threefold. The first is negative, which is the mere absence, so to call it, of faith in one who has in no way heard the faith. This is not a sin, but a punishment of sin. Wherefore this thesis stands condemned: Purely negative infidelity, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin. The second infidelity is privative. This positively resists the preaching of the faith, and refuses to receive the faith. The third is positive or contrary infidelity, in one who not only shuts his eyes to the light and preaching of the faith, but also obstinately defends errors contrary to the true faith. This contrary infidelity is threefold: Paganism, Judaism, Hereticism. Paganism is a voluntary error resisting a faith not yet received. To Paganism are reduced Atheism, Deism, and Mahometanism. Judaism is an error against the faith received in figure. Hereticism is an error resisting with pertinacity the faith received in the manifestation of the truth.

II. Question I. Can Infidels be licitly tolerated among Catholics? Answer. Absolutely, and prescinding from every respect, this tolerance seems illicit. The hope of a greater good, of common utility, and of avoiding a greater evil can induce Princes to tolerate Infidels in their dominions, if they bring no prejudice upon the faith. The tolerance of Heretics demands a greater cause.

III. Question II. Can the Church, either immediately of herself, or by the aid of Princes, compel Infidels who are not her subjects to receive the faith? Answer. The common opinion denies it, with St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, art. 8; and it is drawn from St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 5, saying: For what have I to do to judge them that are without? Wherefore the Church cannot compel Infidels who are not her subjects even to hear the preaching of the Gospel: for if she cannot compel them to receive the faith, neither can she compel them to hear it. But if the discourse be of Jews who are subjects, she can compel them to hear the Gospel, because with regard to the Jews a peculiar reason holds. For they, in the figure and in the promises of the old Law which they profess, have received the Gospel. And the usage of the Roman Church, compelling the Jews dwelling at Rome to hear the Gospel, confirms our opinion. Nor does compulsion to the faith follow from this: because although the hearing of the Gospel prepares for the faith, it in no way compels. For the hearers all remain free. But all Infidels, whether subjects or not subjects, who impede the preaching of the Gospel, the Church can restrain. The Preachers, however, must announce the Gospel of Christ adorned not with arms or soldiers, but with patience, humility, meekness, penance, peace, and tranquillity. But the Church cannot deprive infidel Princes not subject to her of the dominion which they hold over their Christian subjects and slaves, as is had from the Gospel itself, Matthew 22: Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's. And the same St. Peter teaches, first epistle, chapter 2. But Infidels in catholic kingdoms are not capable of jurisdiction over Catholics. Wherefore it is not to be permitted that Jews have Christian menservants and maidservants, as is evident from the chapter Cum Judaei, 2, On the Jews.

Among the unfaithful there are some who never received the faith, and these are the pagans: Others are those who rejected the faith once received, and these are heretics: Others, finally, who long worshiped the faith of the Savior under figures, but did not acknowledge it when it was manifested, and these are the Jews: Here we are to treat of unfaithfulness in general for the absence of faith, and when something is to be touched upon concerning the unbaptized unfaithful: in the following disputation, however, we shall discourse on heresy.

It is TO BE NOTED, from St. Bonaventura on those words Lucas 19. Non relinquent in te lapidem super lapidem: eo quod non cognoveris tempus visitationis tuae — There shall not be left in thee a stone upon a stone: because thou hast not known the time of thy visitation — that Infidelity is the ruin of the spiritual edifice; just as faith, on the contrary, is the foundation of that edifice. But this is Infidelity, not that which is opposed to Fidelity, which is a moral virtue inclining toward faith, or a promise to be kept, of which Eccles. 5. Displicet Deo infidelis promissio — An unfaithful promise displeaseth God — as the holy Doctor warns on that passage; but it is the infidelity that is opposed to the Theological virtue, as I said, disp. 1. quaest. 1., with St. Bonau. That Infidelity is a sin, I showed in disput. 1. quaest. 14. and the following, where the obligation to believe the articles of faith, and other matters, were treated of; and therefore it can be sinned against by grave omission, in not learning the things of faith that have been sufficiently proposed.

But Infidelity can be sinned against in TWO WAYS: either positively, by attacking and refusing the truth of faith once acknowledged, and this is called infidelity of contrariety; Or privatively, by lacking the due knowledge. Some add another negative lack, which is through invincible ignorance, but this the majority do not admit, with St. Bonavent. 3. dist. 21. art. 1. quaest. 3., of which I treated in Prima secundae, tract. de peccato, disp. 1. quaest 1.

Infidelity is DIVIDED, moreover, into Heresy, Judaism, and Paganism, by St. Thom. quaest. 10. art. 5. and St. Bonau. p. 1. Gentil. sect. 26. There the holy Doctor proves that infidelity is the greatest sin among sins, viz. Ioan. 16. Arguet mundum de peccato, etc. quia non crediderunt in me — He will argue the world of sin, etc. because they believed not in me. He calls this Sin antonomastically. And Ioan. 3. Qui non credit, iam iudicatus est: quia non credidit in nomine Unigeniti filii Dei — He that doth not believe is already judged: because he hath not believed in the name of the Only-begotten Son of God. And of Mark, at the end: Qui vero non crediderit, condemnabitur — But he that believeth not shall be condemned — as if the supreme punishment were prepared for the unfaithful. I said, with St. Bonau., that infidelity is the greatest sin among sins, because no one on the way hates God expressly, but only interpretatively, as St. Bonau. teaches on those words Ioan. 15. Et oderunt me, et Patrem meum — And they hated me, and my Father. Interpretatively indeed they hate, insofar as they are turned away from Him through sins, or would not be punished; but formal hatred is the proper possession of the damned.

St. THOMAS compares infidelity with the hatred of God, and says that this is worse, because it is opposed to Charity, which is greater, 1 Corinth. 13. But that Infidelity is greater, he says, than Despair, as I shall say in disp. 6. quaest. un., although the latter is more perilous. See also Tannerus T. 1. quaest. 8. dub. 1.

Furthermore, the holy Doctor places infidelity in the intellect, in 3. dist. 5. quaest. 5. ad 4.; for it is opposed to faith, which is in the intellect and the will, or in free choice, as I said, disp. 1. quaest. 18. Of this treat Suarez disp. 16. sect. 3., Hurtado disp. 67., Lugo disp. 18. sect. 1. They ask especially: whether the sin of infidelity is always consummated in the intellect; whether sometimes in the Will alone.

Suarez loc. cit., Coninch. disp. 18. dub. 3., Tannerus 2. 2. disp. 1. quaest. 8. dubio secundo, Fuliens. lib. 3. cap 6. DENY it.

Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 10. p. 1., Hurtado disp. 68. sect. 2. ASSERT it, which opinion, understood Metaphysically, pleases Lugo, num. 9, although, speaking commonly, he adheres to the former. Fuliens., however, says that the objective malice is in the intellect, which fails from faith; but the formal [malice] in the will, from which the perverse act of the intellect freely goes forth.

It is certain that such infidel Princes, or even private persons, are capable of dominion. And indeed to have dominion over goods is defined by Paulus III. in a certain Bull cited by Coninch. disput. 1. dub. 10. num. 160. Of dominion also over persons as over slaves, it is certain that it can be with them if they hold slaves by a just title, say a just war, etc.

From many Scriptures S. Doct. shows that jurisdiction can be in infidels over the faithful. First from 1. a Petri 2. Subiecti estote omni humanae creaturae propter Deum: sive Regi, tanquam praecellenti. Be subject to every human creature for God's sake: whether to the King, as preeminent.

Next by that of Rom. 13. Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit. Et infra: Non solum propter iram, sed etiam propter conscientiam. Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. And below: Not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience. Finally from the other epistles of Paul S. Doctor gathers the same.

Thirdly from that of Matth. 22. Reddite ergo, quae sunt Caesaris, Caesari. Render therefore to Caesar what is Caesar's. The Apostles inculcated this precept to refute the calumny, as if our faith denied obedience to Princes. Whence Paul ad Titum 3: Admone illos, ut Principibus obediant. Admonish them, that they obey Princes. The same precept the PP. enjoined: Clemens P. lib. 4. constitut. cap. 12. et lib. 7. cap. 17. Tertullianus lib. ad scapulam, cap. 2. Polycarpus cited by Euseb. lib. 4. hist. cap. 14. Basil. in Moral. reg. 79. Hieron. epist. 4. Chrysostomus homil. 23. in epist. ad Rom. Origenes lib. 9. in eandem epist. Oecumenius, Nazianzenus, Epiphan. and others, whom Suarez relates de defensione fidei, lib. 3. cap. 1.

It is proved fourthly by S. Doct. by the reason of the Apostle. Omnis potestas est a Deo, atque ordinata; et qui ei resistit, Deo resistit, et damnationem incurrit: All power is from God and ordained; and he who resists it resists God and incurs damnation: but by the law of nature many are given having power of jurisdiction, by a just title, whether by war, or custom, or prescription, or translation of dominion, whether into a true person, as is a King; or a fictitious one, such as a Republic. Nor indeed is it once acquired lost on account of the infidelity of the Prince, or through the faith of subjects; for an infidel can well rule the faithful people of God, even with just laws.

It is confirmed by D. Bonav. because to serve is not an evil, but meritorious: Therefore by Baptism we are not absolved from that servitude.

Of dominion therefore even real over faithful slaves it is proved by S. Doct. from that of Ephes. 6. Servi obedite Dominis carnalibus cum timore, et tremore, in simplicitate cordis vestri, sicut Christo: non ad oculum servientes, quasi hominibus placentes, sed ut servi Christi, facientes voluntatem Dei ex animo, cum bona voluntate servientes, sicut Domino, et non hominibus: Servants, obey your carnal masters with fear and trembling, in the simplicity of your heart, as to Christ: not serving to the eye, as pleasing men, but as servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart, serving with good will, as to the Lord, and not to men: The same he repeats ad Coloss. 3. ad Titum 2. But then all the princes were, nay, almost all even private masters, infidels. But Peter speaks of the slaves of infidel masters epist. 1. cap. 2. in those words: Servi subditi estote in omni timore dominis, non tantum bonis, et modestis, sed etiam discolis, Servants, be subject in all fear to your masters, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward: as S. Bonaventura observes, and Lugo num. 133. S. Bonav. renders the reason of this fundamento 4. with D. August. in Psalm. 124. because Christ did not make free men of slaves, but of bad slaves, good slaves, which S. August. also confirms conc. 31. in Psal. 118. and the author of the qq. novi, et veteris testamenti, under the name of August: quaest. 15. and in the Council of Gangra can. 3. it is related cap. si quis servum 17. quaest. 14. that anathema is inflicted on him who, under pretext of religion, urged a slave to flee. It was however celebrated in the time of Pope Sylvester, in which Gentile masters had many Christian slaves.

The authors of the contrary opinion object first, from that of 1 Cor. 7. Nolite fieri servi hominum, pretio empti estis. Do not become the slaves of men; you were bought with a price.

Some answer with Suarez, that Paul is not there speaking of civil, or penal servitude: for of this he had said a little before: Servus vocatus es? non sit tibi curae. Were you called a slave? let it not be a care to you. And he concludes: Unusquisque in quo vocatus est fratres, in this let each remain with God. He speaks therefore of vitious servitude, by which one, in order to serve another, offends God: Nemo enim potest duobus dominis servire. For no one can serve two masters.

Cornelius there, Lugo n. 136. and others affirm that the exposition of D. Bonau. in the body of the text is BETTER, that those words are to be understood of civil servitude also, namely, that those compelled indeed into servitude ought patiently to bear it; yet if they are not compelled, and can be free, they ought not to reduce themselves into the servitude of infidels, for thus they will be able more promptly, more readily, and more freely to attend to religion, and the preceding words intimate this, as S. Doct. relates Servus vocatus es? non sit tibi curae: sed et si potes fieri liber, magis utere, that is, if it is in your power not to be a slave, use it: but if you have been compelled, bear it patiently.

Yet it SEEMS that by fundamento 4. he does not reject the exposition of others on these words, namely, that even if one could go out from servitude, it is meritorious to remain in it; and therefore on this occasion it is to be used for the merit of humility. Indeed S. Doct. shows that they can sell themselves, 4. dist. 36. dub. 3. Simply however, that servants ought to obey their Princes, and Masters, the Apostle enjoins also 1 Timot. VI. Quicumque sunt sub iugo servitutis, dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur, ne nomen Domini, et doctrina blasphemetur. Si quis aliter docet, et non acquiescit sanis sermonibus Domini nostri Iesu Christi: superbus est, et nihil sciens. Whoever are under the yoke of servitude, let them judge their masters worthy of all honor, lest the name of the Lord and his doctrine be blasphemed. If anyone teaches otherwise, and does not assent to the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ: he is proud, and knowing nothing. And he proves this earnestly ad Rom. 13.

They OBJECT secondly, that the Evangelical Law carries liberty with it: For therefore, when Matth. 17. the tribute was demanded from the Apostles, the Lord asked Peter: Reges terrae a quibus accipiunt tributum, vel censum? a filiis suis, an ab alienis? The Kings of the earth, from whom do they receive tribute, or custom? from their own sons, or from strangers? Christ concluded: Ergo liberi sunt filii. Therefore the sons are free. In which place, under the name of sons, he seems to have understood all the faithful, as Lyra and Hieronymus indicate.

Suarez relates the VARIOUS expositions of that passage, lib. 1. cit. cap. 4. and lib. 4. cap. 5. and cap. 8.

S. Doct. ANSWERS that Christ ascribes this immunity to himself, as being the son of God by nature. Therefore from this passage the Fathers prove the natural filiation of God, because by it he declares himself not to be subject to the paying of tribute. So Chrysost. and Hilar. cited by Suarez cap. 5. num. 5. But they say he could have extended this exemption to his family, the Apostles, and others, who left all things and followed him, and Hieronymus speaks in this sense: but he communicated it especially to Peter, and his successors, as those words signified: Ut autem non scandalizemuseos, solve pro me, et te, But that we may not scandalize them, pay for me and you; for with the scandal removed, Peter could have not paid, the immunity having been communicated to him by Christ, as Lugo notes n. 138. with D. Bonau. prima parte Centil. sect. 31. Tannerus subscribes disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2. num. 44.

They OBJECT thirdly from the first of Iacobi: Qui autem perspexerit in lege perfecta libertatis, But he that has looked into the perfect law of liberty, where the Gloss: Lex libertatis est lex Evangelica. The law of liberty is the Evangelical law.

S. Doct. ANSWERS that the Evangelical Law makes us free from the servitude of sin, and the servitude of the old law, as is said Rom. 8. Non accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore, sed accepistis Spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus: Abba, (Pater.) You have not received again the spirit of servitude in fear, but you have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba, (Father.)

They OBJECT fourthly. The law of charity, composing all into one, makes all things common; whence 1 Cor. 3. Omnia vestra sunt, sive mors, sive vita. All things are yours, whether death, or life. And ad Ephes. et Coloss. Omnes sumus in Christo, etc. We are all in Christ, etc.

S. Doct. ANSWERS that charity makes us one by a certain communication of graces, and affections; but not of temporal dominion; otherwise it would be forbidden that even some Christians be unequal, say one a King: another a prisoner in the Ergastulum.

They OBJECT fifthly. The bond of the Divine law is greater than that of the human; but the Evangelical law absolves from the obligation of the old divine law: Therefore.

S. Doct. ANSWERS that it is not alike; for the new Law evacuates the old law, as truth the figure; but it is not thus with human Law, which aids the Divine to be observed: Whence the Apostle 1. Timot. 2. commands that prayer be made for Princes, that we may lead a quiet and tranquil life under them.

They OBJECT sixthly. Christ willed to redeem us by himself, that he might restore us to our pristine liberty, and that man might be subject to himself, as S. Anselmus says Lib. Cur Deus homo, cap. 5. since therefore we have been bought with the great price of the blood of Christ the Lord; we are his alone: Therefore it seems that a Christian, who has been reborn in Christ, is not bound to any servitude.

S. Doct. ANSWERS that we do not attain the liberty bought for us by Christ, unless translated into glory. Whence here liberty is begun from guilt; but there it is consummated, liberty from misery, and from every human power; Whence it does not follow that, if we are bought by Christ, we are not the servants of any man: The dominion indeed of the devil, or of sin, is excluded, according to that Matth. 6. Non potestis Deo servire, et Mammonae. You cannot serve God and Mammon.

But there is still a controversy: whether the Church can deprive infidel Princes of the temporal dominion which they exercise over the faithful.

INDIRECTLY indeed the Church has this power, by the right of defense, and the right of governance, because the Church can rule her faithful everywhere. So D. Thom. quaest. 10. art. 1. and Bannes, Aragon there, Valentia quaest. 10. p. 8. and Tanner. says it probable disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2. num. 53.

COMMONLY however the Doctors hold that the Church does not have this indirect power over infidel Princes, precisely as they are infidels, unless it redound to the prejudice of the faith. So Bellarm. Tom. 1. lib. 5. de Romano Pontifice, cap. 7. Lorca, Caietanus, and others cited by Hurtadum disp. 77. sect. 2. Coninch. disp. 18. dub. 10. num. 160. Turrianus disp. 52. dub. 1. Castro Palao T. 1. tract. 4. disp. 2. p. 8. num. 6. who adduces others; and Tannerus judges it probable in the place cited.

There is REQUIRED therefore, that the Church be compelled by a persecuting infidel Prince, or that a moral danger of persecution be imminent, as Suarez notes sect. 5. Lugo sect. 1. num. 148. See also D. Bonau. serm. 16. in Hexaëmerone, indicating some things.