Section I. On Sins Against the Precept of the Internal Act

Besides omission of the internal act prescribed by reason of faith, the principal sins are infidelity and heresy, to which apostasy belongs. There are added sins which, although they do not destroy faith, nevertheless in some way are opposed to it. Schism, which "per se is opposed to the ecclesiastical unity of charity" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 39, a. 1, ad 3), is discussed in n. 569.

I. Infidelity. 1. Notion. Infidelity is the lack of faith in a non-baptized man.

2. Division. Three kinds are distinguished, namely positive, privative, and negative. Positive infidelity is when an unbaptized person knows that God has spoken, and nevertheless denies or doubts that which God has manifested; privative infidelity is when an unbaptized person doubts that God has spoken, or suspects that revelation has taken place and neglects inquiry. Negative infidelity is when an unbaptized person does not doubt his religion or does not suspect that revelation has taken place (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, aa. 1 and 5; St. Alphonsus, II, 17).

By reason of the diverse errors there are enumerated: Paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, Atheism, Pantheism, Deism, Rationalism, etc. Yet those of the enumerated classes who have been baptized are rather heretics or apostates.

3. Morality. a) Positive and privative infidelity are grave sin from their whole genus. For reverence due to divine truthfulness requires that, if it is clear that it has spoken, we assent to it; if it is doubtful, we inquire whether and what it has taught, with this end, that if we have learned that it has spoken, we adhere to it. Yet privative infidelity by accident, that is, on account of the obligation of inquiring not being sufficiently perceived, can more easily be venial or even no sin. Negative infidelity is not sin, as is clear. Hence proposition 68 of Baius was rightly condemned: "Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is sin" (St. Alphonsus, II, 17).

b) Positive infidelity and heresy do not differ in species, as we shall explain at once. But it is disputed whether positive infidelity (and heresy) differ in species from privative infidelity. Many affirm this, because positive infidelity (and heresy) directly injure divine authority; privative infidelity only indirectly, insofar as it prevents me from knowing that God has spoken and from being able to subject myself to Him speaking; these seem to differ in species (St. Alphonsus, VII, 301).¹ The diverse physical species of infidelity (Paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, etc.) do not differ in moral species, although diverse species of irreligiosity can be attached to them.

¹ If someone neglects inquiry because he does not wish to submit himself to God revealing, there is privative infidelity, which does not differ in species from positive infidelity.

II. Heresy. 1. Notion. Heresy is the lack of faith in a baptized person; it is called apostasy if someone totally falls away from the faith. Apostasy does not differ in species from heresy, because they agree as to the formal object; namely, they reach God under the same aspect, or each is opposed to the truthfulness of God. As to the material object they differ insofar as apostasy rejects more revealed truths, or rather all revelation (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 12, a. 1, ad 3).

But heresy is usually considered as clothed with certain individuating circumstances; hence, in the ecclesiastical sense, "if anyone, retaining the name Christian, pertinaciously denies or doubts some one of the truths to be believed with divine and catholic faith, he is a heretic; if he totally withdraws from the Christian faith, he is an apostate" (can. 1325, § 2). The customary definition of heresy agrees with these things: "A pertinacious error against divine and catholic faith." It is said:

a) "An error against divine and catholic faith," that is, it is required that something be denied or called into doubt among those things "which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by ordinary and universal magisterium, as to be believed as divinely revealed" (can. 1322, § 1).

b) A pertinacious error, that is, it is required that someone deny or call into doubt something which he sufficiently knows both to have been revealed and to have been proposed as such to be believed (St. Thomas, I, q. 32, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, II, 19; VII, 300).

2. Division. Heresy is distinguished:

a) Into formal and material, according as it is culpable or inculpable.

b) Into internal and external, according as it is completed by an act of mind alone, or is expressed by words or signs.

Corollary I. The following is a heretic, attending only to specific malice and therefore abstracting from individuating circumstances, which do not change the species:

a) One who does not inquire into revelation, because he does not wish to submit himself to God revealing.

b) One who rejects or calls into doubt a doctrine which he sufficiently knows to have been revealed, even if only privately (St. Alphonsus, II, 19).

c) One who indeed admits a doctrine which he holds as revealed, but not on account of the authority of God revealing, rather on account of the mere view of reason.

d) One who rejects or calls into doubt a doctrine which the Church has proposed by definitive judgment, though not as revealed, will easily become a heretic, by denying or calling into doubt the revealed truth that the Church is infallible in proposing that doctrine.

Corollary II. The following is not a heretic:

a) One who does not inquire into revelation out of levity, out of weariness, or out of fear lest, when revelation has been found out, he be bound to change his opinion. The reason is that he does not deny or call into doubt what he knows to have been revealed; nevertheless he sins gravely¹ (St. Alphonsus, VII, 301).

b) One who denies the faith only externally (St. Alphonsus, II, 19, 1).

c) One who suspends judgment, for example "turning himself to other things lest he fatigue the mind, or so that he may apply himself to another thought." Otherwise it must be said if he suspends judgment because he doubts either whether an opinion which he holds as revealed is true, or whether the Church, in proposing something as revealed, teaches what is true; in the latter case he calls into doubt the revealed doctrine concerning the infallibility of the Church (St. Alphonsus, VII, 302; II, 19).

d) One who rejects or calls into doubt a theological conclusion deduced from a truth either revealed or proposed by the Church by definitive judgment; although he will easily become a heretic by rejecting or calling into doubt the revealed premise, or the doctrine that the Church is infallible.

3. Morality. a) Heresy and apostasy are grave sin from their whole genus. For reverence due to divine truthfulness altogether requires that we assent to it, if it is clear that it has spoken.

b) Heresy and apostasy do not differ in species from positive infidelity; for they agree with it in the formal object, because they reach God under the same aspect, namely by offending His truthfulness; and they differ from it only insofar as they are found in a baptized subject.

c) Nor, as is clear, do diverse sects (Lutheranism, Calvinism, etc.) differ in moral species, although diverse species of irreligiosity, customarily exercised in the different sects, can be added.

4. Loss of faith. a) Faith (the habit of faith) is not lost except through a formal sin against faith (n. 357).

b) It is another question whether someone can bid farewell to the Catholic Church without formal sin against faith. Now strictly speaking it seems this must be answered affirmatively; namely, it seems possible that someone gradually call into doubt or even reject the truth of the Catholic Church without calling into doubt or rejecting a truth which he sufficiently perceives to have been revealed. Nor is the Vatican Council (De fide, chapter 3) an obstacle, for it only teaches that no one has an objectively valid reason for calling the Catholic faith into doubt, and that at least material sin is contained in such a manner of acting.²

c) Again, it is another question whether someone can leave the Catholic Church without any grave sin, either preceding or contained in the very defection. Now it seems it must be said as follows: No one without grave sin will come to such a point that he calls into doubt or denies those things which must be believed by necessity of means; for God abandons no one unless He is abandoned.³ Now one who without grave sin loses faith in those things which must be believed by necessity of means seems to have been abandoned by God without himself having abandoned God. As regards defection from the Catholic Church which does not include things to be believed by necessity of means, the matter is more doubtful.

d) But it can more easily happen that a Catholic without grave sin calls into doubt or even denies one or another point of the Catholic faith, namely:

alpha) Either by not noticing that an opinion admitted by him is opposed to the infallible doctrine of the Church, although he knows that it is reproved by priests, but not authoritatively.

beta) Or by persuading himself that he has reason to withdraw from the Church as regards those points, and that they are not rightly proposed by the Church as revealed: such persons do not notice that they are denying the infallibility of the Church, but rather suppose that the Church is erring in a matter which, in the opinion of the one erring, does not belong to the competence of the Church.

gamma) Or by persuading themselves that certain things are proposed by the Church as revealed which seem false to them and which they cannot believe.

The aforesaid persons regularly, at least for the sake of the common good, should not be left in good faith, nor should they be absolved unless they are willing to admit what the Church has proposed either as revealed by God or as indubitable.

¹ There are those who judge that this sin does not differ in species from heresy (p. 330).

² Vacant, Etudes sur le Concile du Vatican, II, p. 179.

³ Van Noort, De fide divina, n. 280.

III. Acceptance of propositions condemned by a note lower than heresy. Besides the sins explained under I and II, which exclude faith, there are others by which believers who retain faith in some way sin against faith, for example if someone culpably is ignorant of things which according to the above notes must be known; likewise if someone maintains propositions condemned by a note lower than heresy; concerning these we must speak more fully.¹

I set forth first can. 1324: "It is not enough to avoid heretical depravity, but it is also necessary diligently to flee those errors which more or less approach it; wherefore all must also observe the constitutions and decrees by which evil opinions of this sort have been proscribed and prohibited by the Holy See." And can. 2317: "Those who pertinaciously teach or defend, whether publicly or privately, a doctrine which has indeed been condemned by the Apostolic See or by a General Council, but not as formally heretical, are to be barred from the ministry of preaching the word of God or hearing sacramental confessions and from any office of teaching, without prejudice to other penalties which the sentence of condemnation may perhaps have established, or which the Ordinary, after warning, has judged necessary for repairing scandal."

1. What are the lower notes? Among these:

a) Some directly signify the falsity of a proposition. Thus: 1. proximate to heresy is that which denies what is proximate to faith, that is, what is commonly held as revealed, but not yet defined as such by the Church; 2. erroneous is that which denies what is theologically certain, that is, what, by mediation of another naturally evident truth, is certainly gathered from revealed doctrine; 3. proximate to error is that which denies what is most probably deduced from revealed doctrine; 4. rash is that which is defended against the common opinion without a solid argument.

b) Others directly indicate that some proposition is brought forward incautiously. Thus: 1. savoring of heresy or suspected of heresy is that which, after inspection of the words and various circumstances, gives occasion for suspecting that some other heresy is in the author; 2. savoring of error or suspected of error is that which gives occasion for suspecting that another erroneous proposition is admitted by the author; 3. ill-sounding is that by which matters pertaining to faith and morals are brought forward beside and against the received manner of speaking; 4. offensive to pious ears is that which states something that weakens the piety of the faithful, or expresses something in such a way that a similar effect follows.

c) Others directly designate some evil influence of a proposition. Thus: 1. scandalous is that which gives those hearing it occasion of spiritual ruin; 2. contumelious is that which is opposed to the honor due to another; it is called blasphemous if it inflicts injury upon God or the things of God as such; 3. schismatic is that which is opposed to the unity of the Church.

2. To what extent must account be taken of the lower notes? Account must be taken of them as follows:

a) If some note has been inflicted on some doctrine by the Church, that doctrine must be held as such, for example as scandalous, contumelious, etc. (can. 1324, 2317). Yet one who does not take account of the lower notes, although he sins, nevertheless is not thereby already a heretic. Sometimes, however, he will easily fall into heresy, for example if someone admits a proposition which is called erroneous; for one who denies what is certainly gathered from revealed doctrine by mediation of some naturally evident truth will easily deny revealed doctrine itself. Besides this, those who externally do not take account of the lower notes must also be accused of scandal.

b) As regards doctrinal declarations issued either by the Supreme Pontiff, yet not by definitive judgment, or by a Congregation which can issue declarations of this sort, as, for example, the Holy Office, as regards these declarations, I say:

alpha) Some subjection is certainly required, as is clear from the Apostolic Letter of Pius IX to the Archbishop of Munich;² likewise from the decree of the Holy Office Lamentabili,³ which Pius X confirmed by his Motu Proprio on November 18, 1907; finally, from those things which Pius X declares in the same Motu Proprio concerning the Biblical Commission: "We declare for the present and expressly command that all, every one, are bound in conscience by the duty of subjecting themselves to the judgments of the Pontifical Council on Biblical matters, pertaining to doctrine..., just as to the decrees of the Sacred Congregations pertaining to doctrine and approved by the Pontiff; nor can all those who impugn such judgments in words or writings avoid the mark both of withheld obedience and of rashness, or therefore be free from grave fault." Besides, it seems altogether consonant that the Church can in some way delegate to others the power of the magisterium, which is not merely doctrinal but authoritative. Now to this right and faculty there corresponds in subjects the obligation of taking account of the things which are taught by those to whom the aforesaid power has in fact in some way been delegated.

beta) External subjection is certainly required; for this at least must be gathered from the documents cited. Indeed, that it is required under grave obligation is clear both from the fact that a grave matter is involved, and from the cited words of the Motu Proprio of Pius X.

gamma) Authors quite commonly teach that even internal assent is required, and it is rightly deduced from the Letter of Pius IX and the obvious sense of the other documents. Nor should you object that the Church lacks the faculty of imposing merely internal acts. It cannot impose acts of this sort by its own authority, but it can do so by vicarious authority (n. 117). Firm assent, however, is not required, because definitive decrees are not in question; rather, an opinionative assent suffices, an assent which, moreover, the said decrees truly deserve. For first, the Sacred Congregations consist of men most versed in the matters which pertain to their province. Then those men in Rome have continual intercourse both with the Supreme Pontiff and with the whole episcopate, so that the sense of the universal magisterium becomes known to them more easily. Finally, it is difficult to deny that, especially upon those to whom the Supreme Pontiff has in some measure delegated his magisterium, something of the divine assistance promised to the Church redounds. Besides this, opinionative assent seems to be required under grave obligation, because the matter seems grave. Yet:

delta) It is licit, provided internal assent is furnished, to study further the matter which the decrees regard, even with the intention of inquiring whether they are true or not. This seems to follow from the nature of the thing, since the Roman Congregations cannot settle the question. But when the question has not been settled, it is licit to undertake further inquiry, and that even with the intention that the truth may be made clear. This is confirmed by the letters given by Cardinal Vaughan to Wilfrid Ward.⁴

epsilon) It is licit afterward, for a very grave cause, to withhold assent first given, indeed even to adhere to the contrary opinion; for example, as regards a learned man, if, after the matter has been investigated further, he finds a new and grave reason; as regards the less learned, if other grave and God-fearing authors already withhold assent or adhere to the contrary opinion.

Now that reason for denying assent, indeed for adhering to the contrary opinion, will occur more easily if the matter concerns decrees of the Pontifical Council on Biblical matters than if it concerns decrees of other Congregations, in other words, if it concerns scriptural matter rather than dogmatic or moral matter. For in biblical matters, whose decision often depends on external arguments both critical and historical, new arguments are more easily found than in a moral or dogmatic matter, which is often decided by internal arguments alone. For the same reason it seems it must be said that an assent equally efficacious as that owed to decrees of other Congregations is not owed to decrees of the Pontifical Council on Biblical matters. For since it can happen more easily that new arguments are found, the fear of error is greater. Indeed I would not say that decrees of the Pontifical Council have less authority in themselves; but the condition on account of which it is licit to withhold assent will more easily exist; hence the fear of erring is greater.

zeta) Finally, it is not illicit to propose new arguments which have been found, certainly with due reverence.

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Annotationes in tractatum de virtutibus theologicis, n. 229 sq.; besides, different authors explain several lower notes in different ways.

² December 21, 1863.

³ July 3, 1907.

⁴ Cf. The Guardian, June 4, 1897.

Question 1. To what extent does one sin who professes Liberalism, that is, the politico-religious system which teaches the full independence of the State from the Church?

Response 1. One who plainly professes Liberalism is a heretic, because revelation teaches at least some dependence of the State upon the Church.¹ The same, as is clear, must be said of one who adheres to a particular doctrine which is opposed to faith.

Response 2. One who admits a particular doctrine, not indeed reproved by the Church as heretical, but nevertheless definitively reproved, sins gravely. Of this sort is, for example, proposition 48 of the Syllabus of Pius IX: "That manner of instructing youth which is separated from the Catholic faith and from the power of the Church, and which looks only, or at least primarily, to the science of merely natural things and to the ends of earthly social life, can be approved by Catholic men."²

Response 3. One who gives his name to a group, for example an electoral group, of Liberals sins gravely, according to what is to be said in n. 509.

¹ Bull of Boniface VIII, Unam Sanctam, November 18, 1302; Encyclical of Pius IX, Quanta cura, December 8, 1864; Encyclical Libertas, June 20, 1888.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1748; cf. Encyclical of Pius XI Divini illius Magistri, December 31, 1929.

Question 2. To what extent does one sin who professes Socialism?

Response 1. One who adheres to the deepest principles of the socialists, namely materialism and atheism, is a heretic.

Response 2. One who rejects all private ownership sins gravely, because a doctrine of this sort cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of the Church.¹

Response 3. One who admits the system of Socialism, even as it exists today, likewise sins gravely, since the said system is opposed to the doctrine of the Church. "Whether Socialism is considered as a doctrine - thus Pius XI² - or as a historical fact, or as 'action,' if it truly remains Socialism, even after it has conceded to truth and justice in those things of which we have spoken, it cannot be reconciled with the dogmas of the Catholic Church, since it imagines society itself as utterly alien from Christian truth."

"For, thus the Supreme Pontiff continues, according to Christian doctrine, man, furnished with a social nature, is placed on this earth so that, living in society and under authority ordained by God,³ he may fully cultivate and develop all his faculties to the praise and glory of his Creator, and, by faithfully performing the duty of his art or other vocation, may obtain for himself happiness both temporal and eternal. But Socialism, being utterly ignorant and careless of this sublime end, both of man and of society, supposes that human association has been instituted for the sake of advantage alone.

"For from the fact that goods are produced more efficaciously by an apt division of works than by the divided efforts of individuals, the socialists infer that economic efficiency, of which only material objects are observed by their minds, must proceed socially by necessity. By this necessity, so they judge, men are constrained to devote and subject themselves wholly to society, as far as the production of goods is concerned. Indeed, to possess the widest possible supply of things which serve the conveniences of this life is counted so highly that the higher goods of man, not excepting liberty itself, must be placed after and even sacrificed to the demands of the most efficacious production of goods. But they suppose that this loss of human dignity, to be undergone in the 'socialized' process of production, will easily be compensated by the abundance of goods socially produced, which will be poured out to individuals, so that according to their own pleasure they may freely apply them to the conveniences and culture of life. Therefore society such as Socialism imagines it, on the one hand, neither can exist nor be conceived without violence that is plainly excessive; on the other hand, it indulges a liberty no less false, since true social authority is absent from it, seeing that this authority is not based on temporal and material conveniences, but descends from God alone, the Creator and ultimate end of all things."

Response 4. One who gives his name to a socialist group sins gravely, according to what is to be said in n. 509.

¹ Encyclical of Leo XIII Quod apostolici muneris, December 28, 1878; Rerum novarum, May 15, 1891; Encyclical of Pius XI Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931.

² Encyclical Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1931, p. 215).

³ Cf. Rom. 13:1.