Mercy

86. On the nature of mercy. 1. An act of charity toward the neighbor constituted in misery is called mercy. A benefit furnished to a neighbor constituted in misery is a work of mercy, or alms taken generally.

2. Mercy is a moral virtue by which man, from commiseration, is inclined to relieve another's misery. Therefore it differs from charity in this, that charity universally wills and procures good for the neighbor from benevolence, but mercy wills and procures it for him who is in misery from compassion. For the misery of the neighbor naturally moves one to compassion, and compassion to relieving misery.

3. The material object of mercy is the evil or misery of another (sickness, ignorance, poverty, sin, etc.), which the merciful person tries to remove. The formal object is the moral goodness which shines forth in removing another's evil from compassion.

Note. The Christian religion especially has taught us the virtue of mercy. For although the law of nature demands it, nevertheless its notion among the gentiles had been obscured and its exercise so neglected that Plato wanted the poor to be banished from the republic, and Seneca thought mercy a vice of the soul. To these Christ the Lord opposed His own mind, saying: I have compassion on the multitude;¹ Come to Me all who labor and are burdened.²

¹ Mark 8:2.

² Matt. 11:28. Cf. A. Weiss, Apologie, Freiburg: Herder, 1897, III, p. 807.

87. On the precept of mercy. a. From the universal precept of charity it follows that each one of himself is bound under grave obligation to succor a neighbor constituted in misery, if he morally can (n. 54): for he who refuses to relieve another's misery does not truly love the neighbor.

Someone can be obliged to succor the neighbor from common charity, by which all, having the same human nature, ought to do good to one another; or from special charity (piety), by which those who are joined by a special reason, as blood relatives, are bound to succor one another; or from charity and justice, by which those who by office have care of others are bound to aid them. Moreover, as long as there are those who are bound to succor from justice or from special charity, and are also believed to be able and willing to succor, others are not bound from common charity; but when those fail, these are bound.

b. Although we are bound to furnish to the neighbor who is in want the good which he needs, or to avert from him the evil which threatens him, whether it is bodily or spiritual, nevertheless none are bound to inquire into the needy except those upon whom the care of others rests by office: for it belongs to the needy themselves to set forth their necessity.

Yet one who reasonably doubts concerning the extreme necessity of someone is bound to inquire into the truth; and if, after inquiry has been made, the doubt remains, there is no obligation of aiding.

88. Works of mercy. The misery of the neighbor can be bodily or spiritual; wherefore some works of mercy are bodily, others spiritual. The bodily works are numbered as seven: to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to receive travelers, to visit the sick, to redeem captives, to bury the dead. Likewise the spiritual works are numbered as seven: to teach the ignorant, to give counsel to the doubtful, to console the sorrowful, to correct sinners, to forgive those who offend, to bear with the troublesome, to pray for the living and the dead. Here we must treat only of two: of alms strictly so called, by which name the bodily works of mercy are designated, and of fraternal correction, which alone among the spiritual works of mercy presents a special difficulty.

The things which regard acts of helping one's neighbor cannot be set forth properly unless certain things are first noted.

I. First Preliminary Note. The necessity by which one's neighbor can need our help is distinguished as temporal and spiritual; each is threefold, namely extreme or quasi-extreme, grave, and common.

1. Extreme or quasi-extreme necessity is when the greatest evil threatens or has befallen someone, and it can scarcely, or scarcely at all, be averted without another's help. By the greatest evil are understood: damnation, death, grave mutilation, perpetual imprisonment. To the extreme necessity of an individual there is equated the grave necessity of a community (St. Alphonsus, II, 27, 31).

2. Grave necessity is when only grave evil threatens or has befallen someone, and it cannot be averted by him without grave difficulty. Grave evil is constituted by: loss of a justly acquired state or of a lucrative or honorable office, or grave loss of goods (St. Alphonsus, ibid.).

3. Common necessity is when the greatest or a great evil indeed threatens someone, but one which can be averted by him without grave difficulty; likewise when an evil threatens or has befallen someone which is not so great, or which, considering his condition, does not render life so very miserable (St. Alphonsus, II, 31; III, 520).

Poor persons commonly are in common temporal necessity; sinners in common spiritual necessity; since commonly they can be freed from sin and abstain from it without so grave a difficulty; yet compare n. 575^†.

II. Second Preliminary Note. Temporal goods by which others can be helped can be distinguished into goods necessary for life, goods necessary for state, and superfluous goods.

1. Goods necessary for life are those which are required for preserving one's own life and the life of one's own people.

2. Goods necessary for state are those which are required according to each one's condition, both for the decent preservation of one's state and for providing for future necessities which commonly are wont to occur, for example those which are reserved for the time of old age, illness, and for educating and endowing children; likewise those things which look to moderately increasing one's state (St. Alphonsus, II, 31).

3. Superfluous goods are those which are necessary neither for life nor for state, in a word, those which can be left without serious inconvenience.

III. Third Preliminary Note. The act by which help is furnished to a neighbor is called beneficence; but insofar as it specifically averts evil from one's neighbor, it is usually called a work of mercy or almsgiving in the broader sense.

Beneficence and mercy are divided into corporal and spiritual. But works of mercy are enumerated as seven corporal and seven spiritual. "For seven corporal alms are set down," says St. Thomas, "namely: to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to gather in the guest, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, and to bury the dead.... Other seven spiritual alms are also set down; namely: to teach the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to console the sorrowful, to correct the sinner, to forgive the offender, to bear the burdensome and troublesome, and to pray for all" (II-II, q. 32, a. 2).

IV. Fourth Preliminary Note. The general rule regarding help to be furnished to one's neighbor is this: In order that there be an obligation of helping one's neighbor, there are required:

1. The known necessity of the neighbor. An obligation of inquiring into necessity does not exist of itself; however, it can arise from a special connection or from an office, for example that of a superior (St. Alphonsus, II, 31; III, 491, question 1).

2. The faculty of helping, and this without relatively grave inconvenience. That is, the graver the necessity is, the graver must be the inconvenience by which you are immune from the obligation of furnishing help.

These things having been noted, omitting works which have no difficulty, we shall treat distinctly of one temporal work of mercy, namely almsgiving taken more strictly, and of one spiritual work, namely fraternal correction, and finally we shall add a few things about some other works of spiritual mercy.

¹ Cf. Capellmann-Bergmann, Pastoral-Medizin, p. 74 sq.; Antonelli, Medicina Pastoralis, I, n. 354 sq.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 28-33.)

Internal Effects of Charity.—There are three acts of the soul that result from love, viz., joy, peace, mercy. (a) The joy of charity is a repose or delight of the soul in the perfections of God and in the union of self and the neighbor with Him: “The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy” (Gal., v. 22). (b) The peace of charity is the harmony of man with God, self and the neighbor: “There is much peace to those that love Thy law” (Ps. cxviii. 165). (c) Mercy is an inclination of the will to relieve the misery of another; it follows from charity, for love of the brotherhood “weeps with them that weep” (Rom., xii. 10, 15).

Mercy.—From charity results mercy, for he who loves his neighbor as a friend in God, must grieve over the latter’s sorrows as if they were his own. Our Lord commands: “Be ye merciful, as your Heavenly Father is also merciful” (Luke, vi. 36). But not all compassion is true mercy or supernatural.

(a) Thus, as regards the object that causes sorrow, true mercy grieves over the evils that befall another against his will, such as sickness, failure in an enterprise, or undeserved misfortune. But wilful evil, such as sin, provokes not mercy, but rather indignation, although one may compassionate sinners on account of the ills their sins bring on them (Matt., ix. 36).

(b) As regards the internal cause of sorrow or sympathy, supernatural mercy arises from the love of charity for the one suffering; natural mercy, from the fear one has that a similar evil may overtake oneself, or that oneself may suffer loss on account of another’s misfortune.

(c) As regards the act of mercy, it is to be noted that it proceeds from the will, regulates the emotions, and is itself regulated by reason. Thus, mercy differs from the sensible distress a refined person experiences at the sight of suffering, which, though good in itself, may never lead to a wish to alleviate sorrow. Thus, also, it differs from unregulated sympathy, which bestows help or forgiveness indiscriminately, without thought of the greater evils that may result; it differs from sentimentality, which does not restrain tears and other emotional expressions within due bounds. The virtue of mercy has a care for the interests of justice, but mere pity, like prejudice, blinds the mind to what is true and right.

The causes of an unmerciful spirit are: (a) lack of charity towards one who is in misery; (b) pride or too much prosperity, which makes one feel that others suffer justly, or that one is above their condition (Prov., xxviii. 4); (c) great misfortunes or fears that have hardened one’s disposition, or made one self-centered.

Mercy Compared with the Other Moral Virtues.—(a) Mercy, if taken for the emotion of sympathy as regulated by reason, is inferior to prudence and justice, which are perfections of the higher powers of the soul (i.e., of the intellect and will). (b) Mercy, if taken for an act of the will disliking the misery of another and moving one to remove that misery, surpasses the other moral virtues; indeed, it may be said to be something divine, and hence more than a virtue. Certainly, it is the greatest of the virtues that have to do with the neighbor, for of its nature it implies freedom from some defect and the relief of that defect in others, which is not the case with other virtues. Thus, while prudence directs acts and justice renders to others their due, these do not of themselves remove ignorance or destitution in a neighbor.

Mercy Compared with Charity.—(a) In itself (i.e., considered precisely as to its essential notes of freedom from misery and relief given to the miserable), mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For, carried to its highest development, freedom from defect means infinite perfection; while relief of defect in others means that, out of infinite love for the Supreme Good, relief is poured out by God on His creatures. Thus, in God mercy is an extension of the love God has towards His own goodness, for the benefit of creatures, and is greater than charity: “The mercy of God is above all His works” (Ps. cxliv. 9).

(b) In its subject (i.e., considered precisely as to the perfection it brings to its possessor), mercy is inferior in creatures to charity. For it is better to be united by love to the Supreme Good than to remove evil in a creature: “Above all these things have charity” (Col, iii. 14). Mercy is the sum of the Christian religion as far as external works are concerned, but charity is the sum of Christianity as regards internal acts.

The Obligation of Mercy.-(a) The natural law itself inculcates mercy, but those not influenced by divine revelation have not highly esteemed it or practised it. Thus, Plato wished that all the poor might be sent into exile. Virgil thought that freedom from pity was a sign of wisdom; Seneca called mercy a vice of the soul; Nietzsche taught that compassion has no place in the morality of the superman.

(b) The divine law commands mercy, especially in the New Testament. Assistance of the poor, the widows, the orphans, the sick, the captives, the slaves and other unfortunates is everywhere insisted on: “I will show thee what the Lord requireth of thee: verily to do justice, and to love mercy, and to walk solicitous with thy God” (Mich., vi. 8).

Thus, there are seven corporal works of mercy. (a) Those that pertain to the needs of the body during life are mentioned by our Lord in Matt., xxv. 35, 36. (b) The burial of the dead is praised in scripture as a good work, as we see in the cases of Tobias (Tob., i, ii, xii), and of those who buried our Lord (Matt, xxvi. 12, xxvii. 57 sqq.).

Spiritual alms, consisting of assistance given those who suffer want in mind or spirit, are either prayers, by which divine aid is asked for them, or various acts by which human aid is conferred. These acts are also of two kinds, and constitute seven spiritual works of mercy.

(a) The defects from which a soul suffers, and which are not moral, include ignorance in the intellect, doubt in the practical judgment, and sadness in the affections; and hence the acts of almsgiving for such cases are instruction, counsel, and comfort.

(b) The defects of soul which are moral are the guilt of sin and its consequences—that is, the offense given and the burdens that result for the sinner or others. The corresponding spiritual alms are admonition against sin, pardon of the offense done to self, patience in bearing with the difficult ways of others, especially if they err through infirmity, or willingness in helping them to bear the consequences of their errors (Rom., xv. 1).

The giving of spiritual alms may suppose superiority or authority in the giver over the receiver, or a certain procedure to be followed; hence, in the administration of spiritual benefits, the due order of time, place and persons has to be remembered. (a) Thus, in the instruction of the ignorant, it is not every kind of ignorance that is a defect, but only the ignorance of things one must know; and it is not every person who is to give the needed instruction. (b) In the correction of sinners, it is not every kind of reproof that is to be used, but gentleness and secret admonition should be employed where possible (Prov., xxvii. 6).

Two virtues of the will which some authorities hold to be more important than justice are the virtues of religion and mercy.

(a) The virtue of religion has a nobler object, since it regulates the worship owed to God, while justice regulates the things owed to man; and its obligation is stricter even than that of legal justice.

(b) The virtue of mercy, which is a rational inclination of the will to relieve the suffering or misfortune of others, is held to be greater than justice, because to relieve the distress of the community or of an individual indicates greater perfection than to pay merely what is due to another.

What does charity toward neighbor import; is there given a precept of charity toward neighbor? - R. To the first. Charity toward neighbor commands love of oneself and of neighbor, but in an ordered way; for not every neighbor is neighbor to us in the same mode. Love of oneself embraces the due care to be had of soul and body. Sins committed against it are implicitly contained and accused in other sins committed and accused in confession. But since even an enemy is neighbor, it also commands love of enemies. Love, namely so that we will good to him. The chief good of man is God. Therefore by charity we will that man possess God, by association in full participation of blessedness. And this is to love neighbor as oneself. Besides interior love, since charity by its nature is not sterile, but active, it also commands exterior works. Therefore besides interior benevolence, charity also commands beneficence, which is the execution of benevolence. The matter concerns the precept of theological charity, which is evidently established from the very words of Christ. "But the second commandment is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Matt. 22:39; 1 John 4:21.

Among exterior works alms and fraternal correction hold a special place; these are works of mercy, the former corporal, the latter spiritual. For mercy is the virtue which inclines us to compassionating another's misery, and from compassion to assisting. The same charity, on the contrary, prohibits hatred of malevolence and enmity toward neighbor, which from its genus is mortal. For by it we will evil to the neighbor insofar as it is evil for him, which is always inordinate and repugnant to charity. Yet smallness of matter is given, since the evil which we will to neighbor can be great or small. Besides this internal act, it consequently prohibits that by our exterior actions we inflict spiritual harm upon his salvation through scandal, or do other harm to him either as to other goods of soul, or as to goods of body. Concerning this last there will be discussion in the precepts of the Decalogue; here we will speak only of the remaining things.

Benevolence, therefore, and beneficence are acts of charity; to the former belongs willing good, to the latter doing good, according to the common account of good. If the good which someone does to another is taken under a special account of good, beneficence will receive a special account and will pertain to some special virtue. If the good, for example, is owed, it will pertain to justice; if it is for relieving misery, it will pertain to mercy, etc. Therefore the conferring of a benefit in general pertains to charity. In order that the conferring of benefit and beneficence properly be had, it is necessary that there be had a liberal conferring of a gift. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 1.

Charity, about which the speech is properly here, is theological charity, by which neighbor is loved on account of God. But there is also given another charity, a moral virtue, by which neighbor is loved on account of the very honorableness of this love, which per se is a natural virtue. The natural motive of this love does not impede this love also from being supernatural, if it is done from grace and informed by faith. And it is commanded by God: "All things whatsoever you wish that men should do to you, do you also to them." Matt. 7:12; Job 4:16. Nevertheless the precept of theological charity is not fulfilled by this love. It is indeed praiseworthy and very meritorious that the acts to be exercised toward neighbor be exercised from the motive of the charity of God; nevertheless per se it is not obligatory.

For as the charity of God commands that we observe his commands, but does not also command that we execute them from the motive of the charity of God, so also charity toward neighbor indeed commands that we exercise various acts of beneficence and mercy, but by no means that we effect them only from the motive of the charity of God.

R. To the second. There is given a precept of loving neighbor with a true and internal affection, as is established from John 15:12, 17, and from propositions 10 and 11 condemned by Innocent XI; and also with external love, 1 John 3:15 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 2. But someone sufficiently satisfies this precept through a certain general love which excludes no one, and accordingly by reciting the Lord's Prayer, in which you have both an internal and external act. A precept of this sort obliges per se when the precept of charity toward God obliges per se. For it is like to this. Matt. 22:39. Hence he who fulfills the precept of charity toward God, by willing every good to God, at least implicitly fulfills the precept of charity toward neighbor, by desiring salvation for him. But it obliges per accidens: 1. If hatred toward neighbor cannot be repelled unless an act of love is elicited; for he who is bound to the end is obliged to the means. 2. When the neighbor is in necessity; otherwise the precept would be vain; if that necessity becomes known, for no one is bound to inquire whether someone is in need. - L. 8; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 25; q. 27, a. 8; q. 30; q. 31; q. 32, aa. 1, 2; q. 34, aa. 3, 4; q. 44; Struggl, q. 6, n. 4; Salm. 17; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 2, n. 81; E. M. 282. Through a certain general love which excludes no one; for care concerning the salvation of neighbor is not incumbent on anyone, unless perhaps in a case of necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 5 ad 3. Nor indeed by reason of common charity is there an obligation of inquiring into the necessity of neighbor. For it regards only cases occurring to anyone. "That which is owed to some determinate and certain person... we must expend upon him, not waiting until he occurs to us, but having due solicitude that we seek him out.... But those benefits which are owed not to a certain person, but commonly to all neighbors... we need not seek those upon whom we may expend them, but it suffices that we expend them on those who occur to us." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33, a. 2 ad 4.

What are the sins opposed to charity? - From the Angelic Doctor, 2. 2, they are: 1. Hatred of God and of neighbor, which is opposed to the very love of charity; hatred of God is virtually present in any lethal sin, q. 34. But charity toward neighbor is gravely injured by any grave displeasure caused to neighbor without just reason, which constitutes a grave offense against him. 2. Acedia, which is opposed to the joy of charity concerning divine good, q. 35. Cf. n. 343 seq. 3. Envy, which is opposed to joy concerning the good of neighbor, q. 36. Cf. n. 327 seq. 3. Discord, which is in the heart, and is opposed to the peace of charity, q. 37. Cf. n. 322. - 4. Contention, which is in the mouth, and is also opposed to peace, q. 38.

Cf. n. 322. 5. Schism, quarrel, war, sedition, which pertain to deed, and likewise are opposed to peace, qq. 39-42. Cf. n. 342, 380, 751. 6. Scandal, which is opposed to the beneficence of charity, q. 43. Omission of help, whether spiritual or temporal, when it is owed, attention being paid to the necessity of neighbor and the ability of the one helping, is properly against mercy, and consequently against charity. Injury of neighbor in his temporal goods is properly opposed to justice. But in all sins against justice toward neighbor, charity and justice are injured at the same time, although in sins against charity toward neighbor justice is not always injured.

Any man is bound per se to show to his neighbor, even an enemy, the common signs and benefits of love from precept; but special ones only from counsel, unless a reason of obligation accedes from elsewhere. Per se, because sometimes a reasonable cause is present for denying them for a time, e.g., by reason of due correction or punishment, of a good effect upon sons or inferiors, or because there is hope that from it he will be amended, or because of a prudent fear of quarrels from the sight or conversation of the enemy, or because of a prudent fear that the enemy will abuse those signs, even if common, for inflicting a new injury; likewise because of the expression of just sorrow conceived from injury, etc. Neighbor even an enemy: An enemy is not to be loved insofar as he is an enemy; thus rather he is to be hated; but insofar as he is neighbor. For by enemy is understood one who has offended or injured undeservedly, and pursues us with hatred. Common signs and benefits of love are those which by reason of general charity are owed to a Christian by any Christian in common, to a fellow citizen by a fellow citizen, to a relative by a relative, and so forth. - But special ones are those which are not owed by reason of general charity, but are shown to some person by reason of a more special friendship and familiarity. But since this is undertaken by free will, hence those special signs proceed not from the debt of charity, but from the liberality of charity. Unless a reason of obligation accedes from elsewhere, such as would be: 1. fear of scandal from omission; 2. hope of the salvation of the enemy; whence, if by one of these things you can, without your inconvenience, reconcile an enemy to yourself and to God, to omit it would be grave; 3. temporal or spiritual necessity; 4. request for pardon for fault and exhibition of special signs of love. But in this last case, as to special friendship and familiarity, its restoration is not necessarily always to be urged. For that special friendship is not owed even to a friend; therefore a fortiori it is not owed to an enemy, since it is altogether voluntary.

Proof of the first part: 1. from the most common opinion of theologians; 2. because to deny those common signs is a manifestation of hatred, which is opposed to charity. Proof of the second part: 1. likewise from the most common opinion of theologians; 2. because, since no other union remains for us with an enemy except the sole union of common charity, we are bound to show him only those signs which are common signs of charity. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 29-31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 25, aa. 8, 9; q. 27, a. 7; q. 31, a. 3; 3, D. 30, q. 1, a. 2; de Carit., q. un., aa. 8, 9; L. 28.

Resolves: Private persons among themselves are rarely bound to correction, at least under grave sin, unless they are familiarly joined to one another, because rarely are all the required conditions found; still more rarely toward superiors because of unsuitability. Prudence generally persuades that correction be omitted toward those whose character is wholly unknown, lest, receiving the correction with an unjust mind, they become worse. Scrupulous persons are ordinarily excused from making fraternal correction, because either they are too greatly wearied, or are unfit; for, disturbed by scruples and anxieties, they lack the necessary discretion for correcting, and are not able to attend to excusing causes.

Some works of mercy are corporal, such as to furnish food to the poor, to clothe the naked, etc.; and others spiritual, such as to correct sinners, to teach the ignorant, to console the sad, etc. We shall speak specifically about only two: 1º about alms; 2º about fraternal correction, insofar as they are referred to the precept of Charity.

S. Th. II-II, q. 28, 29, 30, 45.

920. There are three internal effects of charity:

The first is joy, which is caused from dilection, either a) on account of this, that good is in the one loved and is preserved in him, and thus we rejoice concerning the immutable goodness of God (the joy of friendship completing the love of complacency), or b) on account of the presence of the one loved, and thus we rejoice fully concerning God in heaven, or even on earth concerning his indwelling in the soul (the joy of concupiscence filling the desire of the one loving). The first joy can have no sadness mixed with it; - likewise the other joy in heaven, where it will be altogether full, because nothing remains to be desired, indeed super-full, because more is given than is desired; but not now on earth, where from it there can also follow sadness concerning those things which are opposed to the perfection of participation of the divine good and which are contrary to the effects of charity in us or in neighbor.

In a similar mode we can rejoice concerning our own goods, and rejoice together concerning the goods of neighbor.

The second is peace, which includes two things: a) concord or union of our will with the will of others: charity makes this insofar as we love neighbors as ourselves; from which it happens that a man wills to fulfill the will of neighbor as of himself, and thus two wills tend into one; b) the union of all our appetites: charity makes this insofar as we love God from the whole heart and refer all things to him; and thus all our appetites tend into one.

The third is mercy, which is defined by St. Augustine, de Civ. Dei, l. 9: "compassion or sadness in our heart over another's misery, by which, indeed, if we are able, we are compelled to give relief." For because one loving regards a friend as himself, he regards his evil as his own, and therefore he grieves over this as over his own, and wills to relieve his misery, as his own.

Joy and peace are secondary acts of charity, naturally and necessarily consequent upon dilection; they have the same object and motive as dilection, whence they are not distinct habits. But mercy is a special virtue because it has a special object, namely, another's misery to be relieved by our aid from compassion, and a special appetite, namely, grief over another's misery, to be moderated by reason. Now misery consists in this, that a man suffers what he does not will, that is, an evil which is in some way involuntary to him; and thus the sin of another is also an object of mercy, insofar as it has certain evils annexed which are contrary to the will of the one sinning, such as the obligation of punishment, infirmity, separation from God, etc.

921. Observation. - Mercy is the greatest of all virtues, if it is considered in itself, because to give to others and to relieve defects belongs most of all to a superior, and therefore it is proper to God, in whom it is not distinguished from gratuitous love or charity, which it includes and extends to others. But if it is considered as regards the man having it, it is not the greatest, because it is greater to be joined to the superior, God, which is done immediately by the theological virtues and mediately by certain others. But among all virtues which pertain to neighbor it is the greatest, because to supply for a defect as such belongs to one better (q. 30, a. 4). Thus it is annexed not only to charity but also to justice, and pertains to liberality, of which it is a species (III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 4, qc. 4).

922. The gift of Wisdom corresponds to charity, as the most perfect among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Wisdom is taken: a) for a natural and acquired intellectual virtue by which man promptly judges concerning all things through the highest causes known by reason; b) for a supernatural and infused gift by which man, through the highest supernatural cause, God, and through divine rules, can judge and order all things from connaturality. Man obtains this judgment through the Holy Spirit (I Cor. II, 15 and 10), and therefore this wisdom is a gift of the Holy Spirit.

Wisdom resides in the intellect because its act is to judge; but it has its cause in the will, namely, charity by which we are connatural to divine things, since it unites us to God. Hence it belongs to wisdom to judge with savor, taste, sweetness, and delight. Therefore wisdom is not in sinners. Moreover, it not only contemplates divine things but also through divine reasons judges concerning human things; whence it is at once speculative and practical.

From the aforesaid its definition is clear: A divinely infused habit by which the mind is rendered easily movable by the Holy Spirit for contemplating divine things, and for judging concerning them, and concerning human things according to divine reasons.

As charity, according to the threefold state of men, is divided into the charity of beginners, of those progressing, and of the perfect, which is not a specific but a gradual distinction, conformably there is a threefold grade of wisdom.

"All who have charity and grace making one pleasing have the gift of wisdom at least according to this first grade of it. Now this grade of wisdom consists in two things. First, in this, that through it the intellect judges that one must adhere to divine things rather than to created and perishable things, saying that word of the Psalmist: It is good for me to adhere to God. Second, that through it he rightly disposes and regulates his human and external operations according to divine laws, according to divine precepts or counsels...

"The second grade of wisdom belongs to those progressing, consisting in this, that for the sake of perceiving and experiencing the spiritual and most pure sweetness or delight of wisdom, a man should despise and forsake all enticements of the flesh and delights of the world, and should strive with all his powers to stabilize the intellect in clear and savory speculation of divine things, endeavoring to ascend to the brightness of angelic conversation...

"The third grade of wisdom is fitting only to the perfect, and consists in this, that the knowledge of no created thing should be savory, delightful, or pleasing to the intellect except insofar as it contributes to the knowledge of divine things, and thus the mind itself should be totally fixed upon the contemplation of divine things, so that it may be able promptly, sincerely, subtly, and sweetly to behold them, the passions having been so quieted, and the exterior man entirely reformed, ordered, and subjected at the nod of the judgment of reason, as much as the frailty of the present life takes in or sustains..."¹

¹ Dionysius Carthusianus, De donis, tr. II, a. 15.

To the gift of wisdom is attributed the seventh beatitude: Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God: 1. as regards merit, for peacemakers are those who make peace either in themselves or in others, which is done by reducing them to due order; but to order belongs to wisdom; therefore to be a peacemaker is fittingly attributed to wisdom; 2. as regards reward, for they will be sons of God by participating the likeness of the only-begotten Son of God, who is uncreated Wisdom itself begotten.

923. Observation. - Let the words of St. Thomas, q. 45, a. 5, be noted: "Some obtain so much of right judgment both in contemplation of divine things and also in the ordering of human things according to divine rules as is necessary for salvation; and this is lacking to no one existing without mortal sin through grace making pleasing... But some perceive the gift of wisdom in a higher grade, both as regards contemplation of divine things, insofar, namely, as they know certain higher mysteries and can manifest them to others; and also as regards direction of human things according to divine rules, insofar as according to them they can order not only themselves but also others; and this grade of wisdom is not common to all having grace making pleasing, but rather pertains to graces freely given, which the Holy Spirit distributes according as he wills, according to that word I Cor. XII, 8: To one..."

Mercy is defined by D. Bonaventure, 3. part. Centil. sect. 44.: Mercy is the virtue by which the innermost heart is moved over the calamity of the afflicted. This virtue thinks nothing human foreign to itself; it reckons the losses, or the goods, of others as its own.

It is drawn out from D. Augustine, 19. de civit. cap. 5., where he defines, or describes, it thus: Mercy is compassion for another's misery in our heart, whereby, if we can bring help, we are compelled.

Valentia thus describes Mercy from D. Thom. art. 1., D. Augustine in the place cited, and Aristotle 2. Rhet. cap. 8.: Mercy is pain, or sorrow, over an involuntary evil of another, reckoned as one's own, and in some way against the dignity of the miserable person, whom the one merciful wills to relieve, as far as lies in him, and as he conveniently can.

It is called a Virtue by D. Bonaventure; for it is a virtue distinct from Charity, as the Apostle teaches, Coloss. 3., where he first teaches: Put on the bowels of Mercy, benignity, humility, modesty, patience; but soon after says: Above all these things, have Charity.

It is proved, because it has a peculiar object, namely the evil of another, and the calamities of the afflicted, as able to be relieved by our works. But this is the reason of a peculiar object, and it begets a peculiar difficulty in the act of mercy in efficacious execution. For indeed, in efficaciously relieving another's misery, there remains a principal difficulty even in one having Charity.

Observe, however, that in the description of the last-mentioned mercy it is placed that it is sorrow over another's misery; for, as Damascenus teaches, 2. de fide, cap. 14., Mercy is a certain species of pain, or sorrow, over the evil of one's neighbour indeed, but reckoned as one's own.

It is said to be over an involuntary evil; for misery consists in suffering involuntarily; just as Beatitude, to which misery is opposed, consists in this, that one have those goods which he wills, according to that word of Augustine, Lib. 13. de civit. cap. 4.: Blessed is he who has whatever he wills, and wills no evil. Yet that misery need not be altogether involuntary; for we can have mercy on a sinner, as D. Thomas teaches, art. 1. ad 1., from the opinion of D. Gregory, homil. 34. in Evangelia.

Then it is said to be over the evil of another reckoned as one's own. For sorrow and pain are over one's own evil: whence the motive of mercy must touch one in some way regarding oneself, as D. Thom. teaches, art. 2. Whence, when the Saintly Doctor, in the explanation of the terms of Theology, near the end, describes mercy: Mercy is compassion for the misery and need of one's neighbour; he does not intend to hand down a definition, but to explain the term; otherwise he would have added: for the miseries of one's neighbour, as one's own.

The Saintly Doctor discourses most excellently on Mercy in the passages alleged. But he shows first that Mercy is a peculiar and distinguished Virtue, which is occupied with the miseries of one's neighbour to be relieved, with that affection as if they were one's own; as D. Thom. also says, art. 1. and 3.

Then he prefers it to the other virtues, especially the more distinguished ones.

Indeed, first he prefers it to Penitence, because this immolates the body; but that, the soul. For bodily exercise, that is, penance, is profitable to little. But piety is profitable to all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come, as is had, first Timothy 4.

Secondly it surpasses Justice: therefore it frees the guilty, Matth. 5.: Blessed are the Merciful, for they shall obtain Mercy. From Matth. 6.: If you will forgive men their sins, and your heavenly Father will forgive you your sins. Luke 6.: Forgive, and you shall be forgiven. Proverb. 19.: He that is merciful to the poor lends to the Lord. He also brings this as an argument, because in God Mercy exalts itself above judgment, James 2., and Psalm. 144.: His tender mercies are over all His works. But he hints that this avails only in him who has no superior, as D. Thom. says, art. 4.

But he shows especially that for some reason it is more excellent than Charity. The reason is, which D. Thom. also uses. For Charity only loves, and thus, as it were finite, is contained in the other, tending toward the good through love: but Mercy, overflowing its banks, pours itself out, communicating itself to inferior agents, and therefore bears not only the goods of one's neighbours, but most willingly also their evils.

Second Corinth. 11.: Who is weak, and I am not weak? Who is scandalized, and I am not inflamed? Therefore mercy, considered in itself, surpasses Charity.

But this doctrine can be accommodated to Charity, and Mercy in two ways. In one way, as they are certain good habits, that is, virtues, which are found adequately in man according to their rationes: but inadequately also in God, the formalities being prescinded, namely of habit, which they call imperfections; and in this sense Charity and mercy are compared in themselves, and according to the perfection which it exacts in itself, without respect to object or subject, and considering only the ratio of the act. In this sense Valentia says D. Thomas spoke; for he compares these virtues as they are habits, of which one is for loving, the other for relieving, as Tannerus notes, disp. 2. quaest. 4. dub. 2. num. 31.

Secondly they can be considered, not as they are habits, but in the most abstract reason, inasmuch as mercy is relieving of misery: but Charity is the faculty of loving God; and in this way, say Cajetan and Bannes, D. Thomas is to be understood, that Mercy indeed, in its most abstract perfection, is better than Charity: For that which consists in relieving the misery and defects of the needy ought to be pure act, not a certain potentiality, or lack; otherwise it will not be able to reduce need to act; and in this sense it resplends in God, who is pure infinite act, who can fill all defects and potentialities.

As to D. Bonav., I judge that he spoke in both senses. In the former indeed, because he compares the habit of Charity, and others, with the habit of mercy in general, as is evident from the examples alleged above. But in this latter sense; because he brings some examples of the mercy of God from the Scriptures indicating it, as we have seen. Therefore in both ways mercy, considered in itself, seems more perfect.

Truly, however, if both are considered in order to the subject, Charity is better in him who is not the highest, inasmuch as the highest perfection stands in union with the highest good; but if it is the highest good, then the greatest perfection is to diffuse goodness to all inferiors. See the Saintly Doctor, also giving the motives by which we are moved to mercy, loco cit. The first motive is to consider the miserable to be of our nature. Whence Matth. 23.: For all you are brethren, and Isa. 58.: When you shall see one naked, cover him, and despise not your own flesh. The second motive of mercy is one's own need and misery; for man, considering his own misery, compassionates that of another, whence Ecclesiasticus 31.: Learn from yourself what things are for your neighbour.

The third motive is the unity of Christ and his members, and the love in it, that he reckon as done to himself, or poured out for them, what is done, Matth. 25.: What you have done to one of the least of mine, etc. At the end he enumerates the fourteen works of mercy. See him there, uttering wondrous things.