III. On the Love of Enemies

Must even enemies be loved? - It is certain that enemies must be loved in some way, since they are neighbors; and this is also established from the Gospel, Matt. 5:43 seqq. This precept, insofar as it is negative, prohibits that anyone ever pursue his enemy with hatred; but insofar as it is affirmative, it also obliges to positive benevolence and external beneficence according to the measure of the necessity in which he is placed. - Therefore the question is only about the mode of this positive love to be had from precept, which is explained in the following paragraphs.

Any man is bound per se to show to his neighbor, even an enemy, the common signs and benefits of love from precept; but special ones only from counsel, unless a reason of obligation accedes from elsewhere. Per se, because sometimes a reasonable cause is present for denying them for a time, e.g., by reason of due correction or punishment, of a good effect upon sons or inferiors, or because there is hope that from it he will be amended, or because of a prudent fear of quarrels from the sight or conversation of the enemy, or because of a prudent fear that the enemy will abuse those signs, even if common, for inflicting a new injury; likewise because of the expression of just sorrow conceived from injury, etc. Neighbor even an enemy: An enemy is not to be loved insofar as he is an enemy; thus rather he is to be hated; but insofar as he is neighbor. For by enemy is understood one who has offended or injured undeservedly, and pursues us with hatred. Common signs and benefits of love are those which by reason of general charity are owed to a Christian by any Christian in common, to a fellow citizen by a fellow citizen, to a relative by a relative, and so forth. - But special ones are those which are not owed by reason of general charity, but are shown to some person by reason of a more special friendship and familiarity. But since this is undertaken by free will, hence those special signs proceed not from the debt of charity, but from the liberality of charity. Unless a reason of obligation accedes from elsewhere, such as would be: 1. fear of scandal from omission; 2. hope of the salvation of the enemy; whence, if by one of these things you can, without your inconvenience, reconcile an enemy to yourself and to God, to omit it would be grave; 3. temporal or spiritual necessity; 4. request for pardon for fault and exhibition of special signs of love. But in this last case, as to special friendship and familiarity, its restoration is not necessarily always to be urged. For that special friendship is not owed even to a friend; therefore a fortiori it is not owed to an enemy, since it is altogether voluntary.

Proof of the first part: 1. from the most common opinion of theologians; 2. because to deny those common signs is a manifestation of hatred, which is opposed to charity. Proof of the second part: 1. likewise from the most common opinion of theologians; 2. because, since no other union remains for us with an enemy except the sole union of common charity, we are bound to show him only those signs which are common signs of charity. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 29-31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 25, aa. 8, 9; q. 27, a. 7; q. 31, a. 3; 3, D. 30, q. 1, a. 2; de Carit., q. un., aa. 8, 9; L. 28.

Resolves: It is not licit to exclude an enemy from common prayers, e.g., the Lord's Prayer, and that which is instituted for the community; nor from common alms, the return of a greeting, an answer, the sale of goods exposed for sale, because these are common signs of love. But no one, speaking per se, is bound to loving an enemy by a positive and particular act, nor to greeting him, speaking to him, visiting him when sick, consoling him when sad, receiving him with hospitality, or dealing familiarly with him, etc., because these are special signs of love. Therefore, if any of these, attention being paid to circumstances of places and persons, were a common sign of love, it would no longer be licit to abstain from it, as could easily happen when lodging in the same family, community, college, by reason of consanguinity, common life in religion, common education and study. Struggl, q. 4, n. 36; Sporer, tr. 2, in 1 Pr., c. 6; L. 28.

Although anyone is bound not only interiorly to remit an offense to an enemy legitimately asking pardon, but also to show external signs of remission, nevertheless he is not bound immediately after the offense itself has been inflicted. Nor indeed is he bound to remit satisfaction either for personal injury or for real harm, if he has been harmed. Indeed he is not even bound to accept it if it is offered; but he can also juridically ask for compensation, provided hatred is put aside.

Proof of the first part. As to the internal act: Matt. 5:44: But I say to you: Love your enemies. And ibid. 6:15: If you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive your sins. As to the external act: Because otherwise you would be judged to contemn the enemy, and to wish to persevere in hostility. "But if he (the enemy or offender) does not show fitting satisfaction, the offended person is not bound to speak to him, namely when he either does not wish to satisfy at all, or only halfway." S. Antonin., Summ., p. 2, tit. 8, c. 2, § 6. But here one must carefully note whether the offended person, while he refuses certain offices to the offender, inflicts or wishes some grave evil to him. For if this is absent, and no other grave inconveniences can be feared from these offices denied to the offender, someone ought not immediately to be accused of grave fault, so that on account of it the confessor would rightly deny absolution. Cf. 396, 397; Coninck, de Virt. theol., d. 29, n. 60. But the reason of the restriction made is that the matter seems too violent and above human frailty: to compel an injured person immediately to make reconciliation, the disturbance of soul not yet calmed. Whence an opportune time must be awaited, and meanwhile it suffices that the offended person put aside hatred. Indeed it is sometimes licit to omit common signs of love for a time, as was said at the beginning of n. 396. - Offense. A simple offense is the injury of another's will, by which someone causes annoyance to another against his rational will, and as it were gives a certain right to indignation and aversion. Cf. 400.

Proof of the second part. Because charity is not opposed to justice. For charity does not forbid exacting from an enemy fitting satisfaction either for an injury inflicted, or even for damage caused. Indeed this can also be useful for restraining the wickedness of a man. Sporer, l. c., n. 18. Proof of the third part. Because vengeance by public authority is licit. Therefore it is licit to wish public punishment for an enemy, and to seek it. - But the reason of the limitation is that "if his intention is borne principally toward the evil of him upon whom he takes vengeance, and rests there, it is altogether illicit; because to delight in the evil of another pertains to hatred, which repugns to charity, by which we ought to love all men. Nor is someone excused if he intends the evil of him who unjustly inflicted evil upon him, just as someone is not excused by the fact that he hates one hating him; for man ought not to sin against another because that person first sinned against him; for this is to be overcome by evil, which the Apostle prohibits in Rom. 12:21, saying: Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil in good. But if the intention of the one avenging is borne principally toward some good, which is reached through the punishment of the one sinning, for instance toward the amendment of the sinner, or at least toward restraining him and the peace of others, and toward the conservation of justice and the honor of God, vengeance can be licit, the other due circumstances being observed." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 108, a. 1.

These things indeed speculatively. Practically, it is certainly difficult for public vengeance from love of justice to be separated from inordinate love of private vengeance, which is illicit, Rom. 12:19 seqq., if the punishment is very grave, e.g., of death, mutilation, and no advantage comes to the injured person from it. Likewise, if the offender satisfies as much as he can, to urge him to that which he cannot do seems against charity. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 33, 34; L. 28.

To this therefore belongs vindication, which is a certain special virtue, a potential part of justice, through which force or injury, and altogether anything obscure or ignominious, is driven away by defending or avenging oneself. Virtue, and therefore the punishment to be rendered to the evildoer, for the injury inflicted, proportioned, and the order of reason observed, which is that in graver offenses punishment be imposed by public authority. But in lighter offenses it is impossible to have recourse to the judge. Hence by moderate displeasure or by another rational mode which is in our power, to take legitimate vengeance, so that the boldness of the offender may be repressed, peace conserved, or another good procured, is not illicit. - "Two vices are opposed to vindication: one indeed by excess, namely the sin of cruelty or savagery, which exceeds measure in punishing; but the other is a vice which consists in this, as when someone is too remiss in punishing." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 108, a. 2.

Although hatred of enmity, whether of the person according to himself and of the goods which he has in himself, namely by willing evil to him as such, or insofar as it is evil to him, from its genus is mortal, nevertheless hatred of abomination, or of quality, by which we are averse not to the man but to his malice, is licit. - This is clear of itself, and theologians commonly teach it. Hence a private person who, averse from another, flees him, if he does this so that he may deprive him of his conversation and consolation, and thus sadden him and that it may be ill with him, this is hatred of enmity and sin. But if, wishing no evil, he only flees because the person is discordant with his nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to him, this is hatred of abomination and aversion, and sin if it is irrational; such it will not be if the person is in reality very harsh, provided contempt, scandal, and desire of vengeance are absent. - Struggl, q. 4, nn. 26, 28, 37; q. 5, n. 6; L. 30; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 24, a. 3.

Must the offender ask pardon from the injured person? - R. Affirmatively per se; for in the same way in which charity was destroyed, it ought to be repaired; unless nevertheless another means, or a more fitting mode of reconciliation, is available, by furnishing various offices or benefits, or unless asking pardon seems likely to profit nothing toward placating the offended person. They also except the case in which the offender is far superior to the offended person, unless perhaps such enormity of injury urged that it would require the petition of pardon even from a subject. Likewise the case is excepted in which the offended person is prudently judged to pardon it. But in reality other means of placating the offended person are not lacking. La-Croix, l. 2, n. 189; Struggl, q. 4, n. 35. Pardon. A simple offense is compensated by reconciliation; an injury by satisfaction. Therefore he who simply offends another, by causing displeasure to him, is simply bound himself to procuring restoration of friendship. But he who has injured not only the will of another, but also his right, is bound to undergo some punishment, humiliation, annoyance, for repairing the injury inflicted; and therefore he is bound to ask pardon.