Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question II: What kind of virtue mercy is
The Saintly Doctor discourses most excellently on Mercy in the passages alleged. But he shows first that Mercy is a peculiar and distinguished Virtue, which is occupied with the miseries of one's neighbour to be relieved, with that affection as if they were one's own; as D. Thom. also says, art. 1. and 3.
Quae, et qualis Virtus sit MISERICORDIA.
Praeclare S. Doctor de Misericordia disserit locis allegatis. Ostendit autem primo, Misericordiam esse Virtutem peculiarem insignem, quae circa miserias proximi sublevandas, eo affectu tanquam proprias versatur; ut ait etiam D. Thom. art. 1. et 3.
Then he prefers it to the other virtues, especially the more distinguished ones.
Deinde eam praefert caeteris virtutibus, praecipue insignioribus.
Indeed, first he prefers it to Penitence, because this immolates the body; but that, the soul. For bodily exercise, that is, penance, is profitable to little. But piety is profitable to all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come, as is had, first Timothy 4.
Primo quidem eam praefert Poenitentiae, quia haec immolat corpus; illa vero animam. Corporalis enim exercitatio, idest, poenitentia, ad modicum utilis est. Pietas vero ad omnia, ut habetur, prima Timothei 4. promissionem habens vitae.
Secondly it surpasses Justice: therefore it frees the guilty, Matth. 5.: Blessed are the Merciful, for they shall obtain Mercy. From Matth. 6.: If you will forgive men their sins, and your heavenly Father will forgive you your sins. Luke 6.: Forgive, and you shall be forgiven. Proverb. 19.: He that is merciful to the poor lends to the Lord. He also brings this as an argument, because in God Mercy exalts itself above judgment, James 2., and Psalm. 144.: His tender mercies are over all His works. But he hints that this avails only in him who has no superior, as D. Thom. says, art. 4.
Secundo superat Iustitiam: Ideo reos liberat, Matth. 5. Beati Misericordes, quoniam ipsi Misericordiam consequentur. Ex Matth. 6. Si dimiseritis hominibus peccata eorum, et Pater vester coelestis dimittet peccata vestra. Lucae 6. Dimittite, et dimittemini. Proverb. 19. Foeneratur Domino, qui miseretur proximo. Id etiam affert in argumentum, quia in Deo, Misericordia superexaltat iudicium, Iacobi 2. et Psalm. 144. Miserationes eius super omnia opera Eius. Hoc vero innuit, valere solum in eo, qui non habet superiorem, ut ait D. Thom art. 4.
But he shows especially that for some reason it is more excellent than Charity. The reason is, which D. Thom. also uses. For Charity only loves, and thus, as it were finite, is contained in the other, tending toward the good through love: but Mercy, overflowing its banks, pours itself out, communicating itself to inferior agents, and therefore bears not only the goods of one's neighbours, but most willingly also their evils.
Praecipue vero ostendit, aliqua ratione esse Charitate praestantiorem. Ratio est, quia utitur etiam D. Thom. Nam Charitas solum diligit, et ita quasi finitus in altero continetur, tendens in bonum dilectione: Misericordia autem redundans super ripas effunditur, communicando se inferioribus agentibus, et ideo non solum bona proximorum, sed etiam mala libentissime portat.
Second Corinth. 11.: Who is weak, and I am not weak? Who is scandalized, and I am not inflamed? Therefore mercy, considered in itself, surpasses Charity.
Secunda Corinth. 11. Quis infirmatur, et ego non infirmor? Quis scandalizatur, et ego non uror? Itaque misericordia, in se considerata, superat Charitatem.
But this doctrine can be accommodated to Charity, and Mercy in two ways. In one way, as they are certain good habits, that is, virtues, which are found adequately in man according to their rationes: but inadequately also in God, the formalities being prescinded, namely of habit, which they call imperfections; and in this sense Charity and mercy are compared in themselves, and according to the perfection which it exacts in itself, without respect to object or subject, and considering only the ratio of the act. In this sense Valentia says D. Thomas spoke; for he compares these virtues as they are habits, of which one is for loving, the other for relieving, as Tannerus notes, disp. 2. quaest. 4. dub. 2. num. 31.
Duobus autem modis haec doctrina potest ad Charitatem, et Misericordiam accommodari. Uno modo, ut sunt quidam habitus boni, idest virtutes, quae secundum rationes suas adaequate inveniuntur in homine: inadaequate vero etiam in Deo, praecisis formalitatibus, scilicet habitus, quae dicunt imperfectiones, et hoc sensu comparari Charitatem, et misericordiam secundum se, et secundum perfectionem, quam exigit in seipsa, sine respectu ad obiectum, vel subiectum, et solum considerando rationem actus etiam. Hoc sensu ait Valentia, locutum D. Thomam; nam comparat has virtutes, ut habitus sunt, quorum alter est ad amandum; alter ad sublevandam, ut notat Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 4. dub. 2. num. 31.
Secondly they can be considered, not as they are habits, but in the most abstract reason, inasmuch as mercy is relieving of misery: but Charity is the faculty of loving God; and in this way, say Cajetan and Bannes, D. Thomas is to be understood, that Mercy indeed, in its most abstract perfection, is better than Charity: For that which consists in relieving the misery and defects of the needy ought to be pure act, not a certain potentiality, or lack; otherwise it will not be able to reduce need to act; and in this sense it resplends in God, who is pure infinite act, who can fill all defects and potentialities.
Secundo possunt considerari, non ut habitus sunt, sed abstractissima ratione, quatenus misericordia est sublevativa miseriae: Charitas autem est facultas diligendi Deum; et hoc modo intelligi D. Thomam, aiunt Caietanus, et Bannes, Misericordiam quidem, sua abstractissima perfectione esse meliorem Charitate: Nam id, quod consistit in sublevando alienam egentium miseriam, et defectus, debet esse actus purus, non potentialitate quadam, seu carentia; alioqui non poterit ad actum reducere egentiam; et hoc sensu resplendet in Deo, qui est actus purus infinitus, qui potest omnes defectus, et potentialitates replere.
As to D. Bonav., I judge that he spoke in both senses. In the former indeed, because he compares the habit of Charity, and others, with the habit of mercy in general, as is evident from the examples alleged above. But in this latter sense; because he brings some examples of the mercy of God from the Scriptures indicating it, as we have seen. Therefore in both ways mercy, considered in itself, seems more perfect.
Quoad D. Bonav. arbitror, eum locutum utroque sensu. In priori quidem, quia comparat habitum Charitatis, et alios, cum habitu misericordiae in genere, ut constat allatis supra exemplis. In hoc vero posteriori sensu; quia aliqua affert exempla misericordiae Dei e Scripturis, id indicantia, ut vidimus. Itaque utroque modo perfectior misericordia in se considerata videtur.
Truly, however, if both are considered in order to the subject, Charity is better in him who is not the highest, inasmuch as the highest perfection stands in union with the highest good; but if it is the highest good, then the greatest perfection is to diffuse goodness to all inferiors. See the Saintly Doctor, also giving the motives by which we are moved to mercy, loco cit. The first motive is to consider the miserable to be of our nature. Whence Matth. 23.: For all you are brethren, and Isa. 58.: When you shall see one naked, cover him, and despise not your own flesh. The second motive of mercy is one's own need and misery; for man, considering his own misery, compassionates that of another, whence Ecclesiasticus 31.: Learn from yourself what things are for your neighbour.
Enim vero, si considerentur ambae in ordine ad subiectum; melior est Charitas in eo, qui non est supremus, quatenus summa perfectio stat in unione cum summo bono; quod si sit summum bonum; tunc maxima perfectio est diffundere bonitatem ad omnes inferiores. Vide S. Doctorem, ponentem etiam motiva, quibus commoveamur ad misericordiam loco cit. Dices. Primum motivum est considerare miseros esse nostrae naturae. Unde Matth. 23. Omnes enim vos fratres estis, et Isa. 58. Cum videris nudum, operi eum, et carnem tuam ne despexeris. Secundum motivum misericordiae est propria indigentia et miseria; homo enim considerans propriam miseriam, compatitur alienae, unde Ecclesiastici 31. Ex te ipso intellige, quae sunt proximi tui.
The third motive is the unity of Christ and his members, and the love in it, that he reckon as done to himself, or poured out for them, what is done, Matth. 25.: What you have done to one of the least of mine, etc. At the end he enumerates the fourteen works of mercy. See him there, uttering wondrous things.
Tertium motivum est Christi, et membrorum eius unitas, et in ea amor, ut sibi reputet factum, quod pro eis fit, seu profunditur, Matth. 25. Quod uni ex minimis meis fecistis, etc. In calce vero recenset opera quatuordecim misericordiae. Ipsum vide mira promentem.