Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question I: What mercy is
Mercy is defined by D. Bonaventure, 3. part. Centil. sect. 44.: Mercy is the virtue by which the innermost heart is moved over the calamity of the afflicted. This virtue thinks nothing human foreign to itself; it reckons the losses, or the goods, of others as its own.
Quid sit MISERICORDIA.
Misericordia definitur a D. Bonavent. 3. part. Centil. sect. 44. Misericordia est virtus, per quam intimis super calamitate afflictorum moveris. Haec virtus nihil humanum a se alienum putat; aliorum damna, vel commoda, sua aestimat.
It is drawn out from D. Augustine, 19. de civit. cap. 5., where he defines, or describes, it thus: Mercy is compassion for another's misery in our heart, whereby, if we can bring help, we are compelled.
Eruitur ex D. Augustino 19. de civit. cap. 5. ubi sic eam definit, seu describit: Misericordia est alienae miseriae in nostro corde compassio, qua utique, si possumus subvenire, compellimur.
Valentia thus describes Mercy from D. Thom. art. 1., D. Augustine in the place cited, and Aristotle 2. Rhet. cap. 8.: Mercy is pain, or sorrow, over an involuntary evil of another, reckoned as one's own, and in some way against the dignity of the miserable person, whom the one merciful wills to relieve, as far as lies in him, and as he conveniently can.
Valentia sic ex D. Thom. art. 1. D. Augustino loco cit. et Aristotele 2. Reth. cap. 8. Misericordiam describit: Misericordia est dolor, sive tristitia de malo alieno involuntario, aestimato ut proprio, et aliquo modo contra personae miserabilis dignitatem, cui subvenire velit miserans, quantum in ipso est, et commode possit.
It is called a Virtue by D. Bonaventure; for it is a virtue distinct from Charity, as the Apostle teaches, Coloss. 3., where he first teaches: Put on the bowels of Mercy, benignity, humility, modesty, patience; but soon after says: Above all these things, have Charity.
Dicitur a D. Bonavent. Virtus; est enim distincta virtus a Charitate, ut docet Apostolus Coloss. 3. ubi primo docet: Induite viscera Misericordiae, benignitatem, humilitatem, modestiam, patientiam; mox vero ait: Super omnia autem haec, Charitatem habete.
It is proved, because it has a peculiar object, namely the evil of another, and the calamities of the afflicted, as able to be relieved by our works. But this is the reason of a peculiar object, and it begets a peculiar difficulty in the act of mercy in efficacious execution. For indeed, in efficaciously relieving another's misery, there remains a principal difficulty even in one having Charity.
Probatur, quia habet peculiare obiectum, idest malum alienum, et calamitates afflictorum, ut sublevabiles opera nostra. Haec autem est ratio peculiaris obiecti, et in executione efficaci peculiarem difficultatem parit in actu misericordiae. Profecto enim in sublevanda efficaciter aliena miseria, manet difficultas praecipua, etiam habenti Charitatem.
Observe, however, that in the description of the last-mentioned mercy it is placed that it is sorrow over another's misery; for, as Damascenus teaches, 2. de fide, cap. 14., Mercy is a certain species of pain, or sorrow, over the evil of one's neighbour indeed, but reckoned as one's own.
Observa vero, in descriptione ultimae misericordiae, poni, quod sit tristitia de aliena miseria; nam, ut docet Damascenus 2. de fide, cap. 14. Misericordia est quaedam species doloris, seu tristitia de malo proximi sane, sed aestimato ut proprio.
It is said to be over an involuntary evil; for misery consists in suffering involuntarily; just as Beatitude, to which misery is opposed, consists in this, that one have those goods which he wills, according to that word of Augustine, Lib. 13. de civit. cap. 4.: Blessed is he who has whatever he wills, and wills no evil. Yet that misery need not be altogether involuntary; for we can have mercy on a sinner, as D. Thomas teaches, art. 1. ad 1., from the opinion of D. Gregory, homil. 34. in Evangelia.
Dicitur de malo involuntario; nam miseria stat in patiendo involuntarie; sicut Beatitudo, cui miseria opponitur, consistit in hoc, ut quis habeat ea bona, quae vult, iuxta illud Augustini, Lib. 13. de civit. cap. 4. Beatus est, qui habet, quidquid vult, et nihil mali vult. Neque tamen oportet, miseriam illam esse omnino involuntariam; possumus enim misereri peccatoris, ut docet D. Thomas art. 1. ad 1. ex D. Gregorii sententia, homil. 34. in Evangelia.
Then it is said to be over the evil of another reckoned as one's own. For sorrow and pain are over one's own evil: whence the motive of mercy must touch one in some way regarding oneself, as D. Thom. teaches, art. 2. Whence, when the Saintly Doctor, in the explanation of the terms of Theology, near the end, describes mercy: Mercy is compassion for the misery and need of one's neighbour; he does not intend to hand down a definition, but to explain the term; otherwise he would have added: for the miseries of one's neighbour, as one's own.
Deinde dicitur de malo alieno aestimato proprio. Tristitia enim, et dolor sunt de malo proprio: Unde motivum misericordiae debet aliquo modo respicientem tangere, ut docet D. Thom. art. 2. Unde quando S. Doctor in explicatione terminorum Theologiae, circa finem describit misericordiam: Misericordia est compassio miseriae, et indigentiae proximi; non intendit tradere definitionem, sed terminum explicare; alioqui addidisset: Miseriae proximi, tanquam propriae.