Morality in Marriage

75. Means of avoiding onanism. a. The crime of onanism today spreads widely and is propagated more widely day by day especially for this reason, that spouses wish to enjoy the pleasure of marriage without undergoing the burden of nourishing numerous offspring. For avoiding onanism, wives especially must be admonished to induce husbands by blandishments, prayers, and exhortations either to complete the act rightly or to abstinence.

Motives by which spouses can be deterred from the crime of onanism: a. onanism is a cause of adulteries: for since spouses, especially women, are not satiated by imperfect acts of this kind, they seek illicit pleasures; b. it destroys conjugal peace and concord; c. it causes the joys of father and mother to withdraw from families, into whose place succeed remorse of conscience and fears lest God punish so horrible a crime and snatch away from the living the only offspring; d. onanism is the cause on account of which a family in which only one or another offspring is procreated soon perishes; e. finally, it brings pains of body and manifold detriment of health, especially in women.¹

b. Since no licit means of impeding generation exists, the confessor can advise spouses who wish to prevent further generation of offspring, cautiously and prudently however, that at the time at which conception more easily occurs, namely three or four days before and fifteen days after menstruation has begun, they should contain themselves, but at another time, at which conception rarely occurs, they may use marriage.

c. That this mode of acting is licit is clear not only from the nature of the matter, since nothing is done which is against the end of marriage, but is also established from the declaration of the Holy See.² But the reason on account of which this practice should be suggested only cautiously and prudently is twofold: both because it can give spouses an occasion at any time either of denying the debt or of committing onanism, and because this means is not certain: for experience establishes that conception sometimes has place even at this time.³

¹ Eschbach, p. 569 ff.; Stohr, Handbuch der Pastoralmedizin (Freiburg: Herder, 1900), p. 497 ff.

² The Sacred Penitentiary, 16 June 1880, responded: spouses using marriage in the aforesaid way are not to be disturbed, and the confessor can suggest, cautiously however, the opinion in question to those spouses whom he has tried in vain to lead away from the detestable crime of onanism by another reason.

³ Cf. Olfers, Pastoralmedizin^2, p. 70 f.; Capellmann, Die fakultative Sterilitat (Aachen: Barth, 1889).

285. State of the question. 1. The theories set forth above concerning the man as head of the family, to whom woman ought to be subject, are vehemently opposed by all who contend that women are to be made equal to men, so that men and women enjoy the same rights and are held in the same place. Since a threefold order is distinguished, in which rights equal with men can be attributed to women, the domestic order, the social or economic order, and the political order, equality between man and woman can be more or less perfect, according as it is extended to all the orders, or to only one or another.

2. Since now equality does not flourish between man and woman, but in domestic society woman is subject to man, while in other orders of life she is of an inferior condition, the effort of introducing equality is called the emancipation of women. This is more or less perfect, according as only political and economic emancipation is intended, or also domestic emancipation.

3. Diverse in this question are the studies and opinions of authors. Some demand perfect equality of man and woman in domestic, economic, and political life, so that woman not only may acquire the right of suffrage, but also be admitted to managing public offices, can exercise the same arts and businesses which are exercised by men, and finally at home not be subject to the man: radical emancipation. Others chiefly demand equality of women in the political and economic order. Others finally restrict the equality of women to the economic and social order: moderate emancipation. All likewise demand another and more perfect education and instruction of women. From moderate emancipation of women, especially in the economic and social order, after considering the circumstances of our time, not even theologians shrink away.

¹ Rosler, Die Frauenfrage^2 (Freiburg: Herder, 1907); Cathrein, Die Frauenfrage (Freiburg: Herder, 1901); Mausbach, Die Stellung der Frau im Menschheitsleben (M. Gladbach: Zentralstelle, 1906); Gnauck-Kuhne, Die deutsche Frau um die Jahrhundertwende (Berlin: Liebmann, 1907); Gnauck-Kuhne, Die soziale Lage der Frau (Berlin: Liebmann, 1895); Molsberger, Ratschlage zur Berufsfrage der Frau (Koln: Bachem); Bebel, Die Frau und der Sozialismus^43 (Stuttgart: Dietz).

286. Principles to be held in this question are these:

a. Each, man and woman, possesses the same nature and the same personality, equally perfect as to substantial things, that is, human person. To each belongs the same destination to grace and glory, as child of God, heir of eternal life; each can and must work his or her salvation and attain Christian perfection independently of the other; and therefore from this side the duties and rights of each are the same: for in Christ there is neither male nor female.¹

b. But human nature and person, which is substantially the same, is expressed, developed, and operates in another and diverse mode in man and in woman: for the differences between feminine and masculine nature, as it exists in the concrete, are great and manifest both as to body and as to soul; and as to soul, both in the intellectual order and in the moral order.

The properties of nature diverse on each side show that the man is destined by nature to command and rule, but the woman, on the contrary, to be subject, to help the man and to be governed by him. Therefore nature confirms the condition of woman set forth above (n. 284), and the history of all times and of all peoples also confirms it.

c. In the social and political order, woman is to be excluded from those arts and businesses for which, considering her nature, she is less fit than man and which she cannot exercise without detriment to her natural destination, that is, to the office of mother of the family. But nothing prevents her from being admitted to arts and businesses for which either she is equally fit or more fit than man and which she can undertake without loss to the office of mother of the family.

¹ Gal. 3:28.

I. Moderns distinguish a threefold emancipation of women: physiological, economic, and social: physiological, insofar as women wish, by their own free will, to be freed or to be free from the burdens of a wife, whether conjugal or maternal; economic, by which women wish, even without the husband knowing and with him objecting, to be freely able to have, conduct, and administer their own affairs for themselves, with children, husband, and the whole family set aside; social, insofar as they remove domestic cares, whether of children or of the family, from the wife, so that, with these neglected, she may be able to indulge her own talent and be devoted to affairs and offices, even public ones.¹

II. The threefold emancipation set forth is altogether to be rejected. And indeed the physiological is manifestly a wicked deed, because it entirely neglects the rights and burdens intrinsically joined to marriage. The economic is opposed to the subjection owed to the husband. As to the social, however, we note these things.

1. Social emancipation is not true emancipation of woman, that is, it by no means procures for woman that liberty which is owed to the office of a Christian woman and wife; rather, it is a denial of the feminine character, a corruption of maternal dignity, and a perversion of the whole family. It is said:

a) A corruption of the feminine character; for that equality of rights which is so greatly exaggerated and claimed must indeed be acknowledged in those things which are proper to the human person and dignity, and which follow the nuptial compact and are inherent in marriage; in these indeed each spouse enjoys altogether the same right and is held by the same debt; but in other matters, the natural character of the female sex itself, both lesser aptitude for public affairs and offices, and the natural disposition suggest a certain inequality.

b) A corruption of maternal dignity; since through the said emancipation woman descends from that royal seat to which she was raised within the domestic walls through the Gospel, and in a short time will be reduced to the old servitude (if not in appearance, yet in very truth), and it will come about that, as among the pagans, she will be a mere instrument of man.

c) A perversion of the whole family, because through that emancipation the husband is deprived of a wife, the offspring of a mother, the house and the whole family of an ever-watchful guardian.²

2. "Yet if anywhere the social and economic conditions of the married woman, on account of changed modes and usages of human intercourse, must in some way be changed, it belongs to public authority to adapt the civil rights of the wife to the necessities and needs of this time, with account indeed taken of those things which the diverse natural character of the female sex, honorable morals, and the common good of the family require, provided also that the essential order of domestic society remain unharmed, which has been founded by an authority and wisdom higher than human, that is, divine, and cannot be changed either by public laws or by private good pleasure" (cited encyclical).

¹ Encyclical of Pius XI Casti connubii, December 31, 1930.

² Cf. cited encyclical.

IX. Doubts and Responses.

1. Spouses lawfully abstain from intercourse at the time when fecundation is judged easier, and perform it at another time.¹ Now conception is less probable: according to some, from the fifteenth day after menstruation has begun until a few days (three or four) before it; according to others, only during the time which immediately follows the cessation of the menses, while the week preceding the menses would be more favorable to fecundation; according to others, during the week which follows and the week which precedes the menses. And so this matter is so uncertain that it has scarcely any practical value.²

2. The wife does not sin by rising or urinating immediately after intercourse, because, once intercourse has ended, the vaginal walls immediately adhere to one another, so that the semen is not expelled. She would sin, however, if she acted in this way with the intention that the semen be expelled (St. Alphonsus VI, 954).

3. Spouses who in the act of intercourse restrain semination do not sin, provided that each consents and neither is exposed to danger of pollution. The reason is that that penetration of the female vessel is then reputed an incomplete mutual act, or even an essential part of perfect intercourse; married persons have a right to these things. I said provided that each consents, because each has a right to the semination of the partner. I said provided that neither is exposed to danger of pollution. But since that danger is easily present, in practice this cannot be permitted except to those who know by experience that the danger of pollution is absent (St. Alphonsus VI, 918; n. 101).

4. The husband sins gravely who without a just cause restrains semination after the wife has seminated or is prepared to seminate. The reason is "because then he himself is the cause that the semen of the wife is wasted" (St. Alphonsus VI, 918), that is, deprived of its end. The wife, however, who does not consent to the husband's manner of acting, can seminate, since from begun intercourse, that is, from penetration of the vagina, she seems to receive a right to semination. - A wife who restrains semination after the husband has seminated does not sin gravely, except in the case in which the husband does not consent. For since the semination of the wife is not necessary for generation, she, by restraining semination, is not the cause that the husband's semen is wasted, that is, deprived of its end.

5. The wife can excite herself to semination immediately after intercourse rightly had, because in this case the wife's semination, which is the complement of intercourse, is sufficiently united with the act of the husband (St. Alphonsus VI, 919). The same, for the same reason, must be said about the wife's semination immediately before intercourse.

¹ Sacred Penitentiary, June 16, 1880.

² Cf. Capellmann-Bergmann, Pastoralmedizin, p. 289 sq.; Antonelli, Medicina pastoralis, I, n. 114.

The Morality of Venereal Acts of Marriage.—(a) Non-consummated Acts.—These acts, whether internal or external, are lawful per se when they are used only as accessories to the act of marriage or as means to foster or preserve conjugal love, for the acts are meant by God to serve the purposes mentioned (2510). But per accidens there may be venial sin, on account of inordinateness in the motive (i.e., when only pleasure is intended), or in the manner (i.e., when due decency is not observed). There is mortal sin when these acts are not referred to the lawful conjugal act, but either directly or indirectly to pollution, namely, when there is foreseen proximate danger of pollution and the acts are either solitary or cooperative but performed without sufficient reason (such as expressions of special affection), for pollution is gravely sinful in the married, as well as in the single state (see 2539 sqq.).

(b) Natural Consummated Act.—This act in itself is not only lawful, but meritorious, because it exercises such virtues as obedience (Gen., i. 28), justice (I Cor., vii. 3 sqq.), and love of the common good and religion (Tob., viii. 9). Since marriage intercourse has for its ends not only reproduction, but also the expression of mutual love and the allaying of concupiscence, it is lawful even when conception is impossible or less probable, as when the parties are sterile, or the woman is pregnant, or during the so-called agenesic period, or at the time of lactation. It is a venial sin to exercise the conjugal act when one excludes every motive except that of pleasure (Denziger, n. 1159); and there may be even mortal sin on account of circumstances, such as place (e.g., scandal to others present), manner (e.g., external immoderation, internal desire of another person), evil consequences (e.g., when one of the parties has a contagious or veneral disease, when abortion will likely result, etc.).

(c) Unnatural Consummated Acts.—Pollution is mortally sinful (2535 sqq.), and is worse in married than in single persons, as being an injury to the faith pledged in marriage; and hence it is not lawful to practise it even for the purpose of artificial fecundation. Rectal copulation is also gravely sinful, being unnatural lust (see 2534) and a violation of conjugal faith. The usual forms of unnatural vaginal coition, which are very much practised today, are contraceptive in purpose, and are of two general kinds in the procedure—the physiological or preventive, which uses instruments to keep the semen from the uterus (such as sponges or pessaries for the female, condoms or protectors for the male), or which employs douches or syringes to remove semen from the vagina, or uses chemicals to devitalize it.

Nota.—(a) Non habetur onanismus, nec peccatum, si copula abrumpitur, ex necessitate (v.g., ad vitandum scandalum persona inopinate supervenientis), vel ex utilitate, mutuo dato consensu et periculo pollutionis excluso; nam seminatio extra vas, aut involuntaria est, aut nulla.

(b) Non habetur contraceptio nec peccatum, sed potius actus honestus, si, ob defectum physicum viri vel mulieris, naturae adjuvetur mediis artificialibus ut copula fiat, vel ut semen introducatur in uterum; nam fini matrimonii non obstat, sed obsecundat iste modus agendi.

(c) Artificial Insemination. The subject-matter of the latter part of the preceding paragraph is distinguished from several unlawful practices considered by moralists under the heading of artificial insemination. Pope Pius XII on several occasions has given a clear, accurate and complete statement of Catholic teaching on the subject. We append here his texts:

1. The practice of artificial insemination, when it refers to man, cannot be considered, either exclusively or principally, from the biological and medical point of view, ignoring the moral and legal one.

Artificial insemination, outside of marriage, must be condemned as essentially and strictly immoral.

Natural law and divine positive law establish, in fact, that the procreation of a new life cannot but be the fruit of marriage. Only marriage safeguards the dignity of the spouses (principally of the wife in the present case) and their personal good. It alone provides for the well-being and education of the child.

It follows that no divergence of opinion among Catholics is admitted on the condemnation of artificial insemination outside of marriage. The child conceived in those conditions would be, by that very fact, illegitimate.

Artificial insemination produced in a marriage by the active element of a third party is equally immoral and consequently to be condemned without appeal.

Only the spouses have a reciprocal right upon each other’s body to generate a new life: an exclusive, inalienable right, which cannot be ceded. And so it must be, even out of consideration for the child. On whoever gives life to a small being, nature imposes, by the very strength of that tie, the duty to keep and educate it. But no ties of origin, no moral or legal bonds of conjugal procreation, exist between the legitimate husband and the child who is the fruit of the active element of a third party (even if the husband has given his consent).

As far as the legitimacy of artificial insemination in marriage is concerned, it suffices, for the moment, to recall these principles of natural law: the simple fact that the result desired is obtained by this means does not justify the use of the means itself; nor does the desire of the husband and wife, in itself perfectly legitimate, to have a child, suffice to establish the legitimacy of resorting to the artificial insemination which would satisfy this desire.

It would be erroneous, therefore, to think that the possibility of resorting to this means might render valid a marriage between persons unable to contract it because of the impedimentum impotentiae.

On the other hand, it is superfluous to mention that the active element can never be obtained legitimately by means of acts against nature.

Although new methods cannot be ruled out a priori for the sole reason of their novelty, nonetheless, as far as artificial impregnation is concerned, extreme caution is not enough; it must be absolutely excluded. Saying this does not necessarily proscribe the use of certain artificial means destined only to facilitate the natural act, or to assure the accomplishment of the end of the natural act regularly performed.

Let it never be forgotten that only the procreation of a new life according to the will and the designs of the Creator brings with it, to a marvelous degree of perfection, the accomplishment of the proposed ends. It is at the same time in conformity with corporeal and spiritual nature and the dignity of the married couple, as well as with the healthy, normal development of the child (Address to Physicians, Sept. 29, 1949, Discorsi e Radiomessaggi, vol. xi, pp. 221 ff).

2. We also believe that it is of capital importance for you, gentlemen, not to neglect this perspective when you consider the methods of artificial fecundation. The means by which one tends toward the production of a new life take on an essential human significance inseparable from the desired end and susceptible of causing grave harm to this very end if these means are not conformable to reality and to the laws inscribed in the nature of beings.

We have been asked to give some directives on this point also. On the subject of the experiments in artificial human fecundation “in vitro,” let it suffice for Us to observe that they must be rejected as immoral and absolutely illicit. With regard to the various moral problems which are posed by artificial fecundation, in the ordinary meaning of the expression, or “artificial insemination,” We have already expressed Our thought in a discourse addressed to physicians on September 29, 1949 (Discorsi e Radiomessaggi, vol. xi. pp. 221 ff.). For the details We refer you to what We said then and We confine Ourself here to repeating the concluding judgment given there: “With regard to artificial fecundation, not only is there reason to be extremely reserved, but it must be absolutely rejected. In speaking thus, one is not necessarily forbidding the use of certain artificial means destined solely to facilitate the natural act or to achieve the attainment of the natural act normally performed.” But since artificial fecundation is being more and more widely used, and in order to correct some erroneous opinions which are being spread concerning what We have taught, We have the following to add:

Artificial fecundation exceeds the limits of the right which spouses have acquired by the matrimonial contract, namely, that of fully exercising their natural sexual capacity in the natural accomplishment of the marital act. The contract in question does not confer on them a right to artificial fecundation, for such a right is not in any way expressed in the right to the natural conjugal act and cannot be deduced from it. Still less can one derive it from the right to the “child,” the primary “end” of marriage. The matrimonial contract does not give this right, because it has for its object not the “child,” but the “natural acts” which are capable of engendering a new life and are destined to this end. It must likewise be said that artificial fecundation violates the natural law and is contrary to justice and morality [1] (Marriage and Parenthood, May 19, 1956). See The Pope Speaks, Vol, III, No. 2, Autumn of 1956, pp. 194 ff.

[1] The Holy Father here spoke for several minutes in Latin as follows:

Alia nunc occurrit quaestio, ad quam pertractandam magis addecet latinam linguam adhibere.

Quemadmodum rationalis animus noster artificiali inseminationi adversatur, ita eadem ethica ratio, a qua agendi normo sumenda est, pariter vetat, quominus humanum semen, peritorum examini subiciendum, masturbatiouis ope procuretur.

Hanc agendi rationem attigimus Nostra quoque allocutione coram Urologiae doctoribus coetum participantibus, die VIII mensis Octobris anno MDCCCCLIII prolata, in qua haec habuimus, verba: “Du reste le St-Office a decide deja le 2 aout 1929 (Acta Ap. Sedis, vol. XXI a. 1929, p. 490, II) qu’une “‘masturbatio directe procurata ut obtineatur sperma’ n’est pas licite, ceci quel que soit le but de l’examen” (Discorsi e Radiomessaggi vol. XV, pag. 378). Cum vero Nobis allatum sit, pravam huiusmodi consuetudinem pluribus in locis invalescere, opportunum ducimus nunc etiam, quae tunc monuimus, commemorare atque iterum inculcare.

Si actus huiusmodi ad explendam libidinem ponantur, eos vel ipse naturalis hominis sensus sua sponte respuit, ac multo magis mentis iudicium, quotiescumque rem mature recteque considerat. Iidem actus tamen tunc quoque respuendi sunt, cum graves rationes eos a culpa eximere videntur, uti sunt: remedia iis praestanda qui nimia nervorum intentione vel abnormibus animi spasmis laborant; medicis peragenda, ope microscopii, spermatis inspectio, quod venerei vel alius generis morbi bacteriis infectum sit; diversarum partium examen, ex quibus semen ordinarie constat, ut vitalium spermatis elementorum praesentia, numerus, quantitus, forma, vis, habitus aliaque id genus dignoscuntur.

Eiusmodi procuratio humani seminis, per masturbationem effecta, ad nihil aliud directe spectat, nisi ad naturalem in homine generandi facultatem plene exercendam; quod quidem plenum exercitium, extra conjugalem copulam peractum, secum fert directum et indebite usurpatum eiusdem facultatis usum. In hoc eiusmodi indebito facultatis usu proprie sita est intrinseca regulae morum violatio. Haudquaquam enim homo ius ullum exercendi facultatem sexualem iam inde habet, quod facultatem eandem a natura recepit. Homini nempe (secus ac in ceteris animantibus rationis expertibus contingit) ius et potestas utendi atque exercendi eandem facultatem tantummodo in nuptiis valide initis tribuitut, atque in iure matrimoniali continetur, quod ipsis nuptiis traditur et acceptatur. Inde elucet hominem, ob solam hanc causam quod facultatem sexualem a natura recepit, non habere nisi potentiam et ius ad matrimonium ineundum. Hoc ius tamen, ad objectum et ambitum quod attinet, naturae lege, non hominum voluntate discribitur; vi huius legis naturae, homini non competit ius et potestas ad plenum facultatis sexualis exercitium, directe intentum, nisi cum coniugalem copulam exercet ad normam a natura ipsa imperatam atque definitam. Extra hunc naturalem actum, ne in ipso quidem matrimonio ius datur ad sexuali hac facultate plene fruendum. Hi sunt limites, quibus ius, de quo diximus, eiusque exercitium a natura circumscribuntur. Ex eo quod plenum sexualis facultatis exercitium hoc absolute copulae coniugalis limite circumscribitur, eadem facultas intrinsece apta efficitur ad plenum matrimonii naturalem finem assequendum (qui non modo est generatio, sed etiam prolis educatio), atque eius exercitum cum dicto fine colligatur. Quae cum ita sint, masturbatio omnino est extra memoratam pleni facultatis sexualis exercitii naturalem habilitatem, ideoque etiam extra eius colligationem cum fine a natura ordinato; quamobrem eadem omni iuris titulo caret atque naturae et ethices legibus contraria est, etiamsi inservire intendat utilitati per se iustae nec improbandae.

Quae hactenus dicta sunt de intrinseca malitia cuiuslibet pleni usus potentiae generandi extra naturalem coniugalem copulam, valent eodem modo cum agitur de matrimonio iunctis vel de matrimonio solutis, sive plenum exercitium apparatus genitalis fit a viro sive a muliere, sive ab utraque parte simul agente; sive fit tactibus manualibus sive coniugalis copulae interruptione; haec enim semper est actus naturae contrarius atque intrinsece malus.

907. Principles. - I. The conjugal act between legitimate spouses is of itself honorable and licit; for it is a means established and ordained by the Author of nature himself for the legitimate propagation of the human race.

II. The ends which render an act of this kind honorable are: 1. the generation of offspring, which is numbered among the principal ends of marriage; 2. the satisfaction of the obligation toward the other spouse; 3. the calming of concupiscence, and consequently the avoidance of incontinence both in oneself and in the other spouse; 4. the desire of fostering or conciliating honorable love, of manifesting or promoting conjugal affection, etc. - Thus commonly with St. Ligorius, no. 881 and following, Sanchez, and others against some who do not admit the last two ends.

908. Resolutions. - 1. The use of marriage is illicit if it is made for pleasure alone, that is, by expressly excluding the other ends ¹. This is apparent from proposition 9 condemned by Innocent XI, which reads thus: The act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from all fault and venial defect. Nevertheless, of itself it would be only a venial sin, just as it is venial to take food for delight alone. But the use of marriage is free from this fault if it is a remedy for concupiscence; for its satisfaction is licit as a remedy for concupiscence, whether this is intended expressly or implicitly ². - St. Ligorius, no. 912.

¹ See the fuller explanation of this doctrine in the Note to no. 28, vol. I, which certainly must be kept diligently before the eyes, lest anyone importunately harass both himself and others with empty anxieties concerning the use of pleasures.

² By these words the Author wished to signify that even this slight disorder or fault of one acting for pleasure alone is scarcely ever actually present. And the reason is plain: because the disorder does not reside in desiring pleasure. For, as St. Thomas says (Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 26, no. 6), The pleasure which follows good and desirable operations is good and desirable; and this (as the Angelic Doctor adds, ibid., no. 7) accords with the order of nature.... For we see that nature has joined pleasure to those operations of animals which are manifestly ordained to necessary ends.... For unless pleasure were present, animals would abstain from the aforesaid necessary acts. Therefore the disorder of one acting for pleasure alone will be present when he so rests, as it were, in the pleasure that he positively excludes every other end. I said that he positively excludes it; for the common and certain doctrine concerning every action teaches (see the things which we adduced from St. Thomas, vol. I, nos. 31, 32) that, for an act to be good, it is sufficient that either the further ends or those intrinsic to the work not be excluded, although the agent otherwise bears himself negatively with respect to them; that is, he does not think of them at all while acting, but apprehends the act only under a certain general concept as licit for himself and therefore honorable. The same must also be said concerning the conjugal act, namely, that for its honorableness it is sufficient that the ends intrinsic to this work, which the Author also enumerates in the preceding number, not be positively excluded, while the agent apprehends the work as licit for himself, or (which is the same) as not illicit, although he thinks nothing of those ends while acting.

It can scarcely happen, moreover, that the ends intrinsic to the conjugal work are altogether positively excluded. And this indeed the Author wished to intimate when he introduces the use of marriage as a remedy for concupiscence.

And indeed the Apostle is the authority that this end also, and indeed as an intrinsic one, is present in marriage, so that it may be a remedy for concupiscence, when he says (1 Cor. 7:2): But because of fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband. And again (ibid., verse 5): Do not defraud one another, unless perhaps by consent for a time ... and return again to the same, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence. And again (ibid., verse 9): But if they do not contain themselves, let them marry; for it is better to marry than to burn.

Indeed, Chrysostom, explaining these words of the Apostle, contends that this end is the principal one in the present age. For thus he says (On Virginity, chapter 19): When marriage was delivered for the sake of procreating children, then MUCH MORE was it delivered for extinguishing the heat of nature. And Paul testifies to this, saying: But because of fornication, let each have his own wife, not because of the procreation of children. For there he commands them to come together, not that they may be parents of many children; but why? Lest Satan tempt you, he says. And proceeding he did not say: If they desire children; but what? Let those who do not contain themselves contract marriage. For in the beginning, as I said, it had this twofold occasion; but afterward, with land and sea and the world filled, only one pretext remains, the abolition of wickedness and lust. And again (Homily: What Sort of Wives Are to Be Taken, section 5): Before all else learn what the cause of marriage was and why it was introduced into common life, and seek nothing further. What, therefore, is the cause of marriage, and why was it given by God? Hear Paul saying: But to avoid fornications, let each have his own wife. He did not say, so that poverty may be avoided and riches acquired; but what? That we may avoid fornication, that we may moderate concupiscence, that we may live soberly, that we may please God, content with our own wife. Marriage brings us this; this is its fruit; this is the gain from it.... This, then, must be regarded in marriage

especially: that we may flee sin and be free from fornications. Marriages are to be sought in this, that they may help us to lead life chastely.

Moreover, it will appear superfluous to explain in what manner marriage contributes to the aforesaid end, or by what reason it extinguishes the heat of nature, wards off the temptations of Satan, is the abolition of wickedness and lust, and conduces to moderating concupiscence and leading a sober and chaste life. Nevertheless, it will be useful to hear this from St. Thomas, who, upon the cited text of the Apostle (Lecture 1 on chapter 7 of the First Epistle to the Corinthians), has these things among others: The Apostle, considering the human race now multiplied ..., set aside that necessity for which marriage had been instituted as an office of nature, and proposed the second necessity, according to which it was instituted as a remedy for fault. For because carnal concupiscence still remains in the faithful after baptism ..., it especially incites men to venereal acts because of the vehemence of pleasure. And because it belongs to greater virtue to overcome this concupiscence entirely than can be suitable for men ..., it is necessary that concupiscence be yielded to in part and overcome in part; and this is done when the act of generation is ordered by reason.... But according to the same Holy Doctor, the act of generation is ordered by reason through two things, namely (ibid.): 1. that man use the act of generation according as it is fitting for the generation ... of children; 2. that in the human species there not be wandering and uncertain couplings, such as fornicarious couplings are, but that determinate men be joined to determinate women; and this determination is made through the law of marriage.

Therefore, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, the remedy for concupiscence divinely prepared for man through the institution of marriage resides in this: that through acts suitable for generation in legitimate marriage, concupiscence itself is satisfied; namely, that one yields to and satisfies that appetite for venereal things which the apprehended vehemence of pleasure excites. And since this satisfaction of concupiscence constitutes an end intrinsic to the work, it is manifest that one who is moved by the apprehension of pleasure to conjugal acts, which he otherwise knows to be entirely licit for him as one joined in legitimate wedlock, is so far from excluding a due end that instead, while he wills to satisfy this appetite, he pursues and fulfills the very end for which marriage was instituted by God. Wherefore that proscribed proposition which the Author recalls certainly had to be condemned; but it assuredly also had to be condemned for this reason: that it absurdly presents the act of marriage as though it were an indifferent work undertaken for pleasure alone, when in it there ought rather to have been discerned, from Apostolic doctrine, the work of calming concupiscence through the licit and honorable satisfaction of the venereal appetite, in which the intrinsic end of the work itself consists.

(**) 1. On the occasion of this Note the VV. wrote thirty-six columns (pages 822-840), in which they take up for censure the things which have some connection with the argument of this Note, both in this Note itself and also in other places throughout the course of the whole Work. They so divide the matter into three parts that they discuss: 1. the act of marriage exercised for pleasure; 2. pleasurable acts in general; 3. the interpretation of Propositions 8 and 9 among those condemned by Innocent XI.

Moreover, it seemed good to begin from this last head, for thence a plainer way will be laid out for resolving the difficulties also concerning the two former heads.

2. The VV. therefore contend (pages 836-840) that the condemnation of that proposition IX - The act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from every fault and venial defect - is not avoided through its interpretation handed down both in this Note and in the Note to no. 28, vol. I, in which these things are contained: It is one thing to act FOR PLEASURE; it is another to act FOR PLEASURE ALONE. The latter positively excludes a further end of the work.... But the former involves no disorder of this kind.... From this the reason clearly discloses itself why propositions VIII and IX concerning the act of marriage or the act of eating for PLEASURE ALONE were rightly proscribed by Innocent XI. For they labor under an intrinsic defect on account of the predicate ALONE, which positively excludes all other ends to which actions of this kind are ordained. For the fact that someone otherwise is enticed and moved to a work by the appetite for pleasure, just as to labor by the hope of a prize or wage, is consonant with the order of nature, as St. Thomas holds.

3. Moreover, do not authors whom St. Alphonsus holds as approved stand as sureties for this doctrine, some of whom everyone sees indicated there?

Cardenas, for example, distinguishes in entirely the same manner between a work exercised for pleasure and one exercised for pleasure alone; and he affirms that the one is free from fault, the other not free from it. For concerning the former he thus holds (Dissertation 6, chapter 2, article 2) in the titles of sections 53, 54, and 55: It is not illicit to engage in conjugal intercourse for pleasure as a subordinate end. Pleasure has been ordained by nature for the easier generation of offspring. By the very fact that it is had for pleasure as a subordinate end, it is not had for pleasure alone. But concerning the latter he says thus under the title of section 63: He who uses conjugal intercourse for pleasure alone inverts the order of nature. I ask: does Cardenas not clearly distinguish between one and another manner of acting for pleasure? Why, therefore, do the VV. allege Cardenas against the Note and, in addition, transcribe from Cardenas a long catalogue of Authors who condemn as illicit acting for PLEASURE ALONE? Is not this very thing also condemned as illicit in the Note?

4. Diego Duarte, formerly a Penitentiary in the Lateran Basilica, holds no differently from Cardenas (Brief Exposition of the Condemned Propositions, etc., Rome, 1712, no. 162), saying: It is asked whether it is licit to engage in conjugal intercourse for pleasure alone? Reply. The opinion which denies that carnal intercourse had for PLEASURE ALONE is not free from every fault, even venial, was condemned by Innocent XI with proposition 9.... But if one engages in the said intercourse for pleasure as a subordinate end ..., no fault at all will intervene; for one who so acts follows the order of nature, which appointed pleasure in intercourse for rendering easier the generation of offspring and the preservation of the species.

5. Felix Potestas expresses the same thing more briefly thus (vol. 1, part 2, no. 2280): The act of marriage was instituted by nature for two ends: for the procreation of offspring ... and for the calming of lust; for which reason he who exercises the act of marriage for delight commits no sin if he orders it ... to the principal end. He sins venially, however, who exercises it for delight alone.

6. Nevertheless, the VV. contend that it is the same whether you say that an act was placed for pleasure, or that an act was placed for pleasure alone; for they say that the condemnation of the aforesaid proposition is avoided in neither case. For thus they say (page 837): For verifying the condemned proposition, it is not necessary that one who seeks pleasure positively exclude every other end; it suffices that he exclude it negatively. For whether the other ends are excluded positively or negatively, it is always true that such an operator

The principal circumstances regard the person, the manner or position, and the time. acts for pleasure alone, or has no other end except pleasure itself. Hence the genuine sense of condemned proposition IX is: The act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone (that is, referred to no other end than pleasure) is entirely free from every fault and venial defect.

7. Reply. Indeed, you would rightly say that these things fell from the pen of the VV. altogether less cautiously. What it means to bear oneself negatively with respect to certain ends of a work is explained quite plainly in the Note by the words immediately following: that is, he does not think of them at all while acting. Only those who have never touched the scholastic doctors are ignorant that this meaning is assigned to that mode of speaking in the schools. It must be supposed, say the Salmanticenses (treatise 9, chapter 3, no. 24), that one who seeks precisely some accidental end in marriage can bear himself in two ways: either by positively excluding the other substantial end ..., or by bearing himself negatively concerning the proper end of marriage, either because he does not attend to it, does not remember it, or does not care about it, BUT WITHOUT EXCLUDING IT.

So far is it from being the same (as the VV. contend) either positively to exclude or negatively to bear oneself toward the ends of marriage, that the same Salmanticenses condemn the former as a grave fault, but call the latter a good and meritorious act. For concerning the former they say (ibid., no. 25): If anyone were to contract marriage POSITIVELY EXCLUDING its proper and substantial end, he would not only sin mortally, but would enter no marriage. But concerning the latter (ibid., no. 30): If anyone intends precisely other ends extrinsic to marriage, without excluding its proper substantial end, and thus tacitly and implicitly retaining it, such as riches, honor, PLEASURE, beauty, etc., he would commit no sin, but in contracting marriage WOULD EXERCISE A GOOD AND MERITORIOUS ACT.

8. But it was said in addition that the VV. wrote altogether less cautiously that it is the same whether other ends are positively excluded or one bears oneself negatively toward them, that is, thinks nothing of them while acting. For from this general principle it immediately and directly follows that, in every act, that end toward which the agent bears himself negatively, that is, of which he does not think while acting, must now be held as positively excluded. Moreover, it immediately follows from this that every action which is not elicited from charity and actually referred through charity to God, who by right is the ultimate end of all actions, is vicious. This doctrine indeed presents the condemned Quesnellian and Baian dogma that whatever does not proceed from the fountain of charity is sin, and that even good works performed merely with a view to eternal reward must be numbered among sins.

The reason for this consequence is plainly apparent. For as St. Thomas holds (book 3 of the Sentences, distinction 27, question 1, article 4, question 3), charity is compared to the other virtues both as mover, as end, and as form. He explains thus why charity is called the mover of all the other virtues: That charity is the mover of the other virtues is apparent from this: that the good itself which is the object of charity under the aspect of an end is the end of the virtues. In all ordered powers or arts, it so happens that the art or power which concerns the end orders the acts of the others to its proper end. Hence charity also moves all the other virtues to its own end, and according to this it is said to command their acts. Then he speaks thus of charity insofar as it is an end: If, therefore, charity is the

A fourfold circumstance, or impediment attached to the person, can stand in the way of seeking the debt, namely: 1. a vow of chastity;

mover of the other virtues, it is likewise their end, because this is common to all virtues: that their acts are their proximate ends.... But the end of an inferior power or habit is ordered to the end of the superior one ...; hence the acts of all the other virtues are ordered to the act of charity as to an end; and for this reason charity is called the end of the precept.

And again (book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 38, question 1, article 1), where the Holy Doctor wishes to prove that both God and charity together are the end of all wills or virtues: As there is one end of all things, he says, namely God, so there is one ultimate end of all wills, namely God. Nevertheless, there are other proximate ends; and if according to those ends the due relation of the will to the ultimate end is preserved, the will will be right.... But the due relation of the will to the ultimate end is preserved according to that end by which the will is fitted to participate in the ultimate end ..., and this is charity ...; and therefore not only God but also charity is the end of all right wills.

With these things premised, suppose, please, that what the VV. assume is established: that the end toward which the agent bears himself negatively, that is, of which he thinks nothing while acting, must be judged positively excluded. Will not the ultimate end, namely God and charity, be held positively excluded if a man while acting does not think of God and charity? And consequently, will not all actions which are not elicited from charity and are not actually referred to God be so many sins?

9. But the doctrine of St. Thomas recedes very far from these absurdities, precisely because it is wholly removed from that incautious principle of the VV. For thus the Holy Doctor says (ibid., reply to objection 4): It must be said that, in order that the end of some action be God or charity, it is not necessary that someone, while performing that action, think of God or charity.

And elsewhere (I-II, question 1, article 6, reply to objection 3): It must be said that it is not necessary that someone always think of the ultimate end whenever he desires or performs something; but the force of the first intention, which regards the ultimate end, remains in every desire of any thing, even if the ultimate end is not actually thought of.

And again (On Evil, question 2, article 5, objection 10, which he concedes): It is established that he who has charity has ordered himself and all his things to God, to whom he adheres as the ultimate end. Therefore, whatever he orders either to himself or to any other thing of his, he acts meritoriously, even if he does not actually think of God, unless he is impeded through some disorder of the act which is not referable to God. But this cannot be without being at least a venial sin.

And again (On Evil, question 9, article 2): It sometimes happens that a man does not actually order an act to God, although that act of itself contains no disorder by reason of which it is not referable to God; and nevertheless, because the mind of man is habitually related to God as to an end, that act not only is not a sin, but is also a meritorious act.

10. Hence Valentia holds thus (I-II, disputation 8, question 6, point 3): It must be noted that it is not necessary that the works of the just, in order to be meritorious de condigno, be referred to God by an explicit act either present or elicited a little before; but a virtual relation is sufficient for this, consisting in the fact that the just man AT SOME TIME referred himself and all his things to God through an act of charity.

And Montesinos is witness that this is the common doctrine in the schools, who expressly writes (on I-II, question 1, article 4, question 1, no. 13): It is the common doctrine of Theologians ... that the act of any moral virtue tends to its proper object by reason of its proper honorableness; nevertheless, implicitly and by its nature, without anything else, it tends to God; NOR IS IT NECESSARY THAT IT BE EXPRESSLY ORDERED TO HIM.

Let us therefore conclude that the principle which the VV. assume is altogether false, namely, that the end toward which the agent bears himself negatively, that is, of which he does not think while acting, is positively excluded; indeed, a principle of this kind leads directly to erroneous doctrines condemned by the Church.

11. What can appear more wonderful, however, the VV. do not sufficiently notice: through that principle of theirs even the Holy Doctor Alphonsus is involved in exactly the same condemnation. For these are the words of the Holy Doctor (On Human Acts, no. 44): Although someone approaching the table does not think of the preservation of life, but ONLY of the pleasure of food, as Gonet says, he does not sin on that account; because he wills such pleasure, at least virtually, for the preservation of life, and thus does not desire it inordinately. Now it is manifest that one who approaches the table thinking merely of the pleasure to be taken from food, but nothing of the preservation of life, bears himself negatively with respect to this intrinsic end of food. But, say the VV. (above, no. 6), whether the other ends are excluded positively or negatively, it is always true that such an operator acts for pleasure alone. Therefore even St. Alphonsus (according to the principles and reasonings of the VV.) teaches that it is licit to eat for pleasure alone, and consequently professes the condemned doctrine that eating and drinking to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health; which is proposition VIII proscribed by Innocent XI!

And for confirming (if it please the Superiors) a condemnation of this kind of the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, there also concur the things which the VV. (page 837) adduce from Martinet (Moral Theology, book 5, article 8, section 6) in confirmation of their aforesaid principle. This, they say, the distinguished Martinet rightly expresses in these words: He who in intercourse, neither excluding nor intending the ends of marriage, seeks pleasure alone, assuredly acts inordinately and cannot be excused from venial fault, from the proposition condemned by Innocent XI: The act of marriage, etc. And indeed, one who in an action neither excludes its proper ends nor expressly intends them assuredly bears himself negatively toward those ends. But this is precisely what the words of St. Alphonsus present concerning one who, seeking pleasure alone from food, neither excludes the end of preserving life nor intends it, since he does not think of it; yet according to Martinet, he who so acts cannot be excused from fault by reason of the proposition condemned by Innocent XI. Therefore St. Alphonsus, who teaches that this man does not sin, falls into condemned doctrine!

12. But again it ought to appear no less wonderful that the VV., after accusing those same Notes, as we have seen, of a condemned dogma, then say that they do not stand far from St. Alphonsus. For thus they write (page 834): Insofar as Father B. says: "In order that someone may honorably take pleasure from play ..., it is by no means necessary that he think of the end of play, whether intrinsic or further," he would not stand far from St. Alphonsus if he were to add that some honorable end, at least virtually intended, is necessary. For the Holy Doctor says (On Human Acts, no. 44, at the end): For an actual relation of all words or works to an honorable good is not required, since this would be an unbearable burden and a matter entangled in six hundred scruples;

but a virtual relation suffices, as we have said. Hence, although someone approaching the table does not think of the preservation of life, etc. (as above, in the preceding number).

13. Reply. In order that one may properly recognize how great and of what kind the distance is between the meaning of that Note and St. Alphonsus in so grave a question, it is preferable to have before the eyes the complete context of the Note, which is as follows (Note to no. 28, vol. I): The negative exclusion of an end does not vitiate an act; for it is not necessary for the honorableness of an action to think of a further end or even of the end intrinsic to the work. Therefore, in order that someone may honorably take pleasure from play, food, or rest, it is by no means necessary that he think of the end of play, food, or rest, whether intrinsic or further; but it is sufficient that he apprehend the action as consonant with right reason, or even that he find nothing in it contrary to the order of reason.

And altogether consonant with these are the things which are read thus also in the Note at this place: The common and certain doctrine teaches (see the things which we adduced from St. Thomas, vol. I, nos. 31, 32) that for a good act it is sufficient that the ends, either further or intrinsic to the work, not be excluded, although the agent otherwise bears himself negatively toward them, that is, does not think of them at all while acting, but apprehends the act only under a certain general concept as licit for himself and therefore honorable.

Now let us inquire whether that which the VV. say is lacking is absent in these words, namely, an honorable end at least virtually intended. But he must be blind who does not see here an honorable end, or, as St. Alphonsus says, an honorable good, intended not merely virtually but altogether actually.

And indeed in the former text it is expressly required that the agent apprehend the action as consonant with right reason. But St. Thomas finds the character of the honorable good in this, that it is ordered by reason. Thus the Holy Doctor (I-II, question 39, article 2): Every honorable good proceeds from these two things, namely, from the rectitude of reason and of the will. And again (II-II, question 145, article 2, reply to objection 3): Something is called honorable ... insofar as it has a certain comeliness from the ordering of reason. But that which is ordered according to reason is naturally fitting for man, etc. And in another manner the same Holy Doctor (II-II, question 145, article 1): The honorable, properly speaking, is referred to the same thing as virtue. Moreover, concerning virtue he speaks thus (II-II, question 23, article 3): Human virtue, which is the principle of all the good acts of man, consists in attaining the rule of human acts.... Hence moral virtue is defined by this: that it is according to right reason. This he afterward repeats elsewhere (II-II, question 145, article 2), saying: This pertains to the character of the honorable, which we said to be the same as virtue, which moderates all human things according to reason. Therefore, when in the Note it is said that an action is apprehended and consequently elicited as consonant with right reason, is it not openly said that the will actually tends toward the honorable good and virtue?

And in the other text, is it not most expressly said that the will tends toward that which it apprehends as licit for itself and therefore HONORABLE? But thus the will pursues the honorable good not merely virtually but altogether actually. Why, therefore, do the VV. accuse these Notes as though, according to them, an honorable end toward which the action tends is lacking?

14. Yet although it is false, according to the meaning of the Notes, that a relation to the honorable good is lacking from actions, nevertheless that which the VV. said must be conceded: the opinion of these Notes differs from the assertion of St. Alphonsus, at least if the latter is taken word for word; for the Holy Doctor, for the honorableness of an act, requires that the honorable good be intended virtually, while in the Notes it is required that the will actually tend toward the honorable good. But is this distance or difference of opinions of such a nature that the VV. rightly contend that the opinion of the Notes must be turned toward the opinion of St. Alphonsus? I would indeed judge that not a few will greatly doubt this, and for another reason.

And in truth, if the opinion of the Holy Doctor is taken word for word, it immediately occurs to ask whence that virtual relation to the honorable good arises, or how the honorable good is virtually intended there. For the example which the Holy Doctor supplies is pleasure taken from food. Someone will therefore ask: In what manner is this pleasure virtually referred to the honorable good, or how is the honorable good virtually intended in it? For this must proceed either from a preceding or actual intention of the agent, as happens when someone orders means to an end; or, apart from every added intention of the agent, it will arise from the nature of the pleasure itself, just as we saw with St. Thomas that all acts of all virtues are by their nature virtually referred to the end of charity, even if the one acting thinks nothing of charity. But in the case the former remains excluded, because, as St. Alphonsus says, one approaching the table thinks only of the pleasure of food. But if you say the latter, why, someone will ask, do we say that the spouse sins who, approaching the other spouse, does not think of the preservation of the human species (or another end of marriage), but ONLY of the pleasure of intercourse? Why could someone not contend that this person does not sin, with the reason of St. Alphonsus added (above, no. 11), because he wills such pleasure, at least virtually, for the preservation of the human species or as a remedy for concupiscence, and thus does not desire it inordinately? Otherwise, can these things please the VV., who meanwhile propose that the notion of a virtual relation is to be drawn from this passage of St. Alphonsus?

15. Otherwise, it will be judged much more congruous that this expression of the Holy Doctor is altogether elliptical, and that it is understood that one who approaches the table knows and apprehends the taking of food as an action licit of itself and consonant with reason.

And in this manner it is easily understood how the agent in the case virtually wills the preservation of life and, generally, those ends which render the action honorable. For while he wills the act as consonant with the order of reason, he certainly virtually wills those things on account of which the act is consonant with the order of reason, although he does not then think of them and indeed is altogether ignorant of them.

Indeed, no other norm assuredly appears consonant with the weak condition of men, by whose aid they may be directed to act honorably, than that they apprehend the action generally as licit. And in fact, who indeed would further require for the honorableness of an action that the agent also have before his eyes the reasons on account of which the action can be judged honorable? This investigation of reasons is left to philosophers and theologians, who otherwise often labor greatly in assigning them and are not rarely found disagreeing among themselves, as in the present matter also we perceive that they do not agree among themselves whether, for example, the remedy of marriage is licitly desired by reason of health or of avoiding in oneself the danger of incontinence. How, therefore, could this norm be proposed to the common condition of the faithful for acting honorably?

And to this must be said to pertain the things which the VV. also adduce from St. Alphonsus (On Human Acts, no. 44), where he writes: For an actual relation of all words or works to the HONORABLE GOOD is not required;

since this would be an unbearable burden and a matter entangled in six hundred scruples; but a virtual relation suffices. For it wholly abhors the truth that the Holy Doctor wished to signify that a consciousness of the honorableness of the action which someone is about to place is not necessary, and that a merely virtual consciousness suffices. Therefore, this meaning must be assigned to those words: that an actual relation or direction of the action to those intrinsic ends to which it is ordered by its nature is not necessary, but they are sufficiently intended virtually by the very fact that the action is generally known to be honorable, or even that nothing in that action is perceived as contrary to the order of reason.

Let us therefore conclude: 1. that the VV. demanded without any right that the opinion expressed in the Notes be turned toward the opinion of St. Alphonsus, if the latter is taken word for word; 2. but if the obscure meaning of his elliptical expression is aptly understood, as is fitting, the meaning of the Notes differs in nothing from the meaning of the Holy Doctor.

16. We shall now say some things concerning those matters which the VV. discuss through nine columns (pages 832-836) in the Article to which they inscribe the title: The Doctrine of Father Ballerini on Pleasurable Acts in General Is Weighed.

From the Note to no. 28, vol. I, where the distinction is touched upon between those acting for pleasure and those acting for PLEASURE ALONE, the VV. (page 833) adduce these words: But the former (namely, to act for pleasure) involves no disorder of this kind (namely, it does not positively exclude the further end of the work). For first, pleasure, as St. Thomas says (Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 26, no. 6), is good and desirable if it follows a good operation; and it is proper to the virtue of temperance that it moderate the use of pleasurable things and withdraw from those which are contrary to reason, but not from those which are fitting according to reason (see St. Thomas, II-II, question 141, article 1, reply to objection 1).

But the VV. oppose the things which follow from the same passage of St. Thomas: If pleasure were the ultimate end, it would be desirable according to itself. But this is false.... For the pleasure which follows good and desirable operations is good and desirable; but that which follows evil operations is evil and to be avoided. Therefore, it has from ANOTHER that it is good and desirable. And again (ibid.): In natural things pleasure is for the sake of operation, and not conversely; for we see that nature has joined pleasure to those operations of animals which are manifestly ordained to necessary ends.... For unless pleasure were present, animals would abstain from the aforesaid necessary acts. And chapter 27: For it has been shown that according to the order of nature pleasure is for the sake of operation, and not conversely.

17. Reply 1. In the Note it is not denied that pleasure is good or not good, and therefore desirable or to be avoided, according as the operation from which the pleasure is drawn is or is not good. Consequently neither is it denied that pleasure has from ANOTHER that it is good and desirable. Therefore one must reply: Let the antecedent pass, and I deny the consequence; that is, nothing is inferred from that former text against the Note.

I said, Let the antecedent pass, because, since otherwise according to the same St. Thomas pleasure, as pleasure, is some good, the objected text of the same Holy Doctor needs some explanation. Francis de Sylvestris, commonly called Ferrariensis, supplies this for us in his Commentary on this passage of St. Thomas, where he discusses thus: Something can be called good and desirable in two ways. In one way in the being of nature; in another way in the genus of morals. In the first way the goodness of a thing is considered absolutely according as it is in itself. In the second way it is considered in order to right reason; for it is called morally good

that which is conformable and proportioned to right reason, and it is desirable according to right reason. Therefore this proposition, pleasure is not desirable according to itself but from the operations which it follows, must be understood in the genus of morals, but not according to the being of nature. For thus it is true that of itself it is not desirable, because of itself it does not express some good consonant with reason or discordant from it, but has from the operations that it is conformable or deformable to it. In the being of nature, however, IT IS GOOD AND DESIRABLE ACCORDING TO ITSELF; on account of which St. Thomas says in book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 49, question 3, article 4, that pleasure, insofar as it is pleasure, names some good.

And in fact, St. Thomas, in the place here cited, question 1, reply to objection 3, replies thus to an objection which is of this kind: Every being, insofar as it is such, is good. Therefore that also which is the ultimate perfection of a being is universally good. But pleasure is the ultimate perfection of a being, for it perfects operation, which is second act. Therefore every pleasure is good. To this objection, I say, he replies thus: To the third it must be said that this reasoning does not prove pleasure to be good except insofar as it is pleasure. And then, resolving the arguments of those who say that every pleasure is evil, he adds: It must be said that the virtuous man does not flee every pleasure, but rather embraces his proper pleasure, which is to take pleasure in works of virtue; but he flees inordinate pleasures. And again (ibid., question 3, reply to objection 4): It must be said that the end of any thing is its most perfect operation; therefore all desire the pleasure by which operation is perfected, just as they desire their own perfect operation. And just as error occurs in the appetite for operation, because some insist upon foreign operations while abandoning their proper operations, as all the wicked who follow bestial operations while abandoning human ones, so also some follow foreign pleasures in place of their proper pleasures. Thus the Holy Doctor.

Therefore, Reply 2: from the doctrine of St. Thomas, pleasure in the being of nature is good and desirable according to itself; but in the genus of morals it is good and desirable when it is consonant with the order of reason; and in this latter sense St. Thomas said that pleasure has from another that it is called both good and desirable. Therefore it is again permissible to conclude that that former text of St. Thomas objected against the Note is in no way pertinent. For in the Note the same thing is affirmed, since it treats of pleasure which is supposed consonant with the order of reason. But now to the other objected passage of St. Thomas.

18. The VV. thought great force to be present in this text, because in it St. Thomas affirms (above, no. 16) that according to the order of nature pleasure is for the sake of operation, and not conversely. Hence they construct the argument thus (page 833): Pleasure in one acting rightly is for the sake of operation, or a MEANS TO THE END, but by no means operation for the sake of pleasure.

Reply 1. I distinguish: that opinion of St. Thomas strikes one acting for PLEASURE ALONE, I concede; it also strikes one acting for pleasure, but not for it ALONE, I deny. For thus St. Thomas explains his mind in another place, which the VV. also allege (loc. cit.), namely, Against the Gentiles, book 4, chapter 83, where he says: In this life it is inordinate and vicious if someone uses food and venereal things FOR PLEASURE ALONE and not for the necessity of sustaining the body, etc. And again: Therefore the order is preposterous and unbecoming if operations are exercised for PLEASURES ALONE. But in the Note it is expressly said that the intrinsic ends of the operations, for example the sustenance of the body, are not excluded, even if someone eats for pleasure, however little he thinks while eating of that sustenance of the body. Otherwise, did not St. Alphonsus also write (above, no. 11): Although someone approaching the table does not think of the preservation of life, but only of the pleasure of food ..., he does not sin on that account? Therefore that opinion of St. Thomas does not strike the doctrine of the Note, just as it does not strike the doctrine of St. Alphonsus.

19. Reply 2. When the VV. wish to conclude from St. Thomas that pleasure in one acting rightly is for the sake of operation, or a means to an end, they do not appear sufficiently to have grasped the meaning of that opinion: that according to the order of nature pleasure is for the sake of operation, and not conversely.

Here that most faithful interpreter of St. Thomas, Ferrariensis (Commentary on chapter 83, book 4, Against the Gentiles), must be heard, who beautifully presents the force of that opinion thus: It must be observed, he says, that when it is said that the pleasures of food and venereal things are not for their own sake but for operations, it is one thing to say that pleasures are for the sake of operations and another to say that they are sought for the sake of operations. For that they are for the sake of operations expresses their order according to the INSTITUTION OF BOTH BY THE AUTHOR OF NATURE and according to the intention of nature. For God, who instituted nature, ordered the aforesaid operations to the preservation of the individual and the species; but he added pleasures to these operations so that animals would apply themselves to operations of this kind from the appetite for these pleasures, and thus he willed pleasures to be for the sake of operations. But that pleasures are sought for the sake of operations expresses their order according as THEY TERMINATE THE ACT OF APPETITE; and then, if they are compared ... to the sensitive appetite, pleasures are not thus sought for the sake of operations, BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, OPERATIONS FOR THE SAKE OF PLEASURES, as St. Thomas says, I-II, question 4, article 2, reply to objection 2.

Concerning this, elsewhere (Commentary on book 3, chapter 26) the same Ferrariensis says: Therefore in this place St. Thomas speaks of that order in comparison WITH THE INTENTION OF THE ONE INSTITUTING nature and the order; but in the place alleged he speaks of the order itself, comparing it WITH THE SENSITIVE APPETITE. And a little later: There is a twofold intention of the one instituting nature in an order of this kind (namely, the order between operations and pleasures); one is first and principal, the other secondary. The first and principal is that individuals and species be preserved through operations, and for this pleasure is joined to the operations. The secondary is that they seek the operations from the appetite for pleasure ..., just as if we were to say that a law proposing rewards for studious operations first and principally intends that a man devote himself to studious works and orders the reward to this; but secondarily and accessorily intends that a man, enticed by the reward, seek studious operations for the sake of obtaining the reward.

Therefore, according to the mind of St. Thomas, when it is said that pleasure is for the sake of operation and not conversely, this must indeed be understood of the intention of God instituting nature, because God joined pleasure to operations so that the operations would be sought from the appetite for pleasure. It is otherwise, however, if the order between pleasures and operations is considered according as they terminate the act of appetite. For thus pleasures are not sought for the sake of operations, but, on the contrary, operations are sought for obtaining pleasure. Therefore the VV. wrongly wrote that pleasure in the agent is for the sake of operation as a means to an end.

And the comparison adduced with a reward appointed, for example, for a more elegant elegy or painting shows this most clearly. For would it not be absurd to say that the poet or painter orders the reward to the work as a means to an end, and not conversely order his work to obtaining the sought reward?

20. But again, the assertion of the VV. that pleasure on the part of the agent is related to operation as a means to an end is shown in another manner to be foreign to the doctrine of St. Thomas. The Holy Doctor objects to himself (Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 26, objection 3): Pleasure appears to be desired for its own sake in such a way that it is never desired for another. For it is foolish to ask someone why he wishes to be pleased. But this is the condition of the ultimate end, namely, that it is sought for its own sake.

Now St. Thomas does not deny the antecedent of this argument, but, having conceded it, denies the consequence. But the fact, he says, that men will pleasure not for another but for itself is not a sufficient sign that pleasure is the ultimate end.... For pleasure, although it is not the ultimate end, nevertheless accompanies the ultimate end, since pleasure arises from attainment of the end.

But see these same things explained more clearly elsewhere by St. Thomas (book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 49, question 3, article 4, question 3, reply to objection 3). For he again objects to himself: That which is desired only for itself and never for another is the ultimate end; but pleasure is of this kind, for it is foolish to ask why someone wishes to be pleased. And the Holy Doctor replies: To the third it must be said that, concerning things ordered to an end which are not joined to the end, we are accustomed to ask for what end they are done. But concerning those things which are joined to the end, such a question is not asked, because it is immediately apparent that they are desirable; and because pleasure is joined to perfect operation, which is the end, therefore it is not customary to ask why someone wishes to be pleased. And, moreover, pleasure expresses the resting of the appetite in something; hence to ask why someone wishes to be pleased is the same as to ask why he wishes his appetite to be brought to rest, which is the same as if it were asked why someone WISHES TO ATTAIN THE END OF THE WILL.

Therefore, if according to St. Thomas pleasure is not sought for another, it is manifest that pleasure is not sought by the agent as a means to an end.

21. And plainly worthy of attention is the manner in which Ferrariensis (Commentary on the cited chapter 26) reconciles this doctrine of St. Thomas with another place where St. Thomas says that pleasure is sought for another.

Pleasure, says Ferrariensis, accompanies the ultimate end, and from this it has that it is not sought by men for another, although it is not the ultimate end. But he indicates the apparent conflict thus: It has been said that pleasure in comparison with operation is similar to a perfection which is ordered to the species of a thing, and that the thing is the end of such a perfection; from which it appears that pleasure is sought for another. But here it is said that men will pleasure not for another.

For resolving this difficulty, while we now omit other things, Ferrariensis premises these things: Pleasure and the operation which it follows are related not as two goods (book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 49, question 3, article 4), but as one good, insofar as PLEASURE IS THE PERFECTION OF OPERATION. For just as from perfection and the perfectible there is made one perfect thing, so from operation and pleasure there is made one perfect operation, which is happiness. Hence, just as the ultimate and most perfect operation of man is not ordered to any other intrinsic perfection of man, so neither is the pleasure which accompanies and perfects it; therefore it is not customary to ask why someone wishes to be pleased.... But although pleasure is not sought for anything else separated from it

as something to be acquired through it, it is nevertheless ordered to the operation which it accompanies as to an end, JUST AS EVERY PERFECTION SUPERADDED TO A SPECIES, WHICH PERTAINS TO THE PRESERVATION OR COMELINESS OF THAT SPECIES, IS ORDERED TO THE SPECIES ITSELF AS TO AN END, since it perfects the operation, as comeliness perfects youth; and it is established that this comeliness is for the sake of him in whom youth exists, and not conversely.

Therefore the meaning in which St. Thomas says that pleasure is for the sake of operation and not conversely finally comes back to this: that pleasure is ordered to operation as every perfection is ordered to the thing which it perfects, just as comeliness perfects youth and (as St. Thomas says elsewhere) health perfects man; wherefore we say that health is for the sake of man, but not conversely. Thus the Holy Doctor (I-II, question 33, article 3): Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. In one way after the manner of an end, not indeed according as an end is called that for the sake of which something exists, but according as every good which supervenes completively can be called an end; and according to this the Philosopher says that pleasure perfects operation as a certain supervening end, insofar as upon this good which is operation there supervenes another good which is pleasure, which implies resting in a presupposed good. In a second way, on the part of the agent cause; not indeed directly, because the Philosopher says that pleasure perfects operation not as a physician perfects a healthy man, but as health does; but indirectly, insofar as the agent, because he takes pleasure in his action, attends to it more vehemently. And in the reply to objection 3: It happens that two things are mutually causes of each other, such that one is the efficient cause and the other the final cause of the other; and in this manner operation causes pleasure as an efficient cause, but pleasure perfects operation after the manner of an end. Now this meaning has nothing in common with the other meaning which the VV. attach to this opinion of the Angelic Doctor, namely, that pleasure is related to operation as a means to an end.

22. Otherwise, there is also another meaning in which, according to St. Thomas, pleasure is for the sake of another; this can be seen indicated in passing in the cited Note, where mention is made of play and of the doctrine of St. Thomas on the virtue of temperance.

St. Thomas proposes a certain necessity of some pleasure thus (II-II, question 168, article 2): Just as man needs bodily rest for the refreshment of the body, because he cannot labor continuously ..., so also it is on the part of the soul.... And therefore, when it extends itself beyond its measure into certain operations, it labors and is thereby fatigued, especially because in the operations of the soul the body also labors at the same time, insofar as the intellective soul uses powers operating through bodily organs.... But just as bodily fatigue is relieved through rest of the body, so also animal fatigue must be relieved through rest of the soul. But the rest of the soul is pleasure, as was held above; and therefore a remedy against animal fatigue is applied through some pleasure. And, after recalling the response which St. John the Evangelist is said to have made to those who were scandalized because they had found him playing with his disciples, namely, that the spirit of man would be broken if it were never relaxed from its application, he adds: Words or deeds of this kind, in which nothing except animal pleasure is sought, are called playful or jocose; and therefore it is necessary to use such things at times as a certain rest of the soul.... And therefore there can be a certain moral virtue concerning games ..., insofar as through this virtue man is restrained from immoderation in games.

23. But since every moral virtue consists in a mean, St. Thomas, after showing (loc. cit., article 3) that one can sin against this virtue by excess, further shows (ibid., article 4) that one can also sin by defect. For to the question whether some sin consists in a defect of play, he replies: It must be said that everything contrary to reason in human affairs is vicious. But it is contrary to reason that someone exhibit himself as burdensome to others, for example, when he offers nothing pleasurable and also impedes their pleasures.... But those who are deficient in play neither say anything ridiculous themselves, and are troublesome to those who do, because they do not receive the moderate games of others; therefore such persons are vicious and are called hard and boorish.

Indeed, he adds (article 3, reply to objection 3) that these games are not rejected by austerity: Austerity, he says, insofar as it is a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures, but those which are superfluous and inordinate.

He nevertheless adds (ibid., corpus): But because play is useful for rest and pleasure, while pleasure and rest are not sought for their own sake in human life but for the sake of operation ..., therefore deficiency in play is less vicious than excess in play. And to this pertain also the things which the Holy Doctor had said (loc. cit., article 2, reply to objection 3): The operations of play themselves according to their species are not ordered to some end; but the pleasure which is had in such acts is ordered to some recreation and rest of the soul.

How pleasure from games is ordered to operation the Holy Doctor explains thus (On chapter 3 of Isaiah, at the end), where he discusses choral games: Because it is impossible always to act in the active and contemplative life, therefore it is necessary at times to interpose joys among cares, lest the spirit be broken by excessive severity and so that man may more promptly devote himself to works of virtue.

24. From this doctrine of the Angelic Doctor something can now be deduced without difficulty which also contributes to the principal argument of this Note. For from the foregoing it is necessary at times to interpose joys among cares and to offer a remedy against animal fatigue through some pleasure. And indeed the moderate use of pleasure is so far from being evil of itself that it is rather an act of virtue; and, as the same St. Thomas adds (loc. cit., on chapter 3 of Isaiah), in one who is in the state of grace, even choral play is an act meritorious of eternal life (see Note to no. 32, vol. I, question 6).

Since these things are so, it is now permissible to ask: does it involve any disorder that, for those ends concerning which St. Thomas spoke a little before, a remedy is sought from some pleasure which is known also to have been ordered by God the Author of nature to another end? St. Thomas indeed writes (II-II, question 141, article 4): Because pleasure follows a natural operation, some pleasures are more vehement insofar as they follow operations which are more natural. But the most natural operations are those by which the nature of the individual is preserved through food and drink. It is therefore asked: does it present any disorder that the pleasure of food and drink, which God ordained to the preservation of nature, is also employed for another end?

Certainly, the same St. Thomas, who had said (loc. cit.) that temperance especially concerns pleasures of this kind and had added (loc. cit., article 6) that temperance accepts the NECESSITY of this life as the rule of pleasurable things, namely, that it uses them only insofar as the NECESSITY of this life requires, nevertheless approves (ibid., reply to objection 2) that the temperate man desires other pleasurable things which

are not necessary for health or for a good condition, provided they are not impediments to these. And he adds (ibid., reply to objection 3) that temperance regards necessity according to the fittingness of life, which is considered not only according to the fittingness of the body but also according to the fittingness of external things. To this passage Cajetan adds (in his Commentary): Thus every right use of pleasurable things removes some need either of the body, of duty, or of simply more perfect honorableness.... For, as is apparent in the text, the temperate man uses both the things necessary for the preservation and good condition of the body, and the things fitting according to means, duties, social intercourse, and honorableness.... For one who held a banquet not consonant with his own rank and that of the guests, according to means and honorableness, would not have sufficiently met the necessity of the fittingness of the present life.... Therefore, the necessity of the fittingness of the present life is the rule of temperance, according to which it also commands other virtues, for example liberality, urbanity, and any others which are sometimes needed.

Therefore, the remedy and right use of the pleasure which is taken from food and drink extends much further than the institution of nature, which ordained that pleasure to the preservation of the individual, appears to demand. Therefore, just as according to St. Thomas, because it is impossible always to act in the active and contemplative life, and therefore it is necessary to interpose joys among cares, on an occasion of rejoicing, for example at weddings, the use of pleasure which is perceived from choral play is right; can and must not the same be said of the pleasure which is taken from a banquet for the sake of rejoicing? Certainly the evangelical Father, who said to his servants (Luke 15): Bring the fatted calf, kill it, and let us eat and feast, gave this reason: But it was fitting to feast and rejoice, because this your brother was dead and has come to life again. And to this also pertains the fact that the Lord, on the occasion of a wedding (John 2), so changed water into wine that the chief steward said to the bridegroom: Every man first sets forth good wine, and when they have become intoxicated, then that which is worse; but you have kept the good wine until now. Therefore, there is no disorder if pleasure which of itself and principally is ordained to sustaining life is employed for another honorable purpose extrinsic to this end.

What of the fact that, according to the common sense of the faithful, it also pertains to the joy of the more solemn feast days in the Church that one ought, according to the means and condition of each person, to be cheered by richer and more abundant feasts? And indeed we are plainly taught that this is most honorable and altogether consonant with the sense of the Church when we read that St. Gregory Nazianzen, in his letter to Helladius (in Migne, letter 120) and another to Theodore (ibid., letter 121), gave thanks for the little gifts which had been sent to him by them when the solemnity of Easter recurred. Indeed, St. Basil also, in his letter to Amphilochius, Bishop of Iconium (in Migne, letter 232), does not hesitate to call these little gifts tokens of the feast day. But when, he says, the tokens of the feast also arrive, what else must one call it except a feast of feasts, as the old law was accustomed to call the Sabbath of Sabbaths? Moreover, among the little gifts sent to him he recalls also sweetmeats (tragemata); concerning this gift, however, he adds: My age is not fit for gnawing, since my teeth have long since been worn away both by time and infirmity.

It is therefore manifest that nothing inordinate is found in the fact that pleasure instituted and ordained by God the Author of nature to some special end is assumed for another honorable end whenever this in no way obstructs the end instituted by God and primary, namely, according to that saying of St. Thomas: The temperate man

desires other pleasurable things which are not necessary for health or for a good condition, provided they are not impediments to these.

25. Since these things are so, and since pleasure taken from a richer banquet according to the condition of each person is in no way opposed to the order of reason, whether the common occasion of joy requires this when certain feast days, both sacred and non-sacred, recur; and since the same reason of joy renders pleasures of this kind honorable also among private persons, if at some time the anniversary memory of a heavenly patron recurs, or the birthday of someone in the family is celebrated, or generally some cause of new joy has been brought either by health finally recovered after a most grave illness, or by a rich inheritance unexpectedly acquired, or by the unexpected return among one's own people from a most lengthy journey full of dangers, or from prolonged perils of war, or by accession to some new dignity or most noble office, etc., etc.; why, then, shall we say it is contrary to the order of reason if anyone in any way wearied by any cares, labors, business, studies, or anxieties seeks in moderation, in the aforesaid manner, some refreshment and rest of spirit, which according to St. Thomas is drawn from pleasure? And if even for this purpose alone he recreates himself by the enjoyment of this pleasure, as St. Thomas says (I-II, question 25, article 2), otherwise so observing the law of temperance that, as the same St. Thomas says, no impediment whatever is brought to the primary and natural end of the work, do we not now have that which the VV. otherwise denounce as condemned, namely, that someone can honorably use food and drink for pleasure or delight?

26. Moreover, since this has been said concerning the pleasure and delight of food and drink, why can it not also be said of the pleasure and delight which is sought from conjugal offices in the same circumstances as above? For how does this case differ from the preceding one when the pleasure sought from it for the necessary rest of a wearied spirit in no way impedes the end intended by nature according to the doctrine of St. Thomas? Indeed, if with St. Thomas you weigh, on the one hand, the necessity of some relief and rest from cares, studies, duties, business, and labors, which must be sought from some pleasure; and, on the other, the condition of very many to whom it is scarcely given to seek some honorable and easy pleasure elsewhere, it will readily appear how it can very commonly happen that the act of marriage, to which a certain desire for solace, pleasure, or delight leads, is also rendered wholly honorable by this end, namely, some necessary relief and rest.

This is not the end, you will say, for which God the Author of nature joined pleasure to a work of this kind. It is permissible to reply with the Salmanticenses (On Matrimony, chapter 3, no. 28) that no law commands that what is primary in a work be intended first, provided that what is intended is honorable and good, and especially if it is intrinsic to the work. But, as is apparent from the foregoing, it is honorable and good to seek the rest of a wearied spirit from pleasure, and it is intrinsic to the work to bring this rest through pleasure. Moreover, the Salmanticenses add this reason: that although from the intention of the agent an accidental end is intended primarily, nevertheless from the intention of the work the essential and primary end is always intended so long as it is not excluded.

And to the same matter Aegidius Coninck (disputation 25, no. 17): Although every thing is principally instituted by God, as the Author of nature, for some certain end, nevertheless at least secondarily it is also instituted for any honorable ends for obtaining which it has an aptitude. Eyes, for example, were chiefly given to us for seeing, but secondarily also so that we may signify something to another when honorable utility demands this. Wherefore, with their primary end entirely omitted,

we can use them for all honorable ends of this kind; because from no ground can any reason be shown which obliges us always to use any thing for obtaining its principal end, or principally to intend this end, especially when we do not positively impede it from following. But pleasure which is sought from the act of marriage for the rest of a wearied spirit and for animal recreation neither impedes nor excludes the ends intended by nature and otherwise is found entirely consonant with reason and the laws of temperance, as was said. Therefore it is honorably and consequently licitly sought and is assumed as a means to operation, insofar as man afterward, as St. Thomas says (above, no. 23), may more promptly devote himself to works of virtue.

27. A few things must be added here lest anything be omitted of those things with which the VV. filled those thirty-six columns.

To those things, therefore, by which it is shown in the Note, according to the doctrine of the Apostle and, after the Apostle, of St. John Chrysostom and St. Thomas, that there is in marriage an intrinsic end that it be a remedy for concupiscence, and consequently that this end is so far from being excluded by one who acts enticed by pleasure that he rather pursues and fulfills that very end, the VV. object two things.

First, they urge these things (page 828): It is not licit, or it is not free from every fault, to use marriage merely for capturing pleasure, because pleasure is not an honorable end. And for this they adduce the words of Roncaglia (!).

Reply 1. It can rightly appear hardly tolerable that the VV. added the word MERELY by their own effort, by which they insinuate that acting for pleasure alone is taught as licit in the Note, when the context and purpose of the entire Note tends to excluding that condemned opinion. Reply 2. The VV., therefore, rather condemn St. Alphonsus, who wrote (see above, no. 11) that he does not sin who, approaching the table, does not think of the preservation of life, but ONLY of the pleasure of food; in which words you truly see the exclusive particle only. But if, on account of the reverence due to the Holy Doctor, those words must be drawn to a right meaning, why do the VV. draw the words of others into a perverse meaning, in which no exclusive particle appears, but gratuitously intrude it themselves against the force of the context?

28. Secondly, the VV. urge (page 829) that two things appear to be confused in the Note which must altogether be distinguished, namely, to act for pleasure and to act as a remedy for concupiscence. And they add that these two ends are all the less to be confused because they are rather opposed to one another. When someone, they say, intends NOTHING EXCEPT PLEASURE (behold again the perverse opinion concerning one acting for pleasure alone gratuitously fastened upon our Note!), the same thing happens to him as to a drinker who does not extinguish thirst by drinking but rather increases it. Thus, the more someone pursues pleasure, the more he desires to enjoy pleasure.

Reply 1. Raphael Aversa responds well to these things (On Matrimony, question 21, section 4): The act of carnal intercourse is licit for calming concupiscence. But concupiscence is an appetite for a pleasurable good, as St. Thomas says. Therefore concupiscence is calmed through the use of a pleasurable good, or through pleasure sought from a licit conjugal act. How, therefore, do the VV. contend that pleasure sought from the conjugal work and a remedy for concupiscence are mutually opposed?

Reply 2. Therefore let the VV. condemn St. Thomas, who (see the text in the Note), because concupiscence chiefly incites men to venereal acts on account of the vehemence of pleasure, said it is necessary that concupiscence be yielded to in part, by ordering the act of generation according to reason, that is, with a legitimate wife and with the order of nature observed. Indeed, let them condemn the Apostle, who wrote: Return again to the same, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence. Indeed, let them also condemn the order of Divine Providence, which (see above, no. 19) joined pleasures to these operations so that FROM THE APPETITE FOR THEM animals would apply themselves to operations of this kind. Otherwise, if the Author of nature placed in man that concupiscence which, as St. Thomas says (I-II, question 30, article 3), is the appetite for a pleasurable good, he nevertheless at the same time placed reason, by whose order man moderates that appetite through temperance, which, as St. Thomas says (II-II, question 141, article 5), concerns the principal pleasures which chiefly pertain to the preservation of human life either in the species or in the individual.

29. And it is preferable here to add what the Salmanticenses hold thus concerning spouses enticed by pleasure to their proper office (On Matrimony, chapter 3, no. 33): When the act is good of itself and its proper end is not excluded, a good end is already applied in it; and thus, although indifferent ends are applied as applications of the will to it, the act is not thereby vitiated or rendered evil through defect of an honorable end.... Wherefore an act is good if someone eats temperately, not attending to the end of eating but also not excluding it (according to Martinet and the VV., however, above, no. 11, this would have to be called condemned doctrine!), even if he is applied to such eating by taste and pleasure. And in our case, when someone is applied to marital intercourse by the pleasure to be taken in it, such an act is good, because it is an act of justice and a rendering of the debt, even if attention is not given to this but to taking pleasure, which happens more frequently, because the honorable end of that act is always retained and such pleasure is only an application of the will to it.

Likewise Raphael Aversa (On Matrimony, question 21, section 4): Nor is it persuaded that to have intercourse moderately for pleasure is a venial sin, because in human operations it is not culpable moderately to desire the pleasure instituted in them by nature when the operations themselves are licit and honorable of themselves.

30. But to that which the VV. note (page 829, note 2), that marriage is the lowest remedy for concupiscence, Aversa replies (loc. cit.): The act of carnal intercourse ... is licit for spouses for calming concupiscence. Nor are they bound to use other more perfect and difficult means for this other end; but it is sufficient if they use the means which is also licit and conceded to them. Otherwise it would be very harsh to oblige married persons to strive to subdue the flesh by abstinences, prayers, and other things of this kind rather than have intercourse with one another conceded to them through marriage.... And this must be extended so that conjugal intercourse is licit for someone not only when he probably fears that he may fall into the sin of incontinence; but even if, through the help of God, he hopes and trusts that he will abstain from sin, yet suffers or would suffer the stings of the flesh, he can use this remedy to extinguish them.

And Peter Catalani (Moral Theology, part 3, question 12, chapter 6): Among the other ends for which marriage was instituted are numbered the generation of children ... and the calming of concupiscence. For it was fitting not only to provide for the preservation of the human race, but also ... to institute an opportune remedy for calming dishonorable couplings and movements of the flesh, as Paul wisely says in 1 Corinthians 7. Each end is honorable and licit for spouses;

wherefore, if spouses have intercourse for any one of the aforesaid ends, they commit no sin, because to act for an end preordained by God cannot be illicit and dishonorable. And although spouses could use prayers, fasts, mortifications, and other suitable means for calming concupiscence, they nevertheless are not bound to use them, because it is a counsel to use them and not all receive this word. Therefore, for spouses to have intercourse for these ends will not be to depart from rectitude, since it is a means instituted by God and sufficiently commended by the Apostle Paul. Indeed, it will not be sound counsel to persuade spouses to abstain from intercourse unless they are of proven virtue and sanctity.

31. The VV. object (page 830) that, in the Note, the text of St. Thomas from lecture 1 on chapter 7 of 1 Corinthians is adduced in a mutilated form and that those things which contradict it are omitted. For the Holy Doctor proceeds: In another way indulgence can be taken insofar as it regards fault ...; and according to this indulgence is referred to the conjugal act according as it has venial fault attached to it.... Hence it must be considered that the conjugal act is sometimes meritorious and without mortal or venial fault, for example, when it is ordered to the good of offspring ..., or when it is done for the sake of rendering the debt.... But sometimes it is with venial fault, namely, when someone is excited to the matrimonial act from concupiscence which nevertheless remains within the limits of marriage.... Therefore, in the first manner the act of marriage does not require indulgence; in the second manner it has indulgence insofar as someone consenting to concupiscence toward his wife does not become guilty of mortal sin.

Moreover, elsewhere (Supplement, question 49, article 5, reply to objection 1), the Holy Doctor writes: When nature alone moves one to the act of marriage, he is not altogether excused from sin except insofar as the movement of nature is ordered actually or habitually further to offspring, according as it is a good of the sacrament. And in the reply to objection 2: If someone through the act of marriage ... intends to avoid fornication in himself, there is some superfluity there, and according to this it is a venial sin.

32. Reply. The difficulty concerning the meaning of the Apostle Paul must be resolved in one way, even according to St. Thomas, but the difficulty concerning the opinion of St. Thomas in another.

Therefore, if the meaning of the Apostle is asked, even from the interpretation of St. Thomas, the objection of the VV. is empty; and the reason is that the words objected have nothing to do with the interpretation of the Pauline opinion. And indeed this is the commentary of St. Thomas: "But this I say according to indulgence," that is, sparing your infirmity; "not according to command," as though it were necessary for you unto salvation. For some things must be conceded to subjects on account of their infirmity, and they must not be compelled by command to goods. But the Apostle appears to speak unfittingly. For indulgence concerns only sin. Therefore, by the fact that the Apostle appears to have conceded marriage according to indulgence, he appears to express that marriage is a sin. But to this one can reply in two ways. In one way, so that indulgence is taken here for permission. But permission is twofold. One is of a lesser evil.... Such permission is not made in the New Testament on account of its perfection.... The other is permission of a lesser good, when, namely, man is not compelled by a precept to a greater good; AND IN THIS MANNER THE APOSTLE HERE INDULGES, that is, permits marriage, which is a lesser good than virginity, which is not commanded and is a greater good." Therefore the indulgence of which the Apostle speaks, according to St. Thomas, is referred to permission of a lesser good, but not to indulgence concerning any fault. Hence in the objected words which are immediately subjoined there, St. Thomas assuredly proceeds to resolve the objection proposed to himself, explaining further how indulgence can be referred to the conjugal act; but there he in no way expresses the opinion of the Apostle. And this is confirmed by those things which the Holy Doctor has below, saying: Then when he says (the Apostle), "But let each one," etc., he assigns the reason why he permitted marriage according to indulgence, namely, because not everyone has received from God the gift of such great virtue that he can contain himself entirely.

Viva speaks well concerning this opinion of Paul (On Matrimony, question 7, article 1, no. 2): If it were a venial fault to use such a means for avoiding incontinence, the Apostle could not grant an indulgence that the spouses should return to it. And Coninck (Disputation 34, no. 7) in the same sense: You will say: the Apostle says this according to indulgence; therefore he supposes there is some fault, because where there is no fault, we grant no indulgence. Reply. By denying the consequent and its proof. For to indulge does not there signify to remit faults, but indulgently to permit something. For the Apostle does not indulge them something past, but future; which is done with regard to faults only perversely. That is, no otherwise than we heard St. Thomas saying above: Such permission (namely, of a lesser evil) is not made in the New Testament.

33. Reply 2. But neither do the texts of St. Thomas objected by the VV. (above, no. 31) in any way strike the doctrine for the confirmation and explanation of which the authority of St. Thomas is adduced in the Note.

And certainly there are two things for the explanation of which the authority of St. Thomas is invoked in the Note. The first is that matrimony was divinely instituted also as a remedy for concupiscence. But this is proved by the words of St. Thomas there adduced: He proposes (the Apostle) the second necessity, according to which (matrimony) was instituted as a remedy for fault. Nor indeed is there reason why anyone should perhaps stumble over those words, as a remedy for fault. Behold how St. Thomas speaks more clearly a little afterward: The second good (namely, matrimony) has insofar as it is a remedy for CONCUPISCENCE, which is confined to a determinate person, and this good is called fidelity.

The other thing which is undertaken to be proved by the authority of St. Thomas in the Note pertains to the manner in which matrimony is a remedy for concupiscence, namely, that this consists in yielding to concupiscence itself through acts apt for generation in legitimate marriage. And for this purpose these words of St. Thomas are adduced there: For because carnal concupiscence still remains after baptism, although it does not dominate, it incites men especially to venereal acts on account of the vehemence of pleasure; and because it is a matter of greater virtue entirely to overcome this concupiscence than can befit men, according to Matthew 19: "Not all receive this word"; it is necessary that concupiscence be yielded to in part and overcome in part; which indeed is done when the act of generation is ordered according to reason. Then in the same place it is added how, according to St. Thomas, the act of generation is so ordered by reason that concupiscence is yielded to in part and overcome in part. And this is shown to be obtained when two conditions are observed, which St. Thomas indicates thus: 1. That man use the act of generation according as it befits the generation and EDUCATION of children; 2. That in the human species there be not wandering and uncertain couplings, such as fornical couplings are, but that determinate men be joined to determinate women: which determination indeed is made through the law of matrimony. It is therefore manifest that the texts of St. Thomas objected by the VV. (above, no. 31) prove not even the least thing. For confirming the proposed doctrine, therefore, the authority of St. Thomas was employed in the Note with the fullest right.

Moreover, regarding the texts adduced in the Note, the VV. (page 830, note 3) objected only this: that in the second text the words AND EDUCATION had been omitted; whence St. Thomas concludes that matrimony ought to be of a determinate man to a determinate woman. But it is briefly replied to this that it can appear strange that the VV. dwell seriously upon these things. For are not the words of St. Thomas adduced in the Note where it is said that the order of reason requires that in the human species there be not wandering couplings, but couplings of determinate men to determinate women? Those words certainly suffice for the purpose. For otherwise we leave the labor of gathering even those things which pertain less to the matter to those whose principal care it is that causes be judged from the immense bulk of the volume.

34. Yet another reply should be given to the texts objected above (no. 31), insofar as they appear to intimate that the pleasure sought in the conjugal act is not free from every fault. And especially those words appear to require this (Lecture 1 on 1 Corinthians): But sometimes it is with venial fault, namely, when someone is excited to the matrimonial act from concupiscence which nevertheless remains within the limits of matrimony, as, namely, when he is content with his wife alone.

I said, especially those words; for what the VV. object from the Supplement, question 49, article 5, reply to objection 1, is nothing. For the words objected from this place are these: When nature alone moves one to the act of matrimony, he is not altogether excused from sin except insofar as the movement of nature is ordered ACTUALLY OR HABITUALLY further to offspring, according as it is a good of the sacrament. But suppose, I ask, that you read there the following words: Nor nevertheless does it follow that the movement of nature is evil, but that it is imperfect unless it be ordered further to some good of matrimony. The Holy Doctor, namely, replies to the objection that the act of matrimony can be excused even without the goods of matrimony. Indeed, the objected words tell against the VV. who object to them. For to remove this imperfection of the matrimonial act, it suffices (as is said there) that the act be ordered actually or habitually to the goods of matrimony. But for the act to be called HABITUALLY ordered, it suffices that those ends not be positively excluded. Hence the doctrine of the Note which the VV. attack is confirmed: for an honorable act it suffices that its ends not be positively excluded, that is, however little they may be thought of while acting.

But regarding the last text objected by the VV. (above, no. 31), they themselves (page 832) note that not even St. Alphonsus admits that opinion of the Angelic Doctor, as being too rigid, and they transcribe these words of St. Alphonsus himself (book 6, no. 882): But, with the pardon of the Holy Doctor (whose opinions I have striven universally to follow in other matters), the interpretation of St. John Chrysostom appears more proper, whose words I shall presently adduce and whom Estius, Salmeron, and Cornelius followed, namely, that the phrase "on account of fornication" is not understood of avoiding the fornication of one's spouse, but one's own. And since these things are so, an easy reply offers itself to this text of St. Thomas. For, on the one hand, it does not in any way weaken the doctrine which we constructed on the authority of the same St. Thomas; while, on the other hand, not much weight should be given to an opinion which even St. Alphonsus judged should not be admitted, as being (the VV. say) too rigid.

35. But the reverence due to the Angelic Doctor would be better consulted if a more apt interpretation and reason for the objected opinion were employed.

And in truth St. Thomas (Lecture 1 on chapter 7 of 1 Corinthians) does not explain that saying of the Apostle, On account of fornication, etc., in such a sense that it would be licit with

St. Alphonsus to oppose the interpretation of Chrysostom to the interpretation of the Angelic Doctor. Behold his words: It has been said that it is good for a man not to touch a woman; but because all men are not fit for this good, let each man, on account of fornication, namely, to be avoided, have his own wife, that is, one determined for him, so that wandering and uncertain couplings, which pertain to fornication, may be removed. Hence also Proverbs 5: "Rejoice with the wife of your youth"; and afterward it is added: "Why are you seduced, my son, by a strange woman?" Therefore the interpretation of that Pauline passage which St. Thomas presents agrees to a nicety with the interpretation of Chrysostom which you see in the Note, namely, he interprets Paul concerning the avoidance of one's own fornication, not that of another.

But this must also be held for another reason, namely, lest we make St. Thomas fight with himself, and indeed in the same context. For he had premised these things in the same place: He proposes (the Apostle) the second necessity, according to which (matrimony) was instituted as a remedy for fault (that is, concupiscence; above, no. 33). For because carnal concupiscence still remains after baptism, although it does not dominate, it incites men especially to venereal acts on account of the vehemence of pleasure; and because it is a matter of greater virtue entirely to overcome this concupiscence than can befit men ... it is necessary that concupiscence be yielded to in part and overcome in part, which indeed is done when the act of generation is ordered according to reason. But it is manifest that the Holy Doctor here speaks of the remedy for each person's own concupiscence; otherwise the use of this remedy could never occur without the sin of one or the other spouse.

But, you will say, how then do these things agree with the objected opinion of the same Holy Doctor, namely, that if someone through the act of matrimony intends to avoid fornication in himself, this is a venial sin?

36. I reply that this opinion can be reconciled without difficulty with the aforesaid doctrine of the Holy Doctor, if its reason is sought more diligently from the context; and from this inquiry it will also be apparent in what sense another objected text of the Holy Doctor (above, no. 34) is to be understood.

That these things may therefore be understood more clearly, observe how St. Thomas, after he had asked (Supplement, question 49, article 4) whether the act of matrimony is excused by the aforesaid goods, namely, the goods of matrimony, immediately in the following fifth article, from which the objected words were taken, asks whether the matrimonial act can be excused without the goods of matrimony. But what he means by a matrimonial act without the goods of matrimony is clear from the first objection of the following sixth article, where it is said: It appears that whenever someone knows his wife, not intending any good of matrimony but pleasure alone, he sins mortally. Therefore, with St. Thomas, a matrimonial act not excused by the goods of matrimony is the same as a matrimonial act had for pleasure alone.

And to this indeed pertains the second objection of the fifth article and therefore the reply of St. Thomas from which the objected words were taken. For the Holy Doctor thus objects to himself: He who uses his spouse to avoid fornication does not appear to intend any good of matrimony; but such a one does not sin, as it appears, because matrimony was conceded to human infirmity for this purpose, that fornication might be avoided, as is apparent in 1 Corinthians 7; therefore even WITHOUT THE GOODS OF MATRIMONY his act can be excused. The objection therefore supposes a matrimonial act without the goods of matrimony. But, this state of the question being supposed, it is easily understood why St. Thomas proposes two cases in his reply, namely, when a spouse wishes to avoid fornication in the other spouse, and when in himself. For in the first case he denies that every good of matrimony is absent, because there is the good of fidelity and the act of justice in rendering the debt; but not likewise in the second case; and since, with this good of matrimony also removed, by hypothesis no other good of this kind now remains, the hypothesis of a matrimonial act without the goods of matrimony returns, namely, an act which is had for pleasure alone, which St. Thomas for this reason (above, no. 18) had already said to be stained by venial fault. And the same St. Thomas clearly exhibits the character of this act when, in the following article, reply to objection 1, he writes: It must be said that a man seeks meretricious pleasures in his wife when he attends to nothing else in her than what he would attend to in a harlot; which things the Holy Doctor refers entirely to the present hypothesis, for thus the objection has it: whenever someone knows his wife, not intending any good of matrimony, but pleasure alone. And in reality the matter stands thus when one deals with harlots; for neither the good of offspring nor the good of fidelity is sought there or attended to by the fornicator. Nor nevertheless does the Holy Doctor concede what the objection held, that one sins mortally if pleasure alone is attended to in one's wife without some other good of matrimony. For in the same article 6, in the body, he writes: But if pleasure is sought within the limits of matrimony, so that, namely, such pleasure would not be sought in another than one's spouse, it is thus a venial sin.

And from these things it also follows that it is by no means necessary to attribute to the Angelic Doctor that opinion which the VV. called too rigid, as though, namely, the Holy Doctor generally condemns as some sin an approach to one's spouse by which one finds a remedy for calming concupiscence in oneself, whereas, on the contrary, he himself acknowledges and teaches that matrimony was divinely instituted also for this end. For the Holy Doctor establishes only this, and most rightly, when someone approaches his wife for pleasure alone in such a way that no good of matrimony is attended to, no otherwise than one who approaches a harlot. And indeed, as we saw above (no. 34), according to the Holy Doctor it suffices that the good of matrimony be attended to actually or habitually, namely, that at least virtually that end or good be intended which renders the act of matrimony honorable. For this purpose Seraphinus Capponi, in his elucidations on this passage, alleges these words of St. Thomas: If it is not then ordered, it has nevertheless been preordained by reason. Therefore, for that act to have been preordained by reason is for it to be ordered habitually (see also above, no. 9). Therefore, according to St. Thomas, there is no inordination if a spouse, enticed by pleasure, approaches the other spouse, even if he intends the goods of matrimony only habitually, that is, by not excluding them, as they are excluded in the access of a fornicator to a harlot.

37. Hence, as I said in the preceding number, an easy solution is apparent to the difficulty which another text of the Holy Doctor objected by the VV. appears to introduce, where it is said that the conjugal act has indulgence insofar as someone consenting to concupiscence toward his wife does not become guilty of mortal sin (but of venial sin). For after the foregoing it is easily understood that in this place also the Holy Doctor discusses the matrimonial act without the goods of matrimony, that is, one had for pleasure alone.

That this may readily be clear, observe that according to St. Thomas there is a threefold good of matrimony, namely, the good of offspring, the good of fidelity, and the good of the sacrament. But since the good of the sacrament, as the Holy Doctor says (Supplement, question 49, article 5, corpus), makes matrimony itself honorable, but not its act, it remains that the act of matrimony must be rendered honorable by the goods of offspring or of fidelity, as the same Holy Doctor concludes there. With these things premised, let the context from which the objected words are taken be consulted (Lecture on chapter 7 of 1 Corinthians): Indulgence, says the Holy Doctor, is referred to the conjugal act according as it has venial fault annexed to it.... Hence it must be considered that the conjugal act is sometimes meritorious and without every mortal or venial fault, as when it is ordered to the good of offspring to be procreated and educated for the worship of God, for thus it is an act of religion; or when it is done for the sake of rendering the debt, for thus it is an act of justice; but every act of virtue is meritorious if it is with charity. But sometimes it is with venial fault, namely, when someone is excited to the matrimonial act from concupiscence which nevertheless remains within the limits of matrimony, as, namely, when he is content with his wife alone. Therefore in this place also a twofold case is discerned: the former, in which a good of matrimony appears; the latter, in which those goods of matrimony are lacking; for otherwise the reason for distinguishing one case from the other would be absent. But where the goods of matrimony are in no way attended to in the matrimonial act, one now intends the act of matrimony for pleasure alone, as was said above. Therefore, this passage also of the Angelic Doctor is by no means to be taken as a general rule concerning an act exercised on account of pleasure, but is to be restricted to one acting for pleasure alone in such a way that the goods of matrimony are not even virtually intended.

And let these things suffice, so that it may be concluded that the VV. did not write after sufficiently examining the matter when they said (page 832): It can appear strange that Father Ballerini endeavors to present St. Thomas as favoring him; all the more because it certainly did not escape him that this last reply (where, namely, St. Thomas appears to condemn the conjugal act for avoiding fornication in oneself), as being too rigid, is not admitted even by St. Alphonsus himself. We voluntarily omit many things which could easily be added from the same St. Thomas concerning this argument, lest this Note grow beyond measure.

2. The use of marriage with an adulterous mind is gravely illicit, as if one approaching his own wife should represent another woman to himself. - St. Ligorius, no. 913, and others commonly.

3. The use of marriage is licit for the sterile, both because no law to the contrary can be shown and because the sterile are of themselves fit to perform the conjugal act. If no generation follows, this occurs altogether per accidens; and besides generation there are other honorable ends which render conjugal intercourse honorable.

4. The use of marriage is licit even for the aged, whose seed is no longer prolific, provided that they are able sufficiently to perform intercourse or have a hope, not empty, of performing it. For the same reasons which we adduced concerning the sterile favor the aged. It is further confirmed from the practice of the Church, which blesses the marriages of the aged. - See St. Ligorius, no. 954.

2. affinity from incest; 3. spiritual relationship; 4. bodily impotence.

909. Principles. - I. Any spouse bound by a vow of chastity, or impeded by affinity contracted through his or her own act, is forbidden under grave sin to seek the debt; nevertheless, he or she can, and indeed is bound to, render it to the other spouse who seeks it, since the other party cannot be deprived of his or her right. There are several who extend this same thing to the spouse who, outside necessity, baptized his or her own offspring. Nevertheless, the opinion which denies this is sufficiently probable, and several grave Doctors hold it, as St. Alphonsus says, book 6, no. 150.

II. Neither spouse can seek or render the debt if both are bound by a vow of chastity, or if both have contracted affinity or spiritual relationship through their own act; for each is impeded on account of the vow or sin. Some, however, as was said, deny that this latter impediment on account of spiritual relationship is incurred.

910. Resolutions. - 1. Not only can, but indeed is bound to, render the debt one who made a vow opposed to the right of the other after marriage had been entered; and even one who made it before marriage. For although he sinned gravely by contracting marriage, he nevertheless validly handed over to the spouse that which he had promised to God; otherwise the other spouse, ignorant of the vow, acquired a right to the thing by force of the valid contract.

2. One who, after marriage has been entered, vows to enter religion or to receive sacred Orders after the death of his wife can seek and render the debt, and does not need a dispensation; for vows of this kind do not oblige except after the dissolution of the marriage.

3. According to the more common and more probable opinion, a spouse bound by a vow or by the impediment of affinity (contracted after marriage had been entered) can seek the debt when he notices that the other spouse, not daring to seek it, is in danger of incontinence. He can also seek whenever the other seeks interpretatively; for example, when the woman is restrained by modesty and the man perceives, as St. Thomas says, her will to seek; because then it is rendering rather than seeking. - St. Ligorius, no. 931.

4. A spouse impeded by a bond, however, cannot seek the debt even to avoid incontinence; for the danger of incontinence is indeed a cause for obtaining a dispensation or suspension of the vow, but not for seeking the debt. - Thus Sanchez and others. - Nevertheless, it does not appear illicit to him to warn the other spouse of his own danger and to ask that spouse to seek on this account thereafter. Likewise, probably make an exception if it is a question of impediments imposed by the Church, a dispensation cannot be obtained quickly, and great danger of incontinence lies in delay. - St. Ligorius, no. 930. Compare what we have said both concerning the impedient impediment of a vow and concerning the diriment impediments of spiritual relationship and affinity.

911. • I. Rule. That position is entirely licit which nature itself primarily teaches, namely, that the woman be beneath and the man above. - Thus St. Thomas and others commonly. The reason is that the other positions are somewhat opposed to the order of nature, and consequently introduce some violation of order.

II. Rule. No position, however unnatural, is gravely illicit of itself, provided the conjugal act can be sufficiently completed. The reason is that any inversion of position, provided union can be completed, does not impede generation. - St. Ligorius, no. 917.

III. Rule. Every unnatural position, when a just cause is present, is free from all fault; but sometimes an unnatural position is easier, or even the only one possible; and indeed some greater facility or necessity can remove an inordination of this kind, which of itself is slight. - St. Ligorius, ibid.

912. Resolutions. - 1. Spouses do not sin at all who invert the position on account of danger of miscarriage during pregnancy, on account of the corpulence or curvature of the man, on account of the excessive fatigue of the woman, or even on account of frigidity, when they are more aroused in an unnatural position, etc.

2. Whatever the position which alone is possible may be, it is in no way condemned, although a not inconsiderable loss of semen should follow; because this part of the semen is not necessary for generation and is lost accidentally, against the will of the spouses.

3. A prudent Confessor must take care not to ask questions about the various manners of intercourse, which are not only useless but also full of scandal. Hence, if the penitent raises a doubt about these matters, it will be sufficient for the Confessor to know whether complete pollution occurred outside the due vessel. I said, if he raises doubts, or if the penitent furnishes even an occasion for doubting; for no one fails to see that questions of this kind, in a matter so slippery, are never to be asked unless a manifest necessity is present ¹. - St. Ligorius, no. 917.

¹ It is the very common opinion of the Doctors that both the danger of scandal which the Confessor can occasion to himself and to the penitent, and even to others (for penitents not rarely speak with others about the statements and questions of Confessors), and also the reverence due to the Sacrament, ought to cause him to abstain from further inquiry by questions in a matter so shameful of itself, even if perhaps he fears that the confession will not be sufficiently integral on account of some unmentioned circumstance which perhaps even appears to change the species; but in necessary matters he should use those forms of words which are held to be as becoming as possible. Moreover, let the Confessor remember that an imprudent, importunate, and shameless manner of speaking about this matter has not rarely given just occasion not only for suspecting evil of him, but also for denouncing him before the Ordinaries as though, in the act of confession, as Gregory XV says (in the Constitution Contra sollicitantes), he had uttered shameful discourse; and indeed the judges have been accustomed to proceed both against those who have so offended from malice and also against those who have so offended from mere imprudence. On this argument see Joseph Frassinetti in Dissertation X, entitled On the Integrity Necessary for Confession (Compendium of Moral Theology, vol. 2).

These circumstances principally concern the time of pregnancy, nursing, menstruation, illness, feast days, and Holy Communion.

913. • 1. At no time is the conjugal act of itself forbidden under grave sin, because no law is found by which the work of marriage is ever prohibited by reason of time. I said of itself, because perhaps at times, by reason of circumstances, proximate danger of miscarriage or of health could be induced. But this is exceedingly rare and cannot easily be foreseen in certain cases.

2. Indeed, according to most Theologians, the conjugal act is never forbidden even under light sin by reason of time; the reason is that no law can be assigned by which it is ever prohibited even under light sin. Nevertheless, St. Ligorius, no. 924, is more pleased by the opinion ² which does not excuse from venial fault if intercourse takes place during pregnancy, unless danger of incontinence or another honorable cause is present, which otherwise can scarcely ever be absent.

² These things and other things of this kind are recalled for mere erudition; for as regards practice, the common doctrine, which St. Alphonsus also most keenly defends, is that the uncertain opinion of certain persons is insufficient in a case for establishing either a grave or a light obligation. Therefore the Confessor neither ought nor can urge plainly uncertain obligations of this kind; all the more because in this question St. Alphonsus himself, no. 882 (to which place he refers), refutes the reason upon which this opinion rests; and moreover, in order that the Confessor might know whether occasion for this obligation is given by the circumstances, he would have to mingle lengthy discourses and questions concerning a matter which, according to the opinion of all, he must take the greatest care not to touch unless grave necessity is present.

3. The more common opinion teaches that intercourse had during menstruation is not excused from venial sin on account of the indecency which it appears to present, unless some cohonesting cause is present, namely, to avoid dissensions or to guard against incontinence, etc. - St. Ligorius, no. 925. But a prudent Confessor will abstain from every question in this matter, since there is nothing which must necessarily be declared by the penitent ³. They commonly hold the same, by parity of reason, concerning intercourse had by spouses at the time of purgation, or in the days following childbirth.

³ The question would concern a light fault; but light faults are not necessary matter of Confession, and this even when the light fault is certainly established. But here too there is question of a mere opinion, and there are those who think equally probable the opinion which denies that there is fault in this, especially after it has now been shown that the physiological reasons upon which the opinion of the ancients rested lack foundation, as the distinguished Lecompte makes evident (De l'ovulation spontanee, part 2, section 2). See, therefore, what was said in the preceding note.

914. • 4. The act of marriage during nursing is not illicit, because there is no prohibiting law, nor, according to the testimony of experience, is there any at least proximate danger of corrupting the milk. Hence there is no reason why spouses should be bound for so long a time to abstain from the use of matrimony with a continual danger of sinning. Thus most commonly says St. Ligorius, no. 911.

5. The conjugal act during illness, at least for the most part, is illicit neither under grave nor under light sin, because frequently no harm thereby befalls the spouses; but the exertion which accompanies the act, at least commonly speaking, cannot greatly influence the illness ⁴.

⁴ This appears to have been said too generally, and in particular cases both the inconvenience or harm of the sick spouse and the danger of incontinence in the other spouse will have to be weighed. See below, no. 915, III, and no. 916, resolution 6.

6. According to the more common opinion, it is not illicit on Sundays and even on more solemn Feast days, both because no law opposes it and because marital intercourse does not remove spouses from observing the Feasts of the Church. Most of the Holy Fathers who are objected to the contrary appear to speak of counsel rather than of precept. Hence you will also deduce that there is no reason why use of this kind should be prohibited during Advent or Lent. - Thus commonly. - St. Ligorius, no. 933.

7. Finally, of itself it is not prohibited on the day of Holy Communion, although the spouses approach it from piety alone, provided that they act for an honorable end ⁵. - Thus commonly. - St. Ligorius, no. 922, and book 6, no. 273. - Lugo. - Sanchez and others, who teach that abstaining from intercourse on the day of Communion, whether before or after Communion, pertains to mere counsel, provided it is not had immediately after Communion has been received nor for the sake of pleasure alone.

⁵ You will scarcely understand what these words mean; for it is never licit to do anything without an honorable end, whether on the day of Communion or on other days. You plainly see scraps of singular opinions concerning the ends of matrimony. I say the same concerning the exception added below, for the sake of pleasure alone; concerning which see the observations at no. 908. And if you finally determine that the act is of itself free from fault, you will conclude that this also pertains to mere counsel and not to a precept, either grave or light.

** Regarding this little Note, the VV. (page 827) write: Thus, in Father B.'s judgment, THE CONJUGAL ACT EXERCISED FOR THE SAKE OF PLEASURE ALONE is sufficiently honorable; and to abstain from intercourse on the very day of Communion, when it would be had for the sake of pleasure alone, pertains not to any precept, whether grave or light, but to mere counsel. But what must be thought concerning this doctrine we shall see below. Now the things which the VV. add below concerning this same little Note are contained in these words (page 837): We scarcely understand how, given the condemnation of the aforesaid proposition, Father B.'s opinion can be sustained. For it could be asked what difference there is between these two propositions: To act FOR THE SAKE OF PLEASURE ALONE, and to act ON ACCOUNT OF PLEASURE ALONE. Father Ballerini says the former is licit in the Note to no. 914; but, this being posited, by what reason the latter ought to be called illicit and condemned, let others judge.

Reply. I deny the supposition; that is, I deny that acting for the sake of pleasure alone is said to be licit in the little Note; for only these words are read there: Concerning which see the observations at no. 908. But in the Note to no. 908 only this is said: The Author (Gury) wished through these words to signify that even this slight inordination or fault of one acting on account of pleasure alone is scarcely ever present in reality. Therefore, contrary to manifest truth, the VV. say that Father Ballerini hands down as licit that acting for the sake of pleasure alone, or on account of pleasure alone; for Father Ballerini openly supposes, indeed affirms, that fault is present in it.

But the reason why it is said in that Note to no. 908 that fault of this kind is scarcely ever present is this and no other: namely, Father Gury (no. 908) had written: The use of marriage is illicit if it is done for pleasure alone, that is, by expressly excluding other ends. But in the Note it is observed that it can scarcely happen that ends intrinsic to the conjugal work are positively and entirely excluded. Therefore, in the Note it is not denied, but rather supposed, that acting on account of pleasure alone is illicit; only this is added: that it scarcely ever happens that the other ends are positively excluded, and therefore it scarcely ever happens that the work of marriage is done on account of pleasure alone. But this is not to say that acting for the sake of pleasure alone, or acting for the sake of mere pleasure, is licit.

Therefore, also those things which the VV. add, namely, that in Father Ballerini's judgment the conjugal act exercised for the sake of mere pleasure is sufficiently honorable, and that to abstain from intercourse on the very day of Communion, when it would be had for the sake of mere pleasure, pertains not to any precept, whether grave or light, but to mere counsel: all these things, I say, the VV. fasten upon Father Ballerini's Notes contrary to manifest truth.

917. • Sins can be committed between spouses by reason of the conjugal act, either by excess, that is, by performing acts useless for generation, or by defect, by not completing the essential act, or by staining the marriage bed with the crime of onanism.

Hence there are two sections.

Three kinds of acts are distinguished which, besides intercourse but on its occasion or pretext, can be exercised by spouses. 1. Some are harmful to generation, such as sodomy and pollution, and are against nature.

2. Others are useful, such as touches exciting nature and fostering love. 3. Others are neither harmful nor useful, and are said to be besides nature.

918. Principles. - I. Whatever is necessary for completing the conjugal act, or useful for exercising it more easily, quickly, or perfectly, is entirely licit for spouses. The reason is that he who has a right to a thing also has a right to the necessary or useful means not otherwise prohibited; and for those to whom the principal is licit, the accessory and the means ordered to it are also licit.

II. Whatever in the conjugal act harms generation, or of itself induces an effusion of the generative substance outside natural union, is gravely illicit. The reason is that such voluntary effusion is not licit except in order to generation, and therefore matrimony gives the faculty only for an effusion of this kind which can of itself serve generation; but otherwise, if men could enjoy that pleasure without the consequent burden of supporting and educating offspring, the generation of children would easily be placed second, indeed would deliberately be avoided, and thus society itself would incline toward destruction.

III. Whatever does not indeed harm, but of itself is less necessary or less useful for the act of generating, cannot be imputed as more than a light fault; but other ends intrinsic to acts of this kind excuse from it, namely, that conjugal affection be preserved and fostered, or at least that concupiscence be calmed ¹. Yet there is no need expressly to intend these ends; rather, as was said above, it suffices that they not be positively excluded.

¹ Compare what was said above in the Note to no. 908, where, from the doctrine of Chrysostom and St. Thomas interpreting Paul the Apostle, it was shown that the gain and fruit of marriage especially consists in this: that the ardor of concupiscence be extinguished and thus a chaste life be led. Concupiscence is extinguished when marriage provides the means by which the appetite for pleasure can be satisfied honorably. A chaste life is led when satisfaction of that appetite is not sought outside the legitimate marriage bed.

919. Resolutions. - 1. All honorable kisses between spouses are free from fault, as are touches upon parts both honorable and even less honorable (provided they are done cautiously), for the sake of demonstrating conjugal affection or fostering love, even if involuntary pollution should sometimes accidentally follow; because all honorable signs of love, even tender ones, as means to an end, are licit to those who from the matrimonial bond ought to become one heart and one flesh. - St. Ligorius, no. 934, and others commonly.

2. Less honorable touches and looks are also free from fault of themselves if they are referred immediately to intercourse. Indeed, the same must be held even if they were simply dishonorable but necessary or useful for exciting nature; for then they are a certain preparation for and, as it were, beginning of intercourse. But if the acts by which a spouse disposes himself or herself for the conjugal act are such that of themselves they easily provoke pollution, they can be culpable if diligence to avoid it outside intercourse is lacking ²; and the omission of diligence, where it is of such a kind that through it one is judged nearly to will pollution outside the vessel, can even be a grave fault; but if, due diligence having been employed, such pollution follows beyond the intention, there will be no fault ³.

² For this reason the Doctors warn that these things are especially to be avoided if spouses are in a place where they cannot have intercourse. Sanchez (On Matrimony, book 9, disputation 45, no. 35) indicates two examples of touches which of themselves easily provoke pollution, and St. Alphonsus also indicates one of them (book 6, no. 934).

³ This doctrine must be kept before one's eyes also with regard to the case which the Author presently subjoins, namely, regarding imperfect acts which are exercised between spouses without the intention of intercourse. And the Author indeed indicates only the opinion which does not condemn these acts as gravely guilty. But another opinion, itself sufficiently common (see St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 934), must not be passed over in silence, which excuses these acts from every fault even in the one seeking, if pollution is not intended and there is no danger of consent to it, and provided that some grave cause is present, for example, to foster mutual love ... or to avert the jealousy of the other. And he adds (ibid.) that, probably, even immodest touches on the part of the one rendering (unless they are such that they appear to be an inchoate pollution) are licit, although danger of pollution is present in either spouse, because then the one rendering attends to a licit thing.

But according to the common opinion, which St. Alphonsus also follows (loc. cit., no. 933), these things hold even when intercourse would be entirely forbidden to the spouses, or even would be impossible on account of impotence. And regarding this latter case, when spouses are to be called truly and entirely impotent, we have already made observations above (in the Note to no. 855). But regarding the former, the cause why the use of marriage is forbidden must be considered. For the stated rule will be true if it is forbidden on account of affinity contracted through a crime with one's own wife; but it is otherwise if on account of the nullity of the marriage.

And regarding these imperfect acts, those things which Diana has (vol. 2, tract 6, resolution 205, no. 2) must be recalled: The Doctors commonly note, he says, that when the danger of pollution has ceased in both spouses, the husband does not sin mortally if he breaks off intercourse begun before seminal emission, lest offspring be generated, provided that he does this with the wife consenting or not reasonably unwilling. Indeed, if there is a just cause for impeding seminal emission, for example, on account of poverty and the multitude of offspring, and nevertheless a cause for lying together in order to calm concupiscence, every fault is absent if mutual consent is present.... Hence infirm spouses are not to be condemned even of venial fault who, in order to calm concupiscence, begin intercourse and voluntarily by no means complete it; and this case can frequently occur. And immediately afterward (resolution 207) he proposes this case: A certain man began intercourse with his wife, and afterward, on account of danger of illness, withdrew himself with her consent; but pollution sometimes followed from this. It was asked of me whether such contact was licit. I replied affirmatively, because it is not a sin to attend to a licit thing and an honorable action, although the pollution which will follow is foreseen, provided danger of consent is absent, as it was in the case concerning which I was questioned; because then the pollution is not willed in itself, as is supposed, nor can it be said to be willed in its cause, because I am not bound to omit that action lest pollution follow, when a just cause stands. You have the reason for this resolution more clearly proposed in the doctrine of St. Alphonsus which we reported elsewhere (vol. 1, Note to no. 412). See also Sporer (On Matrimony, no. 500), where concerning a similar case which he takes from Gobat (Experimental Theology, tract 10, nos. 668, 669), he thinks the same with Diana and others and observes that it is a very practical and frequently occurring case.

** The VV. here object (page 828, note 1) to these words of St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 918):

Nevertheless, I think that in no way can they (the spouses) be excused at least from venial sin, whatever Sanchez with others may say. Reply. The Doctors, as even St. Alphonsus acknowledges, do not agree among themselves whether in the case some fault, even venial, intervenes. Therefore, it is not certainly established that there is some law which is thus violated, and consequently no convincing reason is present why the act in question should be condemned as venial fault. But according to the doctrine so strongly inculcated by St. Alphonsus, we neither can nor ought to call something illicit or instill a consciousness of sin when the sin is not established. Therefore, it is fitting that the VV. also not prohibit others from preferring in the case the opinion of other Doctors opposed to the opinion of St. Alphonsus.

Moreover, these words are read in the Note: You have the reason for this resolution more clearly proposed in the doctrine of St. Alphonsus which we reported elsewhere (vol. 1, Note to no. 412). Why, I ask, did the VV. think that no account should be taken of this citation? In that place the Holy Doctor Alphonsus discusses the guilt of those actions which are a cause of carnal movements, indeed even of pollution, and specifically a proximate cause or one gravely influencing; and concerning causes of this kind he writes these things: An exception is made, however, if the aforesaid actions are performed from a cause necessary, useful, or fitting for the soul or body; for then the pollutions arising from them, even foreseen, are not sins, provided consent or danger of it is absent. Thus COMMONLY Silvius, etc., from St. Thomas. But, as is apparent from the texts of Antoninus Diana adduced in the Note, a just cause is supposed to be present in the case. Therefore, the VV. ought to permit us to prefer St. Alphonsus thinking with the COMMON opinion of the Doctors to St. Alphonsus wherever perhaps he appears to depart from his own doctrine and from the common doctrine of others.

"Spouses who use Marriage in the aforesaid manner are not to be disturbed, and the confessor can cautiously intimate the opinion in question to those spouses whom he has tried in vain by another means to lead away from the detestable crime of onanism." Sacred Penitentiary, 16 June 1880.

Conjugal fidelity includes the loyal fulfilment of all the obligations involved in the matrimonial contract: the principal obligations imposed by the Divine natural law, as well as secondary stipulations freely agreed upon by the parties.

The Divine natural law imposes both negative and positive duties.

The negative duties oblige one to refuse to any person but the lawful partner the intercourse which is permitted in wedlock, and consequently to exclude voluntary thoughts and desires for other persons; also to refuse even to the lawful partner whatever is forbidden in wedlock itself.

It is to be understood in the sense in which approved authorities explain it in treatises of moral theology. Even St. Augustine distinguished between such a use of marriage as a high spiritual point of view rendered altogether virtuous;

a use which is less to be commended, considering its motive, but permissible especially to the party who condescends to the weakness of the other; and finally such a use as is gravely sinful, or in the very manner of its exercise strictly abusive, which admits of no formal cooperation;¹ although material cooperation may in certain cases be allowed.²

¹ By formal cooperation one partakes in the bad intention of the principal actor; this community of intention is excluded in purely material cooperation. In the latter, one, for other reasons, either performs an act in itself good or indifferent, or abstains from some act, where the act or the abstention, as the case may be, was in fact helpful to the guilty party. MDe bono conjugali, chapter 6, number 6; Latin Patrology. 40. 377.

² De bono conjugali, c. 6, n. 6; PL, 40, 377.

Not in the least. It is simply a question of understanding them rightly and applying them prudently.

Because the marriage contract is not of a purely private nature; it has from God its laws which are unchangeable by the parties to the marriage. Thus the Holy See condemned the assertion that the consent of the other party could reduce the guilt of adultery to that of simple fornication.¹ Moreover, these laws of God sanction an order of mutual relations which is for the good of the parties. The partner who violates that order does an injury to the other party, which is manifestly contrary to conjugal fidelity, since that demands mutual helpfulness.

¹ Innocent XI (September 24, 1665) Prop. 50, Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1200.

Exactly so. As was said above, in number 17, Catholic tradition so interprets the words which Our Lord quotes with confirming approval from Adam: “They shall be two [not more than two] in one flesh.”

Yes; thanks to this severity the relations between husband and wife bear the fresh and delicious imprint of chastity. That mutual familiar intercourse between the spouses themselves, if the blessing of conjugal faith is to shine with becoming splendor, must be distinguished by chastity in such wise that husband and wife must bear themselves in all things in conformity with the law of God and of nature, and endeavor always to follow the will of their most wise and holy Creator with the greatest reverence towards the work of God.¹

¹ P. 28.

The great positive duty is that of mutual love inspired by charity. The marriage bond sets up between the spouses an intimacy which no other surpasses or even equals; the marriage would never have been entered upon without the mutual affection which was necessary for the parties to give themselves to each other. Conjugal love has in Christian marriage a sort of noble primacy. For matrimonial faith demands that husband and wife be joined in an especially holy and pure love, not as adulterers love each other, but as Christ loved the Church. This precept the Apostle laid down when he said: “Husbands, love your wives as Christ also loved the Church,” which of a truth He embraced with a boundless love, not for the sake of His own advantage, but seeking only the good of His spouse.¹

¹ P. 28.

Charity is a love which is forgetful of self: “Charity seeketh not her own” (I Cor. xiii, 5). It is a love which is not content with words: “Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth” (I John iii, 18). It is a love which has its source in God, ends in Him, and tends to lead to Him those that He loves. Charity should, therefore, manifest itself by mutual benevolence, readiness to help in every necessity or difficulty; also by activity of mutual upbuilding, and reciprocal

influence for good according to the qualities allotted to each party, an office which is called in Christian tradition the work of edification according to the Gospel.

It excludes any abasement of one of the spouses, any degrading subjection or servitude; but, far from excluding all subordination, it rather requires it for the sake of order and harmony; only it must see to it that this subordination is suave and gentle.

Because if nature had not established a hierarchical order domestic society would begin with anarchy, and authority which did not rest on a natural title would make submission more painful and less welcome. Nature herself designates the husband as the superior by giving him strength of body and a fatherhood which does not interfere with his duties in the maintenance and government of the family. Besides having a natural ability which is usually greater, the man has by nature a taste for government and leadership; whereas the woman, physically less robust, naturally leans upon him, and is besides normally impeded by the inconvenient consequences of motherhood. By supernatural revelation, the Apostle derives this hierarchy from the mysterious origin of woman: “For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man” (I Cor. xi, 8).

Not at all. It is limited to the exterior acts of family life which may be reasonably demanded. The wife keeps the independence of a human person; she remains free in her personal conduct, in her practises of piety, in her goings and comings, with due consideration for the conjugal pact and the order of the house and family; she preserves the right to demand of the husband whatever her quality as wife and mother entitles her to, for she, too, has charge of the education of the children. Finally, as the husband and wife were equal in giving themselves each to the other, so they remain equal in regard to the right which flows from

this mutual self-surrender. Besides, the subordination of the wife admits of a certain variation according to circumstances of time, place, and persons. Incapacity on the part of the husband confers upon the wife by a natural devolution the right to replace him in the government of the house. State laws, and the ante-nuptial agreement, if any, may modify the property rights of the wife. There will, therefore, be,even as a regular thing, cases of independence and cases of equality; besides there are exceptional cases.

It may be somewhat diminished or intensified; but, since it is founded in the natural order it can never be entirely abolished nor go beyond certain limits. It is intended to last as long as the family itself.

The Encyclical reminds us that if the husband is the head of the family, the wife is the heart.¹ As the former has the primacy of government, the latter may and should claim for herself the primacy of love. As Leo XIII observes (Encyclical “Arcanum”): “Divine charity should never cease to be the norm of their respective rights.”

¹ See the beautiful reflections of Dermine, work cited, pp. 41-43 on these reciprocal parts of the husband and wife.

Marriage may also be defined as a “total community of life.”

Certainly not, since it began and sprang from that mutual giving of self, and at the same time is its crown and glory.

First, because the spouses can in their union make this their chief purpose. Secondly, because the community of life between the spouses—our second definition of marriage—is providentially directed by God to this last end, which, being the supreme end of man, occupies the first place in the Divine Will.

Absolutely not, because such relations are intrinsically vicious, wrong, and the circumstances mentioned, being merely accidental and extrinsic, cannot alter this. Besides, such a moral disorder could never conduce to perfection nor even serve the purposes of true love, for true love is partly founded on mutual respect, which moral disorder must necessarily weaken. This truth is confirmed by the experience of anthropologists and public officials. Improper relations break up homes.

After calling attention to the fact that every attack upon the child is equally an attack upon conjugal fidelity, because such a sin always compromises the primary end of marriage, the Encyclical mentions three special assaults which are launched respectively against conjugal chastity, against the

hierarchy of the family, and against the love which should be the ruling power in the home.

It is impaired by those friendly unions or “companionate marriages” which we have already characterized above (Number 86); also by that worldly point of view which, because of the exuberance of certain appetites, regards the uprightness of virtuous married people as out of date, demands greater license in relations with third parties, and the abolition of the legal barriers that still exist against adultery.

He appeals to the hearts of chaste couples; he invokes the immutable Divine prohibition: “Thou shalt not commit adultery,” and the unalterable declaration of Christ: “Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart” (St. Matth. v, 28).¹

¹ P. 43.

The theory which holds that the married woman should be freed from all subordination, and put on a footing of perfect equality with her husband. There is a propaganda for a physiological emancipation which would withdraw the wife from the duties of a spouse and mother; an economic emancipation, which would assure her full liberty of movement enabling her to administer her property and her affairs as she pleases; and a social emancipation, which would free her from domestic duties and enable her to throw herself according to her natural bent into politics or business.

This total emancipation is rejected¹ as an upsetting of the entire domestic order, and a cheapening of woman herself, who, robbed of her glory of spouse and mother, would become once more what she was in the pagan world, a mere instrument of the passions of her husband. This so-called “emancipated” woman, now neither a virgin nor a mother, on whom the modern world thinks it is conferring freedom by enabling her to “live no longer for others but for herself, that is, for her pleasure and according to her whims,”

under the influence of concupiscences, the only rights now recognized, undergoes “the brutal domination of him who has received from nature the gift of strength, over her whose weakness will henceforth be defenseless, since she will no longer have the protection of the Christian laws of marriage.”² For that matter, what serious historian does not acknowledge that woman owes her dignity and her true liberty to the Gospel of Christ? Absolute equality is rejected because the interests of the family, the duties of married life, the unity and stability of the institution of marriage demand a certain inequality of rank. But the Sovereign Pontiff has made the necessary or fitting reservations beforehand especially where he recognizes the equal right of both parties to the marriage, to demand of the other the acts that are proper to married life. (See Number 55, above.)

¹ P. 44.

² Abbé Dermine, La Doctrine du mariage chrétien, pp. 81, 82. Here is a confirmation which is not without value, as it comes from a Paris organ of wide circulation, which is not Catholic in its tone. Under the title, Mon Film, the magazine, Le Journal, under date of Jan. 16, 1931, published this frank admission: “Free love, the equality of the sexes, the personal struggle for life—these things are contrary to woman’s deepest instincts, to her moral and physical nature, to her true interests; they are but a last resort in a society where woman, falling from her high position—for she is falling from it in spite of appearances—is in danger of becoming more and more unhappy.”

Not at all; it can and should adapt itself to varying circumstances. Thus no one objects to the abolition of certain legal disabilities of women regarding contracts. But these variations can never change essentially the order established by God.¹

¹ P. 45.

The Encyclical does not touch upon these points in any way. It disapproves only such an injection of woman into public life as would imply her desertion of the home.

For the love which is engrafted upon a sacred duty and which persists through trials and difficulties, there is an attempt

to substitute an insecure and capricious affection and to make the constancy or inconstancy of that sentiment the norm which shall determine the continuance or breaking off of the marital union itself.

He calls it an attempt to substitute a house built upon sand for one that is built on a rock.¹

¹ P. 45.

We must take account of the actual condition of the human race since the Fall of our First Parents. It is, as a matter of fact, impossible to count on any perseverance which is not safeguarded by an obligation. The experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries proves conclusively that liberty alone does not lead to welfare and happiness.

88. - On the remedy of artificial fecundation. The artificial introduction of the male semen into the vagina of a woman has, in a few cases, been able to bring offspring to sterile or impotent spouses. They report that either a sixth part of the attempts, or 21 out of 65 attempts, succeeded well physically.

It is practiced in various modes. a) Semen collected through masturbation is introduced in several sacs into the depth of the vagina as far as the cervix of the uterus. b) The man coits by means of a "condom"; he collects the semen thus emitted in a small glass siphon, previously warmed, and either he himself or a physician afterwards introduces it into the cavity of the uterus. c) Normal copulation having been performed, the semen is collected by means of a metallic instrument and is introduced more deeply, as far as the cavity of the uterus. d) Without any copulation, spermatozoa are extracted from the inner covering of the testicles (the epididymis), and then introduced into the wife's vagina and uterus.

The moral evaluation of this fecundation will be treated later. Thus far we have considered the physiological aspect of the matter.

109. - The formal and material rationale of conjugal chastity. 1. The formal rationale. Conjugal chastity signifies the virtue of chastity insofar as it connotes matrimony. Therefore, such a virtue as it would have existed in the natural order inclines a man to moderate the sexual appetite according to the nature of matrimony as just described.

2. The material rationale (that is, what chastity commands, permits, and counsels in the conjugal state). Therefore this chastity:

a) Repudiates carnal sexual satisfaction which is sought either separately or with one who is not a spouse.

b) Will counsel the right use of marriage; but it will command abstinence where the possibility of right use is lacking.

Now right use can be defined by the threefold end by which matrimony is rendered honorable, so that copulation performed for begetting offspring, for fostering mutual love, or as a remedy for incontinence is fully honorable. Compare no. 62. This is indeed established in itself. But such a manner of acting is presupposed that, while one end is intended, the others are not impeded. Moreover, a serious request of the other spouse of itself supplies a sufficient cause for rendering the debt: for this rendering was promised, but its denial of itself diminishes love. Wherefore this rendering is directed toward the honorable end of fostering mutual love.

Nevertheless, it will be desirable that, according to the law of mutual benevolence, each party study to please the other in this matter and wish to experience complete pleasure together with the other. For sexual union which is freely exercised by common consent and brings strictly common enjoyment of itself benefits the health of the spouses, the increase of mutual love, and the quality of the offspring. Wherefore, not only must those wives be disapproved who, led by a perverse affection, restrain themselves so that they remain frigid in sexual union; but one must also guard lest, deceived by a certain false devotion, they sin by an austerity which, displeasing to the husband, diminishes domestic happiness and easily turns to the hatred of the wife's piety. Was not St. Paul intending this use of matrimony when he wrote: "Let the husband render the debt to the wife, and likewise the wife to the husband" ¹? By such obedience Christian wives might win their unbelieving husbands for Christ, as St. Peter commends: "Let women be subject to their husbands, so that even if any do not believe the word, they may be won without the word through the conduct of the women" ².

¹ 1 Corinthians 7:3.

² 1 Peter 3:1.

113. - I. Conjugal chastity, illuminated by faith, inclines spouses to fulfill all the duties which the perfection of Christian matrimony brings with it.

It consists, however, in various grades, a fact which is perhaps too greatly neglected today and to which St. Augustine already alludes ¹.

¹ Contra Iulianum Pelagianum, book 3, chapter 21, no. 43, and book 4, chapter 2, no. 10 (Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 44, cols. 724 and 741).

In the first grade, which is necessary, spouses have determined to fulfill all duties in such a manner that they do not exceed the limit of conjugal flesh.

In a more perfect grade, carnal commingling is exercised only for the sake of having children, so that the spouses cease from the conjugal act when a spouse reaches that age at which conception is no longer possible.

Finally, in the third and highest grade, the spouses, following the example of St. Joseph and the Immaculate Virgin, preserve perfect continence. Nevertheless, we are warned by the Apostle himself ² that this grade is to be admitted only prudently; and that temporary periods of continence are rather to be counseled which, while they raise the soul upward and render it firmer, terrify or oppress it with no excessive difficulty.

² 1 Corinthians 7:5.

Favorable occasions for temporary abstinence are sacred times ³, so that time may be given to prayer ⁴, and also the first three days after the celebration of nuptials, so that, after the manner of Tobias and his wife, they may be offered to God as the first fruits, as it were, of conjugal life ⁵. But the Apostle himself adds that even temporary continence is of itself to be introduced only by mutual consent.

³ Compare canon 1243: "Sacred times are feast days; to these are added days of abstinence and fasting."

⁴ 1 Corinthians 7:5.

⁵ Tobias 7:4-5. Compare the Rituale.

114. - II. On the chastity of widowhood and on second marriages. The Catholic faith imposes the same chastity upon widowed persons as upon unmarried persons. Wherefore, as a question related to conjugal chastity, only the question concerning second marriages can be raised.

Come now: since not only the bodies which perish, but also immortal souls are united by Catholic marriage, a more perfect grade of conjugal chastity exists of itself when the surviving spouse spiritually preserves fidelity to the deceased party by abstaining from another marriage. And although another marriage can be rendered honorable by the most just causes, nevertheless it is less acceptable to the Church, both because of a certain excess of the venereal appetite which it seems of itself to betray, and also "because of the defect of the sacrament" ⁶. For since the conjunction of Christ with the Church is of one with one, this is less well represented by another marriage. This is also the reason why the Church does not grant her blessing to a widow who, having already been blessed, herself marries again ⁷, and why a bigamist is irregular ⁸.

⁶ Chapter Debitum, 5, De bigamis non ordinandis (1, 21).

⁷ Canon 1143. A woman who, not yet married, is wedded to a widower herself receives the blessing.

⁸ The new Code, canon 984, 4°, restricted to true bigamy alone the irregularity which authors had extended to several cases having a certain likeness to bigamy. There were those who contended that persons whose first marriages preceded baptism were not bigamists. But in Gratian's Decretum it is elegantly replied that sins, but not marriages, are remitted by baptism. Compare chapter 3, dist. 26, and chapter 13, dist. 34.

206. - Conjugal chastity is to be defended from adultery, from solitary onanism, and from conjugal onanism. For a spouse can be tempted to seek venereal pleasure inordinately either with another person, alone, or with the spouse.

1. For guarding against these excesses, a general preparation of the soul for observing continence will be of very great benefit if anything should appear to hinder or dissuade the use of marriage.

But no one will be perfectly prepared for this who does not profess the absolute necessity of the moral law and does not hold God to be faithful, who will not permit us to be tempted beyond that which we are able, but will also make with the temptation a way out, that we may be able to endure it. Cf. 1 Corinthians 10:13.

2. Under a general rationale, and especially against the first two abuses, it will also conduce that a spirit be procured which is alien to that worldly spirit which desires theatrical performances, dances, and the various external festivities of this world. Having proceeded from the error of seeking present ease, they are full of sins, allurements, and scandals of that world to which, because of scandals, Christ pronounced woe ¹. At these festivities, virtue is held up to mockery; snares are laid for the innocent; the desire to please, mingled with ease of living, exploring, and meeting, increases concupiscence, fosters every kind of ambition, inflames souls with suspect or impure affections, and turns them away from the ordinary and quiet manner of life.

¹ Matthew 18:7.

What of the fact that these worldly gatherings demand a liberty which offspring and the obligations connected with begetting and educating offspring do not allow to exist?

Already, relying upon the authority of St. John Chrysostom, Father Hoppenot defines the theater as: "Destroyer of family life" ².

² Petit catéchisme du mariage, p. 188.

Moreover, it is our duty to cultivate a sincerely Christian soul, firm enough that, insofar as some higher rationale from the position which we occupy in society or from the pursuits to which we are devoted requires it, we can and will participate honorably in worldly things; yet noble enough that, despising these weak and vain allurements, we never seek or affect them for their own sake, nor place our delights and happiness in them: we have been born for greater things.

207. - 3. For guarding against adulteries and also solitary or conjugal onanism, something principal is that persons physically and morally fit be joined in marriage, who are prepared to bear the burdens of matrimony.

Wherefore, a) Those who choose the married state, especially girls, should have the true rationale of marriage thoroughly considered, certainly before betrothal, indeed before they think about contracting nuptials, lest, ignorant of their duties, they afterward refuse them or at least bear them reluctantly and unwillingly.

As for young men: great care must be taken lest we recommend the conjugal state as an opportune refuge for all the lustful. Physicians, whether pious or unbelieving, hold the same opinion on this matter, namely, that marriage cannot be commended either to all who indulge in masturbation or to anyone who has a thoroughly inverted appetite.

Let the professor of medicine, Dr. Francotte ³, be heard: "Marriage, one sometimes seems to forget, is an affair between two. It would not be bad to consider the other party for an instant, that young girl, however anonymous she may still be, who must fulfill the office of remedy.

³ De quelques points de morale sexuelle, etc., pp. 27 and 33.

"The matrimonial union is something other than a physiological coupling. It requires the union of souls, harmony of sentiments, love with the spirit of sacrifice and fidelity. 'It is the heart which is the architect of that august sanctuary called the family' (Bougaud). Certain persons seem to care nothing about all this, and they order marriage as they prescribe a purgative.

"And then, it is not unheard of for marriage to result in procreation. What will the children born of so bad a seed be?

"... I know that very estimable authors - Surbled, Heuschen, and Capellmann - recommend marriage as a remedy for masturbation. This recommendation does not fit all cases indiscriminately. Masturbation presents multiple modalities and affects varying degrees of gravity.... There are certainly cases... in which masturbation is only the epiphenomenon and in which it would be senseless and even culpable to push toward marriage. The counsel could be applied to light, accidental forms in healthy individuals without a marked heredity. But here especially it is fitting always to recall that 'the counselors are not the payers.' To push a deep-seated invert toward marriage is to risk, almost with certainty, the worst consequences for the subject himself, for the woman who will be united to him, and for his possible descendants."

Therefore, before counsel of this kind is given, an experienced and upright physician will have to be consulted absolutely.

b) It pertains chiefly to the mother not to conceal from herself bodily defects, especially those of her daughter, but to have them investigated; and, if anything obstructs marriage, to disclose it opportunely to the daughter, or so to govern her life that she never comes to a proposed marriage.

c) Since today there are many concerning whose health, strength, or physical aptitude there can be doubt, we ought by no means to oppose the growth of a custom by which one party - that is, the parents and the bridegroom or bride - offers and admits to the other party an examination of the person by an honorable physician.

d) But the greatest solicitude is also to be had concerning morals. Wherefore, unless the matter is plainly established from elsewhere, Christian parents, before they give consent to marriage, should become more certain concerning the right use of marriage and, if the case should occur, concerning honorable abstinence in marriage.

Indeed, an inquiry is to be made concerning the persuasions and intentions of the bride's parents. Does it not happen that worldly parents accuse a son-in-law of cruelty because he has given his wife a son or daughter, either in the first years of the nuptials or beyond the number which they consider just, that is, beyond two or three, which is the limit often set today? Shall we dare to yield to worldly parents who sometimes do not hesitate to impose conditions contrary to the substance of matrimony?

208. - A special security from adulteries is to be sought by increasing in every way the hope of a happy marriage. To this pertains:

a) That a great esteem for Christian marriage be fostered. Consequently, today at least, let us not represent the conjugal state as less accepted by God, tolerated rather than permitted, and useful only to those whose weak virtue is not equal to observing continence. But rather let it be exhibited as a state which, according to the intention of divine Providence, is still destined for men as the common state; which, being enacted with great dignity in the Christian religion, is to be commended of itself to those who, physically and morally fit, do not seem likely to have, from the grace of God, an efficacious will for a higher counsel. b) That it take place between persons whom true esteem and true love have united in mind before body.

c) Consequently, that each may be able to praise the other for chastity preserved, and may find in past virtue a reason why he or she should not doubt future fidelity either.

Wherefore, scarcely anything more foolish is to be found than that worldly prejudice by which a husband who has had illicit relations is preferred for a pure daughter. Sensible physicians reject this, even in the name of science ⁴. Bourgas says on this matter: "A strange mistake.... The experience acquired in easy loves is most deceptive, and can only become prejudicial to the man imprudent enough to believe that he will find its application in his household. For one cannot reason from the woman wanton with her body to the chaste and modest young woman. Between them, the difference is no less great morally than from the physiological point of view." Le droit à l'amour pour la femme, p. 74.

⁴ Cf. Féré, L'instinct sexuel, p. 320; Ribbing, in Moll, Handbuch, pp. 945-949.

Up to this point we have spoken of lust outside marriage; it remains to speak of chastity and lust in the matrimonial state. In this state the conjugal act, or carnal copulation per se apt for generation, is licit if it is done on account of the due end and with due circumstances; indeed it is an act of the virtue itself of chastity. Hence we shall speak:

1. concerning the essence and end of conjugal copulation,

2. concerning the circumstances of conjugal copulation,

3. concerning accessory acts connected with conjugal copulation,

4. concerning excess in the use of marriage,

5. concerning the conjugal debt and concerning defect in the use of marriage.

I. Besides copulation itself, there are also acts more or less connected with it, which occur between spouses in carnal commerce, which can be recalled to a threefold species:

a. acts ordered to exciting nature toward the conjugal act, or to moving the flesh;

b. acts harmful to the conjugal act, or against the ordering of nature, as pollution voluntary in itself or in the cause, and sodomy improperly so called, or a proximate occasion to these;

c. acts which are neither ordered to conjugal copulation nor harmful, and are said to be beside generation, for example to act for pleasure alone, to touch oneself uselessly.

Hence three principles:

A. Whatever is done according to the due end and generation, or is necessary or useful for the conjugal act, is licit.

B. Whatever is done beside the end, not against generation, does not exceed venial sin.

C. Whatever is against the due end, the generation of offspring, is gravely illicit, and participates in the malice of adultery or violated fidelity.

From these principles it can be judged how spouses can sin through excess, and the following conclusions are already understood.

II. Concerning imperfect venereal acts between spouses present:

1. Imperfect or impudicious acts, looks, touches, kisses, embraces, likewise conversations, even altogether base, exercised between spouses present in order to copulation now to be had, are licit, insofar as they conduce to carrying out that copulation more perfectly, more pleasurably, and more easily. For they are the preparation and beginning of this act as of an end; but if the end is honorable, so too are the means naturally ordered to it. Provided diligence is employed lest semen be emitted outside the female genital canal, and consent is not given to pollution that may arise by chance.

2. Likewise they are licit, with a certain restriction, for fostering or preserving mutual love, which is necessary to marriage and copulation, especially if here and now there is some grave and proportionate reason, for example grave suspicion of infidelity or of propensity toward another person to be avoided, necessity of providing a special sign of love, cutting off the beginning of adulterous libido, the altogether urgent petition of the partner, and so forth. This reason must be graver to the extent that the danger of pollution is greater. But the restriction is this: provided the act is not per se and altogether proximately provoking satiative pleasure or pollution, or equivalent to pollution itself, and there is no danger of consenting to it if at some time it follows. Therefore where spouses notice that the danger of pollution is proximately present, they must cease from the acts.

3. But if here and now there is no reason, so that spouses here and now cannot or do not wish to perfect copulation, yet seek those acts for themselves and intend pleasure alone, they are illicit because in the intention of the agent they are deprived of their natural and due end, but only venially, because there is only the excessive or inordinate use of a licit thing; indeed also gravely if there is proximate danger of pollution or complete venereal pleasure.¹

¹ In the preceding things the question concerns truly impudicious touches; for modest and honorable ones are licit even with danger of pollution, provided some reason is present and the danger of consent is absent. On the contrary, truly base touches exercised with a third person are gravely illicit.

III. Concerning solitary imperfect venereal acts when the partner is absent:

1. Solitary imperfect acts, exercised when the partner is absent, are illicit, because they are done for pleasure alone, unless perhaps in certain circumstances they are useful for preparing future copulation, nourishing sexual appetite, obtaining heat, and so forth. Therefore per se they are illicit: mortally if there is proximate danger of pollution or satiative pleasure, or consent to it; otherwise at least venially, because, according to several, they are not opposed to the essential order of marriage but, by reason of the matrimonial state, of themselves are naturally referred to licit matrimonial copulation, which nevertheless here and now is excluded. According to many others, on the contrary, they are always mortal, because, since spouses per se do not have right over their own body, those acts are of themselves the beginning of pollution,² and do not bespeak an order to copulation except sometimes by reason of special circumstances. Saint Alphonsus says that this last opinion is to be advised, not imposed, in practice.

² Yet it may be permitted to observe that imperfect acts of themselves are not against nature nor according to nature, because of themselves they say nothing such. Compare p. 70. Hence in the case it is the same as if spouses present exercised those acts and did not wish to perfect copulation. Nor should you say: if in spouses imperfect acts and incomplete pleasure are only venial, also in others they are only venially evil. The response: for spouses complete pleasure itself is licit in conjugal copulation, and accordingly also incomplete pleasure. Hence in the case, the thing which is sought by them is not undue, but only the mode in which it is sought is undue. On the contrary, for the unmarried the pleasure itself is undue, as reserved to marriage.

2. Morose delectation concerning copulation with one's own spouse had or to be had, or desire of it, because they concern a licit thing, are not sins, unless danger of pollution were present; for then they are mortal sin. Or unless someone adhered to them altogether uselessly and idly; for then they are venial. Delectation or desire concerning acts venially evil is a light sin; concerning acts prohibited under grave sin it is mortal.

IV. Concerning certain acts preparatory to copulation or accompanying it:

1. To begin copulation in an undue vessel, for example in the posterior vessel or in the mouth, with the intention of consummating it in the female genital canal; likewise to touch the posterior vessel with the genitals or to lick them with the mouth, is not mortal sin, provided the pouring forth of semen is guarded against and sodomitical affection is excluded, which nevertheless will easily be present if the aforesaid things are not done in passing but last for some time. Indeed, if they are sought as the sole means and preparation of the due act and a sufficient reason is present, for example because otherwise someone cannot be excited, they are not sin.³

³ For the incomplete act of itself is not against nature nor according to nature, but abstracts from both, as was said.

2. The woman can by touches, either her own or those of the husband, excite herself to having satiative and perfect pleasure, and thus complete copulation, if the man has previously inseminated within the female genital canal. On the contrary, this would be illicit if the man had inseminated outside the female genital canal in an onanistic mode, because then there would be no copulation apt for generation and accordingly no common act to be completed; whence, if it were done, there would be solitary sin.

3. Likewise, the wife could seek perfect pleasure immediately before the insemination of the man, at least if the man effects intromission before she is calmed. This will be done without mortal sin, and when reason is present, even without venial sin, if because of lesser heat she cannot be moved in the very congress and otherwise experience complete pleasure, or if the man himself is scarcely excited otherwise than by seeing the excitation of the wife and can perfect copulation. For it seems to suffice that in the conjugal act both spouses morally together experience the heat of pleasure. Nevertheless one must try that there also be physical simultaneity, because it is more fitting to nature and health, and fosters pleasure and love more.

4. Nevertheless it would not be licit for the man to continue the act if the wife has withdrawn herself, because it would be nothing but useless pollution.

5. The wife does not sin, at least mortally, who deliberately restrains commotion, distillation, and complete pleasure, because they are not necessary for copulation and generation, and therefore she is not the cause that the semen of the man is prodigally deprived of its end. Yet she would be reprehensible if she did this from anger or aversion toward the husband, and she should be exhorted that also in this she show herself easy so that she may please the man and foster the union of love.

V. Warning. Imperfect acts, since from their nature they are not licit except in order to copulation, are illicit for those for whom seeking or even rendering copulation is absolutely prohibited: thus, for example, by reason of vow, or permanent impotence.

This, however, is not to be understood of all touches, looks, or kisses; for such acts are of themselves licit in marriage, because it belongs to the spouse to exercise them upon the body of the consort, which is his or hers; nor are they of themselves and necessarily venereal, but only when venereal pleasure is sought in them, or they include danger of this kind. In this way, however, they are prohibited for those for whom copulation is altogether prohibited.

I. Excess in the use of marriage can be:

a. by reason of the end, as if it is done exclusively on account of pleasure;

b. by reason of an undue circumstance, for example position, if the act is done in a mode beside that which nature indicates;

c. especially by reason of a mode against nature, if it is done in such a way that generation itself is thereby impeded, for example in a sodomitical mode, in an unnatural vessel and undue organ, namely in the posterior vessel or in the mouth.

IV. Whether the use of marriage is licit for sterilized persons.

A. For sterilized women the use of marriage is per se licit, because per se they remain capable of an act of itself apt for generation. But if sterilization results from an illegitimate act voluntary on their part and can easily be removed, it will first have to be removed before they request the marital debt, because otherwise they would voluntarily place an impediment to generation.

B. For sterilized men who are impotent, as generally happens, the use of marriage is illicit. And indeed:

1. If the impotence is only doubtful, after a diligent examination has first been made, it is licit for them to attempt carnal intercourse so long as they have hope of completing it.

2. If the impotence is certain, the use is illicit. For if it is perpetual and antecedent to marriage, the marriage is null, and consequently every use of it is illicit. If the impotence is consequent, the marriage subsists; but intercourse is illicit so long as the impotence lasts, whatever one or another may have thought,⁶ for although the radical right to intercourse remains, an unimpeded right or the exercise of the right does not, because there cannot be an unimpeded right of doing, attempting, or exercising an altogether impossible act. And although it is per accidens that they cannot perform intercourse apt for generation, nevertheless intercourse such as would occur in them is unfit for generation, not indeed per accidens, but per se. Hence:

⁶ It does not appear that much attention should be paid to this opinion, both because more recently they did not study this question specifically, and because in this matter they do nothing but copy, without a new examination, what certain persons said earlier to be probable.

a. Even to seek the venereal pleasure of intercourse is illicit for them, because pleasure is not licitly sought except for the sake of the act; and if the act is illicit, the pleasure annexed to it is likewise illicit.

Preliminary Note. All the obligations of matrimony flow as corollaries from the three goods of matrimony, and consequently they have already been treated generally in the preceding chapter. Nevertheless, there remains one obligation which pertains to the good of fidelity and which must be treated specially, because it is of such great moment and because from it so many and such great difficulties can arise both for the spouses themselves and for the confessor. This obligation is called the conjugal debt. It indeed pains me, to use the words of St. Alphonsus,³⁷⁹ to have a longer discussion of this matter; but since it occurs so frequently in the hearing of confessions, the confessor must know it thoroughly, so that he can instruct spouses and render a correct judgment concerning sins perhaps committed. I forewarn, however, that the confessor ought not afflict married penitents with inopportune questions; indeed, in investigating this matter it is necessary rather to fall short than to abound. For it is better to leave spouses in good faith and permit material sins than, through imprudent questions, to make formal sins out of material sins and moreover to deter spouses from the sacrament of penance. - We divide this whole chapter into three articles: 1. on the liceity of the conjugal act; 2. on its obligation; 3. on the sins of spouses in this matter.

³⁷⁹ Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 900.

690. Principle. The conjugal act is licit, and indeed meritorious, whenever it accords with the good of offspring and the good of fidelity.

The individual parts of this very fruitful principle are to be explained and demonstrated. Certain ancient heretics denied the liceity of the conjugal act (for example, Saturninus, Marcion, the Manichaeans, and the Encratites), but several texts of Sacred Scripture manifestly prove not only its liceity, but also its obligation. Thus St. Paul writes: "Let the husband render the debt to his wife; and the wife also in like manner to the husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and in like manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife."³⁸⁰ - In the Old Testament, after their creation, God commanded the first parents: "Increase and multiply."³⁸¹ But according to the present order of things, the conjugal act is the sole means of propagating the human race. Therefore, if God wills the propagation of the human race, He also wills the conjugal act, which consequently is licit in itself. Nor is it required that each and every conjugal act serve directly and immediately for the propagation of the human race; for the whole economy of human propagation greatly excels the propagation of brute animals. Indeed, animals of the female sex are not accustomed to have the instinct, or even the power, of generating except during a brief and determinate time of each year; among them conception is very often completed by a single intercourse; and after that intercourse has been effected, the animals abhor another carnal union. It is altogether otherwise in the human race. Human physiology demonstrates that human conception can occur at any time of the year and commonly is not completed except by repeated conjugal acts. These things clearly demonstrate that the Creator permits spouses carnal intercourse even if human conception cannot follow here and now, for example, during pregnancy. Moreover, the unions of animals are transient, mutable, promiscuous, and produce no spiritual good; on the contrary, the marital union of human beings is stable; there is no promiscuity; spouses are not separated except by death.

But the principal end both of the whole conjugal life in general and of the conjugal act in particular is the spiritual good of the spouses.

Since these things are so, a general rule can be established: The conjugal act is licit when it serves the spiritual good of the spouses, even though conception or generation is neither directly and immediately had nor even intended. Not only supernatural virtues, but also marital love and affection conduce to the spiritual good of the spouses. For if spouses are united by true and constant love, their whole life also becomes happy; each willingly bears the burdens of the other, and almost all the praises which St. Paul attributes to charity can be proclaimed of such marital love, when he says: "Charity is patient, is kind; charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely, is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger, thinketh no evil ... beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things."³⁸²

³⁸⁰ 1 Cor. 7:3 f.

³⁸¹ Gen. 1:28.

³⁸² 1 Cor. 13:4 ff.

691. Practical conclusions immediately follow from the rule established above:

1. The conjugal act is licit during the time of nursing, both because the danger of infecting the milk and thus harming the child already born is not present (according to the common opinion of modern physicians), and because no law prohibits it. During the time of nursing a new conception is rather rare; but if it nevertheless occurs, then the mother's milk is customarily much diminished, so that the child already born must be nourished in an artificial manner; this is indeed some inconvenience, since such artificial nourishment is not as good as mother's milk. Nevertheless, this inconvenience is not so great that spouses are bound to observe complete continence throughout the whole time of nursing.³⁸³

2. The conjugal act is licit during pregnancy, provided that no grave danger is thereby brought upon the conceived fetus or the mother. For although a new conception is then impossible, nevertheless intercourse can serve to foster honorable marital love and to allay the impulses of the flesh. For it would be a most grave burden if spouses were bound to observe continence throughout the whole time of pregnancy. Per accidens, intercourse had at this time can be illicit, namely, if grave danger of abortion or illness arises from it.³⁸⁴

3. The conjugal act is licit between sterile spouses; with a wife whose ovaries have been excised, or even whose uterus has been removed;³⁸⁵ with a husband who was castrated after matrimony.³⁸⁶ The reason is the same. Certainly, the proximate end of intercourse in all these cases not only is not attained, but is even impossible; nevertheless, because the carnal act is completed in the ordinary manner and is frustrated of its proximate end only because of a physical impediment which does not depend upon the will of the spouses, it is licit.

4. The conjugal act is licit on Sundays and feast days or on the day of Communion, if it is performed for a reasonable cause. Certainly, it is most fitting that spouses not come together on days of Communion and during the short interval between confession and Communion, especially if they do not approach the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist so often. For such abstinence, being so rare and of such brief duration, cannot be hard; and therefore let the wife ask the husband to be willing then to abstain from the conjugal act. Nevertheless, if the husband bears this with difficulty, let the woman acquiesce in the desire of the husband. Especially let pious women who are accustomed to approach the sacred Synaxis several times each week show themselves ready to please the husband, lest he become indignant at such frequent reception of the sacraments.

³⁸³ Cf. Scavini, Theol. mor. univ., IV, n. 573.

³⁸⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 924), who favors the opinion that intercourse with a pregnant woman cannot be excused from venial fault unless there is danger of incontinence or another honorable cause. This honorable cause, however, is easily present. Certain Holy Fathers spoke more severely about intercourse during pregnancy, for example, St. Augustine and St. Jerome. Cf. Eschbach, Disp. physiol.-theol., 2nd ed., 110.

³⁸⁵ Holy Office, February 3, 1887, and July 30, 1890. Cf. also Noldin, De sexto praec., n. 61.

³⁸⁶ Cf. Sanchez, De matrim. sacr., l. 7, disp. 102, n. 7.

692. 5. The conjugal act is illicit because of pleasure alone, such that pleasure is its sole and ultimate end. Hence Innocent XI condemned proposition 9: "The act of matrimony exercised because of pleasure alone is entirely free from every fault and venial defect."³⁸⁷ Ballerini,³⁸⁸ however, deservedly notes that the words "because of pleasure alone" are to be understood with the exclusion of another honorable end; for it is certainly lawful to seek ordered pleasure, since God Himself joined pleasure to the conjugal act so that this act, so necessary for the conservation of the human race, might be made more desirable; but it is not lawful to seek pleasure as one's proper end. The older authors disputed at length concerning the liceity of conjugal intercourse exercised because of pleasure alone, or for preserving one's own health, or for avoiding temptations of fornication. All these disputes are of little practical utility. For in practice spouses are not to be disturbed if they exercise the conjugal act in an ordinary and honorable manner without actually thinking about some particular end. The reason is that the conjugal act performed in a natural manner fosters marital love, while marital love redounds to the good of offspring; and all teach that the conjugal act is licit because of the good of offspring. St. Thomas also seems to be understood in this sense when he teaches: "In only two ways do spouses come together without any sin, namely, for the sake of procreating offspring and of rendering the debt; otherwise there is always at least venial sin there."³⁸⁹

6. The conjugal act is illicit if one's own health, or that of the other spouse or the offspring, is thereby gravely and proximately endangered. Therefore spouses are not permitted to come together, for example, if one of them suffers from a grave contagious disease and especially from venereal disease,³⁹⁰ or if danger of abortion threatens the conceived offspring from intercourse. Small injuries to health or light bodily inconveniences, however, neither render the conjugal act illicit nor dispense from rendering the conjugal debt. - Authors customarily ask here whether the conjugal act is licit during menstruation and puerperal cleansing, because in these circumstances intercourse not rarely becomes harmful. The only true response to this question is this: Particular cases are to be considered; if grave harm truly arises for certain spouses in these circumstances, either for themselves or for offspring to be born, intercourse is illicit; otherwise it is not.

During menstruation it certainly is not fitting to exercise intercourse, but the opinion of the ancient authors who thought that during menstruation none were conceived except "those damaged in their members, the blind, the lame, and lepers" is not true.³⁹¹ The ceremonial or judicial law of the Old Testament prohibited intercourse during menstruation under penalty of death,³⁹² but this law no longer binds. In the Old Testament this law was wise both for fostering chastity, for avoiding superstition, and for guarding against grave diseases which, because of special circumstances among the Jews of that time, could easily arise from such intercourse.³⁹³

Modern physicians are accustomed to judge more severely concerning intercourse had during puerperal cleansing. Thus, for example, Capellmann³⁹⁴ says: "I consider intercourse in the first two weeks after childbirth altogether prohibited, since it is most apt to bring the gravest harm upon the woman. Indeed, during the following four weeks I do not think it licit without doubt. But since the danger at this time is no longer so great, let theologians determine what causes suffice to compensate for this danger of grave harm which may be brought upon the woman."

7. The conjugal act is illicit when it is completed in an onanistic manner. This is evident, because it is directly contrary to the good of offspring, whose generation is impeded; it is also contrary to the good of fidelity, according to which one spouse gives the other a right over his or her body, but only in order to generation. The discussion will return to the onanism of spouses below, n. 699.

8. The conjugal act is illicit if it does not occur in a secret manner and place. The reason is that scandal and most grave temptations are then caused to others. Hence parents sin gravely who come together immodestly, so that the children can perceive something.

9. The conjugal act is illicit if during it a spouse thinks as though he or she were joined with another person. For such a thought is spiritual adultery. The Angelic Doctor³⁹⁵ writes aptly concerning this matter: "If pleasure is sought beyond the honorableness of matrimony, so that someone does not attend in the spouse to the fact that she is a spouse, but only that she is a woman, being prepared to do the same thing with her if she were not his spouse, it is a mortal sin; and therefore such a one is called a too ardent lover of his wife, because that ardor is carried outside the goods of matrimony."

³⁸⁷ Denz., n. 1159.

³⁸⁸ In the notes to Gury, II, 908.

³⁸⁹ Suppl., q. 49, a. 5. William Peraldus, O.P., a contemporary of St. Thomas, writes concerning this matter: "The [carnal] act can be exercised without any fault and even meritoriously in three cases: 1. when it is for the sake of receiving offspring and educating it for the worship of God.... 2. when the debt is rendered to one asking.... 3. when someone demands that act so that he may guard his spouse lest the spouse fall into the sin [of incontinence]" (Summa virtut. et vitior., I, De temperantia, c. 17, Venice ed. 1571, p. 569).

³⁹⁰ Cf. above, n. 692. What is taught "concerning the matrimony of lepers" (cc. 1, 2, X 4, 8) does not oppose this doctrine, because the ancients thought that proximate danger of contagion did not arise from intercourse with a leper. Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 1, ad 4; Billuart, De matr., diss. 4, a. 4, § 1.

³⁹¹ Thus thought, for example, St. Jerome (In Is., c. 65).

³⁹² "He that shall copulate with a woman in her menstrual flow, and shall uncover her nakedness, and she shall open the fountain of her blood, both shall be put to death out of the midst of their people" (Lev. 20:18).

³⁹³ D. Haller explains well the reason for the Mosaic law (in Eschbach, Disp. physiol.-theol., 2nd ed., 106, disp. 1, c. 8, a. 1).

³⁹⁴ Pastoralmedizin, 18th ed., p. 316. The same physician says: "In my eyes, intercourse, at least in the first weeks, appears as true brutality toward the puerperal woman."

³⁹⁵ Suppl., q. 49, a. 6.

693. Corollary. On acts accessory to marital intercourse. Not only is the conjugal act itself licit, but so also are all accessory acts, whether mutual or solitary, which are either necessary or useful for completing the conjugal act. The reason is obvious; for if the end is licit, all honorable means not prohibited from another source are also licit, so that this end may be obtained. Certainly spouses are to be exhorted to exercise the conjugal act with great modesty, and especially the woman is with all her strength to take care for her modesty and honor; but a mortal sin is never committed by spouses in this matter unless there occurs either pollution of either party, foreseen and culpably willed, or at least the proximate danger of pollution. Absolutely all other lustful acts had between spouses are at most venial sins and often lack every fault. Hence the confessor acts badly if he torments spouses concerning this matter with inopportune questions and renders confession hateful to them. It is much better to leave spouses in good faith or to admonish them only generally to preserve modesty.

698. It is scarcely necessary to note that here there is discussion only of the sins of spouses against chastity.

Principle. a) A grave sin of spouses against chastity is whatever directly and gravely conflicts with the good of offspring and the good of fidelity; b) a venial sin is whatever is done from pleasure alone, without directly conflicting with the good of offspring and fidelity; c) no sin is that which is useful or necessary for performing the conjugal act well and fostering marital love.

Explanation. The second and third parts of this principle are sufficiently evident from what was said above, nn. 690 and 692, concerning the conjugal act performed from pleasure alone and concerning the accessories of this act. - Nearly all mortal sins of spouses can be reduced to three classes: 1. sins of lust perpetrated with other persons, whether by deed or by desire; 2. sodomy and onanistic intercourse; 3. solitary pollution. - There can be no special difficulty concerning the judgment of sins of the first and third classes. The same holds concerning those sins as must be said if they were perpetrated by an unmarried person. A new species, however, is added, namely, the violation of justice. For a spouse perpetrating these sins violates not only chastity but also justice, since he or she no longer has power over his or her own body, but the consort has it, who by divine institution cannot renounce this right. Hence a spouse who has committed, for example, pollution⁴⁰³ or sins with other persons must declare his or her conjugal state in confession. Nevertheless, in practice, because those who are untrained in moral matters do not apprehend the twofold malice in solitary pollution, the confessor can sometimes omit questions, unless he hopes that the penitent, warned of the greater gravity of the sin, will thereby be more effectively deterred from committing new sins.⁴⁰⁴ - Nor are many things to be said here concerning sodomy. For if sodomy is committed with another person, then the same holds as was just said concerning sins of lust committed outside matrimony. But if there is question of imperfect sodomy committed between the spouses themselves, then this must be accused altogether in confession. For it is a detestable abuse of matrimony.⁴⁰⁵

It remains to speak of conjugal onanism, and indeed: 1. of the notion and malice of conjugal onanism; 2. of cooperation in conjugal onanism; 3. of the means of guarding against conjugal onanism; 4. of the manner of treating spouses practicing onanism.

⁴⁰³ Some authors, such as Marc (Instit. mor. I, n. 793) and Noldin (De sexto praec., n. 31), call pollution perpetrated by one spouse adultery.

⁴⁰⁴ Cf. Noldin, ibid., n. 19.

⁴⁰⁵ What perfect and imperfect sodomy are, see above in the treatise on the virtue of chastity, II, n. 706. - Moralists ask here whether venereal pleasure had through touches and looks upon one's own body without danger of pollution is a mortal sin for spouses. Some respond that in all these things spouses are to be judged like unmarried persons; others, however, probably teach that for spouses in the matter of chastity a mortal sin is present only when pollution or its proximate danger arises. But all other things are not gravely sinful, because they can have some relation to conjugal intercourse. It is self-evident that spouses sin not more lightly but more gravely than unmarried persons in venereal pleasure which is referred to an extraneous person. Cf. Berardi, Praxis confess. I, n. 962.

2093. That the conjugal act is of itself licit and honorable is already established from the things said concerning the honorableness of matrimony (cf. n. 1967). But that such an act, from every part, be licit and legitimate, it ought to be clothed with certain conditions, which refer both to the persons using matrimony, and to the end and circumstances of the act itself.

For the liceity of the conjugal act there is required on the part of the persons a true right, and this unimpeded.

It is said 1. a true right, that is, a right which arises from valid matrimony; otherwise the conjugal act would be true fornication. Whence: if matrimony is certainly null, it is never licit for the party knowing this either to seek or to render the debt to the other who is ignorant.⁹ - It is said 2. an unimpeded right; for spouses can be deprived of conjugal right on account of certain prohibiting impediments, which either preceded matrimony or followed after. The principal ones concerning which we must treat here are FOUR, namely: 1. Doubt concerning the value of matrimony; 2. Impotence of body; 3. Simple vow of chastity; 4. Affinity contracted after matrimony was entered. Concerning these, therefore, the following are established.¹⁰

2094. Principles. I. A spouse DOUBTING concerning the value of his matrimony CAN and OUGHT to RENDER the debt to a coparty seeking in good faith; but he CANNOT SEEK it, unless he prudently has put aside his doubt after due diligence has been made. The reason of the first is that if, after the first two-month period, or after consummation of the matrimony, he refused to obey the coparty seeking in good faith, he would commit himself to grave danger of violating that one's right. Whence, as long as from valid reasons it has not been established with moral certitude concerning the nullity of the matrimony, the certain possession of the coparty presses. - The reason of the second is that in the one doubting the right of possession is suspended until the truth has been diligently investigated, as was seen in n. 46; but with doubt persevering after diligence has been made, possession remains for the value of the matrimony, and therefore for the use of it.¹¹

St. Alphonsus with others, against many, admits these same things as sufficiently probable, even if the matrimony had been contracted in bad faith or in doubt; because although the one doubting cannot put aside doubt by title of possession, since he began to possess in bad faith, nevertheless he can put it aside from another principle, namely from the principle that in doubt one must stand for the value of matrimony, in favor of which, in the forum both internal and external, judgment must always be made, by reason of the common good of society.¹²

Yet two cases are to be excepted, in which doubt cannot be put aside from the aforesaid principles, namely: - 1. If someone prudently doubts concerning the death of a prior spouse; for then the prior matrimony possesses, until it is established as morally certain concerning its dissolution; meanwhile, however, the debt must be rendered to the coparty seeking in good faith, as we said above.¹³ - 2. If it is established concerning an impediment of ecclesiastical law, and it is not established concerning a dispensation having been obtained; for then likewise the impediment possesses. But otherwise, if it is established concerning the dispensation and there is doubt concerning its value; because one must stand for the value of the act¹⁴ (cf. n. 1810).

IT IS ASKED. What in the case of a matrimony contracted in GOOD FAITH, if it is PROBABLY invalid, no probability standing for the value?

Resp. It is controverted. The first opinion DENIES the right of seeking the debt; because possession indeed suffragates for one doubting, but not for one opining for the nullity of matrimony. - The second opinion, sufficiently probable, AFFIRMS; because possession confers a certain right of seeking, until it is established concerning the nullity of matrimony. It is confirmed from cap. Laudabilem, de frigid. et malef.; for if, after two years, spouses have not yet been able to consummate, it is surely most probable that the matrimony is invalid; and nevertheless they can attempt intercourse until the end of the third year, certainly for no other reason, except because the nullity of matrimony is not yet certain (cf. n. 45).¹⁵

2095. II. Certain impotence SUPERVENING upon matrimony renders the use of it illicit, insofar as danger of pollution underlies.¹⁶ The reason is that the pouring out of seed is not licit except in an act of itself apt for generation. Authors commonly agree.

It is said 1. certain impotence; for if it is doubtful, it is licit to try intercourse for so long as there is probable hope of completing it as nature requires (cf. n. 2011, Resp. 2).

It is said 2. insofar as danger of pollution underlies; because short of such danger, the conjugal act is licit, no otherwise than touches, concerning which below n. 2110.

Whence spouses are not to be prohibited from the use of matrimony if, on account of old age or another cause, it generally happens that the seed is poured out outside the vessel, "provided there is probable hope of emitting seed within the vessel; because whenever such hope is present, they have a right to intercourse, and if seed is poured out, this happens by accident."¹⁷

2096. III. He who VOWED chastity after matrimony CANNOT SEEK the debt; nevertheless he is BOUND to RENDER it to one seeking. The reason of the first is sufficiently clear from the obligation of the vow. - The reason of the second is that a vow cannot prejudice the right of the other spouse.¹

But if the spouse not only permitted the coparty's vow, but consented to it, intending to yield his right, now neither is permitted the seeking or rendering of the debt. But if "they have vowed mutually, not intending to yield their right, the one is still bound to render to the other seeking," as is commonly taught. And the reason is that the seeking is still just, and on the part of the act honorable, although on the part of the one seeking illicit; and because thus to one seeking there can never be denied a thing which is owed to him from justice² (cf. n. 216 and 519). But if the vow preceded matrimony, recall the things said in n. 1992, Hence 2.

IT IS ASKED. Whether a spouse bound by a vow can ever seek the debt?

Resp. HE CAN, indeed HE OUGHT, in a twofold case: - 1. If the other is in danger of incontinence; because then the obligation arises from the very end of matrimony, which commands that one assist the other. - 2. If the other seeks tacitly, for instance when a wife does not dare to seek because of modesty, and the husband perceives intercourse to be desired by her; because then the seeking is really a rendering. Thus commonly³ (cf. n. 1992).

2097. IV. A spouse who, during matrimony, contracted AFFINITY with his consort, namely by perpetrating complete and formal incest with a blood relative of the consort, male or female, in the first or second degree, is deprived of the right of seeking the debt until he has obtained a legitimate dispensation. - Recall the things said in n. 2031, q. 3.

Note. Concerning adultery, insofar as it deprives of the right of seeking the debt, see n. 2031, question 3.

That the conjugal act be licit and honorable, it must be exercised FOR AN HONORABLE END. This is clear from the things said concerning the honorableness of human acts (cf. n. 306 and 307). - Whence,

2098. I. It is licit to exercise the conjugal act for VARIOUS ENDS which COHONESTATE matrimony, namely: - 1. For generating offspring; because this is the end intended by the very Author of matrimony. Nor, however, must the generation of offspring necessarily be intended, provided it is not positively impeded; indeed it is licit for spouses with a simple affection to wish that offspring not be born, for instance because of the difficulty of nourishing it. - 2. For rendering the debt; because this rendering is an act of justice emanating from the institution itself of matrimony. - 3. For avoiding incontinence in oneself or in the coparty; because after the fall of the first parents, matrimony was also ordained as a remedy of concupiscence. - Indeed, if it is a question of avoiding the coparty's incontinence, the act is not only licit, but also obligatory by precept of charity. - And these are the PRIMARY ends.

Moreover, it is licitly exercised for any honorable end whatever, e.g. for fostering conjugal love, for the health of the body; because nothing prevents a means licit in itself, and useful for that end, from being applied to an honorable end.⁴

2099. II. It is not licit to exercise the conjugal act FOR PLEASURE ALONE. This is clear from the ninth proposition condemned by Innocent XI: "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely without any fault or venial defect." The reason for the condemnation is given because it is a certain perversion of order to intend delight as an end, which nature intends as a means. But there is only VENIAL fault, because the inordinate use of a thing licit in itself is not grave, unless someone rests in it as in an ultimate end (cf. n. 342, q. 3).

It was said: for pleasure alone, i.e. any other end whatever being excluded; because unless such an exclusion is made, the act, apprehended as licit and duly exercised, is referred virtually and by its nature to its proper intrinsic ends. Wherefore it is also without any fault, although the appetite of delight impels one to it (cf. n. 1966).

Here also in passing we note that a spouse sins gravely who exercises marital intercourse with an adulterous affection toward another person, whom he imagines or wishes to be present to himself⁵ (cf. n. 356).

From these things you will resolve: - 1. The conjugal act is licit, although because of sterility there is no hope of offspring; for this happens by accident, and the other ends of matrimony cohonestate the act.

2. Spouses who assume the pleasure of intercourse as a remedy of concupiscence, or for avoiding incontinence, act rather from love of virtue than from love of pleasure, since they intend to preserve continence and avoid sin. But those who desire pleasure for its own sake are led by love, not of virtue, but of pleasure, which is not honorable.⁶

3. In practice, as regards the use of matrimony for delight alone, spouses are customarily in good faith, nor usually can fruit be hoped for from admonition. Whence it is more advisable that the confessor leave them in their good faith.⁷

2100. The due circumstances of the conjugal act look especially to its manner, place, and time.

I. The natural manner or position in the use of matrimony is that the woman be beneath and the man above, since it is more apt for pouring out and receiving seed; whence, of itself it is unlawful to change this position, since such a change is an inversion of the order of nature. Yet authors commonly say with St. Thomas that it is not of itself mortal if the act is exercised in an improper position, either standing, or sitting, or from behind after the manner of beasts, or with the man beneath, provided it always takes place in the natural vessel. For a change of position ordinarily does not impede generation, since the male seed is of itself naturally drawn into the woman's matrix. - And therefore there will be no sin if the natural manner is changed on account of some just cause, e.g. of danger of abortion, scandal, or difficulty.⁸

We said 1. that of itself it is not mortal; for the Angelic Doctor teaches that by accident one can sin gravely in this, if it is done from depraved concupiscence, e.g. from an affection of bestiality or sodomy.⁹ 2. Provided it always takes place in the natural vessel; otherwise the order of nature would be essentially violated, and the end of matrimony would be entirely frustrated (cf. n. 2112).

You will ask whether it is mortal to change position if, because of this, some part of the seed is lost? Doctors more commonly deny it; because if seed is poured into the vessel, a partial loss of it after infusion, which can occur in some positions, happens by chance, nor does it forestall conception. For it is clear that a small amount of seed suffices for generation. - On the contrary, if it were established by experience that the woman retains none of the seed because of the natural position having been changed, then it would be mortal; but this very rarely happens. And therefore the confessor ought not to ask about this danger.¹⁰

2101. II. The place suitable for the conjugal act cannot be, as natural modesty itself dictates, except secret. In a public place or before others, and especially before children, the conjugal act would be a most grave scandal. But if it were done in a sacred place, apart from the case of necessity, according to the more probable and more common opinion it would be a grave and sacrilegious irreverence (cf. n. 788).¹¹

Note. Spouses are to be admonished not to allow children capable of reason, or already capable of some malice, to lie down with them in bed or in the bedroom.¹² But if on account of poverty they are compelled to this, let them at least take care lest the children perceive anything.

2102. III. TIME, of itself, is an indifferent circumstance; nevertheless sometimes, by reason of other adjuncts, it can render the conjugal act lightly or gravely illicit. Thus more commonly with St. Bonaventure. - The reason of the first is that no law can be assigned by which an act of this kind is ever prohibited, and the prescriptions of the ancient Mosaic law have been entirely abrogated by the New Law. Whence if the canons and the holy Fathers seem to prohibit the use of marriage on feast days or in times of penance, the prohibition is to be understood as of counsel, not of precept. Concerning the days of Communion, see n. 1561, 2. - The reason of the second is had from the natural law, because the use of conjugal right can be suspended or impeded on account of the concurrence of another predominant right, e.g. on account of danger of abortion or harm to health, especially in the time of menstruation, pregnancy, purification after birth, lactation, and sickness. - Whence YOU WILL RESOLVE:

1. In the time of menstrual flow conjugal intercourse is forbidden, under venial fault, as the most common and more probable opinion holds; both because it involves a certain indecency, and because, as physicians testify, it can harm the genital parts of the woman and thence, if she conceives, afterward bring on some danger of abortion; and because it is a certain intemperance not to await the suitable time which will shortly be present. In the time of an extraordinary flow of blood, which proceeds from disease and is long-lasting or perpetual, intercourse can then become illicit when it is established by experience that the flow is increased after intercourse; if this happens, intercourse will ordinarily harm somewhat, yet rarely gravely. If it will be only lightly harmful, intercourse will become licit, because otherwise the husband would have to abstain perpetually, which would bring him both grave inconvenience and ordinarily grave danger of incontinence; these two things certainly prevail over a slight harm to the wife.¹³

2. In the time of pregnancy, intercourse, the danger of abortion being excluded, is more commonly judged licit; because it is prohibited by no law, and it would be a most grave burden if spouses were held to contain themselves for so long a time. - Nevertheless, the opinion of those who judge that intercourse with a pregnant woman, speaking of itself, is not without venial fault, is more pleasing to St. Alphonsus; because the seed is frustrated of its end; yet by accident it is cohonestated when an honorable cause accedes, e.g. danger of incontinence, or another cause; and since this is hardly ever absent, in practice this opinion nearly coincides with the former.¹⁴

The danger of abortion will be so much the less, the farther intercourse is distant from the day of conception. Whence it can exist only within the first months of pregnancy, and in this time only then when intercourse is performed either more often or more impetuously; wherefore moderation as to number and manner is to be recommended to spouses. - Moreover, on account of the danger of abortion, intercourse can by no means be forbidden; both because no one knows anything concerning beginning pregnancy, at least nothing certain; and because abortions much more often proceed from a morbid disposition than from a direct cause.¹⁵

3. In the time of purgation, according to the more common and more probable opinion, intercourse is illicit; both because of indecency and because of danger of harm for the wife. - If slight harm is feared, there will be venial fault; if grave, mortal fault. A new conception is not to be feared except after about six weeks, namely when the uterus is restored and menstruation recurs.¹⁶ Moreover, according to the opinion of St. Alphonsus,¹⁷ who consulted a very skilled physician, grave harm can prudently be feared within two days after birth; and, according to more recent physicians, still longer, for one or perhaps two weeks, namely while the puerperal flow, or the woman's great weakness or sickness, persists.

4. In the time of lactation, it is most commonly affirmed that intercourse is licit; because although milk for the most part, when a new pregnancy begins, is soon diluted and shortly ceases, offspring can be nursed in another way, lest spouses be compelled to abstain for so long with so great difficulty. To this there accedes that a woman commonly does not conceive in the time of lactation.¹⁸

5. In the time of sickness, the conjugal act is illicit when notable harm to health can prudently be feared from it. Therefore, A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE between contagious and non-contagious diseases.

1. In the contagious disease of one spouse, if it is a venereal disease or syphilis, intercourse is gravely illicit, on account of the horrendous consequences which it brings with it for the coparty and for offspring. The infected party is not bound to manifest this disease to the coparty, on account of infamy, provided that, while he remains silent, he neither seeks nor renders the debt. Yet see n. 2108, 2.

In other diseases, intercourse is likewise prohibited if they are apt to bring death shortly; but otherwise, if they are chronic or longer-lasting, because the danger of incontinence, which for so long a time can scarcely be absent, seems to prevail. Moreover, the infected party is bound to manifest the disease to the coparty.

It must be admonished in this place that phthisis is not a contagious disease, but hereditary; but it would be better for offspring to be infirm than not to be at all. - On the contrary, the flow of seed which in men is called gonorrhea is for the most part a certain species of syphilis, and therefore contagious, as physicians testify. - Leucorrhea, or white flow, from which pregnant women often suffer, does not forbid intercourse, since it is not harmful.

2. In a non-contagious disease, intercourse is very harmful in a disease that greatly debilitates, joined with fever and the greatest pain. In a slight disease, intercourse is not harmful; nevertheless diseases of the genitals are excepted, which in a woman can be aggravated by intercourse and afterward be healed with difficulty.

Note. After a bath, bloodletting, lunch, or dinner, intercourse is not customarily notably dangerous, as present-day physicians testify.¹⁹

Besides those things which have already been said concerning those who INJUSTLY seek or deny the conjugal act, it remains that we speak of the same act insofar as it is opposed to CHASTITY. - Hence we shall treat: 1. of the sins of spouses generally; 2. specifically of onanism.

2110. Acts which can be exercised in conjugal commerce are distinguished as of THREE kinds: namely some are according to, others besides, others against the end of marriage.¹⁸ Hence a threefold rule:

I. Whatever is ACCORDING TO the end of marriage, or whatever is necessary or useful either for exercising the conjugal act or for fostering mutual love, is licit for spouses. - The reason is, "because for him for whom the end is licit, the means are also licit; and for him for whom the consummation is licit, the beginning is also licit."¹⁹

Hence: 1. Modest touches, kisses, and embraces for fostering mutual love are without fault, although sometimes unforeseen pollution would follow; because this would be by accident, and a just cause is present for applying blandishments of this kind. - But they are gravely culpable "if they are done with danger of pollution in oneself or in the other, in a case in which they are had for pleasure alone, or even for a light cause; otherwise if for a grave cause, for instance if sometimes there is an urgent cause of showing signs of affection for fostering mutual love; or so that a spouse may avert from the other the suspicion that he is inclined toward another person,"²⁰ provided danger of consent is absent.

2. Touches, kisses, embraces, sights, foul conversations, and all immodest acts are without fault if, danger of pollution being excluded, they are referred to intercourse to be consummated here and now. This also is true, although pollution now and then inculpably precedes intercourse.²¹ - Yet spouses ought according to their strength to beware of an effect of this kind, not lingering too long in the aforesaid acts.²²

2111. II. Whatever is BESIDES the end of marriage, or whatever is not of itself necessary or useful for the conjugal act, is customarily a venial fault, from which, nevertheless, an honorable end can excuse. Thus commonly according to the truer opinion. And the reason is that just as the conjugal state cohonestates intercourse, so also it cohonestates immodest acts which do not induce danger of pollution. "For otherwise, since there is so great a companionship between spouses, and they often cannot have intercourse, they would be exposed to continual dangers if such acts were gravely illicit for them. But just as delight sought in intercourse does not exceed venial fault, so also in these touches and sights."²³

Hence: 1. Spouses do indeed sin, but only venially, if for the sake of pleasure and with proximate danger of pollution excluded, they permit to themselves foul acts or sights without order to intercourse. "And this, even if intercourse were then forbidden to them on account of disease, or were impossible on account of impotence which had supervened, as Sanchez and others say; because, since intercourse is licit between spouses, touches between them cannot be gravely illicit. But otherwise one must say if a spouse were bound by a vow of chastity; because such a vow excludes every venereal pleasure voluntarily taken. Thus commonly." - But one impeded from intercourse on account of affinity contracted, although of himself he is not bound under grave obligation to abstain from touches and sights of this kind, since the penal law prohibiting intercourse is not to be extended to touches, nevertheless "in practice, ordinarily he ought to abstain from touches of this kind, especially foul ones, on account of the proximate danger either of pollution, or of seeking intercourse by seeking against the prohibition."²⁴

2. "It is licit, as the truly probable opinion holds, for spouses to take delight, even carnally, concerning intercourse had or future, whenever danger of pollution is absent. The reason is that the matrimonial state itself renders all these things licit; otherwise the matrimonial state would be liable to too many scruples."²⁵ - But indeed, "if delight is had not only with commotion of the spirits, but also with titillation or venereal pleasure, I think it cannot be excused from mortal fault, because such delight is proximately joined with the danger of pollution."²⁶

2112. III. Whatever is AGAINST the end of marriage, or whatever is opposed to the generation of offspring, namely by inducing of itself, outside natural congress, an outpouring of seed, is gravely illicit; indeed, according to the more probable opinion, it has the malice of a double adultery¹ (cf. n. 782, 2). - The reason of the first is that the outpouring of seed is not licit except in order to generation, and therefore matrimony gives spouses no faculty except for an outpouring of seed which can of itself serve generation.² - The reason of the second is that voluntary pollution by a married person violates the right of the coparty; whence it has annexed to itself the malice of adultery, just as pollution by one bound by a vow of chastity has the malice of sacrilege. Since, therefore, in the conjugal act which is done against the end of marriage, each sinner is married, it follows that the aforesaid malice is superadded to the pollution of each.³

Hence: 1. Sodomy between married persons has the guilt of greater malice than between unmarried persons, far from losing anything of its atrocity on account of the matrimonial state.⁴ This also holds concerning a sin not consummated, for instance if the husband were to begin intercourse in the unnatural vessel, with the intention of completing it in the natural vessel; or if he were to rub the private parts around the unnatural vessel of the wife;⁵ or if he were to introduce them into her mouth⁶ (which obscenity is called irrumation); because in these there is either the beginning of sodomy, or an affection toward it, or another sin against nature.

2. Foul touches are gravely illicit which are had without order to the conjugal act, with proximate danger of pollution.⁷ But if acts of this kind are by their nature a kind of disposition toward intercourse, they can be excused in the one rendering, on account of the grave inconvenience otherwise to be undergone by him, as we shall say below concerning onanism, provided they are not such that of themselves they induce an entirely proximate danger of pollution, and therefore seem to be as it were the beginning of it, e.g. lingering handling of the private parts.⁸ For since direct pollution is always illicit, its proximate danger can never be permitted, unless those causes are given and those conditions are observed which sufficiently excuse indirectly voluntary pollution (cf. n. 796).

3. The man sins gravely if, deliberately, he restrains emission, when the wife has already emitted seed or is in probable danger of emitting; because he is the cause why the seed of the wife, the end of generation being frustrated, is wasted. - But otherwise, if he were to interrupt intercourse from a grave cause, for instance to avoid scandal, although with danger of pollution.⁹

4. If the man has already emitted seed, it becomes doubtful whether the WOMAN sins mortally if she withdraws herself from emitting seed, or whether the MAN sins mortally by not awaiting the emission of the wife. The more common and today much more probable opinion denies this; and the reason is that today it has been discovered that in the woman there is not given a true emission of seed which is necessary for generation. The matter which the woman necessarily supplies to generation is the ovum. If the woman has a mature and released ovum, she is apt for fecundation, although she is not moved in the act of intercourse. Certainly, the secretion of humor which theologians call emission, and the concomitant movement of the organ, contribute something to fecundation;¹⁰ but spouses are not held to come together in the more apt manner, and it is enough if they do not impede generation.

Nevertheless, the contrary practice is earnestly to be advised, both because the aforesaid emission of the woman pertains to the complement of intercourse, and lest conjugal love grow cold. - But if either one were so to behave as to impede generation, on the part of intention there would be mortal fault.¹¹

5. It is ordinarily a mortal sin if both spouses, intercourse having begun, restrain emission; and the reason is that although, speaking speculatively, such congress, danger of pollution being excluded, is not gravely illicit, and is reputed like a touch of the private parts, nevertheless practically the danger of pollution can scarcely be absent in both spouses, which would be required. - Except if the spouses have experienced the opposite; yet in that case they would not be excused from venial fault.¹²

6. A wife sins mortally who, immediately after the conjugal act, rises or does something with the intention of expelling the received seed. For such an act, although it is done in vain, nevertheless by reason of the perverse intention has the malice of abortion.¹³

2113. IT IS ASKED. Whether foul touches WITH ONESELF are ever licit for a spouse?

Resp. 1. They are licit if they are ordered to intercourse to be had immediately, as all confess. Indeed, they are licit, more probably, for a WOMAN immediately after intercourse in which the man alone emitted seed, so that she may thus procure her own emission; because although this is not absolutely necessary for generation, nevertheless it can contribute to it and pertains to completing the conjugal act.¹⁴ But before intercourse this is never licit, nor after onanistic congress, because in that case the end of nature would be entirely frustrated.

Resp. 2. The aforesaid necessity or utility being excluded, they are not licit; indeed, according to the more probable opinion, and one wholly to be advised, they are, just as for other unmarried persons, gravely illicit if they are had for pleasure. The reason is both that a spouse does not have a right in his own body of itself, but only by accident, namely in order to intercourse; and that touches of the private parts, when they are done lingeringly and with commotion of the spirits, of themselves tend to pollution and are connected proximately with its danger.¹⁵

2114. Onanism is intercourse begun or completed with an outpouring of male seed outside the vessel (n. 801).

Intercourse is begun when the man indeed penetrates the natural vessel, but as soon as he notices that the outpouring of seed is proximate, withdraws himself; or also when the woman withdraws herself before the man's emission. - Intercourse is completed, namely in the natural vessel, but with greater malice, when the man uses a certain thin covering or instrument to impede the seminal substance from arriving at a place apt for generation.

Moreover, there has been invented a wicked manner of destroying conception immediately after intercourse, namely by means of a certain injection into the uterus. This injection, as is clear, has the guilt of homicide, just as the procuring of abortion.¹⁶

2115. Principles. I. Onanism between spouses is an act against nature, and therefore gravely illicit.¹⁷ - This is clear both from Scripture, which (Gen. 38:10) calls this act a detestable thing, and from reason, which dictates that onanism is true pollution directly defrauding matrimony of its end, and also from the decision of the Church, which, by a Decree of the Holy Office on 21 May 1851, defined that this use of matrimony is prohibited by natural law, and taught that this is elicited from proposition 49 condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: "Mollities is not prohibited by the law of nature."¹⁸

Hence: 1. Onanism can be cohonestated by no cause, whether of poverty, lest offspring to be nourished be multiplied, or of avoiding infirmity, or of warding off danger of death in childbirth. Yet on account of a cause of this kind it can be perpetrated with good faith; and when this exists, it belongs to the prudent confessor to judge whether admonition is expedient or not.

2. Not only the man exercising onanism, but also the wife formally cooperating with or consenting to him sins mortally, and both are unworthy of absolution unless they sincerely grieve concerning the sin and promise amendment. - The wife formally cooperates if by complaints concerning the pains or dangers of childbirth, concerning more numerous offspring, etc., she supplies to her husband an impulse toward onanism, namely foreseeing this effect or even intending it.¹⁹

2116. II. Onanism can be PERMITTED by the wife if a JUST cause suffragates for her rendering the debt to an onanistic husband. - The reason is that she then cooperates with the husband's sin only materially, by an act honorable in itself, which it is licit to furnish under certain conditions and with a just cause acceding.

The CONDITIONS are the following:

1. That the wife not consent to the husband's sin, and that she always be ready to impede it efficaciously, if she could (cf. n. 518, 519). - We say to the sin; for nothing prevents her from consenting to the carnal delight arising from intercourse, or even to a simple complacency concerning not having offspring, according to the things said in n. 2098.

2. That she not cease prudently to admonish the husband concerning the obligation of desisting from this foulness. Thus the S. Penitentiary, 13 Nov. 1816. For she is held to such admonition both from charity toward the husband, namely that he may recover his senses, and from charity toward herself, namely that she may decline every danger of consent. It was said prudently; for admonitions ought not to be continual, nor unseasonable, but opportune, namely when hope of amendment shines forth, and no grave evil is to be feared, for instance the husband's adultery, indignation, or great dissension.

3. That she permit the inordinate act only from a just and reasonable cause. And to this pertain the words of the Major Penitentiary in the cited Response: "Approved and chastened moral theologians agree in this, that it is licit for a wife to render the debt, if from its denial she is to be treated badly by her husband, and can fear grave inconvenience to herself from it; for, they say, in this case the wife is not judged formally to cooperate with the sin of her husband, but only to permit it from a just and reasonable cause."²⁰ In practice, denial of the debt can scarcely be separated from danger of grave inconvenience.

2117. Therefore, when the aforesaid conditions concur, the WIFE can licitly RENDER the debt, provided the act is rightly begun, and she, as regards the interruption, has herself entirely passively. But if the husband is known to be about to commit onanism by means of an instrument, the wife cannot, by having herself passively, permit the act; but she is bound, not otherwise than a virgin to whom force is brought, firmly to resist according to her strength. The reason is that in such a case intercourse on the part of the act itself, already from the beginning, is entirely illicit and against nature.²¹

2118. Questions. QUESTION 1. Whether a wife can also SEEK the debt from an onanistic husband?

Resp. Affirmatively, but only from a grave cause. It is said only from a grave cause, because she is held from charity not to give the husband an occasion of sinning. - Now a grave cause would be danger of incontinence, a long deprivation of the right of seeking, with perpetual scruple whether the cause of seeking is just or not; wherefore she is not held to abstain except for a few times²² (cf. 2098).

QUESTION 2. Whether the husband commits onanism if he indeed penetrates the wife's vessel, but only slightly, and pours out all the seed at the entrance of the vagina?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. In the work, negatively, because that act indeed renders fecundation less easy, but does not impede it; therefore intercourse so exercised is apt for generation. Yet except if it were done in such a way that all the seed flows away and is lost. - 2. In the mind, subdistinguish: affirmatively, if he intends to impede generation in this way, then from a depraved intention he sins mortally against nature; otherwise, it must be denied. Moreover, if he behaves thus because he wishes to avoid a manner more apt for generation, so that offspring may be less certain, he does not seem to be guilty of lethal fault; because he is not held to choose the more certain manner for conceiving offspring, nor is the desire of lacking offspring a mortal sin. Finally, if he has a legitimate cause of behaving thus, because, e.g., the wife on account of recent birth or infirmity in the private parts does not endure more perfect coition, he sins in no way.²³

QUESTION 3. What is to be judged concerning spouses who, for avoiding more numerous offspring, come together only at that time when fecundation can occur with difficulty?

Preliminary note. It is clear from very many testimonies of physicians that the conception of offspring occurs easily about the time in which the woman is in menstruation, namely three or four days before, and about fifteen days after; but with difficulty at another time, called agenesis, if the flow of blood is certain and constant every month.²⁴ Now then,

Resp. Of themselves, they are not to be accused of sin; for they use their right, since the work of marriage is not prescribed at the time when the probability of conception is greater, nor is it prohibited at the time when the probability is less or none. But whether by accident fault enters, is to be judged from the end and from the other circumstances. To the point is the following response, which, after various doubts had been proposed concerning this manner of acting, the S. PENITENTIARY, on 16 June 1880, judged should be given: "The S. Penitentiary, having diligently weighed the things proposed, responds: Spouses using matrimony in the aforesaid manner are not to be disturbed, and the confessor can cautiously, however, insinuate the opinion in question to those spouses whom he has attempted in vain to draw away in another way from the detestable crime of onanism."²⁵

QUESTION 4. But what concerning ARTIFICIAL fecundation, e.g. between sterile spouses?

Resp. Fecundation of this kind, which is done with seed obtained from the husband's pollution, is intrinsically evil, and therefore wholly illicit.²⁶

2119. Admonition. Concerning the office of the confessor in QUESTIONING about the sins of spouses, besides the things said in n. 1804 sqq., let the following be noted:

1. Concerning those things which look to the use of matrimony, the confessor should question only those whom, on account of a just cause, he suspects to be guilty of lethal fault. And he should do this in the most modest manner he can, by inquiring, e.g. from wives, whether "they have always been obedient in those things which look to the conjugal state." - If from a general question of this kind he detects something of culpability, yet does not sufficiently know the nature of the sin, let him come so cautiously to particular questions that he gives the penitent an occasion rather of opening his conscience than seems to investigate it more curiously. - But concerning venial things let him introduce no discussion of his own accord, because, since they are not necessarily to be subjected to the keys, there is no reason why investigations should be instituted in so slippery a matter. Nevertheless, when questioned, let him respond, so that he can thus provide for the peace of consciences.¹

2. The confessor ought sometimes to question concerning Onanism, namely when there is prudent fear that the penitent is guilty of this sin. The reason is that he is held, from the office of judge, to supply the defect of the penitent, as the common opinion teaches.² And hence it is why the S. C. INQUIS., on 21 May 1851, declared the opposite opinion, namely that spouses are never to be questioned concerning this matter, "false, too lax, and dangerous in practice." This declaration especially looks to those regions in which the devastating plague of onanism spreads widely; for many take an occasion for persevering in the worst practice from the fact that the confessor, when the circumstances suggest it, does not question. - At least generally, let him inquire whether there is anything concerning the sanctity of matrimony which gnaws at the conscience.³

But to the Question: Whether those confessors satisfy their duty who, when a penitent accuses the sin of onanism, "keep deep silence, and when the confession of sins has been finished, excite him to contrition with general words, and to him asserting that he detests every lethal sin, impart holy absolution" ... the S. PENITENTIARY, on 14 Dec. 1876, responded Negatively.⁴

It seems useful to add also the following document:

"Most Blessed Father - Bishop N. N., reverently presenting himself at the feet of Your Holiness, proposes to Your Beatitude certain doubts to be elucidated, which for a long time have brought grave anxiety of mind and conscience to pastors of souls and confessors.

"As is known to Your Holiness, the unspeakable crime of Onan is being spread more widely day by day in several regions of France, and it is driving deeper roots; so that hardly any Province remains immune from this pest, and the cultivators themselves of social science publicly complain concerning this deadly disease. Nearly everywhere families are seen to become rarer, not indeed from the infrequency of marriages, but from their voluntary infertility. The matter has now come to this, that whereas before many spouses wished to avoid only excessive offspring, now very many dare, by wicked counsel, to exclude every or almost every reception of children. Hence also, at least in great part, comes that lamentable diminution of ministers of the Church by which the dioceses labor more and more.

"Indeed, the deplorable calamity moves pastors of souls, which is derived into society itself from this depraved use of matrimony; but the most grave offense brought against God and the most present danger of souls moves them more sharply, and at the same time affects them with immense sadness. And this sadness of theirs is also increased from the fact that there is not one manner of acting among all confessors in caring for this wound; nor can the desired uniformity be hoped for from the Responses and Declarations of the Holy See which have thus far come forth.

"The knot of the difficulty turns on the necessity of questioning and admonishing penitents. - Indeed all confessors and writers of moral theology acknowledge the very great gravity of this sin; all likewise confess that the greatest prudence and modesty must be applied by the confessor in questioning, and that it is better that the material integrity of confession be deficient than that scandal should come to the penitent from an indiscreet question, or the honor of the sacred ministry be offended. But confessors disagree on this point: whether the questioning itself is necessary or not, even though expressed in chaste and modest words.

"For some confessors have persuaded themselves that among so many faithful who indulge the detestable practice of Onan, at least some are found who are in good faith. - Therefore, lest they disturb these rare penitents from good faith, they think it more advisable to question no one concerning this sin, unless perhaps the penitent himself begins to accuse himself, and the questioning only renders the confession easier. The same confessors judge that the penitent ought not to be admonished concerning the gravity of this sin, because perhaps he thinks the matter is not so grave. And in that opinion they are also confirmed by this reason, that most spouses, openly admonished concerning the malice of onanism, are foreseen to be about to desert the sacraments, and thus incur a greater danger of damnation.

"Other confessors think that silence is not licit for ministers of the divine law, to whom by office it belongs to teach the faithful their proper duties, when they see the precepts of nature itself generally violated. For then, to use the words of Benedict XIV in his Bull Apostolica Constitutio, 'the penitent either is ignorant of crimes which nevertheless he ought to know, or is placed in those circumstances which, if the confessor dissembles, confirm the sinner in a depraved work, not without the scandal of others; since someone thinks those things are licit for himself which he observes to be practiced with impunity by those who frequent the Sacraments of the Church.' - Hence the aforesaid confessors judge that a discreet question must be asked concerning Onanism as often as there is a founded suspicion that the penitent is addicted to this crime; they judge that the common good demands that a penitent who is only probably in good faith be admonished in open, but discreet, words; finally they judge that then only must one abstain from questioning and admonishing, unless the common good demands the contrary, when from the present circumstances of the matter it seems morally certain that the penitent is in good faith, and that the admonition will be fruitless.

"From the Responses hitherto given by the Holy See, various rules are indeed supplied, by which several doubts already pertaining to this matter are clear.

"Thus from the Response of the S. Penitentiary of 14 December 1876, given to the Rector of a Parish in the diocese of Angers, it is clear that it is not licit to favor the error of penitents, which by many is called good faith, nor to create such good faith.

"It is also clear that those confessors do not satisfy their duty who, when a penitent merely accuses Onanism, keep deep silence, and when the confession of sins has been finished, excite him to contrition with general words, and to him asserting that he detests every lethal sin, impart holy absolution."

"It is clear, moreover, that those confessors are free from every reprehension who, keeping themselves within the limits laid down by the Roman Ritual and approved authors, as regards questions sometimes to be asked of spouses concerning the use of matrimony, 'do not omit to reprehend any penitent whatever, whether of his own accord or from a question prudently asked, confessing onanism, not otherwise than concerning other grave sins, as much as his good seems to demand; nor do they absolve him, unless by sufficient signs he shows that he grieves concerning the past and has the purpose of no longer acting onanistically.'

"But since from the prior Responses of the Apostolic Holy See not all doubts concerning this matter are solved, and meanwhile action is taken diversely by different confessors with Onanists, not without grave detriment of souls and great sorrow of pastors; hence the aforesaid Orator reverently and confidently approaches Your Holiness, having the words of eternal life, earnestly beseeching that Your Beatitude deign kindly to give a Response to the following doubts, namely:

"I. When there is a founded suspicion that a penitent who is entirely silent concerning ONANISM is addicted to this crime, is it licit for the confessor to abstain from prudent and discreet QUESTIONING, because he foresees that several will be driven from good faith and many will desert the Sacraments? Or rather is the confessor not bound prudently and discreetly to question?

"II. Whether a confessor who, either from spontaneous confession or from prudent questioning, knows that a penitent is an Onanist, is bound to ADMONISH him concerning the gravity of this sin, equally as concerning other mortal sins, and, as the Roman Ritual says, to reprehend him with paternal charity, and to impart absolution to him then only when it is established by sufficient signs that the same one grieves concerning the past and has the purpose of no longer acting onanistically?

"The Sacred Penitentiary, considering that the unspeakable vice of which there is question in the case has widely prevailed, judged that to the proposed doubts response must be made, as it responds:

"To I. Regularly, negatively to the first part; affirmatively to the second.

"To II. Affirmatively, according to the doctrines of approved Authors.

"Given at Rome in the S. Penitentiary, on 10 March 1886.

"Card. Monaco, Major Penitentiary.

"Hip. Can. Palombi, Secretary of the S. P."

1641. Principles. - I. The conjugal act among legitimate spouses is, per se, honorable and licit: for it is the means established and ordained by the very Founder of nature for the legitimate propagation of the human race.

II. The ends which render an act of this kind honorable are: 1° the generation of offspring, which is numbered among the principal ends of Matrimony; 2° satisfaction of the obligation toward the other spouse; 3° the calming of concupiscence, and thence the avoidance of incontinence both in oneself and in the consort; 4° the desire of fostering or conciliating honorable love, of disclosing or promoting conjugal affection, etc. - Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus,¹ Sanchez, and others against some few, who do not admit the last two ends.

1642. Resolves. - 1° The use of marriage is illicit if it is done for pleasure alone, that is, either by expressly excluding the other ends, or by intending none of them, not even virtually. This is clear from the 9th proposition condemned by Innocent XI (p. XV). Yet per se it would be only a venial sin, just as it is venial to take food for delight alone. But the use of marriage is immune from this fault if the satisfaction of pleasure is intended as a remedy of concupiscence, whether expressly or implicitly.² Cf. n. 1548. q. 6°, Things to be Noted Beforehand, and n. 29. 31. q. 4°.

2° The use of Matrimony with an adulterous mind is gravely illicit, as if someone, approaching his own wife, represents another to himself. - St. Alphonsus,³ and others commonly.

3° The use of Matrimony is licit for the sterile, both because no law to the opposite can be shown, and because the sterile are per se suitable for completing the conjugal act; but if no generation follows, this occurs altogether per accidens; and besides generation there are other honorable ends co-honestating conjugal intercourse.

4° Also for the elderly, whose seed is no longer prolific, or for whom it is for the most part poured outside the vessel, the use of marriage is licit, provided they are able sufficiently to complete copula, or have a hope, not empty, of completing it. For the same reasons favor the elderly which we have adduced concerning the sterile. Moreover this is confirmed from the practice of the Church, which blesses the Matrimonies of the elderly.⁴

The principal circumstances regard person, position, and time.

1643. - A fourfold circumstance, or impediment annexed to the person, can stand in the way of petitioning the debt, namely: 1° a vow of chastity (n. 1568-1571); 2° affinity from incest (n. 1589. III.; n. 1590. 6a. 7a. 8a; n. 1144. II. 2°); 3° spiritual cognation (n. 1585. 6°); 4° impotence, which also forbids rendering (n. 1618. III.; n. 1619).

Note. - 1° According to the more common and more probable sentence, a spouse bound by a vow, or by the impediment of affinity or spiritual cognation, can ask the debt, indeed is bound to ask it, when he or she notices that the consort, not daring to ask, is placed in danger of incontinence. He or she can also ask as often as the other asks interpretatively, for example, when the woman is held back by modesty, and the man perceives, as St. Thomas says, her will of asking; because then it is rather to render than to ask.¹

2° Yet a spouse impeded by the bond cannot exact the debt, not even for avoiding incontinence; for the danger of incontinence is indeed a cause for obtaining a dispensation or suspension of a vow, but not for asking the debt. - Thus Sanchez, and others. Except, not improbably, if there is question of impediments imposed by the Church, and a dispensation cannot be obtained shortly, and great danger of incontinence is in the delay.²

1644. - First Rule. That position is altogether licit which nature herself teaches, namely that the woman be beneath and the man above. - Thus St. Thomas, and others commonly. The reason is that other positions are somewhat opposed to the order of nature, and consequently bring in some violation of order.

Second Rule. No position, however unnatural, is per se gravely illicit, provided the conjugal act can be sufficiently completed; the reason is that any inversion whatever of position, provided union can be completed, does not impede generation.³

Third Rule. Any unnatural position, a just cause acceding, is free from all fault; but sometimes an unnatural position is easier, or even the only possible one; and indeed some greater facility or necessity can remove an inordinateness of this kind, which per se is slight.¹

1645. Resolves. - 1° Spouses who invert the position do not sin in the least because of danger of abortion in the time of pregnancy; because of the fatness or curvature of the man; because of excessive weariness of the woman; or even because of frigidity, when they are more aroused by an unnatural position, etc.

2° A position which alone is possible, whatever it finally is, is in no way condemned, although a not moderate loss of seed follows; because that part of the seed is not necessary for generation, and is lost per accidens, while the spouses are unwilling.

These circumstances chiefly regard the time of pregnancy, lactation, menses, sickness, Feast days, and Sacred Communion.

1646. - 1° At no time is the conjugal act, per se, forbidden under grave sin, because no law is found by which the work of marriage is ever prohibited by reason of time. I said: per se; because perhaps sometimes, by reason of circumstances, a proximate danger of abortion or of health could be induced. But this is very rare, and cannot easily be foreseen in some cases.

2° Indeed, according to very many Theologians, the conjugal act is never forbidden even lightly by reason of time; the reason is that no law can be assigned by which it is ever prohibited even under light sin. Yet to St. Alphonsus² the opinion is more pleasing which does not excuse from venial fault if copula is had in the time of pregnancy, unless danger of incontinence is present, or another honorable cause, which otherwise can scarcely ever be absent.

3° The more common sentence teaches that coitus had at the time of menses is not excused from venial sin because of the indecency which it seems to bear before itself, unless some co-honestating cause is present, namely for avoiding disagreements, or for forestalling incontinence, etc.³ - But a prudent confessor will abstain from every interrogation in this matter, since there is nothing that must necessarily be declared by the penitent. The same, by parity of reason, they commonly hold concerning copula had by spouses at the time of purgation, or on the days following birth. Yet this could be mortal per accidens, namely if from it grave illness or notable aggravation of illness were imminent for the wife.¹

4° The act of marriage is not illicit during the time of lactation, because there is no prohibiting law, nor, experience being witness, any danger, at least proximate, of infecting the milk. Hence there is no reason why spouses should be held to abstain from the use of Matrimony for so long a time with continual danger of sinning. Thus most commonly, says St. Alphonsus.²

5° The conjugal act in time of sickness, at least for the most part, is illicit neither under grave nor under light sin, because no harm from it happens to the brain for spouses; and the labor which accompanies the act cannot, at least commonly speaking, influence sickness very much.

But generally and wisely as regards all things which precede, the anonymous annotator of Gury³ warns: "Theological opinions concerning the liceity of the conjugal act, as regards circumstances, rest on a twofold principle, of which the first regards law or the dictate of natural law, the other regards fact. That, namely, in the use of marriage it is not lawful to place an impediment to generation, or to bring grave harm to oneself, or to the consort, or to offspring, these are so many principles of natural law, to which Theologians deservedly adhere firmly; but whether such a circumstance ordinarily produces grave evils of this kind, this is a question of another order, and is to be resolved only from arguments of physiology and medicine. Wherefore the diverse sentences of Theologians concerning controversies of this kind, not certainly defined, are to be held as hypothetical conclusions."

6° According to the more common sentence, it is not illicit on Sundays and Feast days, even the more solemn ones; both because no law is opposed, and also because marital intercourse does not remove spouses from observing the Feasts of the Church. Most of the Holy Fathers who are objected on the opposite side seem to speak of counsel rather than of precept. Hence you will also deduce that there is no reason why a use of this kind should be prohibited in the time of Advent or Lent. - Thus commonly.⁴ See p. XCI. C). 2°.

7° Finally, per se, it is not prohibited on the day of Sacred Communion, although spouses approach it from piety only, provided they act from an honorable end. - Thus commonly St. Alphonsus,¹ Lugo, Sanchez, and others, who teach that it is of mere counsel to abstain from copula on the day of Communion, whether before or after Communion, provided it is not had immediately after Communion has been received, nor from the mere cause of pleasure. Cf. n. 1311. 2°.

1649. - Sins can be perpetrated between spouses by reason of the conjugal act either by excess, that is, by placing acts useless for generation, or by defect, by not completing the essential act, or by staining the bed with the crime of onanism. (Cf. also n. 1641. II. 1°. 2°. Besides, modesty and often the reason of avoiding scandal [n. 432. 5°] require the most secret place.)

Hence there is a twofold paragraph.

Acts which, besides copula, but on its occasion or pretext, can be exercised by spouses are distinguished into three kinds. 1° Some are harmful to generation, such as sodomy and pollution, and are against nature. 2° Others are useful, such as touches exciting nature and fostering love. 3° Others are neither harmful nor useful, and are called besides nature.

1650. Principles. - I. Whatever is necessary for completing the conjugal act, or useful for exercising it more easily, more quickly, or more perfectly, is altogether licit for spouses. The reason is that he who has a right to a thing also has a right to the necessary or useful means, and means not prohibited from another source; and for those for whom the principal thing is licit, the accessory also is licit, and the means ordered to it.

II. Whatever in the conjugal act is an obstacle to generation, or per se induces pollution outside the natural conjunction, is gravely illicit. The reason is that voluntary effusion of seed is not licit except in order to generation; and therefore Matrimony does not give spouses faculty except for an effusion of seed which can per se serve generation. But otherwise, if men could enjoy pleasure itself without the consequent burden of offspring to be nourished and educated, the generation of children would easily be postponed, indeed would be avoided by set purpose, and thus society itself would incline toward destruction.¹

III. Whatever indeed is not an obstacle, yet per se is less necessary or less useful for the act of generating, cannot be turned to fault except light fault; yet from this other ends intrinsic to acts of this kind excuse, namely that conjugal affection may be preserved and fostered, or at least that concupiscence may be calmed. See n. 1641. II.

1651. Resolves. - 1° Modest touches and looks between spouses, with danger of pollution in oneself and in the other excluded, are free from every fault, although sometimes involuntary pollution may follow per accidens. But they are venial if they are done for pleasure alone; and mortal if they are done with the aforesaid danger and for pleasure alone or for a light cause. It is otherwise if they are done for a grave cause, say if there is an urgent cause of showing affection for fostering mutual love, or for removing a depraved suspicion from the other.¹

2° Touches and looks which are less honorable are also free from fault per se, if they are referred immediately to copula. Indeed the same must be held even if they were simply dishonorable, because since they have a right to copula, they also have a right to acts per se necessary or useful for copula. But if the acts by which a spouse disposes himself or herself for the conjugal act are such that they easily provoke pollution per se, they can be culpable, if diligence is lacking for avoiding pollution outside intercourse, or if such an act is such that the proximate danger of pollution cannot be guarded against by any diligence, say if the man inserts the shameful parts into the mouth of the wife. Hold the same if in preliminaries of this kind to copula there is present a sodomitic intention.² But if, due diligence having been employed, pollution follows beyond intention, there will be no fault.

3° Spouses do not sin gravely by touches, even immodest ones, although had for pleasure alone and without intention of copula, yet with danger of pollution, even involuntary, and the crime of sodomy excluded. But the one rendering seems always to be excused, although there is danger of pollution in either one (unless the touches are such that pollution seems to have been begun), since then the fault holds itself on the part of the person. - Thus commonly.³ But light fault, which can be present in acts of this kind, is easily excused because of ends intrinsic to Matrimony itself, or other extrinsic ones, for example, because they are suitable for fostering affection or for calming concupiscence.

But what if spouses, after copula has been begun, restrain semination? St. Alphonsus responds:¹ "If both spouses consent in this, and there is no danger of seminating outside the vessel, that, speaking per se, is not mortal; for that penetration of the female vessel is then reputed after the manner of a touch of the shameful parts, which is permitted between spouses, or at least is not mortal, with danger of pollution excluded. St. Antoninus, etc. I said: 1) if both consent; for if one withdraws without the consent of the other, he certainly sins gravely, as all the aforesaid authors say. I said: 2) speaking per se; for Sanchez wisely warns with Veracruz that this ordinarily is mortal, because ordinarily there is danger from such withdrawal of pouring out seed, unless the spouses have experienced the opposite; in which case nevertheless I think that they can in no way be excused from venial sin, whatever Sanchez may say with others."

Likewise what if the husband wishes directly either to pollute the woman, or to pollute himself around the body of the woman without matrimonial copula, as happens too often in practice? - Berardi responds² (yet with a certain trembling, as he admits, because he has not found Theologians teaching his opinion in a clear and firm manner): "If the woman can in no way avoid these touches if she sleeps with her own husband, so that to avoid them she would have to leave the bedchamber altogether, provoking the greatest discord and procuring for herself and her children very grave detriments; I would think that she is not held to undergo such and so great inconveniences, and can limit herself to resistance morally possible for her, provided that by positive acts she never accommodates herself to the shameful touches of the man, but only permits them because of the aforesaid grave causes, bearing herself passively. For then the woman on her part does nothing evil, and simply sleeps in her bed with her own husband. The whole malice is on the part of the husband himself, whose illicit touches indeed the woman ought to impede, if she could; but not if very grave inconveniences stand in the way of her impeding them."

Leaving the matter to the wiser, I cannot fail to observe that it is certainly not licit for the woman to bear herself passively if, unless she positively resists, she is in proximate danger of consent (cf. n. 20).

4° A wife does not sin gravely, indeed, according to the more common and more probable sentence, not even lightly, if by touches she excites herself to semination immediately after copula, in which the man alone has seminated; 1° because semination of the woman pertains to completing the conjugal act, so that the spouses may properly be one flesh; and, just as the wife can prepare herself for copula by touches, so also she can perfect it; 2° because, if women after such irritation were held to restrain the natural motions, they would be continually exposed to great danger of sinning gravely.¹

5° Touches with oneself from venereal delight, the other spouse being absent, cannot be excused from grave sin. The reason is both because a spouse does not have the right of using his or her own body in order to fulfilling pleasure with oneself, but only in order to copula, and because touches of the shameful parts, when they are done lingeringly and with movement of the spirits, tend per se to pollution and are proximately connected with its danger. And St. Alphonsus² calls this opinion the more probable and altogether to be urged in practice, no broad judgment concerning the probability of the opposite sentence being made.

6° Morose delectation concerning copula had, or remotely to be had, with danger of pollution excluded (which nevertheless will be proximately present if titillation of the parts is joined with movement of the spirits), although according to the common sentence it is only venial, nevertheless is to be dissuaded. 1) It is some sin; because in this pleasure, not referred to proximate copula, an inordinateness is found, since an honorable end is lacking and the genital spirits are moved in vain, at least inchoatively. 2) It does not exceed venial sin; because, since copula is per se licit for spouses, it cannot be gravely illicit to be delighted concerning it. Nor, however, is simple thought concerning these things to be had or already had illicit.³ Indeed neither is desire concerning future copula, nor (except in a widower or widow) joy concerning past copula, per se illicit; because desire or joy concerning a licit thing cannot be illicit.

1652. - Onanism consists in this, that the man, after copula has been begun, withdraws himself before semination and pours out the seed outside, in order to impede generation. Everyone sees per se that this is to indulge lust and at the same time to be unwilling to assume the burdens of Matrimony.

It takes its name from Onan, the second son of the patriarch Judah, who after the death of his brother Her, according to custom, was compelled to take his widow Thamar, so that he might raise up seed for his brother; but going in to the wife of his brother, he poured out the seed upon the ground, lest children should be born in the name of his brother. And therefore the Lord struck him, because he did a detestable thing.¹

1653. Things to Be Established. - I say I. Voluntary onanism is always a mortal sin, as being against nature; and therefore it can never be licit for spouses. The reason is 1° because it plainly fights against the primary end of Matrimony, and per se tends toward the extinction of society, and consequently subverts the natural order; 2° because it was strictly prohibited by the supreme Legislator and Author of nature, as is drawn out from the text of Genesis just related; 3° moreover, this is established from the 49th proposition condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: Mollities is not prohibited by natural law. ... Hence thus: Onanism is true and properly so-called mollities, or pollution outside the licit use of Matrimony; therefore. This is confirmed by several Decisions of the Sacred Penitentiary and of the Holy Office to be referred to below. - I said: voluntary; because the sin of Onanism is not present if in the conjugal act seed can indeed be received by the woman, but cannot be retained, or if, after the work of marriage has been begun, seed is poured out because of necessity, for example because others come upon them and the work of marriage must be interrupted.²

I say II. An onanist man can never be excused from grave sin, and therefore is never to be absolved unless he sincerely grieves over his sin and proposes to avoid it for the future. The reason is clear from what has been said.

I say III. A wife can be excused from sin if, for a grave cause, she renders the debt to an onanist husband, provided that interiorly she does not assent to his sin, and exteriorly shows her repugnance by serious admonitions or other signs of displeasure. The reason is 1° because she is occupied with a licit thing and uses her own right, of which she cannot be deprived because of the malice of the man; nor does she properly cooperate in the sin of another, since she bears herself only passively, and the intrinsically evil action consists only in the act of the man then withdrawing against the order of nature; 2° because she is not bound by charity to impede the sin of her husband with grave inconvenience to herself; 3° because it is clear from the responses by which the Sacred Penitentiary declared that a woman of this kind is not to be disquieted. - See the Decisions to be referred to below, n. 1658. ad 1um. 1659.

I said: if for a grave cause; and among grave causes Bouvier enumerates a reasonable fear of death, of grave cruelties, quarrels or blows (measuring gravity according to the condition of the person), divorce, infamy or grave scandal; likewise fear lest the husband should keep a concubine or commit adultery, or lest he should utter blasphemies against Religion, injuries against the confessor, or scandalous words before children or servants.

1654. Resolves. - 1° A woman sins gravely who induces the man to abuse Matrimony, even indirectly or tacitly, for example by complaining about the number of offspring, the labors of childbirth or the education of children, or by repeatedly saying that she will die in the next childbirth, etc. A fortiori she sins gravely if, the husband being unwilling, she withdraws herself from copula begun before semination.

2° Likewise, a woman sins gravely by interiorly consenting to the detestable action of the man, even if exteriorly she shows repugnance. For sin is always to be held in hatred. Yet distinguish consent in the very action of the man from joy over the effect thence following, or over immunity from the inconveniences and dangers which accompany generation. Yet that joy is not without danger (see what was said in n. 232). Especially, however, the woman must beware of the manifestation of joy of this kind, lest the onanist man take an occasion from it for sinning in this way.

3° The wife is held, at least ordinarily, to warn an onanist man concerning the obligation of acting rightly, and to turn him away, as much as is in her, from a perverse manner of acting. Nor does it suffice that she has warned him once; but she ought sometimes to repeat admonitions, unless she is certain that a new admonition will profit nothing. Yet even then she ought in some manner to make known her repugnance, lest she seem willingly to consent to the sin of the husband. - Thus commonly, and thus responded the Sacred Penitentiary when interrogated, n. 1659. IV.

4° It will also be the office of the wife to move the husband by caresses, various signs of love, prayers, and exhortations to completing the act rightly, or to abstaining from it altogether. Experience establishes that very many onanist men, thus enticed by their wives, have returned themselves to better fruit.

1655. Questions. - Query 1° In what manner should a confessor conduct himself with spouses confessing, asking, or wholly silent concerning the use of Matrimony?

Resp. See n. 1425. 2). 3). 4); 1657. Resp. Ad 3um; 1658. § Ad 2um autem.

Query 2° Can a wife ask the debt from an onanist man?

Resp. Affirmatively, more probably, from a just cause; because she has a right to copula, and is excused from the sin of cooperation. - But "she will have a just cause of asking, if she herself should be in danger of incontinence, or if otherwise she would have to be deprived of her right of asking more than once or twice, with a perpetual scruple whether it is a sufficiently grave inconvenience to her or not, then to contain herself." Thus St. Alphonsus.¹ So also declared the Major Penitentiary Card. di Pietro in the admonition to the aforesaid responses of the Sacred Penitentiary, although he adds that the Sacred Penitentiary refused to give a decision concerning this matter.

Query 3° Does the wife sin by furnishing internal consent to pleasure, when she can permit the conjugal act to an onanist man?

Resp. Negatively, provided that she does not furnish assent to the sin of the man. The reason is that, since she does not sin in the least by permitting an act of this kind, neither does she sin by admitting the pleasure coming from it, although she foreknows that the man will not perfect copula; for that act is in itself honorable and licit for the woman, and it does not stand through her that it is not perfected in the due mode.

Query 4° Do spouses sin gravely who, in order to avoid offspring, have copula only at that time in which conception is not accustomed to have place, e.g., in that space of time which runs from about a fortnight after menses up to the next term of these?

Resp. The following doubts were proposed to the Sacred Penitentiary concerning this matter, which, from the French idiom into Latin to the letter, as much as I could, I have translated.

I. 1° Can this manner of acting be excused from mortal sin? - 2° Is it prohibited at least under venial sin by reason of the intention of not conceiving?

II. Is it lawful for a confessor to counsel this manner of acting: 1° to a wife who, although she detests and reproves the onanism of her husband, nevertheless tries in vain to turn him away from it? 2° To both spouses, who, lest they be burdened by a numerous family, voluntarily give themselves to onanism?

III. 1° Can this manner of acting be counseled without danger, by which the diminution of the family is caused more certainly than by onanism, since the very reason of honesty reproves this latter? - 2° Is that danger compensated, if thus mortal sin is avoided and the conscience of very many wives is pacified, who otherwise, whether by fault of the husband or by fear lest they conceive, will be alienated from the Sacraments?

To these doubts "the Sacred Penitentiary, the things set forth having been diligently weighed, responds: Spouses using Matrimony in the aforesaid manner are not to be disquieted, and the confessor can, cautiously however, insinuate the sentence of which there is question to those spouses whom he has vainly attempted to draw away from the detestable crime of onanism by another reason." Rome, in the Sacred Penitentiary, June 16, 1880.

A. Card. Bilio, P. M.
Hip. Can. Palombi, S. P. Secretarius.
L. + S.

Yet note that the spouses of whom there is question in the Query can be in a bad state: a) because of the danger of incontinence, which within the fortnight that immediately follows the menses can be present for at least one of the spouses, and which will more easily be present for those inclined toward venery, especially if they do not greatly abhor sin; b) because of the danger of refusing the debt in the case in which the consort should ask it within that fortnight, and this danger will be the greater the more solicitous the party from whom it is asked is to avoid offspring.¹

Query 5° In what manner must one proceed with a wife who is placed in a proximate occasion of sin because of a man abusing Matrimony in any way?

To be noted beforehand. - The case would be if, the husband exacting it, she herself directly pollutes him with her hands, or if she herself is accustomed truly to consent to onanism, sodomy, her own pollution, etc.

Berardi responds:¹ "In this case the confessor will employ every zeal, that he may turn away the miserable woman from such horrible sins. Women ordinarily are accustomed to have the greatest affection for sins of this kind, and very difficultly are they accustomed to be induced to elicit a firm purpose of ceasing from them, because, by committing the aforesaid sins, on the one hand they satisfy pleasures both their own and the husband's, and on the other hand they free themselves from numerous offspring and from the inconveniences of gestation, childbirth, lactation, etc. Hence it is necessary that the confessor have ready an efficacious admonition and very grave words, that he may deter them from so great a crime.

"But if the admonitions of the confessor produce no or little amendment, it will not rarely be useful to threaten delay of absolution, and even in fact to defer the same."

Query 6° Can the wife of whom there is question in the case be obliged to make a divorce, so that she may be freed from this occasion of sinning with her own husband?

The same Berardi responds,² distinguishing: "If the woman in the use of Matrimony commits mortal sins, without the husband tempting her to committing these same sins, then she has no right of making a divorce, and therefore she must use other means for removing the danger of sinning in this occasion, which must be judged as altogether necessary. But if the husband himself compels her, or tempts her to committing the same sins, then Canonists and Theologians very commonly teach that the woman has the right of making a divorce; whence they argue that she even ought to make the same divorce if, because of cohabitation, she is placed in grave danger of sinning. See St. Alphonsus,³ Sanchez,⁴ the Salmanticenses, etc. But this conclusion must be understood with a grain of salt: namely, inasmuch as the woman indeed ought to make a divorce if she can without grave difficulty; but not if she would have to undergo grave harms and grave difficulties; because then there would be question of a necessary occasion, as Hurtado⁵ and St. Alphonsus note."⁶

1656. - I Consultation. "The Bishop N. most humbly supplicates for the solution of this doubt: 1° whether a woman can be absolved who indeed would suffer the husband, if he acted rightly in conjugal copula, but vehemently desires that the man withdraw himself because that woman fears to have offspring. 2° Whether a woman can be absolved who in conjugal copula could by her caresses obtain from the man that he would not withdraw himself, and does not do it; because that copula displeases her."

Response. - "The Sacred Penitentiary, having weighed the doubts proposed by the Venerable Father in Christ, Bishop N., responded: Negatively. Given at Rome, in the Sacred Penitentiary, on the 27th day of May, 1847."

1657. - II Consultation. "It is asked of the Apostolic See with what theological note the three following propositions are worthy, namely: 1° for honest reasons it is licit for spouses to use Matrimony in that manner in which Onan used it. 2° It is probable that that use of Matrimony is not prohibited by natural law. 3° It is never expedient to interrogate spouses of either sex concerning this matter, even if it is prudently feared lest the spouses, whether the man or the wife, abuse Matrimony."

Response. - "Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition, on the 21st day of May, 1851. To the 1st. That the proposition is scandalous, erroneous, and contrary to the natural right of Matrimony. - To the 2nd. That the proposition is scandalous, erroneous, and otherwise implicitly condemned by Innocent XI in the 49th proposition" (p. XVII). - "To the 3rd. That the proposition, as it lies, is false, too lax, and dangerous in practice."

1658. - III Consultation. Petition of the Most Illustrious Lord Bouvier, Bishop of Le Mans, concerning the manner of acting of confessors with spouses, relatively to Onanism.

"Most Blessed Father, the Bishop of Le Mans in France, prostrate at the feet of Your Holiness with the greatest reverence, most humbly represents the things which follow.

"Nearly all younger spouses do not wish to have a more numerous offspring, and yet morally they cannot abstain from the conjugal act.

"Being interrogated by the confessor concerning the manner in which they use the rights of Matrimony, more commonly they are accustomed to be gravely offended; and, when admonished, they neither abstain from the conjugal act, nor can they be determined toward the excessive multiplication of offspring.

"Then, murmuring against confessors, they forsake the Sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist; they give a bad example to children, servants, and other faithful of Christ; a lamentable detriment to Religion arises thence.

"The number of those who approach the Sacred Tribunal of Penance in many places decreases from year to year, especially on account of this cause, as most pastors more conspicuous in piety, knowledge, and experience confess.

"How then did confessors formerly act? many say. No more children were commonly born then than today from individual Matrimonies, spouses were not more chaste, and nevertheless they did not fail in the precepts of annual Confession and Paschal Communion.

"All readily admit that infidelity toward the consort, and the attempt at abortion, is a very great sin. But scarcely, and indeed not even scarcely, can they be persuaded that they are held under mortal sin either to preserve perfect chastity in Matrimony, or to incur the danger of generating innumerable offspring.

"The aforesaid Bishop of Le Mans, foreseeing that immense evils will thence come, and troubled with anxiety, solicitously asks of Your Beatitude:

"1° Whether spouses who use Matrimony in such a manner that they guard against conception exercise an act per se morally evil?

"2° If the act is to be held as morally evil, whether spouses not accusing themselves of it can be considered as constituted in that good faith which excuses them from grave fault?

"3° Whether the manner of acting of confessors is to be approved who, lest they offend married persons, do not interrogate them concerning the manner in which they use the rights of Matrimony?"

Response. - "The Sacred Penitentiary, having maturely weighed the proposed questions, to the 1st responds: Since the whole disorder of the act proceeds from the malice of the man, who, instead of consummating, withdraws himself and pours out outside the vessel; therefore, if the woman, after due admonitions, profits nothing, but the man insists, threatening blows or death, she herself, as approved Theologians teach, can simply permit it without sin, and this from a grave cause which excuses her; since charity, by which she is held to impede that, does not oblige with so great an inconvenience.

"But to the 2nd and 3rd it responds: That the aforesaid confessor recall to mind that adage, holy things are to be treated in a holy manner; and also weigh the words of St. Alphonsus de Ligorio, a learned man and most experienced in these matters, who in the Praxis Confessariorum § 4. n. 41 says: 'But concerning the sins of spouses with respect to the conjugal debt, ordinarily speaking, the confessor is not held, nor is it becoming, to interrogate, except wives, whether they have rendered it, in the more modest manner in which he can. ... Concerning other things let him be silent, unless he has been interrogated.' Nor should he omit to consult other approved authors. Given at Rome by the Sacred Penitentiary on the 8th day of June, 1842."

1659. - IV Consultation. Question. "Bertha has a man, whom by constant experience she knows to be an onanist. In vain has she attempted every means to draw him back from so nefarious a crime. Indeed very grave or at least grave evils now probably threaten her, so that she must either incur these evils or flee from the house of the husband, unless she permits at least sometimes the abuse of Matrimony, etc."

Response. - "Since in the proposed case the woman on her part indeed does nothing against nature, and gives work to a licit thing, but the whole disorder of the act proceeds from the malice of the man, who, instead of consummating, withdraws himself and pours out outside the vessel; and therefore, if the woman, after due admonitions, profits nothing, but the man insists, threatening blows or death or other very grave evils, she herself (as approved Theologians teach) can bear herself permissively without sin; since in these circumstances of things she simply permits the sin of her husband, and this from a grave cause which excuses her; because charity, by which she is held to impede that, does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Given at Rome in the Sacred Penitentiary on the 1st day of February, 1823."

V. Response of the Major Penitentiary. "Approved and exact moral Theologians agree in this, that ... it is lawful for a wife to render the debt, if from her denial she would be badly treated by her husband, and could fear grave inconvenience to herself thence; for, they say, in this case the wife is not judged formally to cooperate in the sin of her husband, but only to permit it from a just and reasonable cause. Yet let the Orator admonish a wife of this kind, that she not cease prudently to warn her husband, so that he desist from this turpitude.

"Michael, Card. di Pietro,
Major Penitentiary.

"Given at Rome in the Sacred Penitentiary, on the 19th day of November, 1816.

"There exist also other responses of the Sacred Penitentiary, which are wholly consonant with the preceding; Gousset reports these in the work, Justification de Saint Liguori."¹

I. For asking a dispensation in a public impediment, concerning which, according to the faculties (p. LXX. sq.), the Bishop can dispense.

"Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord."

"John N." (the family name is put) "and Anna N. ... of the parish (mission) N. ... of this diocese N." ... (if the persons about to marry belong to different dioceses, this is more correctly² expressed, and indeed immediately after the family name of each. Moreover, the dispensation is more conveniently petitioned through the pastor of the bride, if the impediment is common to both contracting parties, as, e.g., the impediment of kinship) "being blood-relatives in the fourth degree equally in the transverse line, as appears from the appended chart" (see an example of this, n. 1583. q. 2°. p. 252) "they desire to enter Matrimony with each other" (the impediment of blood-relationship is set forth here; but, as is clear, in this place that very impediment by which the persons about to marry are bound is to be set forth), "and therefore they suppliantly beg from Your Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lordship the dispensation necessary for themselves. - The reasons are" ... (Here are set forth the causes which exist for obtaining the dispensation, e.g. 1° the age of the girl, who, having now completed 25 years, probably would not find another man whom she could conveniently marry; 2° e.g. danger of heresy, since the Orators live in a place mixed with non-Catholics, etc.). There follow, if any are present, the circumstances which must necessarily be expressed.

"With the greatest reverence and devotion with which it is proper, I remain,

"Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord,

"Of Your Most Illustrious Lordship,

"Most submissive,

"N. N.,

"Pastor or Missionary Priest.

"Baltimore, day ... Dec. 1874."

Note. - On the back of the sheet, or below the text of the supplicatory petition, let the chart of blood-relationship or affinity be put.

II. For asking a dispensation in an occult impediment, concerning which, according to the faculties or by law, the Bishop can dispense, and whose dispensation can be asked from him without danger of injuring the seal.

"Most Illustrious," etc., as above I.

"Titius and Caja, while the first spouse of Titius was still living, knew each other carnally, and gave faith mutually to each other concerning Matrimony to be contracted between themselves if the wife of Titius should die before him; she now being dead, however, neither of the Orators having plotted against her death, they desire to contract Matrimony between themselves. But since the impediment of crime arising from adultery and promise is occult, and unless Matrimony is contracted between them there threatens danger of scandals or of perseverance in sin, therefore, to avoid these things, and for the quiet of their conscience, they most humbly supplicate that Your Most Illustrious Lordship may deign most graciously to impart to them the grace of dispensation."

"With the greatest," etc., as I.

III. For asking a dispensation from the Bishop, after Matrimony has already been contracted in good faith with an impediment in itself public, and concerning which, by force of the faculties, the Bishop can dispense.

"Most Illustrious," etc.

"It is humbly set forth to Your Most Illustrious Lordship on the part of the devout Orators John N. ... and Anna N. (see above I.) of the parish (mission) ... of this diocese" ... (see above I.), "that they, otherwise ignorant that some impediment existed between them by which they could not be joined matrimonially to each other, contracted Matrimony between themselves by words of the present, public proclamations having been made in their parochial church, and no impediment having been detected or denounced, and solemnized it in the face of the Church, and consummated it by carnal copula. But afterward it came to their knowledge that they (as appears from the appended chart), proceeding in the third and fourth degrees of blood-relationship from a common stock, are joined to each other, on account of which they abstained from carnal copula" (or "and nevertheless persevered in the same carnal copula"). "But since the aforesaid Orators cannot remain in this Matrimony of this kind without dispensation, and, if separation were made between them, grave scandals could thence arise, they supplicate that, the pardon of ecclesiastical law being most graciously given to them, they may be able to enter Matrimony in the face of the Church, and afterward live in it freely and licitly."

"With the greatest," etc., as above.

IV. For asking a dispensation from the Bishop, after Matrimony has already been contracted in bad faith with a public impediment.

"Most Illustrious," etc.

"It is humbly set forth to Your Most Illustrious Lordship, in the name of the Orators John N. and Anna N., of the parish N. of this diocese N., that they, otherwise knowing that they (as appears from the appended chart), in the second degree of blood-relationship proceeding equally from a common stock, are joined to each other, petitioned a dispensation from Your Most Illustrious Lordship" (or "from the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord N.") "for validly contracting Matrimony between themselves, the said impediment notwithstanding; but, having suffered refusal, blinded by mad passion and circumvented by diabolical fraud, they contracted an incestuous Matrimony before the civil magistrate" (or "a heretical preacher") "and consummated it, from which already three children have in the meantime been received by them. But now, from the superabundant mercy of God, greatly fearing concerning the danger of eternal salvation, they have been moved with great sorrow on account of their past life. But since, if separation were made between them, grave scandals would thence arise, and also great harm would come forth for their children; yet in Matrimony they cannot remain without dispensation, they supplicate that Your Most Illustrious Lordship may deign to dispense with them, so that, in the face of the Church, but with public denunciations omitted, they may contract Matrimony with one another, consent having been renewed, and may remain in it freely and licitly; this motive also being added on the part of the undersigned, that unless the dispensation is granted, it is greatly to be feared lest the Orators be entirely perverted in the Faith, and fall away from it, together with the children received, since they live among non-Catholics and infidels."

"With the greatest," etc.

V. For asking a dispensation from the Bishop in an occult impediment, and indeed with sanation of the Matrimony in the root.

"Most Illustrious," etc.

"Sempronia, of the diocese N. N., ignorant of the impediment, in the face of the Church and with denunciations having preceded, contracted Matrimony in good faith with a man by whose brother" (or "son") "she had previously been known carnally. Wherefore, since they cannot be separated without scandal, and danger of incontinence or of grave defamation is present, the putative husband being plainly ignorant of the impediment, and therefore the matrimonial consent cannot be renewed without grave danger of quarrels, hence she humbly supplicates for a speedy remedy of dispensation concerning an impediment of this kind, entirely occult, and indeed in the root of the Matrimony, so that, without renewal of consent, the Matrimony can be healed."

"With the greatest," etc.

VI. For asking a dispensation in a public impediment concerning which the Bishop cannot dispense.

Let Formula I be taken; but:

1° In place of: "Most Illustrious," etc., let this be written: "Most Blessed Father."

2° In place of: "from the Most Illustrious," etc., write: "from Your Holiness."

3° In place of: "With the greatest," etc., write:

"If Your Holiness deigns benignly to grant this grace to the Orators, they will render the greatest thanks for it with the greatest reverence and devotion with which it is proper,"

"To Your Holiness,

"Most submissive,

"N. N., etc.

"Given at N. N."

Note. - 1° If they are poor, after the reasons have been set forth it is said: "They are poor and miserable, and live only from their labor and industry." See n. 1627.

2° Let the supplication prepared by the Pastor of the Orators be sent to the Bishop; but the Bishop, or in his place the Vicar General, sends it to Rome fortified with testimony, seal, and episcopal handwriting.

3° If a dispensation is to be asked from the Holy See in a Matrimony contracted with a public impediment, whether in good or in bad faith, let Formula III or IV be taken, with the things changed which must be changed according to those things which were changed in this Formula VI.

VII. For asking a dispensation from the Sacred Penitentiary in Matrimony to be contracted.

"Most Eminent Prince."

"It is most humbly set forth to Your Eminence, on the part of the Orators Titius and Caja, that they intend to contract Matrimony, but that Titius, a married man, carnally knew Caja by perfect copula while his own wife Sempronia was still living, and they gave faith mutually to each other concerning Matrimony to be contracted between themselves if Sempronia, the wife of Titius, should die before him; and she indeed died before him by poison administered by Titius. But since from the premises the impediment of crime has arisen, and thence they can contract Matrimony neither licitly nor validly, the Orators supplicate for the grace of dispensation concerning this impediment of crime, so that they may publicly contract Matrimony between themselves, and afterward remain in it licitly and freely, and the offspring may be decreed legitimate. The impediment is altogether occult, and the danger of perseverance in sin is pressing, indeed also of grave scandal, if they cannot be joined in lawful Matrimony. Wherefore, for the quiet of their conscience, grieving greatly over the premises, they humbly supplicate Your Eminence, that concerning these things you may deign to provide by Apostolic authority with an opportune remedy.

"Kissing the purple, with the greatest," etc., as I.

"May Your Eminence deign to direct the response to New York (n. 173 Third Street, New York, U.S. of America) to me, the undersigned."

On the outside let him form the inscription thus: "To the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord, Lord N., Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, Major Penitentiary" (from our Provinces: "Prefect of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide"), "Rome."

VIII. For asking a dispensation from the Sacred Penitentiary in Matrimony already contracted.

"Most Eminent Prince."

"Titius, a married man, carnally knew Caja by perfect copula while his own wife Sempronia was still living, and they gave faith mutually to each other concerning Matrimony to be contracted between themselves if Sempronia, the wife of Titius, should die before him; and, after Sempronia had died before him by poison administered by Titius, aware" (or "ignorant" [or "Titius aware" or "ignorant" or "Caja aware" or "ignorant"]) "of the impediment, in the face of the Church, with proclamations having preceded" (or "having been dispensed") "they contracted Matrimony" (or "with no proclamations having preceded, before the civil Magistrate," or "a heretical preacher") "and consummated it by carnal copula." (If each party or one or the other party still perseveres in good faith, let this be expressed; likewise whether each party or one or the other party, aware of the impediment, now abstains from copula, or nevertheless has persevered in the same.) "Wherefore, since the impediment is altogether occult, and separation cannot be made without scandal, I most humbly ask Your Eminence that you benignly indulge dispensation for them, inasmuch as they may be able to contract validly.

"Kissing the purple," etc., as Form VII.

Note. - The formulae by which the Bishop grants dispensations, Prelates will find in Heiss, de Matrim. p. 406 sq.

1. Formula of supplication for dispensation concerning the banns.

"Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord."

"It is humbly set forth that" (the names and surnames of the Orators are written, as above Form I., if the cause is honest or public; fictitious names, if the cause is occult and dishonorable; then the cause itself or causes). "Wherefore the Orators, whom, after diligent inquiry, I have found bound by no impediment, earnestly ask that a dispensation be granted to them concerning two (three) proclamations.

"Commending the prayers I remain," etc.

2. Formula of supplication for dispensation concerning the impediment of mixed religion.

"Most Illustrious," etc.

"Constantia N., Catholic, my parishioner, desires to enter Matrimony with Frederick N. from N., attached to the sect ..." (or "a baptized non-Catholic").

"The non-Catholic party before me, as appears from the declaration annexed to this supplication, promised under the faith of an oath that all infants of either sex to be born from that Matrimony are to be baptized and educated in the Catholic Faith, and that to them, equally as to the consort, the exercise of the Catholic Religion will be entirely free. Moreover, the Catholic party promised that she would take care according to her strength that, as much as is in her, the man be converted to the true Faith. Wherefore she most humbly supplicates Your Most Illustrious Lordship that you deign to grant to her by Apostolic authority a dispensation concerning that impediment. The causes are" (the cause or causes are set forth, e.g. vain attempts that the Oratrix renounce such a Matrimony; founded hope of the conversion of the non-Catholic party, etc.).

S. Th., Suppl., q. 49, a. 4-6.

938. Principle I. That copula is licit for spouses which of itself is apt for generation; for this three things are required: penetration of the vagina, effusion of seed within the vagina, retention of the seed by the woman, namely, so that it can be drawn into the uterus. Therefore he sins gravely who knowingly and willingly does not observe one of these three, or who voluntarily exposes himself to the proximate danger of this.

Conjugal copula which of itself is apt for generation is that by which, from the very mode in which the act is exercised, the conception and generation of offspring can be had per se and from the nature of the thing, even if from elsewhere or per accidens there is an impediment, as from sterility, old age, pregnancy, and other causes. For this threefold condition is required:

1° that the husband penetrate the woman's vagina with the virile member;

2° that he pour forth seed in the vagina and deposit it there;

3° that the woman receive the virile seed in the vagina.

Hence: a) Although conception can occur absolutely without penetration, by pouring forth seed at the opening of the vagina, because it is not impossible for the sperm to enter by its own vital motion and by the attraction of the uterus, nevertheless, because this is altogether rare and per accidens, it does not suffice for copula such as nature instituted it, nor is it an honorable mode of completing copula, even if it is done for a good end, for example to avoid the contagion of disease, but it is gravely illicit; for then in reality there is no copula, but only two simultaneous pollutions.

b) Nevertheless to penetrate the vagina a little suffices, although one acting thus can sin in affection, at least venially, if he acts thus without a proportionate cause. Certainly the mere fear of procreating offspring is not such a cause, as if someone wished thus to avoid conception or render it notably more difficult, and wished to avoid the mode more apt for generation; mortally, if he thinks and intends that thus generation is totally impeded.

A proportionate cause, for example, is if a woman, recently after childbirth or infirm in the genital parts, cannot endure perfect intercourse.

c) Nevertheless it would not suffice to penetrate the vulva a little and deposit the seed between the lips, because thus it would be deposited only at the opening, not at all in the vagina itself; and thus there would be no copula.

d) A fortiori, artificial insemination properly so called does not suffice for copula, by which seed, emitted outside the natural act of copula, is introduced by a certain art into the vagina or uterus; this is always gravely illicit.

1° Thus artificial insemination outside matrimony, by which a woman is fecundated with the seed of any man whatsoever, obtained and introduced by art. For by natural and divine law offspring can have origin only from matrimonial conjunction.

1. This is the question of copula, as they say, "dimidiate," which by several confessors was considered as a fitting remedy to be proposed to onanists. Now the bishops of the Netherlands condemned that practice of confessors who were advising or permitting inveterate onanists to use dimidiate copula lest they sin gravely any more; which, moreover, was gravely scandalous, and rather was by nature suited to prepare the way to onanism. The bishops asked the approbation of the Holy Office, which, Nov. 23-Dec. 1, 1922, gave the following response:

1° it cannot be tolerated that confessors of their own accord teach the practice of dimidiate copula and advise it indiscriminately to all penitents who fear lest more numerous offspring be born;

2° the confessor is to be reproved who, after all remedies have been tried in vain for turning away from this evil a penitent abusing matrimony, teaches him to exercise dimidiate copula for preventing mortal sins;

3° likewise the confessor is to be reproved who, in the said circumstances, advises dimidiate copula to a penitent to whom it is otherwise known, or, when the penitent asks whether this mode is licit, answers simply that it is licit without any restriction or explanation.

Concerning these things Fr. Damen observes, Th. M., II, n. 896, "the reason for the first response is that it is licit for no one, and much less for a confessor, to advise sin, whether mortal or even venial. The reason for the second response is that such a mode of acting involves scandal, since dimidiate copula easily paves the way to worse things, and thus in fact, as to the diminution of offspring, produces the same effect as neo-Malthusianism, and therefore cannot be advised as a lesser evil. The reason for the third response is that the advice is scandalous and the response of the confessor would be false, since it would declare licit that which is illicit."

But copula is not dimidiate if seed is deposited at the orifice or between the lips, because thus there is no copula, not even dimidiate; but if, at the entrance of the vagina and penetrating it, even a little, seed is poured forth.

2° Thus also insemination by which seed would be taken from any man whatsoever for fecundating the wife of another (hetero-insemination), for the same reason.

3° Thus finally artificial insemination in matrimony, by which the wife is fecundated with the seed of her own husband, yet not through an act of coitus of itself apt for generation. This has place if, by an artificial process, seed is transmitted to the internal organs of the woman, seed which is had from voluntary or involuntary pollution, or which is deposited at the mouth of the vagina, or which is extracted from the organs of the man, or which is collected from interrupted copula or from condomated copula. In all these cases the natural mode of procuring generation through copula is lacking, nor is there an action of itself tending to generation.

Indeed, in the case there is not one but in reality a twofold action of man: the first by which the seed is expelled or extracted, which of itself in no way tends to generation, but on the contrary is an impediment of generation, inasmuch as it pours forth seed outside copula and for this reason is gravely evil; the other, artificial, by which the seed afterward is introduced into the vagina or uterus of the woman. And although thus seed is now employed for fecundating the wife, nevertheless the action by which it is expelled or extracted from the testicles, as far as it is of itself, from its nature and from the mode in which it is done, emits seed in such a way that generation naturally is impeded, even if per accidens, from another consequent action, this defect is met so that the seed may contribute to generation in an artificial mode. Nevertheless this is insufficient for restoring rectitude in the prior action.

e) Since penetration of the vagina is an essential condition altogether required, therefore he who certainly cannot penetrate and complete the act in the due mode is in reality impotent. But if the impotence is doubtful, a married person could thus attempt copula as long as there is some hope of penetrating and arriving at perfect copula; otherwise, if there is no hope, because the mere possibility of generation does not suffice, but the probable possibility of copula is required.

1. From artificial insemination properly so called, which is always illicit, there differs artificial insemination improperly so called, by which, namely, after copula has been duly performed and the seed deposited in the vagina or at the entrance of the vagina, the seed is gathered again and transferred more deeply toward the uterus in an artificial mode. But if for this it is necessary to take up the seed in a syringe and also to draw the syringe out of the vagina by reason, for example, of asepsis, from this it probably would not be illicit. For thus the work of man duly furnished remains safe, and only a defect in the work of nature is corrected. - For the whole question of artificial insemination, confer: Allocution of Pope Pius XII to Catholic physicians, September 29, 1949.

939. Principle II. Every conjugal copula of itself apt for generation is per se licit, provided it is instituted for a right end; hence it is necessary that the end on the part of the agent be conformed to the end of the work. - Now the one proper and principal end from the nature of the work is the generation of offspring, to which two secondary ends are joined, but merely subordinately, so that they are true means by which the principal end is more securely obtained: the enjoyment of delight or the calming of concupiscence, and mutual solace or mutual love to be fostered and preserved (n. 769). As Pius XI says in the encyclical Casti Connubii: "Nor are those spouses to be said to act against the order of nature who use their right in a right and natural manner, even if, on account of natural causes, whether of time or of certain defects, new life cannot arise thence. For there are had, both in matrimony itself and in the use of conjugal right, also secondary ends, such as mutual help, mutual love to be fostered, and the calming of concupiscence; these spouses are by no means forbidden to intend, provided always that the intrinsic nature of that act remains safe, and therefore its due ordination to the primary end."

Hence: 1° Spouses can seek conjugal copula, whether for the principal end, or also for a secondary end, but insofar as it is subordinated to the principal end and serves it.

2° Indeed copula can even be demanded by either spouse, and this from justice, so that per se and generally the other party is bound to render it; wherefore it is called the conjugal debt, of which the Apostle speaks, I Cor. VII, 3-5. Hence, for rendering copula, a legitimate end is to render to the other party what is owed to that party from justice; which end, nevertheless, always supposes the primary end of the act or work itself, namely, the generation of offspring.

3° Consequently the Scholastics teach that the conjugal act is legitimated by the goods of matrimony, because through the good of offspring there is had the intention of the due end, through the good of fidelity there is had the due matter insofar as a man approaches his own and not another; and by these the act recedes from two extremes: from pollution or vice against nature and from fornication, holding the mean between the two, and thus it is constituted in the nature of moral virtue, which consists in a mean (q. 49, a. 2).

4° Likewise they teach that in only two modes can spouses come together altogether rightly and honorably so that they are totally excused from sin, namely, for the sake of generating offspring, which regards the first good, namely offspring, and for the sake of rendering the debt, which pertains to the other good, namely fidelity (q. 49, a. 5). To these two ends are reduced the fostering of conjugal love and the remedy of concupiscence, which implicitly tend to the good of offspring and the good of fidelity; for one who would yield to depraved concupiscence and commit a sin of the flesh would break matrimonial fidelity and could harm the good of offspring to be born, and one who would not foster the necessary love would expose these goods to danger.

From this the conclusions follow:

940. Corollaries. - 1° One exercising copula sins who positively excludes the primary end, and gravely if he intends to impede it, or employs means for this.

2° Therefore, he who in completing copula intends a secondary end, for example delight, uniquely or principally, so that the principal end is positively excluded or put after it, sins venially; for there is an inversion of order, namely, a disordered use of a licit thing. Cf. proposition 9, condemned by Innocent XI.

3° Nevertheless, he who explicitly intends a secondary end, for example the calming of concupiscence, and only abstracts from the primary end, acts licitly, because he implicitly intends the principal end to which the act tends from its nature, the whole act, such as it is, existing only for generation.

4° Likewise he who intends to avoid incontinence in himself or in his consort; for here he acts directly from a motive of virtue for preserving continence; on the contrary, he who seeks delight alone acts directly from love of pleasure. Nor is it an objection that the danger of incontinence implies a defect of virtue and therefore sin: this defect is evil, but rather is presupposed to copula; but, this defect standing, to provide a fitting remedy for it by conjugal copula rightly exercised is not evil but good.

5° Nor does he sin who, on account of poverty, weak health, or another honorable end, only wishes with an inefficacious desire that offspring not be conceived, while he uses no illegitimate means for impeding generation, nor positively excludes it in the act, and the act posited is apt for generation.

6° But he sins, and indeed mortally, who approaches his own spouse with an adulterous mind, thinking of another person as present or desiring to have copula with that person; nevertheless, not he who without depraved affection, by thinking of another person, adorns his own wife with the beauty of another in order to excite himself to the conjugal act, although this is dangerous. In a similar way one must speak of a wife thinking of another man, or of his qualities or vigor.

7° The use of marriage is licit also for the sterile and the aged, even if sterility is certain, provided they can complete the act or have hope of completing it, because the act of its nature is ordered to generation, and if generation does not follow, this happens per accidens. Hence the Church blesses their matrimonies.

1. "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone entirely lacks every fault and venial defect." - Cf. S. Thomas, Suppl., q. 49, a. 5 and 6.

8° Likewise the conjugal act is licit even if it is foreseen that, from fecundation, the woman will suffer abortion or bring forth dead offspring into the light, because such an effect occurs per accidens and can be permitted for some honorable end of the act itself.

941. Observation. - For better understanding that copula can licitly be had for diverse ends, without the procreation of offspring being explicitly sought or even possible, or without the conjugal act directly and immediately serving the propagation of the human race, it is helpful to observe with Prummer, Th. M., III, n. 690, that the economy of human propagation differs greatly from the propagation of brutes: a) For animals of the female sex are not accustomed to have the instinct, indeed nor the ready power of generating, except for a brief and determined time of each year, and in such a way that often conception is completed by one single union; after this union has been made, they already abhor another carnal joining. On the contrary, human conception can occur at any time of the year, and in such a way that ordinarily it is not completed except by repeated conjugal acts; and, once it has been obtained, the inclination to other unions does not cease. b) The unions of animals are passing, changeable, promiscuous; the marital union of men is one and stable until death. c) The union of animals is ordered only to the material good of the propagation of the species; on the contrary, conjugal copula, since it is a human act, is ordered to the proper end of human life and to the good of the spouses, which is a higher good, as being the good of reason. By all these things it is clear that carnal copula has been permitted to spouses by the Creator and is licit, although generation is not directly and immediately had or intended, for example during pregnancy or sterility, provided it serves the rational good of the spouses themselves.

947. Notions. - Besides copula itself, there are also acts more or less connected with it, which occur among spouses in carnal commerce; these can be reduced to a threefold species:

Sins can be perpetrated between spouses by reason of the conjugal act either by excess, that is, by placing acts useless for generation, or by defect, by not completing the essential act, or by staining the bed with the crime of onanism.

I say. Whatever is necessary for completing the conjugal act, or useful for exercising it more easily, more quickly, or more perfectly, is altogether licit for spouses. But whatever in the conjugal act stands in the way of generation, or of itself induces pollution outside the natural conjunction, is illicit, and indeed gravely. Finally, whatever is useless or indifferent for procuring generation even remotely and indirectly, or for reasonably promoting conjugal affection, is likewise illicit, but does not exceed venial sin. The reason for the first is that he who has a right to the end has a right also to the necessary or useful means, and means not otherwise prohibited; and to those to whom the principal thing is licit, the accessory also is licit, and the means ordained to it. But the reason for the second is that voluntary effusion of semen is not licit except in order to generation, and therefore Marriage does not give spouses a faculty except for effusion of semen which can of itself serve generation; but otherwise, if men could enjoy pleasure itself without the consequent burden of feeding and educating offspring, generation of children would easily be put after, indeed would be avoided by set effort, and thus society itself would decline to destruction. Finally, the reason for the third is that then pleasure alone would be sought in these things, which, as was said above, is indeed a sin, but does not exceed venial.

You Will Resolve. 1°. Any honorable kisses among spouses are free from fault, and touches upon both honorable parts and also less honorable parts, if nevertheless they are done cautiously, by reason of demonstrating conjugal affection or fostering love, even if sometimes by accident involuntary pollution were to follow; because all honorable signs of love, even tender ones, as means to the end, are licit for those who by the matrimonial bond ought to become one heart and one flesh. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 933.

2°. Touches and looks less honorable are also of themselves free from fault if they are immediately referred to intercourse. Indeed the same must be held, even if they were simply dishonorable, but necessary or useful for exciting nature; for then they are a certain preparation for intercourse and as it were an inception of it. But all these will be venial if they are done on account of pleasure alone, even if they immediately precede intercourse. But they must be held mortal if they expose each or either spouse to danger of pollution before intercourse; which indeed will easily happen if they remain long in these things before they come to the conjugal act.

3°. Spouses do not sin gravely, even if from touches had even without intention of intercourse there arises a commotion of the spirits or of the members serving generation, or distillation follows, although these things would be mortal in the unmarried. The reason is that, voluntary pollution or the crime of sodomy excluded, nothing is done against the good of Marriage. - Nevertheless let them beware lest they fall into proximate danger of pollution, which will easily happen if the motions are very inordinate. Hence, although, speaking of itself, spouses do not sin mortally who, intercourse having been begun, by mutual consent do not complete the conjugal act, if perhaps there is no danger of pollution, nevertheless S. Alphonsus rightly observes after Sanchez that ordinarily this is mortal, because ordinarily such danger will be present. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, nn. 918 and 934.

4°. A wife who excites herself by touches to semination, or rather to her completed pleasure, immediately after intercourse in which the man alone emitted, does not sin gravely; indeed, according to the more common and more probable opinion, not even lightly: 1°. because the semination of the woman, whatever it may be, pertains to completing the conjugal act, so that spouses properly are one flesh, and just as the wife can prepare herself by touches for intercourse, so also she can complete it; 2°. because if women after such irritation were bound to restrain natural motions, they would continually be exposed to great danger of sinning gravely. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 919.

5°. Touches with oneself from venereal delight, the other spouse being absent, according to the opinion of many, cannot be excused from grave sin, even with pollution or proximate danger of it excluded. The reason is that the spouse does not have the right of using his own body in order to pleasure to be completed with himself, but only in order to intercourse. - Nevertheless not a few other theologians, cited by S. Alphonsus, say that, with danger of pollution excluded, this does not exceed venial fault. Moreover, the holy Doctor judges the first opinion more probable and altogether to be urged in practice. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 939. - Lacroix, n. 339. - Baller. note (a), p. 914.

6°. Tibullus, receiving the confessions of women whose husbands are accustomed often to be absent, and who do not easily contain themselves, teaches and urges that those women do not sin in the following cases: first, if by desiring their own absent husband, they suffer sensual commotion or pollution; second, if they desire to experience this same pollution in themselves from ardent love of the absent husband; third, if they excite pollution in themselves by touches had with themselves, provided they refer these acts to the absent husband. The Sacred Penitentiary adds to the beloved writer in Christ: that already twice concerning this matter response had been made by this Sacred Tribunal, and acts of this kind are gravely illicit, and a confessor approving them is to be denounced. Sacr. Pen. 2 Sept. 1904.

7°. Morose delight concerning intercourse had or remotely to be had, with danger of pollution excluded, according to the common opinion is only a venial sin. - I said 1°. that it is a sin, because in this pleasure, not referred to proximate intercourse, disorder is found, since an honorable end is lacking and the genital spirits are moved in vain, at least inchoatively. I said 2°. that it is only venial, because, since intercourse is of itself licit for spouses, to be delighted concerning it cannot be gravely illicit. Indeed, neither desire concerning future intercourse nor approval concerning past intercourse is of itself illicit, unless it is referred to the pleasure of intercourse alone; because desire or joy concerning a licit thing cannot be illicit. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 937. - Voit, n. 1207.¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1116, n. 67.

Think of a typical adolescent boy. He is just discovering things which have been well-known to others for a long time, unaware of how such things have been seen throughout history; he is experiencing a sort of freedom which was not previously available to him, and he longs for more; he is trying to fit in and be “trendy” according to the present cultural norms; he thinks himself to be misunderstood by his parents, whom he does not think to have very much wisdom at all compared to himself, which is obviously untrue, despite his good intentions and sincerity. He often thinks his parents are being “harsh” and “old fashioned”; he doesn’t really understand some of the more sophisticated language that his elders use or references they make to people and events, while his own vocabulary is full of neologisms and warped usages of older words, and his discourse in general is limited to simple topics and is sloppy when it isn’t. His attention is taken by celebrity gurus. He has a lot of energy, enthusiasm, and zeal for life, but he has few tools with which to solve serious problems and so often has to try to invent things on the fly – only when a true crisis occurs does he ask his parents for help, often without much thanks, and then he returns to his supposedly independent lifestyle. He is proud to have the last name that he has, and he does really love his family and will definitely stick up for his mother, but his filial piety is not always so evident, except maybe with a favorite uncle. However, it is true that his adolescence is different than it was for his parents, and he faces unique circumstances and problems which are largely unknown and sometimes inconceivable to his elders. New technology and social realities are a fact of his young life that were not for the generations preceding him. He is not interested in many of the same things which the older folks are, and this is his right insofar as taste admits of no disputation. However, he can be quick to call their tastes “lame” or “boring.” He doesn’t necessarily mean to be disrespectful, but it can seem that way sometimes; he is certainly unaware of the significance which those tastes have in the memory of those from earlier generations – how they acquired them, under what circumstances, and how they have shaped their lives. He does not realize that their tastes are, in some way, objectively better as well, having been acquired after much experience and cultivation.

This image gives one a decent picture of Catholic sexual ethics in the past 60 or so years, especially as presented in much of the popular literature. While there are exceptions to this rule, and rarely does one author exhibit all or even most of the negative characteristics just listed, the overall sense one gets when surveying the popular and even plenty of scholarly literature on Catholic sexual ethics is that, beyond reiterating a few completely uncontroversial or definitive positions on the major topics, the literature is a bit lost in itself. By this I mean that it infrequently grounds itself in the major extra-Scriptural sources of the theological tradition prior to the 1960’s or so except to make a passing mention of Casti Connubii or Arcanum, and it does not even seem aware that there is much to find before then. In a way, one might say that Humanae Vitae and The Theology of the Body have been to Catholic sexual ethics what Descartes or Kant were to Western philosophy: a turning point which people struggle to see beyond into the past, which make it so that everything must be reimagined and begun anew from the point of view contained therein – whether in agreement with the doctrines or not.

Perhaps all of this is somewhat of an exaggeration, but it is nevertheless quite evident that there is a great need for an authentic renewal in Catholic sexual ethics today. This book is a small step in that direction, and it focuses on only one of several topics which need a serious reappraisal in light of the wisdom of the Doctors and great manualists, especially St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Alphonsus Liguori, and Tómas Sánchez, SJ. So many authors do not even seem to be aware of what sorts of questions ought to be asked, let alone how to give the correct answers. What is more, some authors presume to give moral advice on less-than-clear issues without any serious education in moral theology, which is unwise both on the part of the authors and on the part of the readers who heed their uninformed (and usually seriously lax) advice. This problem is quite common in the contemporary popular literature.

Some of the issues within the world of Catholic sexual ethics today seem to stem from a decontextualized reading of St. John Paul II’s Theology of the Body. What is able to be loosely categorized as “personalist” sexual ethics generally takes its cue from the phenomenological aspect of John Paul’s teaching without serious advertence to the Thomistic foundations of his anthropological and ethical assumptions. This leads to a fixation on experiences and psychology, without much grounding for true moral judgments other than average subjective tastes coupled with some kind of fittingness. For example, one might consider the question, “Why should one not fornicate?” The “personalist” sort of answer might be: “Because marriage is an external sign of spiritual unity which is contradicted by the dishonesty of extramarital sexual encounters, and the bonding which accompanies sex cries out for a partnership which endures.” The better answer: “Because a child conceived will in principle lack a mother and father committed to each other for life, which is uncharitable towards the child as it is so risky to his welfare, and if contraception is used then the sexual faculty is perverted by essentially subverting its proper intentionality, thus undermining God’s design for the propagation of the human race, which is even more uncharitable and is so directly against God as Creator.”

The late Pontiff’s work on marriage and sexuality was in fact deeply informed by the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas in particular, and it is therefore a grave mistake to see the two authors as alternatives to each other.¹ There are rhetorical advantages to John Paul’s treatment of marriage and sexuality, but jettisoning “hardline” virtue ethics and the casuistry which evolved to draw definite conclusions on particular points of conscience is not only unnecessary but undermines the integrity and value of the Pope’s entire project. ¹ See Fr. Thomas Petri, OP, Aquinas and the Theology of the Body: The Thomistic Foundations of John Paul II’s Anthropology, CUA Press, 2016.

Another cause, perhaps the central occasion of the derailment of the traditional casuistic treatment of chastity, is the death of traditional courtship and the rise of dating. This seems to have occurred somewhat in conjunction with the advent of the car – suddenly it was no longer necessary to restrict one’s marriage prospects to one’s immediate vicinity where both families could and would be deeply involved in searching out the fittingness of a potential marriage. One didn’t need to plan travel by train either, leaving and arriving at precise places at scheduled times, though the rise of the railroad in the 1800’s began the erosion. From the 1920’s onward in the West, young men and women could go around quite easily by themselves and be far from home – anonymous. Then the expectation that one would build a family in one’s hometown began to fade as well; travel is easy enough, good opportunities could be far away… so be it. While the families of young men and women grew less relevant in their judgment of a partner, their emotions grew more relevant, and marriage slowly became more about one’s own personal existential fulfillment and less about fulfilling a public role in the community. With this new kind of relationship came several questions; there came especially an immediate need for precision on questions about remote expressions of affection – of the “how far can we go” variety – which had been treated by earlier authorities in a way that seemed to take for granted the non-existence of a body of social expectations which would force one to navigate this minefield so deeply.² Gone was the safety of the courtship paradigm, where a “couple” would hardly ever be alone together except by conscious deviance, deliberate disobedience, or by chance in the street – it eventually became normal and finally expected to spend long evenings together without supervision. From here we begin to see things unravel after World War II with the pill (1960), removing a major biological inconvenience to the working woman’s playtime – habitual fertility. Once this line was crossed, it was only a matter of time before the indissolubility of marriage became illusory; after all, if sex was not for producing children to such an extent that women can even disrupt the entire ovarian-uterine system’s well-functioning to maintain a career while “having fun,” why would marriage need to be forever? No-fault divorce came down the line quickly enough (1969 in California), followed shortly thereafter by movement towards abortion in the form of “privacy” in view of Sartrian self-determination, at least in the USA (1973). With the Supreme Court declaring that human nature did not exist,³ marriage was more than merely faltering as a coherent institution, evidently detached from conception and subject rather to the whim and pleasure of the man and woman who themselves allegedly do not have an inherent human nature. Therefore, it made no sense that a man would need to marry a woman and vice-versa. Once “same-sex marriage” became a widespread phenomenon (2004-2015 in the USA), it was not a large leap to accept that biological sex is actually ephemeral and can and should be changed to match one’s interior feelings about how one wants to be perceived and interact with others; or else, perhaps biological sex is not even real at all. ² This book will not address the topic of “remote signs of affection.” It is simply noted in passing as a topic that deserves a serious treatment. ³ See the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) authored by Justice Blackmun.

The most cursory study of attitudes and opinions of marriage throughout history and across cultures reveals that Westerners of the 21st century have an extraordinary fixation on romance. However, it must be noted that even St. Pius V was eager to point out that one of the principal motives for marrying is in fact the companionship contained therein: “We have now to explain why man and woman should be joined in marriage. First of all, nature itself by an instinct implanted in both sexes impels them to such companionship, and this is further encouraged by the hope of mutual assistance in bearing more easily the discomforts of life and the infirmities of old age.”⁴ By God’s design, men and women tend to enjoy being around each other in an exclusive relationship to help one another through their difficulties. While not a promotion or endorsement of marrying for “romance” or for “love,” we see that the saintly and ascetic Pontiff knew in the 1500’s that boys like girls and girls like boys, and he thought that this was a good thing. He continues: “If to these [aforementioned motives] we add other causes which induce to contract marriage, and, in choosing a wife, to prefer one person to another, such as the desire of leaving an heir, wealth, beauty, illustrious descent, congeniality of disposition, such motives, because not inconsistent with the holiness of marriage, are not to be condemned.”⁵ Later in the same chapter, however, he cautions against marriages driven by youthful desire: “But above all, lest young persons, whose period of life is marked by extreme indiscretion, should be deceived by a merely nominal marriage and foolishly rush into sinful love unions, the pastor cannot too frequently remind them that there can be no true and valid marriage unless it be contracted in the presence of the parish priest, or of some other priest commissioned by him, or by the Ordinary, and that of a certain number of witnesses.”^{6 4} Catechism of the Council of Trent for Parish Priests (“The Roman Catechism”), promulgated by order of Pope St. Pius V (1566), translated by Fr. John McHugh, OP and Fr. Charles Callan, OP (1923), 16th edition (1962), p. 343-344. ⁵ Ibid., p. 344-345. ⁶ Ibid., p. 353.

Yet there is much to condemn in prevalent attitudes toward marriage today. In much of the United States, as elsewhere in the West, the average couple showing up for marriage preparation at their local parish is almost entirely unchurched, has little to no understanding of the Faith or commitment to practice it, is “living together,” and is using contraception of some sort (and perhaps practicing other unnatural vices) with no intention to stop doing so once married. Marriage for such people is seen more as being a rite of passage rather than as a fundamental change in the way they live their lives that brings distinct rights and obligations. Thus, the focus of such couples is so frequently on “the wedding” rather than on “the marriage.” Soon enough, the focus will be on the divorce proceedings and who gets to “keep the kids.”

This is the current state of things. Where we might go is a worthy topic of conversation but is not the conversation here, which is moral-ethical analysis rather than cultural-sociological speculation. My guess, however, is that the widespread use of “AI girlfriends,” including “deepfakes,”⁷ and perhaps a marked increased acceptance of polyamory are the next steps. ⁷ To have an avatar who is designed according to one’s tastes; who will say and do whatever one wants, whenever one wants, however one wants; who has no needs and will never grow old; who will never offer rejection and can be discarded and regained easily, without any consequence – this is alluring. Eventually there will likely be physical machines capable of simulating human interaction in a similar way, though this is perhaps a long way off.

The moral literature of the mid to late-1900’s is somewhat anemic compared to previous eras, despite some standout exceptions. This is not only due to the decline of casuistry in general and pollution of the field by the spirit of modernism and laxity, but it is also the case that after the explosion of interest in family life in the second half of the 1800’s in the run up to Italian unification (1870), the world and the Church of the 20th century were swept up by the practicalities and moral questions related to World War I, the Roman Question, World War II and the atomic bomb, the Second Vatican Council and its reforms, the reform of the 1917 Code of Canon Law (1983), the fall of Communism in Europe (1989), the invention and rise of the cell phone, the invention of the internet – hardly a moment to pause and think about how marriage had been subtly undermined by advances in transportation technology, beginning in the 1800’s and maturing in the 1920’s.⁸ The literature related to marriage ethics came largely as a response to Humanae Vitae, itself a response to the creation of “the pill” and the subsequent so-called “Sexual Revolution,” more or less taking place from the late 1950’s to the late 1970’s, which constituted a particular kind of crisis in its own precise context. Without the technological advancement of oral contraceptives, the ethical reflection would have likely remained at the level which Pius XI had left it with Casti Connubii when addressing the same general question in response to the Anglicans’ approval of contraception at Lambeth in 1930. Note that Casti Connubii is an attempt at playing catch-up, just as Humanae Vitae would be almost four decades later.^{9 8} Pope Gregory XVI (d. 1846), a noted luddite, once exclaimed, “Chemin de fer, chemin d’enfer!” (“Road of iron, road to Hell!”) He prevented the construction of a rail system in the Papal States during his reign. While certainly too cautious about new technology (he also disliked gas lamps), we can note that his famous utterance was in a way prophetic. ⁹ The topic of contraception had already preoccupied Pius XI’s close friend and advisor, the famous Fr. Gemelli, but we find relatively little treatment of it at the Roman level before Casti Connubii.

Now, with the decline of dating, the ubiquitousness of pornography, (including the startling applications of AI to such degeneracy,) and the “Tinderization” of relationships, a whole other range of psychosocial problems has arisen which preoccupies authors. Nowadays, young people are asked unironically by casual semi-romantic partners to “DTR” – “define the relationship.” This is often in an effort to avoid languishing in what is called a “situationship.”

While the psychosocial trends are no doubt an important field of inquiry, the literature leaves unexplored the specific on-the-ground problems which “dating” poses and leaves unsolved any number of vexing casuistic puzzles related to the use of marriage¹⁰ that were never definitively settled in the manuals or by Roman authority. (When authors do seek to treat these topics, they do so rather poorly.) Since it is all but impossible to recover courtship, “dating” is now seen as something traditional and ideal, as opposed to aggressive patterns of fornication or ill-defined non-committal long-term semi-romantic partnerships. The moral aspects related to dating therefore need to be treated more surgically.¹¹ What is more, the field of inquiry of the life of chastity for the married couple remains ripe for the intellectual harvest with great pastoral benefits awaiting, including, in the present author’s view, providing the correct point of departure for understanding chastity and purity (its annexed virtue) between potential spouses, especially including the integration into the evaluation of “romantic acts” of a thorough treatment of the concupiscible passions in relation to various objects of love, desire, and delight, but also perhaps including the irascible passions of hope and daring. ¹⁰ The euphemism “using marriage” refers to conjugal relations. ¹¹ The major lacuna in the classical literature appears to be a failure to integrate a robust treatment of how the passions are related to lawful but remote natural union. This problem afflicts both the treatment of the unmarried (“6th Commandment”) and the married (“Use of Marriage”) – in fact, the pathway to a fuller understanding of what is lawful “to feel” and “to want” when unmarried will likely only proceed from an accurate vision of what is lawful for spouses. Unfortunately, apart from totally uncontroversial points, there is a shocking amount of inconsistency on the latter topic among the older authors when there is not silence. The case of the amplexus reservatus (intentionally incomplete natural union) is paradigmatic in this regard (although it is now indirectly condemned as at least venial sin by Pius XII). Some older opinions about chastity in marriage are also founded upon faulty biological assumptions about the mechanics of conception. These discussions exceed the scope of the present text but lurk in the background nonetheless.

The present text does not seek to provide an exhaustive treatment of particular questions related to chastity, nor does it evaluate the contemporary literature of Catholic sexual ethics in detail; rather, it is focused exclusively on proposing a teaching on the use of what is commonly called “Natural Family Planning” (NFP) with respect to the motives for the marriage act itself which is more rigorous than what is commonly found in any number of books, websites, journal articles, or parochial and diocesan programs. It does not advocate for an abandonment of the practice of using NFP to avoid having children, as some in their misguided zeal for chastity mistakenly think is necessary, but instead argues in part that there are moral rules for its right use beyond simply having a justification for avoiding having more children in the first place. A mechanism is also proposed for how to evaluate whether avoiding having children is justified, a principle which is admitted by every author but is explained in serious and morally useful detail by exceedingly few.

The doctrines laid down here are, of course, only safe and probable, in the technical sense of these terms; one remains free enough to disagree and pursue his or her own way, possibly without actually offending God unless his or her conscience is truly convicted by the arguments set down.¹² Furthermore, the subject matter is arguably complicated enough that in following and using the laxer opinion one might do what is venially sinful according to its structure but without any guilt (so-called “material sin”), or have only very slight guilt. However, the motivation remains to propose the theses, along with any number of disputed questions of casuistry. Why? ¹² Moral science does not admit of the same degree of certitude as dogmatic theology, which itself admits of disputes, even on important matters; the reality is uncontestable that many points which refer to sin, even mortal sin, are not settled doctrine, despite being closely related to moral data which are settled, whether by direct revelation or authoritative determination. Sifting through opposing opinions on conclusions in moral theology on finer points, often called “casuistry,” is the bulk of the work in St. Alphonsus Liguori’s Theologia Moralis. Readers should not be disturbed by such disputes, nor claim that such-and-such is “Catholic teaching” when significant dispute exists and no definitive decision has been made by the Holy See, or at least a decision which binds one to religious submission of intellect even without being fully definitive.

As for the more rigorous doctrine on NFP vis-à-vis the use of marriage which will be presented, it is necessary for two reasons. First, because many devout couples have the strong suspicion that something is not quite right with the thought that one’s marriage is fully chaste by merely abstaining from relations for a week each month and doing whatever they like the rest of the time, specifically in the context of trying to avoid having children. They feel like they are somehow “cheating the system,” and they are right in their intuition, despite their lack of an ability to articulate their reasoning. This text seeks to help bring those couples to the “next level” and introduce them to the discipline which is proper to marital chastity, which they will find to be a welcome challenge. Such a way of living conjugal life will be found empowering to the soul, and it will even likely enhance the experience of the marital act itself on account of the act’s purified significance and less frequent use. This doctrine also evades the overly rigorous error into which many people fall, namely, that the use of “NFP” to avoid conception is “diet contraception” (or is simply contraceptive strictly speaking) and is therefore immoral in itself.¹³ Second, because if my thesis is correct the vast majority of couples who are sincerely trying to live out the Christian duties of married life are engaged unwittingly in at least material venial sin. True enough, material sin does not actually offend God – only formal sin does (that which is known to be sin or that which one is obliged to know is sin but does not) – but material sin nevertheless sets the individual on a path towards formal sin by weakening the will’s perception of what is truly good and possibly occasioning other acts which are indirectly or directly occasioned by material sin. This is especially true with regard to sexual matters, towards which humans are violently inclined by the intensity of pleasures, which pleasures God placed in our nature so that we would keep the human race in existence. Furthermore, one can rarely be sure that material sin is merely material sin except in special cases. In any case, as just noted, taking on the proposed modus vivendi, the couple will experience the interior freedom which will improve their spiritual lives and their marriage. ¹³ Some even make the claim that NFP is “Modernist” – not only is this to misunderstand what Modernism is, but it also is hilariously ignorant of the fact that Fr. Andreas Steinhuber, SJ, the individual who gave the major positive consultation on NFP as reflected in the 1880 responsum of the Apostolic Penitentiary, was also a principal ghostwriter for the great anti-Modernist encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis. (In some months after the release of the present text, I will publish the full text of Fr. Steinhuber’s consultation – however, while cautiously positive, the text is mostly interesting from a historical point of view rather than for its moral analysis per se.)

With regard to the motive for elaborating a clearer mechanism by which to evaluate the legitimacy of avoiding children, one need only ask any group of pious couples what exactly a “just cause” is to use NFP, and one will see the problem in the discussion which ensues. In the best case, the discussion will end with, “Be prudent and generous.” This is not untrue, but it is not particularly helpful either.

This book is not meant as an introduction to the topic of NFP, especially its biology, psychology, or practicalities. It is not a survey of the history of NFP, as it has been treated in older popular literature or in broader “cultural” and ecclesiastical contexts (though such a book should be written). It is also not an introduction to Catholic sexual ethics in general, though some explanation is given on the most relevant points. It takes for granted that the reader is at least somewhat familiar with the topic already, especially the incompatibility of Catholic morals with consequentialism in its various forms.¹⁴ It furthermore takes for granted the value of synthesizing and reconciling the major authorities in Catholic moral theology, in particular papal magisterial texts, St. Thomas Aquinas (the Common Doctor), and St. Alphonsus Liguori (the patron saint of moral theologians). It is assumed that the popes and great moral doctors of the Church generally have serious extrinsic authority and are therefore much more important guides than the latest trends in popular Catholic literature on the same topics, and so a goal to reconcile “the authors” as far as is honestly possible has been adopted.¹⁵ Readers who do not intuitively appreciate such a goal or method will probably not like this book. Finally, this text does not present in any rigor the historical context of or developmental narrative between major sources except in a single case (viz., the Sacred Penitentiary decisions). This is because the development of the literature on the role of pleasure in conjugal life and the particulars of the tradition’s treatment of the marital debt is largely irrelevant to the point being made, and other authors have done some of this kind of work already, such as John Noonan in Contraception.¹⁶ There is, however, some serious discussion of the solam voluptatem (“pleasure alone”) debate by way of offering my own solutions to this rather vexing, relevant, and complicated problem. ¹⁴ The way in which a good is obtained potentially matters in an of itself; to steal money and to earn money are both “taking money from someone” but are very different kinds of acts. This is the beginning of the critique against those who say that NFP is contraception because both “stop conception.” It matters what one does, not only what happens because of what one does. ¹⁵ I do not here enter into any discussions regarding the “doctrinal weight” of propositions or “extrinsic authority” of texts. Overall, common sense informed by piety will suffice for the purposes of the present argument. ¹⁶ Noonan’s research is excellent, though his theological reasoning is not always the best. He is also helpful as a guide through the history of the topic of pleasure in the use of marriage. I do not present any material about the shift in perspective between St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus but instead point to Noonan’s work as a starting point for this kind of research.

Readers who are entirely unfamiliar with the concept of the “marital debt” will find only a brief introduction to the topic in Chapter One; they may be startled to learn that such a principle exists and is in fact strongly rooted in the greatest authorities, including Sacred Scripture. They ought to allow themselves to be challenged by the discussion. For a relatively recent text which gives some more explanation, I recommend the fine volume prepared by Frs. McHugh and Callan¹⁷ which addresses this topic with great clarity and marvelous efficiency, though much more could be said (and is said by many older authors). I do not bother to defend the legitimacy of the principle of the marital debt in this book at any length – once again, to dismiss something which has been held by so many weighty authors, and which rests so squarely upon Sacred Scripture (1 Cor. 7:2-5) as well as upon the natural logic of marriage is extremely temerarious at best and possibly next to heresy (proxima haeretica) or worse. (An extended discussion of the marital debt also exceeds the scope of the purpose of this book, which is quite narrow.) Instead of seeing the highly unpopular and little-discussed positions of our famous elders in theology – decorated war-heroes, as it were – as primarily constrictive, we ought to see them as helpful guides towards the infinite freedom and perfect goodness of union with Christ. Even though we face new problems which many of them never faced themselves, they offer us powerful tools with which to solve those problems. We do not need to reinvent the wheel, even if we need to repurpose it. ¹⁷ Fr. John McHugh, OP and Fr. Charles Callan, OP, Moral Theology: A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities, #2614-2616; see also #2622 for their treatment of periodic continence (wherein they also reference an interesting text by Cardinal Hayes, of September 8, 1936); the famous moralist Fr. Dominic Prümmer, OP also gives a helpful summary in his one-volume Handbook of Moral Theology, #860-861. Both texts are easily found online.

Furthermore, despite the fact that we are today freer than in past centuries to publish books and articles with all sorts of questionable positions even on settled doctrine, such as on consummated unnatural vice (i.e. contraception, homosexual acts, self-abuse), this is not a good use of our time. We ought to be orthodox, and we ought to be thorough. In fact, there is much to the world of sexual ethics which is left practically untouched which would be more theoretically and pastorally useful than is commonly imagined. We ought to use the guidance of our elders for all it is worth; there is no need to walk alone when they have already largely done the work for us. Finally, we should take a genuine interest in the methods and focus of the older sources. While we need not imitate their style, or speak exclusively about the same topics, we ought to take them as cues for what the important issues are. The matter of theology, especially sexual ethics, is not simply a matter of taste – souls are on the line, more than with any other matter, and they are threatened by distinct and identifiable errors. While it can be interesting and even very profitable to meander through the psychology or cultural significance of various sexual behaviors, as is so common today in the popular literature, in the end, moral theology includes judgments about what is right, what is wrong, and what is wrong enough to lose one’s soul to the pains of unending Hell. One might even conclude that such considerations ought to take center stage, albeit without limiting the entirety of moral science thereto; after all, one can do more than simply not offend God, one can positively please Him in various degrees.

In this book I will argue for two principal theses, fully aware that the first in particular is extremely unfashionable and that both are possibly wrong. First, contrary to St. Thomas and St. Augustine, but in line with both St. Alphonsus and modern papal magisterial literature, I will argue that the request for the marital debt can be without sin when not intending procreation; however, I will conclude that it is only licit under a certain condition, namely, the legitimate need for the relaxation of concupiscence on the part of the one making the request, rather than for “sexual recreation,” no matter what other non-procreative goods are being pursued thereby (i.e. increased bonding, health, honor, expressing affection, settling a dispute, etc.) so long as the couple is not attempting to have children. As will be discussed, this thesis is in sharp contrast to the thought, seemingly originating with Gury’s manual (1852) and today left practically unchallenged, that the use of marriage is sufficiently justified by the exclusive intention to “express affection” or provide some kind of affective or social good.¹⁸ Second, I will argue that the intention to avoid pregnancy by recourse to using marriage during infertile periods alone must be evaluated by a method of evaluation that is analogous to the judgment which ought to be made in giving alms. Finally, as a conclusion, I will offer some limited observations about the spiritual significance and pastoral application of the doctrines presented herein. ¹⁸ Of course, the thought that conjugal relations have to be excused at all in the first place is almost totally alien to mainstream contemporary Catholic sexual ethics. This is a sign that something is wrong with the literature’s framing of the entire topic.

I. QUESTION I. How can spouses sin against the end of matrimony? ANSWER. They sin: 1. If they be mingled for the sake of pleasure alone. Formerly some taught the opposite, whose opinion Innocent XI condemned: The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is utterly free from all fault and venial defect. Brutes, not men endowed with reason, operate for the sake of pleasure alone.

II. QUESTION II. What is the end on account of which the conjugal act is lawful and meritorious? ANSWER. It is the procreation of offspring, or the rendering of the debt. Some teach that the conjugal act is lawful and good when exercised for the recovering or confirming of bodily health. The Doctors of the Church openly teach the opposite. Let it suffice to allege one, St. Thomas, who in the Suppl., q. 49, art. 5, reply 4, has this: Although to intend the preservation of health be not of itself evil, nevertheless this intention is made evil if health be intended from something which is not of itself ordained to this; as if a man should seek from the sacrament of Baptism only bodily health; and similarly also in the case proposed in the act of matrimony. The same teach Augustine, Jerome, and all the Doctors of the Church. The reason is clear. Matrimony was not instituted for the recovering or preserving of the health of the body. Therefore he abuses matrimony who exercises it as a means by which he may seek bodily health. Spouses also vitiate the conjugal office if they act too shamelessly and intemperately, says St. Augustine, Book On the Good of Marriage, chapter 16.

III. QUESTION III. Are those free from venial fault who use matrimony against their own incontinence and against other graver outrages? ANSWER. Fr. Claude La Croix, Book 6, part 3, no. 291, candidly confesses that Sts. Augustine, Bonaventure, Thomas, and Gregory the Great, reported in chapter Nervi, distinction 13, teach that the conjugal act exercised for the avoiding of one's own incontinence is a venial sin; but he subjoins: Very many other theologians and jurists, with Durandus, Cajetan, Medina, Navarrus, Almain, Gaspar, Layman, Coninck, Rebello, Hurtado, Henríquez, Pontius, Mastrius, Aversa, say most probably that there will be no sin. Behold in what place the first lights of the Catholic Church are held by very many Probabilists.

IV. But we, this new manner of opining being dismissed, bring into the midst the doctrine of the holy Fathers. St. Augustine, expounding the words of St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 7, Return together again, lest Satan tempt you for your incontinency; but I speak this by indulgence, not by commandment, teaches these things in the Enchiridion, chapter 78: It could be thought to be no sin to be mingled with a spouse, not for the sake of procreating children, which is the good of nuptials, but even of carnal pleasure, so that fornication or adultery or any other uncleanness — a deadly evil which it is base even to speak of — be avoided by an infirmity which can be dragged along by Satan tempting. It could therefore, as I have said, be thought to be no sin, had he not added: But I say this according to pardon, not according to command. Who now would deny it to be a sin, when apostolic authority is granted as pardon to those doing it?

V. St. Thomas in the Suppl., q. 49, art. 5, reply 7, confirms the doctrine of Augustine, Gregory, and all the other Fathers with these words: But if a man intend by the act of matrimony to avoid fornication in his spouse, it is not any sin, because this is a certain rendering of the debt which pertains to the good of fidelity. But if he intend to avoid fornication in himself, then there is there a certain superfluity; and according to this it is a venial sin: nor for this was matrimony instituted, save according to indulgence, which is of venial sins. This same doctrine St. Thomas repeats on 1 Corinthians 7, lecture 1, where he says: It is to be considered that the conjugal act is sometimes meritorious and without all fault, mortal or venial; for instance when it is ordained to the good of offspring to be procreated or educated for the worship of God, for thus it is an act of religion; or when it is done for the cause of rendering the debt, for thus it is an act of justice. But every act of virtue is meritorious, if it be with charity. Sometimes indeed it is with venial fault, namely when someone is excited to the matrimonial act from concupiscence, which nevertheless stands within the limits of matrimony, namely that he be content with his wife alone. Sometimes indeed it is a mortal fault, namely when concupiscence is borne beyond the limits of matrimony, namely when someone approaches his wife as willingly, or more willingly, as he would approach another. In the first way therefore the act of matrimony does not require indulgence; in the second way it has indulgence, inasmuch as one who trusts in concupiscence toward his wife is not guilty of mortal sin; in the third way it has no indulgence at all. Like things teach Gregory, Anselm, Bonaventure, and the rest of the Fathers, and among the more recent the graver theologians commonly.

VI. Let parish priests and confessors nevertheless be prudent in admonishing and instructing spouses in the holy end of matrimony, of procreating and educating offspring for the worship of God. Let them inculcate this end and no other: of capturing carnal pleasure, of saturating concupiscence. Let them most cautiously and most chastely remember. For since that office is scarcely wont to be exercised without pleasure and concupiscence, if they should wish to look into such things more subtly than is fitting, they will offend ears and expose themselves to danger.

VII. QUESTION IV. Do spouses sin who exercise the matrimonial act on days of fasting and on the day on which they have received the Eucharist? ANSWER. Very many deny it; but the Fathers and Councils affirm it. It pleases me to transcribe a few things from cause 33, question 4, chapter 3, where these things are had concerning the time of fasts: Brethren, you ought not only to abstain from all uncleanness, but also most studiously to contain yourselves from your own wives. Let no one on the days of fasts be joined to his own wife. Again there, chapter 4, it is subjoined concerning feast days: If a wife is taken for the cause of procreating children, much time seems to be granted for that use; and since the feast days themselves show that on these times one ought to cease from the reason of conception, and to keep it more purely according to the law. Again there, chapter 1, it is inculcated out of St. Augustine: It is sometimes lawful for a Christian to come together with his wife, sometimes indeed it is not lawful. For on account of the procession of prayer it is sometimes not lawful to come together; nay, even from lawful things one must abstain, that what is sought may more easily be obtained. Whence the Apostle says that one must abstain by consent for a time, that one may be free for prayer. Read there several things.

VIII. La Croix, Book 6, part 3, no. 311, says: “That of itself, speaking, it is lawful to have the use of matrimony on the day of communion, has been said in Book 6,” and so forth. To the canons and the holy Fathers he answers with Sánchez, Coninck, Aversa, and others, that they suggest a counsel.

IX. That it may be always more evidently discovered by confessors how far the doctrine of very many casuists differs from the doctrine of the holy canons and of the Fathers, I transcribe a few things out of many. In cause 33, chapter 4, these things are had: If the loaves of proposition could not be eaten by those who had touched their own wives, how much more can that bread which came down from Heaven not be violated and touched by those who a little before have clung to conjugal embraces? Not that we condemn nuptials (for this we do not say), but because at that time in which we are about to eat the flesh of the Lamb, we ought not to be free for the works of the flesh. If Christians ought to approach the Eucharist fasting from all food, how much more must they needs be fasting from the conjugal office? Concerning feast days, in the same place, chapter 2, these things are prescribed out of St. Augustine: As often as either the day of the Lord's Nativity or the other festivities draw near, as I have frequently admonished, for several days before we ought to abstain not only from the company of unbelieving concubines, but even from our own wives. Frequently then did the Fathers of the Church admonish spouses.

X. After the sacred canons and the Fathers of the Church, St. Thomas in the Suppl., q. 64, art. 5, assigns the reason: Just as certain places are sacred because they are deputed to sacred things, so certain times are sacred for the same reason. But in a sacred place it is not lawful to ask the debt. Therefore neither in a sacred time. What to these things say the Probabilists? The Angelic in the same place dissolves all the sophisms which can be opposed.

XI. But that those may be touched with some shame who on feast days and on the very day of sacred communion defend the conjugal office lawful, it pleases me to transcribe what the Catechism of the Council of Trent, which excels six hundred casuists, prescribes, part 2, chapter 8, § 34. This is the title of the cited paragraph: That spouses must sometimes abstain from the conjugal office. Then these things are had: But since all good things are to be obtained from God by holy prayers, this is another thing which it behoves to teach the faithful, that they abstain sometimes from the office of matrimony for the cause of praying and beseeching God: and above all let them know that this is to be observed by them for at least three days before they receive the sacred Eucharist, and more often when the solemn fasts of Lent are celebrated, as OUR fathers rightly and holily PRESCRIBED. For thus it will come about that they themselves feel the goods of matrimony increased daily with a greater accumulation of divine grace; and, spreading the studies of piety, they not only pass this life tranquilly and placidly, but also lean upon the true and stable hope, which confoundeth not, of obtaining eternal life by God's benignity.

XII. QUESTION V. Whether the conjugal office be vicious by reason of a place either public or sacred? ANSWER. If copulation be exercised in the presence of others, it is a mortal sin, no one denying it, on account of the scandal. Touches themselves between spouses in the presence of others are vicious. The conjugal office in a sacred place, urgent necessity being taken away, is sacrilegious. In the time of the menstrual flux the conjugal office is unlawful. For in Leviticus 20 these things are prescribed by God: He that lieth with a woman in her flowers … both shall be destroyed out of the midst of their people. Again chapter 18: Thou shalt not approach to a woman having her flowers. The testimonies of Augustine, Jerome, and the other Fathers I pass over.

XIII. Nevertheless Fr. Dominic Viva writes these things, question 7, article 1, no. 3: “It is asked secondly, at what time the conjugal act is unlawful? I answer that it is not unlawful on feast days, or on days of fasting, nor on the day of communion, nor at the time when the wife is pregnant, or suckles offspring, or suffers menstruation, nor before the nuptial blessings; although it is a counsel to abstain at those times.”

XIV. Holy Scripture commands that those approaching a menstruous woman be destroyed out of the midst of the people. Viva and others will reply that Christ lightened the law, and did not aggravate it. But all the Fathers, the canons, and the Councils maintain that at such a time this office is unlawful. Ought one not rather to stand by these than by modern authors?

XV. That those who approach a pregnant wife are defiled with venial fault all the Fathers to a man teach. The most distinguished D. Eusebius Amort in his Dissertation on Conjugal Intercourse with Pregnant Wives brings into the midst all the most clear testimonies of the Fathers, and utterly routs the contrary opinion of adversaries. Even the nurses themselves disapprove the same doctrine: for these, while they suckle, abstain from the conjugal office; and mistresses who are mothers most severely guard the nurses of their own sons that they be not known by their husbands, on account of the harm to the offspring. A hard law, you say. Hard to the hard, to the carnal, and to the intemperate who would wish to wallow like swine in the bitumen of lust. But it is a sweet law to Christians temperate and well-mannered, who are joined not for the fulfilling of venery, but for the cause of procreating offspring. Demented spouses are forthwith to be separated. To a drunken man asking a wife is not bound to render, save for the avoiding of greater evils.

XVI. QUESTION VI. How can spouses sin against the mode of exercising the conjugal office? ANSWER. There is no need to look into such things, since nature itself, endowed with the light of reason, is the mistress. Christian spouses ought always to have before their eyes the rules of their own profession, which is holy and immaculate. But the chief rule of married persons is that which Tobias, chapter 8, assigns: And now, Lord, thou knowest that not for fleshly lust do I take my sister to wife, but only for the love of posterity, in which thy name may be blessed. Nature itself teaches that in the conjugal office the woman be beneath and the man above. Spouses therefore sin if they invert this order prescribed by nature, by exercising that office standing, sitting, the man beneath and the woman above, or if after the manner of cattle they come together preposterously, though the vessel be preserved. Excessive corpulence of the man, and tenderness of the spouse, can sometimes excuse, so that they may know one another in a manner nearer to honesty.

XVII. QUESTION VII. If a husband be accustomed, while he performs the office, to withdraw himself, that he may hinder generation, does a wife sin by rendering the debt? ANSWER. John Pontas proposes this case, under the word Conjugal Debt, case 39. He contends that the woman is obnoxious to no fault, provided she herself dissent, resist, and oppose as far as she can. And he strives to prove this by the example of Onan, who on account of the effusion of seed in intercourse with Thamar was struck by God. But Thamar was not punished. What thence? Therefore Thamar did not sin, because she is not read to have been struck? Inept is that consequence. Does God always punish all sinners in this world? Onan sinned more gravely: therefore God punished him. Thamar sinned less, therefore perhaps he did not strike her. But to search out the divine secrets is not permitted us. This is certain, that a wife sins mortally who has certainly learned by experiment that her beastly husband of set purpose squanders the seed destined for generation, if she does not deny the debt, because she gives her labour to a thing by its own nature unlawful and gravely criminal.

XVIII. Fr. Sánchez, Diana, Sporer, and others have devised shameful opinions, and have undertaken to make honourable modes of coming together carried into execution by the filthiest husbands, such as can scarcely be reported without detriment to natural modesty. Fr. Claude La Croix, Book 6, part 3, from no. 328 to no. 350, after his manner stuffs in a census of all the opinions which modern doctors have devised in this matter, chiefly Sánchez, Diana, Gobat, Mendo, Dicastillo, and others. These things, if wives read them, will learn what perhaps they are ignorant of.

XIX. Some formerly taught lax opinions even concerning the procuring of abortion, two of which Innocent XI proscribed, namely no. 34: It is lawful to procure abortion before the animation of the foetus, lest a girl be found pregnant. Sánchez teaches that a woman oppressed by force can forthwith expel the seed, as an unjust assailant of chastity, for the avoiding of infamy: which opinion I repute false. Pregnant women procuring abortion, and the rest who give their labour to it, are obnoxious to the excommunication passed by Sixtus V. The other thesis the same Innocent XI proscribed, no. 35: It seems probable that every foetus, so long as it is in the womb, lacks a rational soul, and then first begins to have one when it is brought forth; and consequently it will have to be said that homicide is committed in no abortion.

I. The chief cause is that very many, God not being consulted, undertake so great a business at the suggestion of avarice alone, or of luxury, or of ambition. These causes Hugh of St. Victor sets forth in his epistle to his companion, saying: “Wives are taken today, not for the cause of avoiding fornication, but for the cause of luxury; not for the cause of offspring, but for the cause of money. Riches are wont to be chosen in wives rather than chastity. Many take wives not with their eyes but with their fingers — that is, they take wives not on account of the virtues which they see in them, but on account of the moneys which they can count out. The best thing is that which avarice does not conciliate, and which luxury does not couple.”

II. Those who for the cause of saturating venery celebrate the great sacrament of matrimony cast themselves into the most grave hardships. No less unhappy are the marriages which are contracted from a cupidity of moneys. Two young men strove to take a philosopher's daughter as betrothed, of whom one was poor but prudent and well-mannered; the other rich but frivolous and imprudent. The philosopher, the rich youth being rejected, espoused his daughter to the poor young man. To friends reproaching him with the deed he replied: I had rather give my daughter to a man in need of money than to money in need of a man. A sentence worthy of a wise philosopher.

III. The other chief cause of quarrels, brawls, and aversions which are wont to accompany matrimony is the outrages, basenesses, and obscenities with which the betrothed, being contaminated, approach this sacrament. Whence it arises that neither do wives wish to be subject to their husbands, nor are husbands wont to love their wives as befits. Wives are bound to obey their husbands, says St. Paul, Ephesians 5: Let women be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord: because the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the church. He is the saviour of his body. Therefore as the church is subject to Christ, so also let the wives be to their husbands in all things. But why women often transgress this precept, for the most part husbands are the cause, who neglect to go before women with the example of virtues, who neglect with Christian prudence to bear the defects of the weaker sex, who neglect to follow their wives with a divine love, against the mandate of the same Apostle: for Paul forthwith subjoins in the same place: Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the church, and delivered himself up for it. … So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself. For no man ever hated his own flesh; but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the church: because we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the church. Nevertheless let every one of you in particular love his wife as himself: and let the wife fear her husband.

IV. The other and most grave cause why so many families wither and are extinguished, why so many dissensions and aversions burn, is that pestiferous corruption hitherto unknown to all nations, even to the very heathen and Turks — namely of promiscuous conversations between men and women. The matrimony being entered upon, the husband espouses his own mistress, the wife her own lover. Both, if not in words, at least in deed consent that each may have his own little lover and her own little paramour. The Platonic community of husbands and of wives, if not full, at least half-full, has been brought in. Even if a community of bed did not happen — which is not most difficult — is it not a great crime that a wife should be the mistress either of another husband or of a most shameless youth; that she should be in servitude to these for solace, sport, and diversion, so that from them she may receive again and again the tributes of servitude, little gifts, and services? Those wives who, their own husbands being neglected, converse, play, dance, and caper with other men and husbands, are not the wives whom Paul describes, but imitate the vilest harlots and little strumpets of the crossroads; who defame Christ, who defame the Church, who dishonour their husbands, who break off the succession of families, who disturb society, and who bring in a gross and asinine ignorance into almost all assemblies of men. Men, their own offices being neglected, sow the time with their little mistresses. Of all evils of this kind the husbands are the cause. They are unwilling to coerce their own concupiscence. They are not content with the drink of their own fount, but seek out others' muddy cisterns; and therefore they cannot contain their wives in order. But these wives, made bolder by the depraved examples of their husbands, and with the reins shaken out, become unbridled, and lead their life with their own lovers. Hence the form of times, of hours, and of the best government is disturbed, and all things are confounded. All these things are known to the blear-eyed and to the barbers. What remedy is there? For the wrath of God is kindled, and the fury of divine vengeance strikes with the scourge of a most mournful blindness those who most boldly contend to maintain against holy Scripture, the Fathers, the theologians, the preachers, and experience itself that a most pernicious corruption is honourable.

V. The first ADMONITION which I exhibit to parish priests and confessors is that they altogether deny the sacraments to husbands and wives who are followers of the Platonic and half-full community, until they come to their senses. Otherwise with those not coming to their senses they will descend into hell. If any remedy is left to be applied to so dire a plague, it is in the hand of confessors. Let them suspend absolution to these men, until these marital commerces be broken off. Unless this be done, the die is cast, and no hope of salvation remains.

VI. The second ADMONITION is that parish priests and confessors learn from the Apostle St. Paul the reason and form of the discourse with which they ought to address them. Let them expound in a grave oration the sublimity, excellence, and pre-eminence of evangelical matrimony. Let them interpret the divine documents of the same Apostle. Let them declare the chastity, honesty, and holiness of the conjugal office. Let them often intone the saying of St. Paul: That every one of you should know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honour, not in the passion of lust, like the Gentiles that know not God. Let them represent in congruous words the perpetuity of reciprocal love, and the indissolubility of the mutual bond even unto death. Let them set forth the opposition of the disciples, who, when they had heard the burdens of matrimony, cried out: If the case of a man with his wife be so, it is not expedient to marry; who said to them: All men take not this word. Matthew 19. Not to be long: if parish priests shall have kindled the fire of charity in married persons, if they shall have excited in them the spirit of Christianity, if they shall have formed true Christians, superfluous are, and can be handed over to the fire, all those questions and opinions concerning wifely matters which not a few have stirred up, whereby they bring scandal even to the heretics themselves. Since indeed married persons, when they shall have been joined to Jesus Christ by the bond of charity, will be united between themselves; and the interior virtue itself, probity, and sanctity will eloquently teach the honesty, purity, and chastity which spouses ought to acknowledge, without there being need that they be instructed by others. Opinions most filthy, wherever they are read in the books of certain men, offend readers and dishonour Christian spouses. And let these things concerning the great sacrament of matrimony suffice to have been said.