Section — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
On the Emancipation of Women
285. State of the question. 1. The theories set forth above concerning the man as head of the family, to whom woman ought to be subject, are vehemently opposed by all who contend that women are to be made equal to men, so that men and women enjoy the same rights and are held in the same place. Since a threefold order is distinguished, in which rights equal with men can be attributed to women, the domestic order, the social or economic order, and the political order, equality between man and woman can be more or less perfect, according as it is extended to all the orders, or to only one or another.
Since now equality does not flourish between man and woman, but in domestic society woman is subject to man, while in other orders of life she is of an inferior condition, the effort of introducing equality is called the emancipation of women. This is more or less perfect, according as only political and economic emancipation is intended, or also domestic emancipation.
Diverse in this question are the studies and opinions of authors. Some demand perfect equality of man and woman in domestic, economic, and political life, so that woman not only may acquire the right of suffrage, but also be admitted to managing public offices, can exercise the same arts and businesses which are exercised by men, and finally at home not be subject to the man: radical emancipation. Others chiefly demand equality of women in the political and economic order. Others finally restrict the equality of women to the economic and social order: moderate emancipation. All likewise demand another and more perfect education and instruction of women. From moderate emancipation of women, especially in the economic and social order, after considering the circumstances of our time, not even theologians shrink away.
1 Rosler, Die Frauenfrage^2 (Freiburg: Herder, 1907); Cathrein, Die Frauenfrage (Freiburg: Herder, 1901); Mausbach, Die Stellung der Frau im Menschheitsleben (M. Gladbach: Zentralstelle, 1906); Gnauck-Kuhne, Die deutsche Frau um die Jahrhundertwende (Berlin: Liebmann, 1907); Gnauck-Kuhne, Die soziale Lage der Frau (Berlin: Liebmann, 1895); Molsberger, Ratschlage zur Berufsfrage der Frau (Koln: Bachem); Bebel, Die Frau und der Sozialismus^43 (Stuttgart: Dietz).
286. Principles to be held in this question are these:
a. Each, man and woman, possesses the same nature and the same personality, equally perfect as to substantial things, that is, human person. To each belongs the same destination to grace and glory, as child of God, heir of eternal life; each can and must work his or her salvation and attain Christian perfection independently of the other; and therefore from this side the duties and rights of each are the same: for in Christ there is neither male nor female.1
b. But human nature and person, which is substantially the same, is expressed, developed, and operates in another and diverse mode in man and in woman: for the differences between feminine and masculine nature, as it exists in the concrete, are great and manifest both as to body and as to soul; and as to soul, both in the intellectual order and in the moral order.
The properties of nature diverse on each side show that the man is destined by nature to command and rule, but the woman, on the contrary, to be subject, to help the man and to be governed by him. Therefore nature confirms the condition of woman set forth above (n. 284), and the history of all times and of all peoples also confirms it.
c. In the social and political order, woman is to be excluded from those arts and businesses for which, considering her nature, she is less fit than man and which she cannot exercise without detriment to her natural destination, that is, to the office of mother of the family. But nothing prevents her from being admitted to arts and businesses for which either she is equally fit or more fit than man and which she can undertake without loss to the office of mother of the family.
1 Gal. 3:28.