Objects of Ownership

379. By the name author is understood everyone who by his own talent invents something, of which sort is: a. one who has written a book; b. one who has composed a work of art, such as a musical rhythm or painting; c. one who has discovered a scientific theory, an art, a medical remedy, etc.

Rights of authors. 1. By natural right an author has perfect ownership in the thing which he himself invented before it has become of public right: for each one has a right in the fruits of his own talent; wherefore as true owner he can dispose concerning his own thing according to his choice.

a. Therefore he acts against justice and is bound to reparation of damage who publishes manuscripts against the will of the author, or who steals his secret from the inventor of an art.

b. Therefore he acts against justice who publishes in print, against the will of the author, the lecture of a professor or the sermon of an orator. Nor is the appeal to the fact valid for the contrary opinion, that public speeches either of preachers or of deputies in assemblies are printed in newspapers; for these things are done with the authors knowing and not contradicting. - But by that very fact that someone teaches publicly or preaches, the proposed doctrine becomes in some way of public right; therefore it cannot be impeded that hearers make it their own, use it according to opportunity, or write it out for their own private use and lend the writing to others.

2. In a work already published, the author retains ownership and the right of publishing the work further, but grants to all the use of the published work. For the author is judged to retain that right which from the nature of the thing he can retain, but to grant that which from the nature of the thing he ought to grant; but even after publication has been made he can retain ownership in his own work and the right of publishing the work further; and by that very fact that he publishes the work, he ought to grant its use to all who wish it and pay the owed price. - Besides, to each one naturally belongs the right in the fruits of his own work; but he cannot receive the fruits from his own work unless he retains ownership in the published work and the right of publishing it further.

a. There are those who say that the right of property and further publication in a work or invention already published is lost by the publication itself; and therefore, if the right belongs to the author or inventor of prohibiting that his work or invention be published by others, this is had not from natural law, but from positive law.¹ Although their opinion does not differ much from the proposed one, because they readily concede that a positive law of this kind is altogether consonant with natural equity, nevertheless it is more aptly affirmed that the right of property is indeed from nature, but in many things obscure and indeterminate and therefore must be declared and determined by positive law.²

b. Therefore he acts against the right of the author and publisher and is bound to reparation of damage who sees to it that a published work be printed again without the author consenting. - He who, without the knowledge of the author or publisher, sees to it that some work be printed and published in distant regions inflicts damage insofar as by this reason a greater profit of the author or bookseller is impeded, which can now happen more easily, with means of communication considered, than formerly. - To multiply a book or sheet by transcription for private use, whether for oneself or for another, provided the transcription is not published, is neither unjust nor illicit, because the buyer, by force of the ownership which he acquires in the published work, can dispose of it for his every advantage if the author suffers no damage from it; but from use of this kind the author morally suffers no damage.

c. Whether by natural right the right of impeding that the translation of his work into another language be published belongs to the author is not certainly established, because it is not established whether publication of the translation in reality harms the author and whether the profit which the translator receives exceeds the labor of translation. But positive laws almost everywhere reserve to the author the right of publishing a translation.

3. Civil laws which prohibit the work of some author from being printed without the consent of those whose interest it is, not even after his death unless a certain time has elapsed,³ or which reserve to the author the right of publishing a translation of his own work, oblige in conscience, since they constitute rights (n. 356).

¹ Among recent authors Vermeersch defends this opinion, Quaestiones de iustitia, n. 240 ss.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, III, n. 53.

³ C. A., laws for the protection of copyright, Section 13, according to which, thirty years after the death of the author have elapsed, his work can be printed by anyone.

WE will here consider the various objects which can be owned by men, and to the exclusive use of which they can lay claim as being due to them in justice. We saw above that God has reserved to himself the dominion of human life; he is the God of life and of death, so that an injury is done to God by suicide or by unjustifiable homicide. Not even the State can have the absolute ownership of human life; it can never directly kill the innocent, although, as far as the common good demands it, the State may take the life of malefactors, and may require that each and all should be ready to defend the common weal even at the risk of life itself. No one, then, but God has the absolute ownership of human life or of man’s limbs and members.

Each one, however, has a qualified ownership in the faculties which God has given him. His activities of mind and body have been granted to man that by using them in a proper way he may do good and avoid evil, and thus secure the end of human existence. A man, therefore, is under the obligation imposed by God of making use of his mental and bodily faculties, and he has a consequent right to do so, as far as he does not thereby injure others.

When man by his labour has produced something which serves his wants and convenience, he has a right to the fruit of his toil; this is his property, and he cannot be deprived of it without injustice. This applies to what he has produced with his own toil, out of his own material, with his own resources.

A man’s reputation, then, inasmuch as it is the fruit of his merit and industry, is his property, and he cannot be unwarrantably deprived of it without injustice. He may, however, surrender it himself for good reason; he may write his confessions, like St Augustine, for the purpose of self-humiliation and for the instruction and edification of others; otherwise he must have a care of his own good name, without which he can do little good, and may do great harm to others,

Similarly, by the law of nature a book, design, or composition belongs to the author, and a new invention to the inventor. These things and others of the same kind are the fruit of the author’s or inventor’s thought and labour, and anyone who stole them and published them without their owner’s consent would commit a sin against justice.

Among modern civilized nations these rights are protected by municipal laws and international agreements, and, inasmuch as these determine the vague and uncertain prescriptions of the natural law, they bind in conscience.

The exclusive right of printing or otherwise multiplying copies of books, etc., is called in English law copyright. It extends not only to books, but to every volume, part, or division of a volume, pamphlet, sheet of letterpress, sheet of music, map, chart, or plan separately printed; to engravings, prints, sculpture, models, busts, paintings, drawings, photographs, designs, dramatic and musical representations.

Copyright is protected throughout the British dominions and the principal countries of Europe, which form the Copyright Union. On certain conditions copyright is now protected in the United States of America, and foreign authors may acquire copyright within the States by complying with those. conditions.

English law grants copyright for the author’s natural life and for fifty years longer.

In the United States the original terms run for twenty-eight years; it may, however, be renewed for a further term of fourteen years, making forty-two years in all.

In the same way patent right, or the right of the inventor to reap the benefit of a new contrivance, is protected in England on certain conditions for fourteen years, which protection may be extended for a further period of seven or fourteen years if the inventor has not yet reaped the full benefit of his invention, and such patent is for the public benefit. The period to which patent right extends in the United States is seventeen years.

There is a controversy among theologians as to whether the natural law of itself forbids the reissue by another without the author’s consent of a book which has once been published. Some deny this on the ground that by being published, apart from the prescriptions of positive law, a book becomes public property, and anyone who buys a copy may make what use of it he pleases. He is merely disposing of what is his own. The contrary opinion, however, seems better grounded, for the author in publishing a book makes over indeed to the buyers of it certain advantages, but there is nothing to prevent him reserving the right of issuing it again to himself. The buyer of a copy may make the contents of the book his own and work them up again in any form of his own that he chooses; he buys the material part of the book, paper, binding, etc., and may make what use of them he pleases; but he does not purchase the right to issue the book again, and he violates justice if he does so against the author’s wish. The same holds with regard to patent right.

This controversy is of little practical importance, for sufficient protection is provided in most civilized countries by positive law.

We saw above that no one except God can have an absolute property in man’s life or members. No man, then, can become the chattel of another so that he may lawfully be disposed of like a brute beast. Christian teaching has banished such an idea from Christendom at least. On the other hand, there is no difficulty in admitting that one man may make over his services to another for as long as he pleases. Theoretically, therefore, there seems no reason for saying that slavery is against the law of nature. We here understand by the term the state of perpetual subjection of one to another so that he owes that other his life service in return for board, lodging, and clothes. Practically, great abuses usually accompanied slavery, and we must allow that it is out of harmony with the spirit of the Gospel. Chiefly through the wise and gradual action of the Church, it has ceased to exist as an institution among civilized nations. However, we must not forget that penal servitude is still the just and recognized punishment for grave crime. Merely looking at the question from the point of view of the strict law of nature, we must acknowledge that a state of slavery arising from contract, or birth, or in punishment for crime, or as the result of a just war, is not in itself immoral.

Animals and the earth, together with all that they produce, may become man’s absolute property. God has imposed on him the obligation of maintaining himself and those who are dependent upon him, and he has-a consequent right to make his own whatever is necessary and useful for that purpose, if it has not been appropriated by someone else. He has a right to provide not only for his immediate wants, but for the future also; not only for himself, but for his offspring. In other words, nature herself gives man the right of private property. This right is not given by the State; it is anterior to the State, and its preservation and defence is one of the chief reasons for the existence of the State. It may indeed be regulated by the State, as far as is necessary for the common good, but it is beyond the power of the State to do away with it.¹ No Catholic is at liberty to deny the lawfulness of private property and its necessity in the general conditions of the modern world.

Socialists, indeed, advocate the nationalization of the land and of all the means of production and exchange as a sovereign cure for the economic evils of the world. The plan militates against the right of private property; it is unworkable, and even if it could be introduced it would be no cure for existing evils, and would introduce other new ones. The fuller treatment of this, a practical question in our days, scarcely belongs to moral theology; it is not in the confessional that such questions are treated. The student should consult books on ethics, or special works written on socialism or collectivism.

¹ Leo XIII, on the Condition of Labour, May 15, 1891.

Goods in relation to man are distinguished into:

1. Internal goods, to which belong goods of the body, such as life and members; likewise goods of the soul, both natural, such as faculties, sciences, and so forth, and supernatural, such as grace, virtues, and so forth.

2. External goods, such as houses, fields, money, in a word, goods of fortune. External goods are divided:

a) Into movable and immovable goods. Movable goods are those which can easily be transferred from place to place, such as money, furniture, and so forth. Immovable goods are those which are in no way, or only with difficulty, transferred.

b) Into consumable and non-consumable goods, according as the use of them consists, or does not consist, in their very consumption. Thus, for example, grain is consumable, but a book is non-consumable.

c) Into fungible and non-fungible goods. Fungible goods are those of which one can stand in the place of another of the same species, because it makes no difference whether the same thing individually, or another of the same species, is had; thus one who has borrowed money is not bound to return the same money individually. Non-fungible goods are those of which one cannot be substituted for another of the same species; thus one who has stolen a horse is bound to return the same individual horse.

3. Intermediate goods, namely reputation and honor, which, although they are founded in good qualities, nevertheless formally exist in others, who think well of someone or honor him. For the rest, compare also the division of goods or things with attention to the law of one's country. Moreover:

I. A man does not have direct ownership, but he does have useful ownership, of those goods which pertain to his substance and integrity, such as life, members, and the faculties of the soul. The first is proved from Sacred Scripture: "See that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me: I shall kill, and I shall make live."¹ The reason is that direct ownership exists only over a thing distinct from him who has ownership. Besides, ownership imports a certain superiority with respect to the thing of which direct ownership is had. But no one is superior to himself. The latter is clear; for to what end would those goods have been granted by God, if man lacked the right of using them?

II. A man has full ownership of those internal goods which do not pertain to his substance and integrity, such as operations and habits produced by natural activity. The reason is that a man is the owner of those things which he has acquired by his own industry. The same seems to be said in some way of grace, of habits, and of supernatural acts. For it is rightly admitted that these have truly been given by God as a gift to man. There is added, as regards an adult, that "through the use of free will with the help of God, man disposes himself to such goods, and therefore they are effects of cooperating grace, because man obtains them from God by cooperating with His help for receiving them."²

III. A man has full ownership of reputation and honor. The reason is that a man has acquired these by his own labor. Besides, "if a man were not owner of his own reputation, he could not condone or remit restitution of it; for no one can remit what is not his own. But nevertheless this is often done, and is done laudably."³

One who without proportionate cause neglects his reputation is guilty of the sin of prodigality, just as one who without cause dissipates riches.⁴ Hence Sacred Scripture says: "Have care for a good name; for this will remain to you more than a thousand precious and great treasures. The number of days of a good life is limited; but a good name will remain forever."⁵ This warning must especially be attended to if our reputation is necessary to our neighbors.

"Our reputation," says Lessius,⁶ "can be necessary to our neighbors in three ways. First, when the reputation of a neighbor so depends on our reputation that from our disgrace his disgrace follows; as from the disgrace of a monk there follows a certain disgrace of the monastery. Second, when our reputation is necessary so that we may render to a neighbor an office due to him by strict right; as the reputation of a public person, a Bishop, a Pastor, an Abbot, is necessary so that he may govern subjects well; and in these two events, in the judgment of many, one who disgraces himself sins against justice: not because precisely he deprives himself of reputation, but because as a consequence he harms his neighbor, either by bringing disgrace upon him, or by rendering himself unfit to perform the due office for him. Third, when we are bound to benefit a neighbor not from office but only from charity, and through disgrace we are rendered unfit for this, then one who disgraces himself sins only against charity; just as he sins against charity who throws away money by which he could have benefited the poor."

IV. A man can have full ownership of external goods or goods of fortune, provided they are such that they can be the object of ownership. The truth of the proposition is clear both from Sacred Scripture⁷ and from those things which we said concerning the legitimacy and necessity of private ownership.

I said, however: provided they are such that they can be the object of ownership. In order that this can have place, it is required: 1. that the thing can be subjected to man or occupied by him; hence, for example, the stars are excluded; 2. that the thing can be useful; nevertheless, observe that sometimes a thing which seems useless can be for some use; 3. that the thing is not of inexhaustible use, that is, such that all can use it without harm to anyone, of which sort are, for example, air and daylight.

To the question to what extent the sea can be the object of ownership, Waffelaert responds thus: "If there is question of the vast ocean, then it can scarcely be guarded; then certainly the use, which is major fishing and navigation, is inexhaustible. But if there is question of the parts of the sea washing the land, of gulfs and straits, the use, which is fishing, the finding of pearls and other precious things, the collecting of shells, and so forth, is not inexhaustible, especially since things of this sort and certain kinds of fish are frequently found in determinate and not very spacious places. Besides, provision would not be sufficiently made for the security of a maritime nation if, without any precaution, it were lawful for anyone to bring armed ships to the shore."⁸

V. A man cannot have direct ownership of those goods which pertain to the substance and integrity of the members of another; nevertheless he can acquire useful ownership of them. It is said:

1. A man cannot have direct ownership of those goods which pertain to the substance and integrity of the members of another. This is clear from the fact that ownership imports that the thing of which someone is owner is referred to him as to an end. But it is repugnant that one man be referred to another as to an end.

2. Nevertheless he can have useful ownership of these. This is clear from Sacred Scripture,⁹ and from those things which we shall say concerning the different titles on which the aforesaid ownership can rest. Moreover, the said ownership or servitude, by which someone is bound to furnish all his works to another for food and other things necessary for life, can be introduced:

a) By free agreement; for since man has useful ownership of himself, he can freely transfer it, and indeed entirely, to another.

b) By just condemnation, or as a penalty for a delict; as is clear.

c) By right of war, and by birth from slaves; these, however, with every fault set aside, even original fault, cannot be just titles. "There is," says St. Thomas, "a twofold subjection, one servile, according to which the one presiding uses the subject for his own utility; and such subjection was introduced after sin" (I, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2; I, q. 96, a. 4).

Corollary. Servitude which is extended so far that a man, as if an irrational animal with respect to his works, can be bought and sold, is altogether unbecoming to man, and therefore is judged to be abolished by law.¹⁰

VI. An author has a right in the fruit of his mind, that is, in literary, musical, or other works of the liberal arts; an inventor has a right in the art or industry invented, according as follows:

1. When the work has not yet been published by the author, he certainly has the right that another not seize and publish the manuscript, or steal the secret, for example of a known art. One who has violated that right is bound to restitution of the damage thence following; and therefore, if the author would have published the work, he must compensate the damage hoped for from publication. The same must be said of one who uses knowledge to which he has come by fraud or from a communication made by the author under secrecy.

2. When the work has been published in some measure, for example a writing printed for private use, lectures given, sermons delivered, the author seems to have the right that another not publish it. The reason is that from the circumstances themselves and from common estimation, the aforesaid things have not yet been made simply of public right, but he has retained them as his own. This posited, another also seems to lack the right of making them of public right. Nevertheless custom permits some publication, or even an entire publication, of sermons in newspapers.

3. When the work has been plainly published, one must speak thus:

a) With natural law considered, it is disputed whether the author has the right that another not further disseminate the work, for example by reprinting it.¹¹ Moreover, the opinion which is theoretically sufficiently probable and therefore safe in practice denies this, both because a work published by the author by that very fact becomes of public right, or destined for common use, and because the buyer of the work acquires ownership of it, and therefore can use it according to his will.

Finally, for the same reason the doctrine handed down seems also to be applied to a law which grants someone the right or privilege of using a commercial trademark exclusively.

Corollary I. If someone, within the limits determined by civil law, inflicts some detriment on an author or seller, he does not sin against justice; for by the very fact that civil law determines the right of authors, beyond these limits it takes away their right, if perhaps it exists, by force of high ownership. The same holds concerning international agreements.

Corollary II. The custom even of God-fearing persons commonly permits many things against the right of authors and inventors, namely: 1. the right of buying what has been publicly displayed, even though contrary to law; 2. the right of representing scenic and musical works in circles; 3. the right of making for private use some work for the manufacture of which the author's license is required, because the damage which the inventor suffers, if he suffers any, is very slight, since often it would not have been bought. From the said custom, laws which prohibit the things set forth rather seem to be merely penal.

Objection 1. The author has the right of receiving a fitting reward from the work.

Resp. The assertion is very ambiguous and must be distinguished: the author has the right that others buy the work and thus procure a reward for him, I deny; he has the right that others, for example by reprinting the work, not be the cause why less profit comes to the author, this must be proved; indeed, on account of the arguments adduced, it seems it must be denied.

Objection 2. Authors, at least today, by exposing their works for sale, add the tacit condition that others not reproduce the work by their own authority; in other words, authors sell the spiritual use, but not the commercial use of the work.

Resp. Besides the fact that that condition is asserted gratuitously, it seems one must deny that a condition so vague or indeterminate is validly attached.

Concerning the right of religious in manuscripts and so forth, we shall speak in the treatise on the duties of religious.

b) With civil law considered, which, as order and natural equity demand, has commonly determined this matter, an author, that is, a writer or inventor, seems to have a strict right to those things which the law establishes for his advantage; for legislators in this case expressly declare that they grant the author an exclusive right. Unless the nature of the thing or the context of the law suggests something else, this word seems to be understood of a full or strict right. Nor again should it be objected that the legislator does not care about obligation in conscience; for the explicit or implicit intention of granting a right suffices. Hence a transgressor of the law is bound to restitution of damage even before the sentence of a judge; but penalties established against transgressors do not oblige except after the sentence of a judge.

Some,¹² indeed, do not apply the doctrine handed down to inventors to whom patents (brevets) have been granted, because they are accustomed to increase too much the natural price of the invented thing, which is against the common good. But the fact that they act thus does not seem to impede Authority from being able to grant them a right in the thing invented and published; and that in fact it has granted them a right is to be deduced from the fact that, with the terms of the law considered, it equates them with writers and so forth.

¹ Deut. 32:39.

² Salmanticenses, tract XII, chapter 2, point 5, n. 46.

³ Billuart, IV, dissertation 3, article 2.

⁴ Billuart, loc. cit.

⁵ Ecclus. 41:15 ff.

⁶ Book 2, chapter IV, doubt XI, n. 59.

⁷ Gen. 1:28, 29; 9:1, 3; Ps. 8:7-9.

⁸ De Iustitia, I, n. 88.

⁹ Exod. chapter 21; Lev. chapter 25; Deut. chapters 20-21; cf. Eph. 6:5.

¹⁰ Cf. Leo XIII, letter In plurimis, May 5, 1888.

¹¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 904; Goepfert (II, 68) and Sweens (n. 39), who affirm; Waffelaert (I, 171) and Vermeersch (n. 248), who deny.

¹² Vermeersch, Quaestiones de Iustitia, n. 250.

To n. 875 ff. ON THE DOMINION OF AUTHORS

1. "It is certain," says Fr. Gury, Comp. v. 1, n. 566, "that any man has by natural right a right in the fruit of his industry and of his talent. For if a thing bears fruit for its owner, a fortiori this ought to be true of internal faculties, since nothing can be more proper to man. Therefore anyone can use to his own advantage those things which he has thought out by his own talent in the sciences. Therefore the inventor of some art has a strict right that his secret not be stolen and, against his will, divulged to the public. But if this happens, the damager, according to the measure of the injury inflicted, is altogether held to restitution. But the difficulty is whether an author, once his works have been emitted into the light, can keep them proper to himself and exclude others from their use."

2. This use, of which the question treats, is that by which others commit works once published to the press themselves, and sell them for their own profit. If the author retains to himself a right of property absolutely and unlimitedly in his works already emitted into public light, certainly he can impede others from publishing and selling his works; or, as is commonly said, the author can reserve to himself the right of property as regards this use. But if the author now retains no right of property for himself in those works, he cannot reserve to himself the aforesaid use, of publishing and selling the book.

3. This question can be treated from natural right and from positive right. If natural right is considered first, there are those who hold that the aforesaid right of property, from natural right, altogether strictly belongs to the author. The reason is because if the law of nature itself demands that to each be preserved his own right in the fruit of his industry and talent, and no fruit of industry in our matter can be perceived unless the work is handed over, as they say, to the community, certainly the same law of nature demands that this handing over or publication of the work to the community not deprive the author of the fruit of his industry. On the contrary, there are those who hold that the author, by the right of nature, does not have a right in his work once already published and made public, because a thing once handed over to the community becomes by that very fact of common right; and therefore the right of nature cannot demand that the author be able to reserve to himself the use of the work and exclude others from publishing and selling it.

4. In order that the question be rightly resolved, the strict demand of right must be distinguished from fittingness or congruity and equity. Furthermore, a book formally considered, namely as regards that series of doctrine and its exposition and explanation which it contains, must be distinguished from a book materially considered, namely as regards that material edition which the author made. Now the question concerns neither mere congruity of right nor mere equity, nor is a question moved concerning the material edition made by the author himself. It is evident that it is altogether fitting and equitable that the author be permitted to enjoy the advantage and profit which comes from a book composed by him, and he perhaps will be able to perceive this advantage and profit only in small part unless the right is reserved to him of excluding anyone else from the aforesaid use of his book. Wherefore a positive law acceding and defining a right of this sort is certainly an altogether just law and obliging in conscience; and with that law standing, the author has a strict right of property in his own book. Likewise it is evident that the author, by natural right itself, has a strict right of property in that edition of his book which he himself took care to have made in his own name.

5. But if the discussion is of the strict demand of commutative justice, from natural right, and of another edition of the book to be made and sold by another in his own name, it seems far more probable that this is not opposed to natural right. And indeed the right of property is either a right in the substance itself of the thing and its utility, or in one or the other only. If the matter concerns the substance itself of the thing, since truth is the proper object of the human intellect, as soon as truth and a complex of truths has been published in public light, it becomes the property of each one. Wherefore, just as as soon as an Astronomer has manifested the existence of some star in the sky, all can see it, nor can the Astronomer retain to himself the right that he alone see the star with the exclusion of others, or that they at least pay some tribute to him if others wish to see the star in the sky with their own eyes; so the author of a book, as soon as he has publicly set forth some truth, or series of truths, certainly cannot impede others from understanding the truth, with no tribute paid to him, and perhaps even persuading themselves of it better than he himself. And this is confirmed from the very intention and scope of the writer, preacher, professor: for all these intend that readers and hearers be persuaded and make the doctrines handed down their own. And this is their greatest praise, if they obtain it.

6. Nor indeed can any difficulty be taken from the disposition of things, order, exposition, and the very diction or writing by which things are enunciated and manifested to others. For all these things are reduced to the truth itself and to art and science, which by natural right pertain to all. Nor indeed can there be any right of property in these things, since they can be useful to all; nor do they have in themselves the limitation which material goods have, so that if they serve and are useful to one, they cannot serve another, nor be useful to him. Does the author of a book understand and reason less because others understand what he taught in the same way, and reason in the same way as he does?

7. Hence another point is most easily demonstrated: once a work has been emitted into public light, the author does not preserve dominion in the use of his work, formally inspected, as we have already explained in n. 4; and in this sense we always speak of the author's dominion, and the question is debated among doctors. Truly, if the author does not preserve dominion in the substance of the thing as soon as the work has been made public, how, dominion in the substance having been transferred, will he himself preserve dominion in the use? If this could be done, someone could also by mutuum transfer to another the dominion in the substance of money, with the dominion of the use of the money reserved to himself, which afterward he would sell.

8. Besides, if the author preserves to himself dominion of the use of truths which he perhaps found, explained, and ordered, someone could not use them by study and meditation, and from them proceed by reasoning to other truths perhaps also to be found, as can easily happen in the chemical, physical, mathematical arts and sciences, etc., by proceeding even to the practical application of those truths, which indeed is of the greatest utility and also of the greatest profit. Likewise someone could not publish another's book with notes added for explaining things; nor could he refer texts from another's book in his own book; nor could he thoroughly refute another's book, and remove all authority from it as erroneous, scandalous; which imports dominion not only in the use but also in the very substance of the thing, which he destroys as by his own right.

9. Once the use of his book, publicly published, has been reserved to the author, to the professor in his lecture which he gives in a public academy, to the preacher in his sermon which he gives in a public church, now another writer cannot use that book for composing another and better book, since it is easy to add to inventions; now a hearer could not repeat the lecture to friends and discourse about it in another academy; now another preacher, retaining well by memory the sermon he has heard, could not without sin of injustice deliver the same sermon to the people, and perhaps with greater fruit on account of his personal qualities. But it matters little, as is clear, whether someone retains by memory a lecture pronounced by mouth, a sermon heard, and repeats it to others, or learns by memory and repeats another's lecture or another's sermon published in type. Likewise it matters little that someone repeat another's lecture or sermon orally to others, or transmit it by letters to friends, or by lithography, or even by public type, in the same language, or in another, or even in different languages. But since here one's own talent, one's own ability, one's own industry and labor also intervene, why can someone not perceive the fruit of his own talent and labor, or why must he abstain from exercising his own talent, from exercising his own labor?

10. Moreover, if the author had the aforesaid dominion in his own work, he could transfer it by testament to his heirs, and they to others. Now those who defend the aforesaid dominion of authors are content to assert it only for a determinate time. This limitation shows that in reality, in this question, the strict demand of right is confused with mere fittingness of right and natural equity. Likewise, if the author cannot claim for himself an absolute right in the use of his own book, how is a right of this sort restricted at least to excluding others from publishing and selling the book? For among the other uses of a book this also is numbered. And if someone buys a book, and thus by purchase has made it his own, materially also inspected, how can he be impeded from publishing that same book himself, and selling it in his own name, at his own expense and profit? If someone has a nursery of trees and sells trees, he certainly cannot prevent another, having bought a tree, from himself forming a nursery and then himself also selling trees from it, at his own expense and for his own profit. The same is altogether valid concerning another edition of a book.

11. Nor indeed does the argument of the adversaries prove anything; for since it proves too much, it proves altogether nothing. Truly, what is assumed is certainly true, that the very law of nature demands that to each one his own right in the fruit of his industry and talent be preserved. But a fruit of this sort is that which the author in reality perceives from the edition and from the editions which he himself makes of his own book. That a fruit of this sort also extends to editions made by another, or that another is therefore impeded from making these editions, is not drawn from that; indeed the contrary follows: for another uses his own talent, his own industry and labor, and therefore possesses and enjoys by right its fruits. The other point which is added, that the same law of nature demands that, if no fruit of our industry can be perceived unless the work is handed over to the community, that handing over not deprive the author of the fruit of his industry, likewise proves nothing. For first this would prove that the handing over of dominion in a mutuum ought, a fortiori, not to deprive the owner of money of the fruit to be perceived from money. Moreover, if the author of a book, lest he be deprived of the fruit of his industry, can impede another from publishing the book, translating it into another language, etc., a merchant, businessman, craftsman, etc., can impede other merchants, businessmen, craftsmen, from exercising the same commerce and business and the same art; for from that he is deprived of the fruit of his industry. Nor is it of force that he himself found the mode of manufacturing goods, of conducting business in such or such a way, of exercising the art. This is opposed to common sense itself and to the practice of the God-fearing. And thus if someone discovers a way of finding water in fields and publicly manifests it, who would ever impede proprietors of fields from finding water in their own land, or impede others from exercising this art and perceiving profit from it? Nor is it true that then the author of a book, for example, could perceive no fruit of his talent and of his industry. He certainly perceives the fruit of that edition, or of those editions, which he himself makes. This one thing is true in the case, that the author of a book does not perceive every fruit which can be had from it. But this contains no difficulty. For this is verified almost everywhere in all contracts. And thus he who sells a horse perceives only the price of the horse. The buyer uses the horse for several uses, and by his own industry perhaps earns each year money exceeding the very price of the horse. Nor could someone say that the law of nature demands that, if no fruit of his own thing can be perceived unless the dominion of the thing is handed over to another, that handing over not deprive the owner of the fruit of his own thing. Once the handing over of dominion has been made, that fruit is no longer the fruit of his thing, but of another's; and the thing bears fruit for the other owner, not for the prior owner, whose thing it no longer is. Besides, if someone attends even lightly to the force of the argument brought forward, it is plainly such that it altogether concedes what the adversaries affirm, namely that the thing is handed over to the community, and consequently that the author is deprived of that right of property, and that the thing becomes of common right. But what is asserted, that even in such a case the law of nature demands that the author not be deprived of the fruit of his industry, is consequently said indeed of congruity, of a certain fittingness, of a certain natural equity, but logically it cannot be said of strict right by force of commutative justice.

12. With these things presupposed, we now resolve various particular questions. And first: does he violate another's right who publishes in type a manuscript work without the consent of the author? R. Affirmatively. The reason is that the work, so long as it has not been emitted into the light, remains altogether under the dominion of the author. Wherefore such a usurper is held to restitution of the manuscript and compensation of damages.

13. Likewise, does he violate another's right who publishes in type the lectures of some professor, or the sermon of an orator? R. There are those who generally affirm this, even concerning a public lecture or sermon. The reason is that to teach or preach publicly is not to hand one's work over to another for publishing or selling. But it seems that a distinction must be made. For if the matter concerns a private lecture, a private sermon, it is a clear thing that the professor or preacher retains his whole right in his lecture or sermon. But if the matter concerns a public lecture or sermon, the argument already made has force: that the thing has already been handed over to the community, and by that very fact has been made of common right. And this is confirmed by the fact itself, for there is no one who condemns as injurious to others those who publish public speeches in type, in newspapers, of Deputies or Senators in Parliaments, or of others in public assemblies. The very words of the Supreme Pontiff in public receptions of the Christian faithful are publicly published, and there is no one who accuses this as a grave sin against justice.

14. Can a recently published book be committed to type in another place without the permission of the author? R. If the matter concerns a very distant place, those Doctors themselves who contend that by the right of nature the author retains the right of property in his book to be published again, so that others are excluded from such a right, concede that in such a case a right of this sort seems less to be urged; since an edition in very distant regions less impedes the author from perceiving a congruous fruit of his industry. And this reason still more clearly shows that the author in reality does not retain a right of property in his work; since if he retained that right, it would matter little whether the book is published in a neighboring or distant region without permission, against the will of the author. Certainly it matters little, as regards injustice, that someone occupy another's house, another's field, and use and enjoy them against the will of the owner in a neighboring or most remote region. Nor is it of force to say that someone in such a most remote region could not defend and protect his right of property; otherwise, as the Doctors themselves shrewdly note, it would be lawful for anyone to take crops or grapes for himself at will, because the owner of the field or vineyard is not able to guard them. But if the matter concerns a neighboring place, and treaties are present between various dominions, by force of which the author can enjoy the same right elsewhere as in his own country, commutative justice is certainly wounded, and the violator of another's right is held to compensate damages according to the norm of the laws. But if no convention is present between various regions, since law has no force outside the territory of the legislator, although perhaps such a law is present in the place of the author, nevertheless in another place the editor of the book is not bound by it; and therefore the matter is to be defined only by natural right. But by natural right a right of property of this sort is none, or is very uncertain. Therefore he who uses his own right and publishes another's book cannot be accused as a violator of another's right and as a damager. And this is much more valid if someone did not merely publish another's book, but first translated it into another language. For then one's own industry and one's own labor enter still more.

537. • Principles. I. Man has useful dominion of the goods which are intrinsic to him, namely of soul and body. Therefore he can, without injury to anyone, use them for his own utility, and for every use not prohibited by law.

Yet he does not have direct dominion of these goods. This is established from Sacred Scripture; thus Wisd. 16. 13: "You are, O Lord, who have power of life and death." - Likewise Deut. 32. 39: "I shall kill, and I shall make alive." - It is also established from natural law, as we said where treating of the fifth precept of the Decalogue, n. 389 and following.

538. • II. Man can have useful and direct dominion in external goods of fortune legitimately acquired. This is established, 1. as to useful dominion, because on the one hand these goods are of themselves apt for promoting the preservation or utility of man, and on the other hand the use of them is not opposed to divine and human right; indeed God Himself permitted at least the utility of the aforesaid goods by these words, Gen. 1. 28: "Have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the air," etc. - And Ps. 8. 8: "You have subjected all things under his feet." - It is established, 2. as to direct dominion, because the faculty of applying goods of fortune to one's own uses is restricted by no right; indeed it is expressly permitted by human right, as is clear from the various laws concerning the right of possessing, and by divine right in the words cited: "Have dominion," etc.

539. • Questions. Q. 1. Whether man has dominion of his own reputation?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the common opinion; for even concerning reputation there belong to man the primary acts of dominion, such as to acquire it by labor, to condone restitution of it, etc. Therefore... Yet prudence requires that he not squander it without just reason, and sometimes he is bound under grave sin to preserve it carefully by reason of scandal, of removing harm to the family, etc. - St. Lig., lib. 3, n. 983. - Billuart, diss. 3, art. 2.

Q. 2. Whether man can have dominion over another man?

Resp. 1. Negatively, as to dominion of property; for that belongs to God alone, as is established from what has been said, n. 522.

Resp. 2. Affirmatively, as to useful dominion, or the works of man. The reason is that any man is master of his own work, and therefore he can alienate it for his own utility and hand it over into the dominion of another. For a master can dispose at will of the object of his dominion.

Hence 1. by natural right a man can even sell himself to another forever as to useful dominion. For if he can confer upon another the useful dominion of himself for some time, he can do the same forever, since he can yield whatever he has. 2. Per se servitude is not repugnant to the law of nature, or the state of perpetual subjection by which someone, in exchange for food, is bound to furnish all his works to another.

540. • Q. 3. From what titles can servitude be introduced?

Resp. From the four following titles: 1. From pact, or one's own renunciation. For it is not repugnant that someone renounce his liberty in order to relieve his own need, etc. - 2. From the right of war. For it is not repugnant that the victor should sometimes inflict this punishment. For sometimes he could kill captives for the security of the nation; therefore, a fortiori, reduce them to servitude. - 3. From an offense, or from just condemnation. For if a guilty person can be condemned to death, a fortiori to servitude, since deprivation of life is deservedly considered the greatest of all punishments. - 4. From birth in a state of servitude, since by law they are slaves who are born of slaves. Thus according to the law of nations, in accordance with the common opinion. - Lugo, disp. 6, n. 11 and 17.

541. • Q. 4. Whether the trade in Negroes is lawful?

Resp. 1. It is altogether unlawful by every right, as often as Negroes are unjustly despoiled of liberty, and are transported in bands from their own regions as cheap cattle, and are sold, as happens in their nefarious trade (Traites des Nègres). Against so monstrous a trade there have come forth various Apostolic Constitutions, namely of Paul III, Urban VIII, Benedict XIV, and lately Gregory XVI, in the Constitution In supremo apostolatus, December 3, 1839, as may be seen in the public sheet called Ami de la Religion, tom. 103, n. 3219.

Resp. 2. But if it is a matter of Black persons or others existing in legitimate servitude, it is not per se absolutely unlawful, because once servitude has been admitted as legitimate, the master has a true right in slaves, or in their works, and therefore is able to transmit it to others. I said, per se; for circumstances can stand in the way, for example, if a spouse would have to be separated from a spouse, or if civil laws forbid it, just as in reality servitude is generally interdicted in Europe.

566. • It is certain that any man by natural right has a right in the fruit of his industry and of his talent. For if a thing fructifies for the owner, a fortiori this ought to be true of internal faculties, since nothing can be more proper to man. Therefore anyone can use for his own advantage those things which he has devised by his talent in the sciences. Therefore the inventor of some art has a strict right that his secret not be stolen and, against his will, be published in public; and if this happens, the one causing damage is altogether bound to restitution according to the measure of the injury inflicted. But the difficulty is whether an author, once his works have been emitted into the light, can preserve them as proper to himself, and exclude others from the use of them ¹. Hence:

¹ Understand "from the use" which the Author of the work reserves for himself; what sort this is is gathered from the following questions.

567. • Questions. Q. 1. Whether he violates another's right who publishes a manuscript work in print without the author's consent?

Resp. Affirmatively. For this is openly repugnant to natural right; and among all it is established that as long as the work has not been emitted into the light, it remains entirely under the dominion of the author. Therefore there is no doubt that such a usurper is bound to restitution and to compensation for damages. - Carrière, n. 61.

Q. 2. What must be said of him who would publish in print the public lectures of some professor, or the sermon of an orator?

Resp. One must respond as in the preceding question. For to teach publicly or to preach is not to hand over one's work to another for publishing and selling. Thus judged the Tribunal of Appeals of Paris, February 28, 1801. - See Carrière, n. 61.

568. • Q. 3. Whether he who has published a book in print has the right of preventing anyone from committing it to the press and selling it with damage to the author or to the bookseller to whom the author transmitted his right?

Resp. 1. Affirmatively, by positive right in force in France and in most other places.

Resp. 2. If it is a matter of natural right, it is disputed. More probably it seems that an author does not have a perpetual right in his work, because a thing once handed over to the community becomes by that very fact of common right ². Yet it is consonant with equity that by positive right some privilege be granted to the author for a certain time, or for his life.

² This reason perhaps would prove that it is lawful for anyone to take harvests or grapes for himself at will, because the owner of the field or vineyard cannot guard them. Certainly if the law of nature itself requires that to each one there be preserved his right in the fruit of his industry and talent, as was set down beforehand (n. 566), and no fruit of industry in our matter can be received unless the work is handed over, as they say, to the community, surely the same law of nature requires that this handing over or publishing of the work to the community not deprive the author of the fruit of his industry.

Q. 4. Whether a recently published book can be committed to type in a neighboring kingdom without the author's permission?

Resp. It seems more probably that one must affirm, because the author by natural right can claim no certain right ³, and therefore cannot complain of violated strict dominion. The same must be said of the inventors of various arts. - Thus Carrière, ibid., etc. Moreover, in many places provision has been made excellently by treaties admitted among various dominions, by force of which the author can enjoy the same right elsewhere as in his own fatherland.

³ This general assertion likewise is repugnant to the principle which was established as certain in n. 566. For this reason the agreement of diverse republics is especially congruent with natural right, so that privileges granted anywhere to authors may also be preserved elsewhere. If this agreement is not admitted somewhere, the sanction of a violated duty will indeed be lacking there, but not the duty altogether. Nevertheless, since the publication of books in very distant regions less impedes the author from receiving a suitable fruit of his industry, that principle established above seems to press less as regards them.

43. Man cannot protect and preserve life unless there inheres in him the right of having certain external goods as his own, by which he can enjoy what is necessary for the support of himself and his own. We shall speak: 1. of the right of possessing external goods; 2. of the various kinds of goods, and especially of semi-full dominion.

118. Now that the right of property has been placed in safety, a few things remain to be said concerning the various genera and species of goods, and also concerning the various modes by which semi-full dominion can be had in these goods. Now external goods are divided:

(A) Into corporeal and incorporeal goods: (a) the former are those which fall under the senses, such as a house, field, furniture; (b) the latter are said to be those which are not obvious to the senses, namely rights of fishing, hunting, receiving fruits, etc. This division is not opposed in its members, but only analogous, nor is it very useful except in the matter of prescription.

119. (B) Into movable or immovable: (a) the former are those which, without notable injury, are judged capable of being transferred from place to place physically, morally, or juridically, whether by their own force or by extrinsic force; (b) the latter are said to be those which cannot be transferred without detriment, such as a house, field, etc.

120. By French law, (a) immovable goods are such either 1) by their nature (les terrains, les vegetaux adherents au sol, les edifices); or 2) by destination ("accessories of an immovable to which they are attached"); or 3) by reason of the object to which they are referred (thus real rights of usufruct of immovable things, of servitude, use, habitation, and of most mortgages; thus also immovable credits, immovable actions);² or 4) by declaration (les actions de la Banque de France, les rentes sur l'Etat peuvent ainsi devenir immobilieres); or 5) by annexation (dans un cas: la redevance en argent dont est grevee une mine en faveur du proprietaire du sol).¹

² Civil Code, art. 526; cf. art. 518-525; Planiol, I, n. 2232, 2233, 2648.

¹ Planiol, ibid., n. 2201-2237.

(b) But movable goods are such: 1) by nature (meubles corporels), 2) by anticipation (moissons et recoltes qui font l'objet d'une saisie ou d'une vente), 3) by determination of law² (droits reels - propriete, usufruit, gage, privileges - portant sur une chose mobiliere; certains offices comme etudes de notaire, d'avoue...; creances de sommes exigibles, rentes, actions et interets dans les societes).³

² Civil Code, art. 527.

³ Planiol, ibid., n. 2237-2262.

But this distinction of immovable and movable goods is of the greatest moment for rightly understanding and executing many dispositions of civil law, with regard to testaments, donations, etc., etc.⁴

⁴ Planiol, ibid., n. 2197.

121. (C) Into private or public. Private goods are either those of individuals, or of free groups (richesses collectives privees); but public goods belong to political groups, namely the State, provinces, municipalities (domaines de l'Etat, des departements, des communes, - et aussi Etablissements publics).⁵

⁵ Cf. Planiol, I, n. 3005 sq.

122. (D) Into consumable or non-consumable. Consumable goods are those which are consumed by first use either physically, as food, or morally, as money; - non-consumable goods are those which even by prolonged use are by no means destroyed or changed, as houses, clothing.⁶ The practical utility of this distinction appears in those things which regard usufruct and loan.

⁶ Planiol, ibid., n. 2179.

(E) Into fungible or non-fungible. Two things are said to be fungible between themselves when one can take the place of the other in the payment of a debt: such are things which are commonly numbered, measured, or weighed, as money, oil, grain. Hence fungibility is a relation of equivalence between two things; if this is lacking, there is non-fungibility.⁷

⁷ Ibid., n. 2181, 2182.

I. What Things Can Become One's Own, What Cannot. 1. Never can the person himself, but only a thing, pertain to a man as his own. Of themselves all things can become one's own: exterior things and the powers of the body, members; not only material things but also immaterial things, say our higher faculties; not only things physically existing, but also beings of reason, or things which are in moral estimation, e.g. reputation.

Of themselves, I say. For law can place certain things outside commerce, so that they cannot come into the private or quasi-private dominion of anyone: say streets, in civil law.

Nevertheless, several things can be the object only of imperfect dominion. Thus full dominion of the body and faculties is reserved to God, while merely useful dominion has been conceded to man. Reputation, however, is situated in the perfect dominion of man.

Nor can all things be possessed by all. Thus full useful dominion of faculties, powers, and life cannot belong to another than the man who is constituted from them. Thus also certain sacred things can be excluded from the dominion of laymen by ecclesiastical authority. But what parts of the useful dominion of a person can be possessed by others is established differently in different laws and periods of time. Once a very ample power over slaves was conceded, while today very slight power belonging to another is conceded by civil law, since human works cannot be leased in perpetuity; nor can one who has promised works be compelled against his will to furnish them, but is held only to damages for the refused work.

2. Not only things, but also rights concerning things can be possessed.

Indeed, only concerning perfect dominion can it indifferently be said either that the thing itself or the dominion of the thing is had. When dominion is imperfect, the right rather, or more directly, than the thing itself is situated in our dominion. Wherefore, since the English deny that perfect dominion of an immovable thing can be had, they quite logically designate by the name estate the quantity of right possessed, and speak of estate rather than of the things themselves.

3. Certain things could not be or become one's own without positive law. Thus those rights of exclusively publishing a book or making machines, which are often designated by the common name of authors' dominion. Concerning these things, which daily increase in number, cf. what is to be said about Monopolies.

II. How Things Are Divided. Moreover, some things are movable, which move themselves or can easily be moved from place; others are immovable. But some things are called immovable by their own nature, whether of themselves, as fields, houses, or as adhering to an immovable thing, as such: for example, mirrors inserted into a wall; others are such as assigned to the service or utility, for example, of an estate: thus instruments and animals deputed to cultivating a rural estate are called immovable by their destination.

That division is transferred in several laws to the rights themselves, so that rights which affect an immovable thing are called immovable, and rights which affect a movable thing are called movable. Wherefore they are called immovable by object of application.

Therefore attention must be given to what the laws have concerning that division, and what jurists pronounce concerning the sense of the laws.

Some things are fungible, others non-fungible. Fungible things are determined by genus; non-fungible things by individual body. Circumstances can effect that the same thing, for the most part fungible, must by accident be treated as non-fungible, and conversely.

Some things are consumptible, which by first use are naturally or civilly (as monies are) consumed: their use is said to consist in abuse. Other things are not consumptible.

— I. 1. Only things, never persons, can become one's own. Of themselves all things can become one's own: both material and immaterial; both physically existing and beings of reason, of which moral estimation is had, say reputation. But several things are placed outside commerce, at least that of private persons, by positive law, whether ecclesiastical or civil.

Rights also are one's own; indeed, if you except perfect dominion, we possess rights rather than things.

2. Not all things can be the object of perfect dominion. Thus man has only useful dominion of his body and faculties. Reputation can be situated in perfect dominion.

3. Nor can all things subject to possession be possessed by all. Thus private persons are excluded from possessing certain things; and the full useful dominion of faculties and powers cannot be ceded to another.

4. There are things or rights which cannot become one's own without positive law. Thus what is called authors' dominion.

II. Some things are movable, others immovable, either by their own nature, by destination, or by object of application. - Some things are fungible, others non-fungible. - Some are consumptible, others non-consumptible.

The whole doctrine concerning the object of dominion is comprised in five principles:

6. Principle 1. Man has useful dominion, but not absolute dominion, in the goods which are intrinsic to him, namely those of soul and body.

The reason is that man is as it were God's steward, to whom diverse talents of body and soul have been entrusted to be administered for attaining his supernatural end. Moreover, a steward does not have absolute dominion of the goods entrusted to him, but is held to administer them according to the good pleasure of the lord; nevertheless he can use the talents given for his own advantage. From this principle there follow very practical corollaries, namely:

Corollary 1. Man arrogates to himself a right which he does not have when he destroys the life of the body by suicide. "You are, O Lord, he who has power of life and death," it is said in Sacred Scripture.³⁹ Likewise man commits an injury against God if he corrupts bodily health or calls it into danger without sufficient reason. But much greater is the injury brought against God when man through mortal sin loses the life of his own soul.

Corollary 2. Man cannot treat his own body just as it pleases him. Hence man cannot licitly cut off his own members, procure for himself surgical sterilization or vasectomy, unless this is necessary for driving out a grave sickness; he cannot use his own body for lust; but he can, indeed he must, even with bodily detriment, guard the life of the soul; he can also, on account of the exercise of virtues and for the great utility of the soul, expose bodily health to danger or diminish it, for example by fasting, undertaking grave labors, setting out to foreign missions for the preaching of the Gospel, etc.

³⁹ Wis. 16:13.

7. Principle 2. To man there belongs strict dominion (although limited) over his own reputation.

The reason is that reputation truly is a property which man has acquired for himself by his own labor, namely by the honorable exercise of his faculties, or at least from inheritance. A good reputation is a most precious good. Hence it is said in Sacred Scripture: "A good name is better than many riches."⁴⁰ Hence he commits a great injury who takes away or diminishes another's good reputation by calumny or detraction.⁴¹

Nevertheless man's dominion over his own reputation suffers limitations. For since a good reputation is so necessary for the happy and fruitful operation of man, a grave cause is truly required in order that its voluntary loss may be licit. Hence Sacred Scripture also admonishes: "Have care for a good name: for this will remain for you more than a thousand precious and great treasures. The number of days of a good life: but a good name will remain forever."⁴² Therefore, just as it is not licit to dissipate one's temporal goods, so a fortiori it is not licit to call one's reputation into danger without grave cause. But man is gravely prohibited from diminishing his own reputation, especially if his infamy redounds upon his neighbor, for example upon his family, upon the convent in which he lives, if a good reputation is very necessary for exercising the duties of his state. Hence, for example, a priest cannot permit (without seriously contradicting) the wounding of his own reputation, because the faithful will not have confidence in a priest whose reputation is stained. Nevertheless, from a reasonable cause, man can voluntarily make a loss of his own reputation, for example for exercising humility, for celebrating the mercy of God, etc. Hence St. Augustine wrote the book of the Confessions, St. Francis of Assisi wished to be regarded as foolish, etc. Therefore the general rule is: it is licit to suffer the loss of one's own reputation if the good effects following from it prevail over the evils. In practice it is usually safer not to trust too much in one's own judgment in this matter, but to seek the counsel of a prudent man.

⁴⁰ Prov. 22:1.

⁴¹ How restitution must be made after such an injury, see below n. 187, where damage-inflicting is treated.

⁴² Ecclus. 41:15 sq.

8. Principle 3. Man has dominion over the offspring of his own intellect and industry, according as, however, it has been determined by individual civil laws.

The offspring of intellect are: books published by an author, images, musical rhythm, medicinal remedies newly invented, and other artifacts made by an artisan. All indeed teach that it is pure and putrid theft if someone secretly takes away from another manuscripts or artifacts or inventions not yet made matters of public right, because the legitimate owner is reasonably unwilling on account of grave damage and grave injury brought against him. But when a manuscript has already been printed, or if an invention (commonly, Patent) has already been divulged, theologians dispute whether a new printing of the book made without the author's permission or imitation of the invention is against natural right and obliges to restitution. Some deny this, because a work once published already becomes a common good, which can licitly be occupied by all;⁴³ but the more common and truer opinion affirms it, yet with the restrictions indicated by positive law. And indeed it seems to be a great injury that he who perhaps with hard labors wrote a book, or invented something new, should be frustrated of the fruits of his labors because another publishes the book again or makes an imitation of the invention. Nevertheless, from another side, it would be very harmful to the common good if the publication and imitation of such works remained reserved forever. Wherefore it is necessary that positive laws indeed protect the rights of the author, but also limit them; and thus in fact it has been done among all cultivated nations. Indeed, concerning this matter there exist international pacts among several nations. Already in the year 1886 at Bern in Switzerland such a pact was entered into among some nations, and it was augmented at Paris in the year 1896. But afterward certain nations entered into still special pacts.⁴⁴

Things To Be Noted For Practice. Since natural right does not have special determinations concerning the dominion of authors, and since the determinations of diverse civil laws seem sufficiently just and constitute true rights, they also oblige in conscience, and transgressions induce not only sin but also the obligation of restitution, if the true owner has suffered grave and certain damage. Thus is the opinion today more common. In practice the quantity of restitution can be determined with difficulty, because it is almost impossible to weigh the damage which the author has suffered. Lehmkuhl writes to the matter: "He is held to that restitution which the judge will have defined, if he is called into law. If the author is unwilling to pursue the matter in judgment, and nevertheless does not renounce restitution, that must be restored to the author and publisher in which, according to equitable estimation, they have suffered damage or have been defrauded of profit."⁴⁵

It must be noted that sometimes restitution must be made not only to the inventor but also to buyers. For example, someone has produced a liquor similar to the very celebrated liquor commonly called "Chartreuse" and sells it as true "Chartreuse." In this case the damages brought must be repaired: 1. to the legitimate proprietors producing true "Chartreuse"; 2. to all those who bought false "Chartreuse" in error, since that false liquor has much less value than true liquor, and besides perhaps diminished the health of those drinking it. Since the buyers for the most part are unknown, something must be given in their place to the poor or to pious causes. But how much and how it must be restored can hardly be defined easily. The falsifier does not deserve great indulgence. If he has been detected, even by civil law itself he is most gravely punished and is held to pay the imposed penalty. But if he has not been caught by the civil judge, nevertheless there falls upon him the moral obligation of repairing the damages. Perhaps restitution can then be made in this way: after deducting the expenses which the adulterator made in the fabrication of the thing, let him divide the whole profit into two parts, of which let him expend one upon pious causes, but restore the other to the legitimate proprietor producing it. Thus, saving a better opinion and with circumstances altogether particular, sometimes occurring, set aside.

Often the permission of the author can be presumed for publishing small articles published by him or for transcribing music for private use; the same is valid concerning translations into another language, provided nevertheless that it is a matter of lesser moment. For thus common usage bears. But many authors in these cases require that it be indicated by the translator or new publisher whence he took the written article. But if it is a matter of translations of greater moment, for example of an entire book, then the permission of the author or publisher cannot be presumed, and therefore such an illegitimate translator must be treated in the confessional almost as was said above concerning an illegitimate publisher.

⁴³ Thus especially Bucceroni, Theol. mor. I, n. 878; somewhat also Morres, De iust. I, n. 24; Vermeersch, De iust. n. 246 sqq.

⁴⁴ Cf. Herders Konversations-Lex., s. v. "Urheberrecht."

⁴⁵ Casus consc. I, n. 580.

9. Scholion. On The Dominion Of Authors According To Some Modern Civil Laws. The dominion of authors is protected by Spanish civil law during the life of the author and after his death for 80 years;⁴⁶ by French civil law during the life of the author and after his death still for 50 years; by German, Austrian, and Swiss law during the life of the author and then for 30 years; by British law for 42 years after the first appearance of the work; by the law of North America for 28 years from the day on which the book was sent to the "Librarian of Congress, Washington"; the duration of 28 years can be prolonged for another 14 years.

Concerning the laws of diverse regions about the right of a new invention (commonly Patentrecht, Patent right, droit sur les brevets d'invention), since those laws are not easy either for understanding or in practical application, there is no leisure to speak here. If a case occurs in the confessional, the confessor should first consult an upright man who is skilled in this matter (commonly Patentanwalt); for it is morally impossible that the confessor be able to render a right judgment in so arduous a matter without the previous counsel of someone skilled in civil law.

⁴⁶ Cf. Larraga-Sarollegui, Comentarios al P. Larraga n. 703; Cod. civ. a. 428 sq.

10. Principle 4. To man there belongs strict dominion over external goods legitimately possessed.

This is clear from what was said above, n. 4, concerning the licitness of such private dominion and concerning the absurdity of Communism.

11. Principle 5. Man does not have full dominion over another man, but he can have useful dominion.

The reason is that each man has received from the Creator some inalienable rights. Hence no private man can dispose of the bodily or spiritual life of his neighbor. For as to this all men are equal. Whence it is a most grave injustice if someone by his own authority kills another, unless nevertheless he acts from legitimate defense or with the moderation of inculpable self-protection, as will be explained below concerning an unjust aggressor. A legitimate judge can inflict the penalty of death as bearing the place of God, as will be said below, n. 118.

Useful dominion over the faculties and works of a neighbor can belong to some man, because this follows necessarily from the inequality of the states of diverse men. This diversity indeed has been instituted by God himself, since he willed some to be masters and others to be servants. Wherefore all theologians teach that, pagan slavery being rejected, by which a slave was regarded altogether as a material thing or a brute animal, even slavery properly so called, by which someone is held through his whole life to serve another in all licit things, is prohibited neither by natural right nor by positive-divine right. Hence we see slavery existing not only among barbarous nations, but also among the Jews.⁴⁷ Slavery is manifestly presupposed as something in itself licit also in the New Testament. For the Apostles command that slaves be subject "in all fear to masters, not only to the good, but also to the harsh";⁴⁸ they exhort masters to treat slaves kindly;⁴⁹ they sometimes advise them, but do not command them, to free them.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, history bearing witness, slavery has almost always involved many abuses; and therefore both civil and ecclesiastical law gravely prohibit slavery properly so called in our days.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Cf. Ex. c. 21; Lev. c. 25; Deut. c. 20-21.

⁴⁸ 1 Pet. 2:18; similar things are found in Col. 3:22; Eph. 6:5.

⁴⁹ Cf. Eph. 6:9; Col. 4:1.

⁵⁰ Almost the whole Epistle to Philemon.

⁵¹ Cf. Gregory XVI, Const. In supremo apostolatus, 3 Dec. 1839, and Leo XIII, Encycl. In plurimis, 5 May 1888.

12. Scholion. On The Various Kinds Of Goods. After what has been said concerning the object of dominion, it is useful to add small explanations concerning the various kinds of goods which fall under dominion. For diverse civil codes distinguish very carefully among diverse kinds of goods. They are:

1. Movable and immovable goods. Movable goods⁵² are those which can easily be transferred from place to place. Immovable goods are those which either cannot be transferred, or are considered to be inseparably joined with an immovable thing. In individual codes it is usually determined which goods are considered immovable and which are not. Both in German law and in French law there are considered immovable goods, besides houses and fields and other things which adhere to the soil, also: a) crops and other fruits, as long as they are joined with the soil, but not after they have been separated from the soil by harvest; b) rights which are joined with some immovable good, for example the right of patronage, active servitudes, etc.; c) machines necessary in some workshop; animals necessary for carrying out agriculture, etc.⁵³

2. Fungible and non-fungible goods.⁵⁴ Fungible things are movable goods which can function in place of others; moreover, they are those things which in commerce are customarily numbered, weighed, or measured, and are consumed by the first use, for example money (which among all fungible things, according to modern practice, obtains the first place), oil, grain. For if someone has lent me, for example, 100 francs, I am not held to return altogether the same little coins of gold or silver, but in place of the coins loaned, any other coins of the same value can function. But non-fungible things are those which cannot be substituted by others, but, if they have been loaned or taken away, must be returned altogether identically; for example, if someone has loaned this horse, it does not suffice to return another horse, but altogether the same horse must be returned.

3. Consumable and non-consumable goods.⁵⁵ Consumable goods are considered to be those things which, as such, are consumed by the first use, for example food, drink, money, etc. But I say: which as such are consumed by the first use; for it is not required that they be altogether destroyed or receive another nature. Thus, for example, the cloth from which a garment has been made indeed remains, but it has now been made clothing and ceases to be cloth. Therefore it is considered a thing consumable by the first use. But non-consumable goods are things which are by no means consumed by the first use, but remain in their first state, for example a garment, a house, books, etc.

These divisions must be committed to memory, because otherwise several expressions of civil codes can be understood only with difficulty.

⁵² Fahrnis, fahrende Habe.

⁵³ Cf. Cod. Civ. Germ. §§ 93-98, where these things are called: Wesentliche Bestandteile einer Sache und Zubehör.

⁵⁴ Vertretbare und nicht vertretbare Sachen (cf. Cod. civ. Germ. § 91).

⁵⁵ Verbrauchbare und nicht verbrauchbare Sachen (ibid. § 92).

166. The object of right and dominion is all things, not considered in themselves, but insofar as they bring utility and can be appropriated, and thus yield to man's own advantage, and therefore are called goods. These, comparatively to man, are divided into three species, according to the diverse mode in which they are referred to our utility:

1st. man's internal goods: of the body, such as life, health, members; and of the soul, whether natural, such as faculties and their exercise, sciences and arts, or supernatural, which have been infused by God through the mediation of human operation;

2nd. external goods of fortune, whether movable or immovable;

3rd. intermediate goods (or mixed goods) of reputation and honor, which radically are internal, founded in the excellence of man and in his faculties; formally they are external, in others who honor us and think and speak well of us.

Concerning each it is asked whether man can have right and dominion over them, namely, whether there can exist between them and man a connection or bond, which is founded either in the exigency of the person, or in the common necessity of men.

167. Principle I. Concerning internal goods it must be said:

1. Over those goods which pertain to the integrity of man and are not distinct from him, such as life and the members of the body, and the faculties of the soul, man has right by the very fact that he is man, for by that very fact there is had a bond between him and these goods; yet he does not have direct and full dominion, which belongs to God, but only useful dominion, so that he is their guardian and administrator and user.

For no one can possess himself or be lord of himself, for dominion is something essentially relative, by which one has right in something other (the foundation of dominion does not fall under dominion); but God, as the first principle and last end, is the supreme lord of us, of life and death, and therefore he commits injustice against God who deprives himself of such a good, just as also each one has the duty and right of preserving those things, because they are means given him by God so that he may reach the end.

Yet man can use those goods, for this is required that he may attain the end, so that by acting well he may have eternal life; and therefore he can make their fruits his own (namely, operations and the things which are obtained by operations) for his own utility.

2. Over goods distinct from man, such as the operations of faculties and the things which are acquired through the mediation of human operations or are given by God, man has direct and full dominion: for they are distinct from his entity and therefore can be possessed by him; but they are possessed because they have been acquired by his industry or obtained by his cooperation.

Hence he is lord a) of natural and supernatural virtues, and therefore in these he is not injured unjustly by others, unless it is done in some way against his will by employing some unjust means, such as deceiving or threatening;

b) of intellectual and bodily acts, to which therefore no other can have a title of connection or a right before a contract or some legitimate fact;

c) of bodily or intellectual labor and its fruits, provided he acts in his own name and in his own thing, not in the name of another and in another's thing.

168. Principle II. Concerning external goods it must be said:

1. Man has right to terrestrial goods according as, with attention to the laws of nature and positive laws, he has acquired them for himself by a legitimate fact: for they are destined for his use, as imperfect things for a perfect being, and can be appropriated by him (Gen. I, 26, 28; Ps. CXIII, 16; VIII, 8). And indeed he has not only useful dominion and by a transient use, because they are necessary for him for the preservation of life and thus for the due end, but also full and permanent dominion, by which in a stable and perpetual way he may possess not only fruits but also immovable things, indeed the earth itself. This is fitting to the nature of the thing and necessary from a threefold bond; for:

a) The individual man, since he is a rational being, has before brute animals this, that he himself provides for his necessities and progress and enjoys aptitude for possessing those things which serve his necessity; therefore, since he foresees necessities perpetually recurring, for relieving which terrestrial things are apt, it is conformable to natural ordination that he possess in a stable way not only those things which are consumed by use, but also immovable goods and the earth itself, which are necessary for providing for future necessities (in time of sickness, old age, want, and poverty).

b) Indeed, as a father of a family, he must provide not only for the things necessary for his own preservation, but also for those necessary for the preservation of the species, namely, for his wife, and for his children, who are something of the father, and in whom his personality is prolonged, and who expect from the father food and cultivation by which they may become men sufficient to themselves. Whence a fortiori to man, as father of a family, there belongs the right of possessing, who must acquire for his own and transmit to them goods even immovable, especially fruitful possessions, from which he may be able to sustain the family in time of poverty, or of broken strength, or even after death.

c) Finally, man has full dominion in that which he has produced and in which he has prolonged his own personality: for it is just that the thing made should follow the cause from which it was made. Therefore, if by his own labor he has made a thing or the earth itself fruitful, or even has improved it and has as it were sealed it with the seal of his own personality, it is conformable to reason that he possess the thing itself and the earth (as being now inseparable from the labor); otherwise the fruits of labor would not come to the laborer himself, or even others would have the right of enjoying them.¹

¹ Cf. Leo XIII, Rerum novarum, and Pottier, De Iure et Iustitia.

2. Over the heavenly bodies according to their substance he does not have dominion, because, although they were founded for our utility, they are nevertheless not so subject that we can dispose of them; but according to certain effects, he has indirect dominion, which he can use for his own advantage, for example, light, from which consequently he cannot prohibit others who have a right to it.

3. Over the person of one's neighbor as such (insofar as he can bring utility) man does not have perfect dominion, since all men by nature are peers, and the human person is inviolable, which cannot be ordered to the good and end of other persons (the foundation of dominion does not fall under dominion); yet he can have useful dominion as to his works.

Whence personal servitude, or a state of subjection by which someone, in exchange for sustenance, is bound to furnish all his works to another in perpetuity, of itself (abstracting from excess of oppression and tyranny) is not repugnant to natural right, although nevertheless it is less fitting to human dignity.²

² The Scriptures do not hold servitude as illicit: for Moses did not absolutely prohibit it but moderated it (cf. Ex. XX, 17; XXI, 2; Lev. XXV, 45-46; 54-55); and in the New Law they admonish masters to treat servants kindly, indeed they exhort them to free them, but do not command this (I Cor. VII, 20-24; Eph. VI, 9; Col. IV, 1; to Philem.). Yet Christian doctrine and the Church do not favor servitude, but always tend toward expelling servitude; and under their influence it happened that among cultivated nations servitude was abolished and now by positive law is illicit.

The Scholastics admitted four titles by which servitude could be constituted not unjustly: 1) purchase-sale or donation, both that by which someone freely reduces himself into servitude, for since man can transfer dominion of his own work for a time, he can also do this in perpetuity; and that by which someone already legitimately a servant is handed over by the master to another; 2) right of war, provided the war was just, which now contradicts the modern law of nations; 3) servile birth, by force of which those who were born from servants were held as servants; nevertheless this can seem less equitable if the servitude is perpetual; 4) penalty from a delict: for if someone has deserved death, this penalty can be commuted into servitude. Moreover, forced labor to which some guilty persons are condemned seems to be a certain servitude. - Cf. Billuart, diss. 3, art. 2; and Tanquerey, Th. M., t. III, de Virtute Iustitiae, n. 133-141.

169. Principle III. Concerning the intermediate goods of reputation and honor it must be said:

Man has strict and full dominion over these goods, because he acquires and increases honor and reputation for himself, like external goods, by his own acts and by manifestation of his moral and natural qualities; - and moreover because reputation is necessary for cultivating virtue and preserving peace in society with others.

Hence, just as man can reclaim in judgment an injury of reputation and honor, so he can also condone it; - indeed the very defamation of oneself of itself is not against justice, since man has full right over his reputation; although, if it is done without sufficient reason, it can be prodigality against charity toward oneself, or scandal against charity toward one's neighbor.

Yet per accidens it can be against justice, not indeed insofar as it is defamation of oneself, but by reason of others insofar as it harms one's neighbor, namely: if the reputation of one's neighbor depends upon one's own reputation, and from one's own infamy there follows the infamy of another (for example, of a father, monk, accomplice), or if reputation is necessary to oneself for fulfilling an office of justice, as the reputation of a bishop or pastor. Whence Augustine: Our life is necessary to us, our reputation to others.

170. Division of goods and various genera. - The various species of goods are divided variously:

A. Into corporeal and incorporeal goods (biens corporels et incorporels; stoffelijke en onstoffelijke goederen). The former are those which fall under the senses, such as a house, field, clothing, furniture, money; the latter are said to be those which are not presented to the senses but are perceived by the human intellect, namely, rights of fishing, hunting, receiving fruits, inheritance, etc.: for right is held after the manner of a good about which an owner can dispose.

B. Into movable and immovable goods (biens meubles et immeubles; roerende en onroerende goederen). The former are all things which are not immovable; the latter are those which either altogether, or at least in the state in which they are, cannot physically be transferred or transfer themselves while preserving their substance (C.C., a. 516 sq.).

The distinction of itself and from the nature of the thing falls upon external corporeal things, but by civil law it is also applied to incorporeal things, which by their nature are neither movable nor immovable, yet are judged so by reason of the object to which they are applied.

Therefore, by French law,³ 1st. immovable goods are held to be: a) by their nature, such as lands, buildings, forests, or crops as long as they adhere to the soil; b) by destination, such as animals, machines, and other objects assigned to cultivating fields (objets d'exploitation) or applied in perpetuity; c) by reason of the immovable object about which they are concerned, such as the real rights of usufruct, use, servitude, and mortgage from immovable things, and every real action upon an immovable thing (a. 517 sq.).

³ On this matter the Italian Code, a. 714 sq.; Spanish, a. 333 sq.; Dutch, a. 562 sq.; Austrian, a. 291 sq.; German, a. 90 sq.

2nd. Likewise movable goods can be: a) by their nature, such as ships, wagons, animals, furniture (a. 528); b) by determination of law, such as rights concerning movable things, or of receiving rents, shares in an anonymous society, etc. (a. 529 sq.).

C. Movables according to nature are 1) consumable (verbruikbare), which are consumed by first use, either physically through destruction or loss of form and properties (as happens in paper, food, and drink), or morally when the thing is alienated and by first use is drawn away (for example, money) or changed (cloths turned into clothing); - and 2) non-consumable (onverbruikbare), which are by no means destroyed or changed by first use, such as houses, furniture, clothes, a horse, etc.

D. Movables according to relative and accidental quality are fungible and non-fungible (vervangbare of onvervangbare). The former, in payment of a debt, according to common estimation, can supply other things of the same species and stand in their place, such as generally those things which are usually counted, measured, or weighed, for example, coined money, oil, wheat, sugar, wood for burning, etc. Non-fungible things cannot be substituted for another thing, but the same identical thing must be handed over, for example, this horse which I have carefully selected, this statue, this painting, etc.

Fungible things generally are at the same time consumable, and conversely. Yet there are exceptions: thus the last barrel of wine of such a year which is promised, or gold coins which are lent as a pledge, are consumable but not fungible; - on the opposite side, if one hundred acres of fields are promised to settlers, or if a bookseller asks for a copy of a book for selling, these are fungible but not consumable.

Goods, as objects of dominion, are 1° internal or external; 2° of soul or of body; 3° of reputation and honor; 4° of the person, i.e. of liberty and independence in those things in which man, as an individual, is his own right; 5° of fortune.

591. Principles. - I. Man has useful dominion of the goods of soul and body which are naturally inalienable; God has direct dominion.² Cf. n. 461.

II. Man has direct dominion of the goods of the person, in the sense above under 4°; likewise of the soul, insofar as they are abdicateable without legal injury, though very often not without moral injury, i.e. without sin: namely of his free acts, indeed also of habits, whether natural or supernatural, such as virtues and graces; likewise of reputation and honor in the sense explained at n. 525.

592. III. The proper objects of dominion are goods of fortune or external things,³ provided 1° they can be subjected to the power of man and insofar as they can; and thus things not beneath the moon, such as the sun, moon, and stars, can be subjected to it according to their effects and influences, not according to themselves; 2° they are not inexhaustible in use, such as air, wind, etc., of which only the use or particles already exhausted by someone, not the things themselves considered generically, are objects of particular dominion (n. 599); 3° they are not outside dominion by law. Van Egeren.

593. • Goods of fortune are distinguished in our law in this way. Property is ... divided:

1. Into things real and things personal. Things real include every valuable thing of a fixed and immovable nature, and pass under the general description of lands, tenements, and hereditaments, or simply realty. Things personal include every valuable thing of an unfixed and movable nature, and pass under the general description of goods and chattels, or simply personalty: "There are certain things occupying a sort of intermediate position between the two, some of which are called chattels real, others fixtures";¹ to understand which, it should be borne in mind, that "although immobility is the distinguishing characteristic of realty, an indefinite duration of interest also enters into the idea; and therefore certain determinate interests in land, as leases for years, are called chattels real, because, although they have that immobility which is denoted by the term real, yet for want of an indefinite duration, they are treated as chattels." So also "there are various articles of personalty, which become realty by being annexed thereto; and these are called fixtures."²

2. Real property is again subdivided into things tangible and things not tangible. Things tangible include land and every corporeal thing permanently connected therewith to an indefinite extent above and below the surface, and pass under the general description of corporeal hereditaments, or simply land. Things not tangible include certain rights, privileges, or easements, annexed to land in the ownership of another, and pass under the general description of incorporeal hereditaments.³

For Louisiana, see "Civil Code of Louisiana."⁴

594. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does man have dominion of his reputation?

Resp. See n. 525.

598. • Quaer. 3° Whether and by what right does man have dominion in the fruits of his industry and talent?

Resp. In the affirmative, and indeed 1° by natural right. For if a thing bears fruit for the owner, a fortiori this must be true of internal faculties, since nothing can be more proper to man.

Hence a) it is certain that both he who steals from the inventor of some art, for example whose machine has not yet been handed over to commerce, his secret and divulges it publicly against his will; and he who prints the manuscript work of another, are bound to restitution and compensation of damages; for a work remains under the dominion of the author or inventor as long as it has not been given to public use.

b) It is disputed whether he who has printed a book has, positive law being set aside, the right of impeding lest anyone commit it to the press and sell it with damage to the author or bookseller to whom the author has transmitted his right. Those who deny bring forward this reason for their denial: that a thing handed over to the community, as a book published in print is, by that very fact becomes of common right, and for the same reason neither would those be guilty of injustice who brought to light the public lectures of some professor or the sermon of an orator. Those who affirm respond to the reason of those denying: the natural right which all attribute to the author in the fruit of his talent cannot be exercised by him unless he hand over this fruit to the community; and therefore it is absurd to say that that right is lost through that very thing without which it cannot be exercised. Practically, this question is of lesser moment; for usage today everywhere has it that works published in print are committed to the press and sold by others in the case in which either the author neglected to do those things which are required by positive law in order to provide for himself, or positive law does not assist him, whether because it does not sanction the property of some genus of books, or because it denies its protection to books edited in another region.

Resp. 2° In the affirmative, also by the positive law of almost all nations. And indeed by a law passed by Congress among us provision is made that one who wishes to claim as proper to himself the right of a thing invented by himself (Patent right) deposit a model in the public office (Patent-office) at Washington. But one who wishes to have the right of publishing his own books (copyright) ought to deposit a copy in the public office of the librarian of Congress in the same city, and on the title page of the book committed to type, or on the page immediately following the title page, to state it in the following words: "Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year by N., in the office of the librarian of Congress at Washington." He who desires to know more should go to Kent,¹ or Wells's Every Man his own Lawyer,² or New Amer. Encycl.³

If someone violates a privilege of this kind, a civil action is given against him. But although the inventor, or author or bookseller to whom the privilege belongs, does not bring a lawsuit, nevertheless the violator is bound in conscience to repair the damage inflicted on them. The same seems to be said whenever someone, by a certain change of a new machine or book, renders the force of the law and privilege void.¹

599. • Quaer. 4° Can seas and the ocean be subject to someone's dominion?

Resp. with Kent:² "Navigable rivers which flow through a territory, and the sea-coast adjoining it, and the navigable waters included in bays, and between headlands and arms of the sea, belong to the sovereign of the adjoining territory as being necessary to the safety of the nation, and to the undisturbed use of the neighboring shores. The open sea is not capable of being possessed as private property. The free use of the ocean for navigation and fishing is common to all mankind and the public jurists generally and explicitly deny that the main ocean can ever be appropriated."

I say. Although man can have both useful and direct dominion in goods of fortune legitimately acquired, nevertheless in relation to goods of soul and body he has only useful dominion. The reason of the first is that, on the one hand, material things have a natural aptitude for sustaining our life, and on the other, man not only can but also is held to conserve his life through their use; besides, there are many material things whose use involves their destruction, and this necessarily supposes direct dominion. But the reason of the second is that God alone is the supreme lord of the whole man; for it is said in Deut. xxxii, 39: "I will kill and I will cause to live." Yet man has useful dominion of soul and body, because he must use them that he may tend toward attaining his end.

Question 1. Does man have dominion of his own reputation?

Response. Affirmatively, according to the common opinion; for even concerning reputation there belong to man the primary acts of dominion, such as to acquire it by labor, to condone its restitution, etc. Therefore ... Nevertheless prudence requires that he not squander it without a just reason, and sometimes he is held under grave sin to preserve it diligently by reason of scandal, of removing damage to the family, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de octavo praec. Decal., n. 983.

Question 2. Can man have useful dominion over another man?

Response. Affirmatively; and the reason is that any man is lord of his own labor; and therefore he can alienate it for his own utility and hand it over into the dominion of another. For a lord can dispose of the object of his dominion according to his judgment. Hence by natural right man can even sell himself to another in perpetuity as regards useful dominion, because he is lord of his own labor not only for some time but in perpetuity. Wherefore servitude, or the perpetual state of subjection by which someone is held to furnish all his services to another in exchange for food, is not of itself repugnant to the right of nature. - But from how many titles servitude can arise is a matter full of difficulties, and as regards practice, today among us it has no utility. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 6, nn. 11 and seq. - Kenrick, tract. 8, n. 97.

THERE OCCUR first the seas, which adjoin some land: for these are of those who dominate the shores, cap ubi periculum, §. Porro, de electione, in 6. and the Gloss there, praised by the Doctors of Canon Law, which Baldus also follows in cap. 1. enitio, quibus modis feudum amittatur, and in Leg. penult. at the end Cod. de infant. et substit. sub conditione factis, and in Authent. Ut omnes obed. iudicibus, §. 1. and l. 1. col. 2. de sent. ex brevi recitat. and cap. ex litteris, de probat. and cap. accedens 2. ut lite non contest. and the Doctors in Fagundez lib. 2. cap. 8. The holy Doctor indicates this ad 6. Lucae, where he observes that the sea of Galilee was fierce, because it adjoined the shores of Galilee, and was called of Tiberias, because it adjoined the City of Tiberias, built in honour of Tiberius Caesar. For on this account he who is on the adjoining sea, where it is maritime, is said to be in the district of that city, as appears from Leg. Insulae, ff. de iudiciis.

THEY SAY, however, that dominion is extended from the shore to 100 miles, Bartol. in tract. de Insula, col. 2. Caepola Tract. de servit. rust. praediorum, and it is found in Tom. 6. 2. part. tract. iuris, cap. 16. de mari, num. 13. and is gathered from Leg. Quicumque Cod. de Episcopis, et clericis.

THIS is understood provided that islands in the midst of the sea have not been found and cultivated; for then the whole sea in circuit, through the said space, belongs to the Prince, the finder, and the settler.

AND indeed the sea by the first division remained common; yet the utilities of fisheries, and navigations belonged first to the one who took them; but they belong rather to some one by the concession of a legitimate Prince, as the navigation of the Ocean was conceded by the Pope for sowing the Gospel, as Cabedo testifies he saw the Bulls of this concession, 2. part. decis. 47.

SO also the most illustrious Venetians enjoy by legitimate right the navigation of the Adriatic Sea, to remove Pirates, placed by divine providence.

YET fishing in the sea adjoining the land of some King, and in public rivers, is free to all the subjects of that Prince, ex Leg. 2. and Leg. Nemo, ff. de rerum divisione.

YET Princes have been able to reserve certain fisheries to themselves, as of Tunny, or of Whales, for the common good of the Kingdom. See Lessium Tom. 1. de iust. lib. 2. cap. 5. and Fagundez lib. 2. cap. 8. de contract.

ON the acquisition indeed of dominion over animals, over treasures, and the rest, I have briefly indicated something in the Disput. de restitut. nor does the holy Doctor suggest more to me on this matter.

Titius reads in a certain newspaper that a new edition has been published in the United States of America of a certain book written some years before by an English bishop and published in London. The said bishop, however, complained that his permission had not been sought for the book to be published anew, and indeed that the edition had been made contrary to literary honesty and courtesy. Titius therefore asked a certain theologian whether it was also contrary to moral honesty and justice. Hence it is asked:

1. Is there from the law of nature an exclusive right to publish one’s own book again?

2. If municipal law grants that right to the author, does it pertain to conscience not to violate the law?

3. What kind of right is granted by English law in this matter and by the law of the United States?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. Is copyright of natural law?

It is a disputed point whether copyright, i.e., the exclusive right to multiply copies of a book, belongs to natural or positive law. All agree that until the book has been published the complete ownership of it belongs to the author, and that anyone who deprives him of it against his will commits theft. After publication some authorities hold that as far as the law of nature goes anyone who buys a copy may make what use of it he pleases, and may even issue it again without the author’s permission if he chooses to do so. He is merely making use of his own property. Others, however, affirm that by the law of nature an author may reserve to himself the right of re-issuing his book, while he publishes and sells it to buyers for all other purposes. This is the better opinion.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 346.

2. If the civil law protects copyright, is it matter of conscience not to infringe it ?

Yes, for the case is one in which positive law determines what is at least suggested by the law of nature, and what is in entire agreement with its dictates.²

2 The same work, p. 126.

3. What is the law of copyright in England and in the United States?

In England the law protects copyright for the author's life and for seven years more, or for forty-two years, if this period is longer than the former. In the United States the original term runs for twenty-eight years, but it may be renewed for a further period of fourteen years. A foreign author may obtain copyright in the United States provided that the book is produced in the United States from type set up there or from plates manufactured there.

4. The case. The English bishop in the case certainly had grounds for complaining that his book had been issued in America without his permission. As is clear from the answers given above, it is not absolutely certain that the act was also against honesty and justice, for we must suppose that the bishop had not fulfilled the conditions for acquiring copyright in the United States.