218. On the obligation itself. 1. Every vow obligates the one vowing to fulfill it, and indeed from religion.

a. Sacred Scripture often inculcates the obligation of a vow: When thou shalt vow a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God requireth it.¹ If thou hast vowed anything to God, delay not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him ... and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to pay the things promised.²

b. From a promise by its nature there arises an obligation of furnishing the thing promised. The virtue by which one is obligated to keep promises is fidelity; but fidelity owed to God pertains to the virtue of religion.

alpha. Since in all vows not fulfilled there is injured the reverence and fidelity owed to God, and this in any matter is of the same nature, the injuries of vows are all of the same moral species. Wherefore it is not necessary that the matter of the violated vow be declared in confession.

beta. Therefore he who violates a vow by which a thing already otherwise commanded is promised commits two sins, one against religion, the other against the precept to which the matter of the vow pertains; but he who violates a vow by which a supererogatory thing is promised commits one sin, and that against religion.

¹ Deut. 23:21.

² Eccl. 5:3, 4.

219. 2. The obligation of a vow is grave or light according to the nature of the matter and the intention of the one vowing. For since a vow is, as it were, a certain private law which the one vowing imposes upon himself, the measure of the obligation depends upon the intention of the one vowing. Hence he can vow grave matter under grave or under light obligation, but light matter only under light obligation, since light matter is not capable of grave obligation. If the one vowing does not expressly determine the gravity of the obligation, he is judged to bind himself under grave or under light obligation according to the nature of the matter.

a. Therefore in order that a vow obligate under grave obligation, two things are required: alpha. that the matter be grave; beta. that the one vowing have the intention of obligating himself under grave obligation.

b. That matter is held as grave which, if it is enjoined by ecclesiastical law, obligates under grave obligation, such as Mass, fasting, communion, or any thing which notably contributes to the end of a vow, which is the worship of God.

c. Vows made in religion, since they depend not upon the one vowing alone but also upon the will of the Church, cannot at the will of the one vowing be made under light obligation only; and likewise in the vow of chastity annexed to sacred orders the Church requires the intention of obligating oneself gravely.

Whether several light matters promised by the same vow coalesce into grave matter. - This depends upon the intention of the one vowing, either explicitly made or presumed from common estimation. Therefore if several light matters are promised from the intention of the one vowing as singular things, they do not coalesce; but if they are promised as some one thing, which for the sake of greater facility is divided into several parts, they coalesce. But if the one vowing did not conceive a determinate intention, the matter must be judged from presumed intention or from common estimation. Moreover, in personal vows diverse matters are generally judged to have been vowed rather as singular things; but in real vows generally by way of one thing. Therefore the obligation of the former is usually affixed to the day, while the obligation of the latter, after omission, usually must be supplied, unless from the manner of vowing another intention must be supposed.

Hence, if someone vowed to give a small alms daily, the matter coalesces, and if he omits it for a longer time, he sins gravely or is held to supply it. But if someone vows to recite one Pater daily, the individual omissions do not coalesce, and therefore not even the omission of a long time is a grave sin. - But if someone vows each year throughout the whole month of May to assist at May devotion, he vows the assistance of the whole month by way of one thing, whose individual omissions coalesce; on the contrary, if someone vowed each Saturday to give a small alms in honor of the Blessed Virgin, the omissions do not coalesce, and if he omits it for a long time, he does not sin gravely, because the vow is affixed to the day.

Note. For judging the smallness of matter in vows whose matter is promised by way of one thing, the omitted matter must be considered not absolutely, but relatively to the whole thing promised, so that only a third or fourth part of the whole ought to be judged a notable thing which cannot be omitted without grave fault. Thus he who promised to assist at May devotion throughout the entire month of May does not sin gravely because he omits the devotion once or twice, although the individual devotions considered absolutely (if they last for half an hour) constitute grave matter, but because he omits eight or ten assistances.

220. 3. A vow obligates only the one vowing: for no one can obligate another by his own vow, because no one can promise the thing or action of another, not even of one very closely joined, such as a son or a subject.

a. Children are not held to fulfill the vows of parents by which they consecrated them to religion, unless they themselves afterward consented; but parents, by force of the vow, are held, as far as lies in them, to take care that the children, with their liberty preserved, fulfill what they had promised for them.¹ But if parents vow a thing which they can enjoin upon their children, they themselves by force of the vow are held to prescribe it, while the children are held from obedience to fulfill it.

b. Subjects are held to fulfill vows made by the superiors of the community, not indeed by force of the vow, unless they themselves consented, but by force of a precept imposed from the motive of religion: therefore he who would not observe it would commit a sin against religion.

Whether posterity is obligated by a vow made by a community. - All concede that posterity is not held to observe the vows of ancestors by force of the vow, since no one can be bound by another's vow; but likewise all concede that posterity is held to observe vows made by ancestors, for example of fasting or of keeping a certain day religiously as a feast, of instituting a procession, etc.; but they labor greatly in explaining the origin and quality of this obligation. It seems it must be said:

alpha. If the vow must be fulfilled through a social act, as when it is a question of instituting a procession, those who represent the community are held to fulfill the obligation undertaken by their predecessors from the virtue of religion, inasmuch as they take care that the procession be instituted.

beta. If the vow must be fulfilled through an act of individuals, as when it is a question of fasting, of religious keeping of a feast, individuals are held from religious obedience to fulfill the work promised by their ancestors. For by the very fact that superiors make a vow of this kind with the will that posterity also be held to its observation, they impose upon posterity the precept of observing the vow, provided they have the faculty of prescribing the matter of the vow. Now if it is not a question of celebrating feasts, not only the bishop but also the magistrate has the power of imposing another thing, for example fasting, a pious pilgrimage. And indeed the magistrate, by reason of the common good, can also promise a work of this kind to God and enjoin it upon the community over which he presides.² But because the work has been enjoined from the motive of religion, the community is held to obey from the same motive.³

gamma. From the declaration of the Holy See it is established that a vow of observing some feast obligates only those vowing, and not likewise posterity, not even if the consent and precept of the bishop accedes.⁴ In order that posterity be held to observe this vow, the consent of the supreme pontiff is required. Since the reason of this declaration is the power taken away from all by Urban VIII of instituting new feasts,⁵ this declaration is not to be extended to other vows made by a community, to the observance of which even those not vowing can be obligated by force of precept.

c. The obligation of observing a vow made by ancestors can arise not only through a precept of superiors, but also through custom. Nevertheless, in order that a custom of this kind obtain the force of law, it is required that it begin through voluntary or free acts, which are observed for as much time as is necessary for inducing custom. Therefore the people, knowing that they are not held to these acts, must observe them, in order that an obligatory custom can arise: for if they erroneously thought that they were held to these acts by force of law and therefore observed them, an obligatory custom would not be induced.

¹ Boys (girls), who already at a tender age, having first been consecrated to God by their parents, were handed over to monasteries for education and were called oblates, at first indeed were obligated from the vow of their parents to embrace the monastic life; but afterward (from the thirteenth century onward), once they had entered the age of puberty, they could choose the monastic state or freely depart from it. Cf. Kirchenlexikon, s.v. Oblati.

² Cf. Suarez, l. 3, c. 12, n. 9.

³ Cf. Suarez, l. 4, c. 9, n. 5 ff.; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 634; Berardi, Praxis confessariorum^3 (Faventiae: Novelli, 1898), I, n. 600.

⁴ S. C. R., 18 Apr. 1643 (n. 834); 19 Nov. 1650 (n. 932); 23 Jun. 1703 (n. 2113).

⁵ Constitution Universa, 13 Sept. 1642.

221. On the obligation of a conditioned, disjunctive, and doubtful vow.

A conditioned vow does not obligate unless the condition has been fulfilled: for the condition attached suspends the obligation so long as it has not been fulfilled. Wherefore, where the condition is not fulfilled, no obligation of observing the vow arises.

a. Nevertheless, even a conditioned vow begets some obligation: for it is a true vow, whose obligation is contained in these things: alpha. of preserving the will of fulfilling the promise once the condition has been verified, or of not revoking consent; beta. of not fraudulently impeding the condition.

b. He who impedes the condition, but not fraudulently or culpably, does not sin nor is he afterward held to fulfill the vow. But he who culpably, for example by force or deceit and fraud, impeded the condition, sins against the vow; yet not even here is he obligated by the vow, because the obligation of observing the vow depends upon the fulfilled condition.

c. If the attached condition is fulfilled not formally, but only equivalently, according to the probable opinion the vow does not obligate. For example, he who vowed religion if his sister should marry is not held to enter if she has died, even if the reason of the condition had been the support of the sister.

222. On the obligation of a disjunctive vow, for example, if I recover, each Saturday I shall either fast or give alms.

a. If someone vows disjunctively either a good thing or an evil, vain, or impossible thing, the vow is null, because he cannot be equally obligated to a good thing and an evil thing, as if someone vows: either I shall steal, so that I may become rich, or I shall enter religion.

b. If someone vows good things disjunctively, the vow is valid and is to be understood in such a way that the option belongs to the one vowing; but the part once chosen must be furnished, even if after the choice the other part becomes impossible.

c. If one part becomes impossible before the choice, the one vowing probably is not held to the other part, unless it has become impossible by his fault: for in this case he is judged to have willed to choose the other part, which is still possible.

d. If the very part chosen becomes impossible after the choice without fault of the one vowing, he is held to nothing else.

223. On doubtful vows. a. He who positively doubts whether he made a true vow or only a resolution is held to nothing.

In the former question St. Alphonsus agrees (n. 201); but in the latter he teaches (n. 224) that the vow must be fulfilled again.

b. He who positively doubts whether he has fulfilled a vow made is likewise held to nothing according to the principles of probabilism.

224. Who must fulfill a vow. 1. A personal vow must be fulfilled by the one vowing himself, nor can it be validly fulfilled through another: for by a personal vow the one vowing promised his own proper action; therefore if the one vowing himself cannot fulfill it, he is held to nothing.

2. A real vow must be fulfilled from one's own goods: since indeed the one vowing promised his own thing; therefore he who cannot fulfill it from his own goods is not held to take care that another pay it, but the obligation ceases. Nevertheless it can always be fulfilled through another: for by this vow not the proper action of the one vowing, but some thing of his is promised; if another, whether asked or spontaneously, pays this for the one vowing, with the consent of the same acceding it becomes the proper thing of the one vowing himself.

a. He who, forgetful of the vow, furnishes the work promised, satisfies the vow: for anyone is presumed to have the intention first of all of satisfying his obligations, rather than of furnishing a supererogatory work from devotion alone. But he does not satisfy if he furnished the work with the express intention of not satisfying the vow: for it depends upon his intention whether the obligation remains.

b. Therefore heirs are not held to fulfill the personal vows of the deceased; but they are held to pay real vows, not indeed by force of the vow from religion, but by force of the inheritance from justice toward the deceased: for an inheritance passes to the heirs with its burdens; but a real vow affects the thing itself, which accordingly passes to the heirs with the obligation by which it is affected. Heirs must pay these vows before legacies, even pious ones, but after debts of justice; not, however, beyond the resources of the inheritance, that is, if it can be done without prejudice to the legitimate portion.

225. When a vow must be fulfilled. a. If no time was fixed for fulfilling the vow, it must be fulfilled as soon as it can conveniently be done: for a vow is after the manner of a debt, which must be paid as soon as possible. But if the one vowing determined a certain time, it must be fulfilled at the fixed time. But if an impediment is foreseen, there is no obligation of anticipating.

b. A vow which was not fulfilled at the fixed time ceases, if the time is attached for ending the obligation, as in a vow of fasting on Saturday in honor of the Blessed Virgin. But if the time is attached for urging the obligation, the vow does not cease, but once the time has elapsed it must be fulfilled as soon as possible.

Whether the time has been added for urging or for ending the obligation depends upon the intention of the one vowing. But if this intention is not established, in personal vows the added time is generally judged to be for ending the obligation, but in real vows rather for urging the obligation, unless from the nature and end of the vow something else must be established, as if someone in thanksgiving vows to fast on a certain day, or to offer candles for a certain solemnity.

c. Notable delay of a vow without a just cause in a grave matter is certainly a grave sin if the thing promised is diminished by the delay, for example in the vow of entering religion, because the one vowing withdraws a notable part of the service promised. But if the thing promised is not diminished by delay, as in the vow of a pious pilgrimage, delay even notable and made without a just cause does not seem to exceed the venial sin of negligence, because the thing promised can always be fulfilled integrally, nor does any detriment arise to religion from the delay. Nevertheless, a notable delay, namely one which exceeds several years, can be a grave sin because of the danger of forgetfulness or of future inability to fulfill the vow.

St. Alphonsus judges (n. 221) that a delay which extends beyond six months, with respect to entrance into religion, is notable; others think that a delay of two or three years is not yet notable; others finally judge that this depends much upon the age of the one vowing, and therefore that a young man of sixteen years does not sin gravely if he defers entrance for three or four years.

226. On the interpretation of vows. 1. A vow must be interpreted according to the intention of the one vowing, either expressed or reasonably presumed: for since the whole obligation of a vow depends upon the intention of the one vowing, a vow does not obligate beyond the intention of the one vowing.

a. Therefore he who vowed that he would hear Mass daily for a month is not held to hear two Masses on feast days, unless he expressly intended this, because he is judged to have had the intention of passing no day without Mass.

b. He who vowed to give a chalice to a church which he thought was poor, but which afterward he recognizes to be rich, is not held by the vow if the principal intention was of assisting a poor church; but he is held if his primary motive was of doing good to the church and the poverty of that church was only an impulsive cause.

c. Peter vowed that for ten years he would give ten gold pieces to Paul, so that he might more conveniently feed his family; after a year Paul dies. Peter is still held if the motive cause of the vow was the more convenient feeding of the family and the impulsive cause was relief of the father; he is not held if the motive of the vow was relief of the father from inconvenience and anxiety in feeding the family.

2. Where the expressed intention of the one vowing is not established, a vow must be interpreted according to the nature of the vow, or according to the custom of the Church, or according to common use: for thus the one vowing is judged to have willed to obligate himself.

a. Therefore he who vowed that he would recite the rosary satisfies by reciting alternately. - One vowing fasting for a month is not held to fast on Sunday; one vowing fasting each Saturday is not held to fast if the Nativity of the Lord falls on Saturday (now it can be added: or another solemn feast), unless he expressly intended otherwise. - He who vowed the fast of an entire week is not held to fast on that day on which he must undertake such hard labors that he is excused from the ecclesiastical fast.

b. If someone, forgetful of the earlier vow, has made another which cannot be observed together with the first, for example of undertaking a pious pilgrimage and of serving the sick at the same time, this must be distinguished: alpha. if the second is manifestly more worthy, he is held to observe the second; beta. if it is equal, those who concede that anyone can change his vow into another equal one say that he is held to observe the second; but those who deny this power say that he is held to observe the first; gamma. if the second is a lesser good, or if it is doubtful which one is better, he is held to observe the first.¹

3. A vow must always be interpreted toward the more benign part: for every obligation is odious; but odious things are to be restricted rather than extended.

He who promised something without a determinate quantity, for example alms, satisfies by giving as much as he wishes, provided it is not so little that he seems rather to mock God than to fulfill the vow. - He who promises something without a determinate quality, for example a chalice for a church, can determine it at his discretion, provided that it is not unsuitable.

4. In every vow certain conditions are included, whether by natural law or by ecclesiastical law: if I shall be able; with the right of the superior preserved; if the thing shall not have been notably changed; unless the other yields his right, etc. Yet these conditions do not make the vow conditioned.

According to these rules the obligation of him who, in order to fulfill a vow of entering religion, entered into a monastery, but was again dismissed from it, is to be interpreted. Namely, if he intended to promise only entrance into a determinate monastery, he is held to nothing further, even if he himself gave the cause of his dismissal. But if he intended to promise entrance into religion in general, he is held to take care of the execution of the vow by ordinary means; therefore if without great difficulty he finds another monastery by which he is received, he is held to enter it; if he is again dismissed from it, he certainly is not held to enter another.

Article Fourth. On the Cessation of Vow

The obligation of a vow can cease in four ways: a. by simple cessation, with no authority intervening; b. by irritation; c. by dispensation; and d. by commutation, with human authority intervening.

¹ Laymann, l. 4, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 4.

A vow, as we have seen, imposes a special obligation on him who has taken it to perform what he has promised: “ If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him: but whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it.¹ If a special time was fixed for the fulfilment of the vow, with the intention that it should be fulfilled then, and at no other time, it must be fulfilled at the time appointed under pain of sin, and it no longer binds after the time has elapsed. If, on the contrary, it was intended that it should continue to bind even after the time fixed had elapsed, then the obligation still remains, The obligation should be fulfilled at the proper and reasonable time, and unreasonable delay will be sinful: ‘‘ When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it... . And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin.”² It is not clear, however, whether even notable delay in the execution of a vow is always mortally sinful. Notable delay without just cause would be a mortal sin if the obligation of the vow were grave, and if the delay endangered its execution altogether or made the matter of the vow notably less than was promised. On the other hand, if a rich man vowed to give a large sum of money to the poor, assigning no particular time for the execution of the vow, it is probable that he would not commit a grave sin, even if he deferred giving the money until his death, and then gave it by his will. For in these circumstances the matter of the vow is not seriously affected by the delay, which therefore cannot be a grave sin.

The measure of the obligation of a vow is the will of him who takes it, much in the same way as the obligation of a law depends on the will of the lawgiver. Ordinarily it will be presumed that in grave matter, such as the Church considers to be sufficient for a precept to bind under mortal sin, a vow also binds under pain of grave sin, for the intention of him who took the vow is presumed to accommodate itself to the matter. Nothing, however, prevents him from limiting the obligation of a vow even in grave matter, so that transgressions of it will be only venial sins, if he expressly intended it. This, however, must not be understood of the essential vows of religion, nor of the solemn vow of chastity annexed to sacred orders. These vows are regulated by the Church, and according to her intention they bind under pain of grave sin in grave matter. Another exception must be made to the general rule that the obligation of a vow depends on the will of him who takes it; for if the matter be light it cannot form the ground for a grave moral obligation, when this is imposed by a human will. As a contract binds only the parties who agree to it, so no one can be bound by a vow made by someone else. In former times it was not uncommon for parents to vow a child to religion. Such a vow put no obligation on the child, but the parents were bound by it to give the child the opportunity of entering religion if he desired to do so. There are also instances of communities who have jointly taken a vow to observe a certain day as a fast or a feast. Thus the Romans, in the year 1703, vowed to observe as a fast day the vigil of the feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary in thanksgiving for being preserved from an earthquake. The successors of those who took such a vow are bound to fulfil it, much in the same way as they are bound to pay interest on the National Debt. Their predecessors had the power to bind themselves and their successors, for the community remains the same moral entity.

We saw above that the matter of a vow must be something which is physically and morally possible. It may happen that he who took the vow may be able to fulfil it in part only and not wholly. He will be bound to do at least this when the matter is capable of being divided and is usually so treated, for the obligation of the vow then falls on the whole and on its several parts. Otherwise he will not be bound, nor will he be bound to do something which was a mere accessory of the substance of the vow, even if it be possible. And so one who should vow to fast for a week, if he found this impossible, would not be excused from fasting on the days that he could do so. But if he had vowed to build and decorate a church and afterwards found this to be impossible, he would not be bound to build a portion of it, nor to decorate some other church.

¹ Eccles. v 3.

² Deut. xxiii 21.

A vow may cease to bind for intrinsic or for extrinsic reasons. It will cease to bind intrinsically if the matter cease to be a better good or become impossible. Thus if a young man had vowed to enter religion, but his parents afterward became dependent on him so that he could not leave them without a violation of duty, his vow would cease to bind as long as the same conditions lasted. Or if a wealthy man vowed to spend a considerable sum of money in charities every year, if he became poor his vow would no longer bind him. And generally a vow, like any other promise, will cease to bind if circumstances supervene which at the outset would have prevented the vow from being taken. A vow ceases to bind extrinsically if it is annulled or dispensed or commuted. We will treat of these extrinsic causes of the cessation of a vow in the following paragraphs.

I. The existence of the obligation is clear from Sacred Scripture: "If you have vowed anything to God, do not delay to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases Him; but whatever you have vowed, pay."¹ And indeed the reverence due to God requires that we fulfill the things which we have promised Him.

¹ Eccl. 5:3.

II. The subject of the obligation is only the one vowing, so that no one can be bound directly by force of a vow emitted by another (can. 1310, § 1). I said directly, because the obligation of a real vow, and of a mixed vow insofar as it is real, passes to heirs through inheritance, as we shall explain shortly. I said by force of a vow emitted by another, because if a community has emitted a vow, successors are not bound by force of the vow, but can be bound by reason of a pact, statute, or custom (St. Alphonsus, III, 213, 214, 216, 217).

III. The object of the obligation, or the matter to which the obligation extends, depends on the intention of the one vowing; this is especially to be deduced from the words pronounced or comprehended in the mind, with attention also to common estimation and the norm for interpreting ecclesiastical law in similar matter (St. Alphonsus, III, 222, 180).

Corollary. One who has vowed to recite the Rosary satisfies by reciting a third part, unless something else is clear from the mind of the one vowing. For so the word Rosary is commonly taken. One who has vowed to fast for a month is not bound on Sundays. One who has vowed to fast on each Friday or Saturday, if on such a day, for example, the Nativity of the Lord falls (cf. can. 1252, § 4), is not bound to fast. One who has vowed to hear Mass for a month is not bound on Sundays and feast days to two Masses. Except, as to individual cases, if a contrary mind is evident (St. Alphonsus, III, 224). One who has emitted an indeterminate vow: if it is indeterminate as to time - as if someone has vowed to recite the Rosary daily - is bound perpetually, unless another mind is clear; if it is indeterminate as to the quality or quantity of the thing, he can define it at will, provided the thing defined is not such that it should be judged rather to mock God than to satisfy the vow (St. Alphonsus, III, 221).

IV. The quality of the obligation. The obligation of a vow, that is, of a promise made to God, is an obligation of religion as to genus (can. 1307, § 1), and of fidelity toward God as to species. Namely, the reverence due to God, as we noted under I, requires that we perform the things promised to Him. But here note the difference between fidelity due to men and that by which we are bound toward God. Fidelity is owed to men lest they be deceived; but to God, lest there be derogation from the reverence due to Him. Moreover, all violations of vows are of the same species; hence if another malice is added, for example, "if someone having a vow of chastity fornicated, he can confess separately the violation of the vow" (St. Alphonsus, III, 224).

V. The quantity of the obligation. The obligation of a vow generally is grave from its genus, that is, grave or light according as it concerns grave or light matter. I said generally, because the one vowing can emit a vow, which is like a law, under light obligation,¹ just as a legislator can impose a grave thing under light obligation (n. 149); nevertheless, the one vowing is presumed not to have done this. A matter light in every respect cannot be vowed under grave obligation (n. 149; St. Alphonsus, III, 211, 213). Moreover:

1. Matter is judged grave which, considering the thing and the circumstances, would be prescribed by the Church under grave obligation. If it is a question of a thing to be given, that matter is held grave which, if a reason of justice intervened, would have to be given under grave obligation. Yet the said norms should be understood so that greater matter is required if someone were to vow a series of objects or a great quantity to be bestowed. Hence, for example, one who promises to hear 20 Masses does not seem to sin gravely by neglecting one or another.

2. If someone has vowed something to be repeated often, which is not grave (as if someone vows that he will bestow a franc on the poor every week), there cannot be grave matter unless several matters coalesce. But several matters coalesce if the one vowing intended them after the manner of one thing, as in the example set forth; otherwise if he intended them separately. But if the intention of the one vowing is doubtful, several matters are presumed to have been intended after the manner of one thing if it is a question of a real vow; otherwise if it is a question of a personal vow.

¹ Except if it is a question of public vows, which, when emitted under light obligation, are rejected by the Church and therefore are not accepted by God.

VI. Fulfillment of the obligation; concerning this it must be seen when and how a vow ought to be fulfilled.

1. The time for fulfilling a vow. a) If the time is determined, this must be observed. If a vow has not been fulfilled at the determined time, the obligation ceases or does not cease according as the time was attached for ending the obligation, or for urging its execution. Moreover, the time is judged attached for ending the obligation if it has been determined by reason of the time itself, as if someone emits a vow of fasting on the Vigil of some Saint. Nor then, if an impediment is foreseen, is there an obligation of anticipating it (St. Alphonsus, III, 220). It is judged attached for urging the execution of the obligation if it has been determined by reason of the vow to be fulfilled, as if someone emits a vow of fasting next Thursday, without regard to any special character of that day. In that case the vow must afterward be fulfilled if it was not fulfilled at the appointed time; indeed, generally there is an obligation of anticipating it if it is foreseen that the vow can be fulfilled neither at the appointed time nor afterward.¹ In doubt whether the time has been determined for ending the obligation or for urging its execution, the former is presumed in personal vows, the latter in real vows (St. Alphonsus, III, cited place); nevertheless the circumstances should be attended to. One who emitted a vow of doing this or that within a determined time, for example of receiving Communion within this month, if after the time has begun he foresees an impediment, certainly is bound to fulfill the vow now.

b) If the time is not determined, the vow ordinarily must be fulfilled as soon as it can be fulfilled morally. This is clear from Sacred Scripture,² and from the fact that a vow has the character of a debt. I said ordinarily, because sometimes one might rightly say that the obligation of fulfilling the vow as soon as morally possible is not undertaken by the one vowing, but that the matter can be taken more broadly. Moreover, delay, unless there is a just cause, is a grave sin: 1. when it is done with grave danger of omission or of inability to fulfill the vow; 2. when the delay is notable, and it concerns a vow in which delay involves diminution of the proximate matter, as happens, for example, in a vow of entering Religion; in this vow a delay beyond half a year is held by St. Alphonsus (III, 221) to be mortal. It is disputed whether one sins gravely if the delay is notable, say for two or three years, and it concerns a vow in which the delay does not involve diminution of the matter promised, as happens, for example, in a vow of making a pilgrimage, etc. But with St. Alphonsus (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, n. 33) it seems it must be affirmed, because so great a delay of execution against the will of the creditor, that is, God, seems to contain grave disorder. Deuteronomy seems to favor this.³

2. The manner of fulfilling a vow. a) A personal vow must be fulfilled by the one vowing himself. Hence it cannot be fulfilled through another; nor, if the one vowing cannot fulfill it, must another be substituted by him (St. Alphonsus, III, 217).

b) "Real vows are to be discharged from one's own property; hence one who cannot do so from his own property is not bound to beg from another. But if he can do so from his own property, and yet another, whether asked or spontaneously, wishes to discharge it for him, this is valid.... Indeed, he sufficiently satisfies a vow or oath of alms who, after learning of it, ratifies alms given by another for that purpose while he himself was unaware of it; because then the vow is already fulfilled with the consent of the one vowing" (St. Alphonsus, III, 217). The obligation of a real vow passes to heirs, and likewise the obligation of a mixed vow for the part by which it is real (can. 1310, § 2). It is disputed, however, of what nature the obligation of the heir is. But the real obligations of the testator seem indirectly to affect his goods themselves, so that the said obligations, whether of justice, or of fidelity, or of religion, or of a manifold title, pass to the heirs by the same title by which the testator was bound by them.

c) A mixed vow, as to the personal and real part respectively, must be fulfilled as was said under a and b. But if the obligation of the vow ceases insofar as it is personal, for that reason its obligation does not cease insofar as it is real, unless the real part was promised only accessorily.

¹ Sometimes, however, from the circumstances the intention of the one vowing not to bind himself before the attached time can be gathered.

² Deut. 23:21.

³ Deut. 23:21.

VII. The obligation of certain vows in particular. 1. A vow under a suspensive condition - for example, "I vow entrance into Religion, if my father consents" - obliges in this way: the one vowing is bound:

a) Once the condition has been fulfilled, to execute the vow. Nevertheless he is not bound until the condition has been fulfilled specifically, not merely equivalently. For example, "you vowed Religion if your sister married; it does not suffice if she dies" (St. Alphonsus, III, 219); except if another intention of the one vowing is sufficiently clear.

b) Not to render himself unable to execute the vow.

c) Not maliciously to impede the condition from being fulfilled. But one who impedes that does not act maliciously if it is a question of a condition which depends on the will of the one vowing. Hence if someone vowed to enter religion if within a year he had not entered marriage, he can enter marriage, and thus impede the condition from being fulfilled. "Likewise, you vowed chastity; if you fall from frailty, you do not sin with respect to the vow; otherwise, if you sin deliberately in order to be freed from the vow" (St. Alphonsus, III, 218). One who impedes the condition from being fulfilled is bound to remove the malicious influence if the condition still can be fulfilled; if it can no longer be fulfilled, he is not bound to execute the vow, unless it is evident that the intention of the one vowing extended more broadly (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. A penal vow - for example, "I vow Religion if I shall have perpetrated such a sin again" - after the sin has been committed does not oblige if fully deliberated consent was lacking.

3. A vow concerning the deed of another is understood thus: that the one vowing ought prudently to take care that the other perform it (St. Alphonsus, III, 216).

Corollary I. In strict doubt whether someone has vowed, or has taken up a mere proposal, he is not bound by the obligation of a vow (n. 228). In doubt whether a prepubescent person, otherwise normal, could omit a vow with sufficient deliberation, the faculty is presumed if he has completed the seventh year; otherwise, if he has not completed the seventh year (cf. can. 88, § 3).

Corollary II. One who has performed the thing promised while unmindful of the vow more probably has satisfied the vow, because everyone is judged to have the habitual will of satisfying a debt before what is not a debt. Otherwise one must speak of him who, mindful of the vow, intends not to satisfy it (St. Alphonsus, III, 224, at the end).

Corollary III. In strict doubt whether the act by which the vow is fulfilled has been placed, there is an obligation of observing it; otherwise if it is doubted whether the act placed suffices for fulfilling the vow (n. 231).

The Obligation of a Vow.—Every valid vow obliges to fulfillment, for it is a promise, and loyalty to promises is a moral duty. Scripture declares that one must pay one’s vows, and that it is better not to vow than to vow and not fulfill (Eccles., v. 4), that God will hold as sin the neglect of a vow (Deut., xxiii. 21), that a faithless promise displeases Him (Eccles., V. 3).

(a) The Quality of the Obligation.—A vow is an act of religion, since it promises to God a tribute of honor, even though the thing promised (e.g., a fast, virginity) does not belong to worship but to some other virtue. Hence, the violation of a vow is a sin against fidelity and also against religion. But it seems that sacrilege is committed only by sins against certain vows, namely, those whose matter is a sacred thing dedicated to God; for example, the violation of the vow to fast would not be sacrilegious, while the violation of a public vow of chastity is a sacrilege. All transgressions of vows, as such, are sins of the same species, namely, sins against religion.

(b) The Quantity of the Obligation.—A vow, as being a duty of religion (see 2146, 2148), obliges under grave sin. But in an individual case the sin committed may be only venial on account of lightness of matter or imperfection of the act.

Gravity of the Obligation of a Vow.—A vow has the nature of a private law, since it is an obligation which the vow-maker voluntarily imposes on himself. But a law obliges under grave sin when the subject-matter itself and the intention of the lawgiver require strict obligation (see 381 sqq.). Hence, gravity of matter in a vow depends on the great importance of the thing vowed and on the will of the vower to assume a grave obligation.

(a) Thus, the thing vowed must be of great importance, either in itself (e.g., chastity) or from its relation to divine worship (e.g., a fast, a communion). One cannot oblige oneself to a grave obligation under a vow whose matter is absolutely and relatively of minor importance (e.g., a daily Hail Mary, an alms of twenty-five cents; see 382).

(b) The intention of the vower must be to bind himself under grave sin. He is free not to oblige himself by vow at all, and hence, should he elect to vow, he may bind himself, even though the matter of the vow is of great importance, either under grave or under light sin (or only to penalty), as he wishes. Exception must be made, however, for public vows taken in religious institutes and for the vow of chastity and celibacy taken in the reception of subdeaconship, for the law of the Church on account of the public good decrees that these vows oblige under grave sin.

Rules for Determining What Is Important Matter in a Vow.—(a) In personal vows, an act of omission may be made the subject of grave obligation, if it may be made the subject of grave precept by the Church (e.g., the hearing of Mass, Confession, Communion, a fast or abstinence, a Rosary).

(b) In real vows, some fix grave matter according to the standards for commutative justice (see 1896 sqq.). But such a rule seems unsuitable. The amounts absolutely and relatively grave in theft are determined by the wealth of the person stolen from, but, since God is owner of all things, we do not see how those amounts could be fixed in reference to Him. On the other hand, the duty of religion obliges more strictly than that of commutative justice, and hence it does not seem that grave matter should be the same for both. In practice, the matter is not grave when it is quite inconsiderable (say less than a dollar), or when the vower intends only a light obligation. If the matter is not inconsiderable and the intent of the vower is uncertain, one may decide as to the obligation of the vow from presumptions based on custom, the circumstances of the vow, or the rule that grave obligation is not to be taken for granted (see 709, 714, 659).

Coalescence of Light into Grave Matter.—(a) If the vower has determined the relation of the items of the vow one to another, coalescence can be judged from his intention. Thus, if the vower intends that the items shall be parts of one whole, there is coalescence (e.g., if he vows to give fifty cents in alms daily and neglects this for a year, there is grave sin); but if he intends the items as separate promises, there is no coalescence (e.g., if he vows to say a Hail Mary every day and neglects this for a year, there are many venial sins). If some of the items have been performed, others omitted, and the omissions coalesce, there is grave sin according to some as soon as a notable quantity is reached, but others believe that there is grave sin only when a notable percentage (say one-third or one-fourth) of the matter vowed has been neglected.

(b) If the vower has not determined the relation between the items of the vow, the presumption as a rule favors coalescence in real vows, non-coalescence in personal vows (as in the examples of a vow to give fifty cents daily and of a vow to say a Hail Mary every day). But there are exceptions, as when one vows to give a small alms every Saturday in honor of the Blessed Virgin, for the chief intention in this case may be to show respect to the Mother of God and not to give a certain amount to the poor.

The Time When a Vow Obliges.—(a) A negative vow (e.g., not to drink certain intoxicants) obliges at once and always (see 371).

(b) An affirmative vow to which the vower has annexed a time for fulfillment obliges at the time determined. If the time was intended as a principal circumstance (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary on the Feast of the Assumption), the vow ceases with that time, even though performance was culpably neglected; but if the time was intended only as a secondary circumstance (e.g., a vow to go to confession next week made by one who needs it badly), the vow continues in force even after the time set has elapsed without fulfillment (see 468 sqq.). Anticipation of fulfillment on account of inability to fulfill at the time appointed in the vow, is not necessary, unless the vow was attached to a certain space and cannot be fulfilled in the latter part of this space; for example, if one has vowed to say the Rosary today and foresees that the whole afternoon will be occupied, one should say the Rosary in the forenoon (see 470, 471).

(c) An affirmative vow for which the vower has fixed no special time should be accomplished as soon as this can be conveniently done, for such is the rule in every absolute promise, and, moreover, no better time for fulfillment can be assigned; “When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay it shall be imputed to thee for a sin” (Deut., xxiii. 21).

Delay in Fulfilling Vow.—Sin may be committed by delaying to keep a gravely obligatory vow for which no date was set.

(a) There is no sin if the delay is reasonable in view of the subject-matter of the vow (e.g., to put off a Rosary or fast for two or three days, a pilgrimage of 50 miles for a week, a pilgrimage of 1000 miles for several months, etc.) or of the circumstances (e.g., if one has to delay entrance into religion until one has better health or has closed up a business).

(b) There is venial sin if the delay is unreasonable but does not notably diminish what is promised or endanger its fulfillment. Thus, a Rosary, a fast, or a pilgrimage is as good next year as this year, and, apart from danger of forgetting or omitting, no lapse of time seems to constitute a notable delay in respect to such obligations.

(e) There is mortal sin if the delay is unreasonable and notably depreciates what is promised or notably endangers performance of the vow. Thus, to put off the fulfillment of a vow to enter religion lessens the value of the thing promised, if one waits until old age; it imperils the promise, if one remains in the world for several years exposed to the danger of losing vocation. Moralists hold that three or four years would be a considerable delay in reference to a vow to enter religion.

The Person Obliged to Fulfill a Vow.—(a) A personal vow obliges only the vower, because by its nature a vow is a law which one imposes on oneself (see 463, 1696, 188). But vows taken by a city or community may be obligatory on the subjects in virtue of law, and vows taken by ancestors may oblige posterity in virtue of lawful and obligatory custom. (b) A real vow (and a mixed vow as to the part that is real) obliges also the heirs, for this kind of vow is a debt of the vower’s estate (see Canon 1310). The obligation of the heirs is one, not of religion, but of justice, and they are not held beyond the resources of the estate.

The Manner of Fulfilling a Vow.—(a) As to Internal Disposition.—It is not necessary that one have at the time of fulfillment the purpose of fulfillment, provided there is no intention exclusive of that purpose, for the vow binds one only to do what was promised (cfr. 477). Hence, if one has vowed to hear Mass and then hears a Mass out of devotion, not thinking of the vow, one may take this assistance at Mass as a satisfaction of the vow.

(b) As to External Performance.—If a vow is personal, one must perform it personally, for one’s own act was promised, and hence, if personal performance becomes impossible, it is not necessary or valid to use a proxy; if a vow is real, one may use goods given by others, but one is not obliged in case of poverty to seek the goods of another, since one’s own goods were promised.

The Obligation of Certain Kinds of Vows.—(a) Conditional Vow.—The vower is not obliged by the vow unless the condition is fulfilled, and this is probably true even when the condition is equivalently, but not formally, fulfilled (e.g., Titus, who has to support his mother, vows to enter religion as soon as she contracts marriage, but the mother unexpectedly dies and Titus is thus freed of her support). The vower is not guilty of sin against the vow if he prevents the fulfillment of the condition, unless he uses unlawful means. Such means are not employed if one is not obliged to fulfill the condition (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $10 if one gets drunk), or if non-fulfillment is due to weakness, not to the purpose to defeat the vow (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $100, if one remains sober for a year, when the vower becomes intoxicated accidentally or through frailty before the year is up), or if non-fulfillment is due to the exercise of one’s right (e.g., a vow to enter religion if one’s parents consent, when the vower in lawful ways persuades his parents not to consent). The vower is guilty of sin against the vow, if he uses unlawful means to prevent the condition’s fulfillment (e.g., if he gets drunk purposely in order to evade the alms promised for sobriety, or if he uses fraud or force to keep his parents from consenting to a vow which he has made dependent on their consent).

(b) Penal Vow.—The vower is not obliged by the vow if the act against which the vow is made is committed by him but is not sinful (e.g., Claudius vowed not to play cards, but on a certain occasion did play after having received a dispensation), or is only materially sinful (e.g., Balbus vowed not to use profane language, but on a certain occasion did use such language inadvertently), or is not sinful against the vow, at least if the penalty is for violation of the vow (e.g., Caius vowed not to quarrel under penalty of an alms for breaking the promise, but on a certain occasion did quarrel, adverting to the sin against charity, but not to the vow), or is venially sinful on account of the imperfection of the act, at least if the penalty is grave. If the vower has not determined the number of times the penalty is to be paid, it seems that it should be paid only after the first fault, if the penalty is grave and one that is not customarily repeated (e.g., a distant pilgrimage, a large alms), but should be repeated after every fault if the penalty is slight and one that is customarily repeated (e.g., a decade of the Rosary, a small alms).

(c) Disjunctive Vow.—The vow is null if one of the objects to be chosen from is evil, vain or impossible (e.g., a vow either to earn or to steal the money for an alms). The vower is held to nothing if before his choice one of the things to be chosen from has become impossible (e.g., Claudius vows to give one or the other of two chalices he owns, but before he makes his choice one of the chalices is stolen), or if after his choice the thing chosen becomes impossible (e.g., Claudius decided to give the larger of two chalices, but before he could give it, it was stolen). The vower is held, however, if one of the things to be chosen from has become impossible before choice through the vower’s own fault (e.g., Claudius’ chalice was stolen before his choice because he had culpably delayed to make a choice), or if the thing not chosen has become impossible after the choice (e.g., Claudius decided to give the large chalice and the small one was stolen afterwards).

(d) Doubtful Vow.—Doubts about the essentials, that is, whether a vow was really made (e.g., whether it was a vow or only a resolution, whether there was the requisite intention or deliberation, whether the vow was invalid on account of fear, etc.), or whether a vow certainly made was fulfilled, must be settled according to the principles for directing a doubtful conscience (see 672 sqq.). Thus, if it is more probable that a vow was made or that a vow was not fulfilled, the decision must be for obligation according to the Probabiliorists; but if there remains a positive doubt whether only a resolution was made, or whether a vow was fulfilled, there is no obligation according to the Probabilists. Doubts about accidentals, that is, whether a vow was of this kind or that (e.g., the circumstances of quality, quantity, number, etc.), must be settled according to reasonable rules of interpretation of the mind of the vower.

General Rules of Interpretation of Doubtful Vows.—(a) Private vows must be interpreted according to the expressed or presumptive intention of the vower, for a vow is a private law, and the vower the lawmaker. (b) Public vows must be interpreted according to the sound doctrine of approved authorities on theology and Canon Law.

Special Rules for Interpreting the Mind of the Vower.—(a) A doubtful vow should be interpreted from internal evidence, that is, from the language of the vow itself and the significance usually attached to the terms used, for the presumption is that the vower meant to express himself in the ordinary speech used for vows. Thus, a vow of “virginity” usually means the same as a vow of “chastity,” and should be so understood unless there is reason for a stricter interpretation. The language of a vow is to be understood in the light of the purpose of the vower (e.g., a vow to give a chalice to a church does not mean a glass chalice, since the Church employs only chalices of precious metal); a vow to hear Mass daily does not mean that one must hear two Masses on Sunday, since the purpose of the vow is to let no day pass without assistance at Mass.

(b) A doubtful vow that cannot be sufficiently construed from internal evidence should be judged from general presumptions, that is, from the custom as regards the vow taken (e.g., one who vows an alms is understood to promise the amount that others in his condition promise), from the custom or law as regards the matter of the vow (e.g., one who vows a perpetual fast is understood to promise a fast on days other than Sundays and holydays, for the church law distinguishes between fast days and feast days), from the rules governing the interpretation of laws (e.g., since things odious are to be of strict interpretation, he who vows to give something may himself determine what he wishes to give, provided it is not ridiculously small), from the conditions that are implied in every vow as to possibility, the rights of others, change in circumstances, etc. (e.g., he who promises to become a religious means that he will do so, if a Religious Order will accept and keep him; he who promises a gift means that he will give without prejudice to the claims of third parties, etc.).

The Advantages of Vows to the Vowers.—(a) A first advantage is that a vow strengthens the will of the vower to do good and avoid evil. This is an important advantage, since human nature is so weak and inconstant and so much in need of helps that will add resolution and perseverance to its efforts. The vow is a promise binding not only in honor but also as a religious duty, and an act that has a special claim on divine assistance and a favorable answer, and hence it is a powerful ally to a virtuous life. True, he who takes a vow is subject to greater sin if he is unfaithful. But there is no good that has not some risk attached to it, and the risk here is due, not to the vow itself, but to the weakness of the will which may use it improperly. The person who thinks only of the dangers of storms will neither sow nor reap (Eccles., xi. 4).

(b) A second advantage is that a vow makes the good done more meritorious and praiseworthy. It adds to the virtue practised (e.g., abstinence) the virtue that directs (viz, divine worship or religion, the most excellent among the moral virtues); it offers God a more perfect subjection, since it presents to Him, not only a single act here and now, but the power itself of the will to do the opposite; it acts from a greater resolution and firmness, a circumstance that gives perfection to virtue. All this should be understood per se, or with the qualification “other things being equal”; for if we suppose that a person who has no vow serves God with great charity and fervor, there is no doubt that he is better before God than one who has vows and performs them carelessly and reluctantly.

When a Good Vow May Be Sinful.—A vow good in itself may be sinful or the occasion of sin on account of the dispositions of the vower.

(a) Thus, in taking vows one commits sin if one acts imprudently in not taking into consideration the circumstances. Hence, before making a vow one should consider carefully and consult one’s confessor or director or some other prudent man.

(b) After taking vows one commits sin by regrets, if these regrets include the desire not to comply with obligations (e.g., when one regrets having lived up to a vow in the past or intends not to live up to it in the future, or when one keeps the vow only from human motives and wishes one could violate it), or if they manifest ingratitude towards God (e.g., when one regrets without good reason that one ever took the vow). The sin committed by desire not to comply with obligation is mortal or venial according to the nature of the obligation; the sin of ingratitude is venial. There is no sin at all, it seems, if for a reasonable cause one regrets having made a vow or wishes there were no obligation to perform something of supererogation that one vowed, unless by such wishes one is exposed to temptations and the danger of sinning against the vow.

Merit of Fulfilling a Vow that One Regrets.—If one regrets having made a vow but intends to keep it, is the good work performed better by reason of the vow?

(a) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a religious motive (e.g., the desire to please God or the fear to offend Him), the good work is more meritorious than if there were no vow, for it has the double value of an act of religion and of an act of some other virtue, of a good work done and of a vow to do it.

(b) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a human motive (e.g., the desire to please some human person or to secure some temporal benefit), the good work is not made more meritorious, but indeed is not meritorious at all, since not done for God’s sake.

Who Can Make a Vow?—Every person living in the state of mortal existence, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, is able to take a vow, unless there is an impediment of natural or positive law.

(a) Natural law excludes vows made by those who are not masters of their own acts or who have not the use of reason; for, since a vow is a law which one knowingly places on oneself, it cannot be made by those who have not the right of disposition over their acts or who do not understand the meaning of the obligation. Hence, religious and other subject persons are restricted as to the right of making vows, while infants and insane persons are utterly incapable of making a vow.

(b) Positive law of the Church has laid down certain conditions for the validity of public vows (e.g., age, performance of the novitiate, etc.), and hence those persons in whom the conditions are not found are incapable of taking these vows. The power of binding and loosing has been given the Church, and the regulations on public vows exercise this power for the benefit of the Church as a whole and of the persons who take vows, As to private vows, it is a matter of dispute whether the Church has the power to appoint conditions for them, since they are internal acts (see 426), but it seems that no such conditions have ever been made.

Whether and how does a vow oblige? - The response is contained in the following propositions: A vow is obligatory. For a promise made to a man certainly obliges; how much more, therefore, one made to God. Hence the breaking of a vow is a certain species of infidelity. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3. And the Scriptures most evidently persuade this: When you have vowed a vow ... you shall not delay to pay it, etc. Deut. 23:21. If you have vowed anything to God, do not delay to pay it, etc. Eccles. 5:3. It is heretical, says St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, aa. 1, 2, to assert that a vow does not oblige.

A vow obliges per se, like a law or precept of the Church, and therefore gravely in grave matter, and lightly in light matter. For a vow is as it were a certain private law which someone imposes upon himself. Struggl 17; L. 211, 213.

A vow obliges according to the intention of the one vowing, if he determines the quantity of the obligation in the act of vowing, so that he can bind himself only under light obligation in matter however grave. The reason is that just as a legislator or superior can oblige only lightly in grave matter, so also he who vows can impose only a light obligation upon himself in a grave thing. Yet, conversely, he cannot oblige himself gravely in a light thing, because light matter is not capable of grave obligation. But in the vow of chastity annexed to sacred orders, and in the vows of religious profession, the Church specially requires the will of obliging oneself gravely. Hence religious profession is void when it is expressly emitted without the will of obliging oneself gravely. Struggl 18; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3; L. 211, 212.

Note: That matter is judged grave which, when prescribed by the Church, obliges gravely, such as fasting, Mass, etc.; or which, compared with another precept, seems grave; or which contributes notably to the end of the vow, or to the worship of God.

No one can be obligated by another's vow by force of the vow, because a vow is a personal burden voluntarily undertaken, and therefore no one can promise another's thing or action. S. R. C., 18 Apr. 1643; 23 Jun. 1703.

By force of the vow; for 1. from justice an heir is bound to pay the real vows of the deceased, just as he is bound to pay his other debts, legacies, etc. The reason is that a real vow affects the thing itself, and therefore it remains bound into whatever hands it comes. Hence such vows must be satisfied before legacies, because the obligation of real vows is prior to a free legacy by reason of death, but after debts of justice, because the deceased is judged to have emitted real vows to be paid only from that part of his goods concerning which he was able to dispose freely and without injury to others. Hence a necessary heir can lawfully reserve the legitimate portion, or the portion due according to law, not only for himself but also for other descendants, and therefore he is bound to pay the real vows of the deceased only from the remaining substance.

2. From obedience, subjects, both those who now live and those who in the future will become members of the community, are bound, by force of a certain pact or statute or custom, and from the motive of religion, to fulfill a vow which has been emitted in their name by the civil magistrate, with the Bishop consenting, or by the superiors of a religion. Struggl 24, 26; Suarez, de Voto, l. 4, c. 1, 9; Tamburini, Expl. Decal., l. 3, cap. 12, § 4; cap. 16, § 2, n. 12; 7; Scav., ed. 12, Mediol. 1874, l. 2, n. 219; L. 213, 214, 216; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 98, a. 2 ad 2, ad 4; E. M.

You will resolve: Real vows are to be paid from one's own goods; but he who cannot pay from his own goods is not bound to beg from another so that he may be able to satisfy them. Yet he satisfies if another, whether asked or spontaneously, wishes to pay for him, even though he himself is able to satisfy; because what the other gives, with the consent of the one vowing added, or with ratification if he gave without his knowledge, becomes his own. Except if the matter of the real vow was determined; for then that thing must be given in its individuality, when namely a particular reason moved him to vow this thing in its individuality.

Personal vows can be fulfilled only by the one vowing himself, nor do they pass to heirs. Hence he who vowed a pilgrimage does not satisfy if he hires another; nor is he bound to hire someone if he himself cannot go.

The vows of parents, devoting their children to some religion, or imposing upon them an obligation, for example, of fasting on certain days, etc., cannot bind them. But although children are not bound by the vow of parents who devoted them to religion or to some obligation, nevertheless the vow obliges the parents so that, as far as lies in them, with the freedom of the children preserved, they move them to embrace that which they vowed for them; and much more, that they not stand in the way of children wishing to embrace it. L. 213, 216, 217, 220.

Conditional vows do not oblige when the condition ceases, even if the one vowing himself was the cause that the condition is not posited, provided he did not impede it by deceit, force, or malice; for then someone sins indirectly against the vow, but the vow no longer subsists. The reason is that the condition is now not fulfilled, although by the fault and fraud of the one vowing.

In a disjunctive vow, "if each part is apt matter, that which is chosen must be performed, even if after the election the other part perishes, or is rendered impossible. Conversely, if one part perishes, or is rendered impossible before the election, you are not bound to the other, unless the thing perishes by your fault, or you were in delay in delivering or determining it." L. 224, 218, 219.

He who vows something to be done at a certain time, after that time has passed, whether with fault or without fault, is bound to nothing, if the day was added to terminate the obligation, as, speaking per se and regularly, it is to be judged in personal vows, unless the contrary is established, as very commonly they say. For transgression of a vow does not oblige to compensation. Hence one who did not fulfill on one day is not bound to fulfill on another day.

It is otherwise if the day was added only to urge fulfillment, just as conversely it must be judged, per se and regularly, in real vows, unless again the contrary is established, since that day has no more special reason than others. But if the vow is indeterminate as to time, for example concerning a daily rosary, etc., the vow obliges perpetually, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances. Suarez, l. 4, c. 15; Sanch., in Decal., l. 4, c. 14, n. 25; Struggl 17; L. 212, 220.

Vows are to be interpreted according to the more benign part, since they are laws of a free will. L. 224.

You will resolve: One vowing that he will hear Mass for a month is probably not bound to hear two Masses on feast days; just as this is also probable if it is imposed by a Confessor for penance. One vowing that he will observe fasting can eat milk foods. One vowing fasting for a month is not bound on Sunday. One vowing fasting on the vigil of some Saint which falls on Sunday can anticipate the fast on Saturday. One vowing fasting on each Saturday is probably not bound to the vow if Christmas Day falls on Saturday, unless he expressly intended that he still wished to be obligated on that day, because then he is bound beyond doubt.

But since the matter or substance of fasting is divisible, if the fasting is strict, namely one which includes both one meal only and abstinence, so that those also are bound to one meal who in any way, whether culpably or inculpably, have eaten meats, he who vowed fasting, if he eats meats, and the obligation of the vow is ended on the same day, is bound at least to observe the one meal; but if the obligation of the vow is not ended on that day, if indeed it is not affixed to the day, he is bound to fast on another day.

One vowing that he will recite the rosary satisfies by reciting a third part, because it is commonly so understood; and he satisfies by reciting it alternately, because such a vow obliges after the manner of the divine office; and he also satisfies by dividing the decades. If someone, forgetful of the vow or of the imposed penance, etc., performs the work due, he satisfies well by the general will which each person is judged to have of satisfying first his obligations.

Whether a Religious who has vowed, when he asks license from his superior to fulfill the thing promised by vow, is bound to manifest his vow to him? It is controverted. Some affirm, because this manifestation of the vow conduces, regularly speaking, to obtaining license more easily. Others more probably deny, because a vow is of strict interpretation, and consequently the one vowing is judged to oblige himself only to that which is a necessary and commonly sufficient means for obtaining license. Thus Schmalz., in h. t., nn. 23-25; L. 222-224, 226.

Can light matters in vows coalesce with each other so as to make grave matter? - Either those light matters are vowed separately and by way of several things disjoined from each other, say from a diverse end; or they are vowed in a mass, and by way of one thing. If the first, omissions, even if multiplied, will never be able to combine into grave matter, because they are in no way united with each other. If the second, they can certainly, for the contrary reason, constitute grave matter and arrive at mortal sin.

But matters are judged to be vowed by way of several things disjoined from each other in personal vows; but by way of one thing and in a mass in real vows, unless the contrary is established. For personal vows are commonly judged to be affixed to the day, whence transgression of one does not coalesce with another; not likewise real vows. Thus, for example, a real vow is judged to exist if someone vows to give one little coin daily for a year; but it would be a personal vow if he vowed to recite one Pater on each day of the year. Therefore by omitting to recite this prayer even for a long time, it would be a venial sin; but by omitting that small alms, it would be grave when it had arrived at grave matter. Hence an omission of this sort will always have to be supplied, since by the lapse of time the obligation of the vow does not cease. Yet if the intention of the one vowing were truly doubtful, the vow is judged affixed to the day, so that its matters do not coalesce, but each is terminated in the day. For each person is judged to oblige himself as little as he can. Struggl 17, 33; L. 212, 220.

What delay is to be judged grave? - Per se, any delay of a vow gravely obliging is grave when it is affixed to a determinate time, as is a vow of fasting on such a vigil, etc., because once the time has elapsed the obligation of the vow ceases from the general principle that transgression of a vow does not oblige to compensation.

But if a determinate time was not set, or was set only to urge, not also to terminate, the obligation of the vow, either the delay diminishes the matter promised or it does not. If the first is verified, grave delay in a grave thing will be a grave sin, unless a reasonable cause excuses, as if someone meanwhile awaits a suitable time for the end which he proposed to himself. Hence, for example, if someone has vowed religious life, then, says Tamburini, "the time, or age, of the one vowing must be considered; for if the one vowing is, for example, in his fifteenth year, I would not judge a delay of three or even four years notable. For youths are accustomed to take up religious life around the fifteenth and twentieth year, namely when a state of life is usually assumed. Therefore, while someone in his fifteenth year vows perpetual religion, unless he determines the time for entrance, he does not seem to have renounced the customary manner and time in assuming a state of life... But if the one vowing had reached, for example, the fortieth year of age, I freely admit that a delay beyond six months is sufficiently notable; for such an age does not permit a longer delay."

But if the second is verified, the same Tamburini says that "it does not seem improbable that any delay whatever, provided there is not probable danger of omitting the vow altogether, is only venial. The reason can be that no one, when he gives the whole which he promised and causes no damage to the creditor from delay, seems to be condemned of grave fault, but only of light negligence; but no damage comes to God from the aforesaid delay, etc." And soon after he adds: "That is deservedly certain, when there is no danger of diminution of service, that a vow made without determination of time can be delayed, even without venial sin, until the time in which someone believes he will fulfill it with greater devotion; because this redounds to the greater honor of God, to which the vow is ordered; therefore that greater hoped-for devotion is to be judged a sufficient cause of delay." Explic. Decal., l. 3, c. 12, § 3, n. 11. But others assert generally that it is grave to defer temporary vows beyond two or three years, and perpetual vows beyond six months. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3 ad 3; L. 221, l. 4, n. 72 seqq.; Struggl 19, 21.

How manyfold is the sin committed by one who violates a vow? - Either the vow concerns a thing otherwise prescribed, or not. If the first, there will be a double sin, one against the virtue to which the thing promised by vow pertains, the other against the virtue of religion; for a double precept is violated. If the second, there will be one sin, against religion, because the one vowing in this case does not wish to impose upon himself another obligation than that which arises by force of the vow itself.

But the malice of this sin against religion is perfidy, or violation of the fidelity owed to God, which violation directly pertains to irreverence toward God. But whether violation of any vow whatever, that is, even not solemn, also takes on the malice of sacrilege strictly such, that is, induces another sin against religion directly pertaining to irreverence toward sacred things, some affirm, others deny. Cf. 500. But violation of a solemn vow contains infidelity and violation of a person consecrated to God. From the fact that violation of a vow as such is not of diverse species from diverse matter, "if someone having a vow of chastity fornicates, he can accuse separately the breaking of the vow." L. 224. Roncaglia, tr. 7, q. 2, c. ult., quaest. 5; L. 213, 224.

325. Principles. I. A vow obliges per se, like a law or precept of the Church, and therefore gravely in grave matter, and lightly in light matter; for a vow is, as it were, a certain private law which someone imposes upon himself.

II. A vow obliges according to the intention of the one vowing, if he determines the quantity of the obligation in the act of vowing, so that he can bind himself only under light obligation in matter however grave. The reason is that just as a legislator or superior can oblige in grave matter only under light obligation, so also he who vows concerning a grave matter can impose on himself only a light obligation. - Nevertheless, conversely, he cannot bind himself gravely in a light matter, because light matter is not capable of grave obligation ¹. - Thus commonly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 211 and 213.

¹ It pertains to the prudence of the confessor to admonish penitents on this matter who have vowed spontaneously; namely, lest, as sometimes happens, they sin gravely from an erroneous conscience even where the matter of the vow does not admit grave obligation. To the same prudence it pertains that the confessor persuade a penitent eager to vow that, even if the matter is grave, he should nevertheless assume only a light obligation of the vow, so that the occasion of offending God gravely may be very far away. And this cause existed why many most holy and most wise founders of religious orders, although most desirous of regular observance, nevertheless, in order to avert occasions of divine offense, decreed that rules founded by God's impulse should induce no obligation per se and by their own force which would bind violators by guilt of sin.

And indeed nothing prevents a vow under light obligation from being pronounced also in that matter which, considered according to natural law, obliges under grave obligation, for example in the matter of chastity.

326. Questions. Q. 1. What matter is judged light or grave per se in a vow?

Resp. That matter is judged grave which, when it is prescribed by the Church, obliges gravely, such as fasting, Mass, etc.; or which, compared with another precept, seems grave; or which contributes notably to the end of the vow or to the worship of God. - Reuter.

Q. 2. Whether several light matters coalesce to make grave matter?

Resp. No, if the light matters are vowed separately, so that the obligation is attached precisely to the time or day, or to sanctifying that day. - But it is otherwise if the light matters are vowed by way of one thing, so that the determination of the day accedes only for urging the execution, as happens generally in real vows; nevertheless make an exception unless something else is clear from the intention of the one vowing, on which the whole obligation and the reason of the obligation depend.

978. 1. Errors. Many Protestants, from the fact that they reject the distinction between precepts and counsels, contend that vows concerning things not prescribed, from the motive of worshiping God, are not only illicit, but impious, since they suppose that there are certain supererogatory works which are by no means owed to God. Nevertheless, they concede that the same vows are licit if they are made from another motive, for example, for the sake of avoiding sin, or of freeing oneself from the bonds of the world. - Today, however, not a few rationalists and politicians reprove all vows, especially religious and perpetual vows, as harmful to liberty and to society: for since man is essentially mutable and progressive, no one can abdicate his liberty, especially in perpetuity; besides, religious, by vowing poverty, obedience, and chastity, become not only useless to society, but even harmful: for they produce nothing, and by their example draw others to idleness under the pretext of contemplation. - Hence we shall premise a few things concerning the honesty and excellence of vows.

¹ St. Thomas vindicated the excellence of religious vows in two opuscule works: Opusc. I, Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem; Opusc. III, Contra pestiferam doctrinam retrahentium homines a religionis ingressu (Works, ed. Vives, t. XXIX).

979. 2. Thesis: Vows prudently emitted, from the motive of worshiping God, are honest and laudable.

(A) That vows made in honor of God are acceptable to Him and are commended by Him is clear from many texts of Scripture: the Patriarchs emit vows, and on account of this are blessed by Him;² in the Mosaic law, prescriptions are established concerning the fulfillment of vows: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it: and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin. If thou wilt not promise, thou shalt be without sin."³ Although vows do not fall under precept, as is clear from the words just cited, nevertheless elsewhere they are commended:⁴ "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God." - Under the new law, the Apostles are presented as paying vows;⁵ and many Fathers understood of the vow of chastity the words of Paul concerning younger widows, who have made void their first faith.⁶

² Gen. 28:20.

³ Deut. 23:21-22.

⁴ Ps. 75:12.

⁵ Acts 18:18; 21:23.

⁶ 1 Tim. 5:12.

980. (B) Wherefore, already in the first centuries of the Church, vows were in use, especially the vow of chastity, and afterward the three vows of religious. Thus Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome wrote entire treatises on virginity, insofar as it is confirmed by vow. Let Augustine be heard addressing the spouses Armentarius and Paulina, who by mutual consent had emitted a vow of chastity: "But now, because thy pledge is held before God, I do not invite thee to great justice (if I exhort thee not to recede from the vow), but I deter thee from great iniquity. For thou wilt not be such as thou wouldst have remained if thou hadst vowed nothing of this kind. For then thou wouldst have been lesser, not worse; but now so much the more miserable, which may God avert, if thou shalt break the same to God, as thou art happier if thou shalt pay it. Nor therefore should it repent thee to have vowed; rather rejoice that now that is not licit for thee which would have been licit to thy loss... Happy is the necessity which compels to better things."⁷ - Wherefore the Church approved the vows of religious, condemned their impugners,⁸ and, against Protestants, in a general manner defined the honesty of vows thus:⁹ "If anyone shall say that men are to be so recalled to the remembrance of baptism received that they understand all vows which are made after baptism to be void by force of the promise already made in baptism itself, as if by them both the faith which they professed and baptism itself were detracted from, let him be anathema."

⁷ St. Augustine, Epist. 127, Migne, P.L., XXXIII, 487. - Cf. St. Jerome to Eustochium on the custody of virginity, P.L., t. XXII, 394-425.

⁸ In Denzinger, n. 497-499.

⁹ Trent, sess. VII, De Baptismo, can. 9; Denzinger, n. 746.

981. (C) Reason itself shows that vows, prudently emitted, turn to the glory of God and to the utility of those vowing. (a) To the glory of God; for man, offering and promising to God a thing pleasing and better to Him, studies to please Him and acknowledges His supreme dominion; but because he cannot fulfill the vow except by renouncing his own will and pleasure, at the same time he offers an internal sacrifice and spiritual hosts by which God is worshiped most greatly. - Even conditioned vows, by which something is promised if God grants such a grace, glorify Him, although less perfectly than absolute vows; for thus it is acknowledged that God provides for human affairs, and that one must flee to Him so that opportune helps may be obtained in temporal or spiritual matters. - Nevertheless that mercenary disposition of soul by which something is never vowed to God or to the saints except for obtaining some temporal advantage should by no means be commended; they act much more perfectly who vow something to God absolutely, confidently awaiting from Him whatever it shall please Him to repay at the opportune time.

(b) To the utility of those vowing; for since human nature is weak and inconstant, it greatly benefits, in certain adjuncts, to furnish it strength and firmness by binding oneself to more perfect things through a vow: for thus the will is strengthened and confirmed in good; since an honorable man is, as it were, compelled by a sense of honor to execute promises seriously made; and, if there is question of promises made to God, he is induced gently and strongly by the virtue of religion to fulfill them. Wherefore he will employ every fortitude to overcome difficulties and execute the thing, and thus his powers for doing good will be doubled. Besides, God Himself, in whose honor the vow was emitted, will not disdain to assist the one vowing by His powerful virtue, and from this head his strength will be increased not a little.

982. The adversaries indeed object that liberty is destroyed by vows, since thus the moral power of choosing between contraries is taken away. - The argument is retorted; for the same can be said of all human promises and contracts; for by these the power of choosing is restricted, since the contracting parties impose true obligations upon themselves, whether for a time or in perpetuity. - Therefore the adversaries falsely suppose that liberty is diminished or destroyed by a moral obligation; on the contrary, we are the freer the more faithfully and perfectly we fulfill our duties. For although we have the power of choosing between good and evil, we do not lose this by choosing good, which perfects our nature, but use it well. Is not liberty, on the contrary, diminished when, serving passions and pleasures, contrary to the dictate of right reason, we desire evil? Therefore they are freer who, their passions having been subdued, fulfill their duties more frequently and perfectly. But those who not rashly but prudently, not quickly but after mature deliberation, spontaneously oblige themselves to doing something better, far from binding their liberty with new bonds, become freer: for they bid farewell to pleasures, that they may serve right reason and God Himself more faithfully. - Thus certainly do they judge who, after a long life spent in the practice of virtue, are no longer drawn to evil by the vehement impulse of the passions.¹⁰

¹⁰ M. d'Hulst, Careme 1893, p. 134-136, eloquently declares this as follows: "The vow an enemy of liberty? But do you not perceive the equivocation? Liberty, that is, the right to do: yes, this liberty, which after all is only a benefit, is restricted by the vow. What was permitted is so no longer. But since when is it a moral diminishment to renounce a benefit? Is not everything great in the world of souls made of this stuff? Do you wish to see whom the vow profits? Look at whom it saddens. It saddens egoism, the need to enjoy, to seize goods. Ah! if egoism is not satisfied, so much the better; it is that virtue triumphs... The power of choosing one's acts, that is free will; and such is the moral signification of the word liberty. Well then, this power, where is it exercised, where is it affirmed more? Speak; I appeal to your consciences. Is it in enjoyment permitted, or in enjoyment sacrificed? Ah! in enjoyment permitted, I am not very sure of being free. Perhaps I grant it to myself because it is permitted; then it is a good act; but perhaps I yield to its attractions because it is enjoyment, and then I am no longer free, I am dragged along. If on the contrary I react; if, by going back up the current of my covetous desires, I pass even beyond the line of duty; if I venture, bold and proud, into the regions of perfection; if I do more; if, modest as much as strong, I distrust, in my fervor of today, my weakness of tomorrow, and if, in order to cut it short, like that Spanish conqueror, I burn behind me the ships of return and bind myself by a voluntary bond to heroic actions which it was permitted to me to omit; oh! then, say if it pleases you, that I am no longer free. I shall answer you, for my part, that one is free in the measure in which one does a work of will, and that I have willed more strongly than you, since I have willed more difficult things. And, if returning to the charge, you speak to me of my chains, I shall tell you that I bear them because I chose them, and that I am proud of them, while perhaps you bear some which you did not choose and of which you are ashamed."

983. 3. Corollary. A good work done from vow, other things being equal, is more meritorious than the same work without vow. St. Thomas demonstrates this by a threefold argument: (a) to vow is an act of latria, or of religion, which is the chief among the moral virtues; but since an act of an inferior virtue is better and more meritorious from the fact that it is commanded by a superior virtue, the works of inferior virtues, such as fasting, abstinence, continence, are rendered better and more meritorious when they are done from vow, because thus they are commanded by the virtue of religion, which excels the other moral virtues. (b) He who vows something and does it subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, and therefore subjects himself more perfectly; just as he gives more who hands over to a neighbor the tree with the fruits than he who hands over the fruits only. (c) Through a vow the will is immovably confirmed in good, from what was said above, n. 982; but to do something from a will confirmed in good pertains to the perfection of virtue, which from its nature is stable, just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates sin.

Nevertheless I said other things being equal; for, since charity is the most perfect of all the virtues, he who acts from charity accomplishes more perfect works than he who acts from vow, or from the virtue of religion. Moreover, he who, not from vow, but from repeated acts, accomplishes the same things as one vowing, sometimes acquires greater merit from the greater effort which he must renew more frequently.

984. 1. Principle: By a vow there is induced in conscience an obligation of performing that which was promised; moreover, the gravity of this obligation depends both on the intention of the one vowing and on the gravity of the matter.

(A) From Scripture it is clear that vows must be diligently fulfilled under penalty of sin: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God requireth it, and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin"¹... "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him... and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised."² In truth, if promises made to men must be kept from the virtue of fidelity, a fortiori those things which are made to God must be fulfilled, and indeed from the virtue of religion; for fidelity toward God, as pertaining to divine worship, is deservedly adorned with the name of religion. It is indeed true that a promise does not strictly oblige unless it has been accepted; but, from the texts cited above, it is clearly established that vows, clothed with the due conditions, are accepted by God, and that their fulfillment is urged; wherefore there can be no doubt concerning the obligation which they induce.

¹ Deut. 23:21.

² Eccles. 5:3-4.

985. (B) The gravity of this obligation depends chiefly on the very intention of the one vowing: for since a vow is, as it were, a private law which he imposes upon himself, he can oblige himself under grave sin or under light sin, according as he wills. It also depends on the gravity of the matter itself. Nevertheless, even when there is question of matter grave in itself, a vow can be emitted under light sin only. Yet those vows are excepted whose gravity the Church herself has defined, namely the vow of chastity emitted by sacred ministers, and the vows of religious: for then legitimate authority, on account of the public good, manifestly declares that vows of this kind cannot be made except under penalty of grave sin. - Besides, matter light in itself cannot be vowed under grave sin, because the intention of incurring a grave obligation in light matter is not reasonable, and therefore is not approved by God (De Legibus, n. 274).

Hence, in order that a vow oblige under grave sin, two things are required: that the matter be grave, and that the one vowing have the intention of obliging himself under mortal sin. - Moreover, matter is judged grave which, if it were prescribed by the Church, would oblige under grave sin, such as assistance at Mass, fasting, Communion, etc.; this indeed must be determined from the estimation of prudent men. - When several light matters have been promised by the same vow, they coalesce or do not coalesce into grave matter according as, from the intention of the one vowing, they were promised as one thing or as singular things; when this intention is lacking, the matter must be judged from the estimation of prudent men.

986. 2. Corollaries. (A) A vow directly obliges only the one vowing; for since the obligation of a vow arises from a promise freely made, he alone is bound by this obligation who freely undertook it. Hence:

(a) Children are not held to fulfill the personal vows of their parents, unless afterward they have made these vows their own. Subjects are not held to execute vows made by the superior of the community, by force of the vow itself, unless they have consented to the same, but by force of religious obedience, if the superior legitimately commands this. Likewise posterity is not compelled to observe the vows of ancestors by force of the vow; but, if the community itself, through its legitimate presidents, has emitted some vow, the subjects ought to execute the acts promised by reason of precept, or of custom having the force of law: for presidents can, on account of the common good, prescribe some work which even posterity must fulfill; but because the work is enjoined from the motive of religion, it must indirectly be performed by the subjects from the same motive.

(b) When there is question of a real vow, heirs are held to execute, not from religion, but from justice, those things which had been promised by deceased predecessors, yet not beyond the forces of the inheritance. For a real vow, for example, the promise of some alms, is as it were a burden annexed to the inheritance itself; but the inheritance passes to heirs with its burdens. Therefore these are held to pay the burdens, first indeed debts of justice, but afterward debts of religion, arising from vow, which precede pious legacies.

(c) Moreover a personal vow must be fulfilled by the one vowing himself, since his own action was promised; if the one vowing cannot fulfill it, he is not held to perform it through another. - The contrary must be said of a real vow: for since a thing was promised, the one vowing can give it either by himself or through another.

987. (B) A vow must be fulfilled in the manner in which it was made. Accordingly:

(a) If it is conditioned, it does not oblige unless the condition has been fulfilled. Nevertheless, it is not licit fraudulently to impede the execution of the condition; and therefore he sins against the vow who by deceit, force, threats, or other unjust means impedes this execution. But he who prevents the added condition from being verified only by prayers, persuasion, or licit ways, does not strictly sin, and is freed from his vow, since in reality the condition was not fulfilled. Likewise, if the condition is fulfilled not properly but only equivalently, the vow probably does not oblige; for example, he who vowed entrance into religion if his widowed mother entered second nuptials is not strictly held to enter if she has died, even if the reason for the condition added was the support of the mother.

(b) If it is disjunctive, for example, if I recover, I shall fast for three days or give twenty coins to the poor, the option belongs to the one vowing; but he must execute one or the other. If, before the election has been made, one part becomes impossible without the fault of the one vowing, probably he is held to nothing, because the faculty of choosing does not remain; but a pious and honorable man will nevertheless execute the other part. But once the election has been made, the chosen part is to be performed, even if the other part becomes impossible; but if the chosen part becomes impossible without the fault of the one vowing, he is held to nothing.

988. (C) As to time, a vow must be fulfilled at the prefixed time, without its being necessary to anticipate it, even if a future impediment is foreseen; and notable delay, without just cause, in a grave matter, is of itself a grave sin.

But what constitutes notable delay depends on many circumstances: on the nature of the vow, the age of the one vowing, the danger of forgetfulness or of inability to execute the vow in the future. All these things can be judged only from the estimation of prudent men. Thus he who vowed to enter religion at once, and without cause defers for three or four years, of itself sins gravely, because he withdraws a notable part of the service promised; but if there is question of a pious pilgrimage, a long delay does not seem grave, unless from this there is probable danger of future inability to execute the pilgrimage. - If the vow has not been fulfilled at the prefixed time, its obligation ceases if the time was added for ending the obligation, but by no means if it was added for urging the same: prudent men will judge concerning this, according to the true or presumed intention of the one vowing and the other circumstances. - If no time was prefixed, the vow must be fulfilled as soon as morally possible: for it is as a debt, which must be paid as soon as possible.

989. (D) When there is question of the interpretation of a vow, these things especially are to be attended to: (a) First, a vow must be interpreted according to the expressed or presumed intention of the one vowing, as is established from what has already been said.

Thus he who vowed that he would give annually, for ten years, one hundred coins to Titius, so that he might help him in supporting his family, is held to perform this even after Titius has died, if his primary intention was the support of the family; but not if the primary intention was the relief of the father from anxiety in supporting the family.

(b) When the intention of the one vowing is not established, the vow must be interpreted according to the nature of the vow, the common usage of the place, or the general custom of the Church.

Thus he who vowed to recite the rosary can recite it alternately with a companion; he who vowed a fast can use lacticinia where this custom is in force; if you vowed a fast for a month, you are not held on Sunday, since, from the practice of the Church, fasting does not take place on that day.

(c) If, all things having been weighed, doubt remains concerning the sense of the vow, it is licit to follow the more benign part; for in hateful matters, to which the bond of a vow is referred, the more benign part is to be followed.

Therefore he who promised alms, without determining the quantity, satisfies the vow, provided the sum disbursed is not ridiculous, all things considered; he who vowed a chalice, without a determined quality of matter, is not held to offer a gold one, but can offer a silver one.

Moreover, as to all doubts which arise concerning the existence or extension of a vow, the principles handed down in the Treatise on Conscience, where the various systems of probabilism are treated, must be kept in mind; nor is the fulfillment of a truly doubtful vow to be urged.

1. Every valid vow entails the obligation of keeping the promise made to the best of one’s ability.¹

¹ Numb. XXX, 3 sqq.; Deut. XXIII, 21–23; Eccles. V, 3 sq.

“It pertains to the fidelity of a man,” says St. Thomas, “that he keep that which he has promised.... Above all man owes fidelity to God, both because of His overlordship and on account of benefits conferred, and consequently man is in a very special manner obliged to keep the vows he makes to God.”²

² Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 3: “It pertains to the fidelity of a man that he render what he has promised. . . . Above all, however, man owes fidelity to God, both by reason of His dominion and by reason of the benefit received; and therefore man is especially obliged to fulfil vows made to God, for this pertains to the fidelity which man owes to God.”

“A vow obliges per se,” says Gury, “like a law or a commandment of the Church; that is to say, gravely in an important matter, and lightly in unimportant ones. For a vow is, as it were, a private law, which a man imposes upon himself.”³

³ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 319: “A vow obliges of itself like a law or precept of the Church, and consequently gravely in grave matter and lightly in light matter; for a vow is, as it were, a certain private law which one imposes upon oneself.”

Failure to keep a vow involves faithlessness towards God and a violation of the reverence and respect due to Him by His creatures. It is a sin against the virtue of religion, and consequently a mortal sin, unless the matter involved is of no importance (parvitas materiae).⁴

⁴ For judging parvitas materiae in regard to vows, Noldin gives the following rule: “For judging smallness of matter in vows whose matter is promised after the manner of one whole, the matter omitted must be considered not absolutely but in relation to the whole thing promised, so that only a third or fourth part of the whole is to be considered a notable thing which cannot be omitted without grave fault. Thus one who promised to attend morning devotion for an entire month does not sin so gravely because he omits the devotion once or twice, even though the individual devotions, considered absolutely (if they last half an hour), constitute grave matter, but because he omits eight or ten attendances.” (Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 233).

In gauging the obligation involved in a vow, the first and most important thing to be considered is the intention.

“Ordinarily,” says Fr. Slater, “it will be presumed that in a grave matter, such as the Church considers to be sufficient for a precept to bind under mortal sin, a vow also binds under pain of grave sin, for the intention of him who took the vow is presumed to accommodate itself to the matter. Nothing, however, prevents him from limiting the obligation of a vow even in a grave matter, so that transgressions of it will be only venial sins, if he expressly intends it.”⁵

⁵ A Manual of Moral Theology, I, 249.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 3, ad 3: “The obligation of a vow is caused by one’s own will and intention.”—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 319: “A vow obliges according to the intention of the vower, if he determines the quantity of the obligation in the act of vowing, so that he can bind himself under light obligation only in matter however grave. The reason is that, just as a legislator or superior can in grave matter bind under light obligation only, so also one who vows concerning a grave thing can impose upon himself a light obligation only. He cannot, however, conversely bind himself gravely in a light matter, because light matter is not capable of a grave obligation.”

In case of doubt it may be presumed that the obligation binds sub gravi. If the matter of the vow is something commanded by law (e. g., chastity, temperance), failure to keep it would be a twofold sin, either mortal or venial according as the law in question obliges under pain of mortal or of venial sin.

2. If it is either physically or morally impossible to keep a vow, the latter ceases to bind; nor is he who made it obliged to do something which is a mere accessory to the substance of the vow, even if this were possible. If the matter is capable of being divided, as said above, the vow should be lived up to as far as possible.⁶ Fr. Slater illustrates this rule as follows: “One who should vow to fast for a week, if he found this impossible, would not be excused from fasting on the days that he could do so. But if he had vowed to build and decorate a church, and afterwards found this to be impossible, he would not be bound to build a portion of it, nor to decorate some other church.”⁷

⁶ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 3, ad 2: “If that which someone has vowed is rendered impossible by any other cause, he ought to do what is in his power, so that he may at least have a ready will to do what he can. Hence one who has vowed to enter a certain monastery ought to make every effort he can to be received there. And if his intention was principally to bind himself to entrance into religion, and as a consequence he chose this religious institute or this place as though more suitable to him, he is bound, if he cannot be received there, to enter religion elsewhere. But if he principally intended to bind himself to this religious institute or this place because of a special pleasure in this institute or place, he is not bound to enter another religious institute if they are unwilling to receive him there.”—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 315.

⁷ A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 251.

If a vow is unlimited as to time, it should be kept as soon as possible and not be postponed without grave reason, especially if, through carelessness or later impossibility of fulfilment, the delay is likely to result in complete nonfulfilment or to render the object of the promise illusory. A merely temporary impossibility does not annul the obligation, which, on the contrary, revives as soon as the obstacle is removed. The term assigned for the fulfilment of a vow should be adhered to, but if it has passed, the neglected duty cannot be validly complied with later.⁸ Violation of a permanent vow (e. g., of virginity) does not annul the obligation,⁹ but may become an im- portant inducement for the ecclesiastical superior to grant a commutation or a dispensation.

⁸ Deut. XXIII, 21 sqq.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 3, ad 3: “If it is in the intention and will of the vower to bind himself to render it immediately, he is bound to render it immediately; but if for a certain time or under a certain condition, he is not bound to render it immediately, yet neither ought he to delay beyond that to which he intended to bind himself.”—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, 321: “Question: What delay is to be considered grave? Answer: 1. Every delay of a gravely binding vow which is attached to a determined time is grave of itself, as is a vow of fasting on a certain vigil, etc., because when the time has elapsed, the obligation of the vow ceases and cannot be compensated. 2. But if no determined time was fixed, or if it was fixed only to urge execution of the vow, a notable delay in a grave matter will be a grave sin; what delay is notable, however, must be judged from the nature of the thing promised, from the end, and from other circumstances. Generally speaking, less delay is required for a grave sin where there is danger of forgetfulness or inability, or a notable diminution of the vow, as in those things which are undertaken for one’s whole life.”—Ibid., n. 323: “A vow indeterminate as to the cessation of time, for example, concerning a daily rosary or a fast to be made every Saturday, obliges perpetually unless something else is gathered from the circumstances. In doubt whether the vow is temporary or perpetual, or for a month or a year, the minimum must be held.”

⁹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 3, ad 2: “If [he who vowed to enter a certain monastery ] falls into an impossibility of fulfilling the vow through his own fault, he is bound in addition to do penance for his own past fault, just as a woman who vowed virginity, if she is afterward corrupted, not only ought to preserve what she can, namely perpetual continence, but also to repent for what she lost by sinning.”

Conditional vows take effect only after the postulated condition has set in. Arbitrarily and maliciously to prevent the condition from being verified, either by intrigue, force, or malice, is forbidden.¹⁰

¹⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 3, ad 3.—Busembaum, Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, c. 3, dub. 4, n. 11: “Conditional vows do not oblige when the condition ceases, even if the vower himself was the cause that the condition was not fulfilled, provided he did not prevent it by deceit, force, or malice; for example, you vowed a pilgrimage if Peter approves it, and then you send someone to persuade him not to approve it; therefore, when he does not approve it, you are not bound.”

A personal vow binds him who makes it and no one else. A vow conditioned upon the consent of another takes effect only after that consent has been given.

A “real” vow (votum reale) falls upon the heirs of him who made it, if the matter involved is one of justice, but it never obliges ultra vires haereditatis. The legal obligations of a testator sub titulo iustitiae always take precedence of any vows he may have made.¹¹

¹¹ H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, c. 3, dub. 4, n. 5–9; Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 323.

In regard to doubtful vows, Archbishop Simar lays down the following rules: a) If it is doubtful whether a vow has been made, it may be regarded as not binding. The same rule holds with regard to any circumstance of which it is uncertain whether or not it formed part of the vow.

b) If insuperable doubts arise as to the validity of a genuine vow, or if it is uncertain whether the vow has been fulfilled or not, the obligation remains.

c) If there is doubt as to the qualities or extent of the obligation incurred, this doubt must be solved with due regard to current views regarding such matters, and according to the commonly accepted meaning of the terms employed.¹²

¹² H. Th. Simar, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, 3rd ed., p. 284; cfr. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., p. 323.

The interpretation of vows is subject to the same rules as the interpretation of laws.¹³ The decisive factors are: the intention, the nature of the object, and common sense. Consequently, if a man has vowed to make a donation for some religious or charitable purpose, without determining the amount, he may give as much or as little as he pleases, provided, of course, the gift be not so small as to appear a mockery of God rather than the fulfilment of a vow. If one has vowed to give something without reference to quality, it is sufficient to follow common usage or custom. A vow unlimited as to duration (for instance, to recite the Rosary every day) is regarded as perpetual, unless the circumstances of the case indicate a contrary intention.

¹³ See this Handbook, Vol. I, pp. 177 sqq.; cfr. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 238 sq.

On account of the responsibility and obligation involved, a Catholic should never make a vow without having consulted his father confessor or some other prudent and experienced guide.

Priests should exercise great caution in regard to vows, especially those intended to be perpetual or to last for a long time. In many cases it may be advisable to impose a period of probation, say one year, after the expiration of which the vow may be renewed.

The so-called pledge (to abstain from intoxicating drink) is no vow, but merely a good resolution made known to a priest, and hence does not oblige sub gravi. Sabetti rightly admonishes the clergy to “use great prudence and discretion in receiving such promises.”¹⁴

¹⁴ Comp. Theol. Mor., § 150; cfr. Irish Eccl. Record, May, 1883, pp. 338 sqq.

READINGS.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 249 sqq.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 333 sqq.—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 562 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 277 sqq.—Sabetti-Barrett, Comp. Theol. Mor., 28th ed., pp. 233 sq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 231 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 7th ed., pp. 476 sqq., 481 sq.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 178 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 328 sqq.

Nature of the obligation. The obligation of a vow is not of the same ratio as the obligation of a promise which is made to men. We ought to be faithful to men lest they be deceived, while God, better than the man promising, knows what is going to be. But a man can offer to God the future action itself, or a series of goods and perseverance in the purpose of a good work. Moreover, reverence owed to God, and therefore the virtue of religion, requires that an oblation once made not be revoked. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 124, 128.

Force of the obligation. Now the force of the obligation is that which the matter demonstrates, unless the one vowing has wished to assume a lesser obligation. For he who could promise nothing could also lessen the force of his obligation. Except vows which are required in the undertaking of a state. The intention also of the one vowing brings it about that small matters coalesce or not, according as the one vowing intends to vow to God a certain notable whole by parts, or to offer individual performances as such. Coalescence is easier in real vows than in personal vows.

For a vow, although it induces a graver obligation than that of fidelity, admits smallness of matter, because negligence in observing a vow of small matter is explained from a slight esteem of the thing, not of God.

Judgment concerning grave or light matter must be made prudently, by observing what the vow contributes to divine worship either directly or indirectly. Directly, when a grave act of religion is vowed; indirectly, when a thing grave in another order, by the vow itself, is referred to divine worship. Cf. Suarez, Rel. Tr. 6, L. 5, c. 4.

When a singular action has been promised to God, this rule can be admitted, that the matter is thought grave which, for the intended end, would of itself be urged under mortal guilt by divine or ecclesiastical law. Therefore grave matter is judged to be: hearing Mass, fasting, abstinence of one day, etc.

But when a series of actions is promised, coalescence is not to be urged as in the matter of justice; moreover, one action which, taken in itself, would be notable can be a slight part of the promised series; finally, the very object of such a vow must be defined accurately.

Thus a vow of doing the more perfect things concerns not so much the things in themselves as insofar as they are more perfect; but the excess of perfection of itself seems light matter. Thus he who substitutes another honorable action for the Mass which it would have been more perfect to hear, is not guilty of omitted Mass but of neglected more perfect action; and this is thought light. Wherefore scarcely in a singular act which is not mortal fault will there be grave guilt against such a vow. He also will have sinned gravely who often, as if habitually and with a clear mind, has done things which he has certainly known to be imperfect. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 129.

Is there an acquired right from a vow?. A right is sometimes said to be acquired for another from a vow. Properly speaking, however, an obligation of religion cannot, as such, transfer rights: only an obligation of justice can do that. Therefore, if after a vow a right has been acquired for someone, the cause of the right will be either an accompanying promise from justice made to a physical or moral person, or the execution itself which placed the thing in another's patrimony. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 130.

The extension of the obligation is to be taken from the words of the one vowing and from their reasonable or common acceptance, always inclining to the more benign parts. Wherefore he who vows the rosary satisfies, saving a different expressed intention, by reciting the third part; he who vows Mass or fasting for a month does not have to fast or hear two Masses on Sunday; he who vows the fast of a vigil will have to neither fast on Sunday nor now anticipate the vigil on Saturday, since from c. 1252 §4, vigils are now not anticipated.

He who has made a conditioned or penal vow will be able, according to his varied intention, to impede the condition, to do the action to which the penalty is annexed, or will be prohibited from doing so.

He who has not appointed a day for fulfilling the vow must execute the vow as soon as he conveniently can. Yet a lesser cause is required for deferring than for omitting. But an illicit delay of execution will be judged grave if the one vowing exposes himself to danger of forgetfulness or of inability, or if the matter is notably diminished, for example in the vow of entering religion which a person already super-adult has made.

He who doubts whether he made a vow is presumed free; he who doubts whether he was fully in possession of himself in a vow certainly emitted is presumed to have been conscious, unless a positive reason renders probable the defect of deliberation: in which case, a probable opinion permits that the vow be neglected; although then it is better to ask a dispensation.

II. Execution of the vow. A personal vow can be fulfilled only by the one vowing; a real vow also through another, although he who does not have his own ought not therefore to beg another's. If another has spontaneously done it for you, your ratification will suffice. The intention of fulfilling the vow is not necessary.

The burden of a real vow which the one vowing has imposed upon an heir by a valid testament must be fulfilled by the heir from justice toward the testator. Likewise the heir must satisfy from justice a real vow by which a third party has acquired a right. With this omitted, canonical law obliges the heir from religion to fulfill real vows: "The obligation of a real vow passes to heirs, likewise the obligation of a mixed vow, for the part by which it is real" (c. 1310 §2).

By what title is the heir obliged? From the Code the obligation is said to pass. But it cannot pass except as the obligation which held the one vowing: this, however, was an obligation of religion. Yet most induce an obligation of justice. By what right, this plainly escapes us. Will you say with Suarez (Relig., Tr. 6, Lib. 4, c. 11, n. 7) that goods are received by the heir "liable to the payment of his debts"? But it must be denied that here there is a debt properly so called, which belongs to justice. For a promise from fidelity does not bind goods; and the obligation of a vow is from fidelity toward God (2, 2, q. 88 art. 3): it works no tradition of right. By what miracle, then, would an obligation from religion be converted, in the heir, into an obligation of justice? Why should goods be burdened in the case of an heir rather than in the case of him who made the vow? Therefore this must briefly be said: without positive law, an obligation of promise from fidelity, whether to God or to a man, even if it is personal, would not pass to heirs; now, because of positive law, the obligation of a real vow indeed passes to heirs; but, since the Code determines nothing else, it passes such as it was, i.e., as an obligation of religion. Cf. Quaest. de virtute religionis, n. 138.

He who has vowed the deed of another must merely strive in an honorable manner that the other voluntarily do the thing promised.

A vow of a community or for a community. Concerning this matter, in which no little labor is expended ¹, we think it must be said briefly as follows. Governors who represent a community, just as they can perform other things, can thus vow for the community. After the vow has been made, the obligation of religion passes to the successors of those who vowed, because through them acts the moral person, which remains the same. And if the promised act is one which does not demand the intervention of subjects, the execution itself will be liable to no difficulty. But if the subjects themselves must act, since they themselves promised nothing, they will have to be obliged by law or precept. If, however, the vow is not an action of those who represent the community, but is proposed to the very community of persons that they vow, certainly only those will be held by the vow who truly emitted the vow; nor, without a positive law, will successors be held.

¹ Cf. Op. theol., Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 634.

Specification. The violation of a simple vow differs specifically from sacrilege, concerning which below. It is graver than sacrilege, insofar as it is more directly against God; it is also graver than perjury strictly such.

Obligation of a purpose. A good purpose itself induces a certain light obligation proportioned to human constancy. For it is not reasonable that someone recede without reason from a prudently made choice. Cf. Lugo, De iust. d. 23, n. 1, against Suarez, Tr. 6, L. 1, c. 2, and Quaestiones de religione, n. 141.

Note. Since a vow is after the manner of a law which the person vowing has freely imposed upon himself, the principles concerning the obligation of a law are also generally applicable to the obligation of a vow, with this difference, however, that the obligation of a vow arises from the virtue of religion, whereas the obligation of a law arises from the virtue of obedience.

402. Quality of the obligation. Principle. Every valid vow obliges, from the virtue of religion, only the person vowing.³⁷⁹

That a valid vow obliges is of faith; hence St. Thomas³⁸⁰ calls him a heretic who pertinaciously denies the obligation of a valid vow. Even the pagans acknowledged that the transgression of a vow is a sin, and therefore one who had violated a vow was called guilty of a vow. The fulfillment of a vow is most strictly inculcated in Sacred Scripture: "If thou hast vowed any thing to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him; but whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow than after a vow not to perform the things promised."³⁸¹ "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."³⁸² St. Paul speaks severely of widows who, through their will to marry, violated a vow of chastity which they had made: "Having damnation, because they have made void their first faith."³⁸³ The intrinsic reason, however, is that a vow is a promise made to God. But every true promise, provided that it is lawful and its fulfillment possible, obliges in conscience. Therefore much more does the promise which someone has made to God by making a vow oblige. For if it is an offense against a man to break the faith pledged to him, it is a much greater offense against God to break the faith pledged to Him in a vow.³⁸⁴

I say, however: a vow obliges from the virtue of religion only the person vowing. Therefore a vow, as it is a vow, never obliges others. Hence children are not bound by the personal vows of their parents; e.g., when a father made a vow of making a pilgrimage or fasting, the son is not bound to fulfill those vows if the father is impeded or has already died. Indeed, personal vows can in no way be fulfilled by another; and therefore, e.g., if someone vowed a prayer, he cannot fulfill this vow through another who is even freely willing to say that prayer. If some community, e.g., a city, parish, etc., has vowed some personal action, such as a fast to be performed on a stated day (because of a victory obtained or a calamity overcome), then the inhabitants who descend from them do not indeed violate the vow if they do not fast, but nevertheless they must fast from a particular law.³⁸⁵ But real vows (and the same applies to mixed vows insofar as they are real), although they cannot impose an obligation of religion upon the heirs of the person vowing, must nevertheless sometimes be fulfilled from justice (if they do not injure the legitimate portion of the heirs or exceed the resources of the inheritance), since they are, as it were, burdens incumbent upon the inheritance. For he who accepts an inheritance ought also to take upon himself the burden connected with it.³⁸⁶ Hence heirs who do not pay legacies stipulated from the vow of the testator injure justice and are bound to restitution. Real vows can also be fulfilled by another during the lifetime of the person vowing. Thus, e.g., one who has vowed alms to be given can ask another to be willing to bestow the promised alms in his place.

St. Alphonsus,³⁸⁷ following the opinion of the Salmanticenses³⁸⁸ and Cajetan,³⁸⁹ notes that violations of vows are all of the same moral species, namely, violations of the fidelity owed to God. Hence (speaking absolutely) some penitent can declare the matter of the sin separately from the circumstance of the violated vow, saying, e.g., so many times I broke the fast, so many times I committed fornication, without expressing the vow concerning these matters, and afterwards say: so many times I broke a vow in a grave matter, without expressing the matter. The reason is that, if a circumstance is separable from the substance of the sin, the sin and the circumstance can be declared separately; just as one who stole in a church satisfies by saying: I stole; and afterwards: I committed sacrilege. Although these things are true theoretically speaking, nevertheless they are not to be put into practice, because thereby a right judgment by the confessor concerning the conscience of the penitent and concerning the means of correction to be counseled is rendered very difficult.

³⁷⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 1310, § 1.

³⁸⁰ Cf. Quodl. 3, a. 12.

³⁸¹ Eccles. 5:3ff.

³⁸² Deut. 23:21.

³⁸³ 1 Tim. 5:12.

³⁸⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 3.

³⁸⁵ In some regions and cities there exist vows of this kind made by a community and transmitted to posterity. Thus, e.g., at Rome, from a vow, a fast is observed before the feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary. All indeed concede that such obligations truly descend to posterity, but they do not agree whether by force of the vow. The better explanation seems to be that which asserts that such an obligation still now exists not by force of the vow but by force of a particular law or of legitimate custom having the force of law. For by making the vow the community was able to establish a particular law which also obliges posterity, unless, however, this law has been duly revoked (cf. Decr. auth. S.C.R. nn. 834, 932, 2113). Concerning the dispensation of such an obligation, the same things apply which were said concerning the dispensation of a law.

³⁸⁶ Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 1310, § 2; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 214.

³⁸⁷ L.c., n. 224.

³⁸⁸ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, n. 101.

³⁸⁹ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 5.

403. Scholion. Whether the violation of every vow is sacrilege.

It is disputed among authors whether the culpable violation of any vow has the species of true sacrilege, or only of infidelity or perfidy. Cajetan³⁹⁰ affirms that the violation of every true vow is true sacrilege, because the thing promised by vow is made sacred. But the violation of a sacred thing is sacrilege. The common opinion, however, denies that the sin of sacrilege is present in every violated vow. For if someone, e.g., violates a vow of fasting by an ample supper, he does not seem to have violated a truly sacred thing. Others teach that no violation of a vow other than the violation of a vow of chastity (even a private one) is sacrilege. Finally, others think that the violation of a public vow of chastity (whether simple or solemn) is true sacrilege. This controversy is a dispute about a name. For whether the violation of any vow is called sacrilege or not, there is always a violation of the virtue of religion, and it is grave or light according to the gravity of the matter and the intention of the person vowing.³⁹¹

³⁹⁰ Ib., q. 99, at the end of the question.

³⁹¹ Cf. below, n. 544.

404. Quantity of the obligation. Principle. A vow obliges under grave or light sin according to the quantity of the matter and according to the intention of the person vowing.

Therefore, in order that some vow oblige under grave sin, two things are required: gravity of matter and the intention of the person vowing to bind himself gravely. The reason is that a vow is, as it were, a private law. But a law obliges according to the quantity of the matter prescribed and according to the intention of the legislator, yet in such a way that light matter cannot be prescribed under grave sin, whereas matter grave in itself can be imposed under light sin. Thus similarly, in a private vow, someone can vow matter grave in itself under light sin; but he cannot vow matter light in itself under a grave obligation, since light matter is not capable of a grave obligation.³⁹²

All public vows in religious institutes and in the reception of the subdiaconate are excepted, the matter of which, grave in itself, cannot be undertaken under a light obligation. For grave harm would be inflicted upon ecclesiastical discipline if religious and subdeacons were bound only lightly to those things which they promised by vows.

³⁹² There are several authors, such as Dominic Soto (De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 2, a. 1), Wigandt (Tribunal confessar. tr. 10, exam. 3, n. 32), and Concina (In Decal. l. 4, diss. 2, c. 1, n. 18ff.), who assert that not only public, but also all private vows in grave matter do not admit of an obligation that is merely light, because the person vowing cannot change the nature of the matter of the vow. For just as the person vowing cannot bind himself under grave sin to light matter, so likewise he cannot bind himself to grave matter under light sin. Concina (l.c.) subtly defends this opinion. Nevertheless, the opposite opinion is common today. The reason is that according to St. Thomas (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 3 ad 3), "the obligation of a vow is caused by one's own will and intention." But the fact that the person vowing cannot bind himself under grave sin to light matter proceeds from this, that such a vow would be foolish; on the contrary, it can be very prudent for the person vowing to take upon himself under a light obligation matter otherwise grave.

405. The question immediately now arises: What matter is grave in a vow? General rule: Grave matter in a vow is that which, if it were prescribed by an ecclesiastical law, would oblige under grave sin.³⁹³ But what is grave matter in an ecclesiastical law depends greatly upon the end and circumstances of the law. Thus a law prescribing that a few drops of water be poured into the wine to be consecrated is considered grave, although the matter considered in itself is most light. For this infusion has the grave signification of the union between the humanity and divinity of Christ, or of the conjunction of the faithful people with Christ the Head.

Applications. 1. Matter grave in a vow is considered to be, e.g., Communion to be received, a fast even for one day, a Rosary of five decades to be said, alms of fifty francs to be given, etc., provided, however, that it is not established that the person vowing intended in all these matters promised by vow only a light obligation.

2. In real vows, according to some authors, matter is considered grave which would be grave if the notion of justice intervened. Nevertheless this rule is not to be pressed too much. For if the same quantity were to be called grave in the violation of a vow which is grave in the violation of commutative justice, then in the violation of a vow matter absolutely and relatively grave would also have to be established; or the sin would be lighter if a rich man did not give the sum of fifty francs promised by vow than if a poor man did not give the same sum promised by vow. This certainly disagrees with the common sense both of the faithful and of theologians. Rather, the contrary is to be said: a rich man omitting a real vow of fifty francs sins more gravely than a poor man, because the rich man has greater facility in fulfilling the vow. Besides, if the culpable omission of a Rosary promised by vow is most commonly assigned as grave matter, why would alms of fifty to one hundred francs promised by vow and not given without sufficient reason not also be grave matter? Is saying a Rosary considered more grave than giving alms of fifty to one hundred francs? Hence I think that even a very rich man can bind himself under grave sin by a vow to give the sum of twenty francs, although this matter relative to him is not yet grave in justice. Lehmkuhl³⁹⁴ thinks that to subtract about one percent from a notable sum promised by vow does not seem so notable as to constitute a grave sin. Hence, e.g., if someone vowed to give ten thousand francs to some church and retains one hundred francs, he does not yet sin gravely. This opinion indeed is not approved by me if the person vowing wished to bind himself under grave sin to give the whole sum of ten thousand francs. For in the matter of justice the sum of one hundred francs is without any doubt grave matter. But the obligation of the virtue of religion toward God arising from a vow seems not merely lesser, but rather greater, than the obligation of justice toward one's neighbor; just as other sins against God are also generally graver than sins against one's neighbor.

3. Light matters promised by vow can coalesce into grave matter, so that one who has repeatedly violated a vow in light matter is finally guilty of grave sin. Generally, however, it can be said: Matters do not coalesce in personal vows, but they customarily coalesce in real vows. Nevertheless, exceptions are given. Hence, if someone vowed to recite a decade of the Rosary each day and neglected this vow for one month, there are indeed several venial sins, but no mortal sin, since that vow is personal; nor is there coalescence, since the daily decade of the Rosary was promised by vow as a singular thing. But one who vowed to give alms of two francs each week and neglected this vow for several weeks sinned gravely, since those matters coalesced. If, however, someone vowed to give alms every Saturday in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary and violated this vow for a long time, it is not established whether the alms thus omitted coalesced into grave matter. The presumption indeed stands for coalescence, because the person vowing certainly wished to honor the Blessed Virgin Mary, but nevertheless seems to have intended more principally the worship of God through the relief of the poor. But if the worship of the Blessed Virgin Mary to be rendered on Saturday was altogether primary, whereas the relief of the poor was the secondary end of the person vowing, the omitted alms do not coalesce. In practice, therefore, the intention of the person vowing is first to be investigated; but if this intention is not clearly established, the position favoring the non-coalescence of the matters is to be maintained.

³⁹³ Cf. Salmanticenses, Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, n. 105.

³⁹⁴ Theol. mor. I, n. 595.

406. Fulfillment of the obligation. Principle. Vows are to be fulfilled in that manner and at that time which the person vowing intended in the act of vowing. But when a doubt arises concerning the manner of the obligation and fulfillment, the same rules of interpretation are to be employed which apply to the interpretation of laws.

This principle is easily understood if it is kept before one's eyes that a vow is after the manner of a law in which the person vowing is himself the legislator, who can freely determine and limit for himself all the circumstances of the obligation.

Concerning the time for the fulfillment of a vow, the following things are to be noted:

1. A negative vow (e.g., of not frequenting taverns, of not gambling, etc.) obliges immediately, always, and forever, just as in general all negative laws oblige. Therefore, immediately when such a vow has been made, it is no longer lawful to perform the action concerning the omission of which the vow was made. This is evident of itself.

2. If the time for the fulfillment of the vow was determined by the person vowing, then the vow is to be fulfilled at that appointed time, without its being necessary to anticipate it, even if an impediment to its fulfillment otherwise arising is foreseen. Hence, e.g., a young man who vowed that he would make a pilgrimage in the month of October is not bound to make the pilgrimage in September, even if he now knows that he will be impeded in October because of military service. The reason is that no one is bound to fulfill a law before it obliges.

3. One who did not fulfill a vow at the appointed time is no longer bound, nor can he even fulfill it at a subsequent time, if the appointed time was set as the terminus of the obligation or, as it is customarily said, for terminating the obligation. Hence, e.g., one who vows a fast every Saturday in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary neither ought nor is able to make up such an omitted fast on the following Monday. Therefore, if the omission of the fast on Saturday was inculpable, he committed no sin and is bound to nothing further. But if the omission was culpable, he committed a sin and can no longer satisfy the vow. The time is considered to have been appointed for terminating the obligation when it is intended per se and not accidentally, e.g., because of a special devotion to be rendered at that time, such as to make a meditation on the Passion of Christ every Friday in Lent. But if the person vowing designated the time not as the terminus of the obligation, but rather to urge the fulfillment, namely, lest the fulfillment be deferred too long, then, when such time has elapsed, the obligation of the vow does not cease, but remains to be fulfilled as soon as possible. But one who did not observe the time determined for the fulfillment of the vow sins if the omission was culpable, and that gravely or lightly according to the gravity of the matter.

What matter of delay is grave is difficult to assign in practice, since this depends upon many circumstances, e.g., upon the nature of the vow, the age of the person vowing, the danger of the obligation not being fulfilled, etc. Especially in vows which suffer some diminution from delay will grave matter more easily be present. St. Alphonsus³⁹⁵ thinks it to be a grave sin if someone without sufficient reason defers for more than six months entrance into religion promised by vow; but he calls lax the opinion of those who teach that a delay of this vow for two or three years made without a just cause is not a mortal sin. Certainly, if someone without any sufficient cause were to defer entrance into religion promised by vow, he would not only deprive himself of the great spiritual good of the religious life, but would also expose himself to the proximate danger of losing a religious vocation. But if some reasonable cause for the delay is present (e.g., bodily health not yet sufficiently firm, the resistance of parents, some business still to be completed, etc.), and if the proximate danger of losing the religious vocation is absent, a delay even for several years does not seem sinful. In other vows, however, which suffer almost no detriment from delay, according to several authors any delay whatsoever, even one made without cause, does not exceed a venial fault; because, they say, when someone gives all that he promised and no harm comes to the promisee from the delay, he does not seem to be condemned for a grave fault, but for light negligence.³⁹⁶

4. When no determined time has been appointed for the fulfillment of a vow, the person vowing should earnestly strive to fulfill that which he promised as soon as it can be done. For it is said in Sacred Scripture: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."³⁹⁷

³⁹⁵ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 221.

³⁹⁶ Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 3, § 2.

³⁹⁷ Deut. 23:21.

407. On the obligation of a conditional, disjunctive, penal, and doubtful vow.

1. If a vow was made not absolutely but conditionally, it does not oblige unless the condition has been verified. Hence the obligation of the vow remains suspended so long as the condition has not been fulfilled. It is not lawful, however, by fraudulent and unjust means to impede the occurrence of the condition. Hence, e.g., he sins against his vow who vowed to God that he would enter a monastery after the marriage of his sister, but now by fraudulent and unjust means dissuades his sister from entering marriage.

I say, however: by unjust means; for no one is prohibited from employing just means. Hence he who by opportune entreaties or persuasion impedes the fulfillment of the condition is not guilty of a violated vow. Likewise, a conditional vow does not strictly oblige if the condition was fulfilled not properly but only equivalently. E.g., if someone vowed entrance into a monastery when his mother, whom he is bound to support, should find a suitable marriage, he is not bound (strictly speaking) to enter the monastery if the mother should unexpectedly die, although the obstacle to entering the monastery, namely, the support of his mother, has now been removed. The reason is that a vow is a bond. But a bond ought not to bind beyond the limits clearly established. It is evident of itself that in this and similar cases it is better either to fulfill the vow or to seek a dispensation or commutation.

2. Concerning the obligation of a disjunctive vow, note a few things from St. Alphonsus³⁹⁸ and the Salmanticenses.³⁹⁹

a) If someone has vowed disjunctively a good thing or an evil, vain, or impossible thing, such a vow is null. The reason is that the person vowing can choose the evil, vain, or impossible thing, and then the vow would be null because of the unsuitability of the matter. But since he is free to choose either matter, the whole vow is null from the beginning. E.g., if someone very oppressed by financial difficulties were to vow: either I shall enter among the Carthusians or I shall commit theft from a very rich man, the whole vow is null from the beginning.

b) If someone has vowed disjunctively several good things and consequently suitable matters of a vow, he must choose one of them. But if after the choice has been made the other things promised under the disjunction become impossible, he is nevertheless bound to perform the thing once chosen. Conversely, if either thing promised by vow perishes or is rendered impossible before the choice without fault of the person vowing, the vow ceases. The reason is that the person vowing has now been deprived of the liberty of choice, and that without his fault. E.g., if someone promised by vow that he would give one of two chalices which he possessed, and one chalice was lost to him by theft or fire, he is no longer bound to hand over the other chalice. But if, through the fault of the person vowing, for example because he culpably deferred fulfilling the vow, either thing became impossible, the person vowing is bound to perform the other part, since no one ought to derive an advantage from his own fault. Moreover, in these disjunctive vows the intention of the person vowing is especially to be attended to; if it is clear, the vow is to be fulfilled according to it and not according to the material sense of the words: for God, to whom the promise is made in the vow and who searches hearts, is not to be deceived by the subtleties of casuists.

3. Concerning the obligation of a penal vow, a doubt can arise whether the penalty imposed for the transgression of the promise is to be paid once, or as often as the promise is violated. E.g., when someone vowed that he would give ten marks if he became drunk again, is he bound to give this promised sum once after the first drunkenness committed, or as often as he should afterwards become drunk? St. Alphonsus,⁴⁰⁰ following the Salmanticenses,⁴⁰¹ replies that the penalty is to be paid only for the first time if the vow made was simple; but if the vow was twofold, namely, not to become drunk and to pay the penalty, then the penalty is to be paid as often as the vow is violated, unless, however, this penalty is most grave, such as a pilgrimage or the bestowal of great alms. In practice the intention of the person vowing is to be attended to; if it is doubtful, the position favoring the lesser obligation is to be maintained.

4. Concerning the obligation of a doubtful vow, judgment is to be made according to the rules given above, I, nn. 328ff., concerning a doubtful and probable conscience. Then the rules of right interpretation, to be given immediately, are to be attended to.

³⁹⁸ L.c., n. 224.

³⁹⁹ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, n. 141.

⁴⁰⁰ L.c., n. 223.

⁴⁰¹ L.c., n. 177.

408. On the interpretation of vows.

Rule 1. A private vow is first to be interpreted according to the expressed or presumed intention of the person vowing.

The reason is that a vow is, as it were, a private law, whose legislator is the person vowing himself. But the best interpretation of a law is that which conforms to the expressed or presumed mind of the legislator. Therefore a private vow also is to be interpreted first according to the mind of the person vowing.

Public vows, such as the essential vows in religious institutes, are to be interpreted according to the sound doctrine of authors.

Rule 2. When the intention of the person vowing neither clearly appears nor can prudently be presumed, then the vow is to be interpreted according to the common usage of men or the general custom of the Church.

Hence one who vowed the Rosary can recite it alternately with a companion, for thus the custom of the Church bears. One who vowed a fast for a month is not bound to fast on Sundays, since fasting on Sunday is contrary to the custom of the Church; he can also use milk foods and generally employ those dispensations which are granted in his region to all the faithful during Lent. One who vowed to enter the religious state can enter any approved religious institute; but if after entrance he is dismissed by the superiors, he is not bound to make the attempt again in another religious institute, especially since according to the discipline now in force⁴⁰² no one dismissed from some religious institute after profession can be received into another religious institute without a special Apostolic dispensation. But the petition for such a dispensation (which is not so easily granted) seems to be an extraordinary means to which no one is bound for the fulfillment of his vow. One who vowed to hear Mass daily is not bound on Sundays and feast days to hear two Masses, etc.

Rule 3. In a doubt concerning the existence or extent of some vow, it is lawful to embrace the more benign part.

For the bond of a vow is not to be supposed but proved; and "in obscure matters the minimum is to be followed."⁴⁰³ But when a doubt arises whether the vow has been fulfilled or not, the same rules are to be employed which were indicated above, I, nn. 230 and 333, concerning a law doubtfully fulfilled.

⁴⁰² Cf. Sacred Congregation of Religious, 7 Sept. 1909 and 4 Jan. 1910; Code of Canon Law, c. 542.

⁴⁰³ Rule of law 30 in VI°.

S. Th. II-II, q. 88, a. 3 and 7.

722. The intrinsic and formal effect of every vow is an obligation in conscience, from the virtue of religion, to furnish the things promised. - It is a proposition certain by faith and reason.

It is proved: From fidelity a man is bound to pay that which he has promised; but he especially owes fidelity to God, both by reason of dominion and by reason of benefit received; therefore from fidelity toward God he is especially obliged to fulfill the vows made to Him. Moreover, fidelity toward God pertains to the worship owed to Him and consequently to the virtue of religion. - This obligation is expressly stated in the Scriptures: Deut. XXIII, 21-23; Lev. XXVII, 2; Ps. LXXV, 12; Eccl. V, 3; and in law, can. 1307, § 1.

Therefore violation of a vow is a sin against religion; and indeed against it alone, unless the work was already commanded from elsewhere, as chastity. Yet of itself it is not sacrilege, because it is not the violation of a sacred thing: for a vow of itself does not render either the person vowing or the matter vowed truly sacred. But it is a sin of infidelity, that is, of perfidy toward God.

But since in all vows reverence and fidelity owed to God are of the same account, per se violations of vows in any matter whatsoever are of the same moral species; for which reason it is not necessary that the matter of the violated vow be declared in confession.

723. The obligation of a vow is grave from its genus, because it arises from fidelity toward God (I Tim. V, 11, 12). Nevertheless it is light a) always in matter altogether light, because no one is able to oblige himself beyond the capacity of the matter; b) even in grave matter, if someone obliged himself only under light obligation, because a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing.¹

¹ By the nature of the thing and the will of the Church, exception is made for the vow emitted in sacred ordination or in religious profession.

But if he did not think about this, generally he is presumed to have obliged himself according to the quantity of the matter. Grave matter is that which conduce notably to the worship of God, or to the utility of neighbor or of the one vowing himself, whether from itself or from the circumstances, or is usually prescribed under grave obligation by natural, divine, or ecclesiastical law, for example, fasting, Mass, communion, confession.²

² This is the general rule handed down through the centuries; but now, after Noldin, Th. M. II, n. 215, some think that the rule is not to be strictly applied when not a singular action but a series of actions or a habitual manner of acting is promised after the manner of one thing: then, namely, the omitted matter is to be considered not absolutely but relatively to the whole thing promised, and thus an action notable in itself ought to be judged a modest part from the promised series. Hence one who after the manner of one thing vows for the whole month daily hearing of Mass or assistance at Marian devotion is not to be judged guilty of mortal sin if he omits it once or twice (provided, he says, it is less than a fourth part!), since he has fulfilled the promise substantially. Certainly so, if the one vowing intended in this way to oblige himself only under light obligation to such a part; but such an intention cannot be presumed, because this estimation is established neither from the nature of the thing nor from custom.

It should be noted that several light omissions coalesce into one grave omission if several things are vowed after the manner of one matter to be fulfilled several times, but not if they are vowed after the manner of several things and singly. Unless the one vowing intended otherwise, they are not accustomed to coalesce in personal vows, they are accustomed to coalesce in real vows; nevertheless disparate things: fasting, Mass, meditation, rosary, etc., do not coalesce unless they are vowed by the same vow for the same end, for example, one vowing various spiritual exercises for a month.

724. A vow cannot be fulfilled without the intention of the one vowing; hence if, explicitly or equivalently, someone positively intends not to satisfy, he remains obliged, because in acts which depend totally upon the one operating, the act does not operate beyond his intention.

Nevertheless there is not required 1. a formal and explicit intention, but it suffices that someone, even unmindful of the vow, do the prescribed work: for everyone before he makes gifts is judged first to furnish debts; nor 2. the special final intention of the one vowing or of the promised work, for example, that fasting be done for penance, alms for the glory of God, because ordinarily it does not fall under the obligation of the vow; nor 3. that it be fulfilled in the state of grace, from love of God, or from a supernatural end, unless the one vowing specially obliged himself to this.

725. The obligation of a doubtful vow. - In doubt concerning the existence of a vow, whether a vow was emitted, if after serious examination the doubt remains, the vow is judged not to be present. In doubt concerning the obligation of a vow, that is, concerning its validity or fulfillment, whether the vow was valid or was fulfilled, if the doubt is negative or light, that is, if there are light reasons for thinking that it does not oblige because perhaps it is invalid or already fulfilled, the obligation of fulfilling remains; but if, after diligent examination, a grave and positive doubt perdures, from the indirect principles of Probabilism it can be judged that no obligation is present: nevertheless dispensation is better sought.

But if one doubts concerning the mode of fulfilling, first the intention of the one vowing is to be investigated, then the words by which the promise was made, the nature of the thing promised, and the common usage and sense of the faithful; but if nevertheless the doubt remains, the one vowing may choose the mode of fulfilling which pleases him.

Hence, unless he intended otherwise: one vowing fasting is bound as the faithful in the region are accustomed to fast; one vowing fasting on each Saturday is not bound to fast if the Nativity of the Lord falls on Saturday; one who vowed fasting for an entire week is not bound on that day on which he must undertake such hard labors that he is excused from fasting; one who vowed an undetermined quantity is bound to the minimum among those things which befit God.

726. From a vow only the one vowing is formally obliged. - For by his vow he cannot oblige another, because no one can promise the thing or action of another, not even of those especially conjoined, as sons or subjects.

Yet someone can be obliged from elsewhere to execute the same work, whether from human fidelity, as if he promises that he will fulfill the vow of another; or from obedience, as if a father vows that he will hear Mass with his children and commands this to them; or from justice: thus an heir, after all things due to others and to himself have been paid (among which St. Alphonsus enumerates the legitimate portion of the inheritance owed to a son by law), before all legacies, even pious ones, is bound to fulfill the real vows of the deceased (can. 1310, § 1 and 2).

The one vowing is bound to execute personal vows through himself, nor can he do this through another: the act does not extend itself beyond the intention of the one vowing; - real vows he can fulfill through another, yet from his own goods, for example, by commanding him, or by holding his act ratified.

727. The one vowing is bound to fulfill the vow at the time determined by himself; when this time has passed, he is still bound, if by intention he established the time for urging the obligation; but if for ending it, the obligation ceases but the vow was violated. But if the intention is unknown, the time is judged to have been determined for urging the obligation in real vows, for example, a vow of giving alms for a month; but in personal vows for ending it, for example, a vow of fasting on Saturday: thus unless from the nature and end of the vow it must be established otherwise, as if someone for amendment vows to confess for a week, or in thanksgiving vows to fast on a certain day, or, on the contrary, to offer candles for a certain solemnity.

One vowing who has determined no time is bound to fulfill as soon as he morally and conveniently can, which is to be judged according to the matter and common estimation: a delay is grave which notably diminishes the matter promised, for example, if entrance into religion is deferred for a long time; but if the matter of the vow is not diminished by delay, probably even a long delay is only venial, unless it includes danger of not fulfilling the vow.

One who foresees an impediment is bound to anticipate it, provided the time of fulfilling has now begun, for example, a vow of fasting once in this week or of making a pilgrimage within this month.

728. The obligation of a conditioned vow. - On the part of affection a vow is pure if it has been emitted solely from love of the thing promised and of the honor of God; - not pure if another end is joined, for example, of obtaining conversion. Now on the part of the affection by which it is vowed and of the form by which it is expressed, one vow is absolute, circumscribed by no condition, by which the thing is promised simply in the present; - another is conditioned, by which a thing is promised under an extrinsic condition concerning a future contingent thing, suspensive or resolutory, and which, when the condition has been fulfilled, is either perfected or dissolved, for example, a vow of alms if an inheritance is obtained from a parent, or unless adverse fortune comes, a vow of religious life if a sister consents or unless the sister dies. Yet a vow to which a day is merely joined is not to be judged conditioned, for example, I will bid farewell to the world if my parents have died: for such a condition is necessary, not contingent; it is the same as saying: when they die.

A vow under a suspensive condition:

1. Obliges to furnishing the thing promised when the condition has been truly fulfilled: for then it passes into an absolute vow; it need not be observed a) before the condition has been fulfilled, nor b) if the condition is fulfilled not formally but only equivalently: thus one vowing entrance into religion if his sister marries is not bound if she dies, even if the reason of the condition added was the sustenance of the sister, unless however another intention of the one vowing were clear.

2. Obliges one not maliciously and fraudulently to impede the condition; hence a) if the condition is evil, as in a merely penal vow, the one vowing can, indeed is bound to, avoid the fulfillment of the condition; b) if the condition depends upon the will of the one vowing and is a free thing, for example, alms if the first prize is obtained, the one vowing can licitly not fulfill the condition: for he is bound by no precept to place the condition; c) if it depends upon the will of another and is a free thing, for example, entrance into religion if the father consents, he cannot licitly impede the condition by unjust means, such as force, threats, fraud; he can do so by just means, such as persuasions; d) if the condition depends partly upon natural causes, for example, fasting on such a day if convalescence has been obtained, he cannot studiously impede the causes from fulfilling the condition.

3. It does not oblige to furnishing the thing promised if the one vowing illicitly impeded the fulfillment, although in this case he sinned against the vow.

729. The obligation of a penal vow. - One conditioned vow is simply such, another penal, if under the condition of fault a penalty is promised. This can be emitted as one vow, purely penal, or a simple promise of penalty, for example, a vow of alms if someone either plays or makes himself drunk; or as a twofold copulative vow, or a promise of a better good with the sanction of a penalty to be undergone if it is not fulfilled, for example, a vow of not playing or of hearing Mass under penalty of alms.

A penal vow does not oblige to the penalty if the transgression was inculpable or only venially culpable, at least insofar as it is a transgression of the vow, in the case in which it was copulative, as if one vowing to hear Mass on Sunday omits it while not thinking of the vow: for no one is judged to oblige himself to a penalty, especially a grave one, on account of no or light fault. On the contrary, if the vow is not only penal but rather medicinal, so that someone may become more cautious and watchful in avoiding something or eradicating a custom, for example, if he promises alms as often as he blasphemes.

730. The obligation of an alternative or disjunctive vow. - On the part of mode, a vow is determinate if a certain and definite thing is promised or accurately designated; or disjunctive or alternative, by which an option among several remains if, from several things, one thing to be furnished is promised after the manner of one thing, for example, a vow of hearing Mass or of giving alms. Such a vow:

1. If it is valid, can and must be fulfilled a) per se, in one or the other matter, according to the choice and determination of the one vowing; b) per accidens in one matter (for example, Mass), in the case in which the one vowing by as it were a new vow has so determined himself that he willed absolutely to transfer the whole obligation into that matter: for then the vow is no longer disjunctive.

2. It need not be fulfilled a) if the matter determined in this way becomes impossible; indeed b) if, with such a determination not made, one part becomes evil, vain, or impossible, and thus the faculty of choosing does not remain, while however the intention of the one vowing was to determine himself freely to some part; on the contrary c) it must be fulfilled in the possible matter if the intention was to determine himself in any case whatever, or if by his own will one part becomes impossible: for then he is judged to have wished to choose the other, which is still possible.

3. It is invalid from the beginning if either matter is not apt, for example, evil or vain or impossible, because someone cannot be equally obliged to a good thing and an evil thing, for example: I will steal or enter religion.

731. Corollary. - From the foregoing, practical rules for the interpretation of vows can easily be deduced.

I Say. The obligation of a vow is always light in light matter; but in grave matter it is light or grave according to the intention of the one vowing. The reason is that a vow is, as it were, a certain private law which someone imposes upon himself. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 211 and 213; and de Legibus, n. 143.

Question 1. Can someone be bound by another's vow?

Response. Negatively, at least by reason of the vow; because a vow does not oblige, by reason of itself, except the one emitting it (Can. 1310, § 1), and therefore no one can promise the thing or action of another. - Hence vows of parents devoting children to some Religion, or imposing upon them an obligation, for example, of fasting on certain days, etc., cannot bind them. Yet the parents are bound to this, that as much as is in them, with the liberty of the children preserved, they opportunely move them to embrace that which they had vowed for them, and much more that they not stand in the way if the children wish to embrace it. - § 2. The obligation of a real vow passes to heirs, likewise the obligation of a mixed vow for the part by which it is real (Can. 1310); and from obedience at least, which transfers the obligation to the genus of the virtue with a view to which it is induced, subjects are held, both those who now live and those who in the future will become members of the community, to fulfill vows emitted in their name by a civil magistrate, with the Bishop assenting, or by religious superiors. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 213 and 216. - Baller., note (a), p. 320.

Question 2. What delay is to be judged grave in fulfilling a vow which indeed obliges gravely, but which has not been fixed to a determinate time?

Response. If the vow is for the perpetual service of God, say, of entering Religion, of serving the infirm through one's whole life, etc., it seems probable that its fulfillment can be deferred for two or three years without grave fault, especially if there is a just cause, and the age of the one vowing is not advanced. But if the vow has been emitted for a temporary service of God, as would be a vow of so many fasts, pilgrimages, etc., then, excluding the case in which by the delay the danger is induced of never fulfilling the vow, it seems probable that any delay whatever does not reach mortal sin. Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 321.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Real vows are to be discharged from one's own property; but he who cannot discharge them from his own property is not held to beg from another so that he can satisfy them. Nevertheless he satisfies if another, whether asked or spontaneously, wishes to discharge for him, although he himself could satisfy; because what the other gives, with the consent or ratification of the one vowing being added, becomes his own. Except if the matter of the real vow has been determined; for then that very thing in particular must be given out. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 217.

2nd. A vow indeterminate as to cessation of time, for example, concerning a daily rosary, or a fast to be made every Saturday, obliges perpetually, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances. In doubt whether the vow is temporary or perpetual, or for a month or year, the minimum is to be held. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 221.

3rd. He who has vowed to hear Mass for a month or year is more probably not held on feasts to hear two Masses, unless he has explicitly vowed this; because the end of the vow is that on individual days he should gather the fruit of the sacrifice. Likewise he is not held to fast on Sunday who has vowed to fast for a month, a year, or his whole life, unless he has expressly obliged himself to this; because he is judged to vow fasting according to the custom of the Church. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 224.

4th. He who has vowed a fast on the vigil of some Saint, if this falls on a Sunday, can fulfill the vow on Saturday, according to the custom of the Church. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Introductory remarks. Weighty questions arise in this disputation which I now undertake to examine; and — a matter of no small difficulty — I must, on several points, contend against very many recent casuists. Antiquity, and reason, will nonetheless stand by us, as we trust, that our reader may esteem it a greater and more useful undertaking than to treat questions that are not ancient, but new. For the rest, though many difficulties are unknown to the Fathers, since these questions were unknown to them, I have judged it worthwhile to discuss them, so that our reader may have ready at hand the questions others are accustomed to treat.

I. It is a truth of faith that a vow induces an obligation, such that the one vowing must carry out what he promised. This is clearly prescribed (Deut. 23): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin." St. Thomas confirms this (II-II, q. 88, art. 1; Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1; Quodlibet 3, art. 12): man is bound, above all, to fulfill the vows he has made to God — for this pertains to the fidelity which man owes to God. Now the breaking of a vow is a certain species of unfaithfulness. Whence Solomon gives the reason why vows must be paid: because it displeases God that a promise be unfaithfully kept. This obligation is, by its very nature, grave, and its transgression is, by its own kind, a mortal sin; for St. Thomas says (Bk. IV, loc. cit.): "One who neglects a duly made vow sins mortally, because he breaks the faith which he entered into with God." The matter will become clearer from the following little question.

II. Question I. Does the obligation of a vow pertain to the virtue of fidelity, or of religion; or also to that virtue to which the promised matter itself pertains? Response: First, it is certain that the obligation of a vow pertains to the virtue of religion, or fidelity — since a vow is that by which the worship of latria is shown to God.

III. You will object: Fidelity toward men does not oblige under mortal sin. If, then, a vow is an act of religion, pertaining to the virtue of fidelity, it will not oblige under mortal sin, but under venial. Response: It is granted that fidelity in the promises men make, and accepted by them, does not oblige under mortal sin — since this fidelity remains within the bounds of mere veracity. But the fidelity which shines forth in the obligation of vows is consecrated to God through the virtue of religion; and religion obliges under mortal sin. There is, then, a disparity of reasoning here.

IV. There is disagreement among authors as to whether this obligation of a vow pertains not only to religion, but also to that very virtue to which the matter promised by the vow itself relates. For example: you vowed to fast, and you break your fast — do you sin against religion, in breaking the obligation of the vow, and also, at the same time, against the virtue of temperance? The first, and true, opinion denies that the obligation of a vow pertains to both virtues — since one who vows a work of counsel, or supererogation, imposes upon himself no obligation other than that which arises from the promise made to God. This obligation, however, in its entirety, arises from the virtue of religion, and of fidelity. For the one vowing does not intend to add a new law of temperance for himself, beyond that which prescribes the limits of food and drink; although, out of an affection for temperance, which he reckons profitable and pleasing to God, he makes a vow of such a fast. This is sufficiently evident from the common sense of those who make vows. There is, then, no obligation in a vow pertaining to any other virtue besides the obligation of religion, and of fidelity.

V. The contrary opinion defends that the aforesaid obligation of a vow pertains both to religion, and to the virtue to which the promised matter is reduced — such that one who breaks a vow of fasting commits two sins: one against religion, another against the virtue of temperance. The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 4, §2, n. 102) cite, for this opinion, Valentia (I-II, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 3, q. 1, concl. 3), Sayr (Bk. VI, ch. 6, n. 8), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 11, n. 6), Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 5, n. 11). But in fact Sánchez and Bonacina do not absolutely teach this opinion; rather, they contend only that, when the one vowing intended to bind himself out of a special regard for that virtue to which the matter of the vow relates, in this hypothesis the one vowing would incur two sins; but not otherwise, when he vowed absolutely, without this express intention, and without a particular affection for the aforesaid matter. And indeed, if the one vowing expressly intended to impose this twofold obligation upon himself, he would commit two sins by breaking his vow: one against the vow, the other against the virtue whose observance he undertook out of a debt he assumed by breaking the vow. Nor do I see why the theologians of Salamanca deny that the one vowing can impose upon himself, under grave fault, the obligation of an act of temperance, against that same virtue, such that, by omitting that act, he sins against both the vow and the virtue. For just as, in order to carry out some work of supererogation, a man can bind himself by a vow under grave fault to observe such a virtue, so too he can bind himself under grave fault to exercise some act of temperance. Nor is this to pervert the natures of things. The natures of things, in the moral order, are subject to human deliberation in those matters where no repugnance appears — as is entirely the case here. Is there not, indeed, a precept of fasting that obliges under mortal sin? Why can a Christian not impose such a precept of fasting upon himself, of his own accord and free will? And, on the hypothesis that someone expressly incurs such an obligation, and adds a vow to this obligation, no one would certainly deny that he would incur a twofold crime in the case of transgression, at least from an erroneous conscience.

VI. But, setting aside this verbal disagreement, the first opinion is true, and is defended by Cajetan (II-II, q. 88), Suárez (Bk. V, ch. 3, n. 3), Castropalao (disp. 1, punct. 11, n. 8), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 11, n. 13). Indeed, Sánchez and Bonacina themselves uphold this same opinion, whenever the one vowing does not expressly intend to assume a twofold obligation.

VII. You will object, for the contrary opinion cited: A vow is a certain private law; and the one vowing is legislator of his own right. But a legislator, prescribing an act of some virtue — say, temperance — obliges by the precept of that virtue. The same, then, must be said of a vow. Does not one who violates a vow of fasting sin at once against fidelity and against temperance, just as a transgressor of a vow of chastity is at once unfaithful and unchaste? This is confirmed. Is not a transgressor of a vow bound in confession to disclose the matter of the vow? This is commonly taught by theologians. Now if the sin were only against religion, it would suffice to say in confession, "I sinned against my vow in a grave matter," without needing to explain the matter of the vow. Response: A vow is a private law, whereby the one vowing imposes a burden on himself. Wherefore what the one vowing regards first, and per se, is to bind himself to offering God, by means of a vow, worship, by carrying out this or that action, which he already supposes to be honorable matter for a vow. But law imposes necessity upon the matter it prescribes, or renders the matter necessary, and leaves it within its own sphere and orbit of virtue, so to speak, and, by means of such honorable matter, aims to render men subject to it virtuous. The limits of temperance are prescribed by nature itself. A law that wills men to be endowed with the virtue of temperance constitutes the necessity of temperance — and this is what the law, per se, regards. But one who dedicates a vow of fasting to God, by his own nature, and per se, does not look to, or intend, adding a necessity to the honorableness of the matter to be made subject to the vow; but, supposing the honorableness of that matter, he takes it up as an instrument by which he may show God worship — and this is what the vow, per se, regards. If it is granted that one who breaks a fast also violates temperance at the same time, it does not follow that he sins mortally against the virtue of temperance, but only venially — just as one bound by a vow not to eat would sin, if he ate. For the rest, I am not displeased by the opinion of Fr. Suárez (Bk. V, ch. 3, n. 12) and Castropalao (punct. 11, n. 9), who teach that someone can transgress a vow of fasting without overstepping the limits of temperance. As for the last point, many authors respond that one is not bound to disclose the matter subject to the vow, but it suffices to disclose the transgression of the vow in grave matter; and Sánchez gives this same law (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 25). We, however, say that confession of the circumstances that aggravate the sin is necessary, as we shall show in its proper place — at least so that the minister may form a prudent judgment of the necessity of the remedy to be applied.

VIII. Question II. Is it of greater merit to undertake some work by a vow, or without a vow? Response: The Angelic Doctor answers affirmatively (II-II, q. 88, art. 6; III Contra Gentiles, ch. 137, and elsewhere). He gives many reasons, of which I will indicate three here. First: an act of a more sublime virtue is more praiseworthy, and more excellent. A work done by virtue of a vow proceeds from the virtue of religion, which is greater than that of the one who performs the same work without a vow — for the greater the virtue, the greater the merit. Second: one who performs a work out of a vow dedicates his own freedom to God, and binds himself to God by a firmer bond. Whence, if other things are equal, one who imposes a vow on himself offers God a greater gift than one who does not impose a vow upon himself, for he who makes a vow dedicates his liberty to God for God's glory. This reasoning is rendered more sensible by this analogy: one who gives a tree, together with its fruits, gives more than one who would give only the fruits. Similarly, one who, by vow, offers his liberty to God, and at the same time consecrates the work to God, offers more to God than one who would give only the fruits — that is, the works — of the tree of liberty. Hence it is that one who performs a work out of a vow fulfills two counsels: one of the work, the other of the vow, which likewise falls under counsel. Third: a work bound by the law of a vow proceeds from a will more firmly established in the good. Therefore that work enjoys a greater goodness — for a firmer good, in celestial happiness, redounds to a greater merit than to your firmness.

IX. If, then, we consider the nature of a vow — namely, that it is exceedingly advisable to dedicate our works to God from a will established in the good — we must necessarily infer that it is very expedient for us to make vows seriously, and to offer God the more excellent gifts. The Angelic Doctor himself raises some difficulties against this.

X. You will object: it is not expedient to swear frequently, since frequent oath-taking is forbidden — for it carries with it the danger of perjury, and profanation of the divine name; but the same danger must be feared in a vow: therefore neither must we make frequent vows, etc. Response: St. Thomas himself assigns the difference (q. 89, art. 4): an oath is taken as a kind of remedy, by which aid is brought to human frailty; nor is an oath, apart from necessity, good in itself — for a mere usurpation of the divine name is lawful only through necessity. On the contrary, a vow is, by its own kind, good, and the better, the more free it is from any necessity. Wherefore we ought not to await some necessity in order to make use of it, but, absolutely, and every necessity aside, it can be offered to God. In taking an oath, we make use of God's name, or majesty and reverence. In vowing, we do not make use of God, but show God worship and reverence. And although in an oath too the worship of God shines forth, nonetheless God is honored only then, when necessity urges; his name is assumed for the confirmation of truth. Without this necessity, then, the divine majesty is not honored, but profaned.

XI. As for what is added concerning the danger of violation, the same Angelic Doctor answers (q. 88, art. 4, ad 1), in his customary divine manner: he distinguishes a twofold danger — one arising from the nature of the deed itself, the other from man's own fault. An example of the first is this: if a bridge is ruinous, its crossing is to be avoided, since danger threatens from such a bridge. An example of the second is this: if a bridge is solid and firm, and a man wishes to cross by its extreme edges — since then the danger arises not from the bridge, but from the man himself. A vow, then, is founded upon a firm resolve of the will to worship God; it also strengthens the will itself in the good. The danger of violation, however, does not arise from the vow, but proceeds from man's own fault. For our discussion here concerns a prudent vow, which a man, relying on divine aid, makes, and which he trusts he will observe, with the help of God's grace. It is not, then, any fortuitous danger that ought to hold us back from a work; otherwise we should never enter a skiff, or a ship, never mount a horse.

XII. Question III. Can there be a smallness of matter in a vow? Response: That the obligation of a vow is, by its own nature, grave, and obliges under mortal sin, has already been said. That its transgression can become light, either through an imperfect deliberation, or through the mind's slip, no one denies. For on this ground any law whatsoever can be lightly violated. The whole question turns on this: whether such a light transgression can occur on account of the smallness of the matter itself — just as theft, from a small taking of another's property, becomes a light offense. The smallness or gravity of matter is not always taken from the matter promised by the vow itself, but chiefly from its circumstances and its end. For matter is often light and grave by reason of its end — as will be said in the book on laws.

XIII. I preface what is common ground. If the matter of the vow is not the whole and entire matter, but only partial — say, you vowed to recite the entire Rosary, and omit one decade — then the transgression is light by reason of the smallness of the matter, which, compared to the whole, is reckoned light in common estimation. Fr. Claude La Croix, however, is not to be heeded, who, too laxly, contends (Bk. III, part 1, n. 148) that omitting the entire Rosary is a light matter — although he afterward asserts that a penitent who omits the entire Rosary imposed by a confessor as a penance would not sin mortally. He assigns a different reason for this in this manner: that the recitation of the Rosary, prescribed by a confessor, is imposed by way of a penalty; and since it is quite burdensome to recite the entire Rosary, the matter is therefore reckoned grave; but a vow, on the other hand, is offered as an act of worship to God, and it is not deemed notably burdensome in the recitation of the Rosary, and therefore it becomes light matter — but as sanctified by a vow, it becomes graver and more sublime — since it is elicited from a more noble virtue. A charming method of reasoning indeed, which occurs everywhere among certain casuists! La Croix cites in his favor Tamburini (Bk. I, on the Decalogue, ch. 1, §3, n. 21). But Tamburini expressly teaches the opposite there. Here are his own words: "You vowed a crown of the Virgin consisting of six decades; you omitted two decades. Compared to the aforesaid crown, since they are the third part, they do not seem a light matter; but, since it damages the intended end only slightly — that is, the worship of the Virgin — if the other four decades are recited, it will be venial to omit only two." La Croix, besides Tamburini, also cites Sporer, Tamburini's disciple. But Sporer, as usual, merely copies Tamburini's teaching, as can be seen (tract. 1, ch. 5, §4, n. 30). Gather from this the necessity of reading authors at their source. The difficulty, then, concerns the entire matter of a vow.

XIV. Question IV. Is it a mortal sin, when the whole of that matter, absolutely light, is omitted, to transgress a vow? Response: Cajetan teaches the affirmative opinion (II-II, q. 89, art. 5, dub. 1), Armilla (s.v. Ius, n. 11), Trovamala (s.v. Votum, q. 10), Toledo (Bk. IV, ch. 17) calls it the safer opinion; Córdoba (q. 188). The reason is that the transgression of a vow is, by its own nature, grave. Wherefore, when it is violated with deliberate mind, by omitting the entire promised matter, the transgression is complete, and consequently mortal. This reason does not press very hard: for there are many precepts of natural and divine law which, by their own nature, oblige under mortal sin; and yet a deliberate and complete transgression, in a light matter — say, the theft of a single small coin — is venial. Another reason is adduced, drawn from the parallel of a promissory oath, whose violation, even in light matter, is grave, and never light. But not even this reason is entirely convincing. First, because the nature of a vow is one thing, and that of an oath another — since an oath consists in the invocation of the divine name for the confirmation of an assertory truth. Now a grave injury is inflicted on God whenever he is invoked to confirm a falsehood. Second, because, concerning oaths, there is a certain and firm principle: that perjury is, in the opinion of all, a grave sin — the Church herself so defining, against the patrons of a milder doctrine. From this principle, validly, as it seems to me, it is argued to establish that a promissory perjury is likewise always mortal, as we shall prove below. But a similarly firm foundation we do not have in the case of a vow. Wherefore the opinion which defends that not every perjury, whether assertory... or promissory, is a mortal sin seems to me more probable, and true; but this is disputed concerning a vow.

XV. The contrary opinion is the more common one, defended by Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1), Navarrus (Summa, ch. 12), Henríquez (Bk. V, ch. 20, n. 4), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 1, dub. 2), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 15, q. 4), John of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 1, concl. 1), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 21, n. 4), Suárez (Bk. V, ch. 4, n. 8), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 8), Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 5, §4, n. 1), Palao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 11, n. 6), Sporer (tract. 3, on the Decalogue, ch. 2, sect. 2, n. 81), La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, n. 448), Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 3, n. 10), Cardinal Diana (Vol. VIII, tract. 4, resol. 10), Ledesma (Vol. II, tract. 10, ch. 3, dub. 1), Antoine (tract. on virtues, ch. 3, q. 4), Wigandt (tract. 10, exam. 8, n. 1), where he upholds that a promissory perjury is grave, and assigns its difference from a vow; Paul of Lyon (tract. 4, diff. 2, art. 2, q. 1), Felix Potestas (Vol. I, part 2, n. 1820), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, n. 122), and many others. The reason for this opinion is obvious. A vow, as has often been said, is a private law, which, in likeness to all other laws, obliges according to the gravity of the matter; other laws, in a light matter, oblige only lightly: the same, then, must be said of a vow. This is confirmed by the parallel of partial matter, whose omission is light — since it inflicts a light irreverence toward God. Therefore, since the whole matter of the vow is light, its omission will likewise be light.

XVI. This second opinion seems to me true, if taken absolutely. I would only add this: that it scarcely has a place in practice. For men, commonly, when they make a vow, offer God something reckoned grave in common estimation, both on account of the end, and on account of the dignity of the vow itself. For who, seriously, prudently, and with deliberate mind, would make a vow to recite a single "Our Father" and "Hail Mary," or to kiss the ground twice, or something similar? Certainly men commonly pledge grave matter to God, worthy of a vow. For if it would be shameful even among men themselves, when established in some dignity, or in some case of poverty, to offer such trifling little gifts, unless necessity urged in some case — how much more should men be ashamed to dedicate to God vows whose matter is so small that its omission, or violation of the vow, could be reckoned light? This can be further confirmed from the common principle of law, which, by its own nature, obliges gravely. For just as no legislator establishes any law entirely in light matter, so too no one vowing, speaking prudently and commonly, makes a vow whose matter is light. Wherefore in practice a case will scarcely occur in which someone omits the observance of some vow without grave fault. For although the matter of a vow may appear light, it will nonetheless, by reason of the end intended by the one vowing, always be grave. For example: you vowed to recite one "Our Father" and "Hail Mary" daily, to soothe some most grave temptation, since you have found this recitation an efficacious means, so that you may not succumb to temptation. I would not then dare to exempt you from grave fault, even for a single day's omission — since such matter, by this circumstance of end, becomes grave. Something similar holds in nearly all vows whose matter, considered absolutely, appears light. For everyone who prudently makes a vow does so moved by some grave consideration; and consequently the thing promised, considered in itself, will at least be grave in its end. Granting, however, the hypothesis that the matter of a vow were light in every respect, then I would grant that the transgression of the vow would likewise be light. But I maintain that this scarcely ever occurs in practice — a point I repeat so that the minister of penance may be cautious, provident, and carefully weigh not only the lightness of the matter, but chiefly the gravity of the end.

XVII. Question V. Can the one vowing bind himself gravely in light matter, or lightly in grave matter? Response: As to the first part, when the matter is light on every side, the common, and most common, opinion asserts that the one vowing cannot do this, even if he wished — since a vower cannot bind his subjects... [Concina now considers the two sub-questions]. Regarding the first part, this opinion is quite common: Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1), Pedro Ledesma (Vol. II, tract. 10, ch. 3, dub. 1), Sánchez (Bk. I, on Marriage, disp. 9, n. 6), Diana (Vol. VIII, resol. 11), Vázquez (Vol. II, disp. 163, ch. 4, n. 34), Raphael de la Torre (q. 88, art. 4, disp. 6, n. 8), Prado (ch. 31, q. 4, §3, n. 36), John of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, disp. 29, art. 8), Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 3, n. 12), Leander (tract. 2, disp. 3, q. 9), and others commonly.

XVIII. As to the second part of the question, authors are sharply divided, and go to two extreme opinions. The first teaches that, in matter grave by its own nature, the one vowing cannot bind himself lightly. For, although anyone can vow, or not vow, once he wills to make a vow, the limitation of the obligation no longer remains in his power. Obligation follows the nature of a vow as its own property. One who wills a vow, then, must will that obligation which is proper to a vow. But the obligation proper to a vow in grave matter is grave. One who wills a vow in grave matter, then, must bind himself gravely. This is confirmed. One who wills a vow wills, by that same will, the obligation which follows the vow. Therefore one who wills a vow in grave matter wills a grave obligation. It is proved, further, by the parallel of an oath. It is indeed within a man's power to swear, or not to swear. But, given that he wills to swear, it is not in the swearer's power to bind himself to confirming the truth by means of an oath only under venial fault; rather, he is bound to adapt his intention and will to the nature of an oath. The same, then, must be said of a vow. Finally, if it were in the mind of the one vowing to limit the obligation of a vow, one professing religious life could bind himself under venial only, one being ordained to holy orders could bind himself under light fault only, one contracting marriage could impose upon himself a light obligation of rendering the debt — all of which are false. This opinion is taught by Sotus (On Justice, Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, at the end of the body of the article), Corduba (q. 188, punct. 1), Raphael de la Torre (on II-II, q. 88, art. 5, disp. 6, n. 4), Montesinos (on I-II, on laws, disp. 23, q. 9, n. 159), Pontius (Bk. XII, on betrothal, ch. 11, n. 12), Martínez de Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, q. 4, §2, n. 8), Vázquez (I-II, disp. 158), Wigandt (tract. 10, exam. 3, n. 32, resol. 4).

XIX. The second opinion maintains that the one vowing can, at his own choice, bind himself under light fault in grave matter. They prove it, first, by the authority of St. Thomas, who says (II-II, q. 88, art. 10): He who vows establishes a law for himself. But a law, however much it commands something in grave matter, can by the intention of the legislator oblige only lightly. The same, therefore, must be said of a vow also. This is further confirmed from the same St. Thomas. For in the place cited (II-II, q. 88, art. 3, ad 3) he says: The obligation of a vow is caused by one's own will and intention. Whence it is said, Deuteronomy 23, etc. . . . And therefore, if it is in the intention and will of the one vowing to bind himself to pay at once, he is bound to pay at once. Therefore the gravity of the obligation must be measured from the intention of the one vowing. Lastly, they argue thus. Either it is possible to vow in such matter binding oneself only under venial fault, or it is not. If the first: then, when the one vowing expressly wills to bind himself under venial fault, the obligation will in fact be under venial fault. If the second: it will not be a true vow, and so the one vowing will remain in no way bound. This opinion is defended by Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 4, n. 5), Molina (On Justice, disp. 262, nn. 8 and 12), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 11, n. 4), Filliucci (tract. 26, ch. 3, n. 80), Diana (Part III, tract. 6, resol. 91), Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 5, §2, n. 7), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 12), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 1, nn. 27 and 30), Bassaeus (s.v. Votum, 3, n. 4), Leander (tract. 2, disp. 3, q. 8), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 1, punct. 4), and not a few others.

XX. The first opinion is more probable; for its arguments are valid; the reasonings of the second opinion, however, are weak, and suffer from sophistry. They are reduced, indeed, to two heads, or rather to one — namely, to human will, which can vow, or not vow. A distinction must be drawn here, as the authors of the first opinion draw it. Man can vow, and man can not vow. But, once the position is granted that he really does vow, it is by no means in his power to diminish the quantity of the obligation, and to restrict it at will. Man can approach fire, or not approach it. But, given the approach, warming necessarily follows. Nor is it valid to object that fire, by its nature, heats even against one's will, whereas a vow does not oblige except from the consent of the will; for all theologians grant that the whole obligation of a vow depends on the freedom of the one vowing. St. Thomas says that it depends solely on the will, and on the intention of the one vowing, who can either not vow, or vow for a future time, and not the present. But, given that he has bound himself for the present time, the Angelic Doctor says this, and no more: that the one vowing can defer its fulfillment to a future time. This, and nothing else, does the Angelic Doctor state. By no means, however, does he say that it is possible to pervert the nature of the obligation. For this reason, authors of the first opinion commonly deny that a legislator can, in grave matter, lightly impose or not impose a law — although some, such as Wigandt, Gonet, and others, grant this concerning a legislator, they deny it concerning one vowing, and assign the difference: for a vow directly concerns God, as a superior, who acquires a new right over the one vowing according to the nature of the promise. Wherefore, without God's will, the obligation cannot be relaxed; but law regards the subject, whom the legislator can bind more strictly, or more mildly, at will. Moreover, the obligation of a vow is immediately of divine right; the obligation of human law, however, pertains to divine right only remotely.

XXI. So that every fallacy may be removed, it must be observed that theologians, when they assert that a vow is a private law, do not assert this in the sense that a man, privately, institutes the law of a vow; but because man, vowing, freely undertakes such a law. The law of a vow is instituted in Scripture itself. But God only counsels this law to the faithful; he does not oblige them to it. If, however, a man once wishes to embrace this counsel of vowing, he cannot, in any way, pervert the nature of that divine law by vowing. For the nature of the obligation, in grave matter, is instituted in such a way that, just as all other divine laws are necessarily to be observed, as man is subject to them, so too, once this law of a vow is freely assumed, its nature cannot be altered. It is one thing to establish a new law; it is another to freely impose upon oneself the observance of a law already made. Even granting that a legislator establishing a new law could, at will, moderate the gravity of the obligation, it does not follow from this that the same can be accomplished even by one who merely imposes upon himself the observance of a law already made. In a vow, then, distinguish a twofold obligation: one of the human deed, the other of divine right. The first depends on the will of a man; not so the other. The obligation of the human deed presupposes the will to freely embrace a vow. But, this position granted, the obligation of divine right, which necessarily follows the nature of a vow, in no way depends on the human will — which, though it can refuse the vow, cannot diminish the necessary property of the vow, and adapt it at its own discretion — which could be confirmed by very many examples.

XXII. This is confirmed. The one vowing cannot bind himself gravely in light matter, as all authors of the second opinion admit. Why? Because, they say, the one vowing cannot alter the natures of things — since the promise of the one vowing must be rational: for God rejects, and abhors, a foolish promise. But it would be irrational, and unjust, if, in matter which is by its own nature light, one imposed a grave obligation. The increase of the obligation, then, does not depend on the will of the one vowing: will its diminution depend on it? Why can he not increase the obligation in light matter, but can diminish it in grave matter? What discernible reason, I ask, is there for this? Words can be given in reply, but no solution. For, they say, the one vowing is bound to conform himself to the natures of things, and to adapt his will to them — by the very same reasoning, and with even greater right, he will be bound to do this in grave matter as well.

XXIII. The dilemma which the theologians of Salamanca raise is of no weight at all. For we say it is not possible for a man to make a vow under light fault in grave matter. If this is so, they say, it will not be a true vow, and thus the one vowing will remain in no way obliged. But if this is so, the case falls already: since we ourselves say that a vow cannot be found in grave matter with a light obligation. This is precisely the state of the disputation. If, then, they themselves grant that one vowing in grave matter with the intention of binding himself only lightly does not make a true vow, this is what we ourselves say — namely, that no true vow can be found in such a case. But we say that a man who, with deliberate mind, truly intends, and really vows, elicits a most true vow — one that really produces a vow, even in light matter. For the first will is efficacious. This efficaciousness produces its effect, is manifested, and is discerned. The later will [to limit the obligation] is a mere ineffective velleity, which cannot prevent the necessary properties consequent upon a vow. For one who cannot prevent the existence of that thing which necessarily follows, cannot prevent that which follows from its nature. One who truly vows, then, elicits a most true vow, although he may have the intention of not binding himself except under venial fault.

XXIV. As for the response they give, drawn from the parallel of oaths, and of other contracts, in order to elicit this obligation with only a venial obligation, it does not seem to me sufficiently solid. They say that everyone is free to receive holy orders, or to contract marriage; but, given the will to marry a wife, or to be ordained, a man is no longer free, so as to limit the obligation at his own discretion. For, they say, for a man being ordained to holy orders, or professing religious life, ecclesiastical law is present; other contracts, such as betrothal, marriage, etc., are onerous on both sides — and, lest what is certain among all be denied, this ecclesiastical law absolutely prescribes to all being ordained the making of a vow. For, by this very fact that it prescribes a vow, the one vowing remains bound to make the vow with all its consequent conditions and properties. Likewise, by this very fact that a private individual freely undertakes, and imposes on himself, the law of the vow, he accepts the vow, along with the notions that follow from it, and cannot thereafter be free to limit it. Wrongly is it objected, to disprove the one vowing's inability to limit the obligation, that God, who obliges the one vowing, is not thereafter free to restrict his own law — for a vow is offered to him, and he cannot limit the natural obligation of the vow. What is opposed regarding the parallel of an oath is likewise of no weight. For an oath cannot limit the obligation of the vow which is dedicated to God by an oath, as we have granted, and indicated above; likewise, just as a man swearing cannot limit the obligation proper to an oath, so too, in grave matter, a man vowing cannot limit either the nature or the notions consequent on both.

XXV. Question VI. Does the transgression of a vow to avoid some venial sin oblige under mortal? Response: Although, granting the absolute position of a vow in light matter — such as, for example, reciting one "Our Father" — its transgression would be a venial sin, since prudent men make such vows; nonetheless, since it scarcely ever happens that someone would elicit such a vow, unless for some grave end, it therefore holds that, if someone made a vow to avoid some venial sin, matter altogether light — an officious or jesting lie, or something similar — he would, without doubt, elicit it for some grave end. And therefore I answer that the aforesaid vow would oblige under mortal — which the theologians of Salamanca themselves admit (loc. cit., n. 155), when the one vowing would be hindered from greater perfection by a venial sin subject to the vow — although they say, with Trullench and Sánchez, and others, that such a vow, absolutely considered, obliges under venial fault, if it concerns avoiding venial fault; but under mortal, if it concerns fleeing mortal fault — since perhaps they will say that cases are to be resolved according to the natures of things absolutely considered. We, however, assert the contrary: that cases are to be resolved practically according to circumstances, and according to what commonly occurs in practice. And because there is scarcely anyone who binds himself by a vow to avoid a venial sin, except on account of some grave circumstance — otherwise the vow would be imprudent — therefore, responding according to what commonly occurs, we say that the aforesaid vow obliges under mortal. See what has been said above, n. 12, q. 1.

XXVI. Question VII. Does one who violates several vows in light matter on the same day sin mortally? Response: From what we have already said, the affirmative answer is clear. But, disagreeing even from our own particular opinion, I say that this person sins mortally absolutely — and this is taught by Sánchez (Bk. I, Summa, ch. 14, n. 16), Diana (Vol. VI, tract. 14, resol. 22), Bonacina (disp. 3, q. 6, punct. 6, n. 6), Domenico Viva (q. 8, art. 2, n. 29), and several others. Since the obligation of vows of the same character is the same, although the vows are numerically distinct. Moreover, although each vow individually may pledge to God something light, all these vows taken together nonetheless constitute a grave matter, as we suppose. Therefore, since all these belong, as they pertain, to the same virtue of religion, they gravely violate that same virtue of religion. By this reasoning, one who pledged a grave sum of money to a man in several promises would sin mortally if he retained for himself a small quantity, or if, on several occasions, he refused to render small services — since all these promises, though numerically diverse, pertain to the same virtue of justice.

XXVII. Diana (loc. cit.) considers the contrary opinion probable — since, when several vows are made, each vow constitutes a certain unit, which is not united with the other vows; nor do all agree in anything such that they could form a single whole, and consequently constitute a single fault. The vows are, then, disparate: and the defrauding of the several acts of homage which the one vowing pledges to God will likewise be disparate faults; for the worship resulting from those various promises does not accrue to a single God. It is answered that such arguments are vain, since, according to the common estimation of prudent men, it is a grave matter to defraud God, in whom all these promises converge, of the grave worship shown by fulfilling the promise. That transgression, then, of many vows, really robs God of a grave portion of worship, of the kind promised him in the vows. It will, therefore, be a grave fault.

XXVIII. Fr. La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, n. 411) and Fr. Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 3) say that our opinion is not universally true; otherwise a beneficed cleric would sin mortally who daily omitted some light matter in the Mass, some small part of the Hours, and some small part of other prayers due by obligation — all of which small omissions, they say, would constitute a single grave matter, which certainly no one would maintain. They confirm this with another absurdity: if several light matters, from the fact that they are united in the same virtue of religion, constituted a single grave matter, then, by the same reasoning, several grave matters, subject to the same virtue, would constitute only a single, graver fault; and thus a beneficed cleric omitting the Mass and the Hours would commit only a single, graver fault. La Croix adds that Oviedo does not acquiesce in this opinion. But Oviedo draws a distinction here. If the vows were made from different motives — say, one in honor of the Passion of Christ, another in honor of the Blessed Virgin, a third for the deceased — even though the matters were of the same character (say, all were prayers), he teaches that the matters are by no means united, but that only several venial sins are committed, if all these aforesaid obligations are omitted on the same day — since the distinction of the ends of the vows implies a distinction of the vows themselves. On the contrary, however, if the vows were made for the same end, even if the matters were of a different character — for example, if someone in imminent shipwreck vowed a daily recitation of the Rosary, and then also vowed to give a certain sum of alms — then, he says, these matters are united, and one omitting to fulfill all such vows sins mortally. It is otherwise, he adds, if someone, for the same day, vowed to hear Mass, to say the Rosary, to give alms — though he vowed all these out of an affection for divine worship — he does not therefore say that those matters are united, nor that a single grave matter is constituted from light parts omitted — since that general and mediate motive of religion is not apt for uniting such obligations. La Croix regards this opinion of Oviedo's as more probable. Fr. Fernando de Castropalao, according to the same La Croix's report, also judges this opinion, as described, to be true — that even if all these matters, separately light, were promised by a single act, or vow, that act would nonetheless be virtually multiple, because of the diversity of the nature of the matters. By "matters of a different character," he understands those promised by vow which, though pertaining to the same virtue of religion, are nonetheless prescribed by different laws — such as the Masses, and the canonical hours.

XXIX. The arbitrary speculations, and often useless ones, of certain recent casuists compel us to indulge overly in prolixity, lest their promises should sometimes go unrefuted by us. Let us begin from Fr. Castropalao's last opinion, which we reject as excessively lax. When someone promises several matters of a different character in one vow, will he not sin mortally, because the virtue of that vow is multiple? If this opinion held, how many vows, how many stratagems of casuists would not be evaded! You vow to give two julios to a poor person, to recite ten "Hail, Holy Queen" prayers barefoot, and with arms outstretched and knees bent before the most august Sacrament, to invoke the most holy name of Jesus several times, to keep silence for a quarter of an hour, to read a spiritual passage, to visit the sick, and to comfort them, to visit the Chapel of the Blessed Virgin, to recite "Speak, my tongue," for two hours, and to scourge your flesh through the entire "Miserere" — all these things you pledge to God by a single vow. You omit them all without committing a grave crime, because that vow is multiplied according to the multiplication of the things promised? Whoever among Christians could conceive of such a fruitful multiplication of a virtually single act? No one, certainly, except new Moralists, too much accustomed to speculations contrary to the common sense of piety. Wherefore we reject this opinion of Castropalao's as contrary to common sense. For when the one vowing pledges to God all the aforesaid matters together in a single act, he offers to the divine majesty a single gift, though distinguished by various little offerings, and formed into one. Therefore, when he transgresses such a promise, he gravely offends God — which I could confirm with many examples, were the truth not self-evident.

XXX. As for Oviedo's opinion, we say, first, that if someone vowed, on the same day, to hear Mass, to say the Rosary, etc. (to use La Croix's own words), he would be promising things which, taken separately, would constitute grave matter: for what matter, taken in its own abstraction, is grave with respect to a precept, is likewise grave with respect to a vow. Now hearing Mass, with respect to a precept, is a grave matter: therefore likewise with respect to a vow. Absolutely, however, we say that, although the aforesaid distinction may present a diversity of its own kind, nonetheless, in practice, according to the common sense of piety and prudence, and of sincerity, and good faith, laws must be observed such that one who promises to render several offices, due on the same day, chiefly to the same Lord, incurs a grave injury — which, though separable, nonetheless, taken together, constitute a grave matter. And indeed, if a vow, as has often been said, is to be weighed above all from the intention of the one vowing, the one vowing considers nothing less, when he makes the vow, than such subtle speculations. It should be added that, as has been said above, no one, in practice, seriously and with deliberate mind, vows anything light, except for some grave cause — which holds true, with even greater right, when someone makes several vows at once, or by one vow pledges several small gifts to God. Fr. Claude La Croix's argument, however, is altogether beside the point. For we are not now inquiring whether, if the one vowing omits a small partial matter of one entire vow, and then another small quantity of another vow, he sins mortally — since it is certain among all that such omissions are only venial sins, which, however multiplied, do not constitute a single mortal sin. But the question is whether the transgression of several vows, each of which has its own entire and whole matter light, is to be reckoned mortal for the principal transgression of each entire vow. Now the transgression of the whole of some entire vow's matter presents a different species than the observance of the vow with respect to a merely light part omitted. It would scarcely occur to anyone to ask whether such light transgressions constitute a mortal sin, when it is established that the sins are only venial. But the total transgression of several vows, by its own nature, presents something grave. And, lest we waste more time on a question of little importance, even La Croix himself grants that Oviedo's opinion is more probable — which, however, does not differ from our own, except by an arbitrary distinction which occurs to no one who actually makes vows.

XXXI. Question VIII. Does one who vowed to recite one "Our Father" and "Hail Mary" daily for several years sin mortally if, over several years, he daily omits this prayer? Response: The affirmative opinion, taken absolutely, is defended by Zúñiga (II-II, q. 88, art. 1, dub. penult.), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. II, ch. ult., n. 21), Valentia (Vol. III, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 4), Malder (II-II, tract. 2, ch. 5, dub. 4, q. 1), Tannerus (in II-II, disp. 5, dub. 3, n. 2). The contrary opinion is defended by Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 3), John de la Cruz (in Directorium, part 2, prec. 2, art. 4, dub. 4, concl. 1), Villalobos (Vol. II, tract. 34, difficulty 3, n. 3). They add, however, that this opinion does not comprehend a vow to give a small alms daily: for, if you repeatedly omitted small alms, as soon as these small alms would constitute a grave matter, you would sin mortally. Many others — namely, Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 5, q. 3), Vázquez (I-II, disp. 158, ch. 5), Sánchez (Bk. I, ch. 9, n. 14) — subscribe to this. To these La Croix (n. 450), the theologians of Salamanca (n. 115), Trullench (ch. 4, n. 17), Marín (n. 116), Diana (resol. 14) draw a distinction, saying: If the vow is fixed to the day, and is elicited in honor of each particular day, then a venial sin is committed by transgressing the vow on each individual day — and these venial sins, repeated on individual days, whether over one year or several, do not constitute a single mortal sin. For the obligation passes with the day to which the vow was attached. On the contrary, if the vow is not fixed to particular days, but a time-limit is merely appended as the term of the obligation, then those light matters — namely, the recitations of prayers — are united together, and, after several transgressions, constitute a single grave matter, and a mortal fault is committed.

XXXII. The difficulty, says Diana, is in recognizing when a vow really is fixed to the day, or not. And first, from Castropalao, he answers that if some particular motive shines forth in the individual days — as in reciting the Rosary daily in honor of the Blessed Virgin's calculation [i.e., number of beads] — then the vow is fixed to the day, and the obligation is not extended to the following day, or does not pass over; and this happens almost always in personal vows, as others cited by the same Diana say, to whom La Croix, Marín, Viva, and others subscribe. On the contrary, however, if the vow is real — such as giving a small coin in alms each day — then the vow is not fixed to the day, but the obligation passes to the following day; and, after so many omissions, a mortal fault is committed. Castropalao adds, however, that even in real actions of giving alms, a vow can sometimes be fixed to the day, when some particular reason shines forth in individual days.

This distinction is absolutely true, and sometimes occurs in practice. For in the case of a Cleric bound to recite the canonical hours daily, when the day has passed, the obligation likewise passes. But that Castropalao says this of real actions of giving alms, I do not consider true. Indeed, nearly all authors, when the vow concerns something to be rendered — such as alms, or any other gift, except prayer — say that the obligation is extended into future time, and consequently that one who transgresses up to a grave matter sins mortally. For the rest, how the aforesaid distinction can be applied to a vow to recite one "Our Father" and "Hail Mary" daily, I do not see. For by this very fact that you promised a daily recitation of one "Our Father" and "Hail Mary" for a year, it is already clear that the vow is fixed to each individual day. That the transgression of such a vow, over an entire year, should be only venial, seems to us an opinion too lax in practice — both because it is scarcely found... that someone truly vows, seriously and with deliberate mind, without at least some grave end; and also because, although the multiplication of venial sins never reaches the point of mortal fault, nonetheless the continued and deliberate transgression of a vow, on each occasion, presents a special malice — sacrilegious, and a stubborn unfaithfulness. Wherefore this deliberate will alone, to violate a vow throughout an entire year, comprehending as it does all those prayers, is gravely criminal — just as, even by our adversaries' own reckoning, the omission over a year of a single small coin, which someone had vowed to distribute daily to the poor, would be gravely culpable. And indeed, however the matter may stand in abstract and metaphysical consideration, a case will never occur, in reality and in practice, where someone violates, with deliberate mind, a true vow seriously made, throughout an entire year, without mortal fault.

I. It is certain among all that personal vows must be fulfilled by the one vowing alone, and that they bind him alone. Nor should even real vows be fulfilled by others, except those who would succeed to the goods of the one vowing. The reason is evident: personal vows affect the person himself; and they are therefore called "personal," because they must be fulfilled by that very person — such are fasts, bodily mortifications, pilgrimages, and the like.

II. Question I. Do the vows of parents bind their children; and are vows made through a proxy binding? Response: The vows of parents in no way bind their children — since vows must be free, and must proceed from the will of the one vowing himself. The vows of parents are sometimes said to bind their children, insofar, that is, as the children consent to those same vows, and ratify them: in which sense the texts are to be understood and interpreted which speak of a son bound to a monastery by his parents' devotion, as recounted, for instance, in the chapter on this topic — for Pope Celestine III declared, in a certain decree, that this holds when it is duly approved and confirmed by the son. The son's mere silence, and taciturnity, is by no means sufficient for this consent truly to be held; besides mere negative consent, the son's express ratification and confirmation of the vow is required. The vows of parents are nonetheless not useless, since they aim at this: that they may do their part to bring it about that their children embrace and accept the vow. Vows made through a proxy hold, and bind the principal, or the one commissioning them, just as if made by himself — since one who acts through another acts, in effect, himself. And on this there is no disagreement among authors.

III. Question II. Can, or must, the one vowing fulfill his personal vow through another, when he cannot fulfill it himself? Response: The most common opinion teaches that the one vowing who cannot fulfill his personal vow himself is neither bound, nor indeed able, to carry it out through another. That he is not bound is clear: for a personal vow concerns the one vowing's own action; such a vow, therefore, does not bind to the act of another. That he likewise cannot do so is also established: for, if the one vowing can fulfill the vow himself, he cannot fulfill it through another; but if he cannot fulfill it himself, neither can he through another — since then he would not be doing what he promised; and, once rendered incapable of personal execution, every obligation ceases. So teach Paludanus (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 3, art. 3), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 2), Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 10, n. 2), Sánchez (Bk. II, ch. 15, n. 3), Navarrus (ch. 12, n. 44), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 4, §3), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 14), and others commonly.

IV. Question III. Is one who, through his own fault, has become incapable of observing a personal vow, bound to fulfill it through another? Response: Although a personal vow cannot, strictly speaking, be fulfilled through another, as has been said, nonetheless St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §5) says: "If, however, he made a vow of devotion to go, an impediment supervening, he is not bound to go, or to send another, unless perhaps he was in default; and this happens when, being able, he was unwilling." This same opinion is held by Angles (s.v. Votum, 3, n. 7), Richard (Bk. IV, dist. 38, art. 4, q. 1, ad 1), the Carthusian (in Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 2, §4). It is asked; and it seems to be gathered from Scripture — for in Deuteronomy 23 we read: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin." It also seems to be inferred from St. Thomas's teaching (II-II, q. 88, art. 3, ad 3), where he establishes that one who has become incapable through his own fault must do penance for the past sin, and have a prompt will to do what he can. And indeed it is safer, since one's own fault preceded, to apply some compensation.

V. The contrary opinion is more common, defended by Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 17), where he cites several authors — Navarrus, Valentia, Sylvester; he also cites St. Thomas, who, though he does not expressly teach the former opinion, does not defend the contrary either, but merely lays down principles that are opposed to it. Rather, reason seems to press harder here. For personal vows so affect the person of the one vowing that, incapacity supervening, the vow yields. From the fact, however, that this incapacity arises from the fault of the one vowing, only this follows: that the one vowing is then bound to repent of the past sin, as the Angelic Doctor says; but it in no way follows that the one vowing owes it to fulfill it through another. Reason does indeed seem to persuade this. Nonetheless, in order that a more sincere penance for the sin committed may appear, and so that the one vowing may in some way compensate for his unfaithfulness toward God, he ought, in so weighty a matter, to choose the safer part.

VI. What if the one vowing, before he made the personal vow, was certain that he would never be able to fulfill it? Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 2, q. 10), Angles (s.v. Votum, 3, n. 7), Navarrus (ch. 12, n. 26), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. VI, ch. 7, dub. 5), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 3, q. 5), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 13, where he cites the Abbot, ch. Licet, on vows) teach that, in this case, he is bound to fulfill it through another. Since a vow concerning matter impossible for the one vowing himself is null, as we have said. When, then, the one vowing had this impossibility already known to him, it must be prudently presumed that he made his vow to be fulfilled through another — otherwise we would pronounce him a fool. The opposite is taught by Suárez, Trullench, Azor, Bonacina, Prado, Raphael de la Torre, Leander, and others. But the first opinion seems more probable.

VII. Question IV. Can real vows be fulfilled by another, even without the knowledge, or unwillingly, of the one vowing? Response: This little question contains three parts. First, that a real vow can be fulfilled by another, the most common opinion teaches — since the execution of a real vow lies in the obligation, or exhibition, of a thing promised — say, a chalice, a vestment, furniture, or any other thing. This, however, can be performed equally by another as by the one vowing. The second part, too — namely, that this real vow can be fulfilled by another, in the name of the one vowing, without that person's knowledge — is commonly maintained: since then the thing promised is really exhibited in the name of the one vowing; and nothing else is lacking except the consent of the one vowing, which is present through subsequent ratification. If, however, the one vowing were not merely ignorant, but also unwilling, then the more common opinion holds that the vow can in no way be fulfilled by another — and rightly: since, to satisfy either a vow or a precept, an intention of satisfying is required; but where there is coercion, there is no free resolve. Bonacina, however (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 4, §3), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 14, n. 1), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 25, q. 13) add that the vow, once fulfilled, though the one vowing was unwilling, holds valid, if the one vowing afterward ratifies the execution of the vow.

This opinion, however, does not convince me at all. For if, while the vow is being fulfilled, the one vowing resists, then certainly the execution of the vow is invalid on account of the resistance of the one vowing, or on account of the lack of a positive will, which the adversaries themselves necessarily require. But what is once invalid does not become valid through subsequent acts. The consent of the one vowing, then — whether real, or presumed — is necessary while the vow is being fulfilled. In the case supposed, not only is there no consent, but there is dissent: the vow, then, is not fulfilled. For a future, or subsequent, consent presupposes no execution of the vow at all; therefore it cannot render it valid. All this is quite true, if the force of the argument is considered. If, however, the thing promised has really been offered, and the one vowing detests his past omission and resistance, and shows a consent so efficacious that, had the thing promised not been offered, he would really offer it — then I would not compel him to a new offering, but only to penance for his past omission.

I. It is a truth of faith that a vow produces an obligation, and indeed a grave one, by which the one vowing is bound to execute what he pledges to God, as is had in Deuteronomy 23: When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it. This obligation pertains to the virtue of religion and of fidelity. An action done from a vow is of greater merit than one done without a vow, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 88, art. 6.

II. Question I. Is there parvity of matter in a vow? Answer. The obligation of a vow is by its nature grave; its violation can become light from imperfect deliberation, from an unwitting slip of mind. The difficulty is whether it can be light on the part of the matter. If the matter of the vow is divisible — as if you vowed to recite the whole Rosary and omit one decade — the omission is light from parvity of matter. If the whole matter of the vow is small — such as a vow of reciting one Our Father — then Cajetan, with others, teaches that the omission is mortal; but the opposite opinion is more probable. This little question, as regards practice, is inept. For men commonly make their vows concerning a grave matter, both on account of the end and on account of the dignity of the vow itself. The Theologians dispute whether the one vowing can bind himself gravely in a light matter, and lightly in a grave matter. To the first part of the question I say that when the matter is on every side light, one cannot bind himself gravely under mortal sin. On the contrary, when the matter is by its own nature grave, one cannot bind himself only lightly. For he who wills a vow wills, by that very fact, what necessarily follows from a vow. But a grave obligation follows from a vow in grave matter. Now it is not in the power of the one vowing to pervert the natures of things. St. Thomas is ineptly alleged for the contrary opinion. Men can freely make vows or not make them, says St. Thomas; but, this being posited, that they make vows, they must conform themselves to the nature and law of vows. Nor is the question of such moment that it needs greater discussion. Read Tome 3, book 4, dissertation 2, chapter 1, number 20.

III. Question II. Does he who violates several vows in a light matter on the same day sin gravely? Answer. The more common and more probable opinion affirms it. For although vows differ in number, they nevertheless pertain to the same virtue, and are of the same nature. When, therefore, from several light matters subject to a vow a grave matter is made, then a grave injury is inflicted upon God. Would not he who pledged to a man a grave sum of money in several promises sin deadly if he retained for himself a notable sum of the promised money? They also dispute whether one who has vowed to recite one Our Father and Hail Mary daily for several years sins mortally if he omits it for several days: and commonly they affirm it — although some distinguish concerning a vow that affects the day, and one that does not; but these disputes have been devised by the disputants themselves to exercise the keenness of their wit. Wherefore, these petty distinctions set aside, I say that the deliberate violation of a vow through an entire year is mortal.

IV. Question III. Must children fulfill the vows of their parents? Answer. Personal vows must be fulfilled by the one who made them, because they affect that very person. These vows of parents in no way bind children. For vows must be free. The vows of parents sometimes bind children, insofar as the children consent to those same vows. Hence it follows that the one vowing, who cannot fulfill the vow, is not bound to have it fulfilled through another. Real vows can be fulfilled by others, even without the knowledge, but not against the will, of the one vowing. If the one vowing has become unable to pay a real vow, he comes off free, as is plain in other debts. When a vow is mixed — namely, partly personal and partly real — if the one vowing has become unable to fulfill the personal vow, he must fulfill the real vow through another.

V. Question IV. Are heirs bound to fulfill the vows of the testator? Answer. To personal vows they are not bound. But heirs are bound to pay real vows, even if the testator expressly said that he did not wish to bind his heirs to pay such vows. For once the inheritance has been burdened with a just debt, it is no longer in the power of the testator to free it. But heirs are not bound to pay these real vows beyond the resources of the inheritance, nor before the inheritance has been entered upon, since they can repudiate it. Nor is an heir bound, to the detriment of his own Legitim, to fulfill the vows of a testator who could not burden the Legitim. Heirs can fulfill the real vows of the testator through others, just as the testator himself could have done. A Monastery too, succeeding by hereditary right to the goods of a professed Religious, is bound to fulfill the real vows which he made before his profession, because the inheritance passes to the Monastery with this burden. When the inheritance is burdened with several debts, first debts of justice must be paid, and afterwards legacies and vows. If there are several vows, those of greater moment must be paid first. If there are several heirs, each is bound to pay his own part. If, however, the thing owed to God is in the hands of one heir, the other heirs are bound to make compensation...

A donee is bound to fulfill real vows which affect the thing donated, if the donor has become unable, whatever several say to the contrary: because a debt always follows the thing to which it is attached. A legatee, according to all, is bound to pay the real vows of the one leaving the legacy.

VI. Question V. At what time must vows be fulfilled? Answer. When a determinate time is set for execution, then it must be fulfilled at that time. When the time is indeterminate, then the one vowing must fulfill it as soon as he conveniently can, as is said in Deuteronomy 23 — unless a reasonable cause of deferring is present, so that the vow may be better fulfilled. If you foresee that you will be impeded in the future from fulfilling a vow attached to no particular day, you are bound to anticipate the execution of the vow. A vow not fulfilled at the designated time must be fulfilled after that time has elapsed. You vowed to repay Peter a hundred, which you owe within a month; the time having elapsed, you are bound to fulfill it. If, however, you vowed to fast on the vigil of such a feast, the feast having passed, the vow is extinguished. But those who vowed to fast on each Friday of this month — it is more probable to me that, the month having elapsed, they are bound to fast on each Friday of the following month: since all the Fridays of the whole year are of the same nature. He who vowed to fast on the vigil of St. Francis is not bound to anticipate it, even if he foresees that on that day he will not be able to keep the fast: because the vow is attached to a determinate day.

VII. Question VI. What must be said of a doubtful vow? Answer. You can doubt: 1. whether you made a vow; 2. whether you fulfilled it once made; 3. concerning the quantity of the thing promised. The discourse is not of a light suspicion, or vain scruples, but of a grave doubt, arisen from probable opposing reasons, which keep the intellect in suspense. The Probabilists, relying on that principle, "The condition of the possessor is the better," absolve this one vowing, when doubtful, from the obligation of the vow. This opinion is no less false than the Probabilism on which it rests. Wherefore the Antiprobabilists defend the opposite. St. Thomas, on the fourth book, distinction 38, question 1, ad 8 [recte], has this: But if he doubts how he conducted himself in vowing, he ought to choose the safer way, lest he commit himself to danger. The same St. Antoninus and the sacred canons teach. See Tome 3 on the Decalogue, book 4, dissertation 2, chapter 4.

VIII. If you are certain of the vow, and doubt whether the execution has been fulfilled, according to all you are bound to fulfill the vow. If you doubt the quantity of the thing promised, you must choose the safer part, as the sacred canons prescribe. You doubt whether you vowed a hundred, or fifty; you are bound to pay a hundred. He who vowed to give a chalice to the Church, but doubts whether a golden or a silver one should be given, ought to offer a golden or silver one according to the custom known to him of the Church to which he promised, bronze or copper being excluded. He who vowed that he would not approach a woman, but doubts whether the approach was fornicatory or conjugal, should abstain from either approach. He who doubts whether he made the vow before the age of seven, or the use of reason, is bound to the vow, as the common opinion teaches: since it is established that a vow was made, and it is only doubted at what time it was made. Scarcely anyone vows before the use of reason: therefore it must be presumed that, the use of reason having been completed, the vow was made. One certain of having made a vow, but doubting whether he had the intent of binding himself, is bound to fulfill the vow: because, the deed being proved, all things that naturally accompany such a deed are presumed. Similarly, he who made a vow extorted by fear must be presumed, in a doubtful case, to have had the intention of binding himself: because to presume simulation in one vowing or swearing is to presume a crime; but no one is to be presumed guilty of a crime. If the one vowing doubts, in the aforesaid event, whether he used amphibology of words, or mental restriction, some say the vow does not bind; but this opinion is false for the reason given, and because in doubt the safer part must be chosen. He who, provoked by anger, makes a vow, but afterwards doubts whether he had the necessary use of reason, is bound absolutely to fulfill the vow: because anger rarely so disturbs reason as to take away the liberty sufficient for sinning, and so for vowing. Wherefore if the doubt cannot be laid to rest, the rule must be kept: In doubts the safer part is to be chosen.

IX. Question VII. He who vowed to abstain from wine — is he bound to abstain from beer, and other liquors distilled from wine? Answer. He who vowed to abstain from wine to avoid drunkenness must abstain from all liquors that produce drunkenness. Wherefore Fr. La-Croix is mistaken, who, book 3, part 1, number 459, with his Gobat, teaches that the one vowing, although he intended in his vow to avoid drunkenness, can take any other drinks apt to inebriate. No less lax is the opinion of Fr. Castropalao, who, treatise 15, disputation 1, point 12, number 21, teaches that he who vowed to abstain from wine can drink only so much wine as would suffice for temperate drinkers at one meal. Fr. Patritius Sporer, treatise 3 on the second commandment of the Decalogue, chapter 2, section 3, § 2, number 86, page 238, delivers this judgment: "Surely Castropalao, too laxly, even by German reckoning, requires that quantity which would suffice for some man drinking temperately at one dinner." The laxity of certain Probabilists is sometimes so ample that it displeases even the Probabilists themselves.

X. He who vowed to fast, determining nothing, must keep the vow according to the rite of the Church. Wherefore Sanchez and Tamburini teach too laxly that this man need not abstain from milk-foods in the time of Lent. This opinion falls, it seems to me, into the following condemned thesis: It is not evident that the custom of not eating eggs and milk-foods in Lent obliges. He who vowed to fast, no fixed number of days being set, satisfies the vow if he fasts a single day. He who vowed several fasts does not seem to satisfy it with two fasts: because plurality is not signified by the number two, according to common signification. He who vowed to fast for a month is free from the fast on Sundays: because the fast must be interpreted according to the rite of the Church. Yet some Catholic, led by a singular devotion, all superstition being removed, could fast on Sundays too — and especially to tame the flesh and concupiscence, as so many holy men have done, keeping a continual fast.

XI. He who vowed to hear Mass daily satisfies the vow on feast days by hearing one Mass: since the reasonable intention appears to be that he wills to let no day pass without hearing Mass. A girl who vowed virginity is bound to preserve it after the first shameful act committed. It is otherwise if she had vowed expressly only to avoid the first shameful act: because the vow depends on the will of the one vowing. He who made a vow of pilgrimage satisfies it by an equestrian pilgrimage: because this is a true pilgrimage, provided he did not intend to bind himself to a journey on foot; but he would by no means satisfy it if hired for a wage, or forced by violence: because the execution of a vow is an act of virtue; yet if he consented in mind and intention, even though outwardly compelled, he would fulfill the vow.

XII. He who vowed alms, without determining its quantity, can determine it after the vow was made, just as he could have before the vow. He who vowed to give one of his animals, or of the Church's vessels, can offer whichever of the promised things he pleases: for he is not bound to give either the more precious vessel or the better animal. A moderate mean must be kept in these cases. If, of the things promised, all but one should perish, this one must be offered. If you vowed to give to one of two Churches, designating neither, you can select whichever you prefer.

XIII. Question VIII. Does an error concerning the substance of the vow render it invalid? Answer. The common opinion affirms it: because error takes away the voluntary; for nothing is willed that is not first known. But error concerning adventitious matters and the circumstances of a vow does not render the vow null. But whence is it to be gathered whether circumstances redound to the substance of the vow, or not? Those redound to the substance of the vow which regard the end of the vow; but those are occasions of vowing, which excite one to vow. You vow alms to be conferred upon an honest poor man. The relief of poverty is the end of the vow...

the vow. The honesty of the poor man is the occasion which excites and impels you to the vow. In doubt whether some circumstances have the character of the end of the vow, or of the occasion, one must examine whether, these being removed, the end of the vow would still stand: for if it stands, all the other things have merely the character of occasion. But if, on the contrary, these being absent, the end of the vow would collapse, then they would have the character of the end.

XIV. Question IX. Is a vow extorted by fear valid? Answer. One fear is grave, falling upon a constant man; another is light. A grave fear can arise intrinsically, as from infirmity, a storm, or an imminent shipwreck. A vow made by force of intrinsic fear is valid both by natural law and by positive law: because then the one vowing is compelled by no one but himself. Valid, then, are vows made to avoid death, shipwreck, or another misfortune. A vow is also valid on account of fear justly inflicted from outside: because when fear is justly inflicted in order to extort a vow, the one vowing is unreasonably unwilling. Light fear does not invalidate a vow, because it lightly injures free consent.

XV. The difficulty is concerning a vow made from a grave fear unjustly inflicted from outside, in order to extort it. That this vow is valid by natural law is the common opinion of the Theologians, given that the man, though unjustly compelled, truly and sincerely wills the vow, and in very deed makes it. For fear diminishes, but does not take away, the voluntary, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 89, art. 7, ad 3. To this the Theologians commonly subscribe. As to ecclesiastical law, if the discourse be of a solemn vow made in monastic profession, all affirm that this vow is null, as all the laws declare. If the discourse be of other vows, the Theologians dispute on both sides, and all affirm that each opinion is probable. The former opinion holds that vows of this kind are valid, because the laws speak only of a solemn vow, and moreover the invalidation of a vow is odious, since it derogates from the law of nature. And this opinion seems more probable, because in very deed the adversaries have adduced no text of this kind that declares such vows null.

XVI. Question X. What must be said of a conditional vow? Answer. In any vow, even an absolute one, certain general conditions are included, such as: if I shall be able, if it please God, if the Superior decree nothing else. Particular conditions depend on and are added by the free will of the one vowing himself. The execution of a conditional vow is suspended until the condition occurs. But a condition concerning the present, or the past, or a necessary future, does not make a vow conditional; only a condition concerning a contingent future event does so. A shameful condition, against the substance of the vow, invalidates it, because an error of the substance of a contract renders the act involuntary — not so if it is against the accidents of the contract. A vow under an honorable contingent future condition does not oblige until the condition occurs. If the condition depends solely on the will of the one vowing, he can suspend it at pleasure before it occurs, and free himself from the vow; if it depends on another's will, he is bound to await its arrival — as if he had said: "I vow Religion, if my father consents; if my sister marries," etc. If by his own malice he impedes the occurrence of a condition that depends on another's will, he is bound to fulfill the vow: because he who by his own fault becomes unable to execute a vow is bound to compensate for the vow, as St. Thomas teaches on the fourth book, distinction 38, question 1, article 3.

XVII. Question XI. What is a penal conditional vow? Answer. It is that which someone makes not from an affection toward the thing which he pledges, but from a zeal of avoiding the action which he detests — as if you vow in this manner: "I promise that I will build an altar, if I gamble, if I fornicate." By this vow you intend above all to avoid the sin. He who is absolved from a vow of this kind is also absolved from the penalty. He who vowed to avoid another thing, say gaming, if he violates the vow, is not bound to undergo the penalty as many times as he gambles, but must pay the penalty only once, unless he had expressly imposed upon himself as many penalties as times he would gamble.

XVIII. Question XII. What must be said of a vow to assume the religious state? Answer. He who vowed to enter Religion must apply all care that he be received into it, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 189, art. 2 [recte 10]. If the one vowing has any impediments, he is bound to manifest them to the Prelate of the Religion. If the Religion which the one vowing designated has been relaxed in the substantials of its rule, he is not bound to enter it: because then the vow does not concern a better good, as the Theologians commonly teach. If you desire more on this matter, see Tome 3 of the Christian Theology, book 4 on the Decalogue, dissertation 2, chapter 9.

It is certain that a vow binds under sin to its fulfillment, as D. Bonaventure notes in Speculum animae, cap. 3, long after the middle, and first from Prov. c. 20, and Deut. 23, and 1 Tim. 5, and Ps. 75: Vow, and render to God, where the Gloss explains it: To vow is of the will; but to render is of necessity, as D. Bonaventure notes there. That it binds under mortal sin, Innocent III defines in cap. Licet, de Voto. So all Catholics hold.

The parents of the heretics of this age, Luther and Calvin, most bitter enemies of religion, are not ashamed to do away with even the most solemn vows.^{1 1} N. Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'e medio tollere nisi sunt' (djvu: 'e medio tollere nifi funt'); 'nisi sunt' is not Latin here; rendered as 'nixi sunt' (striven), which the context requires.

FIRST they teach that Vows for the worship of God cannot be made except about things commanded; hence there is one common vow of the faithful, which we make in Baptism.

SECOND they teach that Vows about things not commanded can be made, if not for the worship of God, at least for carrying on the affairs of this life, or for avoiding sins.

THIRD, that the vows of monks are impious and void: this Luther teaches de votis monasticis, and Calvin lib. 4, Institut. cap. 13. Nor do they teach dissimilarly the Augustan Confession, art. 27, and the Confession of Württemberg, c. de votis monast., whom Bellarmine reports lib. 2, de Monach. cap. 15.

Peter Martyr, in his book on celibacy and monastic vows, says two things contrary to Luther. One is that all vows are to be reckoned among the Jewish ceremonies and are therefore abrogated; the other is that no vow is made in Baptism. As to monastic vows, he censures them with no less insolence.

I ASSERT first, that Vows pertain to the worship of God even about things not commanded.

It is PROVED first from Isaiah 19: In that day the Egyptians shall know the Lord, and shall worship him in victims and gifts: and they shall make vows, and shall perform them.

It is PROVED second, from Bellarmine following D. Bonaventure in 4 Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, art. 2: every honorable thing, even of the supererogation of virtue, is of itself acceptable to God: therefore also when offered by vow. The antecedent is proved from D. Bonaventure from Luke 2, where it is said that that Anna dwelt in the temple, serving God night and day; where the Greek has λατρεύουσα, which properly signifies worship, as D. Bonaventure indicates there on that passage, officiously rendering it, she was devoted, and devout toward God. The consequence is proved from D. Thomas, because by a vow one is established in good.

It is PROVED also from the Socratic Doctor in lib. 1, Pharetrae, cap. 38, where, following D. Gregory in Moralia 15, cap. 12, he calls virginity obsequium Deo, "an obsequy to God"; and D. Augustine in lib. de virginitate, cap. 27, where he describes the obsequy of virgins toward God, for they follow the Lamb; and from Cyprian de disciplina et habitu virginum, where he teaches that virgins are far and diametrically alien from the worship of the earth, because they follow Christ. See other things there.

It is PROVED third from the Scriptures, wherein it is found that the saints made vows about things not commanded. So Jacob in Genesis 28, where he first made a vow, promising God tithes of all things, and to raise upon it a stone house of God, if God had granted good fortune to his journey. But if these things had been commanded, Jacob would ill have done them under the condition of a prosperous journey. In 1 Kings 1, Anna vowed in the same spirit her son, if it should be given her by the Lord. So in 1 Paralipomenon 29, David vowed most many treasures together with his subjects for the temple to be built for the Lord, and it is written: The people rejoiced, when they promised their vows willingly: because they offered all with their whole heart to the Lord: and David the king also rejoiced with a great joy. Indeed, not even David himself heaped up so many treasures by command. So in 2 Paralipomenon 31, the children of Israel offered many animals, which they had vowed spontaneously, not by command. In 3 Esdras, Artaxerxes offered what he had vowed spontaneously. In Jonah 1, the men who were in the ship vowed to God, that they might be delivered from shipwreck; Heliodorus, in 2 Machabees 3, vowed many things for his own deliverance. The Blessed Virgin spontaneously offered and vowed virginity, as is said in Luke 1: How shall this be done, because I know not a man? as the holy Fathers testify: Gregory of Nyssa in his oration on the nativity of the Lord; Augustine in lib. de sancta virginitate, cap. 4; Bede on cap. 1 of Luke; Anselm in lib. de excellentia virginis, cap. 4; Rupert in lib. 3 in Cant.; Bernard in sermone 4 super Missus est; D. Bonaventure on Luke 1, and in the Biblia pauperum, cap. 25, where he also enumerates as vows all the things said above.

Calvin most immodestly dares to bark in the Commentary on this passage found in Marloratus, first rebuking the Most Blessed Virgin for infidelity, of whom Elizabeth cried out: Blessed art thou that hast believed, though the holy Fathers, on this passage, cry out with one voice that she never wavered in faith.

Next he rebukes the holy Fathers as absurdly and ridiculously gathering from this the vow of the Blessed Virgin, because (he says) if she had had a vow of virginity, she would have mocked Joseph by taking him as her husband, with great perfidy toward him, and to the mocking of God.

But the wisest Fathers thence solidly deduced the vow; for she alleges her difficulty in conceiving, because she will not know a man. And indeed she could, in harmony with Joseph after the betrothal and before the salutation of the Angel, have vowed virginity — upon which the whole edifice of Calvin collapses.

Yet I will never grant Calvin that the Blessed Virgin at any time had the mind of consummating the marriage; otherwise she would have been a virgin only in body, not in soul, as Bellarmine indicates in lib. 2, de Monachis, cap. 22, after D. Bonaventure in 4 dist. 30, dub. 5, litt. et quaest. 2.

Therefore it is answered with D. Bonaventure in the cited question that the Blessed Virgin before the betrothal had vowed virginity absolutely, and in this Scotus follows him in 4 dist. 30, quaest. 2. The same say Albert the Great de laudibus Virginis, and before them the holy Fathers Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine in the places adduced; nevertheless she had received a revelation concerning Saint Joseph, that he would never seek the conjugal debt, and therefore she confidently associated him with herself for most honorable causes, which we shall relate in the Treatise on Matrimony. She therefore entrusted the Most Blessed body to a spouse who could have consummated the marriage; yet she was certain that he would never wish to do so. But she was betrothed while the divine Spirit breathed upon her, which is sufficient for the reason of matrimony, as Bellarmine notes in the cited place, and Sanchez proves lib. 2, de Matrimonio, disp. 28.

Otherwise Calvin objects conjectures from his own inverted fantasy, namely that the Virgin spoke thus out of excess of mind, because she was about to conceive the Son of God, and therefore to exclude the embrace of a man — not that she had a vow of virginity.

But Calvin rashly prefers his conjectures to the assertion of so many Fathers. Nor does he sufficiently gather that it was said out of admiration; for the Angel answers the doubt, saying: The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, etc., as D. Bonaventure notes on that passage, and Bellarmine after him. As if the Angel should say (the Socratic Doctor says): You ask how you shall conceive? To this I answer, that you shall be made fruitful without corruption; you shall conceive without lust; you shall bring forth without pain, not from the seed of man, but by the power of the Holy Spirit.

But what Bellarmine adds, that the Blessed Virgin did not yet think herself to be the mother of God, does not please me; for in the preceding words the Angel had expressed it: This shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High, etc.

Peter Martyr objects further that from those words the vow of the Blessed Virgin is not gathered, just as when Moses says in Exodus 6: How shall Pharaoh hear me, seeing I am of uncircumcised lips? and yet we would not gather that Moses vowed the circumcision of his lips. So in John 3 Nicodemus says: How can a man be born, when he is old? and yet from that you would not gather that he vowed old age: therefore neither is it gathered from similar words in the Blessed Virgin. These things, however, are senseless and frivolous: for the proposition of Nicodemus was whether a man could be born corporeally again and renew his life, which is impossible; he himself understood regeneration carnally, as proposed to him by the Lord; therefore he sets up a thing impossible and not depending on free will: How can these things be done? as D. Bonaventure notes on John 3. So Moses sets up an impediment to speaking which is necessary from nature; but the Blessed Virgin sets up an impediment depending on free will, namely to be joined to a man in marriage. But if she objects: How shall this be, because she was prohibited by the law — not indeed by the universal law, as is clear: therefore by the proper law of the Vow.

He objects further that the Virgin answered prudently, even though not bound by a vow — namely, if the birth were to come about in the ordinary way, it stood in the way that she was not yet mingled with a man; but if in a higher manner, she asks to be instructed.

But he explains it foolishly thus; for since the Angel brings in the future conception, what does it matter that she was not yet mingled with a man? It was enough to be mingled afterward; but if it was to be done in a higher manner, to set up the natural mode would have been beside the point.

Now I return to our proposition. The vows narrated in the Scriptures were about things not commanded, and yet the Lord required them as most pleasing to himself, as is written in Deut. 23 and Ps. 75: Vow, and render, as Saint Bonaventure weighs it in Speculo animae, cap. 3.

I assert second, that Vows do not pertain to Jewish ceremonies.

It is PROVED first from the cited place of Isaiah, which the holy Fathers Jerome, Cyril, and others interpret of Christians.

It is PROVED second from D. Bonaventure in 4 dist. 38, art. 2, quaest. 3, from that verse of the Psalm soon adduced: Vow, and render to the Lord, which Saint Doctor proves to be understood of us from the Gloss, which says: To vow is of the will, but to render is of necessity. The same Saint Augustine has here. Hence the heretic's response collapses, that the speech was to the Jews.

It is PROVED third from D. Bonaventure in 4 dist. 38, dub. 4, litt., from that passage, cap. 5 of the former Epistle to Timothy, where of certain widows he says: When they have been wanton in Christ, they will marry: having damnation, because they have made void their first faith. In which place by first faith all the Greek and Latin interpreters understand the vow of continence. Hence Saint Augustine on the cited place of Psalm 75, Vow, and render, says: Let each one vow what he can, render it, and be not slothful to vow: for you shall not fulfill it by your own strength, and then, expounding the place of the Apostle, says: What is, they have made void their first faith? They vowed, and did not render.

This the Fourth Council of Carthage expounds, which consisted of 214 Bishops, in canon one hundred and four. And the Fourth Council of Toledo, which consisted of seventy Bishops.

The same three most holy supreme Pontiffs expound with this reasoning: Clement in lib. 3, Constit. cap. 1 et 2; Innocent I in epistola secunda, cap. 13; Gelasius I in epistola 1, cap. 23. Likewise Tertullian in lib. de monogamia, not far from the end; Basil in lib. de Virginitate, past the middle; Jerome in lib. 1 in Jovin., and on cap. 44 of Ezech.; Epiphanius in haeresi 48; Augustine in lib. de sancta Virginitate, cap. 23, and lib. de bono viduitatis, cap. 8 et 9, and the cited place on Ps. 75; Fulgentius in epistola 1. Besides these also all the expositors thus, both the Greeks, as Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius; and the Latins, as Ambrose, Primasius, Bede, Haymo, Sedulius, Anselm, D. Bonaventure, and others.

Luther de votis monasticis answers that by the first faith is to be understood, not the vow — which nowhere is taken under the name of faith — but the Christian faith; which those widows had lost, who, that they might more easily be permitted to marry, fell away from the Christian faith. Therefore he says they went after Satan, and raged wantonly against Christ.

But this interpretation is audacious; and indeed that the promise is meant by faith, D. Bonaventure shows from D. Gregory to Boniface, which is found in 17 quaest. 1, cap. Viduae a proposito, which he also condemns with Apostolic authority, as is related in the text of dist. 38, cap. 1. The same Saint Bonaventure observes in 3 dist. 23, dub. 2, adducing this passage for the keeping of a promise, where he notes it is also taken for the fidelity of a promise owed: Jerem. 7, Fidelity is perished; and of the saint, as is said of Joseph in Gen. 44: I received him into my fidelity; so in Rom. 3 it is said: Shall their unbelief make the faith of God of none effect?

But what he says, that they fell away from the faith in order to marry, is false; for even Christian widows could marry, as the Apostle says in 1 Corinth. 7. But to go after Satan, and to wanton against Christ, aptly signifies the sacrilege of the sin of lust.

Calvin's instance was also similar to these, who adds another exposition: that these widows promised continence, but could not licitly unless they were sixty years old, at which time they are no longer fit for marriage. Therefore the Apostle says: Let a widow be chosen no less than sixty years of age; this therefore makes nothing toward establishing the vows of religious women, who vow even in the flower of their age.

But why does the Apostle rebuke them, if they made void their vows, or if the vows did not bind? Truly the time of sixty years was not prefixed to the vow when making it, but either to the office of a deaconess, as Tertullian says de velandis virginibus, and lib. 1 ad Uxorem, and others; or to admission into the number of those widows who were to be fed from the alms of the Church, as Chrysostom and Ambrose expound here, and Jerome in his epistle to Salvina.

Calvin's THIRD answer is, that that promise was not a vow made to God, but a pledge to the Church not to marry, that they might more freely discharge the office of deaconesses.

But the Fathers say the opposite: that if the pledge had been made to the Church alone, it could easily have been dispensed.

They INSTANCE: the Apostle there says: I will that the younger marry.

It is ANSWERED that he says this by way of indulgence, not of command, as he himself testifies. But of this below.

Peter Martyr says this passage is ambiguous, because it is expounded in many ways, and therefore is not fit for doctrine; then he says it sounds not of damnation, but of a certain infamy, or accusation, or mark, because they did not persevere; and he draws this from Bucer.

But all the holy Fathers expound a true eternal damnation of those widows who married after the vow; and in this sense the Apostle everywhere takes damnation before God and men, Rom. 3 and 13.