Article — Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis
Article II: The Obligation and Execution of a Vow
Nature of the obligation. The obligation of a vow is not of the same ratio as the obligation of a promise which is made to men. We ought to be faithful to men lest they be deceived, while God, better than the man promising, knows what is going to be. But a man can offer to God the future action itself, or a series of goods and perseverance in the purpose of a good work. Moreover, reverence owed to God, and therefore the virtue of religion, requires that an oblation once made not be revoked. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 124, 128.
Force of the obligation. Now the force of the obligation is that which the matter demonstrates, unless the one vowing has wished to assume a lesser obligation. For he who could promise nothing could also lessen the force of his obligation. Except vows which are required in the undertaking of a state. The intention also of the one vowing brings it about that small matters coalesce or not, according as the one vowing intends to vow to God a certain notable whole by parts, or to offer individual performances as such. Coalescence is easier in real vows than in personal vows.
For a vow, although it induces a graver obligation than that of fidelity, admits smallness of matter, because negligence in observing a vow of small matter is explained from a slight esteem of the thing, not of God.
Judgment concerning grave or light matter must be made prudently, by observing what the vow contributes to divine worship either directly or indirectly. Directly, when a grave act of religion is vowed; indirectly, when a thing grave in another order, by the vow itself, is referred to divine worship. Cf. Suarez, Rel. Tr. 6, L. 5, c. 4.
When a singular action has been promised to God, this rule can be admitted, that the matter is thought grave which, for the intended end, would of itself be urged under mortal guilt by divine or ecclesiastical law. Therefore grave matter is judged to be: hearing Mass, fasting, abstinence of one day, etc.
But when a series of actions is promised, coalescence is not to be urged as in the matter of justice; moreover, one action which, taken in itself, would be notable can be a slight part of the promised series; finally, the very object of such a vow must be defined accurately.
Thus a vow of doing the more perfect things concerns not so much the things in themselves as insofar as they are more perfect; but the excess of perfection of itself seems light matter. Thus he who substitutes another honorable action for the Mass which it would have been more perfect to hear, is not guilty of omitted Mass but of neglected more perfect action; and this is thought light. Wherefore scarcely in a singular act which is not mortal fault will there be grave guilt against such a vow. He also will have sinned gravely who often, as if habitually and with a clear mind, has done things which he has certainly known to be imperfect. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 129.
Is there an acquired right from a vow?. A right is sometimes said to be acquired for another from a vow. Properly speaking, however, an obligation of religion cannot, as such, transfer rights: only an obligation of justice can do that. Therefore, if after a vow a right has been acquired for someone, the cause of the right will be either an accompanying promise from justice made to a physical or moral person, or the execution itself which placed the thing in another's patrimony. Cf. Quaest. de relig., n. 130.
The extension of the obligation is to be taken from the words of the one vowing and from their reasonable or common acceptance, always inclining to the more benign parts. Wherefore he who vows the rosary satisfies, saving a different expressed intention, by reciting the third part; he who vows Mass or fasting for a month does not have to fast or hear two Masses on Sunday; he who vows the fast of a vigil will have to neither fast on Sunday nor now anticipate the vigil on Saturday, since from c. 1252 §4, vigils are now not anticipated.
He who has made a conditioned or penal vow will be able, according to his varied intention, to impede the condition, to do the action to which the penalty is annexed, or will be prohibited from doing so.
He who has not appointed a day for fulfilling the vow must execute the vow as soon as he conveniently can. Yet a lesser cause is required for deferring than for omitting. But an illicit delay of execution will be judged grave if the one vowing exposes himself to danger of forgetfulness or of inability, or if the matter is notably diminished, for example in the vow of entering religion which a person already super-adult has made.
He who doubts whether he made a vow is presumed free; he who doubts whether he was fully in possession of himself in a vow certainly emitted is presumed to have been conscious, unless a positive reason renders probable the defect of deliberation: in which case, a probable opinion permits that the vow be neglected; although then it is better to ask a dispensation.
II. Execution of the vow. A personal vow can be fulfilled only by the one vowing; a real vow also through another, although he who does not have his own ought not therefore to beg another's. If another has spontaneously done it for you, your ratification will suffice. The intention of fulfilling the vow is not necessary.
The burden of a real vow which the one vowing has imposed upon an heir by a valid testament must be fulfilled by the heir from justice toward the testator. Likewise the heir must satisfy from justice a real vow by which a third party has acquired a right. With this omitted, canonical law obliges the heir from religion to fulfill real vows: "The obligation of a real vow passes to heirs, likewise the obligation of a mixed vow, for the part by which it is real" (c. 1310 §2).
By what title is the heir obliged? From the Code the obligation is said to pass. But it cannot pass except as the obligation which held the one vowing: this, however, was an obligation of religion. Yet most induce an obligation of justice. By what right, this plainly escapes us. Will you say with Suarez (Relig., Tr. 6, Lib. 4, c. 11, n. 7) that goods are received by the heir "liable to the payment of his debts"? But it must be denied that here there is a debt properly so called, which belongs to justice. For a promise from fidelity does not bind goods; and the obligation of a vow is from fidelity toward God (2, 2, q. 88 art. 3): it works no tradition of right. By what miracle, then, would an obligation from religion be converted, in the heir, into an obligation of justice? Why should goods be burdened in the case of an heir rather than in the case of him who made the vow? Therefore this must briefly be said: without positive law, an obligation of promise from fidelity, whether to God or to a man, even if it is personal, would not pass to heirs; now, because of positive law, the obligation of a real vow indeed passes to heirs; but, since the Code determines nothing else, it passes such as it was, i.e., as an obligation of religion. Cf. Quaest. de virtute religionis, n. 138.
He who has vowed the deed of another must merely strive in an honorable manner that the other voluntarily do the thing promised.
A vow of a community or for a community. Concerning this matter, in which no little labor is expended 1, we think it must be said briefly as follows. Governors who represent a community, just as they can perform other things, can thus vow for the community. After the vow has been made, the obligation of religion passes to the successors of those who vowed, because through them acts the moral person, which remains the same. And if the promised act is one which does not demand the intervention of subjects, the execution itself will be liable to no difficulty. But if the subjects themselves must act, since they themselves promised nothing, they will have to be obliged by law or precept. If, however, the vow is not an action of those who represent the community, but is proposed to the very community of persons that they vow, certainly only those will be held by the vow who truly emitted the vow; nor, without a positive law, will successors be held.
1 Cf. Op. theol., Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 634.
Specification. The violation of a simple vow differs specifically from sacrilege, concerning which below. It is graver than sacrilege, insofar as it is more directly against God; it is also graver than perjury strictly such.
Obligation of a purpose. A good purpose itself induces a certain light obligation proportioned to human constancy. For it is not reasonable that someone recede without reason from a prudently made choice. Cf. Lugo, De iust. d. 23, n. 1, against Suarez, Tr. 6, L. 1, c. 2, and Quaestiones de religione, n. 141.