218. On the obligation itself. 1. Every vow obligates the one vowing to fulfill it, and indeed from religion.

a. Sacred Scripture often inculcates the obligation of a vow: When thou shalt vow a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God requireth it.¹ If thou hast vowed anything to God, delay not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him ... and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to pay the things promised.²

b. From a promise by its nature there arises an obligation of furnishing the thing promised. The virtue by which one is obligated to keep promises is fidelity; but fidelity owed to God pertains to the virtue of religion.

alpha. Since in all vows not fulfilled there is injured the reverence and fidelity owed to God, and this in any matter is of the same nature, the injuries of vows are all of the same moral species. Wherefore it is not necessary that the matter of the violated vow be declared in confession.

beta. Therefore he who violates a vow by which a thing already otherwise commanded is promised commits two sins, one against religion, the other against the precept to which the matter of the vow pertains; but he who violates a vow by which a supererogatory thing is promised commits one sin, and that against religion.

¹ Deut. 23:21.

² Eccl. 5:3, 4.

219. 2. The obligation of a vow is grave or light according to the nature of the matter and the intention of the one vowing. For since a vow is, as it were, a certain private law which the one vowing imposes upon himself, the measure of the obligation depends upon the intention of the one vowing. Hence he can vow grave matter under grave or under light obligation, but light matter only under light obligation, since light matter is not capable of grave obligation. If the one vowing does not expressly determine the gravity of the obligation, he is judged to bind himself under grave or under light obligation according to the nature of the matter.

a. Therefore in order that a vow obligate under grave obligation, two things are required: alpha. that the matter be grave; beta. that the one vowing have the intention of obligating himself under grave obligation.

b. That matter is held as grave which, if it is enjoined by ecclesiastical law, obligates under grave obligation, such as Mass, fasting, communion, or any thing which notably contributes to the end of a vow, which is the worship of God.

c. Vows made in religion, since they depend not upon the one vowing alone but also upon the will of the Church, cannot at the will of the one vowing be made under light obligation only; and likewise in the vow of chastity annexed to sacred orders the Church requires the intention of obligating oneself gravely.

Whether several light matters promised by the same vow coalesce into grave matter. - This depends upon the intention of the one vowing, either explicitly made or presumed from common estimation. Therefore if several light matters are promised from the intention of the one vowing as singular things, they do not coalesce; but if they are promised as some one thing, which for the sake of greater facility is divided into several parts, they coalesce. But if the one vowing did not conceive a determinate intention, the matter must be judged from presumed intention or from common estimation. Moreover, in personal vows diverse matters are generally judged to have been vowed rather as singular things; but in real vows generally by way of one thing. Therefore the obligation of the former is usually affixed to the day, while the obligation of the latter, after omission, usually must be supplied, unless from the manner of vowing another intention must be supposed.

Hence, if someone vowed to give a small alms daily, the matter coalesces, and if he omits it for a longer time, he sins gravely or is held to supply it. But if someone vows to recite one Pater daily, the individual omissions do not coalesce, and therefore not even the omission of a long time is a grave sin. - But if someone vows each year throughout the whole month of May to assist at May devotion, he vows the assistance of the whole month by way of one thing, whose individual omissions coalesce; on the contrary, if someone vowed each Saturday to give a small alms in honor of the Blessed Virgin, the omissions do not coalesce, and if he omits it for a long time, he does not sin gravely, because the vow is affixed to the day.

Note. For judging the smallness of matter in vows whose matter is promised by way of one thing, the omitted matter must be considered not absolutely, but relatively to the whole thing promised, so that only a third or fourth part of the whole ought to be judged a notable thing which cannot be omitted without grave fault. Thus he who promised to assist at May devotion throughout the entire month of May does not sin gravely because he omits the devotion once or twice, although the individual devotions considered absolutely (if they last for half an hour) constitute grave matter, but because he omits eight or ten assistances.

220. 3. A vow obligates only the one vowing: for no one can obligate another by his own vow, because no one can promise the thing or action of another, not even of one very closely joined, such as a son or a subject.

a. Children are not held to fulfill the vows of parents by which they consecrated them to religion, unless they themselves afterward consented; but parents, by force of the vow, are held, as far as lies in them, to take care that the children, with their liberty preserved, fulfill what they had promised for them.¹ But if parents vow a thing which they can enjoin upon their children, they themselves by force of the vow are held to prescribe it, while the children are held from obedience to fulfill it.

b. Subjects are held to fulfill vows made by the superiors of the community, not indeed by force of the vow, unless they themselves consented, but by force of a precept imposed from the motive of religion: therefore he who would not observe it would commit a sin against religion.

Whether posterity is obligated by a vow made by a community. - All concede that posterity is not held to observe the vows of ancestors by force of the vow, since no one can be bound by another's vow; but likewise all concede that posterity is held to observe vows made by ancestors, for example of fasting or of keeping a certain day religiously as a feast, of instituting a procession, etc.; but they labor greatly in explaining the origin and quality of this obligation. It seems it must be said:

alpha. If the vow must be fulfilled through a social act, as when it is a question of instituting a procession, those who represent the community are held to fulfill the obligation undertaken by their predecessors from the virtue of religion, inasmuch as they take care that the procession be instituted.

beta. If the vow must be fulfilled through an act of individuals, as when it is a question of fasting, of religious keeping of a feast, individuals are held from religious obedience to fulfill the work promised by their ancestors. For by the very fact that superiors make a vow of this kind with the will that posterity also be held to its observation, they impose upon posterity the precept of observing the vow, provided they have the faculty of prescribing the matter of the vow. Now if it is not a question of celebrating feasts, not only the bishop but also the magistrate has the power of imposing another thing, for example fasting, a pious pilgrimage. And indeed the magistrate, by reason of the common good, can also promise a work of this kind to God and enjoin it upon the community over which he presides.² But because the work has been enjoined from the motive of religion, the community is held to obey from the same motive.³

gamma. From the declaration of the Holy See it is established that a vow of observing some feast obligates only those vowing, and not likewise posterity, not even if the consent and precept of the bishop accedes.⁴ In order that posterity be held to observe this vow, the consent of the supreme pontiff is required. Since the reason of this declaration is the power taken away from all by Urban VIII of instituting new feasts,⁵ this declaration is not to be extended to other vows made by a community, to the observance of which even those not vowing can be obligated by force of precept.

c. The obligation of observing a vow made by ancestors can arise not only through a precept of superiors, but also through custom. Nevertheless, in order that a custom of this kind obtain the force of law, it is required that it begin through voluntary or free acts, which are observed for as much time as is necessary for inducing custom. Therefore the people, knowing that they are not held to these acts, must observe them, in order that an obligatory custom can arise: for if they erroneously thought that they were held to these acts by force of law and therefore observed them, an obligatory custom would not be induced.

¹ Boys (girls), who already at a tender age, having first been consecrated to God by their parents, were handed over to monasteries for education and were called oblates, at first indeed were obligated from the vow of their parents to embrace the monastic life; but afterward (from the thirteenth century onward), once they had entered the age of puberty, they could choose the monastic state or freely depart from it. Cf. Kirchenlexikon, s.v. Oblati.

² Cf. Suarez, l. 3, c. 12, n. 9.

³ Cf. Suarez, l. 4, c. 9, n. 5 ff.; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 634; Berardi, Praxis confessariorum^3 (Faventiae: Novelli, 1898), I, n. 600.

⁴ S. C. R., 18 Apr. 1643 (n. 834); 19 Nov. 1650 (n. 932); 23 Jun. 1703 (n. 2113).

⁵ Constitution Universa, 13 Sept. 1642.

221. On the obligation of a conditioned, disjunctive, and doubtful vow.

A conditioned vow does not obligate unless the condition has been fulfilled: for the condition attached suspends the obligation so long as it has not been fulfilled. Wherefore, where the condition is not fulfilled, no obligation of observing the vow arises.

a. Nevertheless, even a conditioned vow begets some obligation: for it is a true vow, whose obligation is contained in these things: alpha. of preserving the will of fulfilling the promise once the condition has been verified, or of not revoking consent; beta. of not fraudulently impeding the condition.

b. He who impedes the condition, but not fraudulently or culpably, does not sin nor is he afterward held to fulfill the vow. But he who culpably, for example by force or deceit and fraud, impeded the condition, sins against the vow; yet not even here is he obligated by the vow, because the obligation of observing the vow depends upon the fulfilled condition.

c. If the attached condition is fulfilled not formally, but only equivalently, according to the probable opinion the vow does not obligate. For example, he who vowed religion if his sister should marry is not held to enter if she has died, even if the reason of the condition had been the support of the sister.

222. On the obligation of a disjunctive vow, for example, if I recover, each Saturday I shall either fast or give alms.

a. If someone vows disjunctively either a good thing or an evil, vain, or impossible thing, the vow is null, because he cannot be equally obligated to a good thing and an evil thing, as if someone vows: either I shall steal, so that I may become rich, or I shall enter religion.

b. If someone vows good things disjunctively, the vow is valid and is to be understood in such a way that the option belongs to the one vowing; but the part once chosen must be furnished, even if after the choice the other part becomes impossible.

c. If one part becomes impossible before the choice, the one vowing probably is not held to the other part, unless it has become impossible by his fault: for in this case he is judged to have willed to choose the other part, which is still possible.

d. If the very part chosen becomes impossible after the choice without fault of the one vowing, he is held to nothing else.

223. On doubtful vows. a. He who positively doubts whether he made a true vow or only a resolution is held to nothing.

In the former question St. Alphonsus agrees (n. 201); but in the latter he teaches (n. 224) that the vow must be fulfilled again.

b. He who positively doubts whether he has fulfilled a vow made is likewise held to nothing according to the principles of probabilism.

224. Who must fulfill a vow. 1. A personal vow must be fulfilled by the one vowing himself, nor can it be validly fulfilled through another: for by a personal vow the one vowing promised his own proper action; therefore if the one vowing himself cannot fulfill it, he is held to nothing.

2. A real vow must be fulfilled from one's own goods: since indeed the one vowing promised his own thing; therefore he who cannot fulfill it from his own goods is not held to take care that another pay it, but the obligation ceases. Nevertheless it can always be fulfilled through another: for by this vow not the proper action of the one vowing, but some thing of his is promised; if another, whether asked or spontaneously, pays this for the one vowing, with the consent of the same acceding it becomes the proper thing of the one vowing himself.

a. He who, forgetful of the vow, furnishes the work promised, satisfies the vow: for anyone is presumed to have the intention first of all of satisfying his obligations, rather than of furnishing a supererogatory work from devotion alone. But he does not satisfy if he furnished the work with the express intention of not satisfying the vow: for it depends upon his intention whether the obligation remains.

b. Therefore heirs are not held to fulfill the personal vows of the deceased; but they are held to pay real vows, not indeed by force of the vow from religion, but by force of the inheritance from justice toward the deceased: for an inheritance passes to the heirs with its burdens; but a real vow affects the thing itself, which accordingly passes to the heirs with the obligation by which it is affected. Heirs must pay these vows before legacies, even pious ones, but after debts of justice; not, however, beyond the resources of the inheritance, that is, if it can be done without prejudice to the legitimate portion.

225. When a vow must be fulfilled. a. If no time was fixed for fulfilling the vow, it must be fulfilled as soon as it can conveniently be done: for a vow is after the manner of a debt, which must be paid as soon as possible. But if the one vowing determined a certain time, it must be fulfilled at the fixed time. But if an impediment is foreseen, there is no obligation of anticipating.

b. A vow which was not fulfilled at the fixed time ceases, if the time is attached for ending the obligation, as in a vow of fasting on Saturday in honor of the Blessed Virgin. But if the time is attached for urging the obligation, the vow does not cease, but once the time has elapsed it must be fulfilled as soon as possible.

Whether the time has been added for urging or for ending the obligation depends upon the intention of the one vowing. But if this intention is not established, in personal vows the added time is generally judged to be for ending the obligation, but in real vows rather for urging the obligation, unless from the nature and end of the vow something else must be established, as if someone in thanksgiving vows to fast on a certain day, or to offer candles for a certain solemnity.

c. Notable delay of a vow without a just cause in a grave matter is certainly a grave sin if the thing promised is diminished by the delay, for example in the vow of entering religion, because the one vowing withdraws a notable part of the service promised. But if the thing promised is not diminished by delay, as in the vow of a pious pilgrimage, delay even notable and made without a just cause does not seem to exceed the venial sin of negligence, because the thing promised can always be fulfilled integrally, nor does any detriment arise to religion from the delay. Nevertheless, a notable delay, namely one which exceeds several years, can be a grave sin because of the danger of forgetfulness or of future inability to fulfill the vow.

St. Alphonsus judges (n. 221) that a delay which extends beyond six months, with respect to entrance into religion, is notable; others think that a delay of two or three years is not yet notable; others finally judge that this depends much upon the age of the one vowing, and therefore that a young man of sixteen years does not sin gravely if he defers entrance for three or four years.

226. On the interpretation of vows. 1. A vow must be interpreted according to the intention of the one vowing, either expressed or reasonably presumed: for since the whole obligation of a vow depends upon the intention of the one vowing, a vow does not obligate beyond the intention of the one vowing.

a. Therefore he who vowed that he would hear Mass daily for a month is not held to hear two Masses on feast days, unless he expressly intended this, because he is judged to have had the intention of passing no day without Mass.

b. He who vowed to give a chalice to a church which he thought was poor, but which afterward he recognizes to be rich, is not held by the vow if the principal intention was of assisting a poor church; but he is held if his primary motive was of doing good to the church and the poverty of that church was only an impulsive cause.

c. Peter vowed that for ten years he would give ten gold pieces to Paul, so that he might more conveniently feed his family; after a year Paul dies. Peter is still held if the motive cause of the vow was the more convenient feeding of the family and the impulsive cause was relief of the father; he is not held if the motive of the vow was relief of the father from inconvenience and anxiety in feeding the family.

2. Where the expressed intention of the one vowing is not established, a vow must be interpreted according to the nature of the vow, or according to the custom of the Church, or according to common use: for thus the one vowing is judged to have willed to obligate himself.

a. Therefore he who vowed that he would recite the rosary satisfies by reciting alternately. - One vowing fasting for a month is not held to fast on Sunday; one vowing fasting each Saturday is not held to fast if the Nativity of the Lord falls on Saturday (now it can be added: or another solemn feast), unless he expressly intended otherwise. - He who vowed the fast of an entire week is not held to fast on that day on which he must undertake such hard labors that he is excused from the ecclesiastical fast.

b. If someone, forgetful of the earlier vow, has made another which cannot be observed together with the first, for example of undertaking a pious pilgrimage and of serving the sick at the same time, this must be distinguished: alpha. if the second is manifestly more worthy, he is held to observe the second; beta. if it is equal, those who concede that anyone can change his vow into another equal one say that he is held to observe the second; but those who deny this power say that he is held to observe the first; gamma. if the second is a lesser good, or if it is doubtful which one is better, he is held to observe the first.¹

3. A vow must always be interpreted toward the more benign part: for every obligation is odious; but odious things are to be restricted rather than extended.

He who promised something without a determinate quantity, for example alms, satisfies by giving as much as he wishes, provided it is not so little that he seems rather to mock God than to fulfill the vow. - He who promises something without a determinate quality, for example a chalice for a church, can determine it at his discretion, provided that it is not unsuitable.

4. In every vow certain conditions are included, whether by natural law or by ecclesiastical law: if I shall be able; with the right of the superior preserved; if the thing shall not have been notably changed; unless the other yields his right, etc. Yet these conditions do not make the vow conditioned.

According to these rules the obligation of him who, in order to fulfill a vow of entering religion, entered into a monastery, but was again dismissed from it, is to be interpreted. Namely, if he intended to promise only entrance into a determinate monastery, he is held to nothing further, even if he himself gave the cause of his dismissal. But if he intended to promise entrance into religion in general, he is held to take care of the execution of the vow by ordinary means; therefore if without great difficulty he finds another monastery by which he is received, he is held to enter it; if he is again dismissed from it, he certainly is not held to enter another.

Article Fourth. On the Cessation of Vow

The obligation of a vow can cease in four ways: a. by simple cessation, with no authority intervening; b. by irritation; c. by dispensation; and d. by commutation, with human authority intervening.

¹ Laymann, l. 4, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 4.