§ 4. On the Obligation of a Vow

Note. Since a vow is after the manner of a law which the person vowing has freely imposed upon himself, the principles concerning the obligation of a law are also generally applicable to the obligation of a vow, with this difference, however, that the obligation of a vow arises from the virtue of religion, whereas the obligation of a law arises from the virtue of obedience.

402. Quality of the obligation. Principle. Every valid vow obliges, from the virtue of religion, only the person vowing.³⁷⁹

That a valid vow obliges is of faith; hence St. Thomas³⁸⁰ calls him a heretic who pertinaciously denies the obligation of a valid vow. Even the pagans acknowledged that the transgression of a vow is a sin, and therefore one who had violated a vow was called guilty of a vow. The fulfillment of a vow is most strictly inculcated in Sacred Scripture: "If thou hast vowed any thing to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him; but whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow than after a vow not to perform the things promised."³⁸¹ "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."³⁸² St. Paul speaks severely of widows who, through their will to marry, violated a vow of chastity which they had made: "Having damnation, because they have made void their first faith."³⁸³ The intrinsic reason, however, is that a vow is a promise made to God. But every true promise, provided that it is lawful and its fulfillment possible, obliges in conscience. Therefore much more does the promise which someone has made to God by making a vow oblige. For if it is an offense against a man to break the faith pledged to him, it is a much greater offense against God to break the faith pledged to Him in a vow.³⁸⁴

I say, however: a vow obliges from the virtue of religion only the person vowing. Therefore a vow, as it is a vow, never obliges others. Hence children are not bound by the personal vows of their parents; e.g., when a father made a vow of making a pilgrimage or fasting, the son is not bound to fulfill those vows if the father is impeded or has already died. Indeed, personal vows can in no way be fulfilled by another; and therefore, e.g., if someone vowed a prayer, he cannot fulfill this vow through another who is even freely willing to say that prayer. If some community, e.g., a city, parish, etc., has vowed some personal action, such as a fast to be performed on a stated day (because of a victory obtained or a calamity overcome), then the inhabitants who descend from them do not indeed violate the vow if they do not fast, but nevertheless they must fast from a particular law.³⁸⁵ But real vows (and the same applies to mixed vows insofar as they are real), although they cannot impose an obligation of religion upon the heirs of the person vowing, must nevertheless sometimes be fulfilled from justice (if they do not injure the legitimate portion of the heirs or exceed the resources of the inheritance), since they are, as it were, burdens incumbent upon the inheritance. For he who accepts an inheritance ought also to take upon himself the burden connected with it.³⁸⁶ Hence heirs who do not pay legacies stipulated from the vow of the testator injure justice and are bound to restitution. Real vows can also be fulfilled by another during the lifetime of the person vowing. Thus, e.g., one who has vowed alms to be given can ask another to be willing to bestow the promised alms in his place.

St. Alphonsus,³⁸⁷ following the opinion of the Salmanticenses³⁸⁸ and Cajetan,³⁸⁹ notes that violations of vows are all of the same moral species, namely, violations of the fidelity owed to God. Hence (speaking absolutely) some penitent can declare the matter of the sin separately from the circumstance of the violated vow, saying, e.g., so many times I broke the fast, so many times I committed fornication, without expressing the vow concerning these matters, and afterwards say: so many times I broke a vow in a grave matter, without expressing the matter. The reason is that, if a circumstance is separable from the substance of the sin, the sin and the circumstance can be declared separately; just as one who stole in a church satisfies by saying: I stole; and afterwards: I committed sacrilege. Although these things are true theoretically speaking, nevertheless they are not to be put into practice, because thereby a right judgment by the confessor concerning the conscience of the penitent and concerning the means of correction to be counseled is rendered very difficult.

³⁷⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 1310, § 1.

³⁸⁰ Cf. Quodl. 3, a. 12.

³⁸¹ Eccles. 5:3ff.

³⁸² Deut. 23:21.

³⁸³ 1 Tim. 5:12.

³⁸⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 3.

³⁸⁵ In some regions and cities there exist vows of this kind made by a community and transmitted to posterity. Thus, e.g., at Rome, from a vow, a fast is observed before the feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary. All indeed concede that such obligations truly descend to posterity, but they do not agree whether by force of the vow. The better explanation seems to be that which asserts that such an obligation still now exists not by force of the vow but by force of a particular law or of legitimate custom having the force of law. For by making the vow the community was able to establish a particular law which also obliges posterity, unless, however, this law has been duly revoked (cf. Decr. auth. S.C.R. nn. 834, 932, 2113). Concerning the dispensation of such an obligation, the same things apply which were said concerning the dispensation of a law.

³⁸⁶ Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 1310, § 2; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 214.

³⁸⁷ L.c., n. 224.

³⁸⁸ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, n. 101.

³⁸⁹ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 5.

403. Scholion. Whether the violation of every vow is sacrilege.

It is disputed among authors whether the culpable violation of any vow has the species of true sacrilege, or only of infidelity or perfidy. Cajetan³⁹⁰ affirms that the violation of every true vow is true sacrilege, because the thing promised by vow is made sacred. But the violation of a sacred thing is sacrilege. The common opinion, however, denies that the sin of sacrilege is present in every violated vow. For if someone, e.g., violates a vow of fasting by an ample supper, he does not seem to have violated a truly sacred thing. Others teach that no violation of a vow other than the violation of a vow of chastity (even a private one) is sacrilege. Finally, others think that the violation of a public vow of chastity (whether simple or solemn) is true sacrilege. This controversy is a dispute about a name. For whether the violation of any vow is called sacrilege or not, there is always a violation of the virtue of religion, and it is grave or light according to the gravity of the matter and the intention of the person vowing.³⁹¹

³⁹⁰ Ib., q. 99, at the end of the question.

³⁹¹ Cf. below, n. 544.

404. Quantity of the obligation. Principle. A vow obliges under grave or light sin according to the quantity of the matter and according to the intention of the person vowing.

Therefore, in order that some vow oblige under grave sin, two things are required: gravity of matter and the intention of the person vowing to bind himself gravely. The reason is that a vow is, as it were, a private law. But a law obliges according to the quantity of the matter prescribed and according to the intention of the legislator, yet in such a way that light matter cannot be prescribed under grave sin, whereas matter grave in itself can be imposed under light sin. Thus similarly, in a private vow, someone can vow matter grave in itself under light sin; but he cannot vow matter light in itself under a grave obligation, since light matter is not capable of a grave obligation.³⁹²

All public vows in religious institutes and in the reception of the subdiaconate are excepted, the matter of which, grave in itself, cannot be undertaken under a light obligation. For grave harm would be inflicted upon ecclesiastical discipline if religious and subdeacons were bound only lightly to those things which they promised by vows.

³⁹² There are several authors, such as Dominic Soto (De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 2, a. 1), Wigandt (Tribunal confessar. tr. 10, exam. 3, n. 32), and Concina (In Decal. l. 4, diss. 2, c. 1, n. 18ff.), who assert that not only public, but also all private vows in grave matter do not admit of an obligation that is merely light, because the person vowing cannot change the nature of the matter of the vow. For just as the person vowing cannot bind himself under grave sin to light matter, so likewise he cannot bind himself to grave matter under light sin. Concina (l.c.) subtly defends this opinion. Nevertheless, the opposite opinion is common today. The reason is that according to St. Thomas (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 3 ad 3), "the obligation of a vow is caused by one's own will and intention." But the fact that the person vowing cannot bind himself under grave sin to light matter proceeds from this, that such a vow would be foolish; on the contrary, it can be very prudent for the person vowing to take upon himself under a light obligation matter otherwise grave.

405. The question immediately now arises: What matter is grave in a vow? General rule: Grave matter in a vow is that which, if it were prescribed by an ecclesiastical law, would oblige under grave sin.³⁹³ But what is grave matter in an ecclesiastical law depends greatly upon the end and circumstances of the law. Thus a law prescribing that a few drops of water be poured into the wine to be consecrated is considered grave, although the matter considered in itself is most light. For this infusion has the grave signification of the union between the humanity and divinity of Christ, or of the conjunction of the faithful people with Christ the Head.

Applications. 1. Matter grave in a vow is considered to be, e.g., Communion to be received, a fast even for one day, a Rosary of five decades to be said, alms of fifty francs to be given, etc., provided, however, that it is not established that the person vowing intended in all these matters promised by vow only a light obligation.

2. In real vows, according to some authors, matter is considered grave which would be grave if the notion of justice intervened. Nevertheless this rule is not to be pressed too much. For if the same quantity were to be called grave in the violation of a vow which is grave in the violation of commutative justice, then in the violation of a vow matter absolutely and relatively grave would also have to be established; or the sin would be lighter if a rich man did not give the sum of fifty francs promised by vow than if a poor man did not give the same sum promised by vow. This certainly disagrees with the common sense both of the faithful and of theologians. Rather, the contrary is to be said: a rich man omitting a real vow of fifty francs sins more gravely than a poor man, because the rich man has greater facility in fulfilling the vow. Besides, if the culpable omission of a Rosary promised by vow is most commonly assigned as grave matter, why would alms of fifty to one hundred francs promised by vow and not given without sufficient reason not also be grave matter? Is saying a Rosary considered more grave than giving alms of fifty to one hundred francs? Hence I think that even a very rich man can bind himself under grave sin by a vow to give the sum of twenty francs, although this matter relative to him is not yet grave in justice. Lehmkuhl³⁹⁴ thinks that to subtract about one percent from a notable sum promised by vow does not seem so notable as to constitute a grave sin. Hence, e.g., if someone vowed to give ten thousand francs to some church and retains one hundred francs, he does not yet sin gravely. This opinion indeed is not approved by me if the person vowing wished to bind himself under grave sin to give the whole sum of ten thousand francs. For in the matter of justice the sum of one hundred francs is without any doubt grave matter. But the obligation of the virtue of religion toward God arising from a vow seems not merely lesser, but rather greater, than the obligation of justice toward one's neighbor; just as other sins against God are also generally graver than sins against one's neighbor.

3. Light matters promised by vow can coalesce into grave matter, so that one who has repeatedly violated a vow in light matter is finally guilty of grave sin. Generally, however, it can be said: Matters do not coalesce in personal vows, but they customarily coalesce in real vows. Nevertheless, exceptions are given. Hence, if someone vowed to recite a decade of the Rosary each day and neglected this vow for one month, there are indeed several venial sins, but no mortal sin, since that vow is personal; nor is there coalescence, since the daily decade of the Rosary was promised by vow as a singular thing. But one who vowed to give alms of two francs each week and neglected this vow for several weeks sinned gravely, since those matters coalesced. If, however, someone vowed to give alms every Saturday in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary and violated this vow for a long time, it is not established whether the alms thus omitted coalesced into grave matter. The presumption indeed stands for coalescence, because the person vowing certainly wished to honor the Blessed Virgin Mary, but nevertheless seems to have intended more principally the worship of God through the relief of the poor. But if the worship of the Blessed Virgin Mary to be rendered on Saturday was altogether primary, whereas the relief of the poor was the secondary end of the person vowing, the omitted alms do not coalesce. In practice, therefore, the intention of the person vowing is first to be investigated; but if this intention is not clearly established, the position favoring the non-coalescence of the matters is to be maintained.

³⁹³ Cf. Salmanticenses, Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, n. 105.

³⁹⁴ Theol. mor. I, n. 595.

406. Fulfillment of the obligation. Principle. Vows are to be fulfilled in that manner and at that time which the person vowing intended in the act of vowing. But when a doubt arises concerning the manner of the obligation and fulfillment, the same rules of interpretation are to be employed which apply to the interpretation of laws.

This principle is easily understood if it is kept before one's eyes that a vow is after the manner of a law in which the person vowing is himself the legislator, who can freely determine and limit for himself all the circumstances of the obligation.

Concerning the time for the fulfillment of a vow, the following things are to be noted:

1. A negative vow (e.g., of not frequenting taverns, of not gambling, etc.) obliges immediately, always, and forever, just as in general all negative laws oblige. Therefore, immediately when such a vow has been made, it is no longer lawful to perform the action concerning the omission of which the vow was made. This is evident of itself.

2. If the time for the fulfillment of the vow was determined by the person vowing, then the vow is to be fulfilled at that appointed time, without its being necessary to anticipate it, even if an impediment to its fulfillment otherwise arising is foreseen. Hence, e.g., a young man who vowed that he would make a pilgrimage in the month of October is not bound to make the pilgrimage in September, even if he now knows that he will be impeded in October because of military service. The reason is that no one is bound to fulfill a law before it obliges.

3. One who did not fulfill a vow at the appointed time is no longer bound, nor can he even fulfill it at a subsequent time, if the appointed time was set as the terminus of the obligation or, as it is customarily said, for terminating the obligation. Hence, e.g., one who vows a fast every Saturday in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary neither ought nor is able to make up such an omitted fast on the following Monday. Therefore, if the omission of the fast on Saturday was inculpable, he committed no sin and is bound to nothing further. But if the omission was culpable, he committed a sin and can no longer satisfy the vow. The time is considered to have been appointed for terminating the obligation when it is intended per se and not accidentally, e.g., because of a special devotion to be rendered at that time, such as to make a meditation on the Passion of Christ every Friday in Lent. But if the person vowing designated the time not as the terminus of the obligation, but rather to urge the fulfillment, namely, lest the fulfillment be deferred too long, then, when such time has elapsed, the obligation of the vow does not cease, but remains to be fulfilled as soon as possible. But one who did not observe the time determined for the fulfillment of the vow sins if the omission was culpable, and that gravely or lightly according to the gravity of the matter.

What matter of delay is grave is difficult to assign in practice, since this depends upon many circumstances, e.g., upon the nature of the vow, the age of the person vowing, the danger of the obligation not being fulfilled, etc. Especially in vows which suffer some diminution from delay will grave matter more easily be present. St. Alphonsus³⁹⁵ thinks it to be a grave sin if someone without sufficient reason defers for more than six months entrance into religion promised by vow; but he calls lax the opinion of those who teach that a delay of this vow for two or three years made without a just cause is not a mortal sin. Certainly, if someone without any sufficient cause were to defer entrance into religion promised by vow, he would not only deprive himself of the great spiritual good of the religious life, but would also expose himself to the proximate danger of losing a religious vocation. But if some reasonable cause for the delay is present (e.g., bodily health not yet sufficiently firm, the resistance of parents, some business still to be completed, etc.), and if the proximate danger of losing the religious vocation is absent, a delay even for several years does not seem sinful. In other vows, however, which suffer almost no detriment from delay, according to several authors any delay whatsoever, even one made without cause, does not exceed a venial fault; because, they say, when someone gives all that he promised and no harm comes to the promisee from the delay, he does not seem to be condemned for a grave fault, but for light negligence.³⁹⁶

4. When no determined time has been appointed for the fulfillment of a vow, the person vowing should earnestly strive to fulfill that which he promised as soon as it can be done. For it is said in Sacred Scripture: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."³⁹⁷

³⁹⁵ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 221.

³⁹⁶ Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 3, § 2.

³⁹⁷ Deut. 23:21.

407. On the obligation of a conditional, disjunctive, penal, and doubtful vow.

1. If a vow was made not absolutely but conditionally, it does not oblige unless the condition has been verified. Hence the obligation of the vow remains suspended so long as the condition has not been fulfilled. It is not lawful, however, by fraudulent and unjust means to impede the occurrence of the condition. Hence, e.g., he sins against his vow who vowed to God that he would enter a monastery after the marriage of his sister, but now by fraudulent and unjust means dissuades his sister from entering marriage.

I say, however: by unjust means; for no one is prohibited from employing just means. Hence he who by opportune entreaties or persuasion impedes the fulfillment of the condition is not guilty of a violated vow. Likewise, a conditional vow does not strictly oblige if the condition was fulfilled not properly but only equivalently. E.g., if someone vowed entrance into a monastery when his mother, whom he is bound to support, should find a suitable marriage, he is not bound (strictly speaking) to enter the monastery if the mother should unexpectedly die, although the obstacle to entering the monastery, namely, the support of his mother, has now been removed. The reason is that a vow is a bond. But a bond ought not to bind beyond the limits clearly established. It is evident of itself that in this and similar cases it is better either to fulfill the vow or to seek a dispensation or commutation.

2. Concerning the obligation of a disjunctive vow, note a few things from St. Alphonsus³⁹⁸ and the Salmanticenses.³⁹⁹

a) If someone has vowed disjunctively a good thing or an evil, vain, or impossible thing, such a vow is null. The reason is that the person vowing can choose the evil, vain, or impossible thing, and then the vow would be null because of the unsuitability of the matter. But since he is free to choose either matter, the whole vow is null from the beginning. E.g., if someone very oppressed by financial difficulties were to vow: either I shall enter among the Carthusians or I shall commit theft from a very rich man, the whole vow is null from the beginning.

b) If someone has vowed disjunctively several good things and consequently suitable matters of a vow, he must choose one of them. But if after the choice has been made the other things promised under the disjunction become impossible, he is nevertheless bound to perform the thing once chosen. Conversely, if either thing promised by vow perishes or is rendered impossible before the choice without fault of the person vowing, the vow ceases. The reason is that the person vowing has now been deprived of the liberty of choice, and that without his fault. E.g., if someone promised by vow that he would give one of two chalices which he possessed, and one chalice was lost to him by theft or fire, he is no longer bound to hand over the other chalice. But if, through the fault of the person vowing, for example because he culpably deferred fulfilling the vow, either thing became impossible, the person vowing is bound to perform the other part, since no one ought to derive an advantage from his own fault. Moreover, in these disjunctive vows the intention of the person vowing is especially to be attended to; if it is clear, the vow is to be fulfilled according to it and not according to the material sense of the words: for God, to whom the promise is made in the vow and who searches hearts, is not to be deceived by the subtleties of casuists.

3. Concerning the obligation of a penal vow, a doubt can arise whether the penalty imposed for the transgression of the promise is to be paid once, or as often as the promise is violated. E.g., when someone vowed that he would give ten marks if he became drunk again, is he bound to give this promised sum once after the first drunkenness committed, or as often as he should afterwards become drunk? St. Alphonsus,⁴⁰⁰ following the Salmanticenses,⁴⁰¹ replies that the penalty is to be paid only for the first time if the vow made was simple; but if the vow was twofold, namely, not to become drunk and to pay the penalty, then the penalty is to be paid as often as the vow is violated, unless, however, this penalty is most grave, such as a pilgrimage or the bestowal of great alms. In practice the intention of the person vowing is to be attended to; if it is doubtful, the position favoring the lesser obligation is to be maintained.

4. Concerning the obligation of a doubtful vow, judgment is to be made according to the rules given above, I, nn. 328ff., concerning a doubtful and probable conscience. Then the rules of right interpretation, to be given immediately, are to be attended to.

³⁹⁸ L.c., n. 224.

³⁹⁹ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, n. 141.

⁴⁰⁰ L.c., n. 223.

⁴⁰¹ L.c., n. 177.

408. On the interpretation of vows.

Rule 1. A private vow is first to be interpreted according to the expressed or presumed intention of the person vowing.

The reason is that a vow is, as it were, a private law, whose legislator is the person vowing himself. But the best interpretation of a law is that which conforms to the expressed or presumed mind of the legislator. Therefore a private vow also is to be interpreted first according to the mind of the person vowing.

Public vows, such as the essential vows in religious institutes, are to be interpreted according to the sound doctrine of authors.

Rule 2. When the intention of the person vowing neither clearly appears nor can prudently be presumed, then the vow is to be interpreted according to the common usage of men or the general custom of the Church.

Hence one who vowed the Rosary can recite it alternately with a companion, for thus the custom of the Church bears. One who vowed a fast for a month is not bound to fast on Sundays, since fasting on Sunday is contrary to the custom of the Church; he can also use milk foods and generally employ those dispensations which are granted in his region to all the faithful during Lent. One who vowed to enter the religious state can enter any approved religious institute; but if after entrance he is dismissed by the superiors, he is not bound to make the attempt again in another religious institute, especially since according to the discipline now in force⁴⁰² no one dismissed from some religious institute after profession can be received into another religious institute without a special Apostolic dispensation. But the petition for such a dispensation (which is not so easily granted) seems to be an extraordinary means to which no one is bound for the fulfillment of his vow. One who vowed to hear Mass daily is not bound on Sundays and feast days to hear two Masses, etc.

Rule 3. In a doubt concerning the existence or extent of some vow, it is lawful to embrace the more benign part.

For the bond of a vow is not to be supposed but proved; and "in obscure matters the minimum is to be followed."⁴⁰³ But when a doubt arises whether the vow has been fulfilled or not, the same rules are to be employed which were indicated above, I, nn. 230 and 333, concerning a law doubtfully fulfilled.

⁴⁰² Cf. Sacred Congregation of Religious, 7 Sept. 1909 and 4 Jan. 1910; Code of Canon Law, c. 542.

⁴⁰³ Rule of law 30 in VI°.