Occasions of sin and absolution

An occasion of sin is an external circumstance which leads one to commit sin. It is a proximate occasion if, when a person is placed in it, it leads him to commit sin oftener than not; otherwise it is remote. It is a necessary occasion if he cannot avoid it by using ordinary diligence; otherwise it is voluntary.

(a) There is no necessity to avoid remote occasions of sin, for it is not possible to do so, and in spite of them sin may be avoided by using the proper means.

(b) We are bound to avoid proximate and voluntary occasions of sin, for we cannot remain in them without exposing ourselves to the proximate danger of committing sin, and if we voluntarily choose to remain in a proximate occasion we voluntarily choose the sin. As we are bound to avoid sin we are bound to take the necessary means for that end. This doctrine is confirmed by the 61st, 62nd, and 63rd propositions, condemned by Innocent XI.

(c) A necessary occasion is one which we cannot avoid. It is physically necessary if we cannot physically get away from it; it is morally necessary if it is more difficult to avoid it than to keep from sin while in it by using proper means and precautions.

There is no obligation to avoid necessary occasions of sin, for we cannot be obliged to do what is impossible; but we are bound to take the necessary means to avoid sin in spite of being in the occasion, and such means are always at hand if we have the good will to use them, for God’s goodness will never permit us to be tried above our strength. By using the means to avoid sin while placed in an occasion of sin, we make the proximate occasion remote, as theologians say.

It follows from this that one who finds his ordinary avocation in life, which is supposed to be an honest one, a proximate occasion of sin to him is seldom bound to give it up; he is only bound to make the occasion remote, which is generally possible with a good will and the help of God’s grace.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 11 passages

Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. IV, Article I. On Those in Occasions in General

n. 455.

I. Notion of occasion. An occasion is a person or external thing which creates for a person a danger of sinning.

n. 456.

II. Division of occasion.

Occasion is distinguished into remote and proximate. Remote is that which creates a light danger; proximate is that which creates a grave danger, that is, such a danger in which someone is certainly, more probably, or probably going to fall. Such are, for example, a tavern for a drunkard, a master for a maidservant seduced by him. For the rest, the presence of a proximate occasion can be gathered both a priori and a posteriori. It is gathered a priori when, considering the enticement of the object and the disposition of the subject, it is at least probable that someone is going to fall. It is gathered a posteriori through experience or frequency of falls, namely if someone in a certain occasion, considering the times in which he was exposed to the occasion, has fallen so frequently that it is probable that, with the occasion present, he is going to fall again (St. Alphonsus, VI, 452).

Many call a proximate occasion that in which someone is certainly, or almost certainly, or very probably going to fall. Hence, in order to gather from experience whether an occasion is proximate, they require that someone always, or almost always, or altogether more frequently, has sinned in it. But that the definition of St. Alphonsus handed down by us is right will be clear from what is to be said, since an occasion is already rightly called proximate when there is of itself an obligation of avoiding it physically. But, as we shall prove, there is of itself an obligation of avoiding even that occasion in which someone is only probably going to fall.

Proximate occasion is subdivided into:

a) Absolute and relative, according as it creates a danger for people commonly or for a certain person.

b) Continuous and interrupted, according as it occurs habitually or at intervals.

c) Voluntary and necessary. Voluntary is that which can be avoided without grave inconvenience. Necessary is that which either physically cannot be avoided or cannot be avoided without grave inconvenience. But in order that an occasion can be called necessary, an inconvenience is required the graver in proportion as the danger of damnation, the danger of sinning, the sin to be feared, and the scandal to arise from the occasion are greater. Wherefore note two condemned propositions, namely proposition 62 proscribed by Innocent XI: "A proximate occasion of sinning is not to be fled when some useful or honest cause for not fleeing occurs";² and proposition 41 condemned by Alexander VII: "A concubinary is not to be obliged to cast out the concubine if she would be too useful for the pleasure of the concubinary, commonly regalo, since, with her lacking, he would live life too bitterly, and other banquets would affect the concubinary with great weariness, and another female servant would be too difficult to find."³ Therefore an occasion should not easily be held as necessary. In addition note that the difficulty of renouncing the occasion is commonly exaggerated by penitents (St. Alphonsus, 452, 454).

¹ Cf. Ter Haar, De occasionariis et recidivis.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1212.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1141.

n. 457.

III. Obligation of avoiding occasions. First it must be noted that an occasion of sinning can be avoided physically or morally: physically, that is, by removing or abandoning it; morally, that is, by bringing it about in another way that the danger of sinning ceases to persist. Next it must be observed that we are speaking expressly of occasions of sinning gravely. Now:

There is no obligation of avoiding remote occasions of sinning gravely. The reason is that such an obligation would bring with it an intolerable burden to be borne through one's whole life and continual anxieties; for occasions of this kind continually occur to a person. But it cannot be admitted that a burden of this kind has been imposed on people. Some indeed think that of itself there is a venial obligation; but the argument seems also to exclude that obligation.

n. 458.

As regards proximate occasions of sinning gravely, these things hold:

a) There is a grave obligation of physically avoiding a voluntary proximate occasion of sinning gravely. The proposition thus stated now seems commonly to be admitted, and it is deduced from proposition 61 condemned by Innocent XI: "One who is in a proximate occasion of sinning, which he can and does not will to omit, indeed directly and deliberately seeks or thrusts himself into it, can sometimes be absolved." Now the words of omitting, seeking, and thrusting oneself into it seem altogether to have to be understood of physical avoidance. Next, the proposition stated is proved by the same argument by which the proposition now to be stated is proved.

n. 459.

b) There is a grave obligation of physically avoiding a voluntary proximate occasion, as it has been defined by us; in other words, there is a grave obligation of physically avoiding also that voluntary occasion in which someone is only probably going to fall. For each person is held to avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally; or to proceed here and now in such a way that he is not probably going to sin gravely. But one who does not physically avoid a voluntary occasion in which he is probably going to fall does not avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally.

The major is clear from the fact that one who does not avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally does not truly and simply turn away from the formal offense of God, nor truly and simply turn away from his own supreme evil.

The minor is proved thus: one who does not physically avoid a voluntary occasion in which he is probably going to fall cannot avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally, except through the help of God, by which the danger here and now ceases to be grave. But one who does not physically avoid a voluntary occasion, that is, an occasion which he can easily avoid, cannot without rashness expect the help of God.

The subsumed minor is proved. The help of God, as gratuitous, cannot legitimately be expected except insofar as it is necessary. But it is in no way necessary where the occasion is voluntary, because this can easily be physically avoided; and once it has been avoided, help for resisting it is no longer required (St. Alphonsus, V, 63; VI, 452). These words of the Council of Trent are added: God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes both to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot, and he helps so that you can.¹ Likewise these words of St. Thomas: "Tempting God consists in this, when a man omits to do what he can for escaping dangers, looking only to divine help" (II-II, q. 97, a. 1).

Nor should you object that divine help can be expected, provided it is asked for. For the said help can be expected by one asking only when it is necessary. Indeed, a petition of this kind is not even honest, and therefore it can exercise no influence upon God: the petition of departing from the occasion is honest; the petition of conquering while you remain in the occasion is dishonest.

As regards the doctrine of theologians, I note that most earlier theologians of greater note adhere to the opinion defended, as Ter Haar proves by the testimonies brought forward.² St. Thomas has these things: "The weak in faith, whose subversion can probably be feared, are to be prohibited from association with unbelievers" (II-II, q. 10, a. 9). St. Alphonsus strenuously defends the same opinion in the places cited, and very many, even those who wrote after St. Alphonsus, defend it, as the praised Ter Haar again shows.³

Corollary. The genuine definition of proximate occasion is this: it is an occasion in which someone is at least probably going to fall. For a proximate occasion is that which there is of itself an obligation of avoiding physically. But from what has been said it follows that there is of itself an obligation of physically avoiding an occasion in which someone is at least probably going to fall.

Objection 1. It does not appear why he truly sins gravely who has an altogether notable probability that in this occasion which he approaches he is not going to sin gravely; for he does not choose a thing which by moral necessity brings sin with it.

Response. It suffices, as follows from the argument brought forward, that someone choose a thing such that, once it is posited, he will probably commit sin.

Objection 2. If from the nature of things or from experience it is clear that probably the sin will be avoided, this is a sign that the danger can be avoided with those ordinary helps of grace which can prudently be expected and asked by any person.

Response. I deny the consequent, since the divine help of which there is discussion cannot prudently be expected and asked in the hypothesis posited, because it is not necessary, as we have said.

Objection 3. Because by hypothesis it is also probable that sin will not follow, one who for a reasonable cause commits himself to such an occasion cannot be accused of rashness and said to will sin.

Response. I deny the consequent, since one who without grave cause exposes himself to a grave danger of a grave evil is deservedly accused of rashness. But since in the hypothesis posited it is also probable that sin will follow, the matter concerns a grave danger of a grave evil, that is, of sinning mortally.

Objection 4. In several texts of authors alleged by Berardi and Ter Haar in their favor, the question is only of probable danger, and it is not established that the authors did not understand a probability to which nothing is opposed, and which therefore would be equivalent to moral certitude.

Response. An interpretation of this kind does not agree with the customary meaning of the words.

Note. If someone without cause enters into a danger, but uses such means as remove the very impulse to sin, he is not to be said to expose himself rashly to danger; rather the danger is now not present. For example, if someone always steals when he is alone in some house, he can go there if people are present.

¹ Session 6, chapter 11.

² Ter Haar, cited work, nn. 53-55; nn. 63, 64.

³ Ter Haar, cited work, n. 65.

n. 460.

c) There is no obligation of physically avoiding a necessary proximate occasion. For one who for a grave reason exposes himself to a grave danger cannot be accused of rashness, and therefore can rightly hope that, with means having been used, he will acquire divine help by which the proximate occasion ceases to be such. "And thus surgeons are excused if they expose themselves to danger in treating women, when sometimes in the past they have already fallen because of such an occasion. And thus pastors who have experienced the same misery in receiving confessions. Thus also others are excused who cannot abandon their own office, for instance that of clerk, soldier, tavern-keeper, or merchant, without grave detriment" (St. Alphonsus, V, 63; VI, 455). The same must be said of those for whom, on account of a vehement inclination to evil, innumerable things are proximate occasions. They are indeed held to use means of not sinning, but they are not held to avoid all those things; this would be a very grave burden, and by itself alone already excuses.

n. 461.

Question 1. Whether one is bound, even with very grave damage, to abandon the occasion if he continually neglects to use remedies, and therefore continually relapses.

Response. The affirmative answer seems altogether to be given; for each person is held to avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally, or is held here and now to proceed in such a way that he is not probably going to sin gravely (St. Alphonsus, VI, 457). But the person of whom we speak is probably, not to say almost certainly, going to sin formally unless he abandons the occasion. Therefore he is bound to abandon it.

The minor is drawn from the fact that one who has continually neglected the remedies to be used will probably, not to say almost certainly, neglect them again, and therefore will probably sin again.

Objection. The penitent is bound only either to use the means or to avoid the occasion. Therefore the confessor cannot impose on him the obligation of avoiding the occasion.

Response. In the case the penitent is held to choose the means of avoiding the occasion, because he probably, indeed almost certainly, is not going to use the other means. Nor does the confessor impose that obligation on him, but the law of nature does. But let the confessor teach the penitent the obligation; nor of itself should he abstain from admonition for this reason, that the penitent who neglects the means will not use the more difficult means of abandoning the occasion. For, as Ter Haar observes, "often it is easier for a rightly disposed penitent to posit one very difficult and quasi-heroic act, namely to break off a morally necessary occasion, than afterward, when fervor has diminished and temptation has increased, through a long time, perhaps through months and years, daily to use those remedies of vigilance and prayer with constant struggle against his own passions and the snares of enticements."¹

Question 2. Whether one is bound, even with very grave damage, to abandon the occasion if, although he uses remedies, he nevertheless always relapses in the same way.

Response. The case will not easily occur, because a penitent who diligently uses the means will commonly be amended little by little. But if it occurs, the affirmative answer must be given, because, as we have just said, each person is held to avoid a danger, here and now grave, of sinning formally. But the one of whom we speak is probably, not to say almost certainly, going to sin formally unless he abandons the occasion. There is added that, at least in the hypothesis posited, these words of Christ urge: "If your eye scandalizes you, pluck it out and cast it from you: it is good for you to enter into life with one eye, rather than having two eyes to be cast into the hell of fire."² (St. Alphonsus, VI, 457). Finally, in the work of Pellizzari De Monialibus, the Sacred Congregation of the Index willed the contrary opinion to be suppressed by decree of April 21, 1693.

¹ Ter Haar, De occasionariis et recidivis, n. 176.

² Matthew 18:9.

n. 462.

IV. Absolution of those in occasions. As regards the absolution of those in occasions, these things especially come to be noted:

One who is in a proximate, voluntary, and continuous occasion to which he is strongly attached should not be absolved before he has physically or quasi-physically¹ abandoned the occasion, unless there is a special reason for granting absolution at once. This is deduced first from the fact that "such a penitent is indisposed for absolution if he asks for it before he removes the occasion" (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 66). Moreover, he is indisposed because he exposes himself to a grave danger of breaking his purpose, that is, of not removing the proximate occasion. St. Alphonsus explains this in this way: "Removal of the occasion is a greatly arduous thing, and does not happen unless one inflicts great force on himself, so that he may be torn away from that occasion to which, because of the past adhesion of his mind, he remains strongly inclined. And therefore, if the occasion is not removed before absolution, the penitent will easily deceive himself after absolution, falsely persuading himself that he will resist temptations; and thus, with the occasion not dismissed, he will certainly return to his vomit" (VI, 454; III, 436). But if the penitent does not notice the danger, of itself he must be admonished by the confessor; and once admonished he becomes indisposed if nevertheless he wills to receive absolution immediately. There is added that the confessor as physician is of himself held to use a means without which the penitent is exposed to grave danger of breaking his purpose (St. Alphonsus, cited place). Finally, theologians by far more commonly admit the proposition stated. Thus, for example, St. Charles Borromeo, St. Thomas of Villanova, St. Francis Xavier, St. Leonard of Port Maurice, Venerable Paul Segneri, Lehmkuhl, Bucceroni, Prummer, and others, whose testimonies Ter Haar brings forward.²

What the special reasons are for departing from the rule, or granting absolution at once, see n. 407.

Objection 1. The opinion of St. Alphonsus rests on a doubtful foundation, namely that he sins gravely who exposes himself only to probable sin.

Response. By referring to the proof of that doctrine and the refutation of those things which are opposed to it (n. 468).

Objection 2. The earlier theologians only counsel, and do not prescribe, the opinion which St. Alphonsus defends.

Response. An interpretation of this kind is opposed to the obvious and clear sense of the testimonies of which there was discussion above.

¹ For instance, if the matter concerns a maidservant, by renouncing service, even if she does not depart immediately.

² Ter Haar, cited work, n. 117 sq.

n. 463.

One who is in a proximate, voluntary, and continuous occasion should not be absolved before he has used the assigned means, unless there is a special reason for granting absolution at once. The reason is that, considering the very great blandishments of the present occasion and the danger arising from it of neglecting the assigned means, the will of the penitent must be sustained by the remedy of delay. "For I judge," says St. Alphonsus, "that the confessor as physician is bound to apply to his penitent the more opportune remedies, so that he may work his salvation; and I think that no more apt antidote can be administered to one who is in a proximate occasion than delay of absolution. For experience teaches that penitents, after they depart absolved, for the most part neglect to use the prescribed means, and thus they relapse most easily. On the contrary, when absolution is denied to them, they strive more vigilantly to carry out the remedies and to resist temptations, moved indeed by fear lest, when they return to the confessor, they again be dismissed without absolution" (VI, 456). What the special reasons are for departing from the rule or granting absolution at once, see n. 407.

n. 464.

One who approaches a proximate, voluntary, and interrupted occasion, and returns twice or three times after being absolved without any amendment:

a) If he shows only ordinary signs of disposition, of himself he cannot be absolved; for since he has already several times not avoided the occasion, although he could easily have avoided it, there is deserved doubt about the disposition. He can be absolved under condition if some one of the causes assigned in n. 404 is present.

b) If either of himself or after being admonished by the confessor he shows an extraordinary sign of disposition, he can be held as sufficiently disposed and absolved (St. Alphonsus, VI, 454; Praxis Confessarii, n. 66).

n. 465.

One in an occasion who is a habituated relapser is to be treated according as was set forth in nn. 461-463, where we spoke about habituated relapsers (St. Alphonsus, VI, 455, 456).

Corollary. Let the confessor not omit to assign to the penitent who is in or approaches a necessary proximate occasion remedies for not sinning; these are:

To diminish the force of the occasion. Not rarely a few words said with strong spirit, a serious threat or reproach, an opening of the mouth to cry out, or reporting the matter to someone who can apply a remedy, suffice so that the perfidious insidiator is cast down in spirit and ceases from every annoyance. Then he ought to avoid being alone with a lone person, flee all familiarity, and as far as can be done even the sight of the accomplice, not speak about him or her, not think about him or her, and similar things. In addition, if the occasion is not presently existing, he ought, insofar as can be done, to shorten his stay in it and quickly finish the necessary business.
To diminish the force of passion by furnishing no encouragement to it through idleness, liberty of the senses, depraved thoughts, depraved reading, intemperance, and so forth; likewise by subjecting it through labor, fasts, and other mortifications, if possible.
To increase spiritual strength by prayer, frequenting of the sacraments, and meditation on eternal truths. Daily, especially in the morning, let him renew the purpose of sinning no more, more profitably before a Crucifix. If the occasion is not presently existing, let him always renew the same purpose before he approaches it.¹

¹ Berardi, nn. 79-83; Aertnys-Damen, II, n. 478.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 2 passages

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On Penance

n. 809.

Absolution of the Habitual Sinner and of One in an Occasion of Sin

“60. Absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred to a penitent who has the habit of sinning against the law of God, of nature, or of the Church, even if no hope of amendment appears, provided that he says orally that he is sorry and proposes amendment.”—“61. One who remains in a proximate occasion of sin which he can but does not wish to leave, and indeed directly and deliberately seeks it out or thrusts himself into it, can sometimes be absolved.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

n. 809.

“41. A concubinary is not to be obliged to dismiss his concubine if she would be exceedingly useful for the concubinary’s pleasure—commonly, regalo—since, if she were absent, he would live his life with too much difficulty, other dishes would affect the concubinary with great weariness, and another maidservant would be found only with great difficulty.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII.

Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 23 passages

135. On Relapsers and Those in Occasions

Alphonsus, a confessor, does not grant absolution to penitents unless he is altogether certain of their good dispositions. Hence he always grants absolution to relapsers and those in occasions the first, second, and third time; but afterward he always denies absolution to all relapsers and those in occasions, unless first the former abstain from every relapse and the latter remove the occasion. Finally, he always defers absolution for all when he himself is doubtful about the dispositions of the penitents.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. The manner of acting of Alphonsus cannot be approved, and he seems not to act well in all things. For first, so that the confessor can grant absolution, it is by no means required that he have complete certainty about the good dispositions of the penitent; but "it is enough that the confessor have a prudent probability concerning the disposition of the penitent, and that on the other side a prudent suspicion of indisposition not stand in the way; otherwise hardly anyone could be absolved, since whatever signs of penitents furnish only probability of disposition." St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 461.

Always to grant absolution to relapsers and those in occasions the first, second, and third time is not right. For the fact that relapsers and those in occasions of this sort have not previously approached confession, or have approached only once and again, certainly is not an argument of the good disposition of those penitents, who can well approach confession without the necessary contrition. Therefore the norm of absolution to be given cannot be that the penitent confesses the first or second or third time, but the prudent judgment in the confessor concerning sorrow and purpose. Indeed, "the penitent must be absolved as often as he seriously proposes to amend in the future and altogether to abstain, provided that the confessor prudently believes that he truly proposes and speaks seriously." Sporer, c. 2, n. 330, cited by St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 463, as handing down the common opinion.

It is also not right always to deny absolution to relapsers, unless first they abstain from every relapse. If it were so, then that would have to be deleted which is contained in the Roman Ritual, Order of Administering the Sacrament of Penance: "But to those confessing more rarely or later, or easily falling back into sins, it will have been most useful to counsel that they confess often, say once in a month, or on certain solemn days, and, if it is expedient, communicate." How will they be able to communicate unless they are first absolved? Nevertheless there is question also of relapsers, and of relapsers easily falling back into sin.

Likewise it is not right always to deny absolution to those in occasions, unless first they remove the occasion. For first, according to the opinion which St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 457 at the end, affirms to be held most commonly, any penitent and always can be absolved who approaches confession with true sorrow and purpose, so that hope of amendment shines forth. Besides, an occasion can be voluntary, from which one can withdraw by his own will; but it can also be necessary, which one cannot remove; nor indeed is he bound to remove it, speaking absolutely, but he is bound only to render it remote from proximate, by using the means which a prudent and discreet confessor will suggest. Therefore if the penitent truly uses these means and tries not to sin, although in fact he has sinned, he can still sincerely grieve and propose; and the very means used and the effort employed can be an argument of that sincere sorrow and purpose. Indeed even still, after experience of no progress, true sorrow and the required purpose can stand, without the will of taking away the occasion with so great a detriment. Therefore the penitent can be absolved. For nothing else is required except confession with sorrow and purpose. Finally, as St. Alphonsus also says, l. 6, n. 454: "The doctors commonly affirm that the penitent is not bound to dismiss the occasion, if otherwise he is going to suffer grave temporal harm, provided meanwhile he is prepared to use the prescribed means ... The reason is that the occasion of sinning is not in itself a sin, nor does it bring a necessity of sinning; wherefore true detestation of sins, and a firm purpose of not relapsing and of using due remedies, can well stand together with it."

It is likewise not right that absolution is always to be deferred when the confessor is doubtful about the dispositions of the penitent. For even in that case of doubt absolution is to be given, although conditionally, if from absolution denied grave spiritual harm of the penitent would follow. Gury, Comp., vol. 2, n. 435.

Therefore it must be said that in this matter of absolution to be granted, deferred, or denied, "a certain rule cannot be established, but the confessor must direct himself from the occurring circumstances." St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 463. And from circumstances of this sort he will easily be able to form a prudent judgment concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent. And, if the priest, clothed with the bowels of the mercy of Christ, who did not come to call the just but sinners, knows how to act studiously, patiently, meekly with those penitents who seem unprepared, and by every industry of charity to stir them to sorrow and purpose, it will indeed be difficult for them not to exhibit some sufficient sign of their mind. Cf. Commentarium De absolutione danda, differenda, deneganda, ed. 5.

Titius, a priest receiving the confessions of the faithful in the church on the day on which the solemn feast of the Blessed Virgin was celebrated with a great concourse of people, among several others imparted absolution to a certain drunken old man, who had abstained from the sacraments for ten years; besides, to a certain young man devoted for about seven years to impurities and self-abuse, although he had been accustomed several times a year to approach the sacrament of penance; finally, to a certain woman who was living after the manner of a prostitute, and who, although with abundant tears she deplored the things admitted by her and detested her most wretched state, nevertheless feared greatly lest from want she would be impelled to relapse again.

Having returned into the sacristy, Titius, exulting with joy, cries out: "Oh, how salutarily these feasts have been instituted! It can scarcely be said what very abundant fruits are perceived from the sacrament of penance!" Then he recounts the three cases reviewed, in general words, to Caius the confessor, who by chance was present. This man greatly wondered at the manner of acting of Titius; for he could not persuade himself how to sinners of this kind, without any intervening delay, and before the habit had been amended and relapse avoided, absolution could be conceded. For he held as certain that there was no truer and safer sign of penance than to abstain from sins, and that he who with a sincere heart proposes that he will sin no more will not relapse so quickly, just as a house solidly built does not fall so quickly. And so a contention arises between them on this matter, to which, that an end may be imposed, both together consult a theologian most distinguished in doctrine and reputation. Having learned the question, he asks within himself:

1.º What comes under the name of customary sinner and relapser? - 2.º What signs of penance must be present in sinners of this sort, so that they can be absolved? - 3.º What must be judged about the manner of thinking and acting of each confessor, as in the Case?

R. To the 1st. Customary sinners are here called those who have contracted the custom of sinning. But this custom, as in all moral matters, is not fixed and determined by such a number of falls; but from greater or lesser frequency it has a certain breadth. He is a customary sinner who blasphemes twenty or ten times in a week, and he also is a customary sinner who blasphemes only five times or once in a week. But relapsers are called those who after confession, although admonished by the confessor, relapse into the same sins, without any or almost any amendment. Wherefore although customary sinners are also relapsers, nevertheless they are not here called relapsers unless after confession they relapse into the same sins, having already been admonished before, and fall back without any or almost any amendment.

To the 2nd. Relapse into sins, whether others or the same, cannot of itself impede absolution. For to the sinner, by the sentence of Jesus Christ himself, not only seven times, but even seventy-seven times, it is forgiven. Hence it is plainly evident that amendment already following, as it is not necessary and essential to true penance, so neither is it necessarily prerequired for absolution. But another thing is plainly evident from this: also with regard to customary sinners and relapsers it is said without any foundation that they can be absolved at least the first time, or once and again, or three times, or three and four times. For if such a relapser could be absolved the first and fourth time, this was because he had contrition and purpose; why therefore could he not have it also the fifth and sixth time? Hence, if a relapser always has it, he can always, speaking absolutely, be absolved. But by what signs is sufficient contrition and sufficient purpose discerned? There are those who require extraordinary signs. But besides the fact that the extraordinary signs which they assign are at least in several things confused with ordinary ones and can also be fallacious, why can ordinary signs not suffice the second time, for example, if they sufficed the first? Why will he who quite seriously affirms and proves by the whole tenor of his confession that he has sorrow and purpose the first time not be able also the second and third and fourth and fifth time quite seriously to affirm and demonstrate the sincere penance of his mind? Wherefore again this is the whole difficulty: to judge prudently about the sincerity of sorrow and purpose, by whatever signs someone may finally be led to a prudent judgment of this sort. Yet it must not be denied that, although absolution can be given, sometimes nevertheless it is expedient to defer it; and this holds both for relapsers and for those in occasions, namely when that delay is judged going to profit the penitent. For if to the office of judge belongs the judgment of absolution to be given or denied, to the office of physician belongs giving it at an opportune time for the greater utility of the penitent. Wherefore, if the confessor judges that delay useful to the spiritual good of the penitent, he can prudently defer it, without being bound to do so, namely if the penitent is sufficiently disposed. Moreover, almost all agree that one must act more mildly both with those who are placed in a necessary occasion, because they are held by a graver difficulty, and with customary sinners and relapsers, because they labor under a greater infirmity. St. Alphonsus also has the doctrine handed down, as to the very substance of the matter, who in Homo Apostolicus, last treatise, n. 13, says: "Whenever some sign is present by which it can prudently be judged that the penitent has changed his will, he can be absolved well." And in the same place the Holy Doctor treats of those in occasions and relapsers.

To the 3rd. Titius acted well by absolving the drunken old man, who had abstained from the sacraments for ten years. For what doubt can there be that that drunken man, approaching the sacraments again of his own accord after ten years, was moved by sincere penance? A sign is certainly present by which the penitent can prudently be judged to have changed his will. The young man devoted to self-abuse could also be absolved, if namely Titius had first suitably stirred him to sorrow and purpose. Spontaneous frequency of the sacraments certainly is a sign of sincere will. It will perhaps also be useful, because that man was accustomed several times a year to approach the sacraments, if Titius frightens him somewhat and shows, as St. Alphonsus says in the place cited, n. 15, as though he could not absolve him. Likewise Titius acted well by absolving the prostitute, who showed not only ordinary signs but also, with abundant tears, extraordinary signs of contrition. Fear of future relapse does not impede the sincerity of present sorrow, and therefore there could be no difficulty of absolving on this account.

But as regards Caius, amendment of life following is certainly the best sign of penance, but true penance can be had also without it. This, from the things just related among others, is plainly established from proposition 36 of the Synod of Pistoia, condemned by Pius VI. Likewise, from the fact that someone relapses quickly after sorrow and purpose and after confession, speaking absolutely, there is no argument of defect of sincere penance. For someone, recalling his mind from worldly things and remembering his last things, with the grace of God aiding, can conceive true and perfect contrition. Once this has been conceived, at once, for example, an occasion of sinning presents itself, placing the matter before the senses, vehemently striking the imagination, more sharply irritating the mind; whence, thinking worldly things again, he adheres to worldly things, and this according to the liberty and mutability of the human will. Wherefore he who just now truly loved God, now loves creatures; as he who just now truly sat, now stands. Nevertheless it must likewise not be denied that some prudent suspicion of defect of sincere penance can be had from the fact that the penitent, admonished and already often admonished, returns without any or almost any amendment. For in reality to what prudent man ought that good faith not to seem suspect, which someone has always disappointed? But, since this is only suspicion, presumption, and conjecture from the very fact of purpose not observed, the matter must be carefully examined with all its circumstances, and then, if the disposition of the penitent still prudently appears doubtful, absolution certainly cannot be given to him, but it is either to be denied, or at least deferred. But that is not understood which D'Annibale has, p. 3, n. 340, ed. 3, namely that it is required that the relapser appear not doubtfully, but sufficiently disposed, and yet absolution is to be denied him when no probable hope of amendment any longer appears. With pardon of the illustrious theologian, these things seem contradictory and practically impossible.

To Bertha, a servant girl often sinning with Caius her master, Titius the confessor imposes that she immediately depart from his house. But she refuses to do this, both because Caius had promised amendment, and because for some years he had not paid her the wages of service, which nevertheless she hoped to receive soon, and would receive no longer if she departed. Having heard these things, Titius absolves her, at the same time enjoining that she return to confession each week. But only after six months, with relapse repeated several times, does Bertha return to Titius, bringing forward the same reasons lest she be compelled to leave the house of her master. And since the confessor hears from her that the master in a few days is about to set out for Naples, where it was necessary for him to remain rather long, and at the same time that she wishes to communicate on that day lest she be deprived of a plenary indulgence, he again imparts absolution. In reality it happened that before the master departed from Rome, Bertha committed no sin with him.

Meanwhile Caius, dwelling at Naples, manifests to a confessor that he has at Rome a servant girl as concubine, whom nevertheless he promises that he will dismiss scarcely after he has returned to his native land; from this it happens that he is immediately absolved.

But when afterward he returned to Rome, he interposes conversation about this matter with the servant girl, and lest they be separated from each other, both firmly determine not to fail any more in the future. A whole month passes and they faithfully observe their purpose. Soon, however, the Easter precept urging, they approach a confessor, who, having been made certain about the matter, dismisses them unabsolved until they separate. Therefore they approach another confessor, who, having heard all things, asks within himself:

1.º What and of how many kinds is an occasion of sin? - 2.º Whether and in what occasion a penitent constituted in it can be absolved? - 3.º What must be judged about the manner of acting of the confessors, as to each thing as in the Case?

R. To the 1st. An occasion is a certain exterior circumstance, bringing to us a danger of sinning. This danger comes from the fact that that exterior circumstance is of itself alluring to sinning. Hence it is clear that an occasion is a true moral cause of sin, although by accident and not of itself. If the aforesaid danger of sinning is possible, but not probable, the occasion is remote. But if the danger is truly probable, the occasion is proximate. But just as the probability of danger is not in an indivisible point, but there is lesser and greater probability, and then moral certainty, so a proximate occasion is less or more proximate, and simply proximate. A proximate occasion, if it is such with respect to someone in particular because of his special fragility, is an occasion relatively; but if it is such regularly with respect to all, it is an occasion absolutely. If again it is such that it cannot be taken away, or not except with grave detriment to oneself, or on the contrary can be removed altogether, then the occasion is simply necessary, morally necessary, or voluntary. Finally, if someone has it with himself or otherwise, it is called in esse, or present, or not in esse, or absent.

To the 2nd. In whatever occasion the penitent is constituted, he can indeed be absolved if he sincerely grieves and proposes. And this in reality is the whole difficulty: to judge prudently about the sincerity of contrition and purpose. Wherefore what is said, that one in an occasion can be absolved at least the first time, is said with no reason. If one in an occasion exhibits signs of contrition and purpose neither the first nor the hundredth time, he can never be absolved; and on the contrary, speaking of itself, he can always be absolved, if he always exhibits sincere contrition and sincere purpose. Hence, if he is in a voluntary occasion and does not remove it, and therefore falls into sins, a prudent argument of sincere contrition and purpose certainly is not had, and therefore he cannot be absolved. If he is in a necessary occasion and tries to render it remote by using opportune means, even if sometimes again he falls into sins, on the contrary an argument is had of the sincerity of sorrow and purpose, whence, speaking of itself, he can be absolved.

To the 3rd. Bertha is found in an occasion, if not simply necessary, then certainly morally necessary. Titius the confessor acted well the first time by absolving her. For on one side Caius had promised amendment, and on the other Bertha also promises amendment, and seems to promise seriously, because she willingly accepts approaching confession frequently from the excellent admonition and exhortation of the confessor. Titius the confessor also acts well the second time by absolving Bertha. For the good will of Bertha appears serious from the confession performed spontaneously, although after six months, and from the desire of Communion and of the plenary indulgence. But the occasion meanwhile is physically removed by the journey of the master. And the sincere will of Bertha this time was also proved by the very fact, because no sin was committed after confession and before the departure of the master. Caius also at Naples is rightly absolved by his confessor. For, since he is removed from the occasion and promises that he will take it away, his will of sinning no more appears serious, and consequently his contrition must be called sincere. These things having been premised and presupposed, the will of Caius and Bertha not to sin any more, after the return of the master, also appears serious, which is also confirmed by the experience of a whole month. Hence the later confessor, whom they soon approached while the Easter precept was urging, does not seem to have acted well by denying absolution to them unless they first separated from each other.

And here it must be noted that, since there was question of the Easter precept, absolution was not to be denied for this special reason also without a graver reason. Besides, Bertha and also Caius appear to be persons, although fragile, religious, and who revere the laws of the Church. Hence the confessor ought not by that denial of absolution, made so precisely, rather to keep them away from confession than to allure and invite them to it. Finally, another thing must be attended to in practice with regard to this Case and others like it. Caius will dismiss Bertha; Bertha will leave Caius. But will not Caius, taking on another servant girl, perhaps be able to have for himself a new and worse danger? And will not Bertha, finding another master, perhaps herself be able to find a new and worse occasion? Hence would it not be better to meet the old evil than perhaps to furnish occasion for a new one? But this certainly is the practical difficulty in cases of this sort, and there is need of great consideration of all circumstances so that a truly prudent judgment may be formed.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 15 passages

Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. III, Ch. II, Art. I, § II, Point I. On Those Who Are Situated in an Occasion of Sin

Definition. - An occasion of sin is generally defined as an external circumstance which, either from its own nature or from the frailty of the man who is found in it, allures or induces to sin. Hence it differs from a danger of sinning, under which designation comes whatever impels to sin, whether it is intrinsic or extrinsic.

Division. A multiple occasion is distinguished, namely: proximate or remote, absolute or relative, voluntary or necessary, present or not present.

A proximate occasion is that in which men commonly sin for the most part; but a remote occasion is that in which men commonly do not sin for the most part. - St. Ligorius, no. 452 ¹.

¹ ** Against this definition the VV. (p. 942, no. 140) oppose these words of St. Alphonsus (Apostolic Man, last treatise, no. 1): Certain Authors hold that an occasion is not proximate unless it is one in which a man has fallen almost always or for the most part; but the more common and truer opinion teaches that the proximate occasion is that in which someone has sinned frequently. They then also allege book 6, no. 452.

Reply. The holy Doctor here rejects two definitions; for, as he interprets himself, when he calls one part truer, he does not regard the opposite as probable.

Nevertheless, as regards the first, perhaps there will be someone who doubts whether the holy Doctor sufficiently grasped the sense in which that definition was employed. We have this sense in De Lugo (disputation 14, no. 149), where he writes: Some say that a proximate occasion is defined by Gregory in canon Negotium, On Penance, distinction 5, namely, one which we cannot, or certainly cannot without difficulty, use without sin. This, however, needs moderation. For Pope Leo in canon Qualitas 2 and canon Contrarium 3, On Penance, distinction 5, says that commerce or military service cannot be exercised without sin except with the greatest difficulty; and nevertheless it is certain that a merchant or soldier is not bound to leave these offices; hence in Luke 3 St. John the Baptist did not counsel soldiers to leave military service, but to observe the laws of that state. Others therefore add that a proximate occasion is one which a man, the circumstances being considered, never or almost never uses without sin, as one who keeps a concubine at home. From these things it is sufficiently deduced that account is not taken here of the frequency of falls, from which it would be defined whether this is a proximate occasion for someone; rather, it is asked what circumstances are to be called a proximate occasion, whatever frequency of falls may at length be assigned, so that it can be called truly proximate.

As regards the other definition, the holy Doctor indeed seems to refer the words for the most part to the frequency of falls with respect to the man who is situated in that occasion. But the context of the holy Doctor is not without some difficulty. For in that same place (Apostolic Man, last treatise, no. 1), which the VV. object, St. Alphonsus shortly before thus defines a proximate occasion: A proximate occasion, speaking per se, is that in which men commonly fail for the most part. Hence Gury seems to have taken his definition from St. Alphonsus word for word. How, therefore, is it reconciled that St. Alphonsus appears to reject the definition which he himself hands down in the same place?

Likewise, in another place (book 6, no. 452) the holy Doctor writes: Others define a proximate occasion as one in which the penitent is believed never or rarely to abstain from sin. This definition perhaps seems to be taken in the sense which we reported above from De Lugo. The holy Doctor continues: But this definition does not please; it is better said with Sanchez, Holzmann, De Lugo, Suarez, Collet, Wigandt, Croix, Viva, and Father Segneri that a proximate occasion per se is that in which men commonly sin for the most part. Behold, therefore, the holy Doctor again adopts (it is better said, he says) that definition which he seems to reject elsewhere. How are these things easily reconciled?

And indeed, even in this place, when he defines a proximate occasion per accidens, he says: Either because this man, although not almost always nor more frequently, has nevertheless frequently fallen in that occasion. But now the same difficulty seems to occur here. For here the word frequently, since it is opposed to the word more frequently, intimates that, in order to constitute a proximate occasion, it is not necessary that the man sin in it more often than he does not sin. And since these things are so, how are they now reconciled with the preceding definition, that a proximate occasion is one in which men sin for the most part? For for the most part certainly is not said of those who abstain from sin more often than they sin.

I indeed would not doubt that these passages of the holy Doctor which seem to conflict with one another can be suitably reconciled, especially if the sense in which, as we saw with De Lugo, others define a proximate occasion is kept before the eyes; nevertheless, I find no trace or mention of that sense in the holy Doctor. Yet this is sufficiently manifest: the VV. would consult better for the honor and reverence of the holy Doctor if, before censuring the writings of others, they inquired somewhat more diligently into the doctrine of that same holy Doctor.

An absolute occasion, or one per se, is that which of itself induces to sin and accordingly is such with respect to men taken commonly; a relative occasion, or one per accidens, is that which, although it is not an occasion with respect to others, is nevertheless such with respect to someone, his frailty being considered.

A voluntary occasion is one which can easily be left; but a necessary occasion is one which cannot be removed physically or morally.

Ch. I, Question V: Concerning Those in Occasions of Sin · Ch. IV, Question Second: Concernin…, Article III: Concerning the Obligation of Granting, Denying, or Deferring Absolution

A present occasion, or one in esse, is one which someone has with him without actually seeking it, for example, if he keeps a concubine at home or is accustomed to sin with a maidservant; an occasion not present, or one non in esse, is one which someone does not indeed have in actuality but easily finds, such as a tavern in relation to a drunkard, or a mistress in relation to her lover.

n. 629.

Principles. - I. Absolution is not to be denied to a penitent situated in a remote occasion, even if he is unwilling to leave it. The reason is: 1. because it does not induce a proximate danger of sinning mortally; 2. because too harsh an obligation would be imposed upon the penitent, since occasions of this kind generally cannot be avoided morally. - St. Ligorius, Apostolic Man, last treatise, no. 2 and following.

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II. A penitent who refuses to leave a voluntary proximate occasion of sin is never to be absolved, whether that occasion is proximate per se or per accidens, whether in esse or non in esse. This is evident from proposition 61 condemned by Innocent XI, which reads thus: One who is situated in a proximate occasion which he can and will not leave can sometimes be absolved; indeed, he directly and deliberately seeks it or thrusts himself into it.

n. 629.

III. But absolution cannot be denied on account of that occasion to a penitent who is situated in a necessary proximate occasion, if he is otherwise found disposed and wishes to use the prescribed remedies. The reason is that no one is bound to the impossible, whether physically or morally; and otherwise an occasion of sinning is not of itself a sin, nor does it place a man under a necessity of sinning. - St. Ligorius, no. 453.

n. 630.

Questions. - QUESTION 1. Can a penitent who sincerely promises that he will leave a proximate occasion of sinning be absolved before he has left it?

n. 630.

Reply 1. Yes, per se, if it concerns an occasion non in esse, when the penitent, as we suppose, is truly disposed and the danger of breaking his purpose does not appear grave ².

² Some grave danger could threaten from the circumstance of some effort which must necessarily be employed to avoid the occasion, as the Author presently notes. But when this difficulty is absent and the danger seems to threaten solely from human frailty or inconstancy, see the doctrine of Suarez reported above in the note to no. 625.

n. 630.

I said per se, because if the circumstances require some effort, for example, in fleeing some companion, or in not approaching some house in certain circumstances of time, persons, etc., then it will pertain to the prudence of the Confessor to weigh whether it is expedient that the penitent first overcome the difficulty. Reply 2. No, generally speaking, if it concerns a present occasion, or one in esse, which can easily be left immediately. If, however, the penitent gives extraordinary signs of sorrow, so that it can be believed that the danger of inconstancy in his purpose is absent, he can be absolved, especially if a reasonable cause is added, for example, a mark arising from omitting Communion, a solemnity, an indulgence, etc. - According to the mind of St. Alphonsus, the same is to be said if the penitent cannot return to the same Confessor, or at least cannot return except after a long time. For then, says the holy Doctor, he not only can be absolved, but has a right to receive absolution.

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- QUESTION 2. Can one be absolved who, while situated in a necessary occasion, always relapses in the same manner after employing the remedies?

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Reply 1. Perhaps the supposition could be denied ³. For it can scarcely happen that, when the remedies are employed, some correction does not follow if they are proposed opportunely and suitably to the circumstances.

³ At first sight St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 457) seems to deny that this penitent can be absolved. But it is evident from the context that he asserts this with Croix when there is no hope of correction, namely, as Croix says (book 5, no. 261), cited by St. Alphonsus, when someone can in no way bring it about that a formal danger of sinning is not joined to the external occasion, and, in other words, can in no way bring it about that the proximate danger becomes remote. Moreover, this is that hypothesis which the Author deservedly says is to be denied as absurd; for when remedies are suitably suggested and faithfully employed, a relapse could indeed be rendered morally impossible, for example, if, when external sins are at issue, conversation of a man alone with a woman alone is faithfully avoided.

But because St. Alphonsus (loc. cit.), after Croix (loc. cit.), seems to attack Cardinal De Lugo and others alleged there, it is not to be thought that these authors either disputed about that incongruous hypothesis or taught that due disposition is never lacking to a penitent who always relapses in the same manner. Indeed, the same St. Alphonsus (no. 457, at the end) finally returns to the opinion of De Lugo, which he furthermore calls most common, namely, that this penitent can be absolved if he approaches with true sorrow and purpose. Thus De Lugo also says (On Penance, disputation 14, no. 158): Even after that experience of no progress, true sorrow and the required purpose can stand without a will to remove the occasion with so great a loss. Therefore, the penitent can be absolved; for nothing else is required except confession with sorrow and purpose. That true sorrow with the required purpose can stand even then, although the occasion perseveres, the same St. Alphonsus teaches thus (no. 455): The Doctors commonly affirm that the penitent is not bound to leave the occasion if otherwise he would suffer grave harm, provided that meanwhile he is prepared to use the prescribed means.... The reason is that an occasion of sinning is not in itself a sin, nor does it bring a necessity of sinning; wherefore true detestation of sins and a firm purpose of not relapsing and of employing the due remedies can well stand with it. But that sorrow and purpose of this kind can be had even after a preceding experience of inconstancy, St. Alphonsus himself, as we saw above, supposes, and the thing itself cries out. For to what end would you suspend absolution so that the penitent might resist more efficaciously, if you believe a purpose of this kind to be impossible? But go to Cardinal De Lugo himself (disputation 14, nos. 158-159), and those things which St. Alphonsus objected from the vain hypothesis of Croix will appear of no moment.

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Reply 2. In the case, the general rule would have to be employed which St. Ligorius ⁴ proposes with the Author of the work entitled Instruction for New Confessors, namely, Francis Giordano, a priest of the Congregation of the Mission, who published his work at Rome in the year 1726, and which was afterward reprinted at Rome in 1841. A rule of this kind is (cited work, part 1, chapter 10, no. 244) that it should be maturely weighed whether, in practice, it is more difficult to remove the occasion than to avoid sin, with the occasion present, or whether it is easier. If it is more difficult to remove the occasion, let it be decided that it is morally impossible to remove it. And this norm, as the Author himself acknowledges, he took from the work of Venerable Paul Segneri entitled The Instructed Confessor (chapter 5), where these things are found: The precept of fleeing the occasion was imposed by natural law to diminish sins, not to increase them. Therefore, when removing the occasion is more difficult in practice than, with the occasion present, effectively avoiding sin, there can be no obligation of removing it; otherwise the danger of doubling the guilt would be increased by those very means which are prescribed by law to destroy it.

⁴ ** The VV. rightly note (p. 605, in the note) that the holy Doctor Alphonsus has nothing about this general rule and did not allege the aforesaid Author for this purpose. **

For the rest, the things said here by Father Gury directly attack the opinion which Claude Croix (against very many, as he himself admits, book 5, no. 261) defends as more likely, and toward which St. Alphonsus also inclines as though truer: namely, that in the case someone is bound to leave the occasion even with the loss of all goods of fortune, reputation, and life. For this he furthermore falsely alleges certain authors cited by John Sanchez, as he says, and Stoz, neither of whom in fact has any of these things.

Indeed, whether with the same Croix you fashion the chimerical hypothesis of a man who can in no way bring it about that the proximate danger ceases, or whether you speak better of one who continually relapses into the same sins because through frailty he sometimes omits the use of the means, it will always be true that this opinion of Croix is neither consonant with reason nor capable of being prudently reduced to practice.

And surely, by the law of nature the penitent is indeed bound to avoid a proximate danger. But since this can be obtained in two ways, namely, either by using suitable means so that the danger becomes remote, as they say, or by removing or fleeing the occasion, the penitent is bound by the law of nature only to one or the other. By what right, therefore, will the Confessor impose this one upon him rather than the other? Can the Confessor, as we saw with De Lugo above in the note to no. 605, command anything other than what is necessary?

Moreover, since it is manifest that that which is judged morally impossible because more difficult to execute can neither be nor ought to be imposed upon the penitent, will it truly be easier to undergo the danger of all one's goods, as Croix says, both of fortune and of reputation and even of life, than to employ some remedies for diminishing the danger of sinning?

Furthermore, if, according to the evident reasoning of Venerable Father Paul Segneri, the Confessor ought to prefer that which removes the penitent further from the danger of sinning, he surely can never choose that in which the penitent is more certain to sin. Therefore the Confessor will never prudently prefer that which must appear less probable of execution. But is it not less probable that the flight from the occasion with so great a danger will be hoped for than the suitable use of means for diminishing the danger? And it is surely marvelous that Croix (loc. cit.) shows that he is moved in no way by the reasoning of Pallavicini, whom he alleges, namely, that if the obligation of avoiding the occasion with so great a danger is imposed, the penitent will ordinarily violate it and will not leave the occasion; hence the imprudent Confessor will attain this alone: that he furnishes a certain occasion for committing still more sins!

For the rest, even if that indiscreet obligation is not imposed, another way is available to the Confessor, since meanwhile he can, where the matter requires, suspend absolution, so that the penitent may be efficaciously moved to employ the suitable means. For, as John Sanchez says (disputation 10, no. 10), judgment must be rendered concerning these as persons having a habit of sinning, not as persons having an occasion, since it does not lie in their choice to avoid it. And if some moral diligence appears in the penitent, the rule of Suarez will avail (On Penance, disputation 32, section 2, no. 4), that absolution is not to be denied to him, even if he relapse again and again, especially if he restrains himself somewhat and gradually diminishes the number of sins; which Navarrus noted, chapter 3, no. 21. Sometimes, however, absolution can be deferred and some greater penance or precaution employed.

It must also be added that, if the Confessor finds the penitent so frail and even inconstant in employing the means that he must judge him less disposed for absolution on account of a defect of efficacious purpose, he will still imprudently exact from so frail, infirm, and weak a man that which is more difficult and morally impossible for him; and much more imprudently will he rigidly and harshly reject him from himself. For thus he will attain this alone: that the despairing penitent is immersed more deeply in sins. On the contrary, charity, kindness, and patience in often receiving and hearing him will obtain at least this: that he is neither wholly abandoned to the devil, nor altogether casts aside the means and prayers, nor has the way cut off by which he can be helped by counsels and exhortations, and that he knows access to reconciliation always lies easily open to him; just as the Doctors advise must be done where they treat of the confessions of a prostitute, a usurer, and others of this kind, who are not sufficiently disposed but have some less efficacious desire of correction or a better life, or only a velleity. Nor surely in the case ought the confessor to forget the opinion by which Suarez (On Religion, treatise 5, book 3, chapter 8, no. 7) concludes concerning this argument: Nor can human infirmities of this kind be cured more efficaciously by man.

** Against this Note and the one immediately preceding, the VV. heap together thirty-four columns (pp. 603-620), or rather fill them with a vast mass of useless things. I said useless, since they scarcely, if at all, touch the hinge of the matter. And the VV. surely held a most convenient way of extricating themselves from the difficulties when they write (p. 620): We omit to refute specifically the intrinsic reasons which Father Ballerini brings forward for his opinion, lest we undertake a superfluous labor; for the preceding explanation of the doctrine which St. Alphonsus holds sufficiently reduces all those reasons to nothing.

But this is altogether false. And surely those intrinsic reasons which are indicated in the Note are contained in these very few points: 1. The penitent is indeed bound by the law of nature to avoid a proximate danger. But since this can be obtained in two ways, namely, either by using suitable means so that the danger becomes remote, or by removing or fleeing the occasion, the penitent is bound by the law of nature only to one or the other. Therefore, the confessor cannot impose this one upon him rather than the other. And the reason is that the Confessor is not a legislator and accordingly, excepting sacramental satisfaction, cannot by command impose upon a penitent anything to which the penitent is not bound by some other law. Moreover, I ask: Does anything occur in the explanation of the doctrine of St. Alphonsus which the VV. set forth beforehand by which this principle might perhaps be overthrown? Indeed, will anyone think that this principle can be shown to be false?

Another principle is this: It is manifest that, of two means by which the end can be obtained, the one which, as more difficult to execute, is judged morally impossible can neither be nor ought to be imposed upon the penitent by the Confessor. But it is more difficult to undergo the danger of all one's goods, as Croix says, both of fortune and of reputation and even of life, than to employ some remedies for diminishing the danger of sinning. Therefore.

There is added a confirmation from the observation of Venerable Father Segneri, which is a certain consequence of the preceding principle. Namely, the Confessor ought to prefer that which removes the penitent further from the danger of sinning, and accordingly can never choose that in which the penitent is more certain to sin. Therefore the confessor will never prudently prefer that which must appear less probable of execution. But the flight from the occasion with so great a danger (of all goods, namely, of fortune, reputation, and even life) is hoped for less probably than the suitable use of means for diminishing the danger. Therefore.

Moreover, in that whole explanation of the doctrine of St. Alphonsus to which the VV. refer the reader, they have not even a word about these things, much less have they attempted to reply to anything. This alone can be seen: that they endeavor (p. 619) to weaken the reasoning brought forward by Venerable Segneri by adducing these words of his, which are read shortly after the text brought forward here: In doubt, always hold to the stricter side, because this, as we have seen, is the more favorable to the penitent. These, as is evident, do not pertain to the matter, because the rule proposed by that same Venerable Author and confirmed above by unshaken reasons in no way concerns doubtful cases. Therefore the VV. in fact reply nothing to the preceding intrinsic reasons, however much they pretend that they have replied; St. Alphonsus never used so wretched an artifice for evading contrary reasons, and we most certainly believe he never would have used it.

Thus, in the explanation of the doctrine of St. Alphonsus which the VV. set forth beforehand through six columns (pp. 608-610), this alone pertains to the matter: that they attempt to show that the hypothesis thus described by Croix (book 5, no. 261) is not chimerical: When someone can in no way bring it about that a formal danger of sinning is not joined to the external occasion, or, in other words, when someone can in no way bring it about that the proximate danger becomes remote. This hypothesis we called absurd in the Note, namely, when remedies are suitably suggested and faithfully employed.

To prove that these things are falsely said, the VV. propose two examples, one of which, however (p. 610), taken from Cardenas, does not pertain to the matter. For Cardenas (part 4, dissertation 40, no. 145) proposes the case of a concubine who, if she resists the lust of her accomplice, will most certainly be expelled by him from the house; and, this having been done, she will perish from hunger. I said that this example does not pertain to the matter; for where is there any place here for employing remedies by which the danger may become remote, when this single choice is given her: either to sin or to be expelled from the house, about to perish from hunger? It is the same, namely, as when Mattathias was given the choice either to eat swine's flesh or to undergo death. And if the hypothesis of Claude Lacroix were ultimately directed to this, surely every controversy would be absent. But Lacroix (loc. cit.) asserts that most weighty Authors stand for the opposite opinion, whom he afterward also calls very many; and at the end he seems also to permit the contrary practice, saying: He who wishes to defend the first, more benign opinion should read the Defense of Gobat. Therefore the hypothesis of Lacroix is altogether another.

And to this clearly pertains the other example which the VV. (p. 608) fashion: namely, of a young man who is not his own master and desperately loves a female relative with whom he is compelled to live in the same house. Having committed several sins with her and being agitated by the stings of conscience, he approaches confession. The Confessor, recognizing that this occasion is necessary, prescribes THE CUSTOMARY REMEDIES for him, especially that he should endeavor to avoid being alone with her. The penitent omits none of the prescribed things and faithfully avoids being alone with her; but he does not avoid the accomplice, who industriously seeks him and by flatteries and solicitations brings him to the point that he again falls miserably and sins, if not by consummated acts, at least by imperfect acts or by consenting interiorly. He returns to the confessor, who does not hesitate to absolve one in no way negligent in employing the remedies. He returns again and yet again, a recidivist in the same manner.

He does not sin except when he is sought and solicited by the accomplice, so that the supposition, always in the same manner, is true in the strictest sense. But at length the confessor... defers absolution for him. The penitent returns, nevertheless again a recidivist in the same manner. From this the VV. conclude: You therefore have in the strictest sense the case which St. Alphonsus proposes, and only two questions remain: 1. Whether in this case there is hope of correction, and 2. What the confessor must do.

Reply. The Confessor, as the VV. say, prescribed the customary remedies. But I ask: why did he omit certain other remedies, indeed less customary, but altogether suitable to the circumstances? The penitent, they say, omits none of the prescribed things and faithfully endeavors to avoid being alone with her; but he does not avoid the accomplice. And below: He does not sin except when he is sought and solicited by the accomplice. But concerning Blessed Thomas it is read that he drove away with a firebrand even the woman who had been introduced to shake his constancy. Why, therefore, did the confessor not persuade the young man that, after first admonishing her in vain even with harsh words, he should at length drive away with a firebrand the wicked woman whom he now thoroughly recognizes as a snare to himself and a fatal cause of eternal damnation? And if he did not have a firebrand at hand, that he should receive her with slaps and kicks? For who does not know that this kind of remedy, if the others do not profit, is most suitably and not rarely employed, and further ought to be employed, both by a man with a wanton woman and by a woman with a wanton man?

But, what is more marvelous, the VV. finally arrive at the opinion which they seem to attack. For after wrongly fashioning that the confessor had employed all the remedies, and further had fallen from every hope of obtaining correction, and finally had seriously declared to the young man that no hope of salvation remained for him unless he left his paternal home, they present the young man himself as so disposed that, solicitous for his eternal salvation, he either leaves his paternal home or, about to attempt the utmost, straining every power and nerve and imploring divine help more fervently than usual and with his whole heart, resists the solicitation of the accomplice and finally emerges victorious in this contest.... Indeed, even if he did not immediately enter into these sound counsels, nevertheless his watchful conscience would not permit him to languish in sins and would not cease to cry out until he had fulfilled one or the other in deed. Thus indeed the VV. (pp. 608-609).

But: 1. From these things it is now plainly gathered that the hypothesis of Croix is therefore chimerical and absurd, concerning a penitent who can in no way bring it about that a formal danger of sinning is not joined to the external occasion, or, in other words, who can in no way bring it about that the proximate danger becomes remote. For in this very case, which they otherwise present so that no hope of correction shines forth, they themselves suppose that the young man, after taking up a more fervent effort, can thus resist the solicitation of the accomplice so that he finally emerges victorious in this contest. Therefore they confess that, even while the present occasion perseveres, the proximate danger can become remote when suitable remedies are employed. Therefore they say contradictory things when they assert both that no hope of correction is present and nevertheless that a change of morals is to be hoped for.

2. Therefore they concede that the aforesaid young man is not necessarily to leave his paternal home, but that one or the other is to be chosen by him: either that with a firmer will he employ suitable means for conquering the temptations, or certainly that he flee from the occasion by leaving his paternal home, if he is unwilling to undertake the care and labor of employing the means. For otherwise, as the VV. very well write (p. 608), it is certain that this penitent can resist the solicitation and does not resist on account of a defect of purpose; for no commands, divine

grace assisting, is impossible for anyone to observe. Therefore, the conclusion against them is that, if purpose is lacking, the cause is to be sought in this: that suitable means are either not suggested and prescribed to him by the confessor, or he himself does not faithfully use them.

Hence there is a consequence against the opinion which Croix prefers. For if the penitent is bound only to one or the other, and satisfies his obligation if he chooses and holds to one of the two ways of escaping the danger of sin, the confessor therefore cannot impose one determined way of the two by command; and much less ought or can he prescribe that way which, since it is more difficult to execute, exposes the penitent, as Segneri said, to a more certain danger of sin.

From these things the reply to the texts of Authors which the VV. heap together through thirteen columns (pp. 610-617) easily discloses itself. Namely, the obligation which they urge of leaving the occasion is to be understood conditionally: namely, when the penitent does not bring himself to employ the suitable and indeed necessary remedies which render the danger remote from proximate.

The VV. complain, and indeed gravely censure (p. 607), that the hypothesis fashioned by Croix is called absurd and chimerical, while the practice consequently proposed by him according to that incongruous hypothesis, namely, of exacting from the penitent that which, according to the words of Segneri, exposes him to a more certain danger of sinning, is called imprudent, indiscreet, and not consonant with reason, when St. Alphonsus also preferred it, whose virtues and consequently prudence have nevertheless already been declared to have attained the heroic degree.

Reply to point 1. The VV. themselves, as we saw above, reject that hypothesis and prove it false while they seem to wish to defend it. As regards point 2, how, first of all, will the VV. prove that the holy Doctor praises that practice when, on account of its difficulty in comparison with the use of other means, it induces the penitent into a more certain danger of sinning? But then this kind of argument manifestly proves too much. Indeed, above (see the Note to no. 627, question 6) we saw, in this matter of prudence, namely, when the question is whether or not absolution is to be deferred for a penitent who has not yet satisfied the obligation of making restitution, that the doctrine of St. Antoninus differs from the doctrine of St. Alphonsus. And since the virtues and further the prudence of each were declared to be in the heroic degree, and indeed St. Antoninus possessed such dexterity in explaining counsels that he was called by the common praise ANTONINUS OF COUNSELS, as the Roman Breviary has, how can these things be reconciled in this manner?

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 10 passages

Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Moral Part — Chapter II: On the Confessor

n. 524.

Notion and Species of Occasions. (A) Notion. An occasion of sinning is an external person or thing enticing to sin. Hence it is distinguished from those internal principles which incline to sin, such as concupiscence, evil habits, etc. It is also distinguished from danger of sinning, which can be both external and internal: therefore danger extends more broadly than an occasion of sinning, or, in other words, every occasion of sin is a danger, but not every danger is an occasion. - Nevertheless an external occasion is not truly dangerous unless there is at the same time an internal propensity to evil. Hence, in practice, two things concur to constitute an occasion: an external object enticing to sin, and an interior inclination to sin.

n. 525.

(B) Species. An occasion of sin is twofold: remote and proximate. (a) The former is that which constitutes only a slight danger of sinning, because it has some, but not great, force for enticing to sin, so that those who are placed in it generally do not sin. Concerning this there is no special difficulty: for it is established that such occasions exist everywhere, so that to avoid them it would be necessary to go out of this world.

(b) The latter, or proximate occasion, is that which constitutes grave danger of sinning, so that those placed in it frequently fall into sin.¹ Here we treat only of an occasion of committing mortal sin. But since danger of this kind can be more or less certain, we note that the rules handed down below must be understood more strictly concerning those who are in certain danger of sinning, but more mildly concerning those who are only in probable danger; for they must be applied not mathematically, but morally.

¹ Certain ones, however, with Ballerini (n. 168) and Genicot (n. 371-372), judge only that occasion to be proximate in which solid probability is lacking that a person can use it without sin, or, in other words, that occasion which induces a morally certain danger of sinning. See this restriction refuted in Berardi, op. cit. De Occasion., n. 9-12; Aertnys, ap. N. R. T., t. XXXII, 1900, p. 500 sq.

Now the gravity of this danger can be discerned in two ways: by experience, namely if someone, placed before in the same circumstances, generally or at least frequently sinned; for example, if someone entering a tavern is rather often made drunk, the occasion is proximate; if very rarely, it is remote; - from what commonly happens, even when experience is lacking. For although a certain person has never sinned, sometimes it can be foreseen that he will very probably sin, if he is exposed to such a dangerous occasion; for example, if some younger girl, light in mind and weak in will, is going to live alone for a long time with a vicious man, it is greatly to be feared lest, given human weakness, she fall into sin; therefore such cohabitation, even before any sin has been committed, is a proximate occasion.

n. 526.

(a) On the part of the person, proximate occasion is absolute or relative: absolute, when, human fragility being considered, it constitutes grave danger for all, for example, the reading of a very obscene book, long cohabitation with a concubine; relative, when it induces grave danger not for all, but only for this or that person, because of his special fragility or past falls; thus entrance into a tavern for one who is frequently made drunk there is for him a proximate occasion, but not for all; a prolonged conversation with a girl is a proximate occasion for a young man who pursues her with impure love, but not for all.

(b) On the part of duration, the occasion is continuous, or in esse, when it always, or at least habitually, accompanies the person, for example, unjust retention of another's goods, retention of an obscene book or picture, or a vicious person living in the same house; - or interrupted, or absent, when it occurs or is approached only at intervals; for example, entrance into a tavern where someone incurs danger of drunkenness; access to feasts at which detraction is habitually committed; conversation with a mistress who does not live under the same roof.

(c) On the part of the cause, the occasion is voluntary or necessary: voluntary, when it can be freely dismissed without grave inconvenience, for example, access to theaters, conversation with depraved companions, gambling, etc.; necessary, when it cannot be dismissed without grave inconvenience, whether physical or moral. Now an occasion is physically necessary if it can in no way be dismissed, for example, if someone is detained on a ship or in prison with depraved companions, if one living in concubinage is in the article of death and time is lacking for expelling the concubine; it is called morally necessary if it cannot be dismissed without grave temporal or spiritual harm, for example, without loss of office or function, without scandal, etc., as will be explained more fully below.

n. 527.

(D) Principal Occasions of Sin. That the rules concerning those in occasions may be better understood, it is expedient to review the principal occasions, while noting, however, that these are not always and for all proximate, but that judgment concerning their proximity must be made according to the notion handed down above; these matters are treated more fully in the various Treatises of Moral Theology.

(a) Against faith: reading of newspapers, periodicals, or non-Catholic books; - more intimate and more frequent familiarity with non-Catholics; - attendance at schools and colleges in which no religion, or a false religion, is taught; - service among heretics, or irreligious masters; - attendance at non-Catholic sermons; - mixed marriages, etc.

(b) Against chastity: concubinage; - cohabitation of persons of diverse sex who are by no means joined in lawful marriage; - conversations with depraved companions; - certain dances which, because of the persons, the kind of dancing, and the circumstances of place and time, are more dangerous; attendance at theaters, especially those which inflame lust both by the things exhibited and by scenic dances (ballets); - reading of obscene or erotic books; - retention of statues, images, and photographs which today easily corrupt morals among the young; - certain less honorable games among persons of diverse sex; - more frequent and protracted visits of lovers, especially when one alone remains with one alone for long hours, as often happens in certain regions, with great detriment to souls; - domestic dangers, which arise either from members of the family, or from servants, or from masters; - certain arts which are dangerous because of depraved conversations or more intimate relations between persons of diverse sex, etc.

(c) Against temperance: taverns and eating-houses; - frequenting of those who indulge in drunkenness, especially on Saturday or on other days on which workers are accustomed to receive wages; - certain festivities, whether religious or civil; - sometimes wedding feasts, and in certain regions vigils beside the bodies of the dead (wakes); potation by equal draughts (in English, habit of treating), etc.

(d) Against justice: certain public and political offices, which easily furnish a means of becoming rich unjustly; - certain businesses, and stock-exchange speculations, which are not immune from fraud, etc.

n. 528.

On the Manner of Acting with Those in Occasions. One must distinguish between a free proximate occasion and a necessary one.

n. 532.

(B) On a Necessary Occasion of Sinning

State of the Question. From what has already been said (n. 526), it is easily understood what a physically necessary occasion is. But a morally necessary occasion is called one which cannot be left without grave spiritual or temporal harm, concerning which, in individual cases, the confessor must prudently judge, with all circumstances considered. We shall bring forward only a few examples, from which judgment can be formed in the others.

(a) Grave spiritual harm is judged to be present: 1. when the penitent cannot leave the occasion without casting himself into another similar or worse one: such is the case of a maidservant who, because of her beauty and moral fragility, in all the houses in which she has stayed has found the same or worse dangers. Yet illusions must be guarded against; for example, a master who has often sinned with a younger maidservant easily believes that he will be in equal difficulty with a new servant; yet this is often false, especially if he chooses an older servant, less attractive, grave in character and pious. 2. When the occasion cannot be avoided without injustice or another sin; for example, ordinarily a husband cannot leave his wife, or conversely; nor a son or daughter the paternal home; a soldier the army before the appointed time; a nun the convent; nor a hired physician the care of some person; nor a servant before the established time. 3. When the occasion cannot be avoided without grave scandal or another spiritual evil of others; for example, a mother of a family who cannot be separated from her husband without scandal of neighbors or spiritual harm of the children; or a master who cannot cast out a maidservant immediately after a mission without exciting scandal. But here also illusions must be guarded against; often one living in concubinage will say that the maidservant cannot be cast out without scandal, while on the contrary scandal is removed by her casting-out, provided that it is done prudently, at an opportune time, and under a reasonable pretext.

n. 533.

(b) Grave temporal harm is judged to exist when the occasion cannot be dismissed without notable loss of life, reputation, or fortune; for example, if someone would have to abandon his own office or art, by which he sustains himself or his family, as a merchant who in trading finds an occasion of committing fraud; a physician who in exercising his art finds dangers of sinning; a pastor by hearing confessions; a woman by receiving guests. This is especially true when at the same time some spiritual harm is present because of dangers arising from poverty or idleness.

But if the harm is only light, when all things have been carefully inspected, the occasion cannot be called morally necessary. Hence this proposition 41 was deservedly condemned by Alexander VII, March 18, 1666: "A concubinarius is not to be obliged to cast out his concubine, if she were too useful for the delight of the concubinarius, commonly for his pleasure, while, if she were lacking, he would lead life with too much hardship, and other foods would affect the concubinarius with great weariness, and another maidservant would be too difficult to find."¹ And by Innocent XI, on March 2, 1679, proposition 62: "A proximate occasion of sinning is not to be fled when some useful or honorable cause for not fleeing occurs."²

¹ Ap. Denzing., n. 1012; cf. Viva, loc. cit.

² Denzing., n. 1079.

Hence a fortiori a proximate occasion is not to be sought directly, even under the pretext of a spiritual or temporal good; for proposition 63 was condemned by the same Innocent: "It is lawful to seek directly a proximate occasion of sinning, for our own or our neighbor's spiritual or temporal good."³

³ Denzing., n. 1080.

n. 534.

Principle: One who is placed in a necessary proximate occasion is not sincerely contrite, nor worthy of absolution, unless he is prepared to make the occasion from proximate morally remote, by employing the means necessary for this. It is certain.

For one who does not wish to use these means by that very fact shows that he loves the danger of sinning in which he is placed, and consequently sin itself; for one who sincerely wills the end, that is, in this case, avoidance of sin, by that very fact wills the means necessary for the end, that is, those things which at least morally remove the occasion. - But on the other hand, those who sincerely wish to use the necessary means by that very fact show that they do not wish to sin; and with God helping, "who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able," they can safely hope, by the help of these means, to overcome the dangers.

It was said necessary means, because absolutely speaking the penitent is not bound to employ all useful means, but only those which are truly necessary; and there is place there for good faith in the manner set forth above (n. 529).

n. 535.

Corollaries. (a) The principal means by which a necessary occasion can be made from proximate morally remote are of three kinds:

Some tend to lessen the force of the occasion; such are words said seriously and firmly to the accomplice in order vividly to express horror of this or that sin; - the threat that the whole matter will be disclosed to those who can bring a remedy, for example, superiors, parents, masters; - avoidance of every familiarity or solitary conversation with the accomplice; indeed, to flee his sight, neither to speak of him nor think of him, insofar as it can be done; - if some circumstances generate a proximate occasion, for example, an evening conversation with a maidservant, they must carefully be taken away; likewise, if danger arises from the fact that the accomplice enters the room, let the door be closed and locked, etc.
Others lessen the force of concupiscence: assiduous labor, so that in this way the evils which idleness is wont to teach may be avoided¹; - modesty of the senses, especially of the eyes: "I made a covenant with my eyes, that I would not even think of a virgin"²; - mortification of curiosity and of other passions: for those who are accustomed sometimes to resist their inclinations in lawful things resist unlawful things much more effectively; - by avoiding, or vigorously putting to flight, depraved, indeed dangerous, thoughts, especially about the beloved person; - by leaving dangerous readings; - by abstaining from excessive drinking; - by restraining concupiscence through moderate bodily exercise, etc.

¹ "For idleness has taught much malice." (Eccli., XXXIII, 29.)

² Job, XXXI, 1.

Finally others increase spiritual strength: every morning and evening, and also when temptation urges, to pray fervently: "Watch and pray that you enter not into temptation"³; - daily before the image of the Crucified to renew the purpose of sinning no more; - frequently to have recourse to the Blessed Virgin; - often to think about the last things;¹ - to read pious books; - to recite pious aspirations and to walk in the sight of God; - to receive the sacraments assiduously, and especially after a fall to approach the confessor at once², etc.

³ Matt., XXVI, 41.

¹ If someone does not know how to meditate and is addicted to sins, let him say to himself daily, before sleep: if I continue to live thus, I shall be devoted to eternal punishments.

² St. Philip Neri gave to a certain young man, who was sinning gravely almost daily, scarcely any other penance except that, if he relapsed, he should return at once to confession; the penitent obeyed, and Philip always absolved him, and always imposed upon him the same penance; by this means, in a very short time, the young man was amended and came forth as an angel. Cf. Berardi, n. 82.

Yet these means, as St. Leonard³ rightly notes, are not all to be employed at the same time, but now these, now those, according to the character of the persons, the nature of the occasions, and other circumstances.

³ St. Leonard, Discorso mistico, n. 20.

n. 536.

(b) If those placed in a necessary proximate occasion always relapse in the same way, after several paternal instructions, exhortations, and rebukes, they cannot be absolved unless they present extraordinary signs of contrition, or leave the occasion, even with very grave inconvenience. Thus commonly, with St. Alphonsus (n. 457), against a few.⁴

⁴ Baller. P., n. 192 sq.; Genicot, n. 374; Noldin, n. 409. They allege also Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 157 sq.; but Lugo himself admits (n. 160) that these frequent relapses, without amendment, create some presumption against such an occasionary, and therefore the necessity of certain special signs for destroying that presumption. - Cf. Vindic. Alphons., p. 603-620.

Explanation: 1. First indeed the necessary remedies are prescribed to the one in the occasion; if he has neglected them, he must be seriously warned two or three times to employ them; but if again he has neglected them, he must be dismissed without absolution, unless extraordinary signs of contrition are exhibited, as we shall say concerning relapsed sinners, on account of the reason there adduced.

If he has employed at least some means, with some amendment, he can be absolved and must be exhorted to greater efforts.
But if he has employed the means, and after several trials there is no amendment nor at least probable hope of amendment, he is not to be absolved before he dismisses the occasion or brings special signs of a better purpose. For in this case the danger of sinning is so grave that, all things considered, to remain in this danger is now a sin. Wherefore the words of Christ⁵ pertain here: "If your eye scandalizes you, pluck it out and cast it from you: it is good for you to enter into life with one eye, rather than having two eyes to be cast into the gehenna of fire"; by these words it is signified that we ought to suffer all harms, even the gravest, rather than incur eternal damnation, and therefore the loss of grace.

⁵ Matt., XVIII, 9.

Ballerini indeed objects that the hypothesis of St. Alphonsus must be denied; for if up to now there has been no amendment, from this it can only be concluded that the means were not sufficient, or were neglected. We admit indeed that it rarely occurs; for one who seriously employs opportune remedies is generally amended. But sometimes there are those who do not use these seriously unless absolution is deferred until they either dismiss the occasion or present extraordinary signs of contrition.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 5 passages

Vol. III, Pt. II, Tr. V, Ch. III, Art. III, Habitual Sinners, and Recidivists

n. 449.

449. Those in occasions of sin are called those who are situated in an occasion of sinning. Now an occasion of sinning is something extrinsic (a person, thing, book, spectacle, dances, and so forth) which entices to sin and affords an opportunity of sinning.⁴¹⁴ Therefore an occasion of sinning is not a disordered passion or the frailty of the penitent, since these are something intrinsic.

Division of occasions:

a) A remote occasion, which carries with it only a light danger of sinning and in which a man is accustomed to sin rarely. Such remote occasions exist everywhere on earth, and a man neither ought nor can flee from them. b) A proximate occasion, which causes a grave and pressing external danger of sinning, in which a man frequently sins mortally in fact; for example, visiting a tavern for a man greatly addicted to the vice of drunkenness.

A proximate occasion is subdivided: alpha) One is absolute, or per se; another is relative, or per accidens. The former is that in which all men generally are accustomed to sin gravely, for example, to look lingeringly without reasonable cause at very shameful things. The latter is that which induces a proximate danger of sinning not for all, but for some determinate man because of his special frailty or an aroused passion, for example, entering a tavern for a drunken man.

beta) One is voluntary; another necessary. The former is said to be that which can easily, or with light inconvenience, be removed, for example, a dangerous courtship between lovers. The latter is that which cannot be removed physically or morally. In a physically necessary occasion there live, for example, in the same house children of a family who sin with one another; men imprisoned who sin with one another. In a morally necessary occasion there live in the same house children of a family who sin with the maid of their own family. For the maid can more easily leave the house than a son of the family. Therefore a necessary occasion is one which cannot be removed without great harm and great external difficulty. But what is truly great harm must be weighed from the diverse circumstances of persons.

gamma) One occasion is continuous, or in esse; another is interrupted, or non in esse. The former is that in which someone is always situated, for example, a concubine living in the house of her master, onanistic spouses; the latter is said to be that in which someone indeed does not always live but which he can easily have, for example, a tavern for a drunken man; a mistress for a lustful man.

⁴¹⁴ An occasion of sinning and scandal agree in this, that both entice to sin; but they differ: a) because scandal is always a human act, while an occasion can also be an external physical thing; b) because an occasion affords an opportunity of sinning, but scandal does not always do so.

n. 450.

450. 1. Absolution of Those in Occasions of Sin.

Rule 1. Absolution is not to be denied to a penitent existing in a remote occasion.

The reason is that all of us live in a remote occasion of sinning, which, if we had to avoid it, would require us to go out of the world, which is wholly filled with dangers of sinning. Therefore to avoid remote occasions of sinning is impossible, and consequently is not necessary.

Rule 2. Absolution is not to be denied to a penitent who is situated in a necessary proximate occasion, provided that he is truly contrite and prepared to employ the prescribed means, so that the occasion materially proximate becomes formally remote.

The reason is that the confessor cannot demand from the penitent that which is physically or morally impossible. But, on the other hand, it can safely be hoped that the penitent who employs the prescribed remedies will conquer the temptations with the help of God, "who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able."⁴¹⁵ The chief means by which a necessary proximate occasion can be rendered formally remote are: fervent prayer, frequent confession, the flight of every familiarity and solitary conversation with the accomplice, and so forth. - But when the penitent refuses to employ remedies of this kind, or when he indeed promised them but afterward neglected them and consequently always relapsed into the same sins, he is to be treated as a recidivist dwelling in a proximate occasion, namely, he is not to be absolved unless he has given extraordinary signs of contrition and has removed the proximate occasion even with the gravest inconvenience. For Christ prescribed: "If thy eye scandalize thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee: it is better for thee having one eye to enter into life, than having two eyes to be cast into the hell of fire."⁴¹⁶

You will ask. Can a penitent be absolved who, existing in a necessary occasion, always relapses in the same manner after employing the remedies? The response seems easy to us: Such a case is scarcely ever possible; for then the penitent truly does what lies within him. Moreover, God does not deny grace to one doing what lies within him. It can indeed occur that the penitent relapses several times into the same sins; but if he obeys the commands of the confessor, at length he will become constant. For the rest, if the case should nevertheless occur, the penitent would be treated as a habitual recidivist. - A case of a necessary and continuous proximate occasion is the abuse of marriage between spouses. But if that sin is committed again and again by the spouses without any amendment, absolution is to be deferred or denied, since the due disposition of the penitents is then absent.

⁴¹⁵ 1 Cor. 10:13.

⁴¹⁶ Matt. 18:9.

n. 451.

451. Rule 3. Absolution is to be denied to a penitent who refuses to leave a voluntary proximate occasion of sinning gravely.

The reason is that he who wills voluntarily to remain in a proximate occasion loves the danger of sinning, and consequently has neither true contrition concerning past sins nor a true purpose concerning avoiding future sins. Hence, on March 2, 1679, Innocent XI condemned proposition 61: "He who is situated in a proximate occasion of sinning, which he can and does not will to omit, and indeed directly and deliberately seeks or thrusts himself into, can sometimes be absolved"; proposition 62: "A proximate occasion of sinning is not to be fled when some useful or honorable cause for not fleeing it occurs"; proposition 63: "It is lawful directly to seek a proximate occasion of sinning for our own or our neighbor's spiritual or temporal good."⁴¹⁷

If someone is situated in a voluntary and continuous proximate occasion, absolution is generally to be deferred until the penitent has actually removed this occasion. Hence, for example, a concubinary is not to be absolved before he has cast the concubine out of the house. The reason is that, although the penitent is here and now sufficiently disposed to receive absolution, nevertheless it is greatly to be feared that afterward, unmindful of the promise given and overcome by vehement passion, he will not remove the occasion. But I said: generally, because if the confessor has moral conviction of the firm purpose made by the penitent, and especially if the penitent is no longer able to return to the same confessor, he can grant absolution immediately. But if the penitent has already again and again promised in preceding confessions to remove the occasion and has not kept his promises, he is now not only one in an occasion of sin but also a recidivist, and consequently is not to be absolved unless he has given extraordinary signs of contrition and an urgent necessity of absolving is present.

But if someone is situated in a proximate non-continuous or interrupted occasion, he can be absolved immediately, provided that he seriously promises to leave this occasion. But if he is not only one in an occasion of sin but also a recidivist, he is not to be absolved unless he has given extraordinary signs of contrition, as will be stated below.

⁴¹⁷ Denz., nn. 1211-1213.

n. 452.

452. 2. Absolution of Habitual Sinners.

A habitual sinner, or one habituated, is said to be one who has contracted the habit of some sin, into which, however, he has not yet relapsed after its confession. But if he has already confessed this sin once or several times and nevertheless has committed it again, he is called a recidivist.⁴¹⁸

How many acts are necessary for acquiring an evil habit cannot be determined absolutely. For this depends upon many things, namely, upon weakness of will, upon the nature and manner of the sin, and upon the long or short interval within which the individual sins are committed. Thus, for example, a man weak in will more easily contracts an almost invincible habit of sinning than a strong man. According to St. Alphonsus,⁴¹⁹ he is judged to have contracted a habit who is accustomed to commit an external sin five times in a month. But for internal sins a much greater number is required.

A custom of sinning can arise either from external human incitement, that is, from a proximate occasion, and then the habitual sinner is at the same time one in an occasion of sin; or from a diabolical temptation or from a disordered passion, and then he is properly a habitual sinner. Concerning this latter the following rule is valid.

Rule. A habitual sinner can and ought to be absolved when he is truly attrite and sincerely promises to employ the means necessary for conquering the evil custom.

The reason is that an evil custom in no way proves the indisposition of the penitent. Moreover (according to the adage: The penitent is to be believed when speaking both for himself and against himself), a penitent firmly asserting his attrition and his purpose seriously to employ remedies against the evil custom is worthy of belief and capable of absolution. The remedies which are to be employed by the penitent must be determined according to the quality both of the evil custom and of the man sinning. Proposition 60, condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679, is not opposed to this doctrine: "Absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred to a penitent having a custom of sinning against the law of God, of nature, or of the Church, although no hope of amendment appears, provided that he declares orally that he is sorry and proposes amendment."⁴²⁰ For in this proposition the essence of the error is situated in those words: "although no hope of amendment appears." Moreover, a habitual sinner who confesses a habit of sinning for the first time and seriously promises amendment always offers a true hope of amendment. Certainly, if a habitual sinner has already rather often promised amendment and nevertheless always fell in the same manner into the same sins, he offers little hope of amendment; but then he is now not a simple habitual sinner, but a habitual recidivist, who is to be treated otherwise, as will be stated below. For the rest, it is very rare in practice that someone is a simple habitual sinner and not at the same time a recidivist. A simple habitual sinner would be, for example, a man who has not confessed for ten years and within this time has contracted the habit of polluting himself once a week.

⁴¹⁸ Cf. below, n. 453.

⁴¹⁹ Praxis confess., n. 70.

⁴²⁰ Denz., n. 1210.

n. 453.

453. 3. Absolution of Recidivists.

In some sense all men are recidivists, for all repeat sins. We are not speaking here of recidivists in this broad material sense. A recidivist in the strict or formal sense is called one who after confessions so falls into the same mortal sins that from this it is rightly permitted to doubt concerning his disposition in the preceding confessions. Therefore a recidivist differs from a habitual sinner, since the latter accuses a habit of sin for the first time. Older authors not rarely confuse the habitual sinner with the recidivist; but modern theologians do not describe the characteristic signs of a recidivist in the same manner. Therefore careful attention must be given to the precise sense in which the individual authors accept the words habitual sinner and recidivist. The quasi-characteristic sign of a recidivist seems to be that after repeated confessions (three or four) he has employed no serious effort to guard against some grave sin, so that his persistence in an evil will can prudently be inferred from this.⁴²¹

Rule. A recidivist regularly cannot be absolved unless by special signs he has first dispelled the presumption of indisposition existing against him.

I say: regularly, for in a case of necessity the sacrament can be administered even to a man doubtfully disposed. - But the reason for the rule stated is that from a relapse into exactly the same sins without any amendment whatsoever there arises a vehement presumption that the penitent lacks sincere contrition and a firm purpose, since it is scarcely possible that a man, grieving from his inmost heart concerning the sins committed and firmly proposing to employ the means necessary for amendment, should fall in exactly the same manner into the same sins. Therefore this presumption must be destroyed, which assuredly is not done by a simple assertion of the penitent. For if the penitent has already failed again and again to keep his promises, he certainly merits little belief. Therefore he must prove his true contrition and purpose from elsewhere.

The special signs of contrition and a sufficient purpose are diverse according to the diverse character of penitents, nor can anything be determined in particular. Thus, for example, tears shed on account of sins committed show a sufficient disposition in a strong man who weeps very rarely, while, on the contrary, they merit no great belief in certain women who are accustomed frequently to weep at will. Let the general rule be: After weighing all the circumstances, the confessor must have sufficient certitude of the disposition of the penitent. - As special signs showing a sufficient disposition there are adduced, for example, the spontaneous flight from a proximate occasion; firmness in a good purpose at least for some time. Hence, if the penitent after the preceding confession abstained for a month from a sin into which he previously fell every week, he offers a special sign of the good purpose he had. Nevertheless, too much trust is not to be placed in those penitents who for human reasons approach Easter confession and then abstain from sins for some time beforehand with the intention of avoiding the denial of absolution. Other special signs are: a spontaneous confession, especially at an unusual time; a pious pilgrimage for the purpose of making a confession; Spiritual Exercises completed. If a recidivist brings none of these or similar signs, he is not immediately to be dismissed without absolution, but is to be disposed to true contrition and a sincere purpose. This must be done especially whenever there is question of sins committed from frailty, for example, of pollution rather often committed by a young man. But if after a suitable exhortation the recidivist remains doubtfully disposed, in a case of necessity he can be absolved under condition; otherwise absolution is to be deferred for a brief time. A delay of eight days suffices for recidivists who sin from frailty; but for recidivists from occasion, absolution is fittingly deferred for fifteen days. It is evident of itself that the confessor ought to address the penitent not with rough but with most humane words. Let him be mindful of that adage: "Firmly in the matter, gently in the manner." In our days absolution is rarely to be deferred unless it is altogether necessary. For because of the weakness of faith under which many penitents labor, delayed absolution often does more harm than good.

⁴²¹ Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 2208, § 1.

Merkelbach, Pastoral Questions

Benedict H. Merkelbach, O.P. — 36 passages

Ch. I, Question V: Concerning Those in Occasions of Sin

n. ¶2120.

VI. Practical rules. - From the foregoing three practical rules can be established:

n. ¶2121.

A. One who remains in a voluntary and continuous proximate occasion regularly cannot be absolved unless he first proposes to remove the occasion and also removes it.

n. ¶2122.

For since removal of the occasion ordinarily is arduous, there is proximate danger of breaking the purpose, and therefore if the occasion is not taken away before absolution, the penitent will easily deceive himself (falsely persuading himself that he is going to resist temptations), so that the purpose is rendered inefficacious and he does not remove the occasion. Hence the penitent who, adverting to this, exposed himself to this danger would be at least suspect concerning disposition, concerning which therefore moral certitude often could not be had: for why does this man make confession if he does not remove the occasion? And then the confessor who exposed him to such danger would sin against his office of physician.

n. ¶2123.

Exception is made if, public scandal being lacking, 1) the penitent from ignorance or lightness of soul is not conscious that he remains in a proximate occasion or that the obligation of removing it is grave, and the confessor foresees that admonition will be useless or harmful: then provisionally he is to be left in good faith, and little by little instructed concerning the occasion to be fled, which he will better understand if by experience of his own fragility he has known that he frequently sins because of it;

n. ¶2124.

or the occasion can easily be left behind, e.g., a depraved book, a thing of another detained while restitution is spontaneously promised;

n. ¶2125.

or the penitent manifests extraordinary signs of sorrow and purpose, e.g., he has already sent notice to the maidservant concerning leaving the house, or has hired a new maidservant;

n. ¶2126.

or a grave cause urges, so that previous removal of the occasion harms more, e.g., imminent danger of death, great difficulty of returning for a long time and of approaching another confessor, as easily happens if the penitent comes from a remote place, danger of infamy or scandal as easily happens if the sacrament must be received, danger of spiritual harm, e.g., alienation from the sacrament.

n. ¶2127.

In these latter cases the penitent is to be admonished that he will not obtain absolution any more unless he has stood by his promises; but if he has been admonished uselessly, he is to be held as a recidivist.

n. ¶2128.

B. One who remains in a voluntary and interrupted proximate occasion, e.g., by frequenting games, eating-houses, depraved societies, can be absolved several times, provided that he firmly proposes to beware of it; but if he has promised several times, and no amendment appears, he is to be held and treated as a recidivist, and generally, unless perhaps he furnishes extraordinary signs of disposition, absolution is to be deferred until he has actually left behind the occasion.

n. ¶2129.

For he is judged disposed, and therefore is to be absolved, unless signs of the contrary are present, as easily happens if he has promised several times and is now habituated, or unless it is better to send him back, with his consent, so that he may remove the occasion more promptly and firmly.

n. ¶2130.

C. One who remains in a necessary proximate occasion regularly can be absolved, provided that he is truly disposed to render the occasion remote by opportune and efficacious remedies.

n. ¶2131.

For on the one hand the occasion is not a sin nor does it induce necessity of sinning, but can be overcome, although with difficulty, especially with the grace of God; on the other hand no one is bound to the impossible, and therefore one who is in a necessary occasion rather unwillingly undergoes the danger than loves and seeks it and exposes himself to the occasion. Hence, if he uses opportune means and humbly asks the grace of victory, he can hope for it from God, "who will not permit you to be tempted above that which you can bear" (1 Cor. X, 13).

n. ¶2132.

Hence: 1) He can be absolved provided that a) the occasion is not evil in itself; b) a just cause is present, such as physical impotence, or a sin otherwise to be committed, or danger of an equal or greater sin, or the spiritual good of himself or of the neighbor, or great loss of temporal goods (life, reputation, fortune); c) there is hope of a good outcome, namely of overcoming the temptation; and d) the penitent is prepared to use sufficient means.

n. ¶2133.

On the contrary, he who after several admonitions always relapses in the same way, even means having been used, so that there is no amendment nor probable hope of amendment, is to be treated as a recidivist and cannot be absolved; unless perhaps he furnishes extraordinary signs, or is prepared to use new special means, or, if the occasion can physically be removed, first leaves it behind, according to Mt. V, 29 and XVI, 26 and XVIII, 9: for otherwise he is morally certainly going to sin. For as often as someone in some occasion is morally certainly going to sin, he is bound to flee it even with danger of life.

n. ¶2134.

And although Ballerini denies the supposition, saying that amendment necessarily follows from the means used, and that from the absence of amendment it can only be concluded that the means were insufficient or neglected, nevertheless this, although it rarely happens, is not impossible; indeed sometimes there are those who do not seriously use the means unless absolution is deferred until they furnish greater extraordinary signs or leave behind the occasion. Such a one, namely, either must return amended or remove the occasion before he is absolved.

n. ¶2140.

VIII. Applications. - From what has been said Marc deduces the following conclusions (Th. M., II, n. 1825):

n. ¶2141.

A woman must prefer to perish in want rather than frequent a house where she is given gifts which have already passed, or probably soon are going to pass, into the wages of prostitution.

n. ¶2142.

A penitent must leave a confessor, although useful, if from conversation with him he is accustomed to consent to impure delight.

n. ¶2143.

A man, thievish for a long time, must leave an office which impels him to steal.

n. ¶2144.

The glutton must avoid banquets; the drunkard taverns; the lustful man familiar and private conversations with women, etc., even if he seems to himself to have a just cause for conversing thus.

n. ¶2145.

An adolescent and a girl, frequenting one another with a view to marriage, are not to be absolved unless the occasion from proximate becomes, or can become, remote through means to be prescribed by the confessor.

n. ¶2146.

A son of the family sinning with a maidservant who dwells with him in the paternal house is not to be absolved (at least more often) unless he diligently uses the remedies prescribed by the confessor, and thus truly removes the occasion.

Ch. IV, Question Second: Concernin…, Article III: Concerning the Obligation of Granting, Denying, or Deferring Absolution

n. ¶3668.

V. Absolution is regularly to be deferred to those who are doubtfully disposed, unless a grave reason urges that they be absolved under condition. - This is altogether certain, for of itself it is illicit to expose a sacrament to danger of nullity or fruitlessness, because the reverence owed to the sacrament forbids this as sacrilege; - unless accidentally, if there is a grave and proportionate reason, or a notable utility of the neighbor to be obtained at once, because the sacraments are for men. This is to be understood when the confessor has employed every effort for obtaining sufficient disposition, and certain disposition cannot be obtained.

n. ¶3669.

Namely, as often as there is danger of nullity for the sacrament and danger of notable detriment for the neighbor, and both cannot be avoided at the same time, rather the danger of the neighbor is to be avoided and nevertheless the sacrament is to be conferred under condition: for the sacraments are for men, and the law of charity in a case of grave necessity prevails over the law of religion. Thus in the following cases:

n. ¶3670.

in danger of death, while the necessity of absolving here and now urges and there is only doubtful matter, - or doubtful disposition, - or a doubtfully capable subject, for example, because there is doubt concerning his life or concerning sufficient presence to the minister;

n. ¶3671.

in the case of a marriage soon to be celebrated, or Confirmation soon to be received, if the disposition of the penitent is doubtful; likewise in return to the Church after Baptism repeated under condition;¹

¹ Not thus of itself, while the precept of communion urges, because this can be postponed; - unless accidentally there is a founded fear of infamy or scandal, as is said under 4.

n. ¶3672.

in a case in which a doubtfully disposed penitent would for a long time lack the occasion of confessing;

n. ¶3673.

in a case in which a doubtfully disposed penitent would be exposed to grave infamy or to giving scandal to others, if he were dismissed unabsolved;

n. ¶3674.

if it is greatly to be feared lest one doubtfully disposed and dismissed be cast into despair or not be about to return to receive the sacrament; not however if he seriously threatens this, because rather it is a sign of indisposition;

n. ¶3675.

in doubt concerning the sufficiency of matter which is doubtfully grave, or concerning the sufficient or perfect use of reason in the penitent, while the precept of confession urges, or perhaps grave matter is present;

n. ¶3676.

finally in doubt whether the minister has already absolved or absolved duly, that is, with the due form. This case is reduced to doubt concerning the condition of the subject, because if the penitent had already been validly absolved, the matter of the sacrament, namely, a new confession, would be lacking.

n. ¶3677.

Therefore there are only six cases on the part of the penitent, and one on the part of the minister.

n. ¶3678.

VI. According to St. Leonard of Port Maurice, those are judged doubtfully disposed: a) who have relapsed in the same or a worse mode, without employing the remedies prescribed by the confessor and without serious effort of amendment; b) who respond only coldly that they are sorry, especially if they have already often relapsed; c) if they show great affection for sin, or have derived great utility from sin, or put their whole zeal into satisfying passions; d) when they are of a freer and more lax life, or rashly excuse their sins, or institute contention and altercation with the confessor, or seem to boast concerning the sin committed; e) when they approach the sacrament not spontaneously, but only by command of parents or others, or from mere custom, or to please others, or from fear lest they lose reputation; f) if they refuse a moderate penance proportioned to their strength.

n. ¶3679.

Therefore those are called doubtfully disposed in the strict sense against whose disposition a grave suspicion arises from positive indications (such as we have enumerated), without on the other side a probable and prudent judgment concerning sufficient disposition being able to be formed on account of much graver reasons.

n. ¶3680.

It is said: 1) from positive indications; therefore if against dispositions proved by grave reason no grave positive reason militates, or only a slight and tenuous reason, then the penitent is not judged doubtfully disposed, because in human and practical matters a solidly founded opinion to which no grave reason is opposed is equivalent to practical certitude. And thus the opinions of some, who contend that probable disposition suffices (understanding probability in the strict philosophical sense of greater likelihood), are reconciled with the opinion of St. Alphonsus, who requires morally certain disposition;

n. ¶3681.

without on the other side a probable and prudent judgment concerning sufficient disposition being able to be formed. For although from one or another motive, for example, from repeated relapse, a grave suspicion can arise, on the other side there can be much graver reasons concerning sufficient disposition, namely, extraordinary signs of contrition. But a notably more probable opinion is equivalent to practical certitude. Then therefore absolution is to be given at once, and indeed in an absolute mode.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 8 passages

Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. III, Ch. III, Art. II, § 1. On The Obligation Of The Confessor Toward Penitents Diverse From The State Of Soul

n. ¶1.

I. On Occasionaries

n. ¶1819.

DEFINITION. An occasion of sin is either a person or any external thing, alluring to sinning. Therefore it is constituted from two things: an external and alluring object, and an internal propensity to sin (cf. n. 373).

DIVISION. A manifold occasion is distinguished, namely: remote and proximate; and this latter is continuous or interrupted; voluntary or necessary.

A REMOTE occasion is that which indeed has some force of alluring to sin, but in which the danger of sinning is less probable, and in which men for the most part do not sin. We are not bound to avoid this, except perhaps under light obligation, insofar namely as a light danger of sinning would threaten us from it. Nevertheless, per accidens, we would be obliged under grave obligation, namely in the case in which grave scandal would be furnished to others (cf. n. 376).

A PROXIMATE occasion is that which induces probable or grave danger of sinning. - It is such per se, or per accidens. It is called an occasion per se, or absolutely proximate, when the external object is such that most men, through it, are for the most part induced into sin, e.g. a fixed look at a very base thing, dwelling with a concubine. "A proximate occasion per accidens, or relative, is that which, although with respect to others it is not proximate, nevertheless with respect to someone is proximate: either because this one, in such an occasion, has frequently fallen, or because it can prudently be feared that he will fall, on account of the known experience of his fragility."² - Therefore, just as an occasion proximate per se can be remote with respect to someone very pious and cautious; so, on the contrary, an occasion remote per se will be proximate with respect to someone who has become very weak and ready to fall.

A continuous occasion, or one in being, is that which is always present, without being sought: e.g. a concubine or maidservant with whom someone dwells and is accustomed to sin; an obscene book which someone keeps in his library. An interrupted occasion, or one not in being, is that which is not indeed always present, but is easily found: such as a brothel, tavern, wicked friend, lover, or mistress.
A voluntary occasion is that which can easily be avoided; but a necessary occasion is that which cannot physically or morally be removed: physically, for example, if someone were in prison or on a galley, or at the point of death, no longer having time or manner of expelling a concubine; morally, if the occasion cannot be dismissed without grave scandal, or without danger of falling into something worse, or without great detriment in the goods of life, reputation, or fortune.³

Hence ADVERT that an occasion is not judged necessary: if the scandal or danger of falling into something worse is light, or fictitious and imaginary, as often happens in cases of this sort; likewise if the damage or inconvenience to be undergone is of small moment. - Hence St. Alphonsus with Sporer and Palao does not excuse a moderately rich man who, lest he suffer damage of one hundred ducats (today I would say one thousand francs), would not wish to leave the occasion.⁴

n. ¶1820.

Principles. I. The confessor, so that he may bring a PRUDENT JUDGMENT concerning those who are involved in an occasion of sin, ought TO ATTEND both to past falls, and to the peculiar circumstances of the penitent, and finally to the things commonly happening. Thus from the mind of St. Alphonsus and others. And indeed in truth:

From past falls the gravity or probability of danger is especially to be argued, in the case in which the penitent has already been involved in an occasion for some time, and has already sinned in it. Now, "some authors will that it is not a proximate occasion unless it is one in which a man has fallen almost always, or for the most part; but the more common and truer opinion teaches that a proximate occasion is that in which someone has frequently sinned."⁵ But frequency of falls is either relative or absolute. Relative frequency is computed according to the number of times in which someone was exposed to the occasion, and will be present, e.g., if someone in twelve visits is accustomed to sin five or six times; likewise, if he visited a woman only three or four times in a year, and for the most part sinned with her; indeed if he visited only once in a year, and nevertheless always sinned. - But absolute frequency will be present when the number of falls, considered in itself, is notable, as if two persons who meet every Sunday should fall ten or twelve times per year. Either frequency suffices for constituting a proximate occasion.⁶
From the circumstances of the penitent, especially from his known fragility, likewise the gravity of danger is to be judged, in the case in which he himself has not yet, or has rarely, been involved in the occasion, or has not yet sinned in it; for it would be unadvised to wait for experience of falls in order to bring judgment concerning the danger. Hence St. Alphonsus: "When," he says, "an external occasion is joined with a vehement passion or vicious habit, or strong temptation, he sins who does not leave it, even if he has not yet yielded to temptation; because it will rarely happen that such a one will contain himself if he is not separated from the occasion."⁷ - And hence it is why a maidservant, earnestly solicited by her master, is generally bound to depart from his house. We say generally; for if she were very devoted to piety, very cautious, and always used opportune remedies, she would not be absolutely bound to departure.⁸
From things commonly happening, and from these alone, the gravity of danger is to be judged when other special indications cannot be had from the very person of the penitent. Hence the following RULE must be held: If some occasion has induced others, involved in the same circumstances of things, into danger of sinning, it is to be presumed that the same occasion will similarly induce this penitent also.

But lest the Confessor be led by false conjectures, let him remember that others, because of difference of age, state, sex, disposition, education, instruction, etc., are affected otherwise, although they are involved in the same occasions. It is also to be adverted that habituation brings it about that not all are equally excited by the allurements of sin. And thus indeed it happens that many things are more dangerous to those habituated than to those not habituated, because habit renders both consent and fall easier; and vice versa, that some things are more dangerous to those not habituated than to those habituated, since, because of long use, they have now been made more dull, or because of the use of worse things they need stronger incitements for sharpening lust. Hence St. Alphonsus,⁹ speaking of the very bad custom of certain women: "Habituation brings it about," he says, "that men, from such a sight (of women showing their breasts), are less moved to concupiscence, as experience establishes."

n. ¶1821.

II. Never is a penitent to be absolved who DOES NOT WISH to remove, insofar as it is in him, the PROXIMATE occasion of sin. - It is proved: 1. From Scripture (Eccli. 3:27): "He who loves danger will perish in it"; (Matt. 5:29): "If your eye scandalizes you, etc."

From several propositions condemned by Innocent XI: N. 61: "Sometimes he can be absolved who is involved in a proximate occasion of sinning, which he can and does not wish to omit, indeed directly and by design seeks, or casts himself into it." N. 62: "A proximate occasion of sinning is not to be fled, when some useful or honorable cause of not fleeing occurs." N. 63: "It is licit directly to seek a proximate occasion of sinning, for the spiritual or temporal good of ourselves, or of the neighbor." - 3. From reason: he who freely wills an occasion in which he will probably sin, by that very fact and implicitly wills the sin; and therefore he already sins, and is unworthy of absolution.¹⁰

We said insofar as it is in him: namely by taking away the danger of sinning: whether physically, i.e. by removing the external alluring object, when the occasion is voluntary; or at least morally, i.e. by healing fragility, or proclivity to evil, by opportune and suitable remedies, when the occasion is necessary (cf. n. 1825).

n. ¶1822.

From what has been said there arise, for practice, the following Rules:

Rule 1. One who is involved in a PROXIMATE VOLUNTARY OCCASION IN BEING, as, e.g., a concubinary, or a maidservant frequently sinning with her master, whatever promises he may make, cannot, ordinarily speaking, be absolved, even the first time, unless he has actually removed the occasion. - The reason is the proximate danger of breaking the purpose; because the removal of such an occasion, on account of the great attachment of soul, demands an arduous victory over oneself; and therefore, if the occasion is not taken away before absolution, the penitent will easily deceive himself after absolution, falsely persuading himself that he will resist temptations, and thus, the occasion not having been dismissed, he will certainly return to the vomit. Wherefore the PENITENT who, adverting to this, wished rashly to expose himself to this danger, would be indisposed; the CONFESSOR who exposed the penitent to such danger would sin gravely, both against the office of judge, by absolving the indisposed, and against the office of physician, by not applying the necessary remedy.¹¹

It was said ordinarily speaking; because exceptions are given, provided the penitent firmly promises that, as soon as possible, the occasion will be taken away. - Namely there is excepted: 1. If the occasion is such that it can easily be dismissed, e.g. a wicked book. - 2. If the penitent manifests compunction and firmness of purpose through extraordinary signs of sorrow; because prudently, in this case, because of the sign of more abundant grace received, execution of the purpose can be hoped for. "Nevertheless," Roncaglia says, "that he himself, even in this case, would defer absolution until the occasion is removed, if absolution could conveniently be deferred; and so also (St. Alphonsus adds) I would act." - 3. If a grave cause compels that absolution be granted at once; because, from a grave cause and with due precautions, it is licit to expose oneself and another to a danger which is then rendered remote; therefore, when the penitent is in some necessity of receiving absolution before he takes away the occasion, he is judged as if he were in a necessary occasion, and accordingly has a right to be absolved at once.¹²

FOUR grave CAUSES of this sort are listed, namely: - 1. Danger of death, namely if the penitent is mortally sick, and the occasion cannot be removed at once: whether because there is no time, or because grave infamy, or grave scandal, will arise from such dismissal, as often happens.¹³ - 2. Difficulty of returning: namely if he cannot return to the same confessor, or not except after a long time, and would find great inconvenience in repeating confession before another. The reason is the great burden either of repeating confession before another, or of remaining for a long time in the state of sin.¹⁴ The same is valid if the penitent confesses in a place very distant from his own domicile, so that there would be a great burden of returning.¹⁵ - 3. Danger of infamy, namely if he has the necessity on the same or following day of entering marriage or receiving Communion, insofar as he cannot abstain without grave infamy.¹⁶ Similarly, if he confesses in the time of a Mission, and cannot, without a mark of infamy, remove the occasion at once. In this case, removal of the occasion is to be remitted to some weeks after the Mission, under this condition nevertheless, that at once, if it can be done, some precaution be used, e.g. renunciation of leasing, and that remedies be prescribed for preventing relapse. Thus St. Leonard of Port Maurice.¹⁷ - 4. Danger of spiritual damage, namely if it is prudently to be feared lest the penitent, on account of the delay of absolution, since he has not yet been made constant, be alienated from confession and waste away in sins; because then the delay would rather increase the danger of breaking the purpose.¹⁸

But in the cases mentioned, the Confessor ought TO ADMONISH the penitent not to trust that he will obtain absolution in the future unless he has stood by his promises.¹⁹ - But if the penitent has already at another time been admonished by another confessor concerning removing the occasion, and has not obeyed the admonition: he is to be held as a recidivist, and therefore cannot be absolved unless he brings extraordinary signs of sorrow, as we shall say below (n. 1830).²⁰

n. ¶1823.

Rule 2. One who is involved in a PROXIMATE VOLUNTARY occasion, but not in being, e.g. by frequenting games, taverns, wicked societies, can be absolved the first, second, indeed even the third time, provided he firmly proposes to keep himself from it. But if afterward amendment does not appear, absolution is to be deferred until he has actually left the occasion. Thus St. Alphonsus,²¹ with St. Charles Borromeo and others. - Now, the reason why one must act more mildly with a penitent of this sort seems to be in this: that when the occasion is not present (especially if the danger is not that of falling into base acts, but into blasphemies, quarrels, drunkennesses, obscene words, impure thoughts, and other things of this sort, as in the cases proposed by St. Charles), it does not allure to sin as strongly as an occasion always present, or in base matter; and therefore the penitent, who firmly proposes to guard himself from the occasion, can, without rashness, hope that it will happen that he avoids sin, whether by not approaching the occasion unless some reason is given, or by otherwise using precautions and remedies.

It was said, 1. can be absolved, that is by the confessor as judge, because he is judged sufficiently disposed. But he can also be sent away to another time by the confessor as physician, so that he may more promptly and more firmly take away the occasion from the midst. And it is counseled that this be done, even the first time, when the habit of sinning in the occasion has already grown old, so that an experiment may be taken whether in reality he removes the occasion, or at least begins to amend himself²² (cf. n. 1827).

It was said, 2. can be absolved the second, indeed even the third time, i.e. when a wicked habit is not joined with the occasion. For when the penitent, in an occasion of sinning, is formally recidivist into a wicked habit, he must be treated as a recidivist (cf. n. 1829).

n. ¶1824.

Rule 3. One who is involved in a PROXIMATE NECESSARY occasion can be absolved without leaving the occasion, provided he appears otherwise disposed and wishes to use the prescribed remedies. "The reason is," says St. Alphonsus,²³ "because an occasion of sinning is not properly sin in itself, nor does it induce the necessity of sinning; hence true sorrow and purpose not to fall again can well stand with the occasion; and although each one is bound to take away the proximate danger of sinning, this is understood when he himself voluntarily wills such danger; but when the occasion is morally necessary, then the danger becomes remote through opportune remedies, and God then does not withdraw Himself from assisting by His grace him who has truly deliberated not to offend Him."

We said, as above: can be absolved, namely by the confessor as judge, if he appears otherwise disposed. But let us hear St. Alphonsus again:

"But IN PRACTICE," he says, "all agree that it is expedient that absolution be deferred for those who are involved in a proximate occasion even if necessary. Indeed, that I may say candidly what I think in this matter, I would never absolve one who is in an extrinsic proximate occasion (for concerning an intrinsic one I shall speak otherwise), especially if the occasion is concerning base matter, whenever absolution could conveniently be deferred. For I judge that the confessor as PHYSICIAN is bound to fit to his penitent the more opportune remedies, so that he may secure his salvation; and I think no antidote more apt can be ministered to one who is in a proximate occasion than delay of absolution; since experience teaches that penitents, after they depart absolved, for the most part neglect to use the prescribed means, and thus most easily fall again. On the contrary, when absolution is denied to them, they more vigilantly strive to execute the remedies and resist temptations, indeed impelled by fear lest, when they return to the confessor, they again be dismissed without absolution.

"And in the case in which the penitent previously admonished by another confessor has neglected the prescribed means, and has fallen again in the same way, I say that he must altogether be dismissed without absolution, unless perhaps he exhibits extraordinary signs of sorrow. And even for this one gifted with extraordinary compunction, ordinarily speaking, I would deny absolution, when absolution could conveniently be deferred.

"Perhaps to someone handing down these things I shall seem too rigid; but I, when I had met penitents entangled in the snares of occasions of this sort, have always acted thus and always will act; for proceeding in this way I think myself not rigid, but especially benign toward them: since no manner seems to me more apt than this, that they be snatched from sins and from eternal damnation; and on the contrary I would believe that, if by acting benignly I furnished to them the absolution which they ask, I would be the cause that they miserably languished in vices. Let each one abound in his own sense. - Would that all confessors conducted themselves thus with penitents of this sort! Far fewer crimes indeed would be committed, and many more souls would avoid perdition."²⁴

n. ¶1825.

Questions. Q. 1. What REMEDIES ought the confessor to assign to a penitent who is involved in a NECESSARY occasion?

St. Alphonsus responds: "The remedies are: great prayer, - more frequent use of the Sacraments, - daily before an image of the Crucified to renew the promise of sinning no more, - to avoid being alone with her alone, - to flee from the sight of the accomplice, and similar things."²⁵

And these remedies the penitent IS BOUND to use, insofar as he can; for otherwise the occasion will indeed be necessary, but the danger voluntary: just as, in the case of shipwreck, not to seize the plank is to commit oneself to certain danger of death.²⁶

Q. 2. Whether one can be absolved who, existing in a NECESSARY occasion, ALWAYS IN THE SAME WAY, notwithstanding the remedies, falls again?

Resp. Negative, if after many experiments no amendment appears, nor probable hope of amendment. Thus St. Alphonsus, as the truer opinion; and the reason is because, if someone always falls again in the same way, he is truly indisposed; for from such a relapse it is detected that either the remedies were not duly used, or the occasion is not truly necessary; for necessity of sinning is not given, and no one is tempted above what he can bear. Therefore the precept of Christ presses, saying: "If your right eye scandalizes you, pluck it out and cast it from you" (Matt. 5:29). It was said, if no hope of amendment appears; but this is judged to shine forth if the penitent, at present, brings extraordinary signs of sorrow.²⁷

From what has been said you will resolve:²⁸ 1. A woman ought rather to choose to perish from want than to frequent a house where she is given gifts which have already passed, or probably will soon pass, into meretricious wages. - 2. A penitent ought to leave a confessor, although useful, if from his conversation he is accustomed to consent to impure delight. - 3. A man, thieving for a long time, ought to leave the office which impels him to stealing. - 4. A glutton ought to avoid banquets; a drunkard, taverns; a lustful man, familiar and private conversations with women, etc., even if he seems to himself to have a just cause for conversing thus. - 5. An adolescent and a girl, frequenting one another with a view to marriage, are not to be absolved unless the occasion from proximate becomes remote, through means to be prescribed by the confessor (cf. n. 826). - 6. A son of a family sinning with a maidservant who dwells with him in the paternal house is not to be absolved unless he diligently uses the remedies prescribed by the confessor and thus truly removes the occasion. But, generally, an occasion of this sort cannot be removed except through the emigration of one or the other (namely, of the son or of the maidservant).

Concerning occasions in particular see what was said at n. 824 and following.²⁹

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 22 passages

Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART THIRD: ON THE MINISTE…, Ch. II, Art. I, § II. On the Manner of Acting with Various Kinds of Penitents

n. ¶2.

1429. Definition. - An occasion of sin is generally defined: an external circumstance which, whether from its own nature, or from the frailty of the man who is found in it, allures, or induces, to sinning. Hence it differs from the danger of sinning, by which name comes whatever impels to sin, whether that be intrinsic or extrinsic.

Division. - A manifold occasion is distinguished, namely proximate or remote; absolute or relative; present or not present; voluntary or necessary.

1° A proximate occasion is that which induces a probable danger of sinning; remote, however, that which induces a slight [danger], or in which commonly men, for the most part, do not sin.

2° An absolute occasion, or occasion per se, is that which of itself induces to sin, and therefore is such with respect to men taken commonly; but a relative occasion, or occasion per accidens, is that which, although it is not an occasion with respect to others, is nevertheless such with respect to someone, his frailty being considered, or because he has frequently fallen in it. Wherefore, just as an absolute proximate occasion can be a relative remote one for one who is very pious and cautious, so on the contrary an absolute remote occasion can be a relative proximate one for one who is weak and prone to vice, especially shameful vice.

3° A present occasion, or occasion in esse, is that which is continually present to someone, without its being sought, e.g. if he keeps a concubine at home, or is accustomed to sin with a maidservant; but a not-present occasion, or one not in esse, is that which is absent, and at intervals either is sought or occurs, as a tavern is relative to a drunkard, a mistress with respect to her lover.

4° A voluntary occasion is that which can easily be dismissed; but a necessary one is that which cannot be removed physically or morally.

Moreover the causes which truly render some occasion necessary are nearly these:

1° Complete impossibility of avoiding the occasion, e.g. if a concubine were shut up in a prison of which her concubinary were the guard.

2° If the occasion cannot be avoided without sin, suppose of injustice, or without true and grave scandal, as if a wife were in occasion on account of cohabitation with her husband, and from separation there would follow spiritual ruin in the children or scandal among the people.

I said: a) without TRUE scandal; for fictitious or imaginary scandal is not scandal. Of this kind would be that which a concubinary would invent, alleging that the people, if he cast out the concubine, would be confirmed in the suspicion which it already has concerning his concubinage; for that very suspicion itself is already the scandal, which cannot be removed except by the casting out of the concubine.

I said: b) without scandal ... GRAVE; for a light one is not proportioned to the grave danger of one's own ruin.

3° If the occasion cannot be deserted without grave temporal harm in goods, whether of fortune, of reputation, or of life, or without another grave difficulty.

4° According to Berardi and others. When the person in occasion cannot withdraw himself from one occasion without certainly falling into another equal or worse occasion, or into another equal or worse spiritual danger. The reason is that no one can be obliged to something useless or to something worse. Hence Gury wrote: "A maidservant would not have to be obliged to depart at once from the house ... for the case in which ... she could not depart except so as to fall into an equal danger and perhaps into a greater one." Yet one must beware of hallucination, which in this matter is very easy; for it is too easy to be deceived, where it is sweet to believe. Thus it is very easy for a concubinary to believe, e.g., that he will sin in an equal way even with a new maidservant, and nevertheless to delude himself; concerning which matter Viva wrote: "Certainly the danger, considered in itself, of sinning with a new maidservant is not the same ... as of sinning with a concubine."

n. ¶1430.

1430. - Principle I. In order that a right judgment may be made concerning the probability of the danger which makes some occasion proximate, according to the mind of St. Alphonsus a distinction must be made between an occasion in which someone has already been placed for some time, and an occasion which is now to be approached for the first time.

In the former case the occasion will have to be held proximate if someone has frequently sinned in it; nor is it required that he always or almost always have sinned in it, or even more often than not. But it makes no difference whether the frequency is relative or absolute. Relative frequency is computed according to the number of times in which someone was exposed to the occasion, and it will be present, e.g. if someone in twelve visits is accustomed to sin five or six times. But absolute frequency will be present when the number of falls, considered in itself, is notable, as if two persons who meet on single Sundays fall ten or twelve times in a year, or if for several years you have always sinned in a house which you visit only once in the year.

In the latter case, one must stand by the presumption taken from things which commonly happen: namely, it must be presumed that probable danger of sinning will be present for someone if that very occasion commonly brings that probable danger to other persons placed in the same circumstances. - I said: placed in the same circumstances; for diversity of circumstances, whether on the part of the subject, or on the part of the occasion itself, or on the part of the manner in which the same occasion is approached, induces a difference in the degree of danger.

On the part indeed of the subject, a difference of age, state, sex, temperament, virtue, education, instruction, affections, etc., can have great influence. Thus some things are very dangerous to children and not to adults; to youths and not to old men; to the lustful and not to the cold; to those leading a celibate life and not to the married; to men and not to women, or conversely to women and not to men. Thus some things are very dangerous to common people, but not to persons of distinguished condition and well educated. Thus frail persons and those lacking the fear of God will find grave dangers where persons endowed with virtue and piety will be in slight or no danger. Thus a prolonged conversation with a woman ordinarily exposes those who pursue her with disordered love to grave danger; but not those who do not have such an affection. Thus books of impious men or heretics, which ordinarily would expose secular persons to very grave danger, expose a Religious man, very grounded in Theology, to slight or no danger. It must also be adverted that habituation produces great differences. For on one side many things are more dangerous to the accustomed than to the unaccustomed, insofar as custom renders consent and fall easier; and on the other side some things are more dangerous to the unaccustomed than to the accustomed, insofar as some things from long use (or from use of worse things) no longer make any impression; whence St. Alphonsus wrote: "Habituation causes that men are less moved to concupiscence from such a sight" (of women showing their breasts), "as is clear from experience."

But on the part of the occasion itself, many circumstances can induce a great difference in the degree of danger. Thus it is one thing to converse with a young, beautiful, adorned, immodest woman, full of allurements; and another thing to converse with an old, deformed, grave, modest, pious woman, etc. Thus it is one thing to be present at a comedy represented with sufficient honesty and sufficient decency; and another thing to be present at a comedy very shameful or represented very shamefully.

Finally, on the part of the manner in which the occasion is approached, many circumstances can likewise induce a difference in danger. Thus it is one thing to speak with a girl secretly, witnesses being removed, frequently, for a long time, and without any caution; and another thing to speak with her in the presence of others, rarely, for a brief time, and with opportune cautions.

n. ¶1431.

1431. - Principle II. In order that someone may be treated as constituted in a proximate occasion, it is required that the occasion from proximate has not become remote. But that it has become remote is known from nearly these indications:

1st If from sufficient experience it is clear that the gravity of the danger has vanished; as, for instance, if someone was accustomed almost daily to become drunk in a tavern, and now already for a long time indeed frequents the tavern daily, but, on account of the purpose made, has never become drunk. But a much longer experience is required in chastity.

2nd If some cause has supervened which evidently destroys the gravity of the danger, as if someone had had a custom of sinning with a woman near him, not on account of affection toward her, but on account of the mere discharge of lust; but now has taken as wife her sister, whom he very much loves. I say: evidently or sufficiently certainly, so as to exclude the case, e.g., of one promising amendment yesterday.

3rd According nevertheless to only some Theologians. If the penitent shows extraordinary sorrow and purpose. But I would admit this third indication only if the occasion, which I suppose to be voluntary, a) is not present, nor going to last long; or b) is not very alluring, as if, e.g., there is question of an associate with whom the penitent himself was accustomed first to introduce depraved conversations.

4th If other means sufficient for rendering the occasion remote without separation are present, and it can be presumed that the penitent will in fact employ them.

n. ¶1432.

1432. - Principle III. Absolution is not to be denied to a penitent constituted in a remote occasion, even if he does not wish to desert it. The reason is: 1° because it does not induce a proximate danger of sinning mortally; 2° because too hard an obligation would be imposed on the penitent, since such occasions generally cannot be morally avoided. Yet make an exception, and that per accidens, if the occasion, although remote, unless it is deserted at once, is going shortly to be proximate, as if with the occasion there is joined a vicious habit, or a great temptation or vehement passion.

n. ¶1433.

1433. - Principle IV. A penitent is never to be absolved who refuses to desert a voluntary proximate occasion, whether that occasion is proximate per se or per accidens; whether in esse, or not in esse. This is clear from propositions 61, 62, 63, condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVII; likewise from the 41st condemned by Alexander VII, p. XIV.

n. ¶1434.

1434. - Principle V. But to a penitent who is placed in a necessary proximate occasion, absolution cannot be denied on account of that occasion, if from elsewhere he is found disposed, and is willing to use the prescribed remedies. The reason is that no one is bound to that which is either physically or morally impossible; and from elsewhere the occasion of sinning is not of itself a sin, nor does it cast a man into the necessity of sinning. And this sentence indeed, according to St. Alphonsus, is most probable; "but," he adds, "in practice all agree that it is expedient that absolution ... be deferred. Indeed ... I would never absolve," thus the holy Doctor continues, "one who is in an extrinsic proximate occasion, ... especially if the occasion is concerning shameful matter, whenever absolution could conveniently be deferred. For I judge that the confessor, as physician, is held to fit to his penitent the more opportune remedies, so that he may work out his salvation; and I think that no other more apt antidote can be ministered to him who is in a proximate occasion than the delay of absolution; since experience teaches that penitents, after they depart absolved, for the most part neglect to employ the prescribed means, and thus very easily relapse." - Note that the holy Doctor says: whenever absolution could conveniently be deferred ... as physician, etc. For which reason, if there is question of a penitent whom the confessor prudently and before God judges not going to return, or not except after a long time, the delay of absolution will no longer have the character of medicine.

I said: is willing to use the prescribed remedies. Here it is asked, what remedies are to be assigned to the penitent who is placed in a necessary occasion? Resp. They are of a threefold kind: 1° some are directed to diminishing the force of the occasion; 2° some to diminishing the force of passion; 3° finally some to increasing spiritual strength.

First indeed it is necessary to diminish the force of the occasion. Not rarely a few words spoken with a strong soul; - not rarely some serious threat or reproach; - not rarely even one opening of the mouth for crying out; - not rarely even once to report the matter to someone who can apply a remedy, - suffice so that the treacherous plotter is cast down in spirit and ceases from every annoyance. The Salmanticenses wrote that such a person in occasion ought "not to mingle long conversations with that woman, and not even to joke lightly." He will also have to avoid looking at her with delay, and, as far as possible, not to speak about her, not to think about her, etc. But especially, says Scavini, "it must be inquired ... whether some circumstances generate the proximate occasion, in which case, by removing the circumstances, the occasion will be removed; e.g. sin is never committed except while in the evening he converses in the kitchen with the maidservant; then entrance into the kitchen at that time should be prohibited, and the occasion will be removed." Moreover these and similar things will be able, if not to destroy the force of the occasion, at least to diminish it not a little.

Secondly it is necessary to diminish the force of passion, by providing it no foment through idleness, through freedom of the senses, through depraved thoughts, through depraved readings, through intemperance, etc.; likewise by subjecting it through labor, through fasts and other macerations, if this is possible.

Thirdly it is necessary to increase spiritual strength. This is done chiefly by prayer, frequency of the Sacraments, and meditation on eternal truths.

As to prayer, care must be taken that the penitent, every morning and evening, and also when temptation comes, earnestly implores God and the Blessed Virgin for grace so necessary to him. But everyone knows how great is the usefulness of novendial prayers, devout assistance at the Sacrifice of the Mass, visitation of the Most Holy [Sacrament], renewal of purpose before the Crucifix, etc. Moreover prayers have greater force if they are joined with alms.

As to frequency of the Sacraments, care must be taken that the penitent choose for himself a stable confessor, learned and pious, as far as possible, and that he confess to him with the greatest frequency with which he can. But especially care must be taken that the penitent return to Confession immediately after a fall.

Finally, as to meditation on eternal truths, care must be taken that the penitent every day seriously think again about death, divine judgment, and eternal torments. But if for the penitent there were an opportune occasion of making spiritual exercises (even privately in his own home), as if he were a priest, or a rich person, or a Religious, then the confessor would have to employ every effort with him, that he may undertake them and perform them rightly; indeed, when possibility is given, there can be a true obligation of recurring to extraordinary means of this kind, namely when the evil and danger of the soul is great and extraordinary.

n. ¶1435.

1435. - Principle VI. Never, i.e. not even the first time, can he be absolved who is placed in an occasion, necessary indeed, but such that, while it stands, amendment cannot be hoped for, or no hope exists that the remedies will be going to profit. The reason is that to wish to remain in such an occasion is to wish the sin, and the removal of the occasion is here the sole means of salvation. Except the occasion which it is altogether impossible to remove. See n. 1429. 4°. 1°. Cf. n. 1436, q. 2°.

n. ¶1436.

1436. Questions. - Query 1° Can a penitent who sincerely promises that he will abandon a voluntary proximate occasion of sin be absolved before he has abandoned it?

Resp. 1° Affirm., and that not only once or twice, but even three times, if a) there is question of an occasion not in esse; b) the purpose of avoiding the occasion is firm; for if the habituated person otherwise betrays indications of indisposition, as if after the first or second absolution he falls back in the same way and with no effort employed for avoiding the occasion, he will have to be treated as formally a recidivist, and therefore neither the second nor third time will he be absolved without some extraordinary sign, as will be clear from the things to be said n. 1473 sq. - But it must be noted that here only whether he can be absolved is asked; for although the confessor, as judge, can absolve this penitent, as sufficiently disposed, nevertheless he can also, as physician, delay absolution, so that he may see whether the penitent in truth avoids the occasion or at least begins to amend himself; indeed it will be expedient to act thus, even the first time, if the custom of sinning in the occasion is already inveterate. I said: and that not only once, etc. For several times before the real execution of the purpose he cannot be absolved.

Resp. 2° Neg., if there is question of a present occasion or one in esse, not even the first time. If however the penitent either a) gives extraordinary signs of sorrow AND absolution cannot conveniently be deferred; or b) cannot return to the same confessor, or at least not except after a long time, NOR has been unfaithful to a promise already made before concerning removing the occasion (in which case he is to be treated as a recidivist, i.e. not absolved unless he brings extraordinary signs), he not only can be absolved, but has a right to receive absolution.

The reason of the rule is that "the taking away of the present occasion" is "a greatly arduous matter; ... and therefore, if the occasion is not taken away before absolution, the penitent will easily after absolution deceive himself, falsely persuading himself that he will resist temptations.... For which reason, if such a one wished to be absolved before he deserts the occasion, he would be indisposed, because he would constitute himself," and that voluntarily, as is supposed in the question, "in a probable danger of breaking his purpose; and therefore the confessor" absolving him "would sin both against the office of judge and of physician." And indeed against the office of judge, because he would absolve one indisposed; but against the office of physician, because he would not apply to him the remedy necessary to his salvation.

The reason of the 1st exception is that those extraordinary signs indicate that the penitent has been endowed with more abundant grace, from which he can be hoped to be more constant in removing the occasion. But that absolution even in this case is to be deferred, if it can conveniently be deferred, is from this, that the little cord of occasion is broken with difficulty. - The reason of the 2nd exception is that then the occasion here and now is necessary, since it cannot conveniently be taken away before absolution. But that absolution even in this case is to be deferred, if the penitent has not stood by the promise previously made concerning removing it, will be clear from the principles which we shall hand down concerning recidivists n. 1473 sq.

Query 2° Can he be absolved who, existing in a necessary occasion, after remedies have been employed, always relapses in the same way?

Resp. Neg., if there is no hope of amendment, whatever finally must happen. Thus St. Alphonsus, as the truer [opinion]. The reason is that, although on account of a just cause the danger of sin can be permitted, nevertheless the formal sin itself can never be permitted; but, when no hope of amendment appears, danger and sin become one single thing. - Hence a woman ought rather to perish from poverty than to frequent a house where she receives large alms, but which always degenerate into the wage of prostitutes. I said: if there is no hope of amendment. But this is judged to be present "if in the present [case] the penitent brings extraordinary signs of sorrow."

n. ¶1437.

1437. Resolves. - 1° "A maidservant vividly solicited by her master, ... if ... she is frail and little devout ... is held to depart from his house," although she has not yet sinned. The reason is that the occasion here, although still remote, is shortly going to be proximate. See n. 1432. - But if "she were given to piety, and cautious, and employed opportune remedies for repelling temptations and opposing passion, then I would not bind her to taking away the occasion." St. Alphonsus. The reason is that then the occasion cannot be presumed shortly going to be proximate.

2° Paul has often sinned with his maidservant, and can dismiss her without grave inconvenience. On occasion of spiritual exercises, to which he applies himself far from his own home, he confesses. It is asked whether he can be absolved before he has in fact dismissed the maidservant. Resp. distinguish. Either he has promised others that he will dismiss the maidservant, or not. If the former, he will not be able to be absolved unless he offers extraordinary signs, such as spiritual exercises are not when they have been performed perfunctorily and for this reason only, because the Superior or diocesan statutes compelled him to them. If the latter, he will be able to be absolved. See the reason of this resolution n. 1436. q. 1°. R. 2°.

3° Peter, on account of his business, or because otherwise he would be judged, not without manifest danger of enmities, to disregard those laws of relationship which are accustomed to be observed among relatives, goes two or three times in the year to a house which for him is a proximate occasion of the sin of lust, or to a certain city in which he is accustomed to sin with prostitutes. It is asked, 1° whether Peter must be obliged no longer to approach that house or city; 2° whether he can be absolved if he has promised to employ the prescribed remedies?

Resp. to the 1st Neg., if he is prepared to use the prescribed remedies.

Resp. to the 2nd Neg., if (which nevertheless will be rare in the case) absolution can conveniently be deferred, or if he is a recidivist and does not bring extraordinary signs of sorrow. The reason of each response is clear from the things said n. 1434.

4° Those who are not sui juris, as a son or daughter of a family and a wife, and are placed in a proximate occasion in esse with a male servant, a maidservant, a relative, or a husband, can be absolved if they seriously promise to employ the remedies prescribed by the confessor, and absolution cannot conveniently be deferred; otherwise, if either a) absolution can conveniently be deferred, or b) after remedies have been employed in vain, they always fall back in the same way and do not give extraordinary signs of sorrow. This follows from the things said n. 1436.

5° Caia, deprived of parents and destitute of every human hope, lives in concubinage with Peter, to be expelled from his house and to perish from hunger unless she continues to obey Peter's lust. It is asked whether she can be absolved before she has left Peter's house? - Neg. This follows from the things said n. 1436.

n. ¶1438.

1438. Definition. - Concubinage properly so called is the frequent and continued lying together of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman, keeping her as if she were a wife, whether in the same house or in another. - I said: properly so called; for if there were frequent and continued lying together with a married man or a married woman, it would be concubinage improperly so called.

n. ¶1439.

1439. Questions. - Query 1° Is he a concubinary, or at least is he held to separation, who rarely has sinned with a domestic woman?

Resp. 1° He is not a concubinary, since that frequent and continued lying together is not present which, as was said in the definition, is required for concubinage.

Resp. 2° He is not held to separation, provided that 1) the danger of relapse without separation either has already become remote or can be rendered remote; 2) on account of special circumstances either on the part of the subject, or on the part of the occasion itself (n. 1430), it cannot be presumed that the danger of relapse, although for now remote, will shortly again become proximate; 3) separation is not necessary for ending or repairing scandal which perhaps has arisen. The reason of the 1st is that the occasion is not, or at least is no longer, proximate; the reason of the 2nd and 3rd is clear from the things said n. 295. 12°; 301; 1432. - In practice, however, on account of the defect of the second condition, separation will often be necessary.

Case. - Lampridius once or twice sinned with his maidservant; he confesses after three months, affirming that he is sorry with his whole heart and that he will employ suitable means for avoiding relapse; but that he cannot cast out the maidservant, who is very useful to him. All these things having been weighed, the confessor absolved him. It is asked: Could Lampridius ... have been absolved? Gury resolves: "Lampridius absolutely could have been absolved, without dismissing the maidservant at once, the circumstances of the case being considered; or some experiment of time could be permitted."

Query 2° Can a concubinary ever be absolved before he has dismissed the concubine; or a concubine, before she has deserted the concubinary?

Resp. Distinguish. For on one side the occasion is either voluntary or necessary; but on the other the concubinage is either public or occult.

If 1) the concubinage is public and the occasion voluntary, Neg., and that although he gives signs of great sorrow. "The reason is both because it would beget scandal to see him who still keeps a concubine at home, or frequents her house, approach the Eucharist; and because a public sinner should not be absolved unless he also publicly does penance, and satisfies for the scandal." Therefore, before he is absolved, he must dismiss the concubine, or, if she lives outside the house, not approach her for some notable time.

If 2) the concubinage is public and the occasion necessary, ordinarily the concubinary will be able to be absolved in one case only; namely, when he lies dangerously ill, and the remedy of Matrimony can be employed. But if there is no place for this remedy, he will indeed be able to be absolved and fortified with the Sacraments of those going forth [from this life], provided nevertheless that a) the presence of the concubine or concubinary is not joined with proximate danger of sinning, or this danger can both be rendered remote and is in fact rendered so; and b) scandal either is not present, or, if it is present, is removed. But scandal is not present if the morally insuperable difficulties which impede the expulsion of the concubine or the desertion of the concubinary are of themselves manifest to the people or altogether presumable by them. But scandal is removed, in the case in which those difficulties were unknown to the people, if the sick person makes them manifest openly to some witnesses. (24) p. 420.

It is clear of itself that here there is question of a sick person in possession of himself; for, if the sick concubinary is found destitute of his senses, he must be absolved under condition, and also anointed with Holy Oil, as is clear from the things said n. 1371. 4°, and will be clear from the things to be said in the Treatise on Extreme Unction, n. 1508. q. 8°.

If 3) the concubinage is occult and the occasion voluntary, namely such as can easily and immediately be removed before absolution, absolution cannot be given, as is clear from the things said n. 1436. q. 1°. R. 2°, and that although the penitent brings extraordinary signs (except the cases concerning which in the cited place); for "experience shows too much that, absolution having been obtained, the occasion is afterward taken away with difficulty, and thus he very easily returns to the vomit." Except, according to the mind of St. Alphonsus, if the concubine lives outside the house. See n. 1436. q. 1°. R. 1°.

If 4) the concubinage is occult and the occasion necessary, one must attend to why it is necessary.

If a) it is necessary by reason of scandal or infamy, "commonly speaking he is not to be absolved.... The reason is that in prolonged concubinage it is morally impossible for the matter not to become known to others." I said: COMMONLY speaking; for "if otherwise grave damage of reputation cannot be avoided," in this "very rare case" he will be able to be absolved. "But in that case I say that it is altogether expedient that absolution at least be deferred, until the continence of the penitent is proved by experience; unless the case were that the penitent (otherwise sufficiently disposed, as is supposed) could not return any more; ... or if the necessity of communicating were imminent for avoiding positive infamy." The reason of the resolution is clear from the things said n. 1434. - Hence a priest who (which may it be absent!) would live most miserably in concubinage with a female relative or maidservant without any suspicion on the part of the people, will be able to be absolved if, by casting out the concubine forthwith and without delay in the case of grave illness, or immediately after he has returned home from Spiritual Exercises, that which is occult would become public with great scandal. Nevertheless he would have to resolve to dismiss the concubine as soon as he could do so without the aforesaid scandal. Cf. however n. 1437. 2°. - Resolve the same if in the time of a Mission there were question of dismissing a maidservant, in the case in which dismissal, made precisely at that time and immediately, would cause infamy.

If b) it is necessary by reason of damage in goods of fortune, a distinction must be made. Namely, he will be able to be absolved if there is question of damage which would make the man fall from his proper state, as if, e.g., a maidservant is very poor and a notable wage, e.g. of many years, is owed to her, which the master will not pay if she departs. The reason is that to fall from one's own state is a sacrifice so grave that practically it cannot have the character of a means for liberating the penitent from sins; for it is easier that he effectively cease from sins, while the occasion remains, than that he dismiss it with so intolerable a sacrifice. "But in these cases regularly" (i.e. except the cases just alleged under a) "absolution is also always to be deferred."

If c) it is necessary on account of complete impossibility of removing it, or because it is not possible to withdraw oneself from it without falling into another equal or worse one: recall the things said n. 1429. 4°, and the admonition concerning absolution regularly to be deferred, as in the preceding cases.

Query 3° Would one who was publicly thought to be a concubinary, and was not, be held to dismiss the woman on account of whom such an estimation came upon him?

Resp. 1°. If he gave occasion to the rumor neither by an evil work nor by one less right, he is not held; but it suffices that he make known that an opinion of this kind is false; for then the scandal, as calumniously excited, either will cease or will become Pharisaic.

Resp. 2°. If by a work either evil or less right he gave occasion to the opinion, separation, if it can be done without grave damage, must be enjoined; because anyone is held by natural right to remove scandal; but he will be able to accomplish this with difficulty without separation, since he gave cause to the scandal. If separation cannot be done without grave detriment, he is not held to it; since charity, by force of which he must remove scandal, does not oblige with so great an inconvenience; therefore it suffices that he strive to remove the scandal by exemplary life and by making known the truth.

Query 4° What if provision can be made for the salvation of the concubinaries through Matrimony?

Resp. 1° This remedy is expedient when either 1) the concubinary or the concubine labors under a certainly lethal disease; or 2) no unhappy outcome from such a Matrimony can be feared.

Resp. 2° That remedy ought to be employed in that twofold case, if it is necessary for legitimating offspring. - See the things to be said in the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 1539. q. 4°.

n. ¶1447.

1447. - Query. How should the confessor conduct himself as to those penitents whom he finds to have evil companions?

Resp. Let him examine: 1) whether there is truly question of a proximate occasion of mortal sin, concerning which there would undoubtedly be question, a) if the penitent were placed in grave danger of doing gravely depraved actions, whether with the companions themselves (e.g. by committing sodomy with them), or from their instigation (e.g. by going with them to brothels). Say the same if b) there were question of danger of having or hearing conversations which cannot be had or heard without mortal [sin]. Nevertheless in this case judgment would not have to be hastened, but first the quality of the conversations themselves would have to be examined, i.e. whether they are of several species (e.g. against Religion, against charity, against chastity, etc.), and whether they truly contain grave guilt. Recall the things said n. 491. I. 1°-5° and n. 492, where concerning the cases in which foul speaking is mortal.

But in the hypothesis that the conversations cannot be excused from mortal [sin], and there is truly question of a proximate occasion, let him examine: 2) whether this occasion is voluntary or necessary. Certainly it can be necessary, if companions of this kind are found in the same college, in the same workshop, etc. (and concerning these cases n. 1460-1465), or if those companions are his own neighbors, insofar as (as often happens in the country) it is morally impossible altogether to avoid encounters with them.

n. ¶1450.

1450. - Concerning the dangers of play see n. 1050 Note.

Query. Can one who, because of play, is placed in a proximate occasion of disorders, concerning which n. 1050 Note, render this occasion remote by employing cautions and moderation?

Resp. This depends on the circumstances. Sometimes indeed he will be able to do this; but if he is borne to playing by an excessively great passion, or if the quality of the companions or place almost necessarily draws him to play and to excesses, then no remedy remains except in the first hypothesis altogether to desert play, and in the second to desert those companions and that place.

n. ¶1451.

1451. - The dangers of taverns are: 1) drunkenness, and the disorders which ordinarily accompany drunkenness (see n. 243); 2) play, and the sins which are accustomed to arise from play; 3) neglect of prayer, of the obligation of Mass, indeed even of the Paschal precept; 4) lust; 5) quarrels, beatings, indeed, especially among us, homicides.

n. ¶1452.

1452. Questions. - Query 1° Can a tavern-goer render this occasion remote by abstaining from excesses, without entirely leaving the tavern?

Resp. "If the tavern-goer," says Berardi, "frequents the tavern without grave necessity, and if from a vice too inveterate he has contracted a great passion for drinking excessively, then in no way can he have hope of rendering this occasion remote without total separation. Indeed it is necessary besides to desert those companions who are accustomed to turn aside to the tavern, and sometimes, especially in the beginning of conversion, it will not be enough to wish to desert the companions, but it will also be necessary to place oneself in the impossibility of complying with their invitations: which can be done by handing over to the wife the money as soon as it has been earned; for thus, destitute of money, he is compelled to repel every temptation of turning aside to the tavern."

Query 2° Are there any causes which render this occasion of the tavern necessary?

Resp. Affirm., namely the necessity of one's own craft, e.g. because someone is a driver, broker, merchant, brewer, etc. (26) p. 421.

n. ¶1453.

1453. - Young men and girls loving one another and keeping company are placed in a proximate voluntary occasion - either a) without the intention of future Matrimony, - or b) without a founded hope of the same. Therefore these are to be treated in the manner which was said n. 1433 and 1436. q. 1°. - But if the intention and hope of Matrimony are present, distinguish. For either they visit one another in such a way that grave sin and its proximate danger are absent, or not. In the former case they can be absolved; in the latter they are to be treated as those who are placed in a proximate necessary occasion. See n. 1434, 1436. q. 2°.

But the cautions to be employed, lest the keeping company become sinful, or a proximate danger of sin, are: - 1) That they not dwell under the same roof; - 2) that one alone not be together with one alone, especially at that time (e.g. while the parents have gone out of the house), or in those places (e.g. in a field; in a solitary lane in night hours), where they are not observed by others. For these things, especially if they happen not by chance, but by counsel, will not happen except from an end of lust or with the greatest danger of lust. Wherefore one must act most severely with parents, and especially with the mother, and the grave obligation of vigilant custody and caution must be urged; - 3) that they not keep company without the knowledge or against the will of parents, or of those who are in the place of parents to them; for then most certainly they are going to visit one another secretly, and at those times and places at which they cannot be observed; - 4) that the keeping company not be protracted too long: wherefore a prudent confessor should leave no stone unmoved, so that he may avert from keeping company those between whom Matrimony cannot be contracted except after a long time, or is foreseen as having to be contracted after a long time; - 5) that the visits not be more frequent or more protracted than prudence, especially from the practice of the God-fearing, permits. Nevertheless the girl will be able to tolerate these (special cautions being opposed to the special danger which arises from them), if there is fear lest otherwise she be deprived of prosperous nuptials; - 6) that lovers not approach each other with proximate danger either of obscene touches, or of kisses, embraces, etc., prohibited under grave [sin] [see concerning the Sixth, n. 487. 488]; - 7) that lovers fortify themselves in a special way with spiritual helps, but chiefly with frequency of the Sacraments.

Let St. Alphonsus be heard concerning these things. "But generally speaking concerning young men and girls who love one another mutually, all these are not indiscriminately to be condemned for grave fault; but ordinarily I judge that with difficulty are they outside the proximate occasion of sinning lethally. This is too clear by experience; for out of a hundred adolescents scarcely two or three, in that occasion, are found immune from mortal [sins]."

Resolves. - 1° As soon as lovers frequently fall into mortal sin, they are to be treated as those who are placed in a proximate occasion, and therefore the occasion must either be altogether taken away, or from proximate be rendered remote. - It must be taken away, if in fact (all things considered) there is no hope that it will become remote, or it is not necessary, i.e. if without grave damage the lovers can renounce present Matrimony and await an occasion of another Matrimony.

But it is taken away either by renouncing Matrimony, or by contracting it, or by interrupting the visits until it is contracted.

It is rendered remote (supposing that it is necessary), if, the confessor taking care, they soon contract Matrimony, and meanwhile employ greater cautions, first of all diminish visits, are never alone, etc.

2° If lovers cannot converse except alone, suppose because the beloved woman is a maidservant or a widow living alone, they are placed in a necessary occasion from this cause at least, and are to be treated as such.

3° If the parents unjustly resist the Matrimony, the keeping company, provided nothing else stands in the way, is not illicit.

Note. To lovers only honorable kisses are lawful, according to the custom of the country, e.g. on arrival and departure.

n. ¶1454.

1454. - I say I. In any hypothesis a woman is held not to consent by the will, and therefore to abstain from every act of positive cooperation. The reason is clear of itself. - Hence in no hypothesis will it be lawful for her in any way to compose or accommodate herself to the shameful act, by removing, e.g., clothes, etc. - Hence also, if she foresees that violence will be inflicted on her, in the case, e.g., in which she would approach such a house alone, she must, if she can, not approach the same house alone.

I say II. The cases of this violation can be reduced to three.

The first case is when the violence is total and absolute, so that the woman physically cannot either cry out, or move herself, or in any way impede copula; and in this case she is held only to resist by the will; for no one is held to the impossible.

The second case is when without danger of notable damage, or infamy, or excessive shame she can cry out or resist extrinsically. The resolution of this case we gave n. 20. under 2°. § Women sin gravely, etc.

The third case is when she would indeed have hope of avoiding the foul congress by crying out or otherwise resisting extrinsically, but only with danger of notable damage to herself (e.g. of death), or of infamy, or of excessive shame.

Concerning this case I note the following:

1) As regards the danger of infamy to be feared from crying out, it is necessary that there be question of true infamy, e.g. of the danger lest a girl be held as corrupted; for often not infamy, but rather honor and praise comes to a woman crying out that she may preserve her honesty.

2) Let the things said n. 462. q. 2° and q. 3° and n. 20 under 2° be recalled, where we hand down the doctrine of St. Alphonsus concerning this case.

3) Lugo notes: "In practice violent oppression, and without fault on the part of the woman, must be believed with difficulty. For it is very rare that, if she wishes, she cannot in some way resist and impede violation; but on account of ... weakness of soul, and sometimes also on account of a hidden affection of lust, which they are altogether ashamed to manifest, they consent."

Nevertheless it can be believed with less difficulty that the oppression of white women by Black men, such as sometimes happens in this region, was altogether unwilling; for they are accustomed to abhor Black men.

From the things said you resolve: 1° If a woman were shamefully touched by a man with whom she is making a journey in a carriage, certainly she is held to resist in the better way in which she can; but, outside the case of proximate danger of consent, she would not be held to throw herself down from the carriage, while it is moving swiftly, with very grave danger of breaking her bones.

2° A woman permitting herself to be touched by another with a touch which commonly is judged modest, as taking, handling of the hand, embrace and kisses according to the custom of the country, does not sin, unless it is established to her that it is done from a depraved affection; indeed even in this case she will be able to bear herself permissively, if otherwise she would inject suspicion of infamy, or others would be scandalized, which nevertheless certainly is not to be feared when those touches are done openly.

n. ¶1464.

1464. - Some arts are not only dangerous, but altogether iniquitous. Such are all superstitious arts, e.g. the art of healings, magical art, divinatory art, etc., to which modern animal magnetism and spiritism are reduced. Such also are the usurious art, shameful pimping, etc. No one does not see that arts of this kind can be made honorable by no reason, and must altogether be deserted. But other arts are not iniquitous per se, but only dangerous. Thus soldiers are exposed to many dangers of sinning because of blasphemies and fornications which are very common to them; likewise merchants and brokers because of frauds, perjuries, etc.; likewise physicians and surgeons because of the treatment of women; likewise farmers because of shameful conversations, bestialities, etc.; likewise carriage-drivers because of blasphemies, drunkennesses, etc.; likewise almost all artisans because of immodest or impious conversations, etc. Say the same concerning various offices in which many dangers are found, as happens, e.g., in the office of Confessor, Advocate, Judge, Magistrate, etc.

n. ¶1465.

1465. - Query. Is someone held to desert an art not iniquitous per se, but gravely dangerous for himself?

Resp. Neg., if either 1) the gravity of the danger can easily be destroyed by the penitent through other means, e.g. by changing not the art, but the workshop; or 2) there is a grave reason for not deserting the art, and the penitent is prepared for rendering the danger remote, and for undergoing sacrifices the more grave in proportion as the ruin is greater to the danger of which he is exposed.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 47 passages

Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Fifth Part: On the Subject…, Question Two: On the Requi…, Article II: On Occasionaries

n. 663.

663. An occasion of sin is an external circumstance of a thing or person, furnishing facility for sinning and thus inviting to sin, which constitutes a danger of sinning. Hence it is distinguished a) from internal principles which incline to sin, such as bodily complexion, passions, concupiscence, and bad habits; b) from the danger of sinning, which can be both internal and external and is broader: namely, it is an impulse toward sinning which, if it comes from a person or from an external thing, is called an occasion; if it is from within, it is called a simple danger, so that every occasion is a danger, but not every danger is an occasion; c) from scandal, which denotes an occasion of sin from the external action or word or deed of another; hence, although an occasion of sin is present in every scandal, nevertheless not every occasion is scandal.

n. 663.

Therefore this is constituted at the same time from two things: 1) on the part of the external object, from the impulse and opportunity alluring to sin; 2) on the part of the subject, from the propensity or internal inclination toward sinning.

664. Occasion is divided: A. By reason of influence, it is remote or proximate, according as it has only a certain force of alluring to sin, or also a great force; or according as it constitutes a slight danger of sinning, or a grave danger, so that one who exposes himself, if not more often, at least frequently or several times, will sin.

The gravity of the danger can be recognized by the confessor in a threefold way:

from the experience of the penitent or frequency of relapse, if someone previously placed in the same circumstances has for the most part, or at least frequently, sinned; for example, if he sinned ten times in a month with a maidservant, or even if he rarely visits a person and sins with her each time;

from what commonly happens, namely when experience is lacking and other special indications cannot be had from the person of the penitent himself; then the rule is to be applied: that which is commonly an occasion of sin for others in the same circumstances is presumed to be such also for this person until the contrary is proved; for example, if a young man prone to lust enters a brothel, or if a younger girl, light in mind and weak in will, dwells for a long time alone with a master vividly soliciting her;

from the circumstances and character of the penitent, especially from his known fragility, although he himself has rarely been in the occasion, or has once been in it and has not sinned.

But since the danger can be more or less grave and certain, the rules for the different case will have to be applied more strictly or more mildly.

B. By reason of the person, it is absolute and according to itself, or relative and by accident, according as, considering the fragility of men, it constitutes danger for all, - or only for a determined person, by reason of his own fragility and particular disposition.

Namely, an occasion proximate per se is that in which men commonly sin more often; - by accident it is that which, although it is not proximate with respect to others, nevertheless is proximate with respect to some person, because he has frequently fallen in it, or because his fall is prudently feared. Thus the reading of a very obscene book is absolutely proximate, as are concubinage, lying down with a person of the other sex, a fixed gaze upon a very obscene thing; - on the contrary, entering a tavern is relatively proximate for a drunkard, commerce for an unjust man, conversation with a woman for a lustful man, a lengthy conversation with a beautiful girl for an impure young man, dances for a fragile young man, the office of surgeon or confessor by reason of special weakness, etc. Hence not only can an occasion absolutely slight be relatively grave, but also an occasion absolutely grave can be relatively slight for someone, if he is little moved by reason of some special circumstance, frigidity, habituation, piety, or if he has specially fortified himself with cautions and efficacious aid.

C. By reason of duration, it is continuous and in being, which is present and always or habitually accompanies a man, or which at least morally is continuously present without being sought; - and interrupted and in becoming, not in being, which is absent, and only at intervals occurs or is sought.

Thus continuous is the detention of another's goods or of a benefice accepted simoniacally, retention of a bad book or obscene picture, concubinage or dwelling with a maidservant with whom you are accustomed to sin, assiduous frequenting of a person at your home, etc.; on the contrary, interrupted is entrance into a brothel, or into a tavern for a drunkard, access to a banquet, bad companionship, conversation with a mistress who does not live under the same roof, play for one who is accustomed to blaspheme while playing, frequenting a girl, taverns, dances, etc.

D. On the part of the cause, an occasion is either voluntary or necessary, according as it can easily be avoided without grave inconvenience, or cannot be removed either physically or morally.

Physically, indeed, if in no way it can be dismissed, as if someone is in prison or on a ship with an occasion of sinning, or in the moment of death and does not have time to cast it out; morally, if the occasion cannot be dismissed without sin, or grave scandal, or grave danger of falling into an equal or worse evil (as if a servant would quarrel with peaceful companions such as he would scarcely find in service), or great detriment to the goods of life, reputation, or fortune (even for a rich man), such as loss of office (for example of a physician, advocate), employment, state, fortune. Thus, for example, a husband with respect to his wife; a son or daughter of the family who has an occasion at home; parents for whom offspring furnish an occasion of anger; a student who cannot leave a school or college; the office of physician, merchant, military service; conversation with a girl for entering marriage.

665. Principle. There is by its nature a grave obligation upon each one, as far as lies in him, of removing the proximate occasion of sin.

It is proved: One who knowingly and willingly remains without sufficient reason in a proximate occasion freely wills the occasion in which he will probably sin, and by that very fact implicitly wills sin, and consequently sins and is unworthy of absolution: for he does not have an efficacious will or purpose of sinning no more, but by the fact that he does not avoid a grave danger when he can, he is convicted of loving the sin whose danger he loves. - Or, on the contrary: One who must absolutely will the end must also will the means morally necessary for that end; not indeed doubtful means, but certain or more certain ones. Therefore a man who must absolutely will to avoid sins is bound to avoid grave danger or to remove the proximate occasion, which is the morally necessary and more certain means for this.

Hence a) the Church has condemned the opposite doctrine, namely Innocent XI, propositions 61, 62, and 63, and Alexander VII, proposition 41;

b) the Scriptures also generally warn: "He who loves danger will perish in it" (Ecclus. 3:27); "If thy right eye scandalize thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee: for it is expedient for thee that one of thy members should perish, rather than thy whole body be cast into hell" (Mt. 5:29).

Hence one who remains in a proximate occasion is bound under grave obligation to remove physically the external object alluring to mortal sin; or, if this cannot be done, at least morally, namely by opportune remedies by which the proclivity to evil is healed; - otherwise he is incapable of absolution, because he does not wish to fulfill a grave obligation and lacks the purpose of not sinning for the future. And he commits a sin of the same species as that to which he knows he exposes himself, and so much the graver as that sin is graver and its danger more proximate (I, n. 177).

666. An opinion not to be approved. - A few authors have said that the only proximate occasion to be abandoned is that which constitutes a more probable or morally certain danger of sinning, or in which men sin more frequently or almost certainly; that this must be left behind is evidently demonstrated by the argument brought above. It does not appear, they say, why one sins at least gravely who also has a solid reason for thinking that he will not sin gravely in this occasion which he approaches: for he does not choose a thing which by moral necessity carries sin with it. Thus, for example, Genicot, Theol. Mor. II, p. 372, after Ballerini, De Pecc., n. 434 ff., and Noldin, Theol. Mor. III, n. 399.

Falsely, however. For:

When there is question not of the mere licitness and illicitness of acting, but of an end absolutely to be obtained, we cannot choose a merely probable part, indeed not even a more probable, less safe part, but that which is safer must be done. Now, to avoid formal sin is an end absolutely to be attained. Therefore we cannot expose ourselves to a grave danger, even a merely probable one, of sinning mortally, but we must do the safer thing and leave behind the occasion which includes probable danger. The danger of formal sin before all things is absolutely to be fled.

One who exposes himself to a probable danger of sinning, although perhaps only in individual acts, nevertheless at some time probably, indeed certainly, will fall, which must be avoided by absolute necessity; and therefore as often as he exposes himself to that probable danger, so often he fails against the end to be obtained, of avoiding sin, because on each occasion he rashly exposes himself to grave danger of sinning. But this is a mortal sin from its kind; hence he sins mortally.

One who without reason exposes himself to a merely probable danger of bodily death sins gravely; so also one who exposes himself to a merely probable danger of death of the soul, or of mortal sin. Nor can he expect the special help of grace which he needs, who rashly and without cause exposes himself to the danger of sinning.

Hence for a relatively proximate occasion there is not required an absolute frequency of falls, or a number notable in itself, but a relative frequency suffices according to the number of times in which someone has been exposed to the occasion. Thus if in twelve visits someone is accustomed to sin six or five times; likewise if someone, visiting a girl daily, sins ten times in a month; or if they meet every Sunday and fall twelve times in a year or somewhat more; likewise if for two years someone visited a woman only three or four times in a year and almost always sinned with her; indeed if for three years he visited only once in a year and sinned as often as he visited.

667. Practical rules can therefore be established:

A. One who remains in a voluntary and continuous proximate occasion regularly cannot be absolved unless he first proposes to remove the occasion and also removes it.

For since removal of the occasion ordinarily is arduous, there is a proximate danger of breaking the purpose; and therefore if the occasion is not taken away before absolution, the penitent will easily deceive himself (falsely persuading himself that he will resist temptations), so that the purpose is rendered inefficacious and the occasion is not removed. Hence a penitent who, knowing this, would expose himself to this danger would be at least suspected concerning disposition, concerning which therefore moral certitude could often not be had. For why does this man make confession if he does not remove the occasion? And then the confessor, who would expose him to such danger, would sin against his office of physician.

Except, when public scandal is lacking:

if the penitent from ignorance or lightness of mind is not conscious that he remains in a proximate occasion, or that the obligation of removing it is grave, and the confessor foresees that admonition will be useless or harmful: then provisionally he is to be left in good faith, and gradually instructed concerning the occasion to be fled, which he will understand better if by experience of his own fragility he has learned that he frequently sins because of it;

or the occasion can easily be dismissed, for example, a bad book, a thing of another detained, provided restitution is spontaneously promised;

or the penitent manifests extraordinary signs of sorrow and purpose, for example, he has already sent a message to the maidservant that she is to leave the house, or has hired a new maidservant;

or a grave cause urges, so that a previous removal of the occasion would do more harm; for example, an imminent danger of death, great difficulty of returning for a long time and of approaching another confessor, as easily happens if the penitent comes from a distant place, danger of infamy or scandal, as easily happens if a sacrament is to be received, grave danger of spiritual harm, for example alienation from the sacrament.

In these last cases the penitent must be admonished that he will not obtain absolution any more unless he has stood by his promises; but if he has been admonished uselessly, he is to be held as a relapser.

B. One who remains in a voluntary and interrupted proximate occasion, for example by frequenting games, taverns, bad societies, can be absolved several times, provided he firmly proposes to beware of it; - but if he has promised several times and no amendment appears, he is to be held and treated as a relapser, and generally, unless perhaps he furnishes extraordinary signs of disposition, absolution is to be deferred until he has actually left behind the occasion.

For he is judged disposed and therefore is to be absolved, unless a) contrary signs are present, as easily happens if he has promised several times and is already habituated, and generally this is gathered from the absence of all amendment; - or b) unless it is better to send him away, with his own consent, so that he may remove the occasion more promptly and firmly.

C. One who remains in a necessary proximate occasion regularly can be absolved, provided he is truly disposed by opportune and efficacious remedies to render the occasion remote; - but if he has promised several times and no amendment appears, he is to be dismissed until he has amended himself, unless perhaps he shows altogether extraordinary signs of disposition.

For on the one hand an occasion is not sin nor does it induce a necessity of sinning, but it can be overcome, although with difficulty, especially with the grace of God; on the other hand no one is held to the impossible, and therefore one who is in a necessary occasion undergoes the danger unwillingly rather than loves and seeks it and exposes himself to the occasion. Hence, if he applies opportune means and humbly asks the grace of victory, he can hope for it from God, of whom the Apostle says: "He will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able" (1 Cor. 10:13).

Hence: 1) He can be absolved, provided that a) the occasion is not evil in itself; b) a just cause is present, such as physical inability, or a sin otherwise to be committed, or the danger of an equal or greater sin, or the spiritual good of himself or of his neighbor, or great loss in the temporal goods of life, reputation, or fortune; this cause is required to be the greater, the greater the danger is; c) there is hope of a good outcome, namely, of overcoming the temptation; and d) the penitent is prepared to apply sufficient means.