Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article Seven. Concerning Absolving Occasionaries.
397. Notion of Occasion. An occasion of sin is generally defined as an external circumstance which offers a man an opportunity of sinning and allures him to sinning.
a. A circumstance can be a thing, as a depraved book, or a person, as a mistress for a lover. b. It differs from the danger of sinning; therefore an occasion does not name an interior inclination, whatever it may be, to sin, whether this is external or internal; wherefore danger has a broader range than an occasion of sinning. c. Two things must be considered in an occasion: the convenience of sinning which it offers to the man, and the impulse to sinning; therefore an occasion agrees with scandal, but in scandal the matter is considered more as it impels to sinning, whereas in an occasion it is considered more as it offers the opportunity of sinning. d. Two things concur to constitute an occasion: on the part of the object, the impulse and opportunity toward sin, and on the part of the subject, propensity and inclination toward sin.
398. Division of Occasion. 1. One occasion is remote, another proximate. That is called remote in which the danger of sinning is slight, in which therefore men for the most part do not sin; that is called proximate in which the danger of sinning is grave, in which therefore men for the most part sin.
An occasion is called proximate or remote from its conjunction with sin; and with moral certitude accompanying sin it is called proximate, otherwise remote. Greater or lesser conjunction of the occasion with sin is chiefly taken from the frequency of lapses of him who is found again in the occasion. But how great this frequency ought to be in order that the occasion can be called proximate, or morally necessarily joined with sin, cannot easily be determined; hence it is that theologians define a proximate occasion in diverse ways. For some say that the proximate occasion is that in which men always or almost always sin; others, that in which they never or almost never abstain from sin; others, that in which men sin for the most part; others, that in which men frequently sin.1 It can be affirmed that an occasion is proximate when moral certitude is present that a man in it will sin, or when solid probability is lacking that a man in it will avoid sin. But whether moral certitude of sinning is present in a particular case, or whether it is lacking, must be judged: a. from the frequency of relapse known by experience, whether the penitent has already been in the occasion and has sinned in it for the most part; b. from the character of the penitent, whether perhaps from vehemence of temptation and from the known fragility of the penitent it ought by experience to be judged that he will almost always sin in this occasion; c. from common contingency, for frequently the gravity of danger must be judged from this rule: what for others in the same circumstances is a proximate occasion, will also be proximate for this one.
A proximate occasion is either proximate absolutely or per se, or per accidens or relatively. The former is that which commonly for all men brings in a proximate danger of sinning, as the sight of a shameful thing or obscene conversations; the latter is that which brings in a proximate danger of sinning only for some determined man on account of his own fragility, as access to a tavern.
A proximate occasion is either voluntary or necessary: voluntary is that which can easily be avoided or can be avoided with slight inconvenience; necessary is that which cannot be removed either physically or morally; physically, if someone, e.g., is enclosed in the same prison with an occasion of sinning; morally, if the occasion cannot be dismissed except with great difficulty or with great detriment in the goods of life or fortune or reputation.
a. In practice, one must not easily believe, but prudently inquire into the truth of the matter, if one constituted in an occasion pretends that he can dismiss the occasion only with great harm; for affection for sin often increases the difficulty of removing the occasion.
b. To form a judgment whether the harm which someone ought to undergo in order to flee or dismiss the occasion is truly notable, the circumstances of the persons must be attended to, and this must be measured according to the diverse estimate of fearful persons from the common estimate of men. St. Alphonsus notes (n. 455) that a moderately wealthy man is not excused if he refuses to suffer a loss of one hundred ducats (c. 800 cor.) to abandon the occasion.
- A proximate occasion is either continuous or present, or interrupted or not present: continuous, or in esse, is that which someone always has with him, which he always has to seek, such as a free obscene or shameful statue which someone keeps at home; interrupted, or not in esse, is that which he does not indeed have with him, but can easily find, as a tavern for the drunkard, a mistress for the lover, gambling for him who is accustomed to blaspheme by gambling.
1 Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, sect. 10, n. 148 ss.
399. Concerning Absolving Occasionaries in a Free Proximate Occasion. 1. A penitent who does not wish to avoid a proximate occasion of gravely sinning, which he can easily avoid, cannot be absolved: for he who does not wish to avoid a proximate occasion of this kind does not have an efficacious will not to sin any more, and therefore is not disposed for obtaining absolution, since the will itself of remaining in a proximate occasion is a grave sin.
It is not licit to admit the excuse by which penitents promise that, with remedies employed for not sinning, they will render a proximate occasion remote, when they can avoid it without difficulty; for it is not licit rashly to expose oneself to a danger of sinning which can easily be avoided, but it must plainly be fled.
- He who promises that he will abandon a free proximate occasion, whether the occasion is continuous or interrupted, can per se be absolved, provided the confessor can prudently believe his promise. For he who is judged sufficiently disposed can per se always be absolved; indeed, ordinarily, absolution granted to him will profit more than its delay, because the grace of the sacrament will help him in executing his purpose.
Nevertheless, if, having already often been absolved, he has not stood by his promises, but has relapsed in the occasion, he is not to be absolved unless he has first dismissed the occasion; for the confessor ought rightly to suspect that he does not have a firm purpose. Further, even if he could be judged disposed, prudence persuades that by this means of delayed absolution the weak will of the penitent be helped in executing the purpose, especially if the occasion is in esse. Nevertheless, since the penitent can also be truly disposed after repeated relapse, absolutely speaking he is not prohibited from being absolved if a reason urges for granting absolution again before he has dismissed the occasion, provided he is seriously sorry and proposes amendment.
There are those who in this case establish the following rule concerning a voluntary proximate occasion in esse: the penitent cannot be absolved, not even the first time, unless he has first dismissed the occasion, even if he is disposed.1 This rule is clear if it is stated concerning a strict obligation of deferring or denying absolution; for it seems hard, since the penitent is supposed sufficiently disposed and denial of absolution has the nature of a remedy by which relapse is prevented. But the confessor cannot be obligated to prescribe a remedy which is not altogether necessary, nor does he have the right to enjoin such a remedy. Yet it could sometimes be prudently advised to the penitent that absolution be deferred already at once the first time until the occasion has in fact been dismissed, where namely the delay of absolution is judged to be profitable to the penitent, as if there is question of dismissing a concubine.
1 St. Alphonsus, n. 454.
400. Concerning Absolving Occasionaries in a Necessary Proximate Occasion. 1. He who does not wish to abandon a proximate occasion, morally necessary, of gravely sinning can be absolved, provided he promises that he will employ remedies for not sinning. For one constituted in a necessary occasion must be judged disposed if he is willing to employ suitable remedies for not sinning, since there does not exist an absolute obligation of abandoning the occasion, as not voluntary, but only a hypothetical obligation, either of employing remedies or of abandoning the occasion.
a. Remedies by which a proximate occasion can be rendered remote are: diligent prayer, more frequent use of the sacraments, daily renewal of the purpose of not sinning anymore, not being alone with a woman alone, fleeing from the sight of the accomplice, etc.1
b. How great the inconvenience ought to be which excuses from abandoning a proximate occasion cannot be defined by a general rule, but must be determined in a particular case by the prudent judgment of the confessor, diligently considering the particular cases in which approved authors think that one constituted in a necessary proximate occasion must be absolved, so that he can form judgment in this matter.2
- If one constituted in a necessary proximate occasion after several confessions returns with the same sins without any amendment, it is not absolutely to be demanded that he abandon the occasion, but he can still be absolved if he seriously wishes to employ means by which the occasion becomes remote instead of proximate; for when this will has been posited, he is sufficiently disposed, even if he does not wish to remove the occasion. Whether in a particular case dismissal of the occasion is to be demanded, or rather the use of means is to be earnestly recommended, must be left to the prudence of the confessor. Generally it can be said that it is not to be demanded that the occasion be dismissed if it is much more difficult to dismiss the occasion than to avoid sin by employing remedies.
In this case several authors with St. Alphonsus (n. 457) establish this rule: the penitent cannot be absolved unless he abandons the occasion, even if he must undergo a very grave inconvenience, the loss of goods, reputation, and life itself, since with him no hope of amendment appears; the words of Salvatori are to be applied: if your eye scandalizes you, etc.3 Others, however, think that one must not proceed all the way to this point; for from the fact that after many relapses no amendment has followed, it is not to be inferred that no hope of amendment remains, but only this: either that the proposed means were not sufficient, or that they were not employed. But if this latter is established, the penitent must be seriously warned either that he diligently employ the remedies or abandon the occasion, even with very grave inconvenience.
1 Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 151. St. Alphonsus, n. 455.
2 Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 151. St. Alphonsus, n. 455. Berardi, De recidivis et occasionariis II, p. 98 ss.
3 Mark 9:46.